

THE
CALCUTTA REVIEW

An Illustrated Monthly

THIRD SERIES

Volume CXLII

January—March,
1957

PUBLISHED BY THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

First Series--1844

New Series—1913

Third Series—1921

THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

JANUARY—MARCH, 1957

Vol. 142: Nos. 1—3

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JANUARY, 1957

[No. 1

BENGAL (1750-1800)

HEMENDRA PRASAD GHOSH

CHAPTER VII

Social Condition

Society in Bengal during the second half of the eighteenth century is to be divided into two parts—The European and the Indian. The Indian society again must be divided into the society in Calcutta and that in the mofussil.

The European society really meant the society of the English practically centered in Calcutta—though the English had business centres scattered all over the Province.

Social Life of the English

The social life of the English was thus described by Hamilton :—
“ Most gentlemen and ladies in Bengal live both splendidly and pleasantly, the forenoons being dedicated to business, and after dinner to rest, and the evening to recreate themselves in chaises and palankins in the fields, or to gardens, or by water in their budgeroes which is a convenient boat that goes swiftly with the force of oars. On the rivers sometimes there is the diversion of fishing or fowling, or both; and before night they make friendly visits to one another when pride and contention do not spoil society, which too often they do among the ladies, as discord and faction do among the men. And although the ‘Conscript Fathers’ of the colony disagree in many points among themselves, yet they all agree in oppressing strangers who are consigned to them, not suffering them to buy or sell their goods at the most advantageous market, but of the Governor and his Council, who fix

their own prices, high or low, as seemeth best to their wisdom and discretion; and it is a crime hardly pardonable for a private merchant to go to Hughly, to inform himself of the current prices of goods, although the liberty of buying and selling is entirely taken from him before."

The English in Bengal were prone to eat too freely even during the summer months. Mrs. Eliza Fay wrote from Calcutta on the 29th August, 1780 :—

"We were very frequently told in England, you know, that the heat in Bengal destroyed appetite. I must own that I never yet saw any proof of that; on the contrary, I cannot help thinking that I never saw an equal quantity of victuals consumed. We dine too at two o'clock in the very heat of the day. At this moment Mr. Fay is looking out with a hawk's eye for his dinner; and, though still much of an invalid, I have no doubt of being able to pick a bit myself. I will give you our bill of fare and the general prices of things. A soup, a roast fowl, curry and rice, a mutton pie, a fore-quarter of lamb, a rice pudding, tarts, very good cheese, fresh churned butter, fine bread, excellent Madeira (that is expensive, but eatables are very cheap). A whole sheep costs but 2 rupees, a lamb one rupee, six good fowls or ducks ditto, twelve pigeons ditto, twelve pounds of bread ditto, two pounds of butter ditto, and a joint of veal ditto."¹

It was customary to keep *Mussalchees* on torch-bearers to accompany the palankins after nightfall. The custom had not died out when Valentia visited Calcutta in 1803. In his account of Calcutta we find :—

"The usual mode of travelling is by palanquins but most gentlemen have carriages adapted to the climate, and horses, of which the breed is much improved in late years. It is universally the custom to drive out between sun-set and dinner. The *mussalchees*, when it grows dark, go out to meet their masters on their return, and run before them, at the rate of full eight miles an hour, and the numerous lights moving along the Esplanade produce a singular and pleasing effect."²

Then Valentia mentioned facts about the dress worn by and the houses occupied by his countrymen in Calcutta :—

"It was formerly the fashion for gentlemen to dress in white jackets on all occasions, which were well suited to the country; but being thought too much an undress for public occasions, they are now laid aside for English cloth. The architecture of all the houses is

¹ Mrs. Fay's, *Letters from India* (a new edition, 1908).

² George, Viscount Valentia—*Voyages and Travels*, Vol. I.

Grecian, which I think by no means the best adapted to the country, as the pillars which are generally used in the verandahs, require too great an elevation to keep out the sun, during the greater part of the morning and evening, although the heat is excessive at both those periods. In the rainy season it is still worse, as the wet beats in, and renders them totally useless. The more confined Hindoo or Gothic architecture would surely be preferable.”³

In the midst of pleasure, pomp and eagerness to become rich religion was at a low ebb and morality uncared for.

Forbes wrote thus :—

“ These people (the Indians) in their own artless expressive style often asked me this important question—*Master, when an Englishman dies, does he think that he shall go to his God?* My answer in the affirmative generally produced a reply to this effect—Your countrymen, master, seem to take very little trouble about that business; they choose a smooth path and scatter roses on every side. Other nations are guided by strict rules and solemn injunctions, in those serious engagements, where the English seem thoughtless and unconcerned. The Hindoos constantly perform the ceremonies and sacrifices at the Dwai; the Mahamedans go through their stated prayers and ablution, at the mosques; the Parsees suffer not the sacred fires to be extinguished, nor neglect to worship in their temple. You call yourselves Christians, so do the Roman Catholics who abound in India. They daily frequent their churches, fast and pray and do many penances; the English alone appear unconcerned about an event of the greatest importance.”⁴

In 1772 Mr. Shore (Lord Teignmouth) wrote from Calcutta to his mother—“I believe I before mentioned to you the too great prevalence of immorality in this settlement.” In 1775 he observed, in another letter, “Dancing, riding, hunting, shooting are now our employments. In proportion as the inhabitants of this settlement have increased, we are become much less sociable and hospitable than formerly.” To this list of amusements he might have added gambling and horse-racing, drinking and fighting duels.

A society which boasted of men like Clive and Hastings as its shining lights could not but be ill-equipped for decency and morality. In his elaborate article on the English in India Sir John Kaye wrote as follows :—

“ It would indeed be difficult to imagine anything much worse than the state of Society, during the administration of Warren Hastings. The earlier adventurers may have committed more heinous

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Forbes—*Oriental Memoirs*.

crime, and been participators in scenes of more offensive debauchery; but in those more remote times, the English in India were too few and too scattered—their habits were too migratory a character—to admit of the formation of anything worthy to be spoken of as Society. At a later period, affairs were so much in a transition-state; there was so much of the turmoil and excitement of war, that the English might be properly described as living in a great encampment; their manners were more the manners of the camp, than of the drawing-room and of the boudoir; and some time necessarily elapsed before affairs settled themselves down permanently into a state of social quiescence; if that can be called settlement, where the days appear, with nauseous obtrusiveness, on the surface. There was certainly Society in the chief presidency, during the administration of Warren Hastings; but in candour we must acknowledge it to have been most offensively bad Society. Hastings himself, whatever may have been his character as a political ruler, had no title to our admiration as a moral man. He was living, for years, with the wife of another, who lacking the spirit of a cock-chaffer, connived with all imaginable *sang-froid* at the transfer of his wife's person to the possession of the Nabob; and when the convenient laws of a foreign land, deriving no sanction from Christianity, formally severed the bond, which had long been practically disregarded, the Governor-General had the execrably bad taste to celebrate his marriage with the elegant adulteress in a style of the utmost magnificence, attended with open display and festival rejoicing. What was to be expected from the body of Society, when the head was thus morally diseased? Francis was a hundred-fold worse than Hastings. The latter was weak under a pressure of temptation; he was not disposed to 'pay homage to virtue', by throwing a cloak over his vice; and did not sufficiently consider the bad influence which his conduct was calculated to exercise over Society at large. In him, it is true there was a sad want of principle; but in Francis an evil principle was ever at work. His vices were all active vices—deliberate, ingenious, laborious. His lust was like his malice, un-impulsive, studious, given to subtle contrivances, demanding the exercise of high intellectual ability. When he addressed himself to the deliberate seduction of Madame Grand, he brought all the mental energy and subtlety of matured manhood to bear upon the unsuspecting virtue of an unexperienced girl of sixteen. Here indeed were leaders of Society not only corrupting the morals, but disturbing the peace of the presidency. The very members of the Supreme Council, in those days, could not refrain from shooting at each other. Barwell and Clivering went out. The latter had accused the former of dishonesty;

and the former in return had called his associate a 'liar'. They met; but the contest was a bloodless one.⁵ Not so that between Hastings and Francis. The Governor-General shot the Councillor through the body, and thus wound up, in this country, to be renewed in another, the long struggle between the two antagonists. Such was the Council. The Supreme Court exercised no more benign influence over the morals of Society. Sir Elijah Impey, the Chief Justice, *was a model of rapacity and injustice*—corrupt as he was cruel—and others not far below him in rank were equally near him in infamy. Viewing the whole picture, with an unprejudiced eye, it is assuredly a most disheartening one. In 1780 was published the first Indian newspaper—*Hickey's Gazette*. If any one desire to satisfy himself, beyond the reach of all inward questionings, that what we have stated in general terms of the low moral tone of Society, at that period, is unexaggerated truth, let him turn over the pages of that same *Hickey's Gazette*. Society must have been very bad to have tolerated such a paper. It is full of infamous scandal—in some places, so disguised as to be almost unintelligible to the reader of the present day, but in others set forth broadly and unmistakably; and with a relish not to be concealed. We find it difficult to bring forward illustrative extracts . . .⁶. The most significant passages are too coarse for quotation⁷

In the English society of Calcutta of the time we are confronted either by perilous and importunate courtesans with an expression either vile or coarse, incapable of shame or of remorse or by another set "skilled in artifices and whimpering, voluptuous and coquette, with neither the nobleness of virtue nor the greatness of crime."⁸

The history of the career of Mrs. Hastings is well known. Yet because she had become the Governor's wife she was treated with respect. In 1780 Mrs. Fay wrote in a letter:—

"I have delivered my letter of introduction to Mrs. Hastings She resides at Belvedere house, about, I believe, five miles

⁵ M. Grand tells us that Barwell would not return Clivering's fire . . . "His antagonist suspecting this delicacy arose from a growing attachment which he observed to prevail between Mr. Barwell and Miss Chavering (Lady Napier) called out loudly to him to take the chance of hitting him, for, in whatever manner their contest might terminate, the General added, Mr. Barwell could rest impressed that he had no chance of ever being allied to his family." Mr. Barwell, however, was resolute, and the seconds interfered.

⁶ Hunter in his *The Thackerays in India* describes the contents of the paper as "nauseous mixtures of dullness and indecency" and comments—"Scurrility and servility, indeed, long seemed the only two notes known to Calcutta journalism: Who could have foreseen that those cat-callings of bugle-boys, practising their prentice wind-pipes in some out-of-the-way angle of the ramparts, were destined to grow into clear trumpet notes which should arouse sleeping camps to great constitutional struggles, and sound the charge of political parties in battle?"

⁷ *The Calcutta Review*, 1844.

⁸ Taine—*History of English Literature*.

from Calcutta The lady was fortunately at home, and had three of her most intimate friends with her on a visit Mrs. Hastings herself, it is easy to perceive at the first glance, is far superior to the generality of her sex, though her appearance is rather eccentric, owing to the circumstance of her beautiful auburn hair being disposed in ringlets throwing an air of elegance, nay almost infantine simplicity, over the countenance, most admirably adapted to heighten the effect intended to be produced. Her whole dress too, though studiously becoming, being at variance with our present modes, which are certainly not so, perhaps, for that reason, she has chosen to depart from them. As a foreigner, you know she may be excused for not strictly conforming to our fashions; besides her rank in the settlement sets her above the necessity of studying anything but the whim of the moment. It is easy to perceive how fully sensible she is of her own consequence. She is indeed raised to a 'giddy height' and expects to be treated with the most profound respect and deference."⁹.

The romance of M. Grand "the fair daughter of the Capitaine du Port at Chandernagar, whose seduction cost Sir Philip Francis fifty thousands rupees in 1779, and who ended her chequered career in 1835 as Princesse de Talleyrand" exhibits the sordidness of the Society. It reminds one of the remark of Taine—"When we scratch the covering of an Englishman's morality, the brute appears in its violence and its deformity. One of the English statesmen said that with the French an unchained mob could be led by words of humanity and honour, but that in England it was necessary, in order to appease them, to throw to them raw flesh."¹⁰

Coel Catherine Werlee was brought to Chandernagar by her father. Her bewitching beauty—even when she was a girl, attracted attention. Mr. George Francois Grand arrived at Calcutta and was kindly received by Warren Hastings. Hastings was in the habit of paying visits to Sukhsagar, the sugar-cane plantation of his friend, Mr. Crofts, and to Chandernagar where he used to stay with the French Governor. It was at the latter place that Grand met Miss Werlee and became enamoured of her. They were married in July, 1777 when the bride was "about three months short of fifteen years of age, having been born in the Danish Settlement of Tranquabar on the Coromandel Coast, on November 21, 1761."¹¹

The Grands removed to Calcutta. The course of events went smoothly for some time. On the 23rd November, 1778 there was a ball

⁹ Mrs. Fay's *Letters from India*.

¹⁰ Taine—*History of English Literature*.

¹¹ Busteed—*Echoes from Old Calcutta*.

in the house of Philip Francis, a member of the Council. Here Mrs. Grand attracted the attention of the host, to whom nature had been prodigal in her gifts. "In addition to his rare mental endowments he was remarkable for an exterior described as 'strikingly handsome'. His contemporaries speak of his tall, erect, well-proportioned figure; his classical features; his small delicately moulded ears and shapely hands etc."¹²

He had come to Calcutta alone—leaving his wife in England. He tried every means to gain Mrs. Grand's heart; but found it difficult to get access to her. The Garden House in which the Grands lived was well guarded. At last an opportunity presented itself on the 8th December, 1778 when there was a gathering at Barwell's house at which it was absolutely necessary that Mr. Grand should be present. So he left for Barwell's house at about 9 P.M. What happened is thus narrated by Mr. Grand himself¹³ :—

"On the 8th of December, 1778, I went out of my house, about 9 o'clock, the happiest, as I thought myself, of men, and between 11 and 12 o'clock returned the same night to it, as miserable as any being could well feel. I left it, prepossessed with a sense that I was blessed with the most beautiful as well as the most virtuous of wives, ourselves honoured and respected, moving in the first circles, and having every prospect of speedy advancement. Scarcely had I sat down to supper at my benefactor, Mr. Barwell's society, I was suddenly struck with the deepest anguish and pain. A servant who was in the habit of attending Mrs. Grand came and whispered to me that Mr. Francis was caught in my house and secured by my *jemmader* (an upper servant exercising a certain authority over other servants). I rose up from table, ran to the terrace, where grief, by a flood of tears, relieved itself for a moment. I then sent for a friend out, whom I requested to accompany me, but the rank of the party, and the known attachment which I was well aware, he held to him however, he execrated his guilty action, pleaded his excuse with me. I collected myself, so much as circumstances would admit, and dispatched the servant to acquaint the *jemmader* I was coming. In my way I thought proper to call on my friend Major Palmer and, request the use of his sword, and to attend me as a friend, the purpose which I had in view being to have released Mr. Francis, and seeing him out of my premises, compelled him to have measured himself with me, until one of us fell. Palmer approved of my determination, and we repaired to the spot. The porter hearing my voice, opened the gate, and in my lower apart-

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Grand—*Narrative of the Life of a Gentleman Long Resident in India.*

ments my friend and I beheld with astonishment the present Sir George Shee, bound to a chair and endeavouring to obtain from my servants his release, with Mr. Shore, now Lord Teignmouth, and the late Mr. Archdekin, companions to him, joining in the same prayer, and entreaty. He complained of having been cruelly treated by them. My *jemmader*, on the contrary, told a plain tale. It was, that he had secured Mr. Francis to meet the vengeance of his master, until Mr. Shee, assisted by the other gentlemen, upon a loud whistle, sounded by Mr. Francis, had scaled the walls of my compound, rushed furiously on him, and in the scuffle, occasioned Mr. Francis to escape."

Mr. Grand then sought "the satisfaction which the laws of honour prescribe, as a poor relief to the injury committed"—wrote to Mr. Francis to meet him for a duel. But when Francis would not take up the gauntlet thrown down by him Mr. Grand sought redress in the Supreme Court which ordered that Francis should pay as damages fifty thousand Sicca Rupees—with costs of suit.

Later events and the metamorphosis of Mrs. Grand into Princess Talleyrand need not detain us.

The incident as stated above shows the depth of degradation to which the leaders of the English Society of Calcutta of the time had sunk. It appears that even Lord Teignmouth who had deplored "the too great prevalence of immorality in this settlement" helped Francis in his nefarious attempt to corrupt another man's wedded wife! The work of the greatest among its members was, in most cases, tarnished by greed and crime. No wonder "in the fierce struggles of the pent-up stifling settlement, no reputation was too high, no fate too tragic to escape the revenging tusk of slander."¹⁴ Even on the tombs the reptiles of the time did not fear to spill their slaver. They had no scruples.

(To be continued).

¹⁴ Hunter—*The Thackerays in India*.

RESEARCH ON PERSONALITY AND THE PROBLEMS OF ASSESSMENT

PROF. SRINIBAS BHATTACHARYA, M.A. (EDN.), M.A. (LOND.)
T.D. (LOND.).

It is perhaps the experience of many, engaged in the field of education, that difference in attainments is not only due to intelligence factor. The majority of the population possessing almost the same average level, shows wide divergence in their attainments in examinations.

But why? The scope of the present thesis lies within the field of query mentioned above. The writer here has started with few assumptions for carrying on the investigation :—

1. Personality factors—*viz.*, interests, are effective determinants to success.
2. That some interest patterns are formed at a certain age level inspite of the possibility of interfusion.
3. That other factors of personality—*viz.*, persistence, etc., are also connected with attainments.
4. That there is a factor of general persistence besides their specific manifestations.

The aim of the present investigation is, therefore, being limited to the study of interrelation between interest, persistence and attainments.

With the hope that the said investigation will throw much light on the procedure for educational guidance, the following programme has been drawn up :—

1. To classify interest into six general patterns, in the first instance, for convenience of investigation : (i) Academic, (ii) Scientific (iii) Technical, (iv) Commercial, (v) Artistic, (vi) Agricultural.
2. To establish certain criteria for the validation of the test materials.
3. To construct suitable tests and techniques for the assessment of interests and persistence.
4. To compare the test results with the actual attainments in different examinations.
5. To find out the correlation between the different sets of scores derived.

SCOPE FOR THE INVESTIGATION

Time is changing and the need for assessment of individual 'differences' is being felt more and more. It is also the experience of many that attainments differ mostly owing to the difference in interests, i.e., one's preference for one's activity or subject.

In the present investigation, the writer is more concerned with the expressed interests than in the potential ones. Because of too much overlapping of aptitude with other emotional factors—ability, training, etc., the investigation has been confined within the mentioned area.

The scope for such an investigation lies in the field of education as well as psychology because of the mutual relationships with one another.

Besides, how far the guidance programme should be influenced by the research finding partly falls within the scope of the present enquiry.

THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

For the practical execution of the experiment, it is perhaps wise to design the same in the following ways :—

(a) Population. (b) Techniques and Tests. (c) Scoring and Administration.

Population :—

The population will mainly consist of the students reading in different educational institutions. The age range of the population being 14 to 17 bears a significance in the field of guidance.

Six types of institutions have been selected for the administration of the tests designed to measure six types of interests—academic, technical, scientific, commercial, artistic and agricultural. The population will, in the first instance, be handy, for making the enquiry thorough and intensive and be drawn from different socio-economic levels.

Techniques and Tests :—

As the proposed study demands a knowledge of interest, persistence, and attainments and as there is hardly any instrument for assessing these qualities in this country, effective techniques for the assessment of the qualities have been evolved in the first instance.

Tests and Techniques for the assessment of interests—A brief outline :

Questionnaire No. 1. The writer was fully conscious of the limitations of the inventory or questionnaire as techniques for assess-

ment of what refers to "inner states of the individual" his likes or dislikes, interests and preferences. The greatest limitation of this technique lies in the scope for subjectivity and dishonesty of the testees. But while on the one hand the questionnaire is not free from subjectivity, it is also observed that the questionnaires measure something quite consistently.

Questionnaire No. 1—has been designed to assess the six types of interests and it includes 84 items.

Questionnaire No. 2—has been designed to assess the general persistence and it includes—18 items. In this connection, it may be mentioned that this is a Bengali adaptation of the English Questionnaire which has been validated on school students in England.

Questionnaire 3. Another disguised questionnaire, in story form, has been constructed for assessing persistence as it was felt that this technique might minimise test consciousness, facilitate projection through identification of the self with the characters depicted in the story.

Questionnaires 4 & 5 :—(for the assessment of confidence)—are similar to questionnaire Nos. 2 and 3.

Other Techniques :—The writer, while trying to attack the problems of interest assessment from all sides, has evolved certain other techniques as follows :—

1. Information Test.
2. Three situation tests (I and II).

Similarly, for the assessment of persistence, situation tests have been evolved :—

1. The same situation test I with a different direction and scoring principle.
2. Another situation test for assessing general persistence in particular.

Besides the above, ratings of the teachers and parents, interviews will be taken for a thorough enquiry, where necessary.

1. *Information Test* :—With a view to comparing the test results and making different approaches, this technique was devised with the assumption that a person, specially instructed in a particular field, naturally keeps more information about that than others.

With this fundamental hypothesis, the test was constructed including 36 items, to measure the six types of interest. In other words, there are six items for measuring each type of interest. The items demanded specific information about specific field and are therefore expected to have high discriminating values.

Situation Tests :—(for interest assessment).

There are two situation tests devised for the assessment of interest, viz., S.T. No. I and S.T. No. II.

Situation Test No. 1—This is a deviation from the common inventory type as it tries to draw out one relevant interest by means of presentation of certain pictures and diagrams. The subjects are required to choose the activity he likes and perform them. There is a series of such diagrams with necessary directions. There are, on the whole, 36 such diagrams—6 for measuring each type of interest.

The test demands activity, not so much dependent on intelligence. On the contrary, they demand specific information and knowledge of specific fields of interest.

Situation Test No. 2—This forms a new technique consisting of a number of news-items of varied interests. The items are designed so as to cater to the varied interests and one may choose going through the lines in which he is interested. The interest of a person will, therefore, be revealed by the choice of items which one makes for perusal, and deriving information.

Situation Test No. 3 (Flash Cards)—A number of Cards containing different pictures pertaining to different fields of interest will be presented for a short time and scoring will be guided by the nature and number of the objects retained.

Situation Test No. 4 (for the assessment of persistence).

This is the same Test S.T. No. I but with different direction. Among the series of activities, the subjects may continue to perform one type of activity according to his choice or change from one to others. There will be a definite direction that one can stick to one type of activity if he likes and this will not effect his attainment in any way. In other words, the test was designed to find out his normal persistence in intelligent activities, involving the question of motivation.

Situation Test No. 5 : (for the assessment of general persistence).

The test is rather boring because there is little scope for activity demanding intelligence.

Roughly speaking, the test provides scope for different types of activities.

1. Dotting with pencil and pricking with pins.
2. Writing numerical and making circles round odd and squares round even numbers.
3. Dotting the i's and cutting the t's, etc.

POWER AND CULTURE

FELIX GROSS

Brooklyn College

Power as a value

Power is one of the key issues of politics. It is a goal in itself for those obsessed by the will to power, but only a means for idealists; it is a supreme good for some, but an extreme evil for others. As a value it always remains a key issue, a touchstone of politics and political personalities. As a value-attitude or an urge, it is paramount in the social psychology of politics. It is a fundamental problem of political ideologies and political movements.¹

The problem of power is also a problem of freedom. The relationship between freedom and power is a basic dilemma of a democratic constitution. Does the increase of the power of the state necessarily imply limitations on personal freedom? Or does increase of individual freedom impose restraints and limitations on the power of the state? These two are among the perennial questions that have been debated for centuries, questions which are not merely academic.

The concept, the philosophy, of power and force is a part of the whole culture, a part of the historical development. It is a result of social, economic, and political conditions quite as much as it is a result of personality factors. Within every nation, every culture, we may find a number of political ideologies but every one of these ideologies is in some way or another influenced by the culture of the nation. An Englishman may choose among conservatism, liberalism, and socialism yet each will have a common tinge of British culture. British, French, or Spanish socialists have many values, ideas and views in common but certain elements of their ideology are different as a result of differences in national culture and in social, economic, and political conditions.

In consequence the concepts of power, force and violence are different values in different nations. Different attitudes toward force, violence, and power are developed through different political and social experiences.

A different philosophy of power developed among the Americans, British, and Swiss than that which obtained in Russia, Germany, and some other continental states.

Philosophy of force and power

In Russia political theory developed in fascinating extremes : power and the use of force came to be considered as either the supreme good or the supreme evil. For the tsar, as well as for Lenin and Stalin, power and force were supremely "good". Konstantin P. Pobiedonostsev was a defender and philosopher of the 19th century Russian theocratic autocracy² for whom autocracy, orthodoxy, and dogmatism were positive values. Contrariwise, he considered parliament, democracy, and liberalism to be "the great lie of our age." When political reforms were intended at the beginning of this century, Pobiedonostsev, in the name of religion, argued that the tsar had no right to limit his own powers which were given to him by the deity.³

In contrast to Pobiedonostsev, Tolstoi argued power, force, and violence were evils :

But however power has been gained, those who possess it are in no way different from other men, and therefore no more disposed than others to subordinate their own interests to those of society. On the contrary, having the power to do so at their disposal, they are more disposed than others to subordinate the public interests to their own.

On the otherhand, the true of Christian doctrine, making of the law of love a rule without exceptions, in the same way abolishes the possibility of any violence, and cannot, in consequence, help but condemn every state founded on violence.⁴

Pobiedonostsev was on the extreme right. At the extreme left were the anarchists (Berdiaieff called anarchism a Russian ideology) who considered power to be the father and mother of all social evils. The state as a focus of power was their chief villain and mortal foe. The goal was a stateless society, a federation of communes, without any instruments of compulsion, without police or army. Michael Bakunin, the Karl Marx of anarchism, said :

If there is a devil in history, it is this power principle. It is this principle, together with the stupidity and ignorance of the masses, upon which it is ever based and without which it never could exist, it is this principle alone that has produced all the misfortunes, all the crimes and the most shameful facts of history. And inevitably this cursed element is to be found, as a natural instinct, in every man, the best of them not excepted. Everyone carries within himself the germs of this lust for power.⁵

Every logical and sincere theory of the State is essentially founded on the principle of *authority*—that is to say on the eminently theological, metaphysical and political idea that the masses, *always* incapable of governing themselves, must submit at all times to the

benevolent yoke of a wisdom and a justice, which in one way or another, is imposed on them from above."

Bakunin was here facing the age-old dilemma of means and ends. Power and the state were evils, so he justified force and violence as means for destroying the state. Consequently, the use of force and power as means were good and useful.

Even a more profound contradiction was entertained by the Russian populists, "narodniks", under the last tsars. The populist movement dated from the second half of the century and it is not easy to digest in a few sentences the political ends of the various groups which were identified with the populists. In certain periods anarchists were among them, but generally they were closest to democratic socialists. Their goal was the transformation of Russia into a democratic and socialist republic.

However, Russian autocracy provided no instrumentality for a legitimate and legal struggle in behalf of democracy and social change. Force in the form of revolution was left as the sole alternative of such a struggle. In consequence violence and terror were used as means to achieve democracy. In this connection it is helpful to distinguish value-goals from attitudes. Populist democracy was a value-goal; however the every day revolutionary struggle shaped their attitudes toward power and violence. A faction of the populists applied violence, in spite of the fact that the desired goal was limitation of power and abolition of violence.

In sharp contrast Lenin, Stalin, and the other communists were no Hamlets caught by an ethical dilemma. They approved of unlimited power and violence as a way to seize, to consolidate, and to maintain power. Freedom was shifted to the very end of the millenium to those happy days when the state would disappear. For the coming generation the promise was dictatorship. The populists and later social revolutionaries approved the use of force in the absence of democracy, but once democracy were achieved, they argued, violence must be abolished and power limited. Lenin and Stalin took the opposed position, holding that at precisely this moment unrestrained power should rule."

The fascist and nazi ideologies presented the idea of unlimited power in the hands of a dictator, a "leader" who personified the state, as the desired value. Force and violence were approved and were an essential part of the program, while terror was a method of government. In short, force in the hands of the privileged to be used against the non-privileged was elevated to a guiding principle."

Gandhi personified more than anybody the political philosophy of a substantial part of India. Contrary to the authoritarians, force and power in his philosophy is an evil—not a value-goal, not a "good". He rejected force as a means of struggle. The result of his philosophy was the strategy of non-violence. Gandhi's approach to problems of power and politics was essentially moral. Strong influence of Tolstoi and Thoreau gave universality to his ideas.

I must not deceive the country. For me, there is no politics without religion . . . not the religion of the superstitious and the blind, the religion that hates and fights, but the universal religion of toleration. Politics without morality is a thing to be avoided.⁹

There is then a state of enlightened anarchy. In such a state every one is his own ruler. He rules himself in such a manner that he is never a hindrance to his neighbour But the ideal is never fully realized in life. Hence the classical statement of Thoreau that that Government is best which governs the least.¹⁰

Turning now to the Anglo-Americans we find yet a third set of values and attitudes toward power. In the philosophy of Locke, Mills, Jefferson, Madison, Adams and Acton, power is evil but an evil that man has to use since living in a society and in a state requires enforcement of laws and defense of country. A progressive change requires power—so does the exercise of civil rights. Tyranny was abolished by force. But power, being an evil, should be used with restraint and should be limited once democracy is established.

Leaders and ideologists of the American Revolution have made philosophical and practical contributions in their study of power. Since they believed power to be a dangerous proposition, they held it should be checked and balanced. Their approach to the problem of power was rationalistic and empirical. Their efforts represented a kind of engineering in that they tried to solve the problem of a complex mechanism. Their emotions were controlled. There is little in them of Gandhi, Bakunin, Lenin, or Machiavelli. The Continental theoreticians—and their contribution was of course fundamental—were interested in ideas of freedom. The Continental Europeans liked and knew how to develop ideas, and were less interested in the problems of their application. The hiatus between promise and reality was the eternal weakness of European political visions. The American political philosophers were above all interested in methods of application, so that the general principles could pass from the realm of ideas to that of reality. Since power was force, the problem was to create a mechanism which would control and humanize this dangerous energy.

The problems of limitations of power and of the relation between freedom and authority were essential in British political philosophy. As in the case of the Americans (who were British revolutionaries), approach to freedom was through the limitation of power. Such was the view of John Stuart Mill in his essay *On Liberty*. Similarly, Lord Acton's discussion of freedom is an exposition of the danger of power rather than of the blessings of freedom. Harold Laski, one time leader of the British Labor Party and a noted political scientist, also recognized the need of a coercive quality of power in an empirical, pragmatic way.¹¹

In the last analysis, says Laski, the State "is built upon the ability of its government to operate successfully its supreme coercive power".¹²

The writings of Lenin and Stalin are largely devoted to the problem of how to get power—unlimited power—as the means to establish a state, founded on violence and terror. Jefferson, Adams, Madison, Acton, and Mills had an entirely different interest. Their concern was how to limit power, how to protect an individual against the power of the state—against the potentialities such a power might contain. Gandhi faced a dilemma—how to reconcile non-violence with the need to use power. With him, non-violence became a technique for seizing power without the use of force. Once India was free, however, the same problem emerged again—how to administer power without force. And force was used by Indian government, the same, which won independence by non-violence. A statesman who used unlimited power was a political villain to Acton; the same man was an astute politician for Hitler. A statesman who hesitated to use force to attain power was a political fool in the eyes of Lenin and Mussolini. This suggests that the same symbol—power—was a different concept for each of them. It held different meanings, mirrored different personalities, and reflected different social, economic conditions.

The individual and society

The explanation of this fact cannot be given in terms of one single cause. National values obviously are an important element in shaping attitudes toward power but those attitudes may change with changing social, economic conditions. In like fashion attitudes toward power also vary with ideologies and personality types. Such attitudes, like all attitudes, are a result both of the impact of society on an individual, and of the impact of individuals on society. Within the framework provided by this broad concept of interaction between individuals and society, we shall undertake to analyze the causes of varying attitudes toward power in terms of differences in the : (1) values of national

culture; (2) political ideologies; (3) dynamic social, economic and political relations; and (4) personalities. These variables are important because power is not only a part of the spectrum of politics; it is also a part of man's personality and ethics. A man's attitude toward power, toward the use of violence, toward the use of force, provide the basis for understanding his ethics, his moral judgements, and his value system.

Similar to natural sciences, in social sciences the distance between an observer and the observed facts has its influence on perception and inference. Various levels of magnifications and distance unravel different configurations of details, different aspects of integration and also lead to various levels of abstraction.

The power concepts of an individual give us a picture of his 'political personality', i.e., his relation to society and to other individuals. From this vantage point we can see in detail his authoritarian personality, although we may lose the picture of the whole phenomenon. We may see an evident psychopath like Hitler, who probably had strong psychopathological tendencies. From other vantage points from a farther distance, we might see less detail but more of the context, more of the interactions of various forces, interaction between individual and society. We might see, for example, how the inborn potentialities of future dictators in Germany and Russia were shaped by national values and society, or a rebellion against those values and society. We might see how authoritarian individuals act, and under what definite social, economic, and political conditions they are successful. We might see how they influenced ideologies and were influenced by them in the use of power.

Power and national values

The problem of national culture, especially of national values, is of long and controversial standing. It is not easy to pin down the national characteristics and similarities. An opponent of the hypothesis of common national values will always find a group of people with different values than those identified as typically national. However, with all its limitations the concept of a national cultural pattern cannot be disposed of. There is ample evidence that it corresponds to social reality in spite of all difficulties of definitions, due to the phenomena of national multivalence. The concept is certainly important in the analysis of attitudes toward power. The prophet of fascist autocracy never gained such mass support in Great Britain as they did in Germany. They never rallied really strong cohorts. The screams of the few British blackshirts at Oxford Circle and Trafalgar Square never changed into a roaring, regimented, uniformed mass, marching through

the streets in heavy-booted rhythmic response to the command of her "führer". British tradition, national values, and education in the democratic process might be a part of any explanation of the difference. The German nation had strong emphasis on the values of discipline, of strong government, of attitudes of submission to "befehl", and of patterns of behavior which had developed in Germany during the long years of strong rule by the emperors, Iron Chancellors, and the military caste. Those traditions favored acceptance of a more authoritarian system of power.

Tolstoi's ideas of non-violence did not change the course of Russian history. He had a great many admirers in Russia but his concepts changed neither the conduct of the autocracy nor the tactics of revolution. Tolstoi-Gandhi, however, were successful in India. Here the idea of non-violence had an appeal to the national values of the masses and was effective against a non-autocratic colonial authority. It is important to note that the British in India were much more reluctant to use violence than were their Russian counterparts. Neither the tsar nor Stalin spared cartridges in their dealings with their "subjects".

These examples, true as they are, present a simplified picture. The national values are not solid, unyielding. There are differences and contradictions within every culture precisely because there are opposed groups in every society.

Perhaps Professor Allport's¹³ concept of the J curve might help in this connection. In his discussion of ethnic-cultural differences, recognition of behavior typical of different ethnic groups is paramount. At the same time differences within the ethnic group are also recognized. For instance, he points out that the generally used language in America is English; however, a certain percentage of the immigrant population keeps to the language of the "old country". Again the Catholics are supposed to attend Sunday mass but some do not. Yet again, in the United States theatres commence on time and trains run on schedule; the emphasis on punctuality is strong, yet some people are not punctual. On these grounds Allport suggests that ethnic patterns could be plotted in a J shaped histogram. The long arm of the histogram J indicates those who conform while the short arm, or the curve, indicates those who do not.

The J curve may be illuminating when applied to the values shared by people in the same nation-culture. For example the concept of the value of freedom in Great Britain has the form of a histogram. The Labor, Conservative, and Liberal parties agree in principle on certain, but not all, limits of power. They share this value, while a tiny

minority of totalitarians still forms a rather short left arm of the J curve.

We may, however, extend Allport's concept to other shapes of histograms, the J curve might be complemented by a U curve or a V curve. Germany after the first World War, was a Germany of divergent and often extreme views. The value of power, and the attitude toward power of the democratic parties from the Social-Democrats Democrats, Catholic-Center was different from that of the monarchistic and nationalistic *Stahlhelm*, the Nazis, or the Communists. It was a U or V curve rather than a J curve, with the partisans of authoritarianism balancing those of democracy. Can we speak about characteristically national attitudes toward power where such a division obtains? Of course we can. The concept of democratic power in Germany was forged into a pragmatic tool in an actual experience. The democrats had to face totalitarians. They applied power in a society torn by those contradictions, and their concept of power was tested against the opposition of German, not French, Nazis. The totalitarians and democrats were tied together by their contradictions. The Nazis, in their struggle for totalitarian power, precipitated the development of methods of defense by the democratic German government which, unfortunately, were destined to fail. The methods were related to German conditions. The abstract values of power were thus translated into the patterns of behaviour, and the patterns of behaviour were expressed in conflicts. This social inter-action shaped the concepts of power held by both the friends and foes of democracy and, in consequence, the dialectical opposition of those two opposed values of power were a result of a German experience.

A tradition in favor of the resolution of differences through compromise is also influential in determining the quality of the struggle resulting from such contradictions. For example, in certain periods the Democrats in America may favor an increase of federal power while the Republicans favor stronger state governments to counterbalance federal power. But, such difference in views cannot be compared with the contradiction between the Nazis and Democrats on the issue of power. The Democrats and Republicans agree on Civil Rights, on the fundamental notion of limitations on power. The disagreement does not destroy the basic political values, while a compromise with fascism does.

Through political power is not the only type of power, the dominant national values usually find expression in other social institutions—in the church, the school and the family. As for instance it may be pointed out that the German family is more autocratic,

while the American family tends to be more democratic and permissive. In consequence, in a German family the positions of the father and his power are strong and his almost absolute authority over his children is widely accepted. Again, in an Italian family, hierarchy is significant, with the father holding power and privilege. Similarly the oldest son has more power and authority than the younger children. In this situation the position of the mother is specific—she supplies the element of warmth and love, thus serving to counterbalance the father's authority. In an American family, husband and wife share the family power. Children have power, too, and participate in making decisions through family conferences. The family is also permissive, younger children enjoying more privileges than the older ones. However, once they mature, their position is equal. Thus do the concepts of power found in any given culture pervade the entire society and find expression in all the basic institutions. It is noteworthy that within these institutions the distribution of power corresponds to the J curve—*e.g.*, in not all German families is the father in a strong position. Nor are all American families equalitarian and permissive.

The values under discussion are not mere abstract concepts. They are expressed in social actions and form overt patterns of behaviour. They are to be seen, for example, in a policy of a government or in a father's disciplinary and educational actions. Such actions can be observed, and hypothesis about them can be verified. Nor are national values the only values. There are some values that are shared by larger cultural aggregates, such as the countries of the Western tradition, for example. Moreover, some values appear to be universal. Herbert Spencer in his "Ethics" argued that altruism, expressed in a mother's attitude toward children, is universal. But universal values are expressed in a variety of ways in various cultures. Thus both the universality and the variability of culture are reflected in the values of any given culture.

Freedom is an especially good example of a general, universal value, although this urge is expressed in a variety of ways, both within and as between societies. No one desires chains on his hands; no one likes to be a victim of exploitation and abuse. Even the drive for autocratic power is only an urge for unlimited freedom for one man, the autocrat, at the expense of the freedom of the others. It is a selfish, anti-social, and egoistic expression of this urge. In such a way, the contest of power and freedom, both concepts being universal phenomena, are expressed as different types of attitudes and values in different nationalities and personalities. Those values are variations of the universal urges.

Ideologies and social, economic conditions

The nationally held conceptions of power under discussion—including whatever contradictions there may be—find expression in political ideologies. However, the appeal of these ideologies depends on the dynamic economic, political, and social conditions of those to whom they are addressed. Change in these conditions may produce change in views on power, as well as changes in other values. This is so because all these elements are not separate blocs but are interrelated and in continuous interaction. They cannot be separated and any attempt to analyze their complex interrelations is beyond the scope of this book.

This section must not be closed without a word of warning against any tendency to assume that the concept of national values is a sufficient answer to the whole problem of cultural influence. Such an error would overlook the fact that religion plays a very significant role in shaping our attitudes and values toward power and violence. Religion also influences the social, economic, and political conditions, and in turn, is influenced by them. For example, national concepts of power influence the concepts of power held by religious leadership and such influence is reflected in the differing power structure of catholicism and Protestantism.

Another word of caution is in order. The significant role of the irrational element in political behavior must not be overlooked. The Nazi movement in Germany and the adoration of unlimited power by many educated Germans cannot be explained solely in terms of the factors we have just mentioned. Human reactions are not rarely unexpected and the emotional tensions which sometimes appear in history are not easily traced to their origins.

Personality

Different ideologies of power attract different types of persons. For example, a philosophy of non-violence, attracted Gandhi, but repelled Lenin. It would seem that such differences, at least in part, stem from differences in personality structure. Such an assumption could explain why Tolstoi and Bakunin—the former a Christian anarchist and prophet of non-violence, the latter as anarchist and a partisan of violence (as means toward his stateless ideal), living through similar social upheavals, members of the same aristocratic class, nurtured in the same orthodox religion—responded to divergent ideologies.

Terror and non-violence attract and require different personalities, different skills, and different values. A change in the ideology of power of a political movement, even a change in tactics may have its impact on the process by which members are drawn into the movement.

When in 1878 the populists in Russia changed their tactics because their hopes of a change through mass movement were frustrated, the new tactics of individual terror attracted and required different personalities. Peter Larov, one of the leading spirits of the populist movement wrote about this change as follows:—

..... The year 1878 introduced into the Revolutionary movement a crisis that led to a complete change, both in the division of the party into various sections and in their respective relations. The modes of action were changed; the revolutionary type was changed. The defects and the virtues so characteristic of the most prominent persons in the movement a few years ago gave place to totally different defects and virtues which characterize the Russian Revolutionary movement of modern days.¹⁴

Change in attitude toward violence and force was reflected in change of a revolutionary type, in changes of concepts and values.

A quiet, democratic leader in France, however, might have joined an underground and changed his values of non-violence to force against the German conquerors. If France would have remained free, he would live the whole life of a quiet, peaceful citizen, afraid of any violent action. Change of political conditions may produce such strong impact on personality that he would change attitudes and values and, in consequence, his personality. Precisely this happened during World War II under the impact of the occupation. For instance, Rataj, the speaker of the Polish Parliament, was one of the organizers of the Polish democratic armed resistance. More frequently, however, new types of struggle attract and require different personalities. Under these circumstances not all change their values. Some retire, some wear down, others die as martyrs, and still others are imprisoned. Ethics must not be overlooked; it remains a strong social force and guide of decision. The struggle against oppression was mostly a revolutionary struggle. The feudal system yielded to force and revolutionary forces and similarly with colonial rule. Many of those who undertook this struggle belonged to the privileged classes—to the nobility. Ethical motivation rather than economic interest promoted their choices. Force in history so often serves to break the walls of oppressive and exploitative systems.

Psychological theory suggests that childhood experiences may have something to do with these different responses in terms of verification. It is difficult, if at all possible, to prove that a given experience was one of the causes of an attitude to power. Peter Kropotkin was an anarchist who opposed any authority, especially the authority of the state. He strongly believed that man by nature is good and that

institutions destroy his good nature. As a child Kropotkin loved his mother who was warm and affectionate. In contrast he opposed his father's authority and had rather a dislike for him. His mother died when Kropotkin was quite young (still in formative years), and his father's remarriage resulted in the severance of ties with many of Peter's relatives. These facts—quoted from Kropotkin's memoirs—suggest that the traumatic experiences of Peter Kropotkin's early childhood may have shaped his attitudes and his views on human nature. Similarly, his rebellion against his father served to shape the potentialities reflected later in his rebellion against the tsar and autocracy. Lenin's childhood experiences provide another case in point. His brother, a revolutionary populist, was executed in Lenin's early youth and young Lenin knew that he had been hanged in a tsarist prison. This traumatic experience might have been a factor in the development of his unmerciful and revengeful attitude toward all he regarded as "ruling class". Both suggestions are plausible hypotheses as far as the inference is concerned. The facts of Kropotkin's and Lenin's infancy and youth are true—but can we prove that they influenced personality formation? It might have been another traumatic experience, or none at all. An hypothesis of this kind is useful so long as we remember that at present it must be used very tentatively.¹⁸

Though some personality characteristics are inborn, personality is largely shaped by early childhood experiences. The family, the play group, and unique experiences (such as witnessing a battle, a strike, or an accident) may have paramount significance in personality formation. Some of the potentialities thus developed may never be activated unless they are released by the impact of social realities, by the social environment. May be potential Hitlers and Stalins were born in America only to have their potentialities diverted into other channels by the peaceful political and economic conditions of American society. May be they became frustrated neurotics, or directed their desire for power into different avenues. Perhaps driving an automobile of 350 horsepower—one of those you use below 10% of power while driving 50 miles per hour—gave them the feeling of power over the machine, over the road, over speed which they craved.

Multivalence

Though personality has to adjust to changing conditions, this adjustment to changing realities is not the only problem. Many men and women are inconsistent; they operate not on one, but on many, often contradictory value systems. Multivalence is characteristic of many personalities. Many oscillate among a number of contradicting

value systems and yield easily to the value system of the group. They may belong to a number of groups. For example, we may imagine a German who was a member of a trade union and of a veteran's organization. The trade union was based on different values than the German imperial veteran's organization. In consequence our imaginary German played one social role in the union and a different one again among the former imperial soldiers. Sometimes he followed one and sometimes another value system and pattern of political behavior. To begin with, he had inconsistent values, and faced difficulty in reconciling both systems. Under pressure, our imaginary German would be likely to swing toward the authoritarian, Nazi pattern. Only strong personalities have the ability to cope courageously with such differences, deciding for themselves what is right, and choosing from among different values and patterns of behavior which are often a result of the different and conflicting roles one has to play in contemporary society.

Nations, like individuals, are ambivalent because they are composed of individuals, many of whom are also ambivalent. The Germans were far more ambivalent, as a nation, than the British. Therefore, even a Germany under a democratic majority is still feared by its neighbours because it may reverse itself. However, Britain under a socialist majority may swing to the conservatives, but this change does not involve any change in basic concepts of freedom and power.

The position of an individual within a class may also influence his attitudes toward power. A member of the nobility in a medieval society, or a member of the bureaucracy in a Prussian state had an interest in the increase of power by virtue of the groups to which he belonged. In a German officer's caste there was a caste interest in the power of the Army in the German state. These examples show how social and economic relations influence individual attitudes and values toward power.¹⁶

Interrelations

In spite of all the difficulties involved in the study of the interrelations of the individual and society, such an analysis does help us to understand the difference in attitudes toward power. In the Great Britain of 1917, Lenin at best would have played a role of an hysterical crank in the British House of Commons. In the America of 1918 Trotsky would have been listened to by a select crowd of mavericks in a Greenwich Village cold-water flat. In the United States of 1850, Tolstoi would have been another Thoreau, but in 1950 he would have been listened to only by small Quaker groups and other pacifists. In India, however, he would have been another Gandhi. There were

Lenins and Hitlers before these men emerged. But only in certain historical moments, in certain societies, could they play the roles they did. If Lenin had been born fifty years before he would have played a minor role as a subordinate to Bakunin, may be he would have been a Tkachev or a Nechayev. By the same token there were great revolutionary moments in the history of Europe, as in 1945, the moment of European liberation, when there was no great European leader to capture the imagination of masses with the idea of European union.

Only certain types of men, only certain personalities are manipulators of a military coup or leaders of an historic revolution. The seizure of power does not happen everywhere—there must be a personality in a society where attitudes toward power and violence favor such actions, in a critical moment of social change—in a moment of political, social and economic tensions. Oppressive and exploitative political and economic systems tend to create conditions in which violence is a sole alternative of change. Under such conditions of oppression and tensions, the attitude to violence may change, and violence may be approved by an individual or a people who previously had abhorred it.

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EAST INDIA COMPANY'S CONCERN FOR RECORDS

PROFULLA CHANDRA ROY, M.A.

"As style is the man, so government are the Records"—Says Galbraith in his 'Introduction to the use of the Public Records' ¹. Even those, who have scant regard for this maxim, must have viewed with dismay the photo in the Statesman of July 25, 1954 with the following caption :

"Part of the burnt legal records at the High Court building of Indore, which was set on fire by a crowd, which stoned the building last week. Damage to the records is stated to be likely to impede the judicial investigation of many pending cases".²

It does not, of course, require calamities like fire, flood or war to emphasize the value of records as indispensable tools of administration. Equally understandable is the utilitarian motive, which actuates the administrator to win back what has been lost. Yet every attempt to salvage from wreck, tend the damaged and preserve the sanctity of evidence must be regarded as a heroic endeavour. The reason, though not far to seek, may best be given in the words of Waldo Gifford Leland :

"The ultimate purpose of the preservation and efficient administration of Public records goes for beyond the improvement of administrative processes and the facilitation of public business. The ultimate purpose is to make possible for our present generation to have enduring and dependable knowledge of their past and for future generations to have such knowledge of their past, of which our present is a past".³

Truly speaking, growing years bring about a revolutionary transformation in the character of records. With passage of time their intrinsic value begins to increase, whatever may be the dismal mark of age on the fragile body. The gradual accretion of qualities, far surpassing the exclusive needs of the administration at the currency stage, makes the body of records more attractive, productive and fruit-bearing to the discerning eyes of the researcher, who make most profitable use of it at the stage of non-currency. The records of the East India Company's government in India, described by James Grant Duff in his 'History of the Marhattas' as 'probably the best

historical materials in the world ' offer a case in point. In spite at a rift in the late William Foster has the same complimentary ring :

" had the archives of the East India House survived in their entirety, we should now be in possession of full information regarding the transactions both at home and abroad. But during the greater part of the Company's existence little heed was paid to the value of its records for historical purposes and the preservation of any particular series depended chiefly in its practical utility in relation to current work. Fortunately, in most cases this was sufficiently great to ensure the retention of those on which the student is likely to set chief store".⁵

Whatever charge may be laid at the door of the East India Company for its unawareness of the possible use of the records for research purposes, this Company, trading in the East from its distant, headquarter in London, came to own a rich accumulation of records through its desire to control effectively the action of its servants in India. The sudden turns, swift changes and unforeseen developments in the relations with country powers might have left the initiative entirely into the hands on the men of the spot. But this was purely temporary. The grip of the Court of Directors always remained firm, even when the sceptre was wielded by towering personalities like Wellesley or Dalhousie. The distance separating the Directors from their servants who were not readily available for consultation, placed the supreme control necessarily at the record level. It was, indeed, a government of records par excellence. The Court watched the march of events in India with jealous care, regularly sent instructions on every matter of moment, studied the despatches from India to see how far the directives from London had been faithfully implemented and chalked out new lines of advance in the light of communications received. As a result the flow of correspondences was both continuous and voluminous. The Court insisted on having the detailed account of the proceedings of the Government of India in various departments. Foster writes :

"In its final development, proposals were largely made in written minutes, which often, in controverted questions, provoked equally argumentative minutes of dissent : and these were entered at full length upon the records of the Council meeting (termed "Consultations" or "Proceedings"), transcripts of which were regularly sent home. In early days these were accompanied by separate volumes, containing copies of all letters received or sent; in later times such

correspondence was either entered on the Consultation, or in cases of special importance, transmitted as enclosures to dispatches.”

This method of sending lengthy transcripts in handwriting of the minutest administrative detail was expensive and time-consuming, occasionally made worse by the additional duty of supplying extra copies to the Directors. The Public letter to the Court of April 5, 1783 carries the groan of a piteous appeal from the Governor-General and Council at Fort William in Bengal :

“As we already transmit copies of our proceedings to you in triplicate and the additional duty of supplying the place of any which may be lost as well as of preparing the particular copies of our advices to you for the use of his Majesty's Ministers cannot be performed but at a very considerable expense to the Company, the salaries of clerks being much higher in his country than in Europe and as so much increase of their duty amidst the hurry of a despatch tends to throw the business of the Public Offices into confusion, we humbly submit to you the propriety and advantage of having such copies prepared in England.”

This appeal to get rid of the onerous task of supplying extra copies of official transaction in India, when this could be done in England at a less expense without throwing the normal public business out of gear, loses, of course, much of its force when pitted against the Court's desire to have transcripts of official proceedings, which were lost on their way to England as a result of enemy action. When surrender to superior might of the enemy was inevitable, the Captain of the English vessel, carrying the packets of records, usually considered it wise to throw them in the watery grave of the blue or destroy on board the valuable load instead of allowing the enemy to possess the covetable booty. This could neither be recovered nor could it be transcribed by the London addresses in the absence of any copy for the same. A few documents are reproduced below to show a record deal between the Directors and the Government at Fort William, Calcutta, which took place after the loss of packet of records as a result of the capture of vessel called the Admiral Hughes on March 6, 1782 by a French Frigate, Egretton.

(1) LETTER FROM COURT OF APRIL 30, 1782

“ we have been informed by Captain Greenway the Commander of the vessel called the Admiral Hughes and Mr. Oakes late a passenger thereon charged with the dispatches from Madrass

that the said vessel was taken by a French Frigate named the Egretton the 6th March last near the Western Islands and that several of the packets were thrown overboard and if the Captain's declaration is to be confided in the act were destroyed on board "."

(2) LETTER FROM COURT OF JUNE 18, 1782

" We have already advised you in our before mentioned letter, of the unfortunate capture on the 6th March last, near the Western Islands, of the Admiral Hughes Pocket, commanded by Captain Greenway, and of the loss of all her packets. We therefore hereby direct, that you send us by the first conveyance, Duplicates of such letters, consultations and other papers as were on Board that vessel from your Presidency "."

(3) LETTER TO COURT OF APRIL 5, 1783

" We have ordered copies of all the papers lost in our packet by the Admiral Hughes to be prepared and they shall be transmitted you as soon as ready, but from their bulk it will require a considerable time to make transcripts of them notwithstanding the additional number of clerks who will be employed for that purpose. "'

(4) LETTER TO COURT OF OCTOBER 23, 1783

" Captain Alexander Wynch of the Madras establishment being desirous of returning to Europe by the Nurbudda and having solicited to be entrusted with the charge of our dispatches, which he is willing to take upon him without any expense to the Company. We have agreed to place them under his care and he will have the honour of delivering this letter to you."

BOARD OF ORDNANCE

Conformable to your desire conveyed to us by the Governor-General and Council directing that you be furnished with Duplicates of all Letters, Consultations, Accounts and other Papers, transmitted from hence by the ship Neptune in May, 1781 and by the Rockford in September of that year, whose packets were forwarded from Madras in the Admiral Hughes's packet, that was unfortunately captured by the enemy near the Western Islands. We have the honour of furnishing you with copies of such of those papers as you have not acknowledged to have received, viz.

Copy of our proceedings from the 1st September, 1780 to the 1st April, 1781 with Index.

General Ledger Ordnance Department for 1779-80.

General return of Ordnance and Stoves remaining at this Presidency and its subordinates the 30th April, 1780.

Indent of articles wanted for the Powder works, dated the 27th November, 1780.

Indent of Military Stoves for the garrison of Fort William, dated the 28th March, 1781 " "

One more document in the Public Department deserves special mention in this connection. It gives the name of the writers, who were specially employed to make copies of the records lost on their way to England. Both Europeans and Country men were employed on a purely temporary basis, though discrimination was made in wage rates between the two. To quote the statement as embodied in the documents :

"The following are casual and will be discharged when the occasion is over.

Europeans employed in copying the proceedings ordered by the Court of Directors to replace those lost in the Admiral Hughes Packet and paid at 1 gold Mohur per section

I. Stapleton

G. Watts

W. Brant

Natives.

Paid at 15 Sa' Rs. pr. Section

A. Morse

L. de Corta

L. Argotty

I. Faria

L. Peirara

H. Pinnetz." "

The entire transaction bears eloquent testimony to the eagerness of the Company to replace what was lost so that it might have a faithful record of the official business in India in its totality. The question of time, labour, expenditure or any other administrative difficulty did not matter in the least to the Court of Directors so long as their records remained in unbroken continuity. It is easy to

criticize them for having looked at the record problem from purely administrative or utilitarian point of view. But criticism is silence into admiration by a little reflection that they were unconsciously laying the massive foundation for the archival dictum, so ably expounded by Solon J. Buck.

"A record group is something more than the sum of its own parts. It has an integrity, a meaning in itself. No part can be lost or neglected without affecting other parts and the group as a whole".¹³

The meticulous care taken by the East India Company for retention of records also produced beneficial results both at home and abroad. The servants in the East could not be indifferent to the records when they knew that they will largely be judged by their actions, as reflected on the body of the records. Separated by an unending mass of water, the only means of communication between them and the Directors was the records which alone could offer them a good defence, when their actions in the official capacity were subjected to unwarranted criticism and their good faith was called into question. The net result on either side was a rich accumulation of records which gives within a reasonable compass a rapid and effective survey of the records in each class, generally distinguishing each volume and giving idea of the date it covers.

The rule of the Company now belongs to the past, but the unique legacy of records, which it has bequeathed to posterity, remains living and operative in the repositories of National Archives of India and the Commonwealth Relations Office Library (former India Office Library). This will continue to offer to the unceasing stream of researchers "the subtle delight of working with manuscripts—that delight which is a compound of many simples: the faint slightly acrid scent of old papers parchment and leather, the poignant appeal of the faded brown ink, the realisation that the little bundle of paper or parchment before is a symbol of hopes and fears, the ambitions and disillusion, the loyalties and hatreds of the actors, who once played a passionate part on what is now a deserted and forlorn stage; the reflection at once inspiring and sobering that to advance thus far is to lay oneself open to challenge to recreate the past, to restore the vanished scene, to reveal to a world, that has long forgotten them, the actors in the long vanished drama and to set before the readers of to-day a coherent and convincing account of the ambitions and the activities of those who played the leading part in a great movement that was widening out far beyond our conventional conceptions".¹⁴

List of References

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- ³ Waldo Gifford Leeland--the first Conference of Archivists, December, 1909; the Beginnings of a Profession--the American Archivist Volume XIII--number 2 April, 1950. p. 120.
- ⁴ Grant Duff--History of the Marhattas ed. 1823 Vol. II p 185.
- ⁵ William Foster--A guide to the India Office Records 1600-1858 Introduction (i).
- ⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁷ Para 70--Public Letter to Court of April 5, 1788.
- ⁸ Para 7--Public Letter from Court of April 30, 1782,
- ⁹ Para 2--Public Letter from Court of June 18, 1782.
- ¹⁰ Para 69--Public Letter to Court of April 5, 1783.
- ¹¹ Paras 198-199--Public Letter to Court of October 23, 1783.
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• ENGLISH IN INDIAN UNIVERSITIES

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Four simple considerations will show that English must continue to have a place of importance in university courses in India. First : if we have to stand in the modern world as a nation worth the name, we cannot afford to lose touch with western knowledge. Of the three European languages that hold the key to western knowledge, viz. English, French & German, the first is the easiest for us to learn since it is being learnt in India for the last hundred and fifty years. Moreover, the world-importance of English is still greater than that of the other two languages or, indeed, than that of any other language. Second : English is bound to remain one of the official languages of the Republic of India and of most, if not all, of its constituent states, far longer than the period prescribed in the Constitution. However it may hurt our national pride, sheer necessity will have it so. Third : English is bound to remain for years to come the chief medium of intercourse between the different parts of India, especially between the north and the south. Fourth : English has long served and will long serve yet as a unifying force in India too precious to be thrown away.

It is no use, however, merely asserting what the place of English in university courses in India ought to be. It is far more important to ensure, if it is to be of any value, that English is studied on the right lines; otherwise, it had better not be studied at all. The lines on which English is studied at present in Indian universities are far from being the right ones.

B.A. & B.Sc. PASS COURSES : ENGLISH AS A COMPULSORY SUBJECT

English is at present a compulsory subject for the B.A. Pass degree in all Indian universities, and in many of them, for the B.Sc. Pass degree as well. The considerations enumerated above prove beyond doubt that this is just what it should be, and that those Indian universities which do not have English as a compulsory subject for the B.Sc. Pass degree should make it so at the earliest possible moment. But it is one thing saying that English should be a

compulsory subject; another, if by English is meant English literature. The latter is what Indian universities mean by compulsory English at present, and that is exactly where they have been going wrong for years. All that may be urged regarding the importance of English for India does not necessarily call for a course consisting of Shakespeare or Shelley, Milton or T. S. Eliot. It is time that we gave up our conventional ideas in this matter, which are so hide-bound that as soon as it is said that English should be a compulsory subject for the Bachelor's degree, we begin to think of a course in literary terms. The result is that the average graduate of an Indian university, though he has been made to read Shakespeare and Shelley, is unable to write an ordinary letter in correct English. We must get out of this fantastic situation. It is time that it was clearly recognised that, so far as the average student is concerned, the educative value of literature should be made available for him entirely through his mother-tongue. Indian universities should accordingly take early steps to enlarge and enhance the standards of their courses in Indian languages and literatures. As for a foreign language (which English is, after all, for Indians), if it is learnt of choice, its literary application may come uppermost. If, however, it is learnt of necessity because it happens to be a State language or the medium of intercommunication between different parts of a country or among different sections of its population, it is the language and not the literature, its practical application and not the literary, that is of more immediate concern for the learner. The compulsory course in English for the Bachelor's degree of Indian universities must therefore be predominantly a language course with a pronounced practical bias. The suggested practical bias is justified by the further consideration that a language is not really mastered so long as it remains a remote, bookish entity (as English unfortunately does for most learners in this country). Real mastery of a language comes only when it grows to be a living reality for the learner, and it becomes a living reality only when the learner is able to apply it with ease to the varied needs and affairs of practical life. It is surely a strange lop-sided education that makes one write learnedly on Shakespeare and flounder when it comes to the writing of an ordinary letter in English.

Accordingly I propose the following syllabus for Compulsory English for the B.A. & B.Sc. (Pass) Examinations:—(i) Practical English: 100 marks; (ii) Précis-writing: 50 marks; (iii) Prescribed Texts for Rapid Reading: 100 marks.

In (i), the questions will all be concerned with the application of the English language to topics of practical life. A wide variety of such questions is possible (e.g., letter-writing on topics of practical life, dialogue-writing in conversational English on matters of workaday life, etc. etc. Room may also be found in this paper for passages relating to workaday life being set for translation from the candidate's mother-tongue into English, alternative questions being provided for those whose mother-tongue is not any of the Indian languages recognised by the university concerned).

In (ii), not less than ten texts should be prescribed for rapid reading. It is important, however, to lay down in the examination regulations what kind of questions should be set on these texts. If the questions are designed merely to test generally the candidate's acquaintance with the contents of the prescribed texts, they may be easily answered by cramming 'note-books' instead of reading the texts themselves. As it is not possible to ban 'note-books' by legislation or otherwise, such an eventuality will have to be reckoned with and guarded against. Since this compulsory course in English is primarily a language course, I suggest that questions on the texts prescribed for rapid reading should consist *entirely* of passages taken from them and set for translation into the candidate's mother-tongue, the object being to test his understanding of the English language. (Alternative arrangements will of course have to be made for those whose mother-tongue is not any of the Indian languages recognised by the university concerned).

The selection of the texts prescribed for rapid reading should be made on the following principles (all of which should be duly incorporated into the examination regulations) :—

(a) Since, from the point of view of practical life, it is extremely important that students should acquire some knowledge of conversational English, at least one of the texts shall be a modern prose drama (but not in dialect) and at least one, a modern novel containing plenty of dialogue (but not in dialect).

(b) One of the texts, but not more than one, shall be an anthology of English verse.

(c) At least two of the prose texts prescribed for B.A. students shall deal with serious non-literary topics in good prose (e.g., Allen's *Democracy & the Individual*, Fred Hoyle's *The Nature of the Universe*), etc..

(d) At least one of the prose texts prescribed for B.Sc. students shall deal with some topic of literary interest in good prose (e.g., C. Day Lewis's *Poetry For You*).

(e) Since it is important that young learners should not be misled into taking archaic, semi-archaic or old-fashioned English for the norm of the language as spoken and written today, none of the prose texts prescribed for rapid reading should be earlier than the twentieth century.

B.A. PASS COURSE : ENGLISH AS A SUBSIDIARY SUBJECT

There should also be an optional course in English as a subsidiary subject for the B.A. (Pass) Examination. This would be more or less a literary course meant for those who have acquired sufficient proficiency in the English language to be able to undertake with profit a study of English literature. I propose the following syllabus for this course :—(i) Poetry and Verse Drama : selected texts; (ii) Prose and Prose Drama : selected texts; (iii) Composition, Rhetoric, and Prosody.

It is important, however, that there should be provision in the University Regulations for an admission test of proficiency in the English language for students who want to take English as a subsidiary subject for the B.A. (Pass) Examination (as well as for those who want to go in for the Honours course in English proposed below). This is important, for we must do all that we can to avoid the grievous waste resulting from students with insufficient knowledge of English doing or being made to do English literature—a common and distressing phenomenon now-a-days in colleges and universities all over India.

HONOURS COURSE IN ENGLISH

Not all Indian universities have got Honours courses at present. Every Indian university should have a three-year Honours course in a variety of subjects including at least one foreign language and literature. So far as a foreign language and literature is concerned, English would of course be the first choice for the same reason as stated earlier, viz. that it is being cultivated in India for the last 150 years (not to speak of the intrinsic merits and importance of the English language and literature). The Honours Examination in English should consist of not less than eight papers, each of four hours' duration, and the syllabus and questions should be so framed as to compel first-hand study of original texts and discourage second-hand study

through criticisms and histories of literature. This last is a great evil spoiling English studies in universities all over India, and we must do all that we can to put it down if we mean business and desire to give English studies an honoured place in our universities.

The Honours course in English must include both literature and philology (including phonetics), and there should be room for rhetoric and prosody in one of the eight papers. Needless to say, standards of teaching, study and examination in Honours courses must be pitched fairly high; an Honours course must be worth its name. At present we would come across in our country hundreds of young men and women flaunting Honours and M.A. degrees in English of Indian universities and yet unable to write ten correct English sentences together. English studies in Indian universities are bound to come to a dead end if we allow this sorry state of things to continue. Let there be a rule that answers written in bad English at the Honours Examination in English would be summarily rejected.

Only two classes should be awarded in Honours examinations: first and second. The written examination should be followed by a *viva voce* test. In order that it might not be misused as a lever for moving up candidates from a lower to a higher class, only negative awards should be made at the *viva* for gross deficiencies, if any, of knowledge, understanding and equipment shown by candidates. In the case of candidates for the Honours degree in English, glaring defects of pronunciation should be regarded as a gross deficiency of equipment.

M.A. COURSE IN ENGLISH

For the same reasons as stated under 'Honours Course in English', all Indian universities should attempt to provide for an M.A. course in English. Needless to say, standards of teaching, study and examination in M.A./M.Sc. courses should be high enough to be fully worthy of their name: mark the word *Master*. The standards should be such that whenever and wherever we come across a person possessing a Master's degree of an Indian university, we may without hesitation take it for granted that he or she really knows something. Unfortunately, as things go now, this is far from being the case. It is imperative that Indian universities should, at the earliest possible moment, enhance the standards of their Master's degree. Let there be at least one examination-degree of Indian universities that carries with it the hall-mark of unquestioned distinction. I would accordingly suggest as follows:—

(1) The M.A./M.Sc. course should be a *two-year* course following a three-year Honours course. Certain Indian universities have a one-year M.A./M.Sc. course following a three-year Honours course. This is hardly a sound practice. Even if we have a well-organised Honours course of high standards, how much of post-graduate study worth the name is possible in one year? A possible objection to my proposal may be that its adoption will unduly prolong the academic career of our youths. This objection, however, has no real validity. An M.A./M.Sc. degree is by no means a *sine qua non* for entry even into the higher branches of Government service (barring a certain number of specialised posts), nor is it indispensable for entry into any of the higher professions (excepting the higher levels of the teaching profession) or for admission into foreign universities. Students who want to go out to earn or to go abroad for further studies may easily do so after obtaining their B.A./B.Sc. degrees with or without Honours. The M.A./M.Sc. course is primarily meant for those who would be college or university teachers and those who want to pursue knowledge and research for their own sake. There is, therefore, no reason why we should shorten the duration of the M.A./M.Sc. course, even for those who have done a three-year Honours course.

(2) Admission to the M.A./M.Sc. course in any subject should be restricted to those who have obtained an Honours degree in that or an analogous subject. The Regulations of Indian Universities should explicitly prescribe an Honours degree as an essential prerequisite for the M.A./M.Sc. degree.

(3) Only two classes should be awarded in the M.A./M.Sc. Examination: first and second. The Examination should consist of not less than ten papers (each of four hours' duration) *plus* a dissertation *plus* a *viva*. For reasons already stated, only negative awards should be made at the *viva*. It should be permissible for candidates to submit their dissertations in the same year as they take the written papers or earlier or later. There need be no insistence that the dissertation must embody the results of out-and-out original research or thinking. All that the dissertation should be meant to test would be the candidate's ability to organise the results of detailed first-hand investigation into a selected subject, on which he would be expected to say one or two new things.

The M.A. course in English should cover the entire range of English Literature from the beginnings to the twentieth century. Old and Middle English must be compulsory; there is no point in

obtaining an M.A. degree in English without any knowledge of Old and Middle English. In addition to compulsory papers, the syllabus should also find room for a few optional papers on the following among other subjects :—(i) English and Germanic Philology; (ii) English Metrics; (iii) English Critical Theory; (iv) Detailed study of a prescribed period of English Literature in relation to the social, political, and intellectual history of that period. Syllabus and questions must be framed in such a way as to compel first-hand study of original texts. Glaring defects of pronunciation on the part of candidates should be punishable by negative awards at the *viva*. Bad English in the written papers should lead to a summary rejection of the answers concerned. All this should be expressly provided for in the University Regulations.

The M.A./M.Sc. degree of Indian Universities (particularly in English) is regarded even in this country itself as inferior to the Honours degree of western universities, and for good reasons too. For instance, in making a teaching appointment, an Indian University would ordinarily prefer a candidate possessing a first or even second-class Honours degree of, say, London to one possessing a first-class M.A. degree awarded by itself. This is a strange commentary indeed on the worth of our M.A./M.Sc. degrees. We cannot get out of this shameful state of affairs and remove the stigma of inferiority from our M.A./M.Sc. degree unless we raise the standards on the lines I have suggested. The matter, I should think, is serious enough to engage the immediate attention of all Indian Universities and other bodies concerned with higher education in India.

ENGLISH AS A SUBJECT FOR RESEARCH DEGREES

English is certainly an important and worthy subject of research for Indian Universities. But the way research in English is being carried on at present in Indian Universities calls for drastic amendment. Research in English in Indian Universities, whether done by persons holding research scholarships or by candidates for research degrees, is usually of the nature of critical and historical studies that break but little new ground, and the theses produced are glorified essays rather than research-work properly so called. On analysis these theses are mostly found to be rehashes of or embroideries on things already known and stated, and the authors appear to be ill-informed about the work already done on or around the subjects concerned in England and America. Such repetitive work passing for research can only be regarded as a deplorable waste of intellect.

tual energy, and serves only to bring English studies in Indian Universities into ridicule and contempt. If they cannot get out of this morass of fruitless re-iteration, Indian Universities had better not encourage research in English.

The fact of the matter is that the field of English Literature has been so thoroughly ploughed by English, American and German scholars in course of the last hundred years that little scope is now left for original work unless one is prepared to delve into the minutiae of a period or movement. Research work in English in Indian Universities, if it means to be research in the proper sense of the term, must turn its attention to these minutiae. But how can a research worker delve into these unless his University provides him with the necessary appliances for doing so? If, then, an Indian University desires that fruitful research in English should be done under its auspices (and there is every reason that it should so desire), it must have its library well-stocked with the following :—

(1) Micro-films of as many issues as possible of old defunct periodicals like, say, *The Gentleman's Magazine* (a veritable store-house of research material). There are organizations now-a-days in England and America which undertake the supply of such micro-films on request (see *Unesco Library Bulletin*).

(2) Photostats or micro-films of a large number of early manuscripts and early printed texts, and all modern reprints or facsimiles of these that have been published so far.

(3) All definitive modern editions that have been published so far of English texts, major and minor, of all periods (the minor ones being as important for research purposes as the major ones). (For out-of-print items, contact should be made with suppliers like Messrs. Blackwell of Oxford).

(4) Current numbers of at least a dozen of the learned journals, English and American, that specialise in English studies (e.g., *Modern Language Review*, *Review of English Studies*, *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, *Modern Philology*, *Studies in Philology*, *Philological Quarterly*, *Modern Language Notes*, *Shakespeare Quarterly*, *PMLA*, etc. *Notes and Queries* must also be subscribed to). These are indispensable for research workers in English.

(5) Micro-films of back-numbers (as many as possible) of such learned journals.

(6) Essays and studies published from time to time by the English Departments of Western Universities, particularly American Universities (recent as well as earlier issues).

(7) Correspondence, autobiographies, diaries, journals, memoirs, feminiscences, and the like of English writers, major and minor, of all periods, and of their friends and associates. (These contain valuable research material).

In addition, a University must be prepared to supply at its own cost micro-films of any manuscript, rare book, periodical or document that may be required by a research-worker in English.

To avoid useless duplication, a research-worker must keep himself well-posted with information concerning the work already done on or around his subject. His University should, therefore, subscribe to and collect back-numbers of at least these five publications:—*The Year's Work in English Studies* (English Assn., London), *Annual Bibliography of English Language and Literature* (Modern Humanities Research Association, Cambridge), *Work in Progress* (id.), *Shakespeare Survey* (Cambridge University Press), and *Subject-Index to Periodicals* (Library Association, London). It should also have a complete stock of such valuable modern bibliographies as the *Cambridge Bibliography of English Language and Literature*, Landa's bibliography of Restoration and Eighteenth-Century Literature (compiled for the *Philological Quarterly*), etc., along with all bibliographies published so far of individual writers and texts, e.g., Ebisch and Schücking's *Shakespeare Bibliography* (with Supplement), Raven's *Hamlet Bibliography*, Stevens's *Reference Guide to Milton*, Keynes's bibliography of Donne, and the like. Such bibliographies are indispensable for research-workers in English.

Fundamental research in English Literature—e.g., determining the canon of an early writer, preparing definitive editions (complete with *apparatus criticus*) of hitherto unedited writers and texts, dating or deciphering old manuscripts and early printed texts, and the like—is practically unknown in India. This is where Indian Universities that desire to promote genuine research in English Literature, should turn their attention. It will be necessary for this purpose to depute a member of the university teaching staff to either the U.K. or the U.S.A. to learn English palaeography and bibliography, which it will be his duty on return to teach to all research-workers in English at his university. The latter should provide him with all materials that may be needed by him to do this duty, and should make it

obligatory for all research-scholars and candidates for research degrees in English, whatever their subject, to take a course of training at the university in English palaeography and bibliography. It should also be made obligatory for them to acquire, if they do not have it already, a working knowledge of a major European language (ancient or modern) other than English.

Unless Indian universities are prepared to do and provide all these, they had better stop awarding research scholarships and research degrees in English.

Those who guide research-work in English at Indian universities have a special responsibility in the matter. They must not allow those working under them to choose such themes for their research as would lead merely to large-scale essay-writing around things already known and understood. Mere secretaryship to existing knowledge, dotting its i's and crossing its t's, is hardly a profitable occupation for the human mind.

ENGLISH AS A MEDIUM OF INSTRUCTION IN OTHER SUBJECTS

Whatever has been said or implied above about the value of English as a subject in university courses in India does not necessarily prove its suitability as a medium of teaching and study in subjects other than English—not even in the highest stages of university education in India. Whatever the merits and advantages of English as a language, we in India must now prepare ourselves for a gradual replacement of English by regional languages as medium of instruction in subjects other than English in all stages of university education. This is not merely a matter of national sentiment—it is a question of sound educational practice. The reasons why a foreign language ought not to be the medium of instruction are well summed up in a memorable remark made by the late Dr. Stresemann, famous Chancellor of the Weimar Republic, at a meeting of the League of Nations: "The mother-tongue is the innermost sanctuary of the soul". Once the implications of the remark are clearly grasped, there can be no question that in subjects other than itself English must by easy stages give place to regional languages as medium of university education in India. The necessity of this change is further proved by the stagnation of thought in medieval Europe, which no less an authority than Dr. Coulton attributes to, among other things, the universal use of Latin (*i.e.*, a language other than the mother-tongue) in scholastic circles.

The only difficulty in the way of the proposed change is lack of suitable text-books in the regional languages of India. This, however, is not an insuperable difficulty, and there is no reason why it cannot be removed, in, say, ten years if Indian Universities set about the task of removing it in earnest. As for technical terms we need not wait till Indian equivalents have been found for all of them; whatever the purist might say, most of these should be taken over bodily in transliteration into the various regional languages. Meanwhile, as a preparation for the change-over, candidates for all university examinations in subjects other than English may be given the option of writing their answers in the regional language of the area concerned; with permission to use technical and semi-technical terms in transliteration or in Roman script. The existence of such an option will gradually create a demand for suitable text-books in the regional languages, and the demand in its turn will call forth the first supplies. This particular experiment has succeeded in West Bengal where the Calcutta University has been for the last few years allowing this option to candidates for the Intermediate and B.A./B.Sc. (Pass) Examinations in subjects other than English. This has gradually brought into existence a considerable number of books in Bengali on different subjects for the two examinations (including a number of science subjects). Although most of the books smack too much of examination requirements, they have none the less made a beginning by way of filling in a void in the language, and have evolved a suitable terminology in Bengali for each of the subjects concerned. Personally I am in favour of this option being extended right up to the M.A./M.Sc. examinations as an interim measure pending the final replacement of English by the regional languages of India as the medium of university education in all its stages in all subjects other than English.

A suggestion has been made in recent years that the regional language should be the medium of instruction and examination in English as well. On principle there is not much to object to in the proposal. Western universities teach and hold examinations in foreign languages and literatures through the medium not of those languages but of the native language of the country or area concerned, and they are none the worse for that. I have found from personal experience that English Literature can be taught with great success in Bengali even in M.A. classes provided one is allowed the occasional use of English expressions not susceptible of a happy translation. I should have found the proposal not altogether unacceptable.

but for one horrible possibility. It is well known that one can obtain an Honours or M.A. degree of an Indian university in language-subjects like, say, Sanskrit or French without knowing very much of those languages, simply because answers can be given mostly in English. It is the frightful prospect of English coming to share the same fate if the medium of instruction and examination is a language other than English that reconciles me to the existing practice in respect of that subject in university courses in India; and I would conclude by re-emphasizing a particular suggestion I have made above, viz. that in the English papers in Honours and M.A. examinations answers written in bad English should be summarily rejected.

THE INDIAN PROBLEM IN SOUTH AFRICA: CAPE TOWN—SUCCESS (1927-46)

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II

The Pegging Act was put into operation before long. The Minister of the Interior refused to grant permits to Indians in many cases to occupy properties they had already purchased in the predominantly European areas of Durban. The 'Illegal' occupiers of Stands were hauled up before the Court for the contravention of the Act. Local authorities all over South Africa were "inspired to inaugurate housing schemes for the segregation of Indians and other races". A section of the Indian population in Natal began to be steadily ousted from its economic footholds by the penetration of Europeans into Indian areas. That was the real problem in Durban. The penetration by Indians into European areas was no problem at all. The Indian market-gardeners began to be turned out of their little holdings by Europeans, who wanted sites for house-building or by industrialists, who were spreading along the coast. It was apprehended that Indians thus dispossessed would be driven into Durban's unskilled labour market.

The Natal Indian Congress met at Durban in February, 1944. The Congress expressed its indignation at the Pegging Act, which in its opinion was "the negation of the most elementary human right and a violation of the principles of democracy and (also) those underlying the Cape Town Agreement of 1927". The Congress resolved to oppose the Act, and

(i) to organise mass meeting of protest against the Act all over Natal ;

(ii) to sponsor the signing of a mass petition to be presented to the Union Government ;

(iii) to seek the co-operation of Indian and other organisations in the Transvaal and the Cape Province ;

(iv) to awaken world opinion in general and opinion in India and Great Britain in particular against the Act.

The Government of India was requested by the Congress to recall the Indian High Commissioner in South Africa as a protest

against the passing of the Pegging Act. Copies of the above resolutions were to be forwarded to the Government of India, the Indian High Commissioner in South Africa and the national leaders of India, among others.¹⁹

Prime Minister Smuts had suggested in his message to the 1944 session of the Congress the appointment of a commission to investigate the important issues affecting the Indian community. The latter was asked to participate in the commission's work. The Congress after a heated discussion, gave its verdict in favour of co-operation with the proposed commission with certain reservations. Senator Clarkson, the Minister of the Interior, announced the appointment of the Third Broome Commission a fortnight later. It was composed of Mr. Justice F. N. Broome (Chairman), Mr. W. M. Power, Senator D. G. Shepstone, Mr. S. R. Naidoo, Mr. A. I. Kajee and Mr. I. A. de Gruchy (Secretary).

The Commission was "to inquire into and to report upon matters affecting the Indian community of the Province of Natal, with special reference to housing and health needs, civic amenities, civic status and provision of adequate residential, educational, religious and recreational facilities and to make recommendations generally as to what steps are necessary further to implement the uplift clauses of the Cape Town Agreement of 1927 and as to all matters affecting the well-being and advancement of the permanent Indian population of Natal"²⁰

The appointment of the Third Broome Commission was followed by the Pretoria Agreement (April 19, 1944). The Agreement was the

¹⁹ That this Conference expresses its strong indignation at the passing of Act 85 of 1943, commonly known as the Pegging Act which it considers to be the negation of the most elementary human right and a violation of the principles of democracy and those underlying the Cape Town Agreement of 1927.

"The Pegging Act has been sponsored by Anti-Asiatics with a view to strangling the Indian community economically, and this Conference is firmly of the opinion that there existed no justifiable ground for the Union Government to pass this most obnoxious legislation and hence demands the immediate repeal of the Pegging Act, and to give effect to this demand, resolves to carry on a mass campaign on the following lines, namely :—

"(a) Hold mass meetings of protest in every part of Natal,

"(b) Sponsor the signing of a mass petition and present the same to the Union Government.

"(c) Seek the Co-operation of Indian and other organisations in the Transvaal and the Cape Province.

"(d) Awaken world opinion particularly in India and Great Britain against the Act."

This Conference resolves to request the Government of India to recall the High Commissioner in South Africa as a protest against the passing and the perpetuation of the Pegging Act of 1943 and that copies of this resolution be forwarded to the Government of India, the High Commissioner, national leaders in India and to other quarters.

²⁰ Review of Important Events Relating to or Affecting Indians in different parts of the British Empire during the year 1943-44, p. I.

outcome of negotiations between the Government of South Africa and the Natal Indian Congress. Under the Agreement, the Pegging Act was to be allowed to lapse on the expiry of its original term on March 31, 1946, and an Ordinance of the Natal Provincial Government was to take the place thereof. The Ordinance was to provide for the establishment of a Licensing Board of five—three Europeans and two Indians—to control the occupation of dwellings by licensing. Of the three European members of the Board one was to act as the Chairman.²¹

The Pretoria Agreement recognised the right of Indians to own and occupy property anywhere in Natal—a right denied by the Pegging Act.—“ save and except in the case of occupation of dwellings for residential purposes in urban areas which was likely to engender racial bickering due to juxtapositional living ”.²²

The control of the occupation of dwellings by Indians contemplated in the Pretoria Agreement was in respect of residential occupation only. Mr. G. Heaton Nicholls, the Administrator of Natal, told a correspondent of the Star (Johannesburg) after the signature of the Agreement, “ Areas will be set up in which one race may not take the place of another in any dwellings. The Board will determine these areas and will issue occupation licenses ”. The spirit behind the agreement was that Indians would accept statutory-voluntary—not statutory-segregation in Durban provided civic amenities of the same standard and on the same scale were available in Indian as well as European quarters. The acceptance was not to jeopardise in any way the inherent right to the ownership and occupation of property throughout the rest of Natal.

New Delhi re-acted favourably to the Pretoria Agreement as it accepted the principle of “ *no statutory segregation of Indians* ”, The Government of India pointed out at the same time that something more positive than the mere withdrawal of a threat was necessary for the improvement of the position of the Indians in the Union of South Africa.

Not a few in South Africa—Indians and Europeans alike—condemned the Pretoria Agreement with vehemence. It was condemned

²¹ “ It was agreed that the situation would best be met by the introduction of an ordinance into the Natal Provincial Council. This Ordinance would provide for the creation of a board consisting of two Europeans and two Indian members under the chairmanship of a third European, who will be a man of legal training. The object of the legislation will be to create machinery for the board to control occupation by the licensing of dwellings in certain areas; and the application of the Pegging Act in Durban is to be withdrawn by a proclamation on the passing of this ordinance.” Official statement issued on April 19, 1944 by Government of South Africa.

²² *Indians Overseas, 1938-49*, by C. Koudapi, p. 259.

as an "unpardonable crime", a "shameful betrayal of the Indian people" and a "virtual sell-out of the Indian community". The Colonial Born and Settlers' Indian Association, the Nationalist Group of the Transvaal Indian Congress, the Liberal Study Group, the Communist Party, the Anti-Segregation Council and some Trade Unions branded the Agreement as a stigma on India's national honour. On the European side, the Durban City Council, among others, expressed its disapproval of the Agreement on the ground that it was hostile to the best interests of the city of Durban and the country as a whole.

The Provincial Government of Natal took steps for the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement before long and published the Draft Occupation Control Ordinance on June 2, 1944, to replace the Pegging Act. The Ordinance, generally acceptable to the Natal Indian Congress, was not so to the Natal Europeans. It was the hostile attitude of the latter that forced the Administrator to refer the Ordinance after the first reading to a Select Committee, though according to the South African Constitution, an Ordinance can be referred to a Select Committee only after the second reading.

The Select Committee modified the Ordinance radically and submitted the same to the Provincial Council as the Residential Property Regulation Ordinance together with its report on the original Ordinance. The modifications were all against Indian interests. While the Pretoria Agreement was concerned only with the occupation of individual dwellings, the new Ordinance provided for the control of acquisition as well occupation of residential properties. The agreement envisaged the control of occupation in the city of Durban alone in the first instance and in other boroughs and townships only after an enquiry by the board to be set up according to the terms of the Agreement and the provisions of the Draft Occupation Control Ordinance. The Residential Property Regulation Ordinance, on the other hand, envisaged the immediate control of occupation in boroughs and townships all over Natal. The Pretoria Agreement proposed to set up a machinery of a temporary nature to control the occupation of properties, whereas the new Ordinance provided for the establishment of a machinery of a permanent character.

The Natal Post-war Re-construction Commission—an all European body—had in the meanwhile recommended racial zoning in Durban. The Natal Provincial Council accepted the recommendation and promulgated the Natal Housing Board Ordinance and the Provincial and Local Authorities Expropriation Ordinance along with

the Residential Property Regulation Ordinance (November 3, 1944). The first provided for the establishment of a Housing Board with powers to acquire and sell property and the second empowered the Local authorities to expropriate land. These Ordinances violated the Pretoria Agreement in more respects than one. They sought to impose racial segregation. The Indians raised their voice of protest against them. Prime Minister Smuts was approached by the Indians with a request to veto the Residential Property Regulation Ordinance as it did not conform to the Pretoria Agreement. The Government of India too shook off their indifference and imposed reciprocal restrictions on South African nationals in India in terms of Sec. 2 of the (Indian) Reciprocity Act, 1943. The restrictions were to be effective on and from November 3, 1944, i.e., the day on which the Natal Housing Board Ordinance, the Provincial and Local Authorities Expropriation Ordinance and the Residential Property Regulation Ordinance were promulgated. The Indian legislature demanded at the same time the imposition of economic sanctions on South Africa and the recall of the Indian High Commissioner therefrom.

Prime Minister Smuts admitted in his reply to Indian representations that the Residential Property Regulation Ordinance violated the Pretoria Agreement. He however thought that it (The Pretoria Agreement) had already lapsed "as the Agreement specifically provided for proceeding by way of an Ordinance and made no further provision for its implementation"²³ He said further that the Pegging Act stood unrepealed and was in force and that he would advise the Natal Provincial Government to reserve the Residential Property Regulation Ordinance for his Majesty's approval. The Natal Housing Board Ordinance and the Local Authorities Expropriation Ordinance were however to become laws straight-way.

The passing of the Residential Property Regulation Ordinance before the Third Broome Commission completed its labours was irregular. It meant in reality the prejudging of matters which were subjudice to all intents and purposes. The Indian members of the Commission Mr. S. R. Naidoo and Mr. A. I. Kajee, therefore resigned from the Commission on December 7, 1944.

The Natal Housing Board Ordinance, the Provincial and Local Authorities Expropriation Ordinance and the Residential Property Regulation Ordinance were finally declared *ultra vires* of the powers of the Natal Provincial Council. The situation created by the declara-

tion was met by the South African Housing (Emergency Powers) Act passed by the Union Parliament in 1945 (June 11). The Act conferred on the Natal Provincial Administration practically all the powers they had sought to assume by the Ordinances under reference. It empowered the Governor-General to issue regulations in respect of the powers of the Natal Housing Board to be set up by the Provincial Council. Local bodies were authorised at the same time to construct dwellings, expropriate property and "carry out other incidental purposes". The regulations, which were to be limited to a period of three years in the first instance, might be renewed by a resolution of both Houses of the Union Parliament. The Minister of the Interior retained the powers of expropriation. Section 4 of the Act empowered the Natal Provincial Council to set up a Housing Board by Ordinance.

The Government of India and the Natal Indian Congress were assured on behalf of the Union Government that they would be consulted at the time the Governor-General framed regulations under the South African (Emergency Powers) Housing Act. The Union Government said further that they had no knowledge of Natal's policy of racial zoning and that they did not contemplate introducing such a policy. The Natal Provincial Administration, they assured, could not inaugurate a policy of racial zoning without their (The Union Government's) approval, and that the Natal Indian Congress would be consulted before the enforcement of the same. The congress was satisfied by these assurances.

The Natal Housing Ordinance was passed by the Natal Provincial Council in September, 1945. The Natal Housing Board, to be set up under the Ordinance, could appropriate land and prescribe conditions limiting ownership or occupation of land appropriated to persons of a specified class and prohibiting ownership or occupation of the same by persons of any other class. The Indians rightly feared that the expropriatory powers conferred on the Government by the Natal Housing Ordinance might be used for purposes of racial discrimination and protested against the Ordinance. Prime Minister Smuts however sought to allay the fears of the Indians. Explaining the policy of the Government, he "pointed to" the safeguards provided in the form of stipulation for prior ministerial consent and for the same ministerial approval, in accordance with the regulation promulgated under the South African Housing (Emergency Powers) Act, 1945, for prescription by the Board

of any conditions referred to above.²⁴ The Prime Minister assured further that these safeguards would be used to ensure "a reasonable and equitable exercise of the powers and protection to every section of the community."

The Interim Report of the Third Broome Commission had been published in the meanwhile on June 11, 1945. The Commission had made one, and only one, recommendation "the only way out of the present impasse lies in the direction of a full and frank exchange of views between the Government of the Union and the Government of India and that the Union Government should invite the Government of India to send to the Union a delegation composed substantially of Indians, for the purpose of discussion with the Union Government and with such representatives as the Union Government may appoint, with such other persons as the delegation may invite, (of) all matters affecting Indians in South Africa."

The Union Government had been thinking at this time of enfranchising the Indian Community. The Minister of the Interior, Mr. Clarkson, made a very important policy statement in the Union Parliament in 1944. He emphasized the need of Indian representations in the Parliament and said . . . "the first Indians came to Natal at the request of the Natal Government and the people of Natal, and the great bulk of the present Indian population are their descendants. They are South Africans: this is their home. They are not foreigners; they are Union nationals. We have an obligation to play the game. As Minister, I intend to see that justice shall prevail. If we could only get the small opposing minorities of both sections to agree, I am sure this question could be settled to the satisfaction of the Indians and the Europeans without any loss of self-respect for either."

Mr. Clarkson's speech infuriated many. There was a flutter in the South African dovecote. The champions of racialism and 'baaskap' went into tantrums by Mr. Clarkson was bitterly attacked in the Parliament by Mr. F. H. Acutt, among others . . . "Since the passing of the Pegging Act a new Minister had taken over Indian affairs and had been making speeches that had disturbed the minds of the European population. He had tried at Maritzburg, on December 3, last year, to persuade municipalities to grant the vote to Indians. The history of the Indian question in South Africa

²⁴ Indians overseas, 1938-1949, by C. Kondabi, p. 272.

was one long list of concessions to the Indians from the day they were introduced into the country. If things developed as they were, it will only be a question of time, before the Indians swallow up the whole of South Africa." More lies have hardly been said in fewer words. Brazenfacedness could not perhaps go farther.

The Third Broome Commission, as noted above, recommended a Round Table Conference between the Governments of India and the Union of South Africa. The recommendation was ignored. Prime Minister Smuts declared on January 21, 1946, that his Government would introduce a Bill with the object of prohibiting the acquisition and occupation of immovable property by Indians in Natal except in certain exempted areas. The Government of India and the Indian Community in Natal were not a little surprised as they had been given to understand that the Natal Housing Ordinance passed in September, 1945, was a solution of the Indian problem and that the Pegging Act would not be renewed on the expiry of its term on March 31, 1946. The Government of India instructed their High Commissioner in South Africa to request the Union Government to postpone the introduction of the proposed Bill and to arrange a Round Table Conference between the two Governments as recommended by the Third Broome Commission to find out an alternative solution. The request was turned down by Prime Minister Smuts on the ground that "it was a matter of essentially domestic policy for the Union".

The South African House of Assembly (Lower House) passed the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of June 3, 1946. The Act better known as the Ghetto Act, replaced the Pegging Act of 1943 and divided Natal into two zones—(a) Controlled Areas and (b) Exempted Areas. The former were reserved exclusively for acquisition and occupation by the European Community. Any one—European, Indian or Malay—could, on the other hand, purchase and occupy land in the exempted areas. Only 350 acres of land were allotted to Indians and other non-Europeans in the Old Borough of Durban, though the Indians alone numbered 25,000 in the district. The 65,000 strong European Community of the Old Borough, on the other hand, already occupied 2,940 acres of land in the district. The provisions of the Pegging Act, which were of a temporary nature, were extended to the whole of Natal on a permanent basis. The Ghetto Act in fact did a greater mischief. The provision for separate areas envisaged in the Act introduced the principle of racial segregation in Natal for the first time. Fixed property in the Exempted

Areas could be freely transferred by non-Asians to Asians and vice versa. In other areas, any such transfer—both for acquisition and occupation—could take place only if the Minister of the Interior granted a permit to the effect. The Act further provided for a Joint Land Tenure Advisory Board of two Indian and two European members. A third European was to Act as the Chairman of the Board. The Board was authorised to grant permits in certain Controlled areas. The Orange Free State and the Cape Province were excluded from the operation of Ghetto Act. But in 1946 there were barely a dozen Indians in the Orange Free State and Indians are barred by immigration laws from entering and living therein. The exclusion of the Orange Free State from the operation of the Act therefore meant nothing. As to the Cape Province, it may be noted that it has a comparatively small Indian population²⁵ and immigrational prohibition against their entry into the Province keeps down their number effectively.

The Act granted communal franchise to Indians. Indians, who—

- (a) were Union nationals and over 21 years,
- (b) had passed the sixth standard or its equivalent and
- (c) had an annual income of £84 or more or owned immovable property of the minimum value of £250

were to elect two European members to the Senate (Upper House) and three European members to the House of Assembly of the Union Parliament. Indians in Natal, who fulfilled the above conditions, were to return two Indian members to the Natal Provincial Council. The Indians were, however, given no representation in the Transvaal Provincial Council.

The Ghetto Act marked "the culmination of the discriminatory policy of the Union of South Africa against Indians and other Asians which has been practised over the last half a century or so. It gave permanent recognition to the principle of segregation of Asians, which has been opposed by the Indian Community and the Indian Government" ²⁶ for more than a quarter of a century.

The Ghetto Act was in many respects more objectionable than the Pegging Act (1943) which it replaced. Let us illustrate. In the first place, the Pegging Act was applicable only to Durban,

²⁵ There were 233,539 Indians in South Africa in 1916. They were distributed as follows—(a) Natal—228,119, (b) The Transvaal—37,505. (c) The Cape Province—16,000 and (d) The Orange Free State—14.

²⁶ Spotlight on South Africa (published by the Government of India), p. 14.

whereas the Ghetto Act was to apply not only to the whole of Natal, but to the Transvaal as well. Secondly, the Pegging Act was applicable only to residential land in urban areas; but the Ghetto Act was to apply to all kinds of land including agricultural land in rural as well as urban areas. Legislation before 1946 had aimed at controlling occupation of land by Indians; but the Ghetto Act went farther and sought to regulate acquisition as well as occupation of land by the Indians. Kondapi sums up the effects of the Ghetto Act in the following words: "By thus laying the axe on the elementary right of Indians to inherit, acquire and occupy property anywhere they like, the Act annihilated the basic rights enjoyed by Indians for over 80 years and condemned them to economic servitude. As regards the franchise provisions, the Act offered communal franchise after infliction on them (Indians) a statutory racial stigma (Indians to be represented by Europeans in both houses of the Union Parliament) which no franchise could alter" ²⁷.

The land tenure provisions of the Ghetto Act laid down that all transfers of land between Asians and non-Asians except in the 'Exempted Areas' of Natal and the Transvaal were illegal. No Asian could borrow on his property in a 'Controlled Area' more than 50 per cent of its value. Mortgage bonds in force at the time of the passing of the Act were however not to be affected by this provision. It was apprehended—and the apprehension was only natural—that in the long run Asians would have to sell their properties in the "Controlled Areas" to Europeans.

The Cape Town Agreements of 1927 and 1932 were treated as mere scraps of paper by the authors of the Ghetto Act, which was a negation of the basic principles of the Agreements. It was, in short, "the culmination of the South African European racial aggression against Indians and Asians."

Feelings ran high on both shores of the Indian ocean. Events moved fast. The Government of India terminated the Indo-South African Trade Agreement. Trade relations between the two countries were severed. The Indian High Commissioner in South Africa was recalled. On June 13, 1946, Indians in South Africa began passive resistance against the Ghetto Act and a batch of Indian women from the Transvaal entered Natal without permits. The Indian objection to the Ghetto Act was based on the following grounds, among others—

²⁷ Indian Overseas, 1938-1949, p. 274.

(i) It abrogated the Cape Town Agreement of 1927 arbitrarily and unilaterally.

(ii) It extended anti-Asian segregation laws for the first time throughout Natal and the Old Transvaal Republic.

(iii) It threatened to reduce the Indian community to economic serfdom.

(iv) It would destroy "whatever incentive there might have been in Natal to improve the living conditions of Indians, especially in Urban areas" as it had already done in the Transvaal; because of the neglect of non-European interests by municipal authorities.

(v) It reduced the Indians to a position of racial inferiority and subordination to the Europeans in all respects and for all time to come. India was on the verge of independence in 1946. Hence the Act was regarded as "a humiliation and a cause of provocation to India".

(vi) It closed to the Indians all avenues of advancement that had been gradually opening to them and was, therefore, sure to deprive the younger generation of Indians of all hopes for the future.

(vii) The limited and small communal franchise representation granted to the Indians under the Act would serve no useful purpose whatever.

(viii) The Act was self-contradictory—it did not recognise the right of India to intervene formally on behalf of Indians in the Union of South Africa; but the right of equal citizenship was denied to them on the ground that they were Indians.

(ix) The Act emphasized the colour bar, intensified race hatred, threatened internal security and endangered world-peace "by aligning peoples in terms of white and non-white—the one differentiation that can never be altered".²¹

The Government of India lodged a formal complaint to the United Nations against the Ghetto Act on the ground that it (the Act) was the "culmination of racial discrimination against Indians in South Africa". The situation created by the Act, the Government of India contended, was likely to impair friendly relations between two members—India and the Union of South Africa—of the United Nations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was requested to place the complaint of India before the General Assembly, which was scheduled to meet on October 23, 1946.

²¹ Vide Spotlight on South Africa (published by the Govt. of India), pp. 15-17.

Passive resistance by the Indians, launched in June, continued in the mean while. The movement took the form of peaceful occupation of land in non-Exempted areas by Indians in violation of the Ghetto Act. The resisters were arrested under the Riotous Assembly Act. In all, nearly 2,300 Indians—men and women—Europeans and Africans, courted imprisonment. Eminent Indians like Dr. Yusuf Mahomed Dadoo, President of the Transvaal Indian Congress, Dr. G. M. Naicker, President of the Natal Indian Congress, Shorabjee Rustumjee, an ex-President of the South African Indian Congress, Dr. Kaisbal Gooman, a leader of the Indian Women's Association, among others, were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. The Europeans had recourse to hooliganism to crush the movement. The camps of the '*Satyagrahis*' were raided during the night, ropes of tents were cut and tents removed or set fire to, camps were pulled down, blankets, taken away and women '*satyagrahis*', kicked. An Indian Police Constable of Durban Krishnaswamy Pillay was brutally assaulted in the public street by a gang of European hooligans. Pillay was removed to the hospital where he succumbed to his injuries²⁹. Repression and hooliganism notwithstanding, the Indians remained firm in their resolve to resist the Ghetto Act.

The Europeans were furious. They thought of breaking the morale of Indians with economic weapons. An organised campaign to boycott Indian traders and to refuse employment to Indians in European firms was launched by the Europeans. Confined in the beginning to the Transvaal in the main, the movement spread before long to certain areas of Natal as well. Boycott Committees were formed in many places. A meeting of the Europeans at *Petersburg* on February 10th, 1947, resolved to boycott Indian traders. European customers of Indian stores and European girls working in Indian establishments were to be "tarred and feathered." Similar meetings were organised in other places. The First Indian Boycott Congress met at Vereeniging in March, 1947. A boycott meeting of Europeans in Ermelo (Transvaal) Town Hall issued an appeal to European parents to deem it a personal duty "to instil anti-Asiatic sentiments into (their) children and to emphasize to them that it is a downright disgrace to trade with, or to be seen in or near an Indian Store". A systematic boycott of Indian trade in the Western Transvaal began at the same time. European patrons of Indian stores were waylaid, 'fined' and intimidated. Two months later, in May, 1947, a Congress of the

²⁹ *Satyagraha in South Africa*—Article by Swami Bhawani Dayal in the *Modern Review* (Calcutta), September, 1946.

South African Protection Movement (Indian Boycott Movement) adopted a Constitution, which aimed at :

- (a) Protecting "Western Civilization in South Africa against Oriental undermining and domination";
- (b) ending "all Indian immigration into South Africa" and
- (c) elimination of "Indians from the economic life of South Africa".

Retaliatory action was proposed against the European customers and employees of Indian Stores. Many contributed liberally to the funds collected for conducting the boycott campaign. The boycott proved very effective at one stage. Intimidation, blackmail and coercion were freely resorted to to make the boycott a success. A European farmer, who had voted in a meeting against the boycott, was waylaid and manhandled.

Some responsible commercial and political organisations and individual Europeans condemned the anti-Indian boycott movement in strong terms. They requested the Government to take counter-measures. The boycotters took the law in their own hands in not a few cases. The Government, however, remained a passive, if not sympathetic, spectator. In reply to a question in the Union Parliament, the Minister of Economic Development said that the boycott of Indian traders in South Africa was not a matter with which the Government was concerned³⁰. Mr. H. G. Lawrence, Minister of the Interior, characterised "the (Indian) passive resisters as dupes and pawns and their leaders as foreign ideologists"³¹.

Heavy odds notwithstanding, the Indian resistance campaign continued till June, 1948, when the Joint Passive Resistance Council of the Natal and the Transvaal Indian Congresses decided to suspend passive resistance temporarily pending an interview with Dr. D. F. Malan, who had just stepped into the shoes of Field-Marshal Smuts as the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa. P. S. Joshi observes that a new phase of the Passive Resistance Campaign had begun in January with the crossing of borders in violation of the 1913 Immigrants Regulation Act³². This however was no new development. The struggle had in fact begun with the violation of the said Act when on June 13, 1946, a batch of Indian women from the Transvaal had entered Natal without permits.

³⁰ Our Countrymen Abroad by Kumari Mukul Mukherjee, pp. 203-209.

³¹ The Struggle for Equality by P. S. Joshi, pp. 292-293.

³² *Ibid*, p. 292.

The United Nations had in the mean while taken into consideration Indian complaint against the Union of South Africa and given its verdict thereon. The Joint Legal and Political Committee of the United Nations Assembly adopted by 24 votes to 19 a French-Mexican proposal asking the Governments concerned to report at the next session of the Assembly on the measures adopted by them to settle their dispute about the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa. The General Assembly accepted the proposal by the requisite two thirds majority. 32 voted for and 15, against the proposal.

The Union Government have, however, refused to listen to the counsels of reason and moderation so far. Of this more anon.

(Concluded)

A STUDY ON THE ETERNITY OF SOUND

GOPIKA MOHAN BHATTACHARYA

Speculation on the eternal nature or otherwise of words are highly important in view of the fact that they are directly related to the problem of God. The Mīmāṃsakas who are generally known to be atheists¹ have elaborately dealt with the eternal nature of words and sought to establish the intrinsic validity of the Vedas. The implication of the Mīmāṃsā theory of the eternality of sound leads to the denial of God as the author of the Vedas. The Naiyāyikas on the other hand have fully demonstrated the transient nature of words and the Vedas have been regarded by them as the creation of the Supreme Lord along with the creation of other ephemeral objects. The Grammarians have also declared in unequivocal terms that the words are of eternal nature². Now all the philosophers agree on the point that the Vedas are nothing but the collection of words.³ Acārya Udayana furnishes us with a logical and clear definition of the Vedas. He says that each and every word cannot be called 'Vedic' because words used by common people are not Vedic. So also Manusmṛitī and Yajñavalkya-smṛitī are not regarded as the Vedas though they point to transcendent objects and direct the path leading to virtue. Thus Udayana declares that the Vedas are the collection of words the source of which lies always beyond the range of valid cognition and which have been accepted as authority by the wise.⁴ It is apparent, therefore, that all the contesting parties agree on the point that the Vedas partake of the nature of sound. It is, therefore, expected that the exact nature of a word should be first determined before we advert to the problem of the authorship of the Vedas.

¹ Dr. P. Śāstri in his Introduction to Pūrvamīmāṃsā refutes the popular belief.

Vide also Prakaraṇapañcīkā by Śālikanātha and Vaidikēśvaraḥ paramakāruṇikāḥ punarasmākam anugaṇa eva Mānamayodaya, p. 171.

² It should be however noted that the position of the Mīmāṃsists is entirely different from that of the Grammarians. The former believe in the eternity of sound (varṇanīyatā-vādin) while the latter agree with the Naiyāyikas in regarding sound as an ephemeral entity. The Grammarians hold that Sphoṭa an eternal and transcendental entity must be postulated, since a word which consists of fleeting sounds can never convey its meaning. Hence the grammarian Patañjali in his Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya describes word as eternal and non-eternal (śabdō nityaḥ Kāryasā-Pāpasā Abhikā).

³ Veda śabdān evādaś śabdarāśir vivakṣitaḥ—Śaṅkara's Commentary on the Muṇḍakopaniṣat.

⁴ Kusumājñali, Chap. II.

The Mīmāṃsakas emphatically refute the theory of Cosmic evolution. The Universe has no beginning in time, no origin can be traced of the currency of language. People have been acquainted with meanings of words through usage of senior experienced persons. Conversation and social intercourse strengthen one's knowledge about the meaning of a word. Carrying the process further backward the Mīmāṃsakas are led to conclude that these words are beginningless in time ever since the objects which are signified by words have come to light. Consequently words and their denotative potency cannot but be regarded as eternal entity.

Words reveal their meaning to us through conventions. A body is ignorant of the meaning of the word 'Cow'. The senior person commands the junior one to fetch the cow and also to bind the horse. The boy notices the course of action of fetching and binding and thereby comes to understand the sense of the term. The Mīmāṃsakas think that unless words are eternal it would have disappeared and consequently could not communicate its meaning. A word consists of so many letters. If the first letter be transient, so also the second, the combination of the first word with the second would not have been possible and thus the ascertainment of meaning would have been an impossibility.

Moreover, the Mīmāṃsakas contend, words would cease to be a valid source of knowledge. Validity of knowledge consists in conative satisfaction (*pravṛttisāmarthyā*).¹ If the word would disappear immediately after its utterance it would have lost all pragmatic efficiency and rendered itself barren.

But a question may pertinently arise in this connexion. If the words are eternal why are not they always present to our consciousness? The question can be answered by an analysis of the Mīmāṃsā view of verbal cognition. To them, all words are eternally existent. But they need the help of certain auxiliary agency that presents them to our consciousness. This agency inheres in the person who puts forth the effort. Prabhākara says that the mental activity of the speaker stirs up the internal organs, air comes out and renders the manifestation of sound possible which is already existent. The Logicians would rather hold that this effort on the part of the

¹ The Bhāṭṭas define valid knowledge as "the knowledge of an unknown and real object" (*Pramāṇa-sūtrātattvārthajñānam—Mānameyodaya*, p.2). But the Prabhākaras take exception to the term "tattvārtha" and prefer to dispense with it. Since according to them there is no false cognition. The Bhāṭṭas however, include the term "tattvārtha" to exclude invalid cognition from the definition of *Pramāṇa*.

speaker is the cause of the word whereas the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that it is only manifestive agency of an ever existing word.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas maintain that sounds are eternal since its locus is eternal. It is co-extensive with ākāśa and is thus ubiquitous. But sound is not apprehended everywhere, for the reason that its perceptibility depends upon the presence of an agent which serves the purpose of revealing the sound. Impact of two tangible bodies or wind on the vocal organ thrown by the internal organic pressure or sometimes disjunction serves as the condition of revealing of sound.¹

The revealing theory of sound has not infrequently been illustrated from the facts of our daily life. Sudden flash of lightning reveals the object nearby which did not come under the ken of perception in the past nor would it come in future. The object remains merged in deep darkness so that it is not cognisable by the sense organ. The Mīmāṃsaka posits that sound also remains covered by the etheric plane. Like the lamp *dhvani* also disperses the obstacle and thereby reveals the sound and gives incentive to the sound receiving faculty of the ear-cavity. As soon as *dhvani* recedes perception of sound comes to a stand-still.²

The Mīmāṃsakas further urge that eternality of sound is established by presumption (*arthapatti*) which, according to them constitutes the instrument of valid cognition. Presumption is an independent source of knowledge. That rather should be assumed which does not hinder the smooth understanding of the meaning of a word or sentence.³ The main objective to which a word is meant for, is the proper understanding of its meaning. But if the word is transitory it cannot yield any meaning. Proper understanding of the meaning follows from the cognition of syntactical relation between words and their meaning. But if they are regarded as momentary or vanish away after two moments then they fail to reveal the sense. And if even on hearing a word its meaning remains non-apprehended then the word loses its potency, why then any attempt for using the word would be made? It is thus proper to assume that all words are eternally existent.

¹ *Śabdām bodhayitum vāyavyasamyoga-vibhāgāvārabhyata
tayośca śrotasāmskāradvārā śabdābhivyāñjakatā-
Navavivaka, p. 285. (Madras University Publication).
Vide also—Śābarabhāṣya on Mīmāṃsa Sūtra 1. 1. 13.*

² *Mīmāṃsa Sūtra 1. 1. 13.*

³ *‘Sa dharmo’ bhyupagantavya yā pradhānam na vadhate etc.
Śloka-varttika—Śabdenityatādīkaraṇa, Śl. 240.*

in a locus different from that of the revealed. It is no good saying that mutual contact in these cases, is not at all essential or in that case all sound of harp far and near would have been predominated by that of the drum. But such an assumption is opposed to the verdict of our experience. That sound of harp which has come to be closely associated with the sound of drum has the chance of being predominated and none else.¹ The Mīmāṃsakas may however contend that each sound is not co-existent with its revealer. Sound is an ubiquitous entity. So not a single instance of the absence of contact can be detected. But to this we may reply that then each and every sound is liable to be manifested by any and every agent. No hard and fast rule could be promulgated with regard to such agency.

We have already discussed the view that diversity in apprehension guarantees diversity in object. Acuteness and dullness of sound are not fortuitous, they are not accidental properties but constitute the real essence of the object.²

The Mīmāṃsakas, as we have already seen, hold that sound is eternal and is made manifested by the impact of at least two tangible bodies. Now the Mīmāṃsakas have to admit that sound occupies the space ever prior to its manifestation. But no such pre-existing sound is apprehended by means of an instrument of cognition. The opponent may reply that such non-perception results from the presence of the obstructing agent. But, in fact, we find no obstructing agent which renders the apprehension of sound impossible. Thus non-cognition informs us of the absence of that object. *Anupalabdhi* informs us the absence of a thing which if it were present, could be perceived. So the non-existence of sound prior to its manifestation could be proved by this negative judgment. Utterance serves as the manifesting agent and sound is heard only when it is uttered leads us to conclude that sound was non-existent prior to its utterance and also ceases to exist when it does not come under the ken of olfactory perception.³

Uddyotakara's dialectics remind us of the process adopted by the Neologicians. He puts his syllogistic arguments in the following way:—Sound is non-eternal since it is a quality and is perceived by our senses like cognition (*buddhivat*). Secondly non-pervasiveness and non-eternity are concomitant. Pleasure inheres in soul and is

¹ Nyāyavārttika, pp. 604-5.

² Tibramandakā śabdātaveṣaṃ na bhaktikṛtā—N.V. on 2.2.17.

³ Nyāya Bhāṣya on 2.2.18.

Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 2.2.28.

itself non-pervasive in character. Sound inheres in non-pervasive substance i.e. *ākāśa*.*. Thus it is non-eternal. Pervasiveness is co-extensive with eternity. But no sane man can assert the pervasive character of sound ¹.

As regards the contention that no cause of the destruction of sound is seen to exist, it only betrays hasty assumption and slipshod thinking. Does the Mīmāṃsaka mean by such contention that non-perception informs us of the absence of any such cause of destruction? Or does he mean by *anupalabdhi* non-cognition in general? But the Bhāṭṭas mean by *anupalabdhi* non-cognition in general. We agree with the Mīmāṃsaka in holding that perception does not guarantee the existence of such cause but we fail to understand how the absence of inference can be posited.² Syllogistic reasoning becomes possible only when we assert the theory of sound series. The sound series is based upon a prior assumption that sound is an effect. The first sound produces the second, the second produces the third and so on, the last sound instance meets decay by its antecedent sound. A product is subject to destruction. Sound is such an entity. So it must have a destroyer.

The objection of the Mīmāṃsakas to the transient nature of sound as advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṅkhya, the Jaina and the Buddhist, is that it does not satisfactorily explain the phenomenon of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). Recognition would turn into a myth in a doctrine of non-eternity of sound. The Mīmāṃsakas have made capital out of this phenomenon. The Grammarian also seeks to prove the eternity of sound on the same principle.³ Were it really the case Mīmāṃsaka's objection would be unanswerable. But Jayanta shows that recognition arises due to the sameness (*Sādṛśya*) of its objects †. Recognition does not always guarantee the identity of the object in question. Sometimes recognition arises erroneously and this error is due to the non-discrimination of diversity in their nature. We overlook the diversity and take into account the resemblance which appears vivid. The cognition of silver in a nacre pearl is a piece of erroneous knowledge. So also in the case of recognition

* The Sāṅkhya, however, holds that sound inheres in its material cause i.e. *bell* and not in *ākāśa*.

¹ Nyāya Vārttika on 2.2.21.

² Perhaps a section of thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School did not subscribe to the view that the cause of the destruction of sound comes under the ken of our perception. Udayana in his *Kusumāñjali* (Chap. II) presents a smashing onslaught on the logic built by this section of Philosophers with his penetrating logical insight.

³ Nāgārjuna—*Vaiśāṅkaraśiddhānta māñjuśā*.

† The Jains also hold the same view. Vide *Akalanika-Nyāyavinīśaya-Karika* 226.

of sound (e.g., this is that 'ga') we have a phenomenon of recognition entirely based on the non-discernment of the intrinsic diversity in real words. So doubt may arise as to the nature of this erroneous knowledge in the form whether it arises due to semblance or identity. Moreover, the Mīmāṃsakas in order to satisfy a critic must have to prove definitely that recognition unaccompanied by any means of knowledge is alone able to prove the eternality of sound. Criterion of truth consists in the capacity to bring to light the real nature of things (*aitthaprakāśakatva*). The older Naiyāyika holds the pragmatic theory of truth. A valid cognition is that which leads to successful action.¹ Reasoning (*tarka*) can only remove doubt. The obstacle which stands in the way of manifestation of the object can only be removed with the help of reasoning. Reasoning facilitate the knowledge of the probandum. But the Mīmāṃsakas have not succeeded in adducing a reasoning in order to remove this doubt.

It is interesting to note that the neologicians observe that recognition does not come in conflict with eternal and identical nature of its object. Identity of the object and the appearance of recognition are not even diametrically opposed. One does not exclude other. They trace diversity of objects in the absence of knowledge of diversity in the object recognition to the identity of the object. But when both diversity and recognition are true, similarity serves as the object (*viṣaya*) of recognition.² Uddyotakara and other old logicians assert the falsity of recognition in such cases. But do we find any sufficient ground to discard the validity of such instances of recognition? Perhaps Vardhamāna realises the weakness of his predecessors and therefore does not subscribe to the view, as he declares in an unmistakable language that recognition in such cases are not invalid.³ Thus Gaṅgeśa and his illustrious son Vardhamāna carry the arguments of Uddyotakara and Jayanta to more logical precision.

The Mīmāṃsakas further contend that if semblance serves as the object of recognition, the recognition would have been in the form—"This word resembles that word". To this Gaṅgeśa replies that in common parlance we often make such identical statements though we have the knowledge of diversity.⁴ But Dinakara Bhaṭṭa

¹ The Neo-logicians however, do not subscribe to the view. They posit the Theory of Accordance.

² *evamāṇe bhede bhāsanāne pratyabhijñāyāḥ sa-jātiyatvam viṣayo na vyaktyabhedah—Tattvasaṁgrahaṇī, p. 447.*

Pratyabhijñā or *tajjātiyatāviṣayinī*—Śāṅkhyaspravaṇabhāṣya on Sūtra, 5, VIII.

³ *Jātiyāyātākālpānāt*—Upakāra on 2nd November, 1937

⁴ *na ca anyorekam bhrama etc.*—Ku-Prakāśa p. 264.

⁵ *Tattvasaṁgrahaṇī, p. 447.*

in his *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī-prakāśa* offers a more plausible solution. He avers that when the piece of knowledge in recognition is determined by the relating universal (*i.e.*, 'ga' qua 'ga'-ness) recognition arises out of semblance. But when no such universal flashes in our mind, we completely identify the two objects of cognition and recognition.¹

Kanāda has pointed out that sound is characterised by an initial difference with eternal entity. When we have an auditory perception of sound but the speaker remains out of our sight, we infer the presence of the speaker from the speech-sound. But this inference becomes inexplicable on the Mīmāṃsā theory. Light serves as the manifesting agent of the agent of the jar. But the perception of jar does not guarantee the existence of light. The existence of jar is independent of manifesting agent *i.e.* the light. The jar is not concomitant with light. But the existence of the speaker logically follows from the perception of audible speech-sound. The Mīmāṃsakas fail to explain this phenomenon of logical association. The Nyāya theory transpires to be more logical and conforming to reason when he holds sound as the product of the contact of vocal organs.²

The Mīmāṃsakas have sought to justify the identity of the object by means of recognition. To them, the act of recognition involves the identity of the object. But when we say "These are those paddies" we are certainly aware of the fact that these paddies differ from those. In spite of this difference the act of recognition takes place. The logicians realized this situation and therefore posited that their nature of being under the same class serves as the condition of recognition.³

To sum up :— We have seen that Jayanta's arguments have been directed into the channels carved out by Vātsāyana and Uddyotakara. But Udayana's dissertation on the problem abounds in original reflections strictly logical and technical. In adjudging his contribution a restatement of the same arguments, we are afraid, may incur. So it seems better to refrain from adverting on those subtle technicalities.

THE SĀṆKHYA VIEW

The Sāṅkhya also does not subscribe to the view of eternality of sound and the manifestation theory. But the trend of argument

¹ Dinakari pp. 100-101.

² Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 2, 2 27.

³ Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa Manipadikkā p. 446
Also, Nyāyamāñjari, p. 206.

goes to show that they repudiate the theory on the ground of their primer assumption of the theory of Satkāryavāda. Thus Vijñan Vikṣu in his commentary on the S. Sūtra (S. P. Bh.) asserts that what the Mīmāṃsakas adverts to is nothing but the assumption of Satkāryavāda (theory of the pre existence of the effect-staff in the cause-staff) what the Mīmāṃsakas call 'manifestation' (abhivyakti) is nothing but a mere transformation which coincides with the Sāṅkhya theory of Parīṇāma. Thus the Mīmāṃsakas, the Sāṅkhya contends, does not add anything new.¹ The Sāṅkhya seems to have entirely missed the point when he charged the Mīmāṃsaka's conception with flagrant *Siddhasādhana* (establishment of that which has been already established). What the Mīmāṃsaka is seeking to impress upon is based on their own metaphysics. He never advocates the theory of Satkāryavāda. To him every object is not a transformation of its prior stage. So the charge of the Sāṅkhya, so far as this point is concerned, does not necessarily relate to the Mīmāṃsaka's position. Such a taxation has got little or no bearing on the Mīmāṃsakas. Again Sāṅkhya theory of Satkāryavāda proposes to establish the pre-existence of the effect in the cause and the cause is transformed into the state of effect. Thus the propounders of the theory of Parīṇāmavāda believe in evolution as the substantial mutation. Jar is the transformation of clay. But when the Mīmāṃsakas declare sound which comes in contact with our ear-cavity to be manifested, he does not necessarily mean that effect-sound is the substantial mutated form of its causes. Ether (*ākāśa*) and other factors is the cause of sound, certainly they are not the cause transmuted. Thus the two views substantially differ. Thus it is probable that the Mīmāṃsā theory has run the risk of misrepresentation at the hands of the Sāṅkhya. We hesitate to ascribe the Sāṅkhya interpretation to the Mīmāṃsaka's theory of manifestation of sound. It is a great misfortune indeed that such a misrepresentation should originate from the pen of a great advocate of a school of thought with a view to imposing his own pet thesis on a great thinker like Śabara or Kumārila. The Dialectic should always be kept free from any initial bias or preconceived opinion. Hence the arguments of the Mīmāṃsaka should be viewed from proper perspective. And we have shown that the Naiyāyikas have untiringly examined with the same outlook which befits a philosophic enquirer.

But the pet theory of the Mīmāṃsakas are not without any other adherents. This much-deliberated question has found favour with

¹ *tādṛśa nityatvam ca sarvakāryāṇāṃ eveti 'siddhasādhanaṃ, Bhāṣya on Sāṅkhya Sūtra 5, 60.*

the Grammarians also, whose contribution in the domain of philosophical speculation is no less worth-guarding. The Philosopher-Grammarian Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadiya* has made out that the world has evolved out of the eternal Logos¹ (*Śabdātattva*). But the Grammarians proceed in a different way from the *Mīmāṃsakas* and the *Vedāntins*. The *Vedāntins* are no less adherent of the eternity of sound. But the difference lies in the very root. The Grammarian boldly asserts that the phenomenal world has sprung out not from the articulate sound but from *Sphoṭa*, the eternal unit of speech. This transcendental sound is manifested by *Dhvani* or audible sound. *Śaṅkara*² and the *Sāṅkhya*³ (though they do not uphold the eternity of sound) declare this *sphoṭa* of the Grammarians as unwarranted assumptions.

Patañjali the author of *Mahābhāṣya* has made a strong plea in favour of the eternity of sound (*nityāsca śabdāḥ*) and uses almost the same epithets which are used by the *Vedāntins* to signify Brahman e.g. *Kūṭastha* (Subtle), *avikārī* (without modification) etc. He justifies his position dialectically and from the facts of our every day life.⁴

*Puṇyārāja*⁵ in his commentary on the *Vākyapadiya* observes that inability to trace the origin of sound forces one to come to the conclusion that non-eternality of sound is a creation of one's fancy.

Thus, in fine, it may be observed that we have shown how the problem of eternity of sound has provoked energetic discussions and how the ancient Indian thinkers were enthusiast in logical speculation and a proper evaluation of the problem is an indispensable propædæutic in setting up the firm citadel of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theism.

¹ *Vāk*—1. 1.

² *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on B.S. 1. 3. 28.

³ *Sāṅkhya Sūtra* Chap. 5. *Sūtra* 57-58.

⁴ See *Mahābhāṣya*—*Paśupati Abhika*.

⁵ *Com. on Vāk*. 1. 2. 3.

KEATS' VIEW OF BEAUTY

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1. *Beauty and Truth* :

Instead of taking the rhetorical trope of Keats, "Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty" at its face value and declaring it as a gem of wisdom we would do well if we enquired into the points of similarity between these two concepts which (points) impressed the poet so much that he fused them (the concepts) in his imagination and broke into that excellent equation much as Shakespeare's "Frailty, thy name is woman". The vision of things under the aspect of eternity is the principal motive of the poem (*Ode to the Grecian Urn*) ending with that moral. This vision is beautiful in the sense of appealing to the mind that resents and loves to escape the change and haste of ravaging time and to brood in quiet amongst the essential forms of things, of objects of perception and feelings, that do not change. It is only they that resist time and change and the portrayals on the Grecian Urn represent them. The urn is beautiful to Keats not because of the sensuous qualities, which only serve as signs for the essences they point to or mean, but because of the latter meanings. This quality of art to defy temporarility is a condition of its beauty as it is exquisitely restful to the mind that seeks quiescence in aesthetic contemplation. But here beauty is akin to truth for the latter also gives us the essences of things and quietens the mind. But they are not identical, for truth is conceptual or intellectual to be approached in a rational manner, even for Keats, as we shall presently see, while beauty is intuitive. What Keats really means by that rhetorical piece is, therefore, that beauty and truth have much that is common between them, so much so that beauty may be a criterion of truth. But a criterion for a thing is distinct from its essence. When Keats says on another occasion that "what imagination seizes as Beauty must be truth," or again, "I never can feel certain of any truth but from a clear perception of its beauty",² he holds beauty to be a test of truth, not its meaning, seeing here in beauty its quality of seizing the imagination by its power of harmony and of giving it a feeling of certainty regarding the object. Truth also has this characteristic and it is only vicious or abstract intellectualism that denies this and that is implicitly criticised by Keats in these passages. But truth for that reason is not intuitive in

the sense that it comes as a flash and is self-evident. A true idea or principle is a concrete one, formed through observation and reasoning (the former yielding data and the latter relating them) and its perceptual and rational elements form its body making it a harmonious whole while we think of it clearly and adequately, and the mind naturally accepts it. It does not exist as an abstraction, nor as neutral with respect to our belief. But to grant this is not to allow that truth consists in harmony and self-evidence, for these are not the only or sufficient criteria of truth, and certainly truth does not mean this. The appearance of beauty in any ostensibly known object by virtue of its harmony is a sign of its truth but from this it does not follow that beauty is truth. When Keats wonders "how anything can be known for truth by consecutive reasoning" and yearns for "a life of sensations rather than of Thought", he merely wonders and does not positively assert that conceptual knowledge, that implies patient observation and reasoning, is false.⁴

That he had a notion of truth as intellectual and more valuable than the experience of beauty is seen from many of his utterances in prose and verse. He regrets that "the prize, high reason" will never be his award and consoles himself by the thought that beauty is simple and satisfying while philosophy "spoils the singing of the Nightingale".⁵ and that though he has no knowledge "yet the evening listens".⁶ Beauty for Keats was not so easy an affair later on when it was born of pain, as that of Moneta's face (in the second *Hyperion*)⁷ and as a dying companion of melancholy (Ode to Melancholy).⁸ Yet it was not beyond his powers of comprehension like philosophical truth. Again, poetry is "not so fine a thing as philosophy—for the same reason that an eagle is not as fine a thing as truth", poetry is instinctive and does not care either for truth or mortality. To a poet a street-fight, is appealing, so also are our reasonings, "though erroneous", to an angel.⁹ No, Keats must not (he says) neglect philosophy though it is hard to master and though poetry is his principal love and vocation; he will ask Hazlitt: "in about a year's time the best metaphysical road" he can take;¹⁰ he has been "hovering for some years between an exquisite sense of luxuriousness and a love for philosophy" and he must turn all his soul to the latter.¹¹ Of course, this philosophy, must not be dogmatic, "the only means of strengthening one's intellect as to make up one's mind about nothing, to let the mind be a thoroughfare of all thoughts".¹² And it must not be abstract and external but should be "proved upon our pulses"¹³ for "nothing can become real till it is experienced".¹⁴ These are but sound maxims, which a philosopher will neglect at his own cost, but this does not mean that

philosophy as a rational discipline should liquidate itself and reach truth, through visions and flashes, or through an unreflective submission of the mind to the heart like poetry as some people think.¹⁵ Philosophy to be based on experience need not be wholly an apprehension as of the particular sense-qualities or of the visions in a mystical trance, neither of which apprehensions constitute, knowledge, where concepts unifying a mass of sensible data are involved. Philosophy to be experientially based requires that it must not be mere airy speculation but raised on the data of direct apprehension, and, so, its general concepts, instead of being abstract or empty, have a solid background of sensuous particulars represented and held together by them. The concepts of love and war, for instance, are adequately known so far as they bring before the mind all the experiences that they severally represent, and no concept, that does not have a referential basis in experience, is to be allowed in philosophy that means business. But philosophy cannot afford to do away with concepts or some abstraction and generalisation that they involve, and Keats never demands this. He gives a high status to poetic imagination yielding him poetic truth, his *Endymion* "was a regular stepping of the Imagination towards Truth"¹⁶ and "Imagination may be compared to Adam's dream—he awoke and found it true",¹⁷ yet, as we saw, philosophy and philosophical truth are finer things for him. He yearns for them, takes to hard study and thinking,¹⁸ holds that an "extreme knowledge is needful to thinking people—it takes away the heat and fever."¹⁹ This knowledge, again, is not poetic knowledge as Middleton-Murry would have us believe,²⁰ for it requires, besides, of course, direct experience and some suffering, hard thinking and, as Keats believed, some training in metaphysics.²¹ So that there is no confusion in Keat's mind between knowledge proper, which is conceptual though based on experience, and poetic knowledge, that is but intuitive or visionary. Thus Truth²² and Beauty are distinct for him though they have some common characteristics, such as harmony and, an immediate appeal to the mind and the power of convincing it, and though essentially a matter of thought, has its basis in experience which characterises beauty.

2. *Beauty and Goodness :*

Just as Keats appreciated the close kinship of beauty with truth while keeping them quite distinct as any clear thinking person would do, so did he with respect to the relation beauty and goodness. Disinterested contemplation of beauty is a good and Keats dedicated himself to it, nevertheless he felt that it is not the good or the highest good. He was convinced that "(excepting the human friend philosopher) a fine writer was the most genuine Being in the world,"²³

"fine writing, next to fine doing, is the top thing in the world."²⁴ He believed he would do good by creating beauty through the poetic medium, but sometimes he would think of a different means; which consisted of giving true knowledge of things and of good and evil to his people and which required of him "application study and thought."²⁵ So he held goodness distinct from beauty and above it, the philosopher distinct from the poet and above the latter. Philosophy is a finer thing than poetry because the latter is neutral in its attitude to good and evil, it enjoys a street-fight, "a thing to be hated"²⁶ and "has as much delight in conceiving an Iago as an Imogen."²⁷ The poet has no self, no character, for this reason, which feature Keats, no doubt, appreciates, as he is a poet himself, but his mind is clear enough to place the philosopher above the "chameleon poet" in his esteem.

3. *Beauty of nature and of art :*

Keats held that beauty has two modes of existence, natural and artistic, and the latter is a higher one in excellence. He would write poetry to add to "that mass of beauty which is harvested from the grand materials, by the finest spirits and put into ethereal existence, for the relish of one's fellows".²⁸ These artistic things, by virtue of their ethereal mode of being, are greater things than their materials.²⁹ The reason for this is not stated by Keats though we can surmise his view. It is because the ideal mode of being is light and free and, so, finer than the material one which is comparatively rigid, and then there is scope here for heightening and sublimating one's natural experience, for the display of "intensity" and "fine excess" which Keats values so much in poetry.³⁰ The artist gathers the things of beauty round him in nature and life and lifts them into a rarefied atmosphere, so that we are more impressed by these artistic products than by their original materials. Now it is human nature, more than the outer (*i.e.*, vegetable, animal and physical) one, that provides the poet with rich materials for creating beauty. "Scenery is fine, but human nature finer",³¹ and Keats must bid the joys of beautiful nature of flora and fauna farewell to meet "the agonies, the strife of human hearts".³² He knows that the highest place of fame and immortality can be reached only by those "to whom the miseries of the world are miseries and will not let them rest."³³ Keats, in search of beauty, was steadily moving towards the centre of life itself, he was becoming more "at home amongst men and women" and "would rather read Chaucer than Ariosto" and write a few plays.³⁴ He was feeling his way to human poetry, this phase in his poetic career is characterised by Middleton-Murry as Keats' return to Shakespeare.³⁵ Thus Keats held

artistic beauty distinct from and finer than natural beauty which serves as the material for the former, the human nature much richer than the outer one in this respect.

4. *Nature of artistic Beauty : Real or Illusory.*

If artistic beauty consists of lifting up our natural experiences into a sphere of ideality and greater intensity, does this process confer more reality to the experiences or takes away some of their reality? In other words, does transmutation of nature and life in art give a product more real than the original material or not? Keats speaks of artistic beauty as truth itself but he means here by truth, as we have seen, poetic truth and not truth proper which is intellectual. Now Keats recognises the value of each kind of truth, and, so, of reality for us in a sense. But he was not like Shelley who held the ideal forms created by imagination out of the given materials in nature to be more real than the latter, "forms more real than living men."³⁸ Though Keats too wrote of "the soul as a world in itself"³⁹ and that "any man may like the spider spin from his own inwards his own airy citadel,"³⁸ yet he was aware of the unsubstantial character of the ideal and its dependence on the material world of sense and understanding for its meaning and existence.³⁹ "Poetry itself", he says, is "a mere Jack O' lantern to amuse whoever may chance to be struck with its brilliance" and "every mental pursuit takes its reality and worth from the ardour of the pursuer—being in itself nothing."⁴⁰ Imagination is like Adam's dream giving us a truth which is but "a shadow of a reality to come."⁴¹ However, when he says that philosophy is "a finer thing" than poetry he is only making a valuational judgment and we know he also spoke of the ethereal artistic objects as "greater things" than the natural ones. So that these statements prove nothing regarding Keats' view of the relative reality of artistic beauty and truth. But that he was no Shelleyan idealist is more or less clear from the previous statements and from the general movement of his thought towards an idea of a more concrete and serious poetry, that is more objective and nearer to life. Beauty, at least as poetry seizes it, has an ideal mode of existence that is parasitic on the actualities of human life and external nature and, so, its reality is derived from this actuality which is the standard of reality. Imagination builds up forms out of the materials found in nature and the former products afford us more exquisite æsthetic delight than the latter originals,⁴² yet they are not more, but less, real than them. The world of physical, vegetable, animal and human nature which is idealised in art by imagination is what our thought, working upon the sensuous matter given to the senses, makes out of it and takes for reality. This is

what we ordinarily know as real and we judge the reality of other things by a comparison with it. This is the healthy realistic attitude of all commonsensical people and Keats was very human and commonsensical. And certainly he was incapable of the sophistication that suspects thought to be creative like imagination and, so, possibly making reality instead of discovering it. All that we can gather from his letters is that he took thought to be objective and necessary giving us truth or reality while constructive imagination gives us ideal objects, real only so far as they derive their materials from this reality of thought (and sensibility) and as they often are shadows of reality like prophetic dreams.

REFERENCES

All citations in this essay from Keats' letters are from H. B. Forman's edition (1931) and those from Keats' verse from H. B. Forman's edition (1931).

¹ Letter to Baily, 22nd November, 1817.

² Letter to George and Georgiana Keats, November, 1818.

³ Letter to Baily, 22nd November, 1817.

⁴ He writes, "I have never yet been able to perceive how anything can be known for truth by consecutive reasoning *and yet it must be*. Can it be that even the greatest philosopher ever arrived at his goal without putting aside numerous objections? *However it may be*, O for a Life of sensations rather than of thought" Mark the expressions under italics which is ours.

⁵ Verse letter to Reynolds, 25 March, 1818.

⁶ Letter to Reynolds, 19 February, 1818.

⁷ *The Fall of Hyperion: a dream*, ll. 256-63.

⁸ "She dwells with Beauty, Beauty that must die."

⁹ Letter to George and Georgiana Keats, 18 March, 1819.

Middle-Murry says of this passage that it means "that one kind of poetry is not so fine as another kind of poetry" that philosophy is for Keats "comprehension of the mystery of life" and it is poetic comprehension the truth of which is to be measured by its harmony (see his *Keats and Shakespeare*, 1st edition, p. 191, and p. 135). C. L. Finney also interprets this passage in a manner to save poetry against philosophy. (See his *Evolution of Keats' poetry*, Vol. II, p. 589). But all such moves appear uncalled for and otiose.

¹⁰ Letter to Reynolds, 27 April, 1818.

¹¹ Letter to John Taylor, 24 April, 1818.

A. C. Bradley and Middleton-Murry take this exquisite sense of luxuriousness to mean a lower kind of beauty while philosophy to mean a higher and complex kind of beauty conquering all ugliness and pain. (See Bradley; *Oxford Lectures on Poetry* (1st edition), p. 235, and Murry: *Keats and Shakespeare* (1st edition), pp. 60-61). But this is artificial for though Keats was moving towards a more serious kind of poetry, more objective and concrete, depicting "the agonies, the strife of human hearts" yet there is no reason to believe that he would call this kind of poetry philosophy. Poetic realisation or beauty is always for him, as it is for us, a vision, though much thought and life's raw experience may go before it, while philosophy or truth is intellectual though it may have also an appeal to our intuition and sense of beauty. Poetry may be philosophical and philosophy poetical but they do not lose their identities. Keats, as his letters amply show, was against vicious intellectualism in philosophy but not against intellectualism or rational pursuit after truth. He was not as romantic a philosopher, reducing philosophy to poetry and truth to poetic vision, and his interpreters, e.g., A. C. Bradley and Middleton-Murry believe him to be. He was no Novalis or Bergson.

¹² Letter to George and Georgiana Keats, 21 September, 1819.

¹³ Letter to Reynolds, 3 May, 1818.

¹⁴ Letter to George and Georgiana Keats, 19 March, 1819.

¹⁵ See e.g., Middleton-Murry, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

¹⁶ Letter to Taylor, 30 January, 1818.

¹⁷ Letter to Baily, 22 November, 1817.

¹⁸ Letter to Woodhouse, 21 September, 1819, and to Haydon. 8 March, 1819.

¹⁹ Letter to Reynolds, 3 May, 1818.

²⁰ See Murry, *op. cit.*, p. . . .

- ²¹ See above and his letter to Reynolds, 27 April, 1818, referred to in note 10.
- ²² Keats means by truth true knowledge (or reality and not a character of knowledge distinct from the latter. Knowledge, in the strict sense, is true and false knowledge is a contradiction in terms and a loose expression for a mere belief or opinion.
- ²³ Letter to Baily, 24 August, 1819.
- ²⁴ Letter to Reynolds, 25 August, 1819.
- ²⁵ Letter to Taylor, 24 April, 1818.
- Letter to George and Georgiana Keats, 19 March, 1819, (already referred to before).
- ²⁷ Letter to Woodhouse, 27 October, 1818.
- ²⁸ Letter to Thomas Keats, 26 June, 1818.
- ²⁹ Letter to Haydon, 11 May, 1817.
- ³⁰ See letter to George and Georgiana Keats, 28 December, 1817, and to Taylor, 27 February, 1818.
- ³¹ Letter to Baily, 13 March, 1818.
- ³² *Sleep and Poetry*, ll. 122-25.
- ³³ *Hyperion: a dream*, ll. 147-49.
- ³⁴ Letter to Taylor, 17 November, 1819.
- ³⁵ See Middleton-Murry, *op. cit.*, p. 200.
- ³⁶ *Prometheus Unbound*, Act I, ll. 746-49.
- ³⁷ Letter to Reynolds, 28 August, 1819.
- ³⁸ Letter to Reynolds, 19 February, 1818.
- ³⁹ He adds after comparing the soul to a spider, self-sufficiently a world of its own, "Now I am sensible all this is a mere sophistication (however it may neighbour to any truth) to excuse my indolence.
- ⁴⁰ Letter to Baily, 13 March, 1818.
- ⁴¹ Letter to Baily, 22 November, 1817.
- ⁴² It may be noted that this distinction between natural and artistic beauty does not exist for many thinkers for whom beauty is an experience and always involves projection and construction on the part of the mind no matter whether the materials are there in nature before it or imagined. That is to say, beauty is ideal for these thinkers, be it of nature or art. However, for Keats, as for commonsense, beauty of nature is a natural characteristic more or less like shape or colour while that of art is ideal in mode of being though resembling natural beauty inasmuch as the former is distilled from the latter by imagination.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

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CHAPTER II

PANTHEISM AND THEISM

Pantheism : Pan=all, and theos=God, i.e., all is God. This doctrine states that the world is God and God is the world. It is a reaction against deism which states an absolute separation between God and the world. Spinoza is the famous author of pantheistic doctrine in modern philosophy. His pantheism asserts true identification of God with the world. It further holds that the nature of the absolute is completely exhausted by the course of the world. According to it all finite things are merely modifications of the infinite substance. All particular minds and material objects are necessarily derived from a single infinite principle. It has no faith in a transcendental absolute Being, because it conceives that God completely manifests Himself in the form of the universe. It identifies God with the sum total of all finite things and denies His transcendence. Spinoza's aim is to show that "all things live and move and have their being in the all-comprehensive reality, that may indifferently be named either God or nature"¹. Spinoza was an ardent religious believer to whom God is all in all, because he holds that "whatever is, is in God" and "only through God," everything, "can be conceived". He assigns no independent existence to the particular finite things (the world of material objects). At one time he speaks of suppressing the finite things by infinite substance; at another he teaches in the language of science the universality of natural law. When as a result of the first tendency in him, he suppresses the finite, the finite, which is neither self-active nor self-explanatory in his system, thus becomes illusory and vague.

According to Spinoza individual finite things are merely creations of false imagination. But when he maintains the universality of natural law he either consciously or unconsciously assigns independent reality to every individual finite thing. In nature everything is real and everything is the part of the one real organised whole. In the Spinozistic system Nature is "resolved upwards into the universal Power". Thus it is very difficult to assert whether Spinoza is a

¹ Norman Smith—The Cartesian Philosophy, pp. 137-38.

pantheist or a theist. The conflict begins with the pantheistic negative interpretation that "beyond the natural order of things and prior to it no divine life or agency can be". This statement indicates the limitation of the supreme existence and denies a supramundane cause with which alone the theists are concerned. But Spinoza's pantheism has some special merit also. "Pantheism whose watch-word is the vindication of the reality of things and minds, of personality and freedom of the individual, has made pantheism an easy target of its criticism. But apart from the metaphysical, ethical and epistemological difficulties which are generally thought to vitiate pantheism, it at least has the unique merit of bringing God into an intimate relation with man and of giving to his religious consciousness that spirit of resignation and self-surrender which man in his deepest communion with the Divine necessarily feels, even when the whole world is flung into destruction (H. M. Bhattacharjee : Principles of Philosophy, p. 385.)

"Theism undertakes to formulate a view of God and the world which is between the extremes of deism and pantheism. The theist is not willing to go the whole way with either the pantheist or the deist. With the deist he denies that God can without remainder be identified with the space-time order; and with the pantheist he denies that God can be wholly external to that order. He agrees that the deist is right in his insistence that God is in some sense more than the world; and on the other hand, he agrees that the pantheist is right in his insistence that God is found within the world-order or nowhere. In short, he holds that God is both immanent within the world and transcendent to it" (G. Watts Cunningham : Problems of Philosophy, p. 404-5.

Theism asserts two distinct lines of thought—the principle of causality and the absolute transcendental reality or God. The natural world is derived as an effect under the "guidance of one wise and mighty personality. The natural world is created by God who is prior to His creation. God as a cause of the universe exists from eternity without the world in Him. Everything which has a beginning is perishable. The world has a beginning, because it is created, therefore, it is perishable. But the Divine cause of the world will exist even after its (world's) destruction for ever. The creator is perfect and imperishable while His creation is imperfect and perishable. According to theism, the world comes into existence by the will of God but God does not evolve into or manifest Himself in the form of the universe.

Some theists assert that the Creator willed, created and set into motion, this world once for all, and has not cared for it after that. The created things blindly follow the wish of the Creator spontaneously, but the creator himself does not feel the necessity of his looking to it again. Once the duty is done, it is done for ever. The world goes on of itself, though the creator is as if asleep. Thus we see that some kind of theism holds the arbitrary will and design in God.

The creation of the Divine is finite while the Divine itself is infinite. The Divine is looked upon as an author or a maker. Theism asserts that the author is perfect but the creation which comes out of the hand of the author is imperfect. The relationship between the author and his work is not from eternity. The author suddenly wills and the work is created. These statements of theism either knowingly or unknowingly hold that there is some imperfection in God, otherwise how can His creation, which He made by His free will, be full of imperfections? Theism includes polytheism, pantheism, and monotheism, and so on. The complete opposite of theism is atheism, which denies the existence of the Divine. Monotheism maintains one absolute infinite transcendental reality whereas pantheism does away with the conception of transcendence.

Whether Spinoza is a pantheist or a theist is a matter of great dispute. Some critics even go so far as to declare him an atheist. His philosophy is the amalgamation of all religious doctrines. The philosophy of Spinoza incorporates every religious doctrine in the development of its own system. It can be safely said that Spinoza wants to reconcile every religion but he fails to make sure of his own religion. The conflicting tendencies of Spinozistic philosophy will be more and more clear to us as we try to realise the relation of substance to finite modes. "There is, however, a curious conflict of tendencies in Spinoza's philosophy. Though he maintains that we must view things in the concrete setting of their constitutive relations, he was yet himself driven to deny the existence of the finite, the knowledge of which he thus sought to complete; and though he denounces any attempt to explain the concrete through general and abstract, he himself in the end hypostatizes, as the sole reality, a few merely abstract conceptions".¹ The strange contradiction between the results at which he aims and the conclusion at which he arrives, lies in his Latin culture and in the rationalistic principles of Cartesian philosophy.

¹ Norman Smith : *The Cartesian Philosophy*, p. 142.

knowledge of the finite, because without the true conception of the latter, the former, which even denies any kind of description, cannot be known in the least. Spinoza's definition of the finite is this: "That thing is called finite in its own kind which can be limited by another thing of the same nature. For example, a body is called finite, because we can always conceive of another body which is greater. So a thought is limited by another thought; but a body is not limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body" (Def. II). Everything that suffers description is finite in its own kind because without reference to that particular class which contains and limits it, it cannot be described. "A finite is thus something that is similar in some respect to something else of its own kind with which it may be compared and be found greater or smaller, longer or shorter, more important or less important".¹ It comes to this, that to be finite is to be limited and comparable, and further it asserts that to be finite is to be included under a class of like things. The infinite is absolute negation of the finite.

Spinoza's substance or God is necessarily infinite and absolutely infinite. Infinite means that which surpasses all other things of the same kind. But "absolutely infinite" means an absolute negation of finitude, determination and description. The infinite is unique, incomparable and it does not belong to any class. It is *sui generis*. The number of its attributes is also infinite. So Spinoza says: "But to the essence of that which is absolutely infinite pertains whatever expresses essence and involves no negation" (Def. VI Expl.).

In Spinozistic philosophy the term "infinite" stands for the following terms: "unique" "incomparable," "indeterminate," "indefinable," "incomprehensible" and "unknowable", etc. Aristotle says that "the infinite so far as it is infinite is unknown".² And a similar meaning can be found in Spinoza who repeats in connection with his argument, that by an infinite number of methods "we can never arrive at any knowledge whatever".³ The world is finite and God is absolute infinite; therefore, there can be no relation and comparison between the infinite substance and the finite world. The above statement holds good in the case of Spinoza who says: "This I know, that between the finite and the infinite there is no comparison (*proportionem*); so that the difference between the greatest and most excellent creature and God is the same as the difference between

¹ Wolffson "The Philosophy of Spinoza," Vol. I, p. 136.

² Physics, I, 4, 187b, 7.

³ Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, 18, (Opera II, pp. 18, 11, 17-23).

God and the lowest creature".¹ Thus we can conclude that here Spinoza accepts the theistic position and definitely holds that God who is necessarily infinite is a transcendental reality. The pantheistic fortification of Spinoza falls down by his acceptance of this theistic position. It seems that at the beginning Spinoza was a pantheist but at the end he was driven to accept the theistic view which maintains that God is transcendental, absolute and infinite Being. The necessarily infinite substance of Spinoza is not exhausted by the course of the production of the finite world because his God or substance is necessarily indivisible and indeterminate. The determinate finite world cannot say anything about the indeterminate infinite substance. The 'absolutely infinite' substance or God excludes all forms of the universe of finitude from it. Though Spinoza's God is indeterminate and unknowable yet Spinoza never says that he is wanting in essence and perfection. Spinoza's God is the essence or indwelling cause of the universe and He is the most perfect Being. According to Spinoza, everything can be vague and illusory but there cannot be any question about the validity of the most perfect Being. Thus regarding the infinitude of God Spinoza was led to accept the theistic conception of God. The conflict of Spinoza's philosophy lies in the opposition between 'All-immanency and some-transcendence'. Immanency is the notion that the intelligent and creative principle of the universe pervades the universe itself. Immanency is a fundamental conception of pantheism. Though Spinoza tries his best to do away with the conception of transcendence yet he is forced to accept some transcendence when the question of 'infinitude of God' comes before him. According to the pantheist God manifests himself in the form of the universe and God is nothing but the sum total of the universe.

But the theists are found possessed by the conception of an indwelling God whose living spirit moves in the unsleeping order of nature to act and behave. When "a pantheist-like Spinoza has to go beyond the *natura naturata*, and concede a *natura naturans* related to it as cause to effect, it is in vain for him to set them forth as identical by covering them together with the label '*causa sui*', and pretend that he has not trespassed upon any 'transcendent' ground"² Now it is quite clear that it becomes very difficult for Spinoza to escape from the transcendent idea of God. The conflict between pantheism and theism ends in the theistic interpretation of God or substance.

¹ Epistola 54.

² Martineau : A Study of Religion, p. 143.

God is the antithesis and reversal of all our ordinary modes of thought. God is 'infinite' and therefore, He is unapproachable by the 'finite'. He is altogether of a different kind from the created things. "We say that he is 'one', but all that that means is that he is not what in the world of our experience we know as 'many'. We say that he is 'good' but all that that means is that he is not what in the world of our experience we know as 'evil'. We say that he is 'living', but all that that means is that he is not what in the world of our experience we know as 'dead'." The above statements show that Spinoza inclines somewhat towards theism. God is an 'infinite' and all-inclusive Being which has no limits. The all-inclusive Being is only limited by its own nature and "that nature inevitably transcends human categories".² The finite can only know 'finite'. Thus God being 'infinite' transcends all things of human experience and He is unapproachable by the 'finite'. "This enlightened, though somewhat chilling theism, which combines a profound sense of the existence of God with a profound distrust of our ability to know him, is fully represented on what might be called the theistic side of Spinoza".³ The theistic side of Spinoza has taught us that we cannot exhaust the nature of the 'infinite' substance by the use of the 'finite' categories. Here Spinoza treats God as transcendent. Again when he says that God is all in all and all things are in God, he gradually goes far away from his theistic position and accepts the pantheistic doctrine by asserting the following: "Everything which exists, exists in God and without God nothing could either exist or be conceived" (Eth. 1, 15). Thus the conflict between the pantheism and theism is quite clear in Spinozistic philosophy. When Spinoza conceives God or substance as 'infinite' and transcendent he is a theist and when he identifies God with the universe or with nature he is a pantheist. The true cause of the conflict between pantheism and theism in Spinoza's philosophy lies in the three words, God, Nature and Substance which are used by him to designate the all-inclusive reality. "Beginning with the primordial causality itself, the *fons et origo rerum*"—he uses several terms to denote it,—Nature, God, Substance,—the two former preponderating in his earlier writings, the last in the Ethics. Though identical in their application, they differ somewhat in their inner meaning: Under "Nature" we are expected to think of the continu-

¹ Leon Roth: Spinoza, p. 65.

² *Ibid* : Spinoza, p. 64.

³ *Ibid* : Spinoza, p. 65.

ous source of birth; under "God", of the universal cause of created things; under "Substance", of the permanent reality behind phenomena."¹ Spinoza holds pantheistic position when he identifies God with the universe. But it must be borne in mind that Spinoza's conception of the universe is far more than the physical world of ours. Spinoza's God or Substance is the fullness of all being, the supreme reality, "God has not been reduced to Nature, but Nature exalted to God".² Some critics declare Spinoza to be a naturalist. By the above statement it is shown that Spinoza is justified even to be a naturalist and his system is thus called the system of one pure naturalism.

The conflict of Spinozistic philosophy, therefore, is between pantheism and theism or between naturalism and theism. The conflicting tendencies have their origin more in Spinoza's profuse use of the term God than its meaning."³ "Avenarius, who has stratified the writings of Spinoza on the basis of the use of the term Nature, God, and Substance . . . has discovered three phases in the development of Spinoza's pantheism, which he designates by the following terms: Naturalist All-in-one, Theistic All-in-one, and Substantive All-in-one".⁴ Windelband brushes aside all these and declares that Spinoza's system is "complete and unreserved pantheism". The problem before us is the problem whether Spinoza's God is absolutely identical with the sum total of particular things or whether God does transcend them in some way. When we accept the former position Spinoza is a pantheist to us and as soon as we agree with the latter conception he becomes a theist.

INFINITE MODES

So far as we have discussed Spinoza's system, it leaves us as yet without any principle of mediation between the absolute infinite substance and the world of the finite things. The conflicting tendency of Spinozistic philosophy is still in the process of development. The relationship between the infinite and the finite is not yet established and as he (Spinoza) advances to link the finite with the infinite the real conflict begins. The long and deep line of demarcation between the infinite and the finite has not vanished. Though Spinoza tries his best to do away with this yet he cannot do so. "The gap

¹ Dr. Martinen's study of Spinoza, p. 169.

² Pollock, Spinoza (1912), p. 381.

³ Wolfson: The Philosophy of Spinoza, Vol. I, p. 298.

⁴ *Ibid* : The Philosophy of Spinoza, Vol. I, p. 299.

between the infinite and finite remains unbridged.¹ The mediaeval's conception of the infinite denies any finitude in it. Spinoza being born and brought up under the influence of the transcendental conception of the infinite met with difficulties in his philosophical investigation of the absolute reality and in no way could set aside the mediaeval philosophers' and Aristotle's conception of the infinite. According to the mediaevals, that which is infinite cannot be finite because finitude indicates some limitation and that which is limited must be perishable. The infinite is imperishable, therefore the infinite cannot be finite at all. By accepting this statement Spinoza is still in the domain of "*Natura Naturans*" or "that which is in itself, is conceived through itself".² Spinoza, being a pantheist, is confronted with difficulties and wants to erect a bridge over the gap between "*Natura Naturans*" and "*Natura Naturata*" or the world of the finite things.

In order to fill up the gap Spinoza introduces the conception of "Infinite Modes". Infinite Modes have a double aspect. They are the connecting links between the two different worlds—the world of infinitude and the world of finitude. "As "Modes", they belong to the sphere of the finite ; as 'Infinite modes', to that of the infinite".³ Here we can notice that the ideas of the finite things and of the infinite substance have come under one head—"Infinite Modes". Though according to Spinoza the finite can only follow from the finite and the infinite from the infinite, yet despite that assertion he combines the ideas of infinite and of finite in order to overcome the peculiar contradictions and difficulties of his philosophy. The following passages contain Spinoza's doctrines of infinite modes: "Whatever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and infinitely and infinite through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and as infinite",⁴ or in other words, "Every mode which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite".⁵ The difference between the attributes and modes is this; the former are conceived through themselves and the latter through the attributes.

¹ Caird "Spinoza", p. 176. *

² God and His attributes.

³ Caird Spinoza, p. 176.

⁴ Eth., I. 22.

⁵ Eth., I. 28.

There are two kinds of infinite modes. The first kind is (i) immediate infinite and eternal modes and the second is (ii) mediate infinite and eternal modes. Immediate infinite modes follow immediately from the attributes and the mediate modes follow from the attribute, already modified by modifications. But both the immediate and mediate infinite modes are combined under the head of "Infinite Modes". It is stated that the absolutely infinite intellect or "the intellect in thought" and motion and rest in extension belong to the class of immediate infinite and eternal modes. The immediate infinite modes are the direct modification of the attributes of thought and extension. The two (infinite intellect and motion and rest) constitute the face of the whole universe. "The face of the whole universe always remains the same although its parts undergo constant change or modification.

In Spinozistic philosophy we meet with two irreconcilable elements. The first is the subordination of the infinite modes to God and the second is the equality of the infinite modes with God.¹ The conception of infinite modes involves contradiction. On the one hand, it is related to God through His attributes and thereby remains in the sphere of infinitude, and on the other hand it is related to finite individuals which are thus modifications of modifications and so on, of God. The double aspect of the Spinozistic infinite modes gives rise to conflicting tendencies.

The conflict which has its origin in Spinoza's conception of infinite substance and finite individuals is really insoluble; yet we find in Spinozistic philosophy an attempt to solve it by introducing the conception of "infinite modes". If Spinoza had been true to his logical construction his philosophical investigation might have ended here. But throwing logic to the winds, he tries his best to cross over the gulf by making 'infinite modes' a via-media between God and the finite world. "Infinite and finite individuality express ideas which, as Spinoza defines them, are reciprocally exclusive; but when we examine what is meant by the phrase "infinite modes", we find that it involves, in opposite directions, an endeavour so to modify these ideas as to bring them into coherence".² Previously we have seen that God or substance as infinite and eternal, transcends all phenomenal objects and thereby it is barren, because "all determination is negation". But with the appearance of "infinite modes" in

¹ Caird : Spinoza, p. 178.

² *Ibid* : Spinoza, p. 179.

Spinozistic philosophy the theistic position of his God is shaken and the barren God becomes fertile. We have also examined that all particular things are nothing but the creations of false imagination, and that which is the creation of false imagination is vague and illusory. The theists conceive the world of particular things or objects as imperfect and transient. The only reality is God or Divine. Once Spinoza was a theist when he did conceive God as the pure infinite and absolute reality. But sometimes he is no more a theist because the finite things can claim for them an infinite origin and that which has the infinite origin is imperishable. Therefore, the finite individuals are also imperishable, as they are nothing but true manifestations of God. Thus Spinoza holds again the pantheistic position.

FINITE MODES

The conflict between pantheism and theism will be more clear to us when we discuss Spinoza's notion of finite modes. The question which naturally arises in this connection is this: "If individual things follow from God, then since God is infinite, where does their finiteness come from"? (Wolfson: *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, Vol. I, p. 388). This is a very important topic which requires clear explanation in Spinoza's system and in connection with this problem we are going to discuss Spinoza's conception of finite modes in the following paragraphs.

The problem can be restated thus: How can the finite come out of the infinite or in other words, how can the infinite be the cause of the finite? The infinite is unique and unlimited, and that which is unlimited is imperishable. The infinite is eternal and perfect Being. But our notion of finite implies that it is limited and perishable. If infinite manifests itself in the form of finite how is it at all possible for the finite to go out of existence for good? That which necessarily comes out from the absolute nature of God or Substance must have the right of existing for ever and there must be self-maintaining impulse in it. Spinoza does assign self-maintaining impulse to them when he says that Nature is equal to God. But again he does not assign any independent reality to them by asserting that the substance (God) is indivisible. Now the problem is this: If God is infinite and absolutely indivisible, from where does the finitude come? In order to answer this question Spinoza introduces the conception of modes in his system of philosophy. Modes are both infinite and finite. Modes as infinite are eternal and modes as finite are temporal. The answer of the above mentioned

problem becomes clear if we read the following lines from Professor Thilly's History of Philosophy. "In one sense, modes are infinite and necessary, in another sense they are finite and temporal The eternal infinite substance expresses itself for ever in definite ways, in an eternal and necessary system of physical and mental forms, in a system of ideas and in a system of bodies. Such an infinite and necessary system of ideas, the totality of all ideas, Spinoza calls the absolute infinite intellect; the system of modes of extension he calls motion and rest; the two together constitute the face of the universe. The face of the whole universe always remains the same, although its parts undergo constant change. Nature, as a whole, may here be compared to an individual organism, the elements of which come and go, but whose form (face) remains the same." (Thilly : History of Philosophy, p. 298).

His definition of modes is this: "By mode", he means the modifications or affectations of Substance, or that which exists in and is conceived through, something other than itself. This definition of modes shows that the one unique and simple Substance or God consists of a multiplicity of modes. The modes are self-dependent and are conceived through God. They have a conditioned existence and they are conditioned by God to act. In proposition XXVIII of Ethics I, Spinoza says: "Every individual thing or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence, and likewise this cause cannot, in its turn, exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence and so on to infinite". The ultimate cause is God or Substance. The highest cause is self-caused or *causa sui* and it is the cause of everything else. When Spinoza maintains that God is the highest cause or self-caused and the most perfect Being he leans towards the theistic interpretation of God. Theism also asserts that God is infinite and most perfect and He is the ultimate cause of this finite world. It also says that the finite individuals are imperfect and there is nothing in them to maintain their independent reality. Spinoza's definition of modes and his proposition XXVIII in Ethics I assert exactly the same thing as the theistic conception does.

Again Spinoza says that finite follows from the finite and infinite, from the infinite. Modes, being finite, implies that God, being

infinite, cannot be the cause of them. So it may be asked: where do they come from? and how do they come? Modes, being modifications of God, assert the fact of divine origin for their permanent existence. But every particular thing taken by itself is a part which is incomplete in power and essence, is finite in nature, and is transitory in existence. The power, whereby each particular thing, and consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of Nature. (Eth.1.XXIV Coroll.). On the one hand, if we assign to the particular things independent existence the model system of Spinoza vanishes and he no more remains a pantheist or a 'God-intoxicated man'. His conception of God as equal to 'Nature' shows him to be a full-fledged pantheist. On the other hand, when Spinoza maintains that "God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence" (Prop. XXV, Ethics I) his attitude is that of a theist. God is not only the cause of particular things (coming into existence) but also of their continuing into existence, or in other words, He is the cause and effect both. We thus see in Spinoza a continuous oscillation between pantheism and theism.

In order to reconcile these conflicting tendencies Spinoza gives a general scheme of deriving modes from substance. The finite follows from finite causes. These causes are infinite in number. They again form an infinite series of causes and effects. That infinite series owes its origin to the mediate infinite modes. Then mediate infinite modes follow directly from God. Thus the series is complete and we can conclude that strictly speaking they (modes) are not finite but infinite in essence and existence. So far as the modes are treated as being of the same essence as God, Spinoza's philosophy must be pronounced to be distinctly pantheistic. So far, however, as he gives them finite or relative stability, his philosophy is theistic.

Again, another difficulty arises when we come across proposition XXVIII of Ethics I, where Spinoza says: That which is finite and which has determinate existence could not be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God for whatever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal." This statement of Spinoza shows that finite modifications are quite impossible. The gap between the finite and infinite remains unbridged. Though Spinoza tries to overcome this conflict yet he has not succeeded in doing so. When he sees the difficulty that the

finite cannot come out of the absolute infinite and indivisible substance he introduces the conception of infinite-finite modes in his system. By introducing this notion he remains no longer strict to his own logic. First of all he tries to prove everything mathematically or say, logically, but as soon as he advances to erect a bridge over the gap between the infinite God and the finite world his mathematical or logical conclusion shows its absolute barrenness.

So far as we have realised that Spinoza's doctrine is not cent per cent pantheistic. We have also tried to show that Spinoza is a qualified pantheist, because at one time he conceives the finite world as a modification of God and at another time he reduces the finite individuals to unreality and illusion. His philosophy gives birth to many a conflicting tendency and in order to reconcile them, he becomes once a pantheist and at another time a theist and so on. Thus we cannot conclude that his doctrine is, strictly speaking, pantheistic. His general tendency is towards pantheism but being confronted with difficulties he is led to accept the theistic position as we have already pointed out.

IS THE DOCTRINE PANTHEISTIC ?

In the above Chapter we tried to show that Spinoza cannot be called either a true pantheist or a theist. The conflict with which we are now acquainted is due to his manifold conception of the relations of the finite world to God. Principal Caird has rightly observed as follows : "In the one case the world is nothing and God is all; in the other the world is the manifold expression of the nature of God, and God the Being whose nature unfolds, without losing itself in the innumerable individualities of the finite world. If Spinozism contained no other conception of the relation of God to the world than the first, we should be compelled to pronounce it a purely pantheistic system. Perhaps the second conception is introduced in order to correct the inadequacy of the first. Therefore, the conflict arose between the first and the second conceptions of the relation of God to the world." ¹ This shows clearly that Spinoza's general tendency towards philosophy is pantheistic but being confronted with difficulties and inadequacies of this pantheistic doctrine he (Spinoza) leans towards naturalism and theism. Thus we can maintain that Spinoza is not a true pantheist. Either he is a qualified pantheist or a theist; either he is a naturalist or a supernaturalist and

so on. Therefore, it cannot be said that Spinozistic doctrine is cent per cent pantheistic. If it were so there would have been no conflict in Spinoza's system and Spinoza would have been freed from the charge that the gap between the finite world and God remains unbridged.

(To be continued)

Reviews and Notices of Books

Existentialism—By Jean-Paul Sartre. Translated by Bernard Frechtman. Philosophical Library. New York. Pp. 92.

Existentialism has obtained an important footing among thinkers and intellectuals on the continent of Europe. At the moment its position seems to resemble that of Freudian Psychology, struggling for recognition during the period preceding the First World War. In England, however, there is a tendency to disregard it, or treat it with contempt, well voiced by Bertrand Russell, who, in a recent broadcast comment, dismissed it as nonsense.

Although Existentialism has come into increasing prominence in recent years, its ancestry goes back to St Augustine's 'Confessions', containing elements like the individual's encounter with destiny, and anguish, dread and despair, which are now basic to the Existentialist attitude. We can even go further back in the past, and see in the words of Socrates, in the *Apology*, the Existentialist position on death clearly stated: I do not know what lies in the beyond, but I go forward with courage and hope, and I shall find out in good time!

The term Existentialist is connected with scholastic philosophy and is based upon a distinction between essence and existence. 'Essence is what a being is. Existence is the act by which a being is'. The words are said by Thomas Aquinas, and this frame work of reference is necessary to define things which exist as marked off from those that are merely objects of thought, such as a unicorn, possessing an essence but no existence.

In recent years Kierkegaard is the first in the new line of thinking. Sartre is perhaps the most popular. The reason seems to be that the latter has, in his novels and dramas, tried to come to grips with the human situation in the existential manner, and has thus given a wider currency to his ideas. The fundamental idea in this philosophy is the freedom of choice. 'We do not merely choose between this course of action and that, we choose and make ourselves'. (Existentialism from Within by E. Allen, p. 56).

This point is of great significance and the following words quoted from the book under review will clarify the position still further: 'When the existentialist writes about a coward, he says that this coward is responsible for his cowardice. He's not like that because he has a cowardly heart or lung or brain; he's not like that on account of his physiological make-up; but he's like that because he has made himself a coward by his acts'. (p. 40).

In Sartre's novels the choice made is often inauthentic. It will be difficult for any one to grasp his attitude without a knowledge of his philosophy. Unlike Freud the Existentialist does not regard man as a victim of circumstance beyond his control. The Psycho-analyst holds some phobia or complex as responsible for conduct but the new thinkers will not thus shift the responsibility on to something outside oneself. Sartre thinks this circumstance the source of the peculiar strength and greatness of his philosophy: 'You see that it can not be taken for a philosophy of quietism, since it defines man in terms of action; nor for a pessimistic description of man—there is no doctrine more optimistic, since man's destiny is within himself; nor for an attempt to discourage man from acting, since it tells him the only hope is in his acting and that action is the only thing that enables a man to live.' (p. 42).

The ultimate test is, of course not the cheerful message which the philosophy carries with it but its basic truth, and its future acceptance or rejection will depend upon how far it satisfies the criterion. As an initial advantage we can see in it a mode of escape from the gloomy determinism preached by Freudians, and Behaviourists under Pavlov.

SRI C. SEN.

Family and Kin in Indo-European Culture—By G. S. Ghurye. University of Bombay Publications, Sociology Series, No. 4. George Cumberlege. Oxford University Press, 1955. Pp. 254. Rupees Twelve.

Professor Ghurye has tried to present in this book a description of the kinship pattern and familial organization of the Indo-European peoples. After some amount of preliminary discussion, he has discussed in detail the structure of the family in ancient and medieval times in northern India; and then proceeded to do the same thing with regard to Greek and Latin cultures. In a final chapter, there is some account of material from Scandinavian and other European cultures. This is followed by a not very elaborate, but pointed discussion of the theory of economic determinism of family structure as propounded by Engels. The last section of the book therefore gains some amount of topical interest. In the last sentence of the book, Professor Ghurye says, "Thus is the primacy of beliefs and ideas over economic factors substantiated by the social history of the Indo-Europeans "

When Professor Ghurye differs from anybody, he hits hard. But, we believe, this is unbecoming in a scientific atmosphere. A sentence like the following one could have been toned down considerably without any loss in the strength of one's views: "It can be easily seen that the so-called particular discrimination of marriage relationships in this line shows not only Morgan's mental confusion but also a travesty of discrimination." (p. 16).


Professor Ghurye goes through a subtle chain of reasoning to prove that the original Indo-Aryan family consisted of four generations. Families became extended, kinship began to be recorded in personal names, until it could no longer be actually traced. Then clans came into being, and bore the names of great heroes or otherwise distinguished persons. Professor Ghurye has tried successfully to combat the view that matriarchy was a universal antecedent of patriarchal organization. While doing so, he has incidentally examined critically some of the uses to which kinship terms have subjected for purposes of historical reconstruction. In this section, Professor Ghurye brushes aside such attempts, unless the existence of the reconstructed forms of marriage can be attested to by other forms of evidence. It is curious however that he says little about Dr. Rivers's attempts in this respect. Perhaps the abstention has been out of respect. But then one has to account for the existence of such things as joking relationships, privileged familiarities, avoidances, etc. by some alternate hypothesis, instead of merely brushing them aside as accidental curiosities.

One observation has to be made with regard to the kind of evidence employed in the chapters dealing with Greek culture. From references in epic literature, Professor Ghurye shows how the Greek family life was corrupted by sexual licence, and unworthy relations between different generations of men and women. But these were, even then, looked upon as deviations rather than as approved customs. In our epic literature too, we find tales of licence or of practices, which are however not to be taken as representing the *norm*. If cultures have to be compared with one another, we believe, it is right to compare on the basis of comparables. The ideals of one and the actualities of another, perhaps picked up from a particular class in society, are undoubtedly not. In any case, we believe that an account of aberrations does not help us in understanding any better either Greek or Hindu social structure.

Professor Ghurye's summary dismissal of the view of Engels does not seem to us to be justified. Engels may have been wrong in discovering in economic determinism a universal solvent. One need only point out that his theory does not help in explaining the *details* of a particular situation. But how can one say that economic forces do not have anything to do with social structure, and it is only beliefs and notions that do? If polyandry arises in a place where there is female infanticide, and where people also do not wish to squander a limited property by division and subdivision, then are not the concepts which eventually arise out of polyandry ultimately referable to 'material' causes? It is true that the beliefs which led to the practice of infanticide are inadequately known as far as their origin is concerned. But they have to be looked for carefully, before we brush aside such a helpful hypothesis as Marx or Engels suggested as completely unwarranted.

Professor Ghurye's book is, on the whole, provocative in many ways. It contains a wealth of information, and logical reconstructions which are on the whole sound. But they are presented with a kind of hardness, and an utter disregard of alternate views which seem to hurt in a scientific atmosphere. No one has, we believe, the right to claim that all truth is on his side. All of us can do no more than pursue our own view of truth to the best of our ability without denying the same right to other people. It is only when we try to find out the truth in the other man's point of view that, in the process of that humble admission, perhaps we come one step nearer to our final objective.

NIRMAL KUMAR BOSE.



THE LATE PROFESSOR JAYGOPAL BANERJEE

Ourselves

DEATH OF PROFESSOR JAYGOPAL BANERJEE

Death occurred in Calcutta on 25th December, 1956, of Professor Jaygopal Banerjee at the ripe old age of eighty-five. We must say that both the country and the University of Calcutta are the poorer by his death. Bengal has lost in him a man of letters, who throughout his life did his best to unlock to Bengali students the vast treasure-house of English literature. Generations of earnest and eager pupils at Cooch-Behar in North Bengal and in the Post-graduate classes in the University of Calcutta sat at his feet and were captivated by his profound learning and the charm of his personality. In a sense, he was one of the last survivors of our heroic age in Bengal—an age which was adorned by a galaxy of bright and inspiring teachers. Professor Jaygopal, after a highly successful career at Cooch-Behar and Banaras, joined the Post-graduate Department of the University of Calcutta where he rose to first Indian Professor and Head of the Department of English Literature. Teaching was the passion of his life. No man of our time can be more truly said to have lived for the sake of his work. A great teacher is one of the rarest of human beings. He has to fill a subject with his personality. Professor Jaygopal had this power in a pre-eminent measure. He was always able to tread even well-worn paths with a sense of vigour and freshness peculiarly his own. It has been said that a great teacher knows, like Moses, how to strike living water from the rock. Jaygopal had this wonderful gift, and thousands of his grateful and devoted pupils will testify to the truth of this statement.

With the Calcutta Review his relations were intimate and sustained. He acted as the Editor-in chief of this Review from 1927 to 1933, and the pages of the Review, for a number of years, bear the impress of his learning and scholarship. His essays on Adwaita Philosophy, Contemporary English Poetry, W. B. Yeats, the Philosophy of Shelley, Robert Bridges, and Red Oleanders of Rabindranath Tagore are strikingly original, and they open out new vistas of thought. He founded the Calcutta branch of Poetry Society where his discourses and brilliant talks excited the wonder and admiration of all the members who listened. But perhaps more than his intellectual powers and aesthetic gifts, the thing most to be valued in his character

was the moral earnestness and integrity of the man. The really interesting and striking thing in his life was not what he actually produced, but himself, that is to say, his transparent sincerity, his simplicity and disinterestedness, his sweet and lovely example, his courage and fearlessness, and above all, his unlikeness to anybody else. He had no stereotyped opinions, but he was always making progress in the path of apprehending truth either through intellect or through intuition. We convey our condolence to the members of the bereaved family.

* * *


DEATH OF PROFESSOR SUHASH CHANDRA ROY

Death has also snatched away from our midst Suhash Chandra Roy who was a Lecturer in the Department of English for more than thirty-five years. Suhash Chandra was a very popular teacher. He was popular with the students and teachers alike. His clean conduct and personal charin endeared him in every circle where he moved. He had just retired from service in the University, and it might be expected that he would live for a few years more to enjoy his well-earned rest. But Providence decreed otherwise. We convey our condolence to the members of the bereaved family.

* * *

CENTENARY CELEBRATIONS

The University has made arrangements to celebrate its centenary in a befitting manner. The programme has already been published in the press and in the pages of this Review. The celebration will reach their climax in the programme of activities from the 19th to 24th of January. It may be recalled in this connection that the University of Calcutta was created by an Act of the Indian Legislative Council on 24th January, 1857. It is therefore, in the fitness of things that the final celebrations of the Centenary should take place on 24th January, 1957. We are glad to announce in this connection, again, that a fairly big volume giving the history of the University of Calcutta during the last one hundred years is being published on this occasion. This volume will convey some idea of the different aspects and activities of University life during one hundred years of its existence. The past one hundred years have been fruitful indeed in the life of the University and the nation in different branches. Let us hope that in the century that lies ahead, the record of the University will be still more fruitful and glorious. Let there be an earnest dedication for this purpose.



Notifications

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/1714/109 (Affl.), dated 28.12.56.

It is hereby notified for general information that the Vice-Chancellor and Syndicate have been pleased to recognise the School of Tropical Medicine, Calcutta as an institution affiliated to this University for training of the students for the D.T.M. & H. Course.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

Notifications : Other Universities.

THE MAHARAJA SAYAJIRAO UNIVERSITY OF BARODA

Notification

No. SR (FX) 56-VI-72

It is hereby notified under the direction of the Syndicate that the results of the following candidates, who have been found guilty of having practised unfair means at the University Examinations mentioned against each of them, held in March-April 1956, are hereby cancelled. Further, all of them *except* Sr. No. 4, *Karna Sajni Parsram*, are debarred from appearing at any University Examination before 31st December, 1957.

Sl. No.	Examination	Seat No.	Name	Faculty/ Institution
1	Intermediate Arts	21	Shah Ramanlal Chhotalal	Intermediate College
2	Intermediate Arts	155	Shah Vinaykant Bhikhalal	Intermediate College
3	Intermediate Arts	156	Vazirani Nanik Dharamdas	Intermediate College
4	Intermediate Arts	157	Karna Sajni Parsram	Intermediate College
5	Intermediate Commerce	72	Shah Thakorlal Bhailalbhai	Intermediate College
6	B.Com.	23	Mehta Manojkumar Chandrakant	Faculty of Commerce
7	Diploma in Architecture	17	Mallick Gian Chand	Faculty of Technology and Engineering.
8	F.E.	60	Golani Purshottam Pribhdas	Faculty of Technology & Engineering.

B. K. BUNTRI,
Registrar.

CENTRAL BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION, AJMER.

Notification

The following candidates, whose particulars are given against each, having attempted to use unfair means at the Intermediate (Arts) Examination of the Board for 1956, have been debarred from appearing at the Intermediate (Arts) Examination of the Board noted against each :—

Sl. No.	Roll No.	Name of Candidate	Name of Father	Name of Institution from which appeared. In case of private candidates name of the place of residence.	Intermediate Arts Examination from which debarred.	Disqualified from the Intermediate (Arts) Examination of 1956 and debarred from the Inter. (Arts) Examination of 1957.
1	9	Amirudh Jayashanker Joshi	Jayashanker Krishnaramji Joshi	Mehsana		
2	981	Mohan Lal Sharma	Makhan Lal Sharma	Ajmer		Do.
3	938	Mata Prasad Mathur	Sobhag Mal Mathur	Ajmer		Do.
4	1923	Vazirani Gordhan Shewaram	Shewaram	Ajmer		Do.
5	4799	Dinesh Chand Chaturvedi	Munni Lal Chaturvedi	Govt. College, Ajmer.		Do.
6	5015	Kishor Mal Mehta	Ummeraw Mal Mehta	S. D. P. Inter. College, Beawar.		Do.
7	5025	Puran Mal B. Kothari	Bhanwar Lal Kothari	Do.		Do.

for Secretary,
Central Board of Secondary Education, Ajmer.

CENTRAL BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION, AJMER

Notification

The following candidates, whose particulars are given against each, having attempted to use unfair means at the Intermediate Commerce Examination of the Board for 1956, have been debarred from appearing at the Intermediate Commerce Examination of the Board noted against each :—

Sl. No.	Roll No.	Name of Candidate	Name of Father	Name of Institution from which appeared. In case of private candidates name of the place of residence.	Intermediate Commerce Examination from which debarred.
1	108	Pcoran Chand Jain	Chandar Mal Jain	Ajmer	Disqualified from the Intermediate Commerce Examination of 1956 and debarred from the Inter. Commerce Examination of 1957.
2	475	Raisuddin Ansari	Sirejuddin Ansari	Govt. Hamidia College, Bhopal.	Do.

for Secretary
Central Board of Secondary Education, Ajmer.

CENTRAL BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION, AJMER

Notification

The following candidates, whose particulars are given against each, having attempted to use unfair means at the Intermediate (Science) Examination of the Board for 1956, have been debarred from appearing at the Intermediate (Science) Examination of the Board noted against each :—

Sl. No.	Roll No.	Name of Candidate	Name of Father	Name of Institution from which appeared. In case of private candidates name of the place of residence.	Intermediate (Science) Examination from which debarred.
1	12	Laxman Prasad Trivedi	Days Shankar Trivedi	Ajmer	Disqualified from Inter. (Science) Examination of 1956 and debarred from the Inter. (Science) Examination of 1957.
2	280	Dharm Deo Sharma	Bahori Lal Sharma	D.A.V. College, Ajmer.	Do.

for Secretary,
Central Board of Secondary Education, Ajmer.

UNIVERSITY OF TRAVANCORE

Proceedings of the Syndicate

No. D. Dis. 56/55

Subject :—Malpractice at the University Examinations held in September, 1954 and March, 1955

READ : (1) Reports of the Chief Superintendents ;

(2) Explanation of the candidates ;

(3) Reports of the Examiners in the subjects concerned ;

(4) Recommendations of the Standing Committee of the Syndicate on residence, welfare and discipline of students.

ORDER

The Syndicate having found the undermentioned candidates at the University Examinations held in September, 1954 and March, 1955 guilty of misconduct or resorting to unfair means at the examinations resolved that the examinations taken by the candidates be cancelled and that they be debarred from appearing for any examination of this University earlier than the date noted against the name of each.

University Buildings,
Trivandrum,
Dated the 26th June, 1956.

P. S. ABRAHAM,
Registrar.

Malpractice at the University Examinations held in September, 1954 and March 1955

MARCH, 1955

Sl. No.	Name of candidate.	Reg. No.	Examination taken by the candidate.	Date of birth	Name of father or Guardian.	Address	Period of punishment.
1	Chandrasekharan Nayar, K.	33	Intermediate	22-2-113	G. Krishna Pillai	K. Chandrase Nair, Vattavilakattu Veedu, Karakulam Pakutty, Nedumangad.	Not to appear for any examination of this University earlier than September, 1957.
2	Thankappan, Achary, K.	520	Do.	19-11-106	S. Kochakunju Achari.	K. Thankappan-Achary, Chundakamala Veedu, Kadam-banad, P. O.	Not to appear for any examination of this University earlier than March, 1957.
3	M. Sreedhara Kurup.	814	Do.	2-10-106	K. Madhava Kurup	M. Sreedhara Kurup, Attur Veedu, Pangaradu, Kalimanoor, P.O.	Do.


4	Sundaram, R.	881	Do.	5-9-109	H. Ramalingam Achari.	R. Sundaram, Thundu Vilakathu Veedu, Mekkam Muri, Dharmalayam Road, Puttanchanthal, Trivandrum.	Do.
5	George Joseph	1198	Do.	27-6-112	K. J. Joseph	George Joseph, Varambaseeril House, Barton's Hill, Trivandrum-1.	Not to appear for any examination of this University earlier than September, 1957.
6	Thrivikraman, M. N.	1407	Do.	10-5-106	Krishnan Neelakantan.	Thrivikraman, M. N., Manoopatu Veedu, Elanthoor.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than September, 1956.
7	Achuthan Nayar, P.	1544	Do.	27-12-110	K. Subhadra Amma	P. Achuthan Nayar, Vilapurathu Veedu, Pappanamkode, Trivandrum-2.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than September, 1957.
8	Sreedharan Nayar, R.	1710	Do.	26-9-110	K. Ramakrishna Pillai.	R. Sreedharan Nayar, Madathuvilakathu Veedu, Vayamoola, Vallakadavu, Trivandrum-3.	Do.
9	Jacob, K. V.	3802	Do.	6-2-109	A. C. Varughese	K. V. Jacob, Ambattuthottathil, Ezhakarenadu, Muvattupuzha.	Do.
10	Sivasankaran Nayar, R.	5061	Do.	16-1-112	P. P. Raghava Ranicker.	R. Sivasankaran Nayar, Chathenkattu Madom, Northern Gate Vaikom.	Not to appear for any examination of this University earlier than September, 1956.
11	Madhavan, P.	5358	Do.	10-7-110	P. K. Kunjunny Nair.	P. Madhavan, Hospital Road, Ernekulam.	Do.
12	Alias, P. P.	6979	Do.	13-1-112	Paul	P. P. Alias, Padinjara Puthiya Madathila, Kunnekal, Muvattupuzha, P. O.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than March, 1957.
13	Vallinayagam Pillai, S.	7443	Do.	7-2-1929	V. Suryanarayana Pillai.	S. Vallinayagam Pillai, North Street, Eravi P. O. Suchindram Puthoor.	Do.

14	Bhaskara Kurup, G.	8938	Inter-mediate	5-7-109	N. Neelakanta Panikkar	G. Bhaskara. Curup, Thundla House, Elampallil, Nooravudu P.O.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than March, 1957.
15	Koshy, P. A.	8961	Do.	26-2-111	Rev. Fr. P. K. Abraham	P. A. Koshy, Pulithitta House, Pandalam.	Do.
16	Lekshmanan, N.	8983	Do.	5-8-104	S. Raman	N. Leksh Manan, Puthen Parayil Veedu, Puthia Vila, Keerikad, P.O.	Do.
17	Kesava Nayar, T. K.	10057	Do.	15-6-108	K. Narayana Pillai	T. K. Kesava Nayar, Kochayathu Veedu, Ettavanasseri, Mynagappally.	Do.
18	Aravindakshan, G.	10092	Do.	15-10-111	G. Gopala Pillai	G. Aravindakshan, Bharathi Sadan, Mundakal, Quilon.	Do.
19	Ardhapanan, N.	10093	Do.	11-6-112	M. V. Neelakantan	N. Ardhapanan, Sathvepalamanadiram, Fzhukone, P.O.	Do.
20	Jenardhanan Pillai, P.	10143	Do.	17-8-110	K. Padmanabha Pillai	P. Jenardhanan Nayar, Kaipurathu Vadakethil Veedu, Kadavoor, Perinad Quilon.	Do.
21	Muthukumaraswamy, Pillai, G.	10159	Do.	14-9-109	R. Govinda Pillai	G. Muthukumaraswamy Pillai, Madathil Veedu, Arunoottemangalam, Mangad, Quilon.	Not permitted to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than March 1956.
22	Kalikutty, C.	10480	Do.	12-4-105	M. V. Velappan	C. Kalikutty, Karuvilayil, Thodiyoor, Muzhangodi, Karunagappally.	Do.
23	Rabindra Nathan, K.	10489	Do.	20-5-109	P. K. Kesavan	K. Rabindranathan, Vadakal Veedu, Mampalli Kunnam, Chathanoor, P.O.	Do.
24	Rajappan Nayar, K.	10590	Do.	24-8-109	K. Kunjan Pillai	K. Rajappan Nair, Thengara Veedu, Vettor, Varkala P.O.	Not to appear for any examination of this University earlier than March, 1957.
25	Venugopala Sodar M.	10905	Do.	18-7-103	P. Chakrapani	M. Venugopala Sodar, Thattam Vilakom Veedu, Nedumangad.	Not to appear for any examination of this University earlier than March, 1956.
26	Srinivasan Potti, K.	10874	Do.	16-2-109	L. Krishnan Potti	K. Sreenivasan Potti, C/o Jyothi Bhavan, Chamaakada, Quilon.	Not to appear for any examination of this University earlier than March, 1957.

27 Bruno, P.	11007	Do.	20-2-110	J. Patrick Fernan- des.	P. Bruno, Mary Vile, Vaddy, Quilon.	Do.
28 Mathew, T. C.	11551	Do.	7-1-112	T. C. Chacko	T. C. Mathew, Theonikkadavil House, Muttiambalam P. O., Kottayam.	Do.
29 Oommen Cherian	11552	Do.	30-9-112	P. O. Cherian	Oommen Cherian, Pynumootil, Perumthuruthy, Thiruvalla P. O.	Do.
30 Jacob, M. P.	688	B.Sc. Degree	18-7-1929	C. R. Michael	M. P. Jacob, C/o C. R. Michael, Beach Side, Alleppey.	Do.
31 George, V.	513	Hindi Vidvan Final.	12-2-1932	G. Verghese	George, V. Vayalil Kettidom, Kalundadam, Quilon Kalukka- davu.	Do.
32 Sugathan, K. S.	24	Third-year Diploma in Technology	6-3-1111	K. K. Sankaran	K. S. Sugathan, Kandathil House, Kattathura P. O. Vatakkekars, N. Parur.	Do.
33 Abraham Thomas, A.	29	Do.	15-6-1111	K. E. Thomas	A. Abraham Thomas, Kadalic- kattil Bunglow, Kunnakal P. O., Via Muvattupuzha.	Do.
34 Sreekrishnan, V.	19	D A.M. ((Transitory))		Velayudhan, R.	V. Sreekrishnan, Thodiyil Veedu, Oottoor, Moongode, P. O. Attingal.	Do.
SEPTEMBER, 1954						
35 Damodaran, G.	1223	Intermediate	9-3-104	K. Govindan	G. Damodaran, Plavilaputhen Veeju, Kalimanoor.	Not to appear for any examina- tion of this University earlier than September, 1957.
36 Balan, G.	1264	Do.	28-4-104	K. Govindan	G. Balan, Kallavila, Cherun- niyoor, Varkala.	Do.

The 25th June, 1956.

P. S. ABRAHAM,
Registrar.



THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

Vol. 142]

FEBRUARY, 1957

[No. 2

BENGAL (1750-1800)

HEMENDRA PRASAD GHOSH

CHAPTER VII

The moral condition of a society which paid respect to Mrs. Hastings and idolised Francis can be easily imagined. Many of the men indulged in what may be called profligate concubinage which was not considered to be "deviation from propriety"—and was never condemned. Then was fashionable dissipation in abundance and no small amount of secret vice. No wonder Lord Valentia who visited Calcutta in 1803 wrote as follows :—

"The most rapidly accumulating evil of Bengal is the increase of half-caste children. They are forming the first step to colonisation, by creating a link of union between the English and the natives. In every country where this intermediate caste has been permitted to rise, it has ultimately tended to the ruin of that country Their increase in India is beyond calculation; and though possibly there may be nothing to fear from the sloth of the Hindoos and the rapidly declining consequence of the Mussulmans, yet it may be justly apprehended that this tribe may hereafter become too powerful to control. Although they are not permitted to hold offices under the Company, yet they act as clerks in almost every mercantile house, and many of them annually sent to England to receive the benefit of an European education. With numbers in their favour, with a close relationship to the natives, and without an equal amount of that pusillanimity and indolence which is natural to them, what may not in time be dreaded from them? I have no hesitation in saying that the evil ought to be stopped, and I know no other way of effecting this object, than by obliging every father of half-cast children to send them to Europe, prohibiting their return as any

capacity whatsoever. The expense that would thus attend upon children, would certainly operate as a check to the extension of zenanas, which are now but too common among the Europeans; and this would be a benefit to the country, no less in a moral, than in a political view."¹⁵

The following advertisements in contemporary newspapers demonstrate the extension of this evil—

(1) "A neat, compact and new built garden-house" is advertised for private sale at 1,500 sicca rupees. It was "pleasantly situated at Chowringhy, and from its contiguity to Fort William peculiarly well calculated for an officer; it would," continues the advertisement, "likewise be a handsome provision for a native lady or child". (1792 A.D.)¹⁶

(2) Advertisement from a paper of 1794—"Wants a Place—To wait upon a lady, either here or on a voyage to Europe, a native woman, the daughter of an European, who speaks English, can dress and attend on a lady, and has already attended one to England."¹⁷

(3) "To be let or sold by private sale—a lower-roomed house situated immediately facing Mr. Derozio's house on the Boytaconah Road, There are Bootich shops belonging to the premises, to be sold with the house, which are let to good and constant tenants; which shops alone bring in sufficient interest: the premises would be a desirable gift to a woman, and a permanent living."¹⁸

In 1810 was published Captain Williamson's *East India Vade-macum* in which the author supports concubinage and shamelessly remarks—"it is impossible for the generality of European inhabitants to act in exact conformity with those excellent doctrines which teach us to avoid There are certain situations and times, in which the law must be suffered to sleep; since its enforcement would neither be easy nor wise; such is the instance now before us". This book gave a detailed account of the expenses attending the keeping of a mistress. The book was dedicated to the Court of Directors of the East India Company as one—"professedly undertaken with the view to promote the welfare, and to facilitate the progress of those young gentlemen who may, from time to time, be appointed to situations under your several Presidencies". Wrote the writer of an article on "The English in India—Our social morality"—Progress!—Yes indeed, 'the Rake's Progress'."¹⁹

The mode in which European ladies, some of rank and education, were accustomed to dispose themselves at Calcutta would be apparent

¹⁵ George, Viscount Valentia—*Voyages and Travels*.

¹⁶ *The Good Old Days of Honourable John Company*.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *The Calcutta Review*.

from the following extract of a letter from a young lady, who—in ignorance of the prevailing practice—had been induced to go out to India in one of the Company's fleets. The letter is taken from Macintosh's 'Travels, and was addressed by the lady to her cousin in 1779 :—

“My dearest Maria—With respect to your request that I should tell you plainly what I think of these matrimonial schemes (for such they are, let people disguise them as they will) I never can impress upon you too strongly the folly and impropriety of your making such an attempt. Certainly, the very project itself is one of the utmost delicacy; for what is it but running counter to all the dictates of that diffidence and native modesty for which English women have been so long held up as the perfect models?

“True it is I am married; I have obtained that for which I came out to India—a husband; but I have lost what I left behind me in my native country—happiness. Yet my husband is rich, as rich, or richer than I could desire; but his health is ruined, as well as his temper, and he has taken me rather as a convenience than as a companion: and he plays the tyrant over me with as much severity as if I were one of the slaves that carry his palanquin. I will just give you a hasty sketch of the manner in which I came by him. What a state of things is that where the happiness of a wife depends upon the death of that man who should be the chief not the only source of felicity. However such is the fact in India: the wives are looking out with gratitude for the next mortality which may carry off their husbands, in order that they may return to England to live upon their jointures: they live a married life, an absolute misery, that they may enjoy a widowhood of affluence and independence. This is no exaggeration, I assure you.

“You know that independent of others, there were thirty of us females on board the H—who sailed upon the same speculation; we were of all ages, complexions, and sizes, with little or nothing in common, but that we were single, and wished to get married. Some were absolutely old maids of the shrivelled and dry description, most of them above the age of fifty; while others were mere girls just freed from the tyranny of the dancing, music and drawing masters at boarding school, ignorant of almost everything that was useful, and educated merely to cover the surface of their mental deformity. I promise you, to me it was no slight penance to be exposed during the whole voyage to the half sneering, satirical looks of the mates and guinea pigs (so the midshipmen on board Indiamen were called), and it would have been intolerable but for the good conduct and politeness of Captain S—. He was a man

of most gentlemanly deportment, but the involuntary compassion I fancied I sometimes discovered in him was extremely irksome. However, we will suppose our voyage ended for nothing at all material happened, and that we are now safely landed at Calcutta.

"This place has many houses of entertainment of all descriptions, and the gaiety that prevails after the arrival of a fleet from England is astonishing. The town is filled with military and civil officers of all classes; and the first thing done after we have recovered our looks, is for the captains to give an entertainment, to which they issue general invitations; and everybody, with the look and attendance of a gentleman, is at liberty to make his appearance. The speculative ladies, who have come out in the different ships, dress themselves with all the splendour they can assume exhausting upon finery all the little stock of money they have brought out with them from Europe. This is in truth their last, or nearly their last stake, and they are all determined to look and dance as divinely as possible.

"Such are the majority of the ladies, while the gentlemen are principally composed of those who have for sometime resided in the country, and having realised fortunes, are determined to obtain wives with as little delay as possible; They are, as I have said, of all ranks, but generally of pale and squalid complexions, and suffering under the grievous infliction of liver complaints. A pretty prospect this for matrimonial happiness! Not a few are old and infirm, leaning upon sticks and crutches, and even supported about the apartment by their gorgeously dressed servants, for a display of all kinds of splendour on their part is no less attempted and accomplished. These old decrepit gentlemen address themselves to the youngest and prettiest and the youngest and prettiest if properly instructed in their parts, betray no sort of coyness or reluctance. In fact, this is the mode in which matches are generally made; and if now and then one happy couple come together, thousands are married with no hope of comfort, and with the prospect merely of splendid misery. Generally speaking, in India, the officers make the best husbands, for they are frequently young and uninjured by the climate, and are the best disposed to attend to the wishes of their wives.

"This is called the Captain's Ball, and most frequently the greater part of the expectant ladies are disposed of there; it is really curious, but most melancholy, to see them ranged round the room waiting with the utmost anxiety for offers, and looking with envy upon all who are more fortunate than themselves.

"If however, as is sometimes the case, a considerable number remain on hand, after the lapse of three months, they unite in giving

an entertainment at their own expense, to which all gentlemen are at liberty to go; and if they fail in this *dernier ressort*, this forlorn hope, they must give up the attempt, and return to England.”²⁰

This is a tocsin of alarm loudly sounded for those who wanted to know if they should try the experiment of husband-hunting in far off India.

On a young lady landing at Calcutta, she was actually “exhibited” before those in search of wives. For the first three or four nights the house where she resided was beset with visitors, and “probably the greater part of the night was spent in receiving such”. It was the rule to “strike the iron while hot”, and marriages were concluded as quickly as possible. But the Governor-General’s license to be married was necessary to constitute it a legal one.

In the “Hartly House” we read the following from a lady at Calcutta who sadly remarks “we must all submit to our destiny” :—

“An old fellow, with an incredible fortune ogles me, and professes his life depends on his obtaining the honour of my hand—my father smiles—and I, with an air of indolent complacence (the air of the country) receive his devoirs as the just tribute of my transcendent charms; which charms (it is already got into circulation) are held by me above all price (for the fetter of my vow has not yet transpired); which may possibly tend to a diminution in the train of my adorers, at least on the arrival of the next ships; for, as the life of a butterfly is but an hour, so the ladies, who wish to see themselves advantageously disposed of, must reprobate the antediluvian practice, and be careful not to let the iron grow cold on the anvil; which with few exceptions, is the universal conduct; so that I doubt not, I shall soon behold this love-stricken greybeard at the feet of some more yielding damsel;—and may she make him as happy as she will flatter herself his wealth can render her; nor once experience the common fate of such expectations—finding she has been self-deceived.”

In the letter quoted before mention has been made of prospective husbands for female adventurers from England come to India in search of husbands as “generally of pale and squalid complexions, and suffering under the grievous infliction of liver complaints”.

The reason for this is not far to seek. Drinking had long been one of the “rational” amusements with which the early Englishmen in Bengal sought to beguile their time. “Arrack punch would seem have been the first beverage to which the English in India addicted themselves—and it often proved to be the last”. There was another

beverage which was called "burnt wine". It was "hot wine boiled with cloves, cinnamon and other spices" which the English used to drink frequently in the morning. Punch and serbet, being always cheap, were the common drinks of the young military men, and pretty freely were they consumed, at all hours, from morning to night. To this slow poison a very large proportion of the heavy annual mortality may be attributed.

The *hookah* was the grand whiler away of time in old Calcutta European society. Ladies were much addicted to it while gentlemen were not less fond of it. In the letters of a gentleman who visited Calcutta in 1779, is given a copy of a card of invitation in which Mr. and Mrs. Hastings "request the favour of his company at a concert and supper at Mrs. Hastings' house in town"—a postscript requests him to bring only his "huccabardar".²¹

Besides the "huccabardar" (the man with the *hucca*) and the "chhatabardar" (the umbrellaman) there were other servants. As fortunes were easily made—money was lavishly spent. The establishment of Philip Francis in Calcutta consisted of sixty servants! The following list of Indian servants',²² wages which prevailed in Calcutta in 1759 two years after Plassey, and the increase which took place in the following quarter of a century would exhibit the extravagant system of house keeping at Calcutta :—

	In 1759	In 1785
Consumah	... Rs. 5-0	Rs. 10 to 25
Chohdar	... Rs. 5-0	Rs. 6 to 8
Head Cook	... Rs. 5-0	Rs. 15 to 30
Coachman	... Rs. 5-0	Rs. 10 to 20
Head Female Servant	... Rs. 5-0	Rs.
Jemadar	... Rs. 4-0	Rs. 8 to 15
Khidmutgar	... Rs. 3-0	Rs. 6 to 8
Cook's First Mate	... Rs. 3-0	Rs. 6 to 12
Head Bearer	... Rs. 3-0	Rs. 6 to 10
Second Female Servant	... Rs. 3-0	Rs.
Peon	... Rs. 2-8	Rs. 4 to 6
Bearer	... Rs. 2-8	Rs. 4
Washerman	... Rs. 3-0	Rs. 15 to 20
Ditto to a Single		
Gentleman	... Rs. 1-8	Rs. 6 to 8
Syce	... Rs. 2	Rs. 5 to 6
Masalchee	... Rs. 2-0	Rs. 4

²¹ Buxterd—*Echoes from Old Calcutta.*

²² *Good Old Days of Honourable John Company.*

Shaving Barber	... Rs. 1	Rs. 2 to 4
Hair Dresser	... Rs. 1-8	Rs. 6 to 16
Khurtch burder	... Rs. 2-0	Rs. 4
House Mally	... Rs. 2-0	Rs.
Grass Cutter	... Rs. 1-4	Rs. 4
Harrywoman to family	... Rs. 2-0	Rs. 4 to 6
Do. to Single Gentleman	... Rs. 1-0	Do
Wet nurse	... Rs. 4-0	Rs. 12 to 16
Dry nurse	... Rs. 4-0	Rs. 12 to 16

When Valentia paid a visit to Calcutta the condition he observed must have been one described by Heber in his hymn—"only man is vile". To the Europeans eager to amass wealth—by fair means or foul—and addicted to indolence, luxury and vice religion was an object of neglect. Wrote Valentia :—

"It will hardly be believed that in this splendid city, the head of a mighty Christian empire, there is only one church of the establishment of the mother country, and that by no means conspicuous, either for size or ornament. It is also remarkable, that all British India does not afford one Episcopal See, while that advantage has been granted to the province of Canada; yet it is certain that from the remoteness of the country, and the peculiar temptations to which the freedom of manners expose the clergy, immediate Episcopal superintendence can nowhere be more requisite. For the want of this is painful to observe, that the characters of too many of that order, are by no means creditable to the doctrine they profess, which, together with the unedifying contests that prevail among them even on the pulpit, tend to lower the religion, and its followers, in the eyes of the natives of every description."²³ It is a case of "if the salt have lost his savour wherewith shall it be salted?" But Valentia's concern seems to be about the effect of such conduct on the part of the missionaries on Indians! It reminds one of the injunction—"tell it not in Gath; publish it not in the streets of Askelon."

"On occasion of marriages the officiating minister was accustomed to receive as bed fees from sixteen to twenty gold mohurs and five gold mohurs for a baptism. No wonder that the chaplains were able to make such splendid fortunes in a short time." It was certainly a case of "passing rich with forty pounds a year."²⁴

Doctors and lawyers were fortunate. "Physic, as well as law, is a gold mine to its professors, to work it at will. The medical

²³ George Viscount Valentia—*Voyages and Travels*. Vol. I.

²⁴ *The Good Old Days of Honourable John Company*.

gentlemen at Calcutta make their visits in palanquins, and receive a gold mohur each patient, for every common attendance—extras are enormous.

“ Medicines are also rated so high, that it is shocking to think of : in order to soften which public evil as much as possible, an apothecary's shop is opened at the Old Fort, by the Company, in the nature of your London dispensaries, where drugs are vended upon reasonable terms. The following charges are a specimen of the expenses those Europeans incur, who sacrifice to appearances.

“ An ounce of bark, three rupees, seven and six pence—an ounce of salts, one rupee, half a crown—a bolus, one rupee—a blister, two rupees, five shillings—and so on in proportoin : so that literally speaking you may ruin your fortune to preserve your life.”²⁵

The summary made in which the police in Calcutta dealt with domestic servants and others when brought up as offenders was interesting. Busteed ²⁶ has given a number of extracts to show this from the charge sheet of the Superintendent of Police in 1778, C.S. Playdell. Some extracts are given below :—

(1) John Ringwell, against his cook named Funjaney, for running away from him and beating another servant who had been engaged in his place. It appears that he had one of his ears cut off for some offence. The present complaint being fully proved—ordered him to receive ten rattans and be dismissed.

(2) A slave girl of Mr. Anderson, Piggy, having again run away from her master and being apprehended by the Chowkedar—ordered her five rattans, and be sent to her master.

(3) Mooleah, a boy, was apprehended by the Pyke of the 8th Division. The boy has been frequently punished in the cutcherry for robbery, and but a few days since received twenty rattans and was sent over the water never to return, notwithstanding which he has thought proper to come back. Ordered him to receive fifteen rattans, and to be again sent over the water (i.e., across to the Howrah side of the river).

(4) Captian Scott complains against Banybub for not complying with his promise to repair his carriage. Ordered ten slippers.

(5) Colonel Watson against Ramsing, as an impostor receiving pay as a carpenter when actually nothing more than a barber. Ordered fifteen rattans, and to be drummed through the Cooly Bazar to Colonel Watson's gates (His garden house was situate in what is known as “ Watgunge ”.)

²⁵ *Hardley House, Calcutta (1789 A.D.).*

²⁶ *Echoes from Old Calcutta.*

(6) Jacob Joseph against Tithol, cook, for robbing him of a brass pot and a pestle and mortar. Ordered him to be confined in Hurring Barree till he makes good the things.

(7) Mr. Nottby against Caloo for putting a split bamboo and laying there in wait purposely to throw passengers down and apparently to rob them. Ten rattans.

(8) Coja Janoose against Sareh, the slave girl of Coja Offan, for running away, it appears she has frequently done it. Ordered her fifteen rattans, and to be kept in the thannah 1st division, till her master returns.

(9) Mr. Levitt against Nursing for inducing one of his slave girls named Polly to rob him of a quantity of linen of sorts, the above girl Polly giving evidence against him. Five rattans.

(10) Birnarold Pinto against his slave girl Pekeytase for running away; this being the second time of her being guilty of the like offence, to prevent her doing the same in future. Ordered her to receive five rattans and be returned to her master.

(11) Ramhurry Jugee against Ramgopal for stealing a toolsey dannah off a child's neck; he says he was running along, and his hands caught in it by accident. Ordered him twelve rattans.

(12) Banker Mahamed against Ramjanny complaining that the wife of the latter abused his wife. It appearing, on examination, they were both equally culpable ordered each to be fined Rs. 5 for giving trouble to the Court by making trifling litigious complaints.

(13) Mr. Cantwell against his Matraney for stealing empty bottles. This she has practised some time, and constantly sold them to a shop-keeper Bucktaram, which he himself confesses. To deter others from following so pernicious an example—ordered Bucktaram twenty rattans, the Matraney ten rattans and both to be carried in a cart round the Town, and their crime published by beat of tom-tom.

The publicity with which men and women were punished was a notable feature of old Calcutta. Miss Gladborne describes the machine in which those convicted were conveyed to prison—"The wheels of this machine are fourteen feet high, and under the axle is suspended a wooden cage (sufficiently large to contain a couple of culprits) perforated with air-holes, and in this miserable plight, guarded by Sepoys they are exhibited to the eyes of the populace."²⁷

The Supreme Court later introduced also the use of the pillory.

Busteed remarks:—

"How difficult it now seems to realise the state of things which we have got a glimpse of here. Slavery in full bloom; the right of

²⁷ Quoted in the *Echoes from Old Calcutta*.

ownership under it, being so recognised that its mere plea was sufficient to justify (in law) an English Magistrate in ordering a poor girl, who in running away had presumably acted in self-defence, to be 'beaten with rods' and sent back to the fangs of her master."

Brutality roamed rampant. Holwell, "in interests of Justice and mercy", brought before the Council in Calcutta the following case of flogging an Indian. In the 'Proceedings' of the 2nd June, 1760 it is noted—"Mr. Barton, laying in wait seized Benautram Chatterjee opposite to the door of Council, and with the assistance of his bearers and two peons, tied his hands and feet, swung him upon a bamboo like a hog, carried him to his own house, there with his own hands chawbooked him in the most cruel manner, almost to the deprivation of life, endeavoured to force beef into his mouth, to the irreparable loss of his Brahmin's caste; and all this without giving ear to, or suffering the man to speak in his own defence, or clear up his innocence to him." Then it is said—"The party flogged is represented to have given valuable information to Government of the frauds committed in the new works of Fort William. Mr. Barton suspected him of bringing a charge against his father. When Holwell denounced Mr. Barton of having taken the rod of justice in his own hands, he replied, he had only punished a profligate spy, who had aspersed the memory of his father. There is no record of any punishment having been awarded to Mr. Barton for his wanton ill-treatment of the native noticed above."²⁸

During the seventeenth century of the Christian era slavery was a recognised institution in Calcutta and the generality of Europeans in the town kept slave boys to serve them. "The most numerous class of slaves, were Bengalees, who had been sold in childhood by their parents in time of scarcity." Sir William Jones in a charge to the Grand Jury at Calcutta, in 1785, described the miseries of slavery existing at that period even in the metropolis of British India:—

"I am assured from evidence which, though not all judicially taken, has the strongest hold on my belief, that the condition of slaves within our jurisdiction, is beyond imagination deplorable; and that cruelties are daily practised on them, chiefly on those of the tenderest age and the weaker sex, which, if it would not give me pain to repeat and you to hear, yet for the honour of human nature I should forbear to particularize. If I except the English from this censure, it is not through partial affection to my own countrymen, but because my information relates chiefly to people of other nations, who likewise call themselves, Christians. Hardly a man or a woman exists in a corner

²⁸ ; *The Good Old Days of Honourable John Company.*

of this populous town, who hath not at least one slave-child either purchased at a trifling price, or saved perhaps from a death that might have been fortunate, for a life that seldom fails of being miserable. Many of you, I presume, have seen *large boats filled with such children, coming down the river for open sale at Calcutta*. Nor can you be ignorant that most of them were stolen from their parents, or brought, perhaps, for a measure of rice in a time of scarcity.”²⁹

Selling Indians and exporting them from the country as slaves to other parts of India not within British dominions, seem to have been common, as it was deemed necessary to issue a stringent order by the Government prohibiting such traffic in future.

“Proclamation, dated the 27th July, 1789”—“whereas information, the truth of which cannot be doubted, has been received by the Governor-General in Council, that many natives, and some Europeans, in opposition to the laws and ordinances of this country, and the dictates of humanity, have been for a long time in the practice of purchasing or collecting natives of both sexes, children as well as adults, for the purpose of exporting them for sale as slaves in different parts of India or elsewhere; and whereas the Governor-General in Council is determined to exert to the utmost extent of the power and authority vested in him, in order to prevent such practices in future and to deter, by the most exemplary punishment, those persons who are not to be otherwise restrained from committing the offence: His Lordship hereby declares that all and every person or persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, or in any respect to the authority of this Government, who shall, in future, be concerned directly or indirectly in the above-mentioned inhuman and detestable traffic, shall be prosecuted with the utmost rigour of the Supreme Court at the expense of the Company etc. etc.”

The following advertisement appeared in a local newspaper in 1780 :

“Wanted...A Coffree slave boy; any person desirous of disposing of such a boy, and can warrant him a faithful and honest servant, will please apply to the printer.”

This proves that slavery was winked at by the authorities.

A strange advertisement for the recovery of a slave boy, named Dindarah, aged about fifteen years, appeared in a newspaper. It shows the ill-treatment that was meted out to these unfortunate human beings. The missing boy had been “marked on the back and arms with the scars of a number of small burns” and had, at the time of his escape “an iron ring on one leg.” A reward of fifty sicca-rupees was offered for the recovery of the missing boy.

²⁹ Quoted in *The Good Old Days of Honourable John Company*.

When the indignation of the British Parliament was directed against slavery in the West Indies (1788 A.D.) the Calcutta newspapers declared that "barbarous and wanton acts of more than savage cruelty daily exercised upon slaves, of both sexes in and about Calcutta, by the native Portuguese" made it most desirable that the system of bondage in the East also should be brought under the restraints of the legislature.

Drunkenness, gambling and profane swearing were almost universally practised. The public journals testify to the absence of "decency and propriety of behaviour" in the social life of Europeans in Calcutta.

In December, 1780, one of them complained that "Europeans of all ranks" ordinarily made Christmas festivities a "plea for absolute drunkenness and obscenity of conversation, that is, while they were able to articulate at all; and urged that respectable men ought not to subject their wives to such impure and injurious associations." Another paper, in 1788, complained of "a very general depravity of conversation and manners, both in mixed and male societies", such as he "hoped for the honour of human nature, was not the case in other countries".

To what extent depravity could be indulged in would be apparent from the following advertisement in the columns of the *Calcutta Gazette* of 23rd February, 1797 :—

"A certain person who made her appearance among the company in the auditory on the first night of performance, is desired to take notice that in future she will not be permitted to remain in the house should she be ill advised to repeat her visit—Theatre, Whaler Place."

Such was the condition of European society in Calcutta at the time. Corruption, drunkenness, immorality of all sorts—were the order of the day. It could not be otherwise in a society which had for its shining lights men like Clive, Warren Hastings and Philip Francis and women like Mrs. Hastings, and Madame Grand. The members of the society were hardened criminals who shamelessly disregarded decency and transgressed its bounds.

The writer in the *Calcutta Review* (1844 A.D.) quoted the following from a biography of Clive published in the eighteenth century under the assumed name of "Charles Carracioli Gent" :—

"Soon after the noble president's arrival at Calcutta, a gentleman in the civil service of the Company, who felt for his fellow creatures amidst these opulent wretches, insensible to the cries of distressed, was honoured with an invitation of the supreme governor. He made an honourable mention of Mr. Vansittart, Lord Clive's predecessor, and highly commended his munificence and benefactions; he observed

before Lord Clive, while at his table, that Mr. Vansitart's benevolence abroad was adequate to his hospitality at home; that he never distributed less in charitable uses during his government than 4,000 rupees per month, and that several widows and young ladies, friendless and destitute, had been the worthy objects of his spontaneous relief, till they were happily married or otherwise released from their troubles and difficulties. This intimation which should have stimulated the noble governor to the same meritorious acts, could not even influence him to bestow a praise on Mr. Vansitart's extensive donations. His lordship replied with a deliberate insensibility, and a shameless sneer, that betrayed his principles; 'What Mr. Vansitart did in this particular, shall be no precedent to me, as I am determined not to follow it; but were the ladies inclined to repay the favour in bestowing theirs, I do not know how far this motive might prevail on my sensation.' This declaration showed Lord Clive in his true colours, and was followed by a contemptuous silence and indignation''.

Of Warren Hastings so much has already been said that more need not be stated.

What a gentleman who had accompanied Sir Thomas Roe to the Court of the Great Moghul wrote in 1665 was aggravated in his successors in India :—

“ It is a most sad and horrible thing to consider what scandal is brought upon the Christian Religion, by the looseness and remissness, by the exorbitances of many, which come amongst them, who profess themselves Christians, and of whom I have often heard the natives, who live here near the port where our ships arrive say thus, in broken English, which they have gotten, *Christian religion; devil religion, Christian much drunk, Christian much do wrong; much beat, much abuse others.*”

The Europeans who lived in the *inofussil*, i.e., away from Calcutta were even worse. “ The more isolated the position of the European exile, the more probable becomes the decay of all high principle in his breast.” Burke and Adam Smith both referred to the official morality of the English in India—but their remarks were equally applicable to their social morality which was staggering.

In this condition of the European society in Calcutta—depraved, dissipated and degraded—Warren Hastings one of the arch offenders responsible for its creation, left India making over charge on February 1, 1785 to Mr. John Macpherson who had been his colleague—second in Council. Mr. Macpherson had a bad record. “ Originally a ship's purser, he had been employed as a secret agent for the Nawab of the Carnatic, whose affairs were a mass of corruption. He got into the

service of the Company by backstairs influence, was deservedly, though irregularly, dismissed by Lord Pigot, Governor of Madras; was reinstated by the Directors, and sent out to replace Barwell on the Bengal Council. John Macpherson effected some financial economies, chiefly by the reduction of salaries, but deserves no commendation. His successor, Lord Cornwallis, a thoroughly honest man, would neither believe a word he wrote, nor touch the corrupt jobs which he recommended. His government was described as 'a system of the dirtiest jobbing', and the man is justly held up to scorn as 'weak and false to a degree' and he certainly was the most contemptible and the most contemned governor that ever pretended to govern".³⁰

For twenty months John Macpherson acted as Governor of Bengal and then laid down the reins of office to be succeeded by Charles, second Earl Cornwallis in 1786.

When Warren Hastings had to leave office the choice of the Directors of the East India Company had at first fallen on Lord Macartney. But the directors could not agree to the stipulation made by him. And Lord Cornwallis was appointed Governor-General in February, 1786.

Marshman who was enamoured of "the transcendent ability of Hastings" remarked—"by a singular caprice of circumstances, the man who had lost America was sent out to govern India, and the man who had saved India was subjected to a prosecution for high crimes and misdemeanours".³¹

The corrupt society was reflected in the administration. Clive who landed in Calcutta for the second time on 3rd May, 1765 had to encounter alarming perils. "Vast fortunes had been amassed by 'the most nefarious and oppressive conduct ever known in any age or country.' The power of the Company's servants had been employed in levying contributions on every class, from the Nabob down to the lowest zeminder. Even the exaction of twenty lacs of rupees from the young Nabob on his elevation in defiance of the express orders of the Court of Directors, was openly avowed without a blush. Luxury, corruption and debauchery pervaded every rank of the service and threatened the dissolution of all government. Clive found Spencer the governor, 'as deep in the mire as any other' and he felt himself justified in affirming that 'there were not five men of principle left in the Presidency'".³²

In England the attitude towards India was deplorable. In 1784 the Bill of Fox was defeated. "The motives of Mr. Fox, in the

³⁰ Vincent Smith—*The Oxford History of India*.

³¹ Marshman—*The History of India*, Vol. I.

³² *Ibid*.

introduction of this bill were pure and benevolent. He really believed that his mission was 'to rescue the greatest number of the human race that ever were so grievously oppressed, from the greatest tyranny that ever was exercised.' But the bill was considered dangerous to the liberties of the (English) nation. The patronage of India was estimated to be worth two crores of rupees a year, and as the principle of competitive appointments had not then been discovered, it was believed that the transfer of it to the Crown, or to the minister would destroy the balance of the constitution. It was, therefore, opposed by many from the most patriotic motives. The Court of Directors, threatened with extinction, filled the country with their complaints, and asserted that after such a violation of chartered rights, no institution in England was secure. The cry was echoed in Parliament by thirty or forty of those whom the spoils of the cast or the jobs of the India-house, had lifted into the senate, and who presented a firm phalanx of opposition to a bill which cut off their children and connections from the prospects of similar fortunes. Every engine was set in motion to defeat this measure, yet it passed the lower House by a triumphant majority of 208 to 102. But the King had been alarmed by the assurance, that it would take the diadem from his head and place it on the brows of Mr. Fox. He, therefore, adopted the unconstitutional course of authorising Lord Temple to inform the peers that he should consider anyone who voted for it as no friend of his. The House of Lords, therefore, threw out the bill."³³

William Pitt then twenty-four years of age was placed at the head of the new ministry :—

"A sight to make neighbouring nations stare,
An empire entrust'd to a school-boy's care."

The East India Company assisted him at the elections and he did not forget them and ignore their interest.

Lord Cornwallis came to the heritage of a scandalous society and Government and strove hard to get rid of corruption. But it was uphill work. Yet it is refreshing to escape from the turbid politics and corrupt society of the time of Clive, Hastings and Macpherson and to pass into the wholesome atmosphere of the Cornwallis regime. He had the courage to defy the Prince Regent, when the latter sought to effect a scandalous job. He tried hard to effect reforms in the society and the administration by his example and integrity. And his efforts were effective.

³³ Marshman—*The History of India*, Vol. I.

AMUSEMENT

The English were fond of theatres and amusements. The first play-house known as the "Old Play House" was established in Calcutta about the middle of the eighteenth century. A dancing hall was attached to it (shown in the old map of Calcutta, 1753). It stood on the site of the present Martin and Burns Buildings. The great English actor Garrick helped its organisers with advice and instructions. The building was badly damaged by Shiraj-ed Dowla's army during the seize of Calcutta, 1756 A.D., and the theatre was closed down. The following note from the Board of Directors may prove interesting :

"We are told that the Building formerly made use of as a Theatre may with a little expense be converted into a Church or Public Place of Worship. As it was built by the voluntary contributions of the inhabitants of Calcutta, we think there can be no difficulty in getting it freely applied to the before-mentioned purpose especially when we authorise you to fit it up at the Company's expense as we hereby do."³⁴

Thus it appears that the (European) inhabitants of Calcutta collected funds for the play-house. But the suggestion thrown out by the Directors was not accepted. The building was used as an auction room.

The second play-house—"The New Play-house or the Calcutta Theatre" was opened in 1775 A.D. at the north-west corner of Lyon's Range behind the Writers' Building. It was patronised by the then Governor-General (*i.e.*, Warren Hastings) and other well-known persons of the time. Subscriptions were raised for it. Hastings, Monson, Barwell, Eliza Impey, Hyde, Chambers, etc. contributed Rs. 100 each.

The very first number of the *Bengal Gazette* published this Theatre's advertisement on the front page. Mrs. Fay mentions this play-house in a letter (1781 A.D.) after witnessing the performance (of 'The Venice Preserved') there. It soon fell on evil days. Liabilities mounted up and the theatre had to be closed in 1808. It was turned into an auction room and was sold to Babu Gopimohan Tagore.

In 1787 Mrs. Bristow established her "Private Theatre" in her Chowringhee residence where she and her husband entertained their wide circle of friends.³⁵ "She is credited with the honour of being the first in Calcutta who brought lady actors into fashion—female character having previously been taken by beardless youths." And the

³⁴ *Calcutta Gazette*, 1st November, 1808.

³⁵ Buxted—*Echoes from Old Calcutta*.

lady amateurs, once started, soon become more ambitious, and took to turn occasionally as some of the male characters. A Calcutta paper, in 1790, was enthusiastic about one of these performances and came out with an ode portions of which were not "quotable". This betrays the taste of Anglo-India of the time. Referring to one of Mrs. Bristow's performances a highly gratified critic wrote—"She went through the whole of her humerous part of 'the English Slave in the Ottoman Seraglio' with a justness of conception and success of execution most admirable. Magnificently decorated by Art, and more beautifully adorned by Nature, the extravagances of the amorous Sultan seemed justified by her charms."

"Whaler place Theatre" was opened in 1797. It was a short-lived play-house with selected audience. A notice in the *Calcutta Gazette* of 23rd February, 1797 quoted before ran as follows :—

A CAUTION

A certain person who made her appearance amongst the company in the auditory on the 15th night of performance is desired to take notice that in future she will not be permitted to remain in the house should she be so ill advised as to repeat her visit.

Dances were very popular. Both the first and the second play-house had Dance Halls attached. Lord Valentia remarked ——"Consumptions are very frequent among the ladies, which I attribute in a great measure to the incessant dancing, even during the hottest weather. After such violent exercise they go into the varandahs and expose themselves to a cool breeze and damp atmosphere." ²⁵

The example of these theatres enthused the opulent Bengalis in Calcutta to take to acting and to the gradual growth of the theatre in Bengal.

DINING AND WINING

Clubs like the "Bengal", the "United Service" etc. which had so to say "shaped the whispers" of the Government were, naturally non-existent in Calcutta during the second half of the eighteenth century A.D. But there were taverns galore. Margaret Martyn ²⁷ in an interesting article has truly said :—

"Calcutta eighteenth century taverns—the Harmonic Tavern, the New Tavern and the Bread and Cheese Bungalow near the Boytacanna Tree, Entally—are now no more than names in dusty tomes. Their hard-living patrons who ate gargantuan meals washed down with two

²⁵ *Voyages and Travels*, Vol. I.

²⁷ *The Statesman*—March 23rd, 1947.

or three bottles of port or sherry, and intrigued and roystered by candlelight are not more. Many of them now lie in Park Street Cemetery, Calcutta, the victims of 'flux' and other strange diseases, of the East."

The Harmonic Tavern stood on the site of the Police headquarters in Lal Bazar and was "the handsomest house in Calcutta." It was able to accommodate "five or six hundred persons with ease". During the trial of Nandkumar its proprietor provided meals of the counsels and attorneys at the trial.

In 1784 the Harmonic came under new management. The new manager, Edward Crighton "late cook to the Hon'ble Sir Thomas Rumbold, Governor of Madras and who served his apprenticeship at the London Tavern in Bishopsgate Street" with John Nicolls "late Steward to the Hon'ble Sir Elijah Impey" had run a tavern in the house which was Captain Hicks' on the south-east side of the China Bazar.

Mr. Crighton erected his "large Hindostany Tent on the Calcutta Course for public brekfasts (twice a week) at two Gold Mohurs each for the season".

The London Tavern, also in Lal Bazar, was a rival establishment to the Harmonic.

Though the Harmonic and the London Tavern were the best known clubs in eighteenth century Calcutta there were also several other similar places in 1778.

One of these was "Vauxhall and Fireworks at Cossinaut Baboo's Gardens in Dhurumtollah". At 44, Cossitoolah Street Angus Gun took boarders and lodgers, "laid in a stock of good Wines and Liquors" and offered "a Billiard Table, Coach House and Stabling for six horses."

CONVEYANCE

Hamilton who visited Bengal during the first half of the eighteenth century wrote—"Most gentlemen and ladies in Bengal live both splendidly and pleasantly. the forenoons being dedicated to business, and after dinner to rest, and in the evening to recreate themselves in chases or palankins in the fields, or to gardens, or by water in their budojeroes, which is a convenient boat that goes swiftly with the force of oars."

Valentia who visited Calcutta in 1803 A.D. wrote as follows:—
"The usual mode of travelling is by palanquins, but most gentlemen have carriages adapted to the climate, and horses, of which the breed is much improved of late years. It is universally the custom to

drive out between sunset and dinner. The mussalchees, when it grows dark, go out to meet their masters on their return, and run before them, at the rate of full eight miles an hour, and the numerous lights moving along the esplanade produce a singular and pleasing effect." ³⁸

* That the palankin was in general use till 1828 will be evident from what Grant ³⁹ has recorded in his—"Letter from an Artist in India;" "In the year 1828 there was a general strike" of the Palankeen or Palkee Oria bearers,—a large body of men, natives of Orissa, who may be called the porters, sedan chair or hackney-coachmen of India. Now if you can imagine the impositions to which the people of London would be subjected, were there no laws to regulate hackney-coach, or omnibus affairs, you will also be enabled to form an idea of the greater extent of inconvenience suffered by the inhabitants here, up to the period I have mentioned, for there were no regulations whatever. The grievances at length occasioned public complaints—police cases, and magistrates' meetings, when it was resolved that certain restrictions should be placed upon the bearers, — the palkees be numbered, and men compelled to wear a small brass ticket on the arm. To this innovation, as they asumed it, they were as desperately averse as the unfortunate Highlanders were to the lowland garb Wearing the ticket, the bearers declared, would occasion the loss of their caste. They found the magistrates, however, not so young upon such points as to be deceived,—so, negociations proving fruitless, the malcontents drew off—assembled in a body on Chowringhee plain—refused to work, and talked of marching *en masse* to their own country Upon the Chowringhee plain they remained for several days. In the mean time, other, commonly termed *Hindoostance*—Up-Country, or Rouwanee bearers, made their appearance in Calcutta, and carriages and buggies were brought more into requisition.

"Amongst others who suffered the general inconvenience was a Mr. Brownlow, who, having, like many more, no other conveyance than a palkee, which was his own property, clapped a pair of shafts and four wheels to it, and with a poney and running groom, went to office in this new vehicle. The idea was caught like an epidemic,—acted upon like a universal cure, and the little machine became denominated a Brownberry. As the history goes, this struck a final blow at the independence of the Oriah bearers, who, finding that their services were thus becoming of diminished importance, were not so difficult of being brought to terms. A meeting was held,—rates were fixed—palkees numbered, and the bearers, ticketed, returned to their labours."

³⁸ *Voyages and Travels*, Vol. 1.

³⁹ Colisworthy Grant—*Anglo-Indian Domestic Life*.

A French traveller named M. Grandpre came to Calcutta near the end of the eighteenth century and wrote in 1790 that Calcutta, exclusive of palanquins "abounded with all sorts of carriages, chariots, whiskies and phaetons, which occasion in the evening as great bustle as in one of the principal towns in Europe. There are also a great number of saddle-horses, some of the Persian breed of exquisite beauty, but no Arabians except a small sort called poonis, which are very much in vogue for phaetons".

To be continued

NYĀYA-MANJARĪ

VOL. II (22)

JANAKI VALLABHA BHATTACHARYYA, M.A., PH.D., *Samkhyatirtha*

We have already said what we should say now with regard to this subject-matter. We have stated that an impression does not produce the knowledge of the meaning of a word. It simply revives our memory. This is what our experience teaches. Now, a question arises in our mind, *viz* , "Is it a royal mandate that an impression shall produce memory only ?" An answer to this question is this that it is the mandate of logic but not that of a king. An impression is not a distinct substratum. When we carefully know an object and repeat its knowledge with all seriousness what conditions its memory of the knower is called an impression. It is only inferred from its effect, *viz.*, recollection. It is not perceived. It is a kind of faculty. It is not possible for an impression which itself is a faculty to be capable of generating the new knowledge of an object. Can it produce an effect other than that for which it has been postulated? An impression which effectuates memory owes its origin to the apprehension of an object. If one holds that an impression generates the apprehension of an object, he speaks of a novel type of impression. It is very difficult on our part to find out the cause of such an impression. Really speaking, we find none. Therefore, an impression cannot be the cause of the apprehension of an object.

The above argument is not sound. A person who possesses the impression of a letter arising from apprehension is seen to apprehend an object. Thus a *samskāra* (impression) is not merely such a faculty as exclusively generates recollection. It is an attribute of the soul. It is called *vāsanā* : [It is the residuum of an apprehension like the fragrance of a flower which has been taken away]. It is capable of producing the apprehension of an object just as it generates memory. In every case, we say whatever is in accordance with experience. Our experience is the source of true knowledge. On the strength of our experience we admit that an impression is competent to produce memory. Our experience also teaches that the knowledge of an object springs from impression. Letters and their apprehension have almost simultaneously taken place. No other sound is presented

to our consciousness. We shall ask our opponents to consider this aspect of the above problem. The knowledge of an object takes place in our mind. We cannot say that such an event occurs without any cause. As it cannot happen without any cause so it necessarily implies its cause. An impression is the cause par excellence of such knowledge. Thus, the knowledge of an object, being an effect of impression like memory, implies impression only.

Now, a question arises, *viz.*, "What is the cause of an impression?" This is a foolish question since it is well-known that an impression owes its origin to the apprehension of an object. Some logicians say "It is natural law that the vivid apprehension of an object produces impression which is the cause of memory."

Now, a fresh question arises in our mind. How does an impression which generates memory effectuate the apprehension of an object? The sense of the question is that the apprehension of an object is presentative in its character. Hence, how can an impression bring it about? If it is effectuated by an impression then it will be representative. There is no hard and fast rule that an impression shall produce memory only. The apprehension of an object produces a special kind of impression. When the apprehension of an object of a particular type comes into being and no adequate cause is found out to account for its existence it is said that such an apprehension owes its existence to this type of impression. Various types of effects are explained only on the assumption of diverse types of causes. This hypothesis is based on the solid rock of experience.

We are not wedded to an opinion that an impression is the direct cause of the knowledge of the meaning of a word. It is a remote cause. It will produce such knowledge through the medium of memory. Let us explain the second hypothesis. A word generally consists of a few letters. All its constituent letters are not simultaneously pronounced. When the last letter is pronounced almost all antecedent letters have passed away. When the last letter is heard the memory of the past ones is recalled by their impressions. Thus, we may have the knowledge of the meaning of the said word through the instrumentality of letters which are remembered and of the letter which is apprehended. Thus we see that this hypothesis suffers from no defects.

Now, the Sphota-vādins raise a fresh problem. The letters of a word, which are now past have not been simultaneously presented

to our consciousness. They have been gradually heard by us. Thus the impression of each letter has been generated by the experience of each letter. As memory depends upon the efficacy of an impression so each letter should be separately remembered. Thus all letters shall be consecutively but not simultaneously remembered. This being the possible course of events, all letters are not simultaneously recollected. Thus as the combination of letters is not possible so all defects, stated before, visit the hypothesis in question.

The Naiyāyikas meet the above objection thus. They hold that the above defects do not vitiate the said hypothesis. As letters successively appear so they are consecutively experienced. These successive experiences gain strength and produce such an impression (*i.e.* work out such a qualitative change in the soul) as simultaneously recalls all letters which have been previously experienced in memory. Let a parallel case be cited to bring home the point in question. Gold is kept in a closed vessel. It is repeatedly heated. Repeated heatings bring about a qualitative change in gold. Thus several acts which gradually take place jointly produce an effect. Thus, an impression (a new type comes into being). The logical conclusion of the above hypothesis is that impression brings forth another well-developed impression. If the Naiyāyikas subscribe to this hypothesis then they assume something transcendental *i.e.*, something which cannot be corroborated by visible facts. The Naiyāyikas join issue with their critics and emphatically assert that it is not transcendental. The very study of the Vedas presupposes such an impression. The reading of the Vedas is an act. As such it is short-lived. If the critics do not subscribe to the hypothesis that an impression begets another impression then as the first reading of the Vedas is not distinct from the last one so a student cannot be able to get an Anuvāka of the Vedas by heart in spite of his life-long study.

Now, the Sphoṭa-vādins sum up the arguments of the Naiyāyikas and say, "There are two alternatives before us. We are to accept any one of them. Either we are to admit that an impression effectuates another impression or we are to admit that an impression is responsible for the knowledge of the meaning of a word. Any way we are to assume transcendental causality. Now, may we ask why do you take an interest in the hypothesis of impression and why do you take an aversion to the hypothesis of sphoṭa? Please state the reasons for your partiality and aversion". The Naiyāyikas say in reply that the proper answer has been given by the celebrated commentator mentioned before (*i.e.*, Śabara). He has pointed out

that if a sphoṭa is assumed then one is to make two assumptions, viz., a sphoṭa and an impression.

Now, the Sphoṭa-vādins contend thus. "We are not required to make double assumptions. An impression of the ordinary type is not a novel object. It is a well-known object which is admitted by all. Therefore, we make no new assumption. We have not allowed an impression to go beyond its normal activity. We firmly stick to the hypothesis that an impression exclusively produces memory. But you, the Naiyāyikas, have allowed an impression to transgress its normal law. We have not followed your foot-steps".

The Naiyāyikas give an answer to the above charge. They say to the Sphoṭa-vādins, "How is that you have not allowed an impression to go beyond its normal activity? You also admit that there is an impression that revives the memory of all letters at a time. The very same path which is adopted by letters to reveal the meaning of a word is also followed by them for the manifestation of a sphoṭa. You assume the hypothesis of an impression but over and above it you postulate the hypothesis of a peculiar sound. Thus, both of us agree to accept the hypothesis of impression. But we do not subscribe to the view that the only function of an impression is to revive memory. But we have only allowed an impression to transgress its limit and to produce the knowledge of the meaning of a word. But you have ab initio put forward the hypothesis of the world of a new pattern. You have postulated sphoṭa—a class of transcendental sound. You also assume that the said sphoṭa is distinct from letters and it is partless. How is it that your assumption does not suffer from cumbrousness?"

Kumārila has also subjected the said hypothesis to a severe criticism :—He says, "The Sphoṭa-vādins assume that a sphoṭa exists and distinguishes itself from letters. A word consists of parts. Hence, they should also postulate that a sphoṭa is partless. Hence, the assumption of impression which plays a necessary part in the production of the knowledge of the meaning of a word has no part to play in the manifestation of a sphoṭa." (Sphoṭa-vāda, Śl. 94). Kumārila's criticism in a nut-shell is this that the assumption of impression, on the part of the Sphoṭa-vādins, is superfluous.

The Naiyāyikas press the Sphoṭa-vādins hard. They review the arguments of the Sphoṭa-vādins. The Sphoṭa-vādins have held that when the initial letter is presented to our consciousness sphoṭa has become manifest and when the subsequent letters are known to us the awareness of the sphoṭa becomes distinctly vivid. They also cite

an example. They hold that the manifestation of sphoṭa is like that of gem. The said example is not appropriate. Gem consists of parts. Hence all minute parts are not discovered by its first perception. Subsequent acts of perception reveal them. In this case subsequent acts of perception have some important part to play. But a sphoṭa is partless like a letter. Hence, the initial letter reveals it in its entirety. What part will the subsequent letters play? A letter being partless, the partial manifestation of a letter is not possible. Similarly, a sphoṭa is not partially manifested since it is partless.

Kumārila has also said to this effect:—"If a letter is pronounced in a low voice, it is not heard at all. If it is loudly pronounced, it is distinctly heard. The whole of a letter is heard and nothing remains to be heard afterwards. The same rule applies to a sphoṭa. Either it is entirely known or it is not known at all." (Sphoṭa-vāda al. 17).

The Sphoṭa-vādins have cited a second example in order to establish their hypothesis. They hold that though a group of Vedic hymns or a verse is presented to consciousness on its being heard for the first time yet it is very clearly and vividly known when it is repeatedly heard. Similarly, though a sphoṭa is manifested by the first letter of a word yet it will be more vividly revealed by the other letters. The example, cited by them, bears no resemblance to a sphoṭa since it is absurd to think that a group of hymns or a verse consists of no parts. Some parts are letters and some other parts are words. The first awareness fails to grasp them all. When they are heard again and again they are retained and are clearly and distinctly known to us. Thus the distinct knowledge of a group of hymns or a verse refers to its parts. But a sphoṭa is partless like an individual letter. Hence the awareness of a sphoṭa knows no different degrees of vividness. It remains always the same. Therefore the example in question is not appropriate.

*The refutation of the hypothesis that a sphoṭa is
manifested by a dhvani.*

Those who hold that dhvanis manifest sphoṭas but not letters are not sound judges. They prefer this view because they think that they can avoid the very dilemma which besets the hypothesis that letters manifest a sphoṭa. The dilemma in question has been referred to in the last section. Though dhvanis which are very slow give rise to audible letters yet they fail to manifest sphoṭas. Again when we hear

to pronounce words very quickly words thus pronounced, convey no meaning since letters, contained in each word, are not distinctly grasped. The drive of this criticism is this that if dhvanis had manifested sphoṭas then both slow and fast dhvanis would have alike manifested sphoṭas.

Now, the upholders of this hypothesis may contend that dhvanis, in order to manifest sphoṭas, hold up to view false letters with the help of organs of speech and the air just as a sword, a dirty mirror etc. exhibit the unreal properties of a face such as the dark complexion, the unusual length etc. The above contention is not tenable. There is no justifiable cause for the falsehood of letters since these letters are presented to our uncontradicted experience. But a sphoṭa which is distinct from letters is never presented to our consciousness. If one holds that an object which is not experienced exists and an object which is experienced does not exist then he talks like one who says that horns exist but a hare does not exist. The new path which has been adopted by you is no less combrous. Śabara, the commentator on the Mīmāṃsā sūtras, has rightly remarked that if sphoṭas are assumed then two assumptions are to be made viz., dhvanis and sphoṭas are to be postulated. Thus we see that the very way which letters follow to manifest a sphoṭa will also be followed by them to communicate the meaning of a word. In other words, the hypothesis of a sphoṭa has in no way an advantage over the hypothesis that words communicate meanings. Hence there is no need of such a hypothesis as postulates a sphoṭa.

The other thinkers i.e., the Mīmāṃsakas, hold that as letters survive even after their presentation to consciousness so they communicate meanings without requiring the help of impressions. But we do not subscribe to this hypothesis since letters are transient. It is illogical to think that letters persist to exist even after their presentation to consciousness. According to our training we know that letters communicate meanings. They do their function as they have been observed before to do it. Kumārila has also said to this effect: —

“As many letters, arranged in a particular order etc.”

“This hypothesis has been viewed with disfavour by the Sphoṭa-vādins. They ask ‘How many letters, being arranged in which particular order, do convey meanings?’ We are poor fellows. We shall not be able to give the right answer. Please ask your own consciousness. It is a very trifling objection. We should not think much of it. You have also said that either letters may communicate

meanings even if they violate the temporary order of their arrangement or if the said order of letters is necessarily required then a sphoṭa should be the temporary order of letters. Such a suggestion is not sound. A temporary order is nothing but the different strokes of time. A sphoṭa cannot be identical with the different strokes of time. The temporary order of letters does not independently communicate a meaning. Again, the temporary order of objects other than letters does not also communicate a meaning. But such an order, belonging only to letters, communicates a meaning. Kumārila has also discussed the problem thus:—

There are two alternative suggestions viz. (1) Does the mere order of letters (*i.e.* not the letters themselves) convey the said sense? Or, (2) do the letters arranged in an order of succession convey it? Though these two alternative suggestions are possible yet the second one is the true hypothesis. In other words, the letters arranged in an order of succession but not the mere order of succession convey the sense of a word. The order of succession which belongs to the letters thus arranged renders its assistance to them to communicate meaning. There is no need of logical demonstration to establish it since the said order of succession is nothing but the property of the said letters. Hence the very letters which have been noticed to convey a particular meaning, being arranged in a particular order of succession, will also convey the same meaning, being arranged in the same order. Thus, a sphoṭa is not an inference. We do not infer it as we do a cause from an effect. It is not also a presumption. We do not presume the hypothesis of a sphoṭa in order to explain the knowledge of meaning. So we establish our point.

The refutation of the hypothesis that a sphoṭa is perceptible

The Sphoṭa-vādins have also argued that as it is generally admitted by usage that a meaning has been communicated by a single śabda so the usage in question points to the hypothesis of sphoṭa. Such an argument is not sound. If letters communicate a meaning in accordance with the law stated before then the above usage holds good.

Now, the sphoṭa-vādins take an exception to the above solution. The word 'śabda' does not denote an impression (*samskāra*). In this world it is not well-known that the word 'śabda' denotes an impression. No body can prove by means of any method that the said word denotes an impression. A person, ignorant of the meaning of a word, learns the meaning of a word when he is instructed

by another person in its meaning. If the word 'śabda' signifies an impression then it is never noticed that the impression, belonging to a person, generates the knowledge of another person. No body can detect such a causal relation since an impression is a transcendental object. Now, the critics of the Sphoṭa-vādins may hold that the word 'śabda' stands for letters. Now, a question arises in our mind. Does the word 'śabda' mean each individual letter or an aggregate of letters? If it signifies each individual letter then the word 'śabda' should communicate no meaning since an individual letter conveys no meaning. Moreover, it should not denote an aggregate of letters since the word 'śabda' is a class name, i.e. a common noun. If we use proper names in the dual or plural number then a common noun in the singular number cannot be used as a case in apposition with either of them. Verbal usage like the following is never seen. Verbal usage "Yajña datta and Deva datta are a man", "Dhava, Khadira and Palāśa are a tree" etc. is conspicuous by its absence in the literature. Similarly, the verbal usage that 'g', 'au' and 's' is a śabda is never seen.

Now, the critics may contend that as the word 'forest' denotes a collection of trees so the word 'śabda' signifies a collection of letters. As the verbal usage that a forest is trees is seen so the usage that a śabda is 'g', 'au' and 's' will be appropriate. Such a contention is not tenable. The above example illustrates the relation of identity in difference, holding between the subject and the predicate. In certain cases we notice identity. But there are also cases which clearly indicate difference. A collection is held to be identical with the objects collected under it. Some verbal usages point to this direction. But there are some other usages which point to the fact that there is difference between a collection and the objects collected. The examples, viz., the forest of mangoes and the forest of wood-apples, clearly indicate their difference. But there is no single instance which refers to the difference of a śabda from letters. The verbal usage, viz., this is a śabda of 'g' 'au', etc. is conspicuous by its absence.

Again, you may contend that the word 'forest' points to the identity of the aggregate of objects with the objects included in the aggregate since a verbal usage that the mango trees are nothing but a forest is noticed. A sentence that the letters 'g' etc. are nothing but a śabda will also be put to use. But such a verbal usage is not noticed. Again, we distinguish the mango trees etc. from a forest. We do not employ the word 'forest' if we intend to convey a particular

mango tree. It is well-known that words 'forest' etc. are nouns of multitude. If this is so then one may in a figurative sense think of the identity of the meaning of the word 'forest', i.e., an aggregate of trees with the particular trees such a mango tree etc. Thus, the sentence that mango and other trees are a forest may be employed. But, in the above case, the letters 'g' etc. cannot be distinguished from a śabda. So we never use a sentence that this is a śabda of letters 'g' etc. Therefore nobody can even in a secondary sense think of the identity of the particular letters 'g' etc. with 'śabda' which denotes the multitude of all letters. Thus, those who hold those letters are śabda cannot fairly justify the usage that śabda communicates a meaning.

Now, the critics of sphoṭa-vādins give a reply to the above criticism. They hold that they should not bother to discuss the problem whether the word 'śabda' may be appropriately or inappropriately employed to denote the individual letters 'g' etc. It matters little if it exactly denotes such letters. It is also of little importance if it does not exactly denote such letters. The reason behind our remark is this that mere verbal usages current in the world do not establish the existence of things. Oh rival thinkers Sphoṭa-vādins! the authors of sciences also corroborate our thesis. The grammarians hold that a verb denotes an action. But they do not hold that a sphoṭa, represented by a verb, denotes an action. Even if we take into consideration the practice of the authors of several sciences then the existence of a sphoṭa which is not based upon sound proof cannot be admitted. Can we identify popular usage with any proof? We have already refuted the thesis that a sphoṭa is an influence. We shall also prove that a sphoṭa is not perceived. A sphoṭa lies beyond the range of other proofs. Therefore the Sphoṭa-vādins take vain pride in citing the popular usage "A śabda communicates meaning to us". They should forget it.

If we uphold the thesis that a letter communicates a meaning then the said popular usage stands justified. The reason is as follows. The last letter accompanied by the impressions of the preceding letters conveys meaning. If this is the thesis then the use of singular number in the word 'śabda' is logically tenable since the letter in question is a śabda and has singular number. The thesis that letters, referred to by a recognitive judgment, communicate meaning suffers from no defect since the word 'śabda' is not employed here to denote such letters as are individually. take into consideration. Let us take a concrete example e.g., the word

'gaṇḥ'. The collection of letters 'g', 'au' and 's' which as not other than the word 'gaṇḥ' communicates a meaning. A word which denotes a collection has singular number. It may be used as a predicate of a subject which has plural number. [In Sanskrit grammar there is no hard and fast rule that the subject and the predicate of a proposition should have the same number. So, the proposition that such and such letters are 'śabda' is quite appropriate. Here, the word 'śabda' denotes a collection of letters. It has singular number. It may be predicated of the subject, such and such letters. Moreover we come across verbal usages like the following, "The vedas are the authority on this matter" etc.]. Moreover the mention of the statement, "We make out a meaning from śabda" is highly illogical on the part of the Sphoṭa-vādins. The word 'śabda' does not denote 'sphoṭa'. In other words, sphoṭa does not constitute the primary meaning of the word 'śabda'. No linguists are seen to employ the word 'śabda' to denote a sphoṭa as they are noticed to use it in the sense of a letter. The Sphoṭa-vādins may contend that śabda is defined as the indicator of an object. This contention is hardly tenable since the definition is too wide. Smoke which points to fire should also be denoted by the word 'śabda'.

Now, the Sphoṭa-vādins, having reflected on the problem from its initial stage, may revise the said definition and hold that śabda is such as being audible indicates an object. (This definition shows an improvement upon the previous one since it does not apply to smoke and similar other indicators. None of these objects is audible. Hence, the defect of being too wide is overcome). But this definition is not applicable to a sphoṭa since a sphoṭa is not audible. Moreover, some portion of the definition is superfluous. The definition should be like this "What is audible is śabda". This amended definition is competent enough to distinguish śabda from all other objects. Hence, the shorter definition is logically sound. The definition in question should not consist of two elements necessary and superfluous. Letters are only audible but no other objects. Therefore letters are only śabda. A sphoṭa is not śabda. Kumārila has also directed his criticism against the sphoṭa theory thus. Letters independent of one another are distinctly grasped by our auditory sense-organ. Neither the constituent factor of a letter nor a sphoṭa is presented to auditory sense-perception".

Now, an objection may be raised against the above definition. If the definition of śabda is this "What is audible is śabda" then it also becomes too wide since it applies to the universal of existence

(sattā). The above objection is not tenable. The intended definition is this "What is only audible is śabda". The adverb 'only' which denotes exclusion has not been appropriately given since śabda is not exclusively heard by means of ears. Ears require the co-operation of manas (the internal organ) to hear śabda. Hence, no purpose is served by the above exclusion. Such an objection is not tenable. The intention of the said exclusion is to distinguish the instrument of this sense-perception from all other such homogeneous instruments. Thus, the definition implies that the sense-perception of śabda is produced only by ears but not by such other sense-organs. Hence, eyes etc. are only excluded but not the internal organ viz, manas. Even if the amended definition is accepted then it remains still too wide since it is applicable to the universal of śabda. Such an objection does not hold good. This defect will be easily mended if the clause 'is possessed of a universal' is added to the definition. Thus, the complete definition of śabda is as follows :—

"What is audible and is possessed of a universal is śabda". [This is the correct definition of śabda. It suffers from no defects. The universal of śabda possesses no universal. Hence, the definition does not apply to it]. The trend of this discussion from its very beginning requires the further qualification as has been proposed just now. This definition will not be too wide even if it applies to the thundering of clouds or to other inarticulate sounds since they all belong to the class of sound. Vātsyāyana, the author of Nyāya-bhāṣya, has stated that sound admits of two kinds viz., letters and inarticulate sound. The definition, "What is the indicator of an object is sound" is not a correct one. We have stated it before. We shall now controvert it and assign our reasons. Suppose an articulate sound reaches our ears. We are still ignorant of the relation of denotation. Hence, the above sound carries no sense. As it communicates no sense, it ceases to be sound since according to the said definition every sound points to an object. When the relation of denotation has been known to us after some time the same thing again becomes sound since it conveys now a sense to us. Therefore the above definition is not universal.

Again, we do not follow your intention behind the procedure of determining the true character of sound. Why do you imagine the identity of śabda with universals, attributes, actions etc. i.e., objects denoted by words? Why does this misgiving arise in your mind? Why do you refute the imaginary identity? We fail to appreciate the value of your useless attempts. Why do you raise absurd propositions

and refute them? We have well understood that words are distinct from their meanings. Therefore what is audible is śabda (sound). But a sphoṭa is not audible. Hence, those who hold that letters constitute words, sentences etc. and convey a meaning can only justify the popular view "We make out a sense from a sound (śabda)". Hence, the popular view goes in favour of the varṇa-vādins but does not favour the sphoṭa-vādins. This is our conclusion.

The Sphoṭa-vādins join issue with the Varṇa-vādins. They raise an objection "Why do not you admit that a sphoṭa is audible?" They also state that every body is aware of the fact that sound produces an awareness of common element which finds expression in the verbal sign 'a word, a sentence etc'. But they also point out that the auditory sense-perception produced by a sound, does not refer to letters. Such a hypothesis is not logically sound. The reason behind our criticism is as follows. Whenever we perceive individual cows viz., Sābaleya, Bihuleya etc. we recognise a common property in each of them and name it as the universal of cowness. Similarly, if we had recognised a word or a sentence in every letter then we would have admitted that a word or a sentence is a type of common property which belongs to every letter. But, as a matter of fact such an awareness does not occur to our mind. Let us illustrate another type of common property which belongs to each of its constituents. A piece of cloth is made up of threads. It inheres in each thread that constitutes it. When we have the first perception of a piece of cloth we perceive the whole without having the discriminative knowledge of its constituent factors. Similarly, do we hear a word or sentence without attending to each constituent letter one after another? If we had heard a word or a sentence as a distinct whole without having the distinct auditory perception of each of its constituent letters then we would have gladly accepted the thesis "A word or a sentence stands on the same footing with a piece of cloth". As a piece of cloth is constituted by its parts so a word or a sentence is not framed by its parts. A word or a sentence does not inhere in letters. It is not a common whole which is shared by all letters. We do never grasp it as a whole at a time.

(To be continued)

SRI RAMAKRISHNA AND WORLDLY LIFE*

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In this paper I propose to expound the teaching of Ramakrishna on the relation between spiritual and worldly life. There is, however, an ambiguity about the phrase "worldly life". Details apart, I can say without fear of contradiction that according to him, as according to its usage, "worldly life" means the life of a householder as against the life of a sannyasin.¹ Now the question is whether, in Ramakrishna's view, worldly life is antithetical to spiritual life.

Ramakrishna repeatedly points out that the realization of God is the end of human life and that sex and wealth stand between us and our possible union with God.² The mind of a worldly man is like a mirror covered with dust. The sensuous desires are the dirt that prevents the light of truth from penetrating such a mind.³ Those who are drowned in worldly life think only of worldly things. When they have ample leisure, they find time hanging heavy on their hands, and they kill time by idle talk or playing at cards. They cannot realize their plight, however. But one may ask: Why should they be so if the world is the creation of a good God?

God, we are told, covers men's minds with the illusion of sex and sensuous desires just to keep the world going. That is His way, inscrutable way, indeed.⁴ God has the power of *māyā* wherewith He creates and sustains the universe. But His *māyā* is a twofold power; it is the power of ignorance as well as the power of knowledge. He, on the one hand, keeps men in ignorance and, on the other, plants in them the principle of light, i.e., knowledge, which is calculated to lift them out of the rut of sense-life and to lead them eventually to the life of Spirit. But what is spiritual life like?

To be brief, spiritual life is life lived for God or Self. And one lives spiritual life if one, unswayed by sensuous desires, ever aspires

* Presented to the Second Conference of the Union for the Study of the Great Religions held in Madras during the Christmas week, 1956.

¹ *Kathamrita* (in Bengali) by "M", III, v, 1.

² *Op. cit.*, I, x, 6; III, i, 6; III, iii, 8; IV, vi, 4.

³ *Op. cit.*, III, iv, 1.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, IV, x, 3.

to realize God or Self. It seems, and some actually say, that spiritual life is apart and that it cannot be lived in society and the State. They are, indeed, of the opinion that one cannot attain to life for God or Spirit except by renouncing the world. Such an idea he seems to convey to us when Ramakrishna says, "Why can't one have a vision of God? Because one's mind is covered with sex and wealth."¹ Does he then mean that spiritual life begins with the absolute rejection of worldly life?

On one occasion, two disciples of Ramakrishna were discussing the question of renunciation just before him. One of them said, "Without overall renunciation none can attain God." Thereupon the other snapped out, "The moment one's mind is fixed upon Him the world (*samsār*) ceases for one." On hearing all this, Ramakrishna appeared rather upset. He then said to them, "You say that the world would go. Where, then, will it go? For my part, however, wherever I am I feel I am in Ram's Ayodhya."²

On another occasion, a certain person asked Ramakrishna, "Well, Sir, is the world illusory? Thereupon with a flare of genius he replied, "The world is illusory so long as He is not realized."³ This view is very original indeed. We have so long been taught that on realization of *Brahman*, the aspirant reaches perfection and rejects the world as illusory. Ramakrishna, however, points out that on realization the world appears very real to the *sādhaka*, in the sense that he now finds that God manifests Himself in the things and beings of the world. According to Ramakrishna, we, in our ordinary way, take the world as existing by itself and such a world is obviously false as it in fact does not exist in its own right. A problem nevertheless remains, namely, how could one with a yearning for God rise out of the false and reach the real world? In short, is life in society an obstacle to one's spiritual progress?

Society is a living whole and has its history. From a small beginning society by stages has come to its present state of existence. And the process of development is still continuing. Traditions of different kinds—economic, political, juridical, religious and the rest, which form our heritage, are the accumulated experiences of the past generations. We are, indeed, under a deep debt to all those who in the past contributed to social development in its manifold aspects. There is no gainsaying the fact that we were born to a society and

¹ *Op. cit.*, III, iii, 8.

² *Op. cit.*, I, xiii, 4.

³ *Op. cit.*, I, ix, 1.

nurtured on the social institutions. We are what we are to-day, certainly because of society. It is little wonder, then, that Ramakrishna emphasizes social life and insists on the strict performing of one's duties.

He makes an approach to worldly life from yet another side. He avers that everyone should perform his or her proper functions in life; nobody can avoid activity. One acts and has to act even when one goes out of society. So the aspirant should not think that he would progress in spiritual life only if he gets out of worldly life. That way, says Ramakrishna, the aspirant would only shirk his duties and the neglect of his duties would assuredly weigh upon him and retard his advance towards his goal.

Now, if one is to live in, and not to renounce, the world, what becomes of spiritual life? The difficulty is that worldly life, involving as it does sex and wealth, appears to be opposed to spiritual life. Ramakrishna, however, points out that there is no short cut to the spiritual goal. Therefore, the aspirant should not be in a hurry or do anything at haphazard. He can proceed towards the realization of his ideal only by some stages, which are to be worked out of worldly life itself. But how?

Ramakrishna tells us that there are infinite paths to God. There are nevertheless three broad kinds of yoga, namely, the yoga of knowledge, the yoga of action, and the yoga of love or devotion.¹ According to Ramakrishna, the yoga of knowledge is far too difficult for anybody to follow, and the yoga of action or karmayoga, though theoretically all right, is not quite practicable in ordinary life. Karmayoga, as expounded in the *Bhagavadgītā*, is the spiritual discipline in which the aspirant is to perform all necessary actions and duties and to offer them as an oblation to God. In this yoga the aspirant is to put himself forth to the best of his capacities without any attachment to the fruits or results of his actions. As Sri Krishna puts it, "In karmayoga the aspirant has a right to action, but not to its result or results."² He, indeed, appears very original when Ramakrishna says that although karmayoga fixes upon God, it posits the ego as the agent or doer and as offering the doings as an oblation to God. He means to say that in this yoga, more often than not, self-interest or selfishness creeps into the mind of the aspirant and renders the yoga a way of insincerity. Ramakrishna seeks to bring it home to our minds that one can become a karmayogi in the strict sense of

¹ *Kathamrita* (in Bengali), I, xi. 4.

² *Gītā*, II, 47.

the term, only after the realization of God in His twofold aspect—the determinate and the indeterminate, when one is transformed and becomes only a channel of divine activity. After this realization, the *sādhaka* retains only the form of the 'I', the substance of the gross 'I' having been destroyed, and thus becomes best fitted for the practice of karmayoga.

Ramakrishna is all for the yoga of love or bhakti. It is narrated of the Enlightened One : “ ‘Full of hindrances is this household life, the haunt of passion. Free as the air is the homeless state’. Thus he considered and went forth.”¹ Ramakrishna, however, does not disvalue worldly life, although he says that it is difficult for a man in worldly life to practise *sādhana*, to follow a strict spiritual discipline. There is nevertheless a way out, according to him. This way is bhaktiyoga or the yoga of love, which consists in thinking God as the Creator and Ordainer, and praying to Him for love and faith, and singing His names. This is the way for a householder who has a yearning for God.²

But how could he divide his mind between God and worldly things? There is doubtless no question of thus dividing his mind. Ramakrishna insists that the aspirant, though he lives in society, has to withdraw his mind gradually from worldly desires and fix it upon God. With the help of homely examples, Ramakrishna explains the procedure a person, enmeshed in mundane life, should follow in his attempt to achieve liberation. A tortoise, as we know, lays its eggs on land; but, as it moves about in water, its mind ever remains fixed on the place where the eggs were laid and left behind.³ Consider, again, the servants and maid-servants of rich people. The former do all their duties and look after the sons and daughters of their masters. In reference to the sons and daughters they even say, “This is my Ram”, “This is my Gouri”, and so on, though they know in the heart of their hearts that the boys and girls are none of their own. The servants and maid-servants work just for money and they always think of their homes and their near and dear ones. Similar should be the attitude, Ramakrishna tells us, of a householder in his spiritual life. The point is that he is not to reject life: he is to accept life by transcending it, *i.e.*, by doing the duties appropriate to his station of life and concentrating at the same time upon God. And when his being is saturated with the thought of the Supreme

¹ Rhys Davids : *Early Buddhism*, P. 81, London, 1910.

² *Kathāmrita*, I, xi, 4.

³ *Op. cit.*, IV, xii, 3.

Being, he becomes detached from empirical things. This is verily his way to the supreme goal—union with God.

Ramakrishna, however, points out that no rules are binding upon those who are seized with divine frenzy. From those who have become mad for God all duties drop off.¹ Still, as Ramakrishna avers, it ultimately depends upon the grace of God whether one attains faith and love and union with Him.²

¹ *Op. cit.*, II, xii, 1; xiii, 4; IV, xix, 1

² *Op. cit.*, I, iv, 7.

REORIENTATION OF TEACHER EDUCATION IN INDIA*

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The problem of education in a country like India where the majority of the people are even now steeped in ignorance, illiteracy, squalor and poverty, and where education has long been regarded merely as a means to getting a job for earning a pittance for livelihood, is not only complex but also serious. It should engage the immediate attention of those who care for the country's good. If we want to live and thrive as a democratic nation, we must not only expand our education to cover the entire population but also remodel it on proper lines without any loss of time.

Now that we are free people of a sovereign democratic republic, we can no longer remain complacent about the existing state of affairs by putting the blame at others' doors only. We are now the masters of our destinies, and whatever problem we are to face has got to be solved not only by our diligent and intelligent endeavours but also by our sincere and correct approach to it. However difficult and baffling a problem may be, a true and proper appreciation of it goes half the way to solve it. The task of improving the educational system in the country brooks no delay if we are not to perish and if we are to prevent the nation from going into chaos and disaster. But improvement of the educational standard at any stage—primary, secondary or university—will remain a pious hope unless and until the society and the state are prepared to appreciate the importance of *teachers* who are the builders of the nation and 'torch-bearers' in the life of the people.

The sooner the need for suitably trained teachers to man our educational institutions is widely and truly recognized, the better is it for India of today and for India of tomorrow, as without properly qualified teachers no state can afford to recognize and improve the educational system to suit the objectives it aspires to achieve by *education*. For imparting a proper kind of education, a well-qualified

* Presidential Address delivered at the Teacher Training Section of the Thirty-first All-India Educational Conference held at Jaipur.

and properly trained teacher sincerely devoted to his task or profession is absolutely necessary.

During the First Five Year Plan, little progress could be made towards the improvement of Secondary Education. During the Second Plan, some of the recommendations of the Secondary Education Commission are proposed to be implemented. A percentage of the existing high schools will be upgraded, and some will be converted into multi-lateral schools so as to provide the pupils at the secondary stage of education with training in different vocations according to their interests, aptitudes and inclinations. This will mean an increasing diversification of courses and will involve the introduction of craft courses, better facilities for science teaching, establishment of commercial, technical, industrial, agricultural and other vocational branches, and so on. If the suggestions of the Planning Commission are implemented, secondary education will, no doubt, be more or less complete and self-sufficient and will succeed in checking, to a great extent, the wasteful rush of students to universities.

But the question is: 'How are the recommendations to be carried out?' Obviously, there must be adequately trained hands to put into effect the much promising programme, because no scheme, however well-planned, can work of itself. Dr. John Mathai, in his brilliant Convocation Address to the University of Calcutta in 1956, has rightly observed, "No educational institution can rise in quality and usefulness above the level of its teachers". Hence arises the pressing problem in India today in the field of education—the problem of *Teacher Education*. In any educational organization, anywhere, the teacher has always been and will always remain the most important factor. In some modern plans of teaching, for instance, the Dalton Plan or the Montessori System, it may seem that the teacher's position as the hub of the educative process is not recognized. But on second thoughts it would be realized that the demand from him as regards qualities of head and heart has, on the contrary, become more, much more exacting. In fact, the modern ideas of education cannot be effectively carried into practice without hard and sound professional preparation on the part of the teacher.

In India, we had hardly ample opportunities before Independence to pay heed to the great problem of Teacher Training. In educational organization we witnessed, during our bondage, only some flirting with the idea of *universal education*—an idea which long ago became a reality in almost every other part of the civilized world. As soon

as independence was won, we proclaimed in our Constitution that we are going to do our utmost to make up leeway ; and the two noteworthy Commissions that we set up on University Education and Secondary Education, have both contemplated vast educational reconstruction programmes. Both these Commissions have, however, stressed the greater importance of the middle part of the educational ladder, that is, secondary education. And both these Commissions have very rightly laid their fingers on the *teacher* as the sore spot in our educational set up.

There is no denying the fact that the profession of teaching in India is not at present very attractive, except to a very small number of people who are born with, or who gradually grow and develop an inclination for the job. The 'World Organization of the Teaching Profession' has reported thus :

"Information from our member organizations throughout the world indicates clearly that the shortage of competent teachers is growing in scope and severity. Among the many reasons for this growing and ominous shortage of teachers, one reason stares out so prominently that all others seem relatively inconsequential, namely, the notoriously unsatisfactory conditions of the teacher's compensation."

We see, therefore, that the 'World Organization of the Teaching Profession' has pointed out the dearth of good trained teachers all over the world. One reason for this is that the task of the teacher is not only an arduous one, he is also denied the social rank and emoluments befitting his position and the importance and gravity of his work. Another reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs is that care is not taken to recruit teachers from an early stage of their educational career. In Russia, an additional school class is organized at the close of the school career to prepare those interested in the teaching profession. We hope that in the not very distant future the teacher will not have any social or economic grievance. But, in that case, the problem of selecting the right kind of teaching personnel will assume the greatest importance in educational organization. In fact, research work on the personality traits of good and bad teachers is in progress everywhere.

Good teachers are both born and made and, by far, the greater number of good teachers is more *made* today than born. By the phrase 'being made' is meant 'being professionally trained'. Most of the teachers are now *dragged* to the teaching profession and not actually *drawn* to it. As the Father of the nation has tacitly put it,

"They only come to the teaching profession, who cannot find any other employment". Hence it is essential that our teachers should be professionally trained to be able to make their teaching really effective and useful. The progress that has been made in the science of Pedagogy would now surely delight the heart of Pestalozzi, and it is very much reassuring that training is recognized today as an essential preparation for those who intend to join the teaching profession.

The Secondary Education Commission is, therefore, right in laying the greatest stress on the problem of organizing the teaching profession. The problem has, however, *two* aspects—one of rapidly enhancing the social and economic status of teachers, and the other of training up a vast army of efficient teaching personnel to meet the growing demands of the necessary educational expansion. The proportion of untrained teachers in our schools, at present, is quite alarming, perhaps, the largest in the world. We have to arrange for the training of the existing untrained teachers first. But at the same time we have to attend to the problem of providing training facilities for the fresh recruits to the profession.

The number of Teachers Colleges and Teacher Training Departments of universities that we have at present in India is utterly inadequate for taking up this *twofold* task. And it is also a fact that it may not be possible for us to start the requisite number of Teacher Training Colleges in the near future. The crying need of the hour is, therefore, to have recourse to some make-shift arrangements for teacher training that can cope with the existing emergency. In Great Britain, the British Emergency Teacher Training Scheme, after the Second World War, allowed a great degree of experimentation in this respect. Under the Scheme, temporary colleges for training up 10,000 women teachers were set up. In Russia, the situation after the Revolution was much the same as obtains in India today. So in that country Short Courses of Training for a few weeks were instituted in 1920, and the scheme continues even today. The teachers who were thus trained were treated as equals to regular-trained teachers in every respect, subject to certain conditions. One of the main conditions was that the Short Training must be followed up by a Correspondence Course and end in a qualifying examination. In view of the acute situation in India, these two schemes of setting up temporary colleges or camps during vacations and Correspondence Courses in Pedagogics should at once be launched.

It is gratifying that some of the State Governments have already

been experimenting on the scheme of running Short Course Training Camps for untrained Graduate and Undergraduate teachers aged more than 45 years. The writer has had the fortune to have visited some such training centres in West Bengal and has found the work quite useful and satisfactory.

A few concrete suggestions may be made in this connection. With a view to imparting the benefit of training at least partially to as large a number of existing teachers as possible, the following measures might be adopted :

(i) Teachers with an experience of ten years or more may be exempted from the theoretical part of the training course. But arrangement must be made to provide such teachers with *practical training* in class teaching, school administration, class management and discipline, preparation of Notes of Lessons, etc. A short training in the theoretical course, say, covering for a month, may be imparted to them, if practicable. But the practical course should cover a period of at least two months, at the end of which the trainees will have to undergo an examination in practical teaching. What we want, after all, is a good *practical teacher*, and not a mere theorist.

(ii) For teachers having less than ten years' experience, however, the full course of training lasting for a period of one academic year should be insisted upon, and facilities should be thrown open to all such teachers.

(iii) For purposes of giving a short term training to the teachers with ten years' experience, a *mobile* staff of instructors appointed by the State Department of Education should be maintained in every district. This staff will move from place to place and organize short course training centres in suitable schools where trainees from specified institutions in the areas should assemble to take their three-months' training. After the training course in a particular area is completed, the said staff will move on to another suitable school in the district and start a new centre there. In this way all the untrained teachers of ten years' standing in a district may easily get training facilities within a year or two.

(iv) The services of the mobile staff of instructors may be retained even after this period. The staff should be made permanent, and its business will be to organize Refresher and Reorientation Courses of training for the already-trained teachers in the district in suitable centres throughout the year.

(v) The Extension Services Departments sponsored by the

All India Council for Secondary Education, Ministry of Education, Government of India, may come to our aid in organizing such Camp Courses for Teachers. And in fact they have been helping the cause of Teacher Education in India by providing Refresher and Reorientation courses. It is hoped that the All India Council for Secondary Education would see their way in expanding their existing programme of activities in this direction to provide for greater facilities for In-Service Training of Teachers.

The Mudaliar Commission has also recommended that part-time courses for meeting the acute shortage of women teachers vis-a-vis the schemes of educational expansion, should be started. This recommendation also should be implemented without delay.

In order to organize Correspondence Courses as well as to co-ordinate the work of Training Colleges, we require a good number of Educational Institutes as envisaged by the McNair Committee's Report in England. Such Institutes have come into existence in considerable numbers in England and Russia. We have to keep in mind that education without research stagnates and fails to meet the needs of the community. And research, to be of real value, must be coordinated by a central body. For this purpose, also, we need an adequate number of Central Educational Institutes or Research Bureaus. In February, 1956, the All India Council for Secondary Education organized a Seminar on 'Examinations' at Bhopal. The writer was one of the participants to that seminar. One of the recommendations of the Seminar was the establishment of Research Bureaus under the State Board of Education, the function of which would be to promote and encourage researches and original investigations in the domain of Examinations and Evaluations. We feel that such Bureaus or Institutes may also concern themselves with the task of organizing from time to time Refresher and Reorientation Courses of Training for the teachers trained in the past, because a good teacher must always maintain contact with the latest developments in educational theory and practice. A teacher is to train himself all his life. As Findlay observes, "The teacher is ever a learner." In the words of Tagore, "A teacher can never truly teach unless he is still learning himself. A lamp can never light another lamp unless it continues to burn its own flame. The teacher who has come to the end of his subject, who has no living traffic with his knowledge, but merely repeats his lessons to his students, can only load their minds : he cannot quicken them."

It is, therefore, implied that in the Teachers Colleges there

should be provision for experimentation and research into the fields of Psychology, Experimental Pedagogy, Educational Measurements and Statistics, Methodology in the teaching of school subjects, and so on. In India there exists at present little scope for research activities in Graduate Training Colleges. In Germany every student-teacher has to study and investigate into an original problem and submit a thesis in part fulfilment of the requirements of the final examination. In Russia, too, such researches are highly encouraged. It is true that in the Master of Education courses of some of the Indian Universities, there is provision for research work and submission of theses in lieu of some theoretical papers. In all Teachers' Colleges, however, it is highly desirable that a spirit of research and original thinking and investigations should be encouraged among the trainee-teachers instead of merely getting them to learn some stereotyped methods. Such work has the great virtue of infusing enthusiasm into the hearts of teachers-in-training and also of making them conversant with the current problems of education.

So far as the curricula and syllabi of Teachers' Training Colleges are concerned, we must be conscious of the urgent need of introducing certain vital changes. The Secondary Education Commission has made a number of valuable recommendations in this respect. One is the necessity of the compulsory study of *Mental Hygiene* for all teachers. The problem of delinquent and backward children in our school and society is assuming alarming proportions in many states, and no teacher can, therefore, afford to neglect these vital problems in the field of education. In Russia, special schools have been set up for the mentally defective (backward, neurotic and delinquent) children, and a separate subject known as Defectology has been introduced in the training courses. Monumental studies on this problem have been made by Sir Cyril Burt in England and by Makarenko in Russia. It is high time that in India some work on these lines should be immediately initiated.

Next, much more stress in the training programme is required to be laid on the knowledge of the contents of the school subjects. It is desirable that the trainees should study the contents and methods of teaching not more than *two* school subjects of the same group, such as, historical, linguistic, mathematical, scientific, and so on. Our teachers must have the knowledge of the contents of school subjects up to the Honours standard. With a view to improving the general level of the knowledge of subject-matter on the part of our existing band of teachers, the following scheme may be recommended :

It is a fact that a large majority of our young graduates, trained or untrained, who are now recruited to the teaching profession, are pass course graduates generally without any remarkable results (*e.g.*, First Division) in the Matriculation and Intermediate Examinations. Steps should therefore be taken to give them an impetus to improve the standard of their knowledge of different school subjects. It might be suggested that there should be an examination held by the Department of Education every year in all school subjects, and the pass course graduates who pass this examination should be encouraged by a suitable increment in their salaries. This examination should insist on a high standard of knowledge of each subject, corresponding to the Honours Course (suitably simplified or modified) of an Indian University. The syllabi for these examinations should be framed by the Department of Education. This system will certainly encourage private studies on the part of the teachers, and the result will be an improvement of their intellectual attainment and at the same time increased efficiency. The pass marks and distinction marks, if necessary, may be kept at a very high level.

Lastly, it is very necessary to see that there is less of general and theoretical Psychology in the training course and much more of Educational Sociology, that is, study of the current trends in social and educational organization; because, in our age the teacher is not a mere instructor but a social leader. It would be helpful, for this purpose, if the teacher, as recommended by the Mudaliar Commission, specializes in at least one extra-curricular activity.

It is a happy sign that a Committee has recently been appointed by the Ministry of Education, Government of India to examine the syllabi prescribed for courses at the B. Ed. level. It is understood that this body might also consider, if time permitted, a reorganization of the M. Ed. Course as well. The Committee already met twice. At its inaugural meeting held sometime in August, 1956, Shri K.G. Saiyidain, Secretary and Educational Adviser to the Government of India, stressed the urgent need for revision of the Training College syllabi in view of the fact that they were mostly drawn up several decades ago. He observed that such syllabi 'contained elements which had no relevance to our present-day educational problems. This prevented the trainees from developing a proper understanding of the Indian educational scene'.

Now, it may be concluded by pointing out that the desired improvement in the standard of instruction and education cannot be effected merely by providing the teachers with necessary facilities

for training and by equipping the schools with requisite aids and appliances. Suitable remunerations and attractive service conditions must be guaranteed to all members of the teaching profession so that they may remain above want and above misery without having to dissipate their energy in private tutorships. We should see that teachers are enabled to dedicate themselves heart and soul to the task of bringing up the members of the rising generation, who are placed under their charge and who shall be the citizens of tomorrow. Let us hope that the time is not very far when the teacher will not have any great social or economic grievance, and we shall be able to attract a satisfactory number of well-qualified persons to the profession, by enhancing their salaries and by improving their status in society—by making life less difficult and less unattractive for them. It is then and then alone that we can really benefit by 'reorientation of teacher education' in India.

LAND REVENUE AND ALLIED CHARGES. IN ANCIENT INDIA

(From the 10th to the 12th century A.D.)

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It is not easy to obtain from inscriptional sources a clear picture of taxation in India, from the 10th to the 12th century A.D. Names of a few taxes are no doubt available; but they are repeated in most records in a conventional style; these are rarely accompanied with details which would have made their meaning better understood. Nevertheless, the material, though insufficient in many respects, has some utility in as much as it throws some light at least on certain sources of revenue which can be recognised with reasonable certainty. It also provides an opportunity for the study of the form in which the earlier system of taxation was carried down in this period and also for assessing the difference between taxation in actual practice and taxation as it is portrayed in the Smritis and other relevant branches of ancient literature.

We may, at first, turn our attention to that branch of taxation that is related to land, *i.e.*, land revenue and allied charges. Land formed one of the main heads of revenue as shown by the Dharmaśāstras, the Smritis and the Arthaśāstra literature. The question whether there was any kind of compulsory taxation of land or land produce in the early Vedic period is a controversial one,¹ but the system of compulsory taxation was not slow to appear, as the evidence of the later Vedic texts shows.² The Jātakas make it clear that the king had the right to a portion of the produce of the land.³ This is also the view of Kauṭilya.⁴ Taxation of land had been known for

¹ In hymn VII 6.5 of the Rig Veda, king Nahusha is said to have forced his people to pay taxes (bali) and in hymn X 173.1 we are told that the king is installed on the throne of the kingdom, and then in X, 173.6. Indra is invoked to make the commonalty (viśah) pay tribute to him; but there is no evidence to show that this tax was levied on land.

² In the Atharvaveda—IV, 22.2 Indra is invoked to give him "share in villages, kine and horses, and to leave the enemy without a portion". (emam bhaja grāmaśveṣu goṣu nistham bhaja yo amitro aya—A V., IV. 4 22.2).

³ In the Kuruṭhamma Jātaka we read that a person, having carelessly plucked a handful of paddy from his own field regrets: "From this field I have yet to give the king his due, and I have taken a handful of rice, from an untithed field" (Imamhā kedārā mayā rañño bhāgo databbo adinnabhāgato yeva cha me kedārato sāhasisaṃuṭṭhi gabhāpati (Vol. II, p. 318). In another place we are told that the 'Donaṃpako Mahāmatta measured the king's share of the produce sitting at the door of the granary, (Vol. II, p. 318).

⁴ Arthaśāstra, sītā-produce (*i.e.*, revenue) from the crown land, bhaga-portion of the produce payable to the government.

many centuries, before our period, as shown by inscriptions and other sources available.

Land continued to be an important source of revenue also during the period under review. First this is shown by the frequent mention of the fiscal expression 'bhāgabhogakara' in most of the inscriptions of the period.⁴ It may be noted that the compound 'bhāgabhogakara' is not known in this form in the literature of the Smṛitis nor is it used as a single revenue term in the Arthasāstra, although the constituent elements of the compound, 'bhāga, bhoga, and kara' separately were quite well known. 'Bhāga' is translated by Kielhorn as 'share of the produce'.¹ 'Bhoga' is interpreted as the 'periodical supplies of fruits, flowers, fire-wood and the like, which the villagers had to furnish to the king.'² But as 'kara' may be taken as a name of a general property-tax levied periodically, besides tribute paid by dependent states, it cannot be regarded as a distinctive agricultural tax.³

In the Rajor inscription of Mathanadeva, dated V S. 1016,⁴ the term 'bhaga and bhoga' are, however, separately used.

Other expressions are sometimes used which appear to be as substitutes for 'bhāga and bhoga'. Thus in the Prabandhachintamani,⁵ we come across the expression 'dāni', which may mean the king's share of the produce. In a grant of Dharaṇīvarāha of Vadhvāṇ (Saka samvat 839)⁶ both the terms 'dāni and Bhoga' occur. A land grant of the Chaulukya dynasty⁷ where the expression

A. It is used in the inscriptions of the following dynasties of Northern India: the Pālas and Senas of Bengal; the Chandellae of Jejābhukti; the Chālukyas of Anahilapātaka; the Paramāras of Malwa and the Gāhādavās, etc.

¹ E. I., Vol. VII, p. 160. It is often taken to mean 3 distinct terms 'bhāga, bhoga, and kara', which are translated respectively as 'shares, right easement, taxes' (R.D. Banerjee, E.I. Vol. X V, pp 293). Vogel, 'Share and use tax in kind' (Antiquities of the Chamba State, pp. 167-69). Dr Ghoshal proposes to identify 'bhāga and bhoga' in the compound, with the usual grain share of the king, called 'bhaga' in the Arthasastra and 'bali' in the Smritis. This is according to Ghoshal supported by a passage of the Arthasāstra (III), where persons occupying fields and embanked reservoirs (setu) from private owners on the condition of 'bhāga, bhoga' as distinguished from those who hold the same on the condition of 'avakarya, prakarya, adhi (mortgage) and so forth. Bhāgabhoga in this case refers to the condition of payment of a specific share of the resulting product. H.R.S. p. 214. R. C. Majumdar, History of Bengal, p. 277. Here 'bhāga' is interpreted as 'land revenue paid in kind'. In earlier works it is used in the sense of 'the king's dues on land, trees, drugs, cattle wealth, etc. (Manu VII. 130-31; VIII, 305; Vishnu Dh. S., III. 25; 'Bhāgadugha' is one of the ratnins of the king. The Amarakośa treats bali, kara and bhāga as synonyms. Hist. of Dh. S., Vol. III, p. 184ff.

² Cf. Bühler's note in E.I., Vol. I, p. 75n. 'Pratibhoga has been interpreted into 'dues in the form of fruits, flowers and vegetables presented every day, (See, Kane, Hist. of Dh. S., Vol. III, p. 190). According to Alakar, 'bhagakara' is a petty tax in kind. (Rāshtrakutas, p. 352 fn. 4) and the officer called 'Bhogapati' collected this tax, (ibid.).

³ Hist. of Bengal (Dacca university), p. 277; Dr. Ghoshal, 'an abbreviation of the more usual bhāgabhogakara'. HRS p. 244; Vardhamāna explains kara as the dues recovered every month from villagers and city dwellers, Kane, Hist. of Dh. S. vol III, p. 190. 'Kara' apparently a tax in money, K. Gupta, Land System, p. 301.

⁴ E. I., Vol. III, p. 263.

⁵ Trans. by Tawney, p. 77n.

⁶ See, I.A., Vol. XII, p. 198.

⁷ Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 204.

'dāṇibhāga' occurs may be incidentally referred to here. Ghoshal¹ identifies the term 'dāṇibhaga' with 'dāṇibhogabhāga' mentioned in a Surāshtra landgrant, dated Saka 839 (=917-8 A.D.) which has been taken to denote 'the periodical supplies of fruits, firewood and the like by the villagers' as meant by the word 'bhoga'. The expression 'māyuta' occurring in the Rajor inscription of Mathanadeva,² is probably a contribution of the same kind as held by the scholar. But is not clear why the affix 'dāṇi' is used in some cases as mentioned above.

An indication of the rates at which the king's share—was to be collected is given in the Sukranīti³ where it is laid down that the king should take one-third, one-fifth, one-seventh, one-tenth, or one-twentieth from the "collectors of grasses and woods".

As regards the king's share of the produce of the agricultural land denoted usually by the word 'bhāga', we find that there was a difference of opinion among the ancient authorities as to the specific share to which he was entitled. The king's share of the produce varies from $\frac{1}{4}$ to $\frac{1}{12}$ in the Smṛitis, and the Dharmaśāstras.⁴ This variation must have been due to the difference in the quality of land as well as regional and chronological factors. It is, clear, that the Manava Dharma Sastra in its present form could not have contemplated different rates unless they were known to have prevailed under different conditions. Sukra⁵ mentions different rates for the different classes of soils and also the net outturn of crops as the basis for assessment of land revenue. It lays down the rates of the king's grain share as follows:—

- $\frac{1}{3}$ from land irrigated by river;
- $\frac{1}{4}$ „ „ „ „ tanks and wells;
- $\frac{1}{4}$ „ „ „ „ rain water;
- $\frac{1}{8}$ „ barren and rocky lands.

Kullottunga Chola of South India is known to have divided land into 8 classes for the purpose of taxation based on classification of soils. Altekar believes that the non-agreement among the Smṛitis must be partly due to the varying practices of the different states or to the different times to meet its varying needs.⁶ It is doubtful if the rates of taxes could be so uncertain in normal times.

¹ HRS. p. 256.

² E.I., Vol. III, p. 263.

³ IV. 2. 119; (śisua-nidani-bhuta-dani-sambandha).

⁴ Gautama (X. 21), Manu (VII. 130), Vishnu. Dh.S. (III. 23-33) declare that the king may ordinarily take a sixth part of the grain crops or produce of the soil; but Kautilya (V. 2.), Manu (X. 2), Shantiparva (87), Sukra (IV. 2.9-10) permit the king to take even one-third or one-fourth part of the crops in times of distress (āpad).

⁵ IV. 2, p. 120ff.

⁶ State and Government in Ancient India.

In this connection we may note the maxim laid down in the Sukraniti^a that 'the ruler should realise his share of the produce from land according to Prajāpati's system; but in times of danger and difficulty, according to Manu's system, not otherwise.' The difference between the two systems was about the measurement of land the king's share being presumed to be the same. According to Prajāpati 2500 cubits made one parivartana of land, whereas 3125 cubits made one such plot according to Manu.¹ Consequently when Manu's system of measurement being greater, the king's share of the produce, would be less under Prajāpati's system. This may explain the variation in rates to some extent.

The traditional rate of $\frac{1}{6}$ as the king's share must have been normally current over a wide area and for a long period. Thus we find the title of the officer-in-charge of the grain-share, 'śhashtḥādhi-kṛita' in one of the grants of Dharmapāla,² the Pāla king of Bengal, early in the 9th century A.D. This shows that the rate $\frac{1}{6}$ was the normal rate in his kingdom. The South Indian inscriptions sometimes refer to the king's sixth part of the produce, as for example, earlier in an inscription of the Kadamba king Śivamṛigesavarman, dated about 450 A.D. the king's share is found fixed at $\frac{1}{6}$. It is further recorded in an inscription of the Chola dynasty, dated 1046 A.D., that the monarch gave away as gifts to Brāhmaṇas one-sixth of the produce of the land, that he used to get as revenue.³ But the Raiwan plate of Govindrachandra of the Gāhaḍavāla dynasty dated 1123 A.D.⁴ shows that the king's share of the produce in his time was fixed at one-tenth. This is also found to be the rate mentioned in another inscription of the same king,⁵ (bhāga.kuṭaka-daśa) (which means the share (bhāga) for the plough-share kuṭaka to be daśa, i.e. ten). The figure 'ten' meaning either ten-hundredths or one-tenth. Kalhaṇa refers to the impost of (dvādaśabhāga) during the reign of King Ananta of Kashmir.⁶ Thus we find that there was no uniform rate fixed throughout the land; it was subject to changes, depending very much on variable factors including temperaments and policies of kings.

^a I. 209. Chaturbhūjair samam proktām kashṭabhūparivartanam
Prājāpatyena mānana bhūbhoga haraṇam nṛipair.

¹ I. 205-206.

² E.I. IV, p. 243.

In the time of Hiuen Tsang the land revenue was assessed on the basis of a uniform rate of $\frac{1}{6}$ of the produce.

³ Epigraphic Carnatica, p. 84. (Devanballi Taluq. No. 75).

⁴ JASB. Vol. LNI, Pt. I, p. 106.

⁵ Ibid, Vol. XLII. Pt. II, p. 314.

⁶ Rājatarāṅgī, ed. Stein, VII. 203.

It may be presumed that the king's share of the produce was in some regions, at least paid in kind. In the *Rajatarāṅginī*¹ there is a reference to rice, collected as revenue during the reign of Sussala. In Kashmir the greatest portion of land revenue was assessed and collected in Kharis of grain.² It may be noted that in several inscriptions of Assam the revenue of land is found to have been estimated in measures of rice. This evidently points to the prevalence in some places, of the system of payment of land revenue in kind.

The custom of paying taxes in cash was also current. The occurrence of the term 'hiranya' in most of the inscriptions belonging to the major dynasties of northern India, during the period under review, is significant. It is generally explained as 'a contribution in cash'.³ But this view is opposed by some scholars who simply translate 'hiranya' as meaning gold.⁴ There is also a divergence of opinion as to the particular item that was taxed to collect hiranya.

N. C. Bandyopadhyay suggests that 'hiranya' is a tax 'on the hoard or capital or on the annual income', i.e. a sort of income-tax.⁵ Beni Prasad explains it as symbolising 'the right of the state to the gold and probably other mines as well'.⁶ Dr. Ghoshal holds that "in the mediaeval period of Indian history while payments of the land revenue reform of Todar Mall were made in kind, certain classes of crops (called by the title *zabit*) were always assessed in cash on the ground that it was very difficult to divide them into shares."⁷ 'Hiranya' was a tax of this nature, levied in cash upon certain special kinds

¹ VIII 1206.

² See, *Rajatarāṅginī*, Vol. II, p. 328. The *Lokaprakāśa* fully supports this conclusion. Kharis of rice (*dhānya-khāri*) are stated there in fixed quantities as payments of rents, fines, interests, etc. The system of reckoning revenue in grain is widely spread throughout Asia, and is naturally well adopted to the economic conditions of a mainly agricultural country.

³ Hiranya is used as a fiscal term in the inscriptions of the Gurjara-Pratihāras, the Pālas and Senas of Bengal, the Chandēllas, the Chaulukyas, the Paramāras, etc.

⁴ Senart, 'tax in money' (E. I., Vol. VII p. 61-62; Kielhorn, 'Payment in money, E. I., Vol. VII, p. 160); Vogel, 'tax in cash', (*Antiquities in the Chamba State*, p. 167-9), etc.

⁵ Trans. by Buhler, S. B. E., II, p. 227; *ibid* XXV, p. 237; Jolly, *ibid*, VII, p. 16; Shamsastry, *Arthasāstra*, p. 173; Meyer, *Arthasāstra*, p. 226; Fleet, *Gupta Inscriptions*, p. 124; R. D. Banerjee, E. I., Vol. XIV, p. 324; *ibid*, XV, p. 298; D. R. Bhandarkar, *ibid*, VII, p. 46; N. G. Majumdar, *Inscriptions of Bengal*, Vol. III, pp. 8, 24, 67, 79, etc. The interpretation of 'hiranya' as 'gold' is shown untenable on the following grounds:—

(a) In the *Smṛiti* texts hiranya is combined with *paśu* (domestic animals), and listed along with the crops, trees, fruits, flowers, leaves, grass, etc. as some of the recognised sources of the king's revenue. Therefore, hiranya must have been one of those allied taxes which were imposed on the agricultural and industrial products of the village.

(b) In the land-grants 'hiranya' is sometimes joined with 'bhāga-bhoga-kara' which is to be taken in the sense of the king's customary grain-share. It is also found together with *dhanya* or the king's share of the crops. Hiranya, therefore, was a similar tax.

(c) For state as contemplated in the *Smṛitis* it may hardly be possible to draw a revenue from gold or on the accumulated hoard of the metal or a tax on the income estimated in gold currency. See, HRS, p. 61.

⁶ Kautilya, Vol. I, p. 183-40.

⁷ The State in Ancient India, p. 302.

⁸ See, Badan-Powell, *Land system*, Vol. I, p. 273 4. Cf. *Aini-i-Akbari*, Blochmann and Jarett's trans., Vol. II, p. 65; *Forbes Bas Mala*, ed. Rawlinson, p. 671.

of crops as distinguished from the tax in kind which was charged upon the ordinary crops.¹ But no reason has been advanced to show why the Smṛitis which specify other agricultural or industrial products does not do so in respect of the items subject to the levy of hiraṇya. Most scholars agree however, that hiraṇya was some kind of tax which was collected in cash.

From the interpretations offered by different scholars it appears that the meaning of the term 'hiraṇya' is not definitely established. There is no doubt that land revenue was sometimes collected in cash. In the Sukranīti² we are told, that if the king receives a tax (rājabhāga) of 100 silver karsas from the cultivators he should make over twenty karshās to him. Unfortunately this text fails to mention what unit of land or what amount of crops was assessed to the tax of 100 silver-karsas. A 10th century Gurjara Pratihāra record from U.P.³ assigns 500 drammas for a temple out of the revenue of a certain village. It may be noted that in the inscriptions belonging to the Sena dynasty of Bengal the revenue of the land is estimated in each case in terms of current silver coins. This evidently points to the general prevalence of payment of land revenue in cash in the Sena territory.⁴

Apparently taking in the sense of a tax in cash some scholars interpret 'Sarvarājabhogakarahiraṇyapratyaya'⁵ occurring in inscriptions as meaning 'with all revenues consisting of the king's grain share and the taxes in cash.'⁶ This interpretation is not accepted by Majumdar who thinks that the phrase quoted means "with all the income such as taxes and gold enjoyed by the king". But the point whether the taxes are in cash or kind is overlooked. Hiraṇya means gold, but why it is included as the name of a tax has not been clearly indicated by the scholar.

The Mallasarul grant (6th century A.D.) mentions, as the designation of an officer Hiraṇya-samudayika apparently connected with Vardhamāna-Bhukti,⁷ Altekar thinks that he was an officer entrusted with the work of collecting tax in cash in Bengal.⁸ Dr. Sen, is however, of the opinion, that he was an officer-in-charge of all taxes, both in money and in kind.¹⁰

¹ HRS. p. 62.

² Ed. by Benoy Sarkar, Chap. IV Sec. II. p. 231-32.

³ I.A., Vol. XVI. p. 174.

⁴ See, N.G. Majumdar, Inscriptions of Bengal, Vol. III. Inscriptions of the Sena dynasty.

⁵ Ibid. No. 1.P.1.

⁶ A HRS. p. 245n.4.

⁷ E.I., Vol. XXIII. p. 159ff.

⁸ D.C. Sircar, Select Inscriptions, p.360, Head of the royal treasury or collector of revenue.

⁹ State and Government in Ancient India. p.

¹⁰ B. C. Sen, Some Historical Aspects of the Inscriptions of Bengal, p. 493.

The victorious Arabs after the conquest of Sind, early in the 8th. century, levied taxes on land at varying rates depending on the nature of irrigation used. The land-tax was usually rated at two-fifths of the produce of wheat and barley, if the fields watered by public canals; $3/10$ if irrigated by wheels or other artificial means; and $\frac{1}{2}$ if altogether unirrigated. If arable land were left uncultivated probably it still had to pay one dirham per jarib and $1/10$ of the produce which would have been collected if the land were actually cultivated. Of grapes, dates and garden produce, $\frac{1}{2}$ was taken, either in kind or in money; and $\frac{1}{5}$ (khums) of the tax were levied on wines, fishing pearls and generally of any products not derived from cultivation were paid in kind or their equivalent value. These taxes were to be paid even before the expenses had been defrayed. That shows that the cost was not considered in fixing the taxes in question.¹

In course of time these taxes further increased even to half of the produce of the land. The ability of the people to pay was sometimes taken into consideration.² But much more was actually collected than the revenue fixed at the above rates. In many cases under the land system that was in vogue in this part of India, farmers not only covered their contracts but also to satisfy their greed they took much more from the cultivators at their expense.³

Besides the 'Bhāgabhogakara', i.e. the usual grain-share and the periodical supplies of fruits, flowers and the like the people in some parts of the country had also to pay some additional taxes on land. These are incidentally mentioned in some inscriptions belonging to different dynasties. Thus in one of the landgrants of Mathanadeva, a feudatory chief, of the Gurjara Pratihāra dynasty, dated A.D. 960, 'a reference to a tax called 'khalabbikshā' is found. This means 'begging from the threshing floor'⁴ and consequently may have denoted an additional impost in kind from the grain brought to the threshing floor.⁵ There may not have been any fixed rate of

¹ Elliot, Hist. of India, Vol. I, p. 474nl.

² See, Elliot, new edition, op. cit., p. 52. Here we are told that Qutbuddin Aiybek raised the revenue from $\frac{1}{5}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$.

³ Elliot, Hist. of India, Vol. I, p. 475 nl.; JRAS, Vol. I, p. 240.

⁴ E I., Vol. III, p. 263.

⁵ HRS, p. 237.

⁶ Ghoshal compares it with 'khalapanji' i.e. the small heaps of grain taken from each larger pile at the time of measurement and under Maratha rule considered as a perquisite of the state.' (Wilson's Glossary, q.v.). HRS, p. 237 fn. 2.

such as impost as it is not specified. Whatever could be spared was accepted to meet any emergency that might arise, such as a famine or any similar calamity or due to war or other such cause. In this connection it may be noted that Kautilya¹ requires the king to beg (yacheta) of the people to offer additional contributions, he employs the word 'praṇaya' (request) for such demands, such taxation was not to be levied on inferior lands and he expressly says that an extraordinary demand of this nature is to be made only once and not twice on the same occasion. The Sāntiparva² contains a specimen of a long address to be given to the people when a king demands higher taxation in an emergency.³ The word 'praṇaya' occurs in the Junagadh inscription of Rudradaman⁴ in connection with an emergent situation requiring an embankment to be repaired.

From the Mangalana stone inscription of Jayatrasimha of the Paramāra dynasty, dated V.S. 1275,⁵ we learn that a stepwell was constructed, and for the sake of charity, the king levied a cess of one sei (=15 seers) of korada⁶ corn on each plough, worked within the limits of the village Mangalana. In the Patanarayana stone inscription of the Paramāra Pratapsimha, dated V.S. 1344⁷ it is stated that for the maintenance of a temple the villagers of Kalhanavada were required to pay one seer of grain at each plough.

From the Mathura Prasasti of the reign of Vijayapāla of Kanauj, dated V. S. 1207,⁸ we learn that the fourth part of a māpaka was taken for the endowment of a temple. The literal meaning of the word 'māpaka' is a 'measurer'. It must have had a technical meaning. Possibly the 'māpri' may be meant here, i.e. the official who had to measure the grain brought into the market, the rates of which were fixed by the Government. Probably the 'māpaka' was entrusted to levy a small tax on the dealers in grain.

It appears from the above that besides the king's share of the produce and other usual taxes, the villagers concerned had to pay

¹ This view is put forward by Dr. B. C. Sen. It has also been pointed out by him that the word 'khalabhikṣa' used in the land grant of Mathanadeva, means the same thing as the word 'praṇaya' mentioned by Kautilya.

² Arthasāstra,

³ 87, 26-33. It is said : 'If the enemy invades you you will lose all including your own wives, the enemy will not restore to you what he robs you of ; etc.

⁴ E.I., Vol. VIII, p. 36.

⁵ I.A., Vol. XLI, p. 85. (1912).

⁶ The term is borrowed from local dialect. In Marwar munga, motha chana, and gaware are collectively called korada.

⁷ I.A., Vol. XLV, p. 77. (1916).

⁸ E. Z. Vol. I, p. 287.

sometimes an additional tax on each plough worked in the village. These taxes were paid in kind. These did not go to the coffers of the state but were local collections for religious or charitable purposes.

OTHER TAXES ON LAND

In addition to the above, mention may be made of some taxes which seem to have been closely related to the land-tax. These taxes had no wide application and were not levied throughout the land. In fact they were occasionally levied by some kings in some places.

Piṇḍaka : In some of the land grants, belonging to the Pāla dynasty of Bengal¹ and Nepal² we come across the name of a tax called 'piṇḍaka'. Its exact nature is not known. It has been identified by Kielhorn with 'bhāgabhogakara'³ and by Ghoshal with 'hiraṇya'⁴. Another scholar suggests piṇḍaka to be the same as 'piṇḍakara' of the Arthaśāstra, which according to the commentator Bhaṭṭa, means taxes levied upon whole villages. Pandit Bhagvanlal Indrajit and Dr. Buhler⁵ interpret the term 'piṇḍaka' to be found in the inscriptions of Nepal in the sense of 'assessment'.

¹ I A., p. 163. (1980).

² See, most of the inscriptions of the Uchechakalpa Mahārajas of Bundelkhand in GI.; e.g. GI. No. 31, p. 135 'the villages are granted with the udraṅga and the uparikara, with the exemption for entrance by irregular and regular troops.....with immunity from the police tax'; inscriptions of the Maitrakas of Valabhi GI. No 39 p. 171. The usual classes of the landgrants are as follows : 'with udraṅga and uparikara, with the contribution in grain (dhānya) and in cash (hiraṇya) with the revenue from the elements and the winds (bhūtavāta), with forced labour as it becomes due, and in a few case with the ten offences.'

'With the udraṅga with the uparikara, with the ten offences See, the Deo-Baranik inscription of Jīvitigupta, II, of the Later Gupta dynasty. (GI. No. 46, p. 213).

See, J. of Bom. Br. R.A.S., Vol. XX. No. 9; I A.. XIV, p. 186 ff. etc.

³ E.I., Vol. IX, p. 1—'sa bhāgabhogah sa-hiraṇya dēnah sa-dāṇḍadāsā-parāḥjaḥ sa-simāparyantaḥ sa-odraṅgaḥ sa-vrikshamālākulaḥ sa-parikaraḥ.....'

⁴ The term 'udraṅga' is mentioned in few inscriptions, e.g. GI. p. 177, in this inscription we are told that King Kharagraha II of the Maitraka dynasty made liberal grants of 'udraṅga' and other gifts.

See, E.I. IV. p. 74; VIII, p. In both these inscriptions of Harsha 'udraṅga' occur together with bhāgabhogakara, hiraṇya, etc. 'Udraṅga' is mentioned with other fiscal terms in the Rajor inscription of Mathanadeva, a feudatory of the Gurjara Pratihāra dynasty. (E.I., III, p. 263).

The term 'uparikara' may be traced in the following :—

(a) The Gaya grant of Samudragupta, GI. No. 60, p. 254 (Generally regarded as spurious).

(b) The land-grants of the Pāla kings of Bengal.

(c) Some of the land grants of the kings of Assam; e.g. a copper plate grant of king Balavarman and two grants of Ratnapāla, JASB, 1897, 1898.

(d) The land-grants of the Paramāras usually contain the clause that the land is granted with the tax in cash and in kind, with the uparikara and with all royal dues (ādayah) etc.

⁵ E.I. Vol. IX, p. 1, also see. E.I. Vol. III, p. 263.

UDRAṅGA AND UPARIKARA

The terms 'udraṅga' and 'uparikara' in some cases occur together¹, and sometimes along with bhāga, bhoga, etc, but not always'. The terms are also noticed separately².

'Udraṅga' is mentioned along with other fiscal terms, in a few inscriptions belonging to the Gurjara Pratihāra dynasty³. The use of this revenue term may be traced in earlier inscriptions also⁴. Bühler explains it with the help of the words 'uddhāra' and 'udgrantha' (? udgraha) as meaning 'the share of the produce collected usually' from the king⁵. Dr. Ghoshal suggests that this word 'udraṅga' can be explained by its Marathi prototype. In Marathi, 'udhar' means in the gross and 'udbārjamābandī' assessing the total revenue of a village upon the chief proprietor, leaving it to him to distribute the proportion'. In the end he concludes that 'udraṅga' means the revenue imposed upon the permanent tenants⁷. This interpretation does not specify the revenue, thus imposed, nor is it clear how this meaning can be derived from the evidence used by him.

It may not be impossible that the term 'udraṅga' was connected with 'draṅga' which means a watch-station or military station⁸. The particular tax in that event may have been collected from places which were close to draṅgas or from draṅgas themselves. In case this interpretation is held as probable, it is not to be regarded as an agricultural tax, like 'bhāga' although it may have been collected from people residing in villages. It may further be noted, that the element 'raṅga' in the term is not devoid of meaning in which it is generally understood. If so, 'udraṅga' may have alternatively meant some kind of tax raised to meet the cost of some local festival periodically held.⁹

Uparikara :—As pointed out in the above this term can be traced in inscriptions of some of the dynasties of Northern India.¹⁰

¹ *Ibid* Vol. IV, p. 245, 254.

² I.A., p. 163, (1880).

³ E.I., Vol. IV, p. 254n.

⁴ HRS, p. 245.

⁵ Probably they were used by the Sātavāhanas, see. E.I. VII, p. No. 7 & 14; HRS, p. 189; the inscriptions of the feudatories of the Guptas of Bundelkhand GI. No. 21, 22, 23, 25, and E.I. VIII. No. 28, p. 234; Guptas E.I. XIX. No. 21, p. 127; Maitrakas of Valabhi, op. cit. and by the Later Guptas.

⁶ I.A. Vol. XII, p. 184n. 3.

⁷ HRS, pp. 210-211. According to K. Gupta 'udriṅga' is the share of the produce collected usually for the king. (Land System, p. 169).

⁸ See, below.

⁹ Extract from a note by Dr. B. C. Sen.

¹⁰ E.I., Vol IX, p. 1; I.A., Vol. XIV, pp. 159, 196ff; JBRS, Vol. XX, p. No. 9; JASB, 1897 and 1898.

Like 'udraṅga' it was current also in inscription in earlier times though there is no evidence of its extensive use.¹ Fleet suggests that it was a tax levied on cultivators who had no proprietary rights in the soil.² Dr. Ghosal regards it as a rent paid by temporary tenants as distinguished from permanent tenants,³ from whom the tax called 'udraṅga' was collected. Dr. Barnett⁴ thinks that uparikara is equivalent to the Tamil expression 'melvar-man' meaning a tax representing the crown's share of the produce. But where the king's share as a tax is mentioned along with udraṅga, the latter cannot have the meaning as attributed to it above.

It is not clear why the same tax should be called by different names in the Sanskrit inscriptions of north India and why the more familiar terms should have been discarded.

Dr. Alterkar suggests that 'uparikara' is identical with 'bhāgabhogakara'.⁵

Dr. Dikshitar, in criticising the former theories states, "It is undoubtedly clear that both (udraṅga and uparikara) stand for charges imposed by the State on the produce of the land and to venture beyond this seems to be audacious. The attempted explanations are far from satisfactory and cannot therefore be generally accepted. It must be noted that on the same land are levied both taxes 'udraṅga and uparikara'. It does not stand to reason that one and the same land was both under the permanent and temporary tenants at the same time. . . ."

Dikshitar may be criticised. Though the two terms may occur together, it may mean that the tax was to be either 'uparikara or udraṅga' as the case might be. It need not necessarily mean that the two taxes were collected from the same people and at the same time.

That both udraṅga and uparikara were taxes levied on land is a view generally accepted.

In attempting to explain the fiscal terms used in inscriptions one feels that available evidence in many cases may furnish little or inadequate help in coming to definite conclusions. The suggestions offered are more or less in the nature of a guess and can hardly be regarded as having settled the disputed points in a final or conclusive

¹ See above

² Gupta Inscriptions, p. 98n.

³ HRS. pp. 191-210.—According to K. Gupta, uparikara is a 'cens'. (Ibid system, p.

⁴ JRAS, p. 165, (1913).

⁵ The Rashtrakutas, and their times, p. 216.

⁶ Gupta Polity, p. 168f

manner. Thus the meanings attributed to such terms as uparikara, udraṅga, hiranya, etc. are obviously based on insufficient data. There is a tendency among scholars to take some of the terms, although mentioned together, as bearing the same meaning. It is doubtful that two or three terms would be used in the same passage in the same sense. Of course, it is quite possible that the lists of such terms, often met with in inscriptions, do not strictly conform to realities. The idea sometimes was to make those lists as comprehensive as possible collecting the terms from different sources. It is not necessary to hold that every item of taxation mentioned was actually current in respect of the land specified in a record concerned alienation of rights. This has inevitably led to some confusion and accentuated the difficulty of ascertaining the meaning of the different terms incorporated.

Like the rice-producing areas, land producing betel-nuts and betel-leaves were also regarded as revenue yielding. From one of the inscriptions of the Sena dynasty of Bengal we come to learn that the king derived an income from betel-leaf plantations (barajas).

Land Revenue Organisation as laid down in the Sukrāṇiti

In Sukra's polity there was to be an officer designated Sumantra, who had to prepare records containing statistical information regarding land cultivated, the amount of the revenue realised in the form of taxes and fines, amounts realised from cultivators, the products from forests, etc. The records were also required to show who received the rent, and who received the remainder after paying of the rent. Sukra refers to a system under which the revenue due from a village was to be paid to the king by a rich man in advance either in monthly or periodical instalments. He was not a royal officer who must have received certain share of the revenue as his fee to cover the cost of collection and also as remuneration for the work done under his supervision. In every way he was to be responsible for the collection and presumably, if the expected amount was not realised, he had to be responsible for it and make up for the loss. It is impossible to say whether the system mentioned by Sukra was one of farming of taxes, whether it permitted licences on the part of the rich man, who had to stand as a guarantee for the due realisation of the taxes due, to make profits at the cost of the people, collecting more than what was due to the government. The other system under which taxes might be collected was that of appointing officers for this work, who were to be paid fees at different rates out of these collections such as $\frac{1}{16}$ th, $\frac{1}{12}$ th, $\frac{1}{8}$ th, $\frac{1}{4}$ th. The taxes due to the king were fixed, for each cultivator was to be provided with a deed of rent.

DYNAMICS OF RATNA

SRI SATADAL KUMAR KAR, M.A.

PART I

In ancient Indian authoritative texts, such as the sacred Vedas, Upanishads, and Puranas, Gems are called "Ratna";¹. The word is derived from the root "Ram", -meaning 'pleasure giver'. This word in the neuter gender was used to signify in the opinion of Kasyapa and Yaska, the best of all wealth (dhana), which has a positive force to bestow peace and happiness to mortals on Earth.² The famous lexicographer Amara Singha held that because people who crave for wealth in this world, become perfectly happy by possessing and keeping a keen attachment (ram) to jewels, the best of all treasures, - it is known as "Ratna".

"dhanārthino-janāḥ sarve ramante hasminnativa yat |
Tatoratnamitiproktam śabdaśāstra viśāradaḥ || "

In the Vedas 'Ratna' has been synonymously used with "Maṇi"; This word (maṇi) represents both masculine and feminine gender. The Vedas assert that "Maṇi" or precious stone is the praiseworthy material emblem of God, which by wearing in our physical body we may always without inflicting injury to anyone be able to win war easily, enhance the span of longevity and ward off evils and sins:

"dīrghāyutvāya vṛhate raṇyūyārisyanto dakṣamāṇāḥ sadaiva |
maṇin viṣkandha dūṣanān jaṅgīdān vibhramo vāyam || " "

In the trend of Vedic seers the famous medico-surgeon of ancient India, sage Suśruta, emphatically admits that by using gems, stones and jewels, one is able to have sacred feeling, by keeping off disease (which is a resultant effect of sinful acts of three kinds, e.g. pāpaja, misraja and karmaja, - done either in previous birth or in the lifetime), - misfortune and twelve-fold waste elements³ of the body, excreted through the sense organs, e.g., ear, nose, eye etc. :

"Pavitrā dhāraṇīyāśca pāpnā-lakṣmī malāpahāḥ" | "

¹ Rigveda, 1. 1. 1. 1; Samaveda. 4. 6 3. 4.; Chandogya Upanisat 2. 2. 3; Brihadaranyak upanisat 4. 4; Gita 17. 7. Cf: Hist. of Ind. Lit.,—Winternitz.,—I, pp 577.

² Nirghantuh, 8. 3. 9.

³ Atharva : 2. 1. 4 1; Cf:- Ṛg-Veda, 10. 18. 7. 6.

⁴ Cf :- "Vasā Śukra māsarinmajjā mūtra biṭ ghrāṇakarnabhiḥ |
śleṣhmāśrudūṣikā svedo dvādaśāite nṛṇām malāḥ" | —Manu Samhitā—5-105.

⁵ Suśruta Samhitā, 2.22; Cf:- Carakasmhitā, Ch. II, (Śāstra sthānam).

According to the injunctions of Manu, there are two principles of using jewels :

- (1) Ordinary (sāmānya)
- (2) Particular (Viśeṣa)

The first one serves the purpose of mere fashion, while the latter stands out to counteract evil astral influences; this obviously informs us that the ancient experts and seers in this field of science, could only select nine particular precious stones (Graha-Ratna), in addition to a variety of semi-precious gems (Upa-Ratna) as substitutes.

From the days of yore in Europe, it has almost become an exhibited truth, that precious stones devoid of any flaw act as blessings on suffering persons who are supposed to use them.¹ Pliny, the famous Roman historian is said to have craved to specialise in 'Stone-Lore' with the intention to serve suffering humanity at large. In his own archaic language he desired to :

"advance the knowledge of posterity in those things that may profit this life, and I mean eftsoones to have a fling at Magicians for their abominable lies and monstrous vanities, for in nothing so much have they overpassed themselves as in the reports of gems and precious stones, exceeding the terms and limits of physick, whiles under Color of faire and pleasing medicines they hold us with a tale of their prodigious effects and incredible."²

Orpheus, the Greek poet and musician of Circa 7th. Cent B. C. observed that "The earth produces every good and evil to man, but she also provides a remedy for every ill. These are to be found chiefly in stones; every virtue is hidden within them".³

In Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa, ⁴ gems are classed in two categories, ---viz., Precious stones (mahā-ratna) and semi-precious stones (upa-ratna).

Nine jewels out of a large variety of precious stones have been selected by experts in ancient India, as representatives of nine major planets (including Sun and Moon,---which are as a matter of fact star and sub-planet respectively),---viz. Pearl, Diamond, Cat's eye, Ruby, Topaz, Zircon, Sapphire, Emerald and Coral :

"Muktāphalaṁ Hirakaṁ Ca Vaidūryaṁ Padmarāgakam
Puṣparāgaṁ Ca Gomedaṁ Nilam Gārutmataṁ tathā |
Pravāla Muktānyctāni Mahāratnāni vai Navah || "

¹ Cf.:- A popular Treatise on Gems in reference to their scientific value"---by Dr. L. Fruchtvanger (New York, 1859)

² Quoted in Semi-Precious stones by N. Wooster (Penguin Books, 1952) pp. 8.

³ Quoted in *Magimāla*, II, pp. 1032.

⁴ Section III; Al-Beruni has also mentioned such categorization of Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa; it is mentionable that he has called this Purāṇa as "Viṣṇudharma," of Indian antiquary. XIX. 1890, pp. 332.

The precious stones are deposited in mountains, banks of rivers and sand-bed of seas. Varahamihira summarised that the precious jewels, e.g., Diamonds etc., are but minerals (iba tūpalaratnānām-adhikāro vajrapūrvāṇām); Quoting his predecessors Varahamihira said that to some one these jewels owe their origin to the demon named "Bala",- to somebody they are produced from the dedicated bones of Sage Dadhici and to others a break in the earth's soil has given birth to the varieties of these precious jewels (Kecid bhuvah svabhāvād vaicitryan prāhurūpalānām).¹

In western countries, a parallel thought to the above is found to have existed in early days. Boetius de Boot, a physician of 17th Cent, attributed the formation of jewels to the mystic intervention of the Deity; Aristotle believed that the jewels are shaped out of "Viscous mud",- a sap that condensed and is congealed by cold, in which earthy-water predominates. To this asserted Carden that "they are engendered between the rocks by means of a sap, which is distilled through their concavity even as the babe in the maternal blood".²

Present day geologists from laboratory tests hold the view that the properties of jewels are generally minerals that are deposited with the unorganised portions of the earth. The jewels are unorganised substances in as much as they represent in one piece the very same properties as in another, when they are broken asunder. Broadly speaking, precious gems or jewels are crystallized hard minerals, having effulging lustre, beautiful colour or purely colourless, electrical or optical diaphaneity, weight and are rarely available.

Half-pure or semi-precious stones or jewels possess most of the above characteristics but in comparatively less degree.

Amongst the great variety of semi-precious stones, ancients in India frequently referred to the followings:—

Rock crystal (Kācaḥ), Aquamarines (Karpuramaṇiḥ), muktāsukti) Sun stone (Suryakānta), Moon Stone (Candra-kānta) Heliotrope (Jyotirasa) Garnet (Pulaka) Chrysoberyl (Karkketan), Lapislazuli (Rājavarita), Carnelian (Rudirākṣya) etc., etc.

"Uparatnāni Kācaśca Karpūrāsmā tathāivaca |
muktā-sukti stathāśankha ityādinī bahūnyapi |
guṇāyathaiva ratnānāmuparatneṣu te tathā |
kintu kiñcit tato hīnā viśeṣaḥ amudāhṛtaḥ" ||

These semi-precious stones possess though not same potency like the precious gems, yet they are worthwhile, in as much as they

¹ Brihat Samhita, Ch. 80/2-5.

² Quoted in Manimala, I, 89.

are used as substitutes of precious stones to ward off evil astral effects on the destiny of human beings. The great majority of these stones are minerals having high medicinal and chemical properties in them. Amongst these, a few are obtained from animals or planets; Aquamarines are the linings of oyster shells; coral is the hard stony skeleton of colonies of small animals growing in shallow sea-water; Amber is a fossil resin of vegetable origin. Besides, serving the purpose of substitutes of planetary jewels both the semi-precious stones are largely used for fashion's sake as jewellery and as raw materials for seals,—statuettes, and vases or bowls; for inlaying furniture or the walls of buildings; The popularity of these stones have drawn attractions of many modern civilized nations. In Russia, we therefore witness the application of a great variety of semi-precious stones in a huge wall map in the Hermitage at Leningrad, the lakes and rivers are set with—Lapizl azuli, the forests and mountains with green and brown Jaspers, etc., ;

During the renaissance period no European gentleman of elegant taste and fashion, besides the Egyptians and Persians in the middle and far eastern countries, would be found without a ring beset with "Turquoise".

Julius Cæsar and Cleopatra are said to have met in a hall of tortoise-shell, studded with Emeralds and Topaz.

Onomacritus (6th. Cent. B.C.), a priest and founder of Hellenic Sorcerism, is said to have treated patients with precious stones.

During the Directoire in France, the ladies revived the classical custom of walking in the gardens with a display of their jewelled toes; A certain class of Roman ladies, termed "Libertine", on account of their affected independence of approved fashion, were accustomed to ornament their ankles with gold rings set with precious stones. Gold rings set with jewels have, in all countries been freely used as souvenirs, passports and tokens of recognition. They are said to have played an important part in the life of Queen Mary and Elizabeth of England; During Queen Mary's reign, a criminal was saved from the very scaffold for possessing mysteriously the queen's jewelled-ring; Similar stories are current in oriental countries too; In the work of Kalidasa it is narrated that Sakuntalā, the hermit-girl, after suffering hell of a trouble and insults, was at long last recognised by her husband, on a sight of his recovered jewelled-ring, which he presented her on the eve of his marriage and which was lost subsequently at hermit's place; The story of Lord Krishna's strong desire to possess the most covetable jewel "Syamantaka" which

originally belonged to king Satrajit, is well known; Satrajit knowing Krishna's such desire transferred the same to his brother Prasena, who due to the unbearable influence of the jewel met his end in the forest by a lion; to the lion as well the jewel's influence was so unsuitable that he was subsequently killed by the forest-king Jambuvan who then possessed the stone; Lord Krishna on such information attacked Jambuvan and after severe dual that raged continuously for twentyone days took over the gem with great satisfaction.

Now a days, jewels set in gold rings and used in particular finger indicate a matrimonial barometer; The prince of Wales, on his marriage with the princess Alexandra, presented her a ring with particular jewels that represented his name "Bertie";—The stones that were set in the ring were: Beryl, Emerald, Ruby Turquoise, Idocrase (or Jacinth?) Emerald. Dr. Carl Gustav Jung, the still living old Viennese world-famous Psycho-Analist, a supposed experimenter on the influence of planetary forces on marriages, possesses a queer attachment for his coiled serpent like (kulakundalini?) gold ring, beset with nine planetary jewels".¹

The splendid array of experiments made for a—considerable length of time by Von Reichenbach under rigid conditions proved that magnetic emanations, streamed from shells, jewels, stones, crystals etc., etc., displaying different degrees of force, shades, colour, form and radiance, supplement the opinions of the most authoritative writers' of different ages with regard to the belief that jewels react over human disposition in² as much as "It will confer strength, banish disease and when worn constantly about the person, ward off epidemics and plagues". In Indian medical authorities like Caraka, we find a same view that by wearing gems, a person is moulded in his activity in accordance with the characteristic and specific influence of infinite potency accumulated upon him from each type of the varieties of gems.

“Maṇīnām dhāraṇyānām karma yad vividhātīnakam ।

Tatprabhāvakṛitam teṣām prabhāvohacintya ucyate ॥”.³

In order to illustrate, the influence which gems exercise over destiny of individuals, the epic narrative of the matchless “Syamanta-

¹ For further light on the subject, the reader is referred to the following interesting works : Mani Mala, Vol. II, Dr. Raja S. M. Tagore (1881); The science of Gems, Jewels Coins and Medals, Ancient and Modern by Dr. Achibald Billing, M.D.; Robert Dingley's paper in philosophical Transactions, Vol. IX, pp. 315" on Gems and precious stones particularly such as the Ancients used Engrave on".

² Cf. Mani Mala, II, pp. 1080 ff.

³ Caraka Samhita, ch. XXVI.

kamani'', which had such coloured effulgence of light that it became the source of everyone's envy for possession and as such could be taken as an ideal example. In this epic it is exemplified that the same gem could act differently with different persons; To king Prasena the Syamantaka jewel was the cause of his destruction, while the same jewel was source of infinite power and happiness to Lord Krishna, who himself being an Omnipotent, could not even discard his craving for owning by force this jewel from Jamvaban.¹

Modern researches in colour therapy has established one fact beyond doubt that the colour plays a dominant part in altering man's mood. It is true that man's endeavour to mould his destiny altogether is trifling attempt in the hands of Nature, yet his knowledge and experiments since the dawn of civilisation has opened a new vista before us to conclude that the physical behaviour and mental make up of an individual could be changed to great extent by change of colour before his vision. Mr. Banerjee from his experiented researches on the subject could make eulogy as under : ²

“My past went off, my pigny self I
 Space and time it left II
 Caught by wonder I met thy help I
 In colour thou has kept II
 A seal of conquest, a crown I saw
 calling miseries and I
 All the needed strength I draw
 Through colour's Magic Blend II
 My research and my labour met
 The cosmic Ray and Colour
 Casting Heaven's Blue wide net
 Hold the Titan power ”.

Modern Astronomers³ have already placed before us, that the 'Cosmic Ray' is mainly divisible into seven clear parts, called "VIBGYOR",⁴ representing respectively Violet, Indigo, Blue, Green, Yellow, Orange and Red. Prof. Horton Sheldon notes that "Newton first placed a glass prism in front of a beam of sunlight and split it up into its component parts. This led to the extensive work of Fraunhofer, and later of Rowland, who definitely tabulated the

¹ *Śrīmadbhāgavata*, Skandha X, ch. 56.

² *Cosmic Ray & Colour* by Sri P. Banerjee (Cal. 1952) Preface.

³ Cf. *Varahamihira's Bṛhat Samhita*, Ch. 31, sl. I.

⁴ *Vide* the learned papers how "Vibgyor" stands in relation to astrology published serially by Sri Bama Nanda Brahmachari, M.Sc. etc. in the "Jyotirveda", an astrological Journal, published from Kalighat (Calcutta), Sept. Oct., Nov., 1956.

exact position in the Sun's spectrum of an enormous number of distinct colours. These colours are referred to technically as "lines of forces."¹

In the event of editing "Uttara Kālāmṛita by Kalidasa," Prof. Ramkrishna Bhat, summed up that "The seven colours of the Rainbow represent the seven planets who by various combinations produce the seven kinds of energy or seven modes of motions that are found common in the universe".² Every being on this earth is subjected to these composite energies; Astrologer's aim is to assess the effect of each of these light on the destiny of the being. Kalyana-varma, the author of Sārāvali held that each planet, which has effect on human life, absorbs seven rays when in exalted sign (Tungasthāna) of the birth-nativity (Janma-kunḍalī); Similarly each planet loses one ray each time in the downward course (neecābhilāṣī) from the sign of exaltation and becomes completely void of ray when reaches the debilitated sign (neecastha).³ It is tentative here to mention the Astronomico-Theosophical synthesis of this planetary light with matter by the Scientist Sutcliffe in his "studies in Occult Chemistry and Physics" ⁴ He regarded the curvature of the space of the Universe⁵ as the conformation of our Mundane Egg,⁶—and obviously conjectures that, "At the end of human evolution, humanity, as it were, hatches out of this Mundane Egg, and experiences the same expansion of consciousness as that of a chicken issuing from its shell to the light of its farm-yard. This process is known in occultism as Initiation. Then man's Ray becomes seven rays, his sun seven suns, and his system of stars seven systems. Thus man is the embryo of a God, and awaits his birth into divinity."

From these it is obvious that each planet possesses a particular colour of light, with the respective characteristic effect on the mundane course of events. The jewels in Ancient India, was naturally selected in accordance with the colours of the planets ;

"Grahāṇāṁ Varnakrameṇa ratnāṇāṁ Varnakramah I"⁷

This was done by the ancients to match between the particular jewel and the ill-aspect of the specific planet, just as specific medicine

¹ Outline of Science (Forming Vol. III of Pocket Library of the World's Essential knowledge,—New York 1929) pp. 12ff.

² Preface.

³ The Astrological Magazine Vol. 41, pp. 726 (Oct. 1954).

⁴ pp. 136.

⁵ Cf. —Space, Time and Matter, Weyl, pp. 800ff.

⁶ Cf. —Eddington remarked, "Whenever there is matter there is action and therefore curvature".—Space, Time and Gravitation, pp. 148.

⁷ Ratna Samiksha, p. 158.

is intended for particular disease :

“Viṣaghnāni ca ratnāni niyato sthāpayet sadā I”¹

These diverse aspects of the gems boil down to a central point that colour is an essential quality of consideration in the identification and categorisation of the jewels in relation to their individual value; The colour of a jewel often changes its commercial name. The red Sapphire is a Ruby; the yellow one a Topaz; the Green is a Chrysolite etc.; Some jewels emanate more than two or three colours in the same specimen,—e.g., the Tourmaline; this speciality of gem is known as “Polychroism”.²—

To distinguish between a real gem from spurious one, a knowledge of its specific gravity is essential. Now-a-days, hydrometer and other scientific instruments have been devised for the purpose of ascertaining specific gravity in jewels.³

In Eastern as well as Western countries, it is almost an axiomatic truth since ancient times that a ring beset with the jewels representing respective planetary forces, safeguard a person from ominous and disadvantageous circumstances. If these jewels are made as gifts to brahmins and as well worn by a person with an intention to fortify his well-being, he is expected then for such act to derive favour from the desired planet :

“Itthametāni ratnāni tattaduddeśataḥ kramāt ।

Yo dadyādvibhriyādvāpi tasmīn sānugrahā grahāḥ”⁴ ॥ ”

It is imperative to make due oblation, worship and charity for drawing the favour of particular planet on the respective jewel to be worn for reaction on existing fortune; When these are done with proper ceremony, the person shall be able to banish the malefic aspects and instead shall be endowed with beneficial effects of the particular planet :—

“Suddhānām mārītānāṁca teṣāṁ śṛiṇu guṇānapi ।

maṇayo vīryyataḥ śīlā madhurāstu varā rasāt ।

Cakṣuṣyā lekhanāścāpi sārakā viśahārakāḥ ।

dhāraṇānte tu maṅgalyā graha-dṛṣṭiharā api ॥”⁵

¹ Manu Samhitā, 7/218.

² This technical term is explained in a succeeding article.

³ In the appendix of this article, a table is shown to indicate the different scientific analysis of jewels.

⁴ Ratna Samikṣa by Pandit Rajendra Nath Sastri (1953 B.S.) p. 29.

⁵ Cf :—Manu Samhitā 11/272 Chandogyanisat 2/23, Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣat 4/4; Gita, 17/27; 18/5.

⁶ Ratna Samikṣa, p. 31.

It has therefore been stressed upon that a planetary jewel when is worn without proper purification of the same as per prescribed rules of oblation, and worship the jewel instead of radiating dynamic beneficial energy reacts over the person like poison :—

Yat Saṁskāravibhīṣu hi bhaved yaccānyathā Saṁskṛtaḥ
tanmartam viṣavaṇṇihantitadiha jñeyābudhaiḥ II¹ "

When planetary jewels are to be worn, they should be first examined as to their flawless condition, otherwise they might react ominously. Varahamihira obviously opined that for the purpose of wearing jewel which might bring in both auspicious and inauspicious happenings (Subhāśubha) on the person, it is advised to get them prescribed and selected under rigid tests, by the expert (Yasminādātāḥ parikṣyam daivam ratnāśritam tajaññaiḥ).²

Dr. B. Bhattacharyya, ex-director, Oriental Institute, Baroda, narrates his experience that "if a mistake is made in the selection of the jewel quite the reverse result may be expected. I know of a case where a businessman by wearing a Ruby became paralyzed and suffered from continuous fever for years. I asked him to remove the Ruby, and within a few days he made complete recovery. My friend Mr. B. H. Shah related to me a case where a Coral which wrongly worn, was responsible for his arrest by the police for no reason or fault. When later, the Coral was removed the person got release and the Criminal Case against him was dropped".³ In this connection Dr. Bhattacharyya, on the opinions of authoritative texts (Śāstra) mentions that "for increasing psychic power by means of planetary jewels, they should not be resorted to by sinful persons who indulge in bad actions, bad thoughts and bad habits, and are swayed by greed, hatred and injury."⁴

In western countries a similar belief is current that a ring beset with the planetary jewels, protect in various ways the person who wears it. The difference that lies with Indian idea on this point, is in recognising seven jewels for seven planets;—to be more clear, in western countries Rahu and Ketu are omitted from the list of nine planets conceived of in Indian Texts. The sayings of Philadelphus quoted by the French Spiritualist M. Nostradamus in his "The Temple of Uramia", cited as below would show as an instance that the creed

¹ Ratna Samikha, pp. 134.

² Brihat Samhita, ch. 80/1.

³ The Astrological Magazine (Banglore), January, 1951, p. 23.

⁴ Ibid, p. 24.

of stone-lore, was a fascination, besides the ancients in India of erudites that inhabited other parts of the world¹:—

“Let a ring be formed of virgin gold
on the day of the Sun² and in the hour of
Jupiter³ in the moon's increase⁴ when thou
shalt place seven precious stones,
the diamond, the Ruby, the Emerald, the
Jacinth, the Sapphire, the Beryl and the
Topaz. Wear it about thee, and
fear no man, for thou wilt be as
invincible as Achilles”.

In Western countries, the gems are generally prescribed to be worn in accordance with the birth month as below:—

January	Hyacinth or Garnet	February	Amethyst
March	Blood stone or Jasper	April	Sapphire
May	Agate	June	Emerald
July	Onyx	August	Carnelian
September	Chrysolite	October	Aquamarine or Beryl
November	Topaz	December	Ruby

TABLE I

A chart of commonly used jewels arranged according to their shades and colours is given as below.⁵

White	Blue	Red	Yellow
Diamond	Diamond	Diamond	Diamond
Beryl	Sapphire	Ruby	Topaz
Sapphire	Spinel	Spinel	Olivine
Rock-Crystal	Topaz	Jacinth	Spinel
			Beryl
Spinel	Tourmaline	Tourmaline	Garnet
Tourmaline			
Jargoon	Beryl	Agate	Jacinth
			Tourmaline
Topaz			Sapphire
	Turquoise	Helio.rope	Chrysoberyl
			Quartz

¹ Manimela, II, p 107.

² Sunday

³ Between 6 a.m & 7 a.m or between 11 a.m & 12 O'clock in the day time.

⁴ Sri P. B. Chowdhury of M/S M. P. Jewellers & Co., of I Vivekananda Road, Calcutta, a well known gem merchant has very kindly helped me by his expert counsel in preparing this table.

Green	Black	Pink	Brown
Diamond	Diamond	Diamond	Diamond
Emerald	Sapphire	Spinel	Jacinth
Peridot	Spinel	Ruby	Garnet
Sapphire	Garnet	Almandine	Tourmaline
			Chrysoberyl
Chrysoberyl	Tourmaline	Chrysoberyl	Quartz
Jasper	Quartz	Topaz	Chrysoberyl
Olivine	Pleonaste	Beryl	Carbuncle
	or		
Tourmaline	Ceylanite		Agate
Violet	Opalescent	Orange and allied redish brown.	Misc. Colours
Amethyst	Diamond	Diamond	Blood Stone
Sapphire	Sapphire	Coral	Mocha Stone
Ruby	Opal	Cinnamon	Onyx
Garnet	Cat's eye	Topaz	Sardonyx
Spinel	Quartz	Zircon	Chalcopyrite
Pyrope	Ruby	Ruby	Lapis-lazuli
Garnet	Moon Stone		
Jade	Pearl	Tourmaline	

The value of all gems are ascertained from their lustre and colour; Those that are devoid of these principal qualities, besides others, are regarded of small worth: When doubts arise with regard to the genuineness of the gem, the universal and common test is to rub it with another gem of tested quality; A false gem will peel off into fragments under the process. The artificial gems generally appear to be softer brittle inferior in weight and in some cases air bubbles in the interior¹. In the ancient Indian medical science and in the texts on the subject, prescription to test the gems are detailed in various ways; We give below few such processes to test the genuineness of jewels; Generally, excepting the diamond all other planetary jewels are refined and applied for test in the solution of the juice of a kind of bread-fruit (mādāra) and powders of red-arsenic (manah-śilā), sulphur (gandhak), and the calx of yellow orpiment (haritāl); the particular gem to be purged out of harmful ingredients, and to add a lasting lustre to its genuine character, it should be dipped in the solvent of above mentioned preparation, kept in a crucible made of cow-dung; the pot should get some heat from fire given from underneath of it and the particular gem should remain in the boiling solvent for a considerable time. This process of refinement and test is called "Puṭpāka".

¹ Cf. :- Manimela, I, pp. 248.

According to others, all gems are purified and tested of their genuine character, by steeping and boiling them separately for seven times in each of the juice of the Aloc(ghṛitakumāri) Creeping Amaranthus(khudranāṭiyā) and in the milk from Human Teats,(stana-dugdha).¹

Besides these universal methods, each of the nine planetary jewels, could be tested in the following manner :—

I. *Ruby*(Māṇikya or Sūryakāntamaṇi) :—The Rubies are imitated by expert traders ; The Persian traders have devised a novel process by which they bring up the pale valueless Rubies the glammour and colour of a costly one.² When the Sun's ray is reflected upon a grass through the genuine Ruby, the grass is subjected to burn :

“Yāḥ-sūryāṁsu sparsāniṣṭhāyuta vaṇhirjātayaḥ
sohayaṁ jāyate sūryakāntaḥ”³

II. *Pearl*(Muktā) : Although some of the false pearls are made solid and of fish scales and do not break easily, yet they are generally brittle and much lighter in weight than the genuine pearls. To test a real pearl, it should be dipped in a pot filled with cow's urine and salt, then taking the pearl out, it should be rubbed with the chaff (crust of some paddy) ; The real one will give more brilliance, whereas the false one will become pale, and may break into fragments :

“Lavanakṣāraḥsodini pātre gomūtra puritekṣitaṁ I
marditamapi sālituṣṣair-yada-vikṛtaṁ tattumauktikaṁ Jātyam II”⁴

III. *Coral*(Vidrūma) : The Coral is often imitated by bone ivory stained with Cinabar and by a compound of gypsum, gum and cinabar. The genuine coral is always born in the vast oceans. If they are rubbed in touch-stone(kaṣṭhiprastar), they never loose their lustre :

“Yā na tyajati nijarucim nikāṣe
ghṛṣṭāhapi sā smṛtā jātyā.”⁵

IV. *Emerald*(Marakata) : Any gem excepting an Emerald should not be worn if found to be broken. A real Emerald when is scratched with a stylo(lauhabhṛinga,—iron pen to write on palm leaves) and then is dipped in lime water⁶, it will bring-in a clear lustre of eight

¹ Manimela, II, pp. 559.

² Manimela, I, pp. 243.

³ Ratna-Samika, pp. 53.

⁴ Ibid, 53.

⁵ Ratna-Samika, pp. 66.

⁶ Manimela, I, 399.

colours like those of green-moss(*śaivālam*), peacock(*śikhāṇḍih*), grass (*sādvāla*), greenish-glass(*haritkācaḥ*), fruit of the emblic myrobalan (*āmlā*), the tail of a fire-fly(*khadyotali*) a glow-worm(*bālakiḥ*) and the flower of glue tree(*śirīṣa*).¹ Practically there is no other gem which is affected more with deformity colour, transparency, clouds and specks than the Emerald. Due to this inherent nature of generally containing defect, the phrase "an Emerald without flaws" has become a dictum to mean 'Unattainable perfection'.

V. *Topaz(Pusparāg)*: A yellow variety of quartz is sometimes sold in the market for the real Topaz; Imitators sometime demand a fanciful price for the fine pink-shade in the Topaz; This should be carefully borne in mind that the hue is artificially done by wrapping up the yellow quartz in German tinder strapped in thin iron wire, and then is subjected to heat by fire or blow pipe. The real Topaz always be of a bright citron, and occasionally of a brilliant gold colour.

The genuine Topaz could be scratched only by Diamond and can easily cut Quartz; It is infusible in charcoal before the blow pipe; It cannot stand strong heat which immediately casts blister like crackings on the surface; With borax it fuses into clear glass and the yellowish hue is transformed into blue with cobalt solution. It is never affected by muriatic acid.

The ancients in India have specified that the best way to test the genuineness of Topaz is to rub it in touch-stone (*ghṛīṣṭam nikāṣapaṭṭe*) whence the original colour will extremely multiply brilliance(*Puṣyati rāgamadhikamātiniyam*).²

VI. *Diamond(Vajra or Hirak)*: Imitators sometime falsely sell the "Novas Mina" or the white Topaz of Brazil which is otherwise known as the "Slaves" Diamond as a real one; Colourless Corundums also are passed fraudulently for the real Diamond. Perfect Diamonds as a matter of fact are like dew-drops(*śīśira-viṇḍuḥ*); There are coloured Diamonds of rare variety which are sold at fancy prices.

The conservative way of testing the Diamond is by applying a varnish, made of ivory-black and mastich, at the back of the gem; If it is genuine, Diamond shall radiate more brilliance, if it is spurious, the false diamond then becomes more dull and dark.

Experts in ancient India devised the following measure to test the genuineness of the Diamond:

¹ Ratna-Samiksa, pp. 71.

² Ratna Samiksa, pp. 77.

Put a piece of diamond inside the root of a silk cotton tree (Vyāghrikandagatam)¹ then wrap it well with a cloth ; the wrapped packet should then be hung in a stick which should be transversely placed on the swing-pot(dolāyantra)² filled with the extracts of allied bean(kulittā),—Latin, Dolichos biflorus) and bitter paddy(kodrava) ; the diamond concerned should then be dipped in this solution for seven days consecutively ; The real Diamond on such treatment, shall get an increased lustre :³

“Vyāghrikandagatam vajram dolāyantra vipācayet I
saptāraṁ kodrava kkāthe koulatthe vimalaṁ bhavet II

VII. *Sapphire (Nilam)* : There are practically four varieties of Sapphires viz., White (Sita), Red (Sona), Yellow (Pita), and dark blue (Krishnacchāyā);⁴ These four varieties are generally endowed with any of the following five qualities :—

(i) *Heaviness (gurutva)* : This sapphire within a small and compact quantity, possesses comparatively a greater weight; “Such a gem conduces to increase of family ”.⁵

(ii) *Soothing (snigdhatva)* : The soothing sapphire always emits a moderate degree of wetness; It energizes to the accession of wealth.

(iii) *Chromatic (varṇādhyā)* : This sapphire glows a blue chromosphere on being exposed to the rising sun; when worn it brings all-round well-being to the person.

(iv) *Partial Radiance (pārsvavartti)* : This sapphire emits from some of its portion a crystal (kācaḥ) silver (raupya) or gold (hema) hue. It is said to have power in bestowing fame.

(v) *Colourful (rañjaka)* : This sapphire covers the pot with its beautiful dark effulgence when it is being put therein (yaḥ pātram rañjayety'asu sañjātyo nila ucyate).⁶ It is considered to have power to increase wealth and peace.

The sapphire which is devoid of any of the above qualities, may be taken to be a spurious gem. The spurious gem may contain any of the following flaws :—

¹ It is otherwise known as “Kantikāri” herb.

² The “Dolāyantra” is an earthen pot filled up with certain liquids for the purification of medicines ; On the pot, a stick shall be placed across from where the medicine to be purified is to be hung by a thread so that it touches the surface of the liquid ; when the pot is heated by fire from underneath, the hanging medicine then begins to swing in the boiling liquid, for a considerable period.

³ Ratna Samikṣa, pp. 138.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 92.

⁵ Maṇimala, I, pp. 441.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 443 ; Cf :—Ratna Samikṣa, pp. 92.

(i) mica-like surface (abhraka); (ii) rift-like mark (trāsa); (iii) semi-coloured (oitraka); (iv) permanently dirty surface (mṛid-garbha); (v) gritty-fragments (asmagarbha) and (vi) rough and uneven shape (rauḥṣa).

Generally the common way to test the genuine supphire is by holding the same in a forcep or corn-tongs,—an inch below the surface of clean water (nīra) or milk (kṣirapuritam) kept in a pot; The liquid then appears to be entirely coloured.

Counterfeit stones are composed of blue glass or crystals cut into facets or artistically pested with a garnet top.

VIII. *Zircon (Gomeda)* :—Intelligent traders sometime sell to the layman Essonite or Cinnamon stone and spinel as Zircons owing to similarity of colour; In Ceylon it is known as “Maturian Diamond” owing to its lustre. Minarologists generally test the genuineness of Zircon by chemical analysis; Besides when this gem is placed under microscopic observation it emits a cottony or nappy texture (=French, Ratinê, i.e. the appearance of water when inter-mixed with spirit).

In Sanskrit texts it is stated that to test the real zircon the following method should be applied :—

Put the gem in an earthen pot filled with milk (Yatranyaste payah), whereupon if it is real one, the milk shall reflect the colour of the zircon. There is another method to test the gem; If it is rubbed in touch-stone, instead of becoming dull, the lustre shall increase.

The spurious qualities are found in those zircons which possess the following flaws :—

“Araṅgaṁ śvetakṛṣṇāṅgaṁ rekhā trāsayutaṁ laghu |

Vicchāyaṁ śarkarāgārāṁ gomedaṁ vivudhastyajet”¹ ||

Obviously, the zircons which exhibit the following flaws should not be used :

(i) Whitish-tinge (ii) Blackish tint, (iii) Fissures (iv) rift marks and (v) light in comparison with size (vi) dull and multi-coloured and (vii) gritty fragments.

IX. *Cat's Eye (Vaidūrya)* :—False Cat's eye could be made of mountain slab (girikācaḥ), fruit of a particular tree (śiśupāla), glass (kācaḥ) Quartz (sphaṭika).

¹ Ratna Sanikṣa, pp. 96.

The common test is that it is scratched only by diamond.

Genuine cat's eye is always free from conflicting colour (kalaṅka).

The common defects of spurious cat's eye are as follows :—

- (I) Karkara—The gem which is very stiff and hard
- (II) Sarkara—Gritty fragments
- (III) Trāsa—Rift marks
- (IV) Kalaṅka—Conflicting colours
- (V) Deha—bearing dirt within.

There are five genuine varieties of Cat's-eye as below (ete pañca mahāguṇāḥ) :¹

- (a) Sutāra—The cat's eye that sparkles alluring hue.
- (b) Ghana—Heavy in proportion to size and shape.
- (c) Atyacchā—Without conflicting colours.
- (d) Kalila—When placed in light twinkles like the moon-beam.
- (e) Byanga—manifests variety of parts and sides.

It has been stressed upon that experts well-versed in the " Science of Gem " can verify, detect and decipher a mendacious from the real one by its lightness softness, gloss etc., etc., :

“ hyayaṁ prabhedo vidūṣā nareṇa I
snehaprabhedo laghutā mṛitutvaṁ I
vijātiliṅgaṁ khalu sarvajanyaṁ II ”.²

[Continued]

¹ Manimāla I, 256.

² Manimāla, I, pp. 262.

INSTABILITY THROUGH INFLATION IN INDIA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH UNDER PLANNED ECONOMY

SUSHIL CHANDRA SAHA

Viveka-Bharati

INTRODUCTION

One of the most striking economic phenomena of the capitalist world is the alternation of prosperity and depression known as business cycle which is associated with rise and fall in the capitalist's profit, investment, employment, income and prices. The entire constellation is governed by a unique mechanism—money, whose periodic misbehaviour under its irrational master man, is responsible for so much loss of economic welfare of man himself. So economists have always busied themselves to devise means so that it does not go off the rails. They have christened the sharply rising prices and a progressive diminution in the value of monetary unit through the expansion of money supply either due to war finance or development finance as inflation and its opposite as deflation. Its various types are 'open and repressed', mild and hyperinflation, 'price inflation', and monetary inflation, tax-induced, wage-induced and deficit-induced inflation, etc., varying with their origin, intensity and duration and the problem for the economist is how to control them and maintain a reasonable degree of economic stability even through inflation and deflation.

The problem is extremely significant for India, for the success of her Second Five year Plan depends on its 'stability' coupled with growth. India can never afford to risk an 'open inflation' in financing her plan. Inflation will jeopardise the economic stability.

For a clear understanding of the subject, it is helpful to be a little familiar with the fundamentals of some analytical concepts and relationships integrated for the first time in Keynes' *General Theory*. These are the basic tools with which the non-Keynesians and post-Keynesians have built their own models and extended Keynesian analysis and who, though differing, could not get far away from him. So Keynesian theory of money and prices would be stated in the first section of the article.

Since inflation is world-wide to-day and Britain herself is one of its major victims, the British case of inflation will be referred to,

very briefly, as a model, so that India, though having a different setting of her problems, can benefit by her experiences and the measures she has adopted to control inflation. After that our main issue, the problem of inflation in the context of India's planned economy, would be discussed.

KEYNESIAN THEORY OF MONEY AND PRICES

Lord Keynes made large and lasting contribution to economics. "To find an economist of comparable influence one would have to go back to Adam Smith." Keynes' influence dominates economic thinking and public policy even to-day. Here we are mainly concerned with his theory of money and prices. Prior to the publication of the *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* Keynes did not altogether refuse to accept the traditional and static 'quantity theory of money' which was offered as an explanation of the inflationary pressures in the First World War, when inflation was of an enormous magnitude and was not preceded by a deflationary epoch as it was in the second world war. The Cambridge variant of the quantity equation emphasised the cash balances, held by the public, as an important factor, which affected the value of money *via* change in the velocity of circulation. The 'fundamental equations' were laid down in *A Treatise on Money*, Vol. I, in the same classical tradition, though they indicated a progressive development of Keynes' theoretical analysis of money and prices which culminated in the more 'realistic income analysis of the *General Theory*.'¹

In *A Treatise on Money*, Vol. I, Keynes mentioned four different types of inflation—(1) Profit inflation to measure the inequality between saving and investment (the value of investment being more than the cost of investment), (2) Commodity inflation to measure the change in the price of liquid consumption goods, (3) Income inflation to measure the change in the rate of efficiency earning, *i.e.*, wages, (4) Capital inflation to measure the change in the price of capital goods relatively to their cost of production.²

Here he tried to explain the change in the value of money and fluctuation in the value of consumption goods and investment goods separately, in terms of his Savings-Investment equations known as the 'Fundamental equations of the value of money' where any

¹ OBITUARY : The Times (London), April, 22, 1946.

² 'Theory of Money and Prices'-an article by John Lintner in the *New Economics*. Ed. by Seymour E. Harris, 1952, P. 504.

³ J. M. Keynes : *A Treatise on Money*, Vol. I (1930), p. 155.

discrepancy between S & I results in the Windfall Profits or Windfall Loss. So the correct monetary and banking policy would be to maintain equilibrium between S & I and to eliminate Q (Profit) by appropriately influencing the rate of interest so that the 'Market rate of Interest' may not depart from the 'Natural rate' and throw the economic system out of balance. Here Keynes followed closely the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell and his analysis was Neo-classical.

In the *General Theory* Keynes laid down his most radical theory of *employment interest and money*. Since the classical economic theory was inadequate to explain the 'involuntary unemployment' of the thirties⁴, he introduced his concept of the *effective demand*, and explained unemployment as the consequence of deficiency of demand. He sought to explain the relation of money supply to employment, wage-unit (money-wage of a labour unit), effective demand and prices in terms of such economic aggregates as aggregate demand, aggregate saving, aggregate investment, aggregate income, and some psychological functions such as consumption function, i.e., marginal propensity to consume less than unity, and Liquidity function, i.e., the propensity to hoard cash, the marginal efficiency of capital, and the rate of interest. These are all interdependent variables in the Keynesian system and money supply affects the price level through its effect on each of these variables.

In terms of Keynesian analysis, what is primarily needed to secure full employment is to raise the effective demand through the stimulation of private and public investment and the consumption expenditure of the community. In this respect Keynes now had greater reliance on the fiscal policy and less on the monetary policy of his earlier stand. The analysis assumes a pre-existent volume of unused capacities in the economy. Therefore, increase in the volume of money supply through public or private investment will not at first raise the wage-unit but will increase employment and effective demand, and, as output increases real income will rise. With every increase in real income, savings increase at a constant S/Y ratio (at least in the short period), and equality between savings and investment is effected through change in the level of income. As these Income-Consumption and Savings-Investment adjustments are instantaneous and the variables are all economic aggregates, Keynesian

⁴ 'Effective demand' means a position in the schedule of demand where aggregate demand price (investment demand and consumption demand together) is equal to the aggregate supply price (aggregate cost of output) that maximises the profit expectation of the entrepreneurs.

analytical model has been described as Macro-Static or Macro-Comparative-Static rather than as Macro-Dynamic.

This process of income creation goes on increasing through a 'multiplier effect' until aggregate savings become equal to aggregate investment at the full employment level.

But as the economy approaches a condition of full employment inelasticities of factor supply appear and labour-productivity diminishes so that wage-unit begins to rise through competitive wage bargains resulting in the vicious wage-price spiral called inflation.

This full employment marks the saturation point of the economy where increased money supply refuses to be absorbed in the economic system and exerts direct and proportionate effect on the price level. Thus Keynes discounts the possibility of inflation in the short period in an underemployed advanced economy. There may be a gentle rise in prices and a 'discontinuous' increase in the wage rate but the situation can hardly be called inflationary. Keynes restricts the term 'true inflation' to a state when the 'final critical point of full employment' is crossed and the situation is one of 'overfull employment'. In his own words, "when a further increase in the quantity of effective demand produces no further increase in the output and and entirely spends itself on an increase in the cost-unit fully proportionate to the increase in effective demand, we have reached a condition which might appropriately be designated as one of true inflation. Up to this point the effect of monetary expansion is entirely a question of degree and there is no previous point at which we can draw a definite line and declare that conditions of inflation have set in".⁵

But Keynes took cognizance of the possibility of what may be called 'bottleneck' inflation, so characteristic of the under-developed economies of the East. He says, "It is probable that the general level of prices will not rise very much as output increases so long as there are available efficient unemployed resources of every type. But as soon as output has increased sufficiently to begin to reach the 'bottlenecks' there is likely to be a sharp rise in prices of certain commodities', 'whilst in other directions there is still a substantial surplus of resources without employment'.⁶

It appears that Keynes' 'theory of true inflation' in Fisherian sense, as a possibility in the long period, is a theory of economic statics. Keynes was, however, mainly concerned with the short-period

⁵ J. M. Keynes, *General Theory of Employment, Interest & Money*, Ch. 21, p.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 300.

cyclical changes in the value of money and did not concern himself at all with the *long-period growth* of the economy.' To him long period was one 'Secular stagnation' in the economy and hence increase in the money supply would exercise a proportionate effect on the price level in such a long-period stationary economy.

In the under-developed economies, however, there is no deflationary unemployment in the Keynesian sense and therefore the shortage of demand is not the key problem. The problem in these countries is one of underutilisation of potential resources and under-employment of labour. Its solution lies in the creation of employment opportunity and raising the productivity of labour for which, the primary requisite is *capital creation*⁷. In the advanced unemployed economies, the problem would be one of 'full capacity' capital utilisation in face of a declining investment opportunity.

To augment the supply of capital resources, increase in the rate of investment is necessary. Given the required rate of capital creation, the required rate of investment will necessitate exactly the equal amount of saving to offset any inflationary potential generated by the investment. The state of under-developed economies is not like that of the advanced economies of the West. The former are said to be in a situation where the classical Say's Law 'Supply creates its demand' applies. Here demand deficiency and superabundance of capital are no problem. On the contrary, the problems here are the excessive propensity to consume the low-aggregate Income, Savings and Investment, the scarcity of capital and 'disguised unemployment'.⁸ Their solution lies in the stimulation of private, public and corporate savings, through the control of consumption and non-priority investment by taxation and canalisation of those savings along autonomous public investment and desirable private investment.

The tools of analysis forged in Keynes' *General Theory* written primarily for meeting the problems of deflationary unemployment

⁷ The analysis of the problem of long-run growth under dynamic condition has been attempted by Keynes' able followers like Harrod Hicks and Joan Robinson in England and other growth economists like Domar, Hamberg, Baumol, etc.

⁸ I prefer this term to the conventional phrasing like 'capital formation' or capital accumulation' in order to emphasise that in the under-developed countries, nothing worth the name capital exists. Everything has to be created anew. Special creation (not evolution) see the Concise Oxford Dictionary.

⁹ Disguised unemployment refers to a state where the marginal productivity of labour is zero or negative so that the withdrawal of surplus labour from its present use does not diminish productivity, e.g., Indian agriculture. Ragner Nurkse in his *Problem of Capital Formation in Under-developed Countries* (1953) says that his disguised unemployment is also a disguised saving potential. The wasted labour force when turned to productive use supported by the available farm surplus would lead to capital formation.

are very powerful and they are used effectively in the "National Income Analysis" of American Economy to day. The same tools when flexibly used can analyse the situation of inflation and appropriate monetary-cum-fiscal remedies and even direct physical control can be applied to control inflation. Keynes' last book '*How to pay for the War*' refutes the charges that he is inconsistent in his analysis and that his theory does not apply to the post-war inflation in the West. Even the post-war inflation in Britain and the very acute 'overfull employment' inflation of the post-devaluation period and the unbalanced budgetary inflation of the labour-administration days are fully explicable in terms of Keynesian analysis and the remedies applied to control inflation were what Keynes himself would suggest.

II

INFLATION IN THE U. K.

In the United Kingdom, inflationary forces were kept under control during the Second World War by the adoption of successful administrative measures. But throughout the post-war boom, 1946-48, devaluation crisis, 1949-50, and the Korean boom, 1950-51 and particularly during the last two years, inflationary pressures have been asserting themselves due to the unusual increase in industrial activity and personal consumption, relating to resources. Unemployment virtually became nil and near full and 'overfull employment' took place. Consequently, wage claims increased in excess of productivity increases. Increase in domestic consumption resulted in the decline of exportable surplus and increased cost of raw materials raised the production cost while fierce competition from Western Germany and Japan led to imbalance in foreign trade and precarious position of the foreign exchange reserve.

Hence 'monetary disciplines' and various fiscal techniques came into operation to arrest the inflationary forces. For the last two years the U.K. has been engaged in a continued battle against inflation and her dwindling dollar-reserve. Bank rate was raised several times indicating a revival of faith in the classical monetary policy but by and large it failed to discipline the banking system. Speculative increase in prices went on fed by the bank credit expansion. The industrial companies having large war-accumulated reserves at their disposal were virtually independent of the banking system. Hence came the attempts to control excessive credit expansion through

requests and 'directives' by the Chancellor of Exchequer to the Governor of the Bank of England to urge upon the banks a 'positive and significant reduction in bank advances, and along with that in the U.K. there was the 'tightening of the hire purchase credit' on the one side and direct control of investment on the other.

"The fiscal measures which were pressed into use in the U.K. included additional taxation, withdrawal or reduction of earlier tax-concessions to stimulate investment through special depreciation allowance etc., reduction in Government expenditure including the withdrawal of food and other subsidies, a cut in public investment and provision of incentives to stimulate saving. Excessive private investment was sought to be restrained through the tightening of capital issues control."¹⁰

Thus when inflation in the U.K. was well under control and there was a sizeable increase in her dollar reserve so much so that even the general convertibility of sterling was being contemplated and discussed, Britain plunged into the Suez operations and faced a serious industrial and financial crisis. A serious 'oil bottleneck' developed and raised the production cost of her manufactures. And in two months' time sterling area's dollar reserve touched the danger level of 2,000 million. Further devaluation of sterling is being discussed and Britain is looking for external financial assistance to relieve the £ in crisis.

III

RECENT PRICE-RISE AND THE PROSPECT OF INFLATION IN INDIA UNDER THE SECOND PLAN

While the above economic developments were going on in the U.K. and abroad, India achieved economic growth with remarkable stability during the First Five-year Plan (1951-56) and only towards the close of 1955-56 some symptoms of inflation were noticeable. The main economic indicators of progress under the first plan are:— 18% rise in the national income, 25/30% rise in industrial production, about 20% rise in agricultural output and 10% rise in the money supply with the public. The wholesale prices declined by 13% and the working class cost of living index declined by 5%. The balance of payment deficit was modest resulting in the decline of Rs. 121 cr. in foreign exchange reserves.¹¹

¹⁰ Reserve Bank of India, Report on Currency and Finance, 1955-56, p. 6.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 7.

The reasons behind financial stability are that the actual amount of money spent under the first plan fell short of the estimated outlay of Rs. 2,856 crores by Rs. 356 crores. The total expenditure during the first three years of the plan were only Rs. 856 crores and in the fourth year about Rs. 500 crores were spent. Total deficit financing during the first plan according to a recent estimate of the Planning Commission would most probably amount to Rs. 300 crores. The amount was moderate compared with the unused capacities the economy harboured as a shock-absorber. There was considerable increase in the supply of food and industrial materials, partly due to the improved technique and largely due to the favour of the climate, to match the primary and secondary increase in money income generated by D.F. Moreover, the drawing down of sterling balances to the extent of Rs. 140 crores also safeguarded the economy against the inflationary effects of D.F.

But if the first plan was moderate and cautious in its approach, the second plan is one of adventure. The prospect of inflation in the second plan has to be considered in the context of its various aspects. This plan has been undertaken to accelerate India's economic growth without putting the economy under undue strain. For the sake of a fair appraisal of the prospects of inflation, one should remember certain basic features of the plan and some strategic national income data. These are the objectives, the size and the technique of the plan, the rate of economic growth desired, the income-consumption and the savings-investment ratio and the capital-output ratio assumed, the volume of new employment to be created, the technique of financing the development plan, the size of the countries' accumulated foreign exchange reserve and its requirement during the plan and the shortfall estimated, the taxable capacity and the tax structure of the country, the amount of external aid grant or borrowing and finally the limit of deficit financing which can be resorted to without endangering the overall '*economic stability*' through inflation. In the light of the information under each of the above aspects, which is given in the final version of the second plan, we shall be able to estimate the possibilities of inflation under it.

1. THE OBJECTIVE, SIZE AND TECHNIQUE OF PLANNING

The fundamental objectives of the plan are (1) a sizeable increase of the order of 25% of the national income in five years; (2) "Rapid industrialisation with particular emphasis on the disposal of and heavy industries"

(3) "Reduction of inequalities in income and wealth and the building up of a socialistic pattern of society, and a more even distribution of economic power."

(4) A large expansion of employment opportunity.

To realise the above objectives

(a) The plan aims at an outlay of Rs. 4,800 crores in the public sector and Rs. 2,400 crores in the private sector;

(b) It aims at securing 5% annual growth on the average for a period of five years;

(c) Though it professes to be a balanced one, the plan is a heavy capital goods industry-biased plan though not neglecting altogether the consumption sector, as in the case of the Soviet technique of Planning with 'unbalanced growth' (In Indian plan, industry, transport and communication account for 47% of the total outlay);

(d) As in the first five year plan, food and agriculture receive considerable emphasis in this plan as well.

(e) The plan aims at the creation of 9 million new jobs of which 8 millions would be in the non-agricultural sector. This is only to cope with the employment need for the new entrants to work force during the plan period with the existing backlog of unemployment of 5 million men remaining the same. Due to the scarcity of capital resources and the vast unskilled manpower and considerable 'disguised unemployment' the Plan favours labour-intensive technique rather than a capital-intensive one for the supply of consumer goods. So the village household industries are preferred to the mechanised industries. Capital-intensive investments with high capital-output ratio but with low employment potential are made for capital goods industries which prepare the ground for industrialisation. The problem of consumption and employment is sought to be met by the village industries.

2. NATIONAL INCOME, CONSUMPTION, SAVING AND INVESTMENT

Indian national income at the end of 1955-56 stands at Rs. 10,800 crores of which consumption expenditure is as large as Rs. 10,044 crores, leaving a net domestic savings, Rs. 756 crores only 7% of the national income. To achieve 25% increase in national income in 1956-61, it can be calculated that approximately 30% of the marginal increment of income must have to be saved by the Indian public annually so that aggregate domestic savings may rise from 7% to 9.72% and the aggregate net investment (taking into consideration the inflow of foreign resources of Rs. 130 crores) may be 10.69% (4%).

increase of investment) of the expected national income in 1960-61., i.e. 18,480 crores.¹²

3. CAPITAL OUTPUT RATIO.¹³

From the above national income data, the growth rate, the capital-output ratio or income-saving ratio can all be calculated by the application of the familiar Harrod Domar formula $G = (S_t/Y_t) (O/C)$ where G represents the growth rate desired, (S_t) = Savings in a given time period, (Y_t) = income in a given time and O/C = output-capital ratio.

This capital-output ratio should be determined by breaking up the economy into sectors and on the basis of the financial cost data and on the engineering data of the specific plants.

The amount of savings necessary to ensure a desired growth rate is calculated thus. If the desired rate is 5% annual and the capital-output ratio is assumed to be 3:1 then S would be $5 \times 3 = 15\%$, i.e. the community must make effort to save 15% of N.I. to ensure the required growth rate. In the second plan average capital-output ratio has been assumed to be 2.3 : 1 compared with the $C : O$ assumed under the first plan as 3 : 1 but the actual being 1 : 8 : 1.

4. TAX REVENUE AND NATIONAL INCOME

The proportion of tax revenue to N.I. is 7.5% constant over several years. In this connexion one may remember Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari's remarks: "the Indian tax system has got into a settled groove. It does not bring into the public exchequer even a constant proportion of national income."¹⁴ In view of the future increase in the taxable capacity during the plan, 25% of the total plan outlay is expected to be raised by taxation.

5. FOREIGN EXCHANGE REQUIREMENT

Though the foreign exchange requirement under the plan cannot be exactly estimated, the likely deficit has been estimated at Rs. 1,100 crores during the five years assuming that the terms of trade will remain unaltered.

¹² Statistical Table No. 4 in the Summary of the Second Five Year Plan in the Reserve Bank report on Currency and Finance, 1955-56, p. 87.

¹³ The ratio of net productivity to a fixed amount of capital-stock during a given time is called 'Productivity ratio' or output : capital ratio. The reciprocal of the productivity ratio is called capital-output ratio.

¹⁴ Finance Minister's Mid-session Budget Speech in the Lok Sabha, published in the Statement Nov. 30, 1956.

The problem of instability through inflation depends on each of the above basic features of the economy and on whether the assumptions are realised or not. For instance.:

(1) We can make use of the Harrod-Domar formula if during the plan period, the income-savings ratio and the capital-output ratio remain constant. But in the case of a dynamic plan with 'unbalanced growth' such a constant ratio cannot be assumed. It is very difficult to gauge accurately, in the absence of reliable statistics how the consumption-behaviour-pattern of the community will shape itself particularly in an underdeveloped economy which will no doubt experience a dynamic upsurge for the first time that may change radically her social and institutional framework. Here, savings co-efficient is likely to be low due to the famous "Duesenberry-demonstration Effects",¹⁵ especially so where savings-consumption ratio is left largely to the voluntary choice of the community in a democratic plan. Then in the case of a rapid change in technology a change in the inter-dependent structure of investment and probable alteration in the price trend both domestic and foreign, the inter-sectoral 'capital-output ratios' and 'the technical coefficients' over a wide range of heterogeneous industries are bound to change. This renders the average capital-output ratio otiose and calculation of growth rate impossible.¹⁶ The danger of using a Macro-Dynamic economic model suitable for the mature capitalist economy to explain the Micro-Dynamic situation in an undeveloped economy lies here. In mature economies growth of income is a matter of course and the problem is to maintain an even rate of development. In undeveloped economies investment does not necessarily lend to income and income to saving. Hence if the plan expenditure cannot be reduced and the community is not prepared to make efforts in terms of thrift and productivity to ensure the required rate of growth, increasing resort to deficit financing will create instability through inflation. So a

¹⁵ This states that the lower income groups accept the consumption pattern set by the higher income groups and develop taste for better and costlier type of goods and higher standard of living. *Income Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behaviour*, J.S. Duesenberry.

¹⁶ For example according to the national income data cited before, the growth rate of 3.6% for the first plan was calculated to be on the assumed average C : O 3 : 1 which would have required 10.8% of N.I. as saving. But, in fact 7% actual saving, secured the same growth rate proving higher productivity and lower C : O ratio which comes to 2 : 1. According to Prof. S. K. Muranjan it is 1.8 : 1. This is partly due to the adoption of quick-yielding capital-saving technique utilisation of idle capacity and partly to increased labour productivity. 10.8% saving could have secured a higher growth rate.

democratic plan has a chance to turn one day a wholly controlled or a partially controlled plan.

(2) Deliberate preference for the labour-intensive backward technology because of its employment potential renders production inefficient and costly. If the output of consumer goods is insufficient to meet the probable rise in demand or be qualitatively unacceptable due to free consumer's preference there arises the danger of instability through inflation.

(3) The objective of the socialistic pattern of society and even distribution of economic power calls for reduction of inequality in income and wealth and a decentralised economy based on village industries. The fiscal and production technique adopted transfers wealth and income from the group that saves to the group whose 'propensity to consume' is high. The danger of inflation is there.

(4) Capital goods industry-biased plan allocates more resources for sectors whose production of the 'bill of final goods' is time-consuming. Besides, there is a large allocation for non-investment welfare expenditure and basic expenditure known as 'social overhead' the results of which are not immediately available. So in the absence of a successful wiping up of part of the income during the time-lag, dangerous inflationary potential exists.

(5) The extension of the public sector might shake the private sector's confidence in the government policy and a very high rate of siphoning of the common saving-pool by borrowing and taxation by the former, may leave inadequate finance for the private sector, compelling it to dissave and reduce investment. Again in case of rising prices, any attempt to control it by indirect taxes will lead to the shifting of the tax to the consumers through price-rise. Then there will arise the problem of under-production inflation and 'taxation inflation'.

(6) The plan assumes a certain amount of shortfall in our foreign exchange resources on the assumption that terms of trade in the next five years will remain the same and a certain amount of foreign aid, grant and loan will be available. But the former can be upset by any unfavourable turn in the international situation or inflation in the west and the latter by a change in the international political and investment climate. The non-availability of the required foreign resources will demand a more energetic stepping up of the export surplus and economising in imports. This again is fraught with the danger of export-induced inflation in the domestic market, e.g. that Suez-crisis and the inflation in the West have already raised the cost

of our planning. Hence the Planning Commission said, "both the growth in consumption and in national income will be conditional on a number of assumptions such as availability of foreign resources of the required order, co-ordination of planning, avoidance of waste and the degree of co-operation from the people in taking to improved methods of production and for creating a favourable climate for development."¹⁷

6. PLAN-FINANCE AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE

To come to the plan-finance, total expenditure under the second plan is taken to be Rs. 7,200 crores of which the share of the private sector is Rs. 2,400 crores. Leaving aside the private sector, the development programme of the central and the state governments together would require an outlay of Rs. 4800 crores. Of this, Rs. 2400 crores will come from the budgetary sources. Of this, taxation at the current rate of 7.5% of N.I. will yield Rs. 350 crores. New taxation after change of the tax-structure, according to the recommendation of the Taxation Inquiry Commission, will yield Rs. 450 crores. Borrowings from the public would bring Rs. 1,200 crores. Of this, market loan and small savings would account for Rs. 700 crores and Rs. 500 crores respectively. Other budgetary sources would bring Rs. 400 crores (Railway contribution would amount to Rs. 150 crores and Provident fund and other deposits would yield Rs. 250 crores).

Of the remaining Rs. 2,400 crores the amount from external assistance has been put at Rs. 800 crores. It is extremely difficult to forecast the foreign exchange requirement and the exchange earning over a period of five years. On the best possible assumptions, the aggregate balance of payment deficit on current account has been put at Rs. 1,100 crores. Part of this deficit Rs. 200 crores will be covered by the drawing down of sterling balances. Rs. 100 crores worth of foreign exchange will be utilised for the investment programme of the private sector. The gap of Rs. 800 crores will have to be covered by floatation of loans in foreign market, by borrowing from the World Bank and grants from other international institutions, through private foreign investment and finally through loans and grants from the friendly governments. Of late the foreign exchange position of India has proved far from satisfactory. During the first nine months of the plan, India has drawn down Rs. 200 crores worth of sterling balances which was to be her total plan period withdrawal. According

¹⁷ Summary of the Second Five Year Plan in R.R.C.F., 1955-56, p. 87.

to a spokesman of the Indian High Commission, India has been drawing £8 million a week. The sterling balances now (Dec. 19, 1956) stand at about £ 400 million (Rs. 5,200 crores) of which £ 300 M. (Rs. 3,900 crores) would have to be earmarked as the minimum reserve for backing for Indian currency (after the revaluation of the gold stock of the Reserve Bank of India at Rs. 61-3-0 per tola).¹⁸ So India was looking to other sources such as International Bank for help in her development plan and the bank was now adopting a co-operative attitude.¹⁹ Indian Prime Minister's recent talk with the President, U.S.A. also reflects a favourable attitude from the U.S. Government.

7. THE ROLE OF DEFICIT FINANCING AND THE POSSIBLE INFLATIONARY REACTION

The outside limit to deficit financing is placed at Rs. 1,200 crores. Deficit financing is a kind of advanced borrowing by the government from the public in the hope that the community would save an equal amount out of the real income generated by the public investment financed by this novel technique of developmental finance. If, however the income in real terms cannot be produced due to the emergence of bottlenecks, it creates an 'inflationary gap' leaving surplus money income in the form of windfall profits and inflated wage-income which unless reduced successfully by taxation or borrowing causes economic instability and jeopardises the Plan. In India deficit finance means the addition to the net circulation of money which has its secondary effects on credit. But as the liquidity preference of the Indian public may be large and the banks are in the habit of keeping large reserve and maintaining current account deposits of the public, the inflationary effects of deficit financing on account of credit expansion are to that extent minimised. Again to the extent, the sterling imports are made it acts as a safeguard against inflation. But sterling reserve would soon be drawn down to the limit of its withdrawal. Deficit financing and mild inflation act as a leading string to economic progress as long as the economy is in a state of deflation; the system is resilient and its dose is moderate. If however the price incentive fails to work, output-response is small or negative and is followed by incremental self-consumption or withdrawal of marketable surplus and speculative

¹⁸ See Reuter report in the *Statesman*, Dec. 21, 1956.

¹⁹ The World Bank has granted 20 million dollar loan to the Indian Iron and Steel Company and is ready to finance transport development in India.

hoarding of stocks, quantity theory of money works with utmost relevance and deficit financing instead of a boon proves a bane. So the government should cry a halt to the expansion of money supply as soon as the price-wage system is put on an upward spiral and take to direct control measures. It appears that the symptoms of incipient inflation are now visible. Introducing two finance bills in the Parliament on Nov. 30, 1956, the Finance Minister said, "The general economic situation has also altered somewhat since the plan was formulated. Prices have registered almost a continuous upward trend. The index is now 430 (1939-100) and the danger of inflationary pressure getting the upper hand has to be safeguarded against by taking steps to mop up a part of the purchasing power with the public. This is evident from the fact that the demand for food, cloth, steel and cement has been rising rapidly one part of the economic policy for the plan period is to increase production and especially of articles of general consumption like food and cloth and the other part is an appropriate tax policy aimed at regulating the flow of purchasing power so as to ensure that development proceeds under conditions of *economic stability*." ²⁰ Further as the Planning Commission suggested : "any adverse repercussion of deficit financing will have to be dealt with in all possible ways by appropriate Central Banking policy through judicious recourse to qualitative and quantitative controls on credit including variation in reserve ratios by the building up of adequate stocks of essential goods like food and cloth, through taxes on profits, windfall gains and on excess consumption in certain lines and physical controls including allocations and rationing of scarce resources." ²¹

The government of India have become watchful of the inflationary situation to-day and have given effect to some of the anti-inflationary fiscal and monetary measures suggested by the Planning Commission. Some munitions still remain to be fired in appropriate time. (Recent credit-squeeze by the commercial banks initiated by the Reserve Bank of India, the introduction of variable reserve ratio and recent direct and indirect taxation measures and lastly the passing of the Bank Control Bill on Dec. 21 are all instances to the point.)

8. TAXATION POLICY

The taxation policy of the Government of India has been oriented

²⁰ T. T. Krishnamachari's Mid-session Budget Speech in the Lokasabha, published in the Statesman, Nov. 30, 1956.

²¹ Summary of the Second Five Year Plan by the R.R.C.F., 1955-56, p. 90.

both to the need for plan-finance and the control of the general economic situation. Even after an ambitious scheme of deficit financing of Rs. 1,200 crores, there exists a gap of Rs. 400 crores in the Planning budget. On the whole, even on a moderate estimate, Rs. 850 crores will have to be raised by the additional taxation. The fear of deficit financing and the refusal to have a cut-back on the plan would raise the amount to a still higher level. Hence the spate of recent taxes like the Capital Gains Tax (imposed in 1946 and withdrawn in 1948), Dividend Tax, higher Super Tax and customs and excises etc. The tax net will probably be spread more widely to cover all classes, the rich, the middle class and even the poor in future and this is what it should be. But the incidence of taxation should be equitable. That is why at the annual meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of India, the Finance Minister said, "The direct tax system must be broad-based if the revenue was to increase with as fair an incidence as possible. The taxation policy had to be linked to the broader investment policy which in turn had to be geared to the fulfilment of the plan. This was the rationale behind the taxation measures."²²

CONCLUSION

There can be no retrenchment in the plan expenditure. For rapid industrialisation is the aim. "If it was a question of Plan being given up or belts being tightened", said Mr. Krishnamachari, he would prefer the latter. So long as inflation did not permeate the field of necessities, such as food and cloth he would not be very much concerned."²³

So in the final analysis we have to turn to domestic financing of development. The government and the people of India need not be diffident about it. There are still good many stones in the governments sling. Hidden wealth and the evaded income tax can be unearthed and people's savings mobilised by an energetic tax-collection and savings-collection drive. The accumulated gold hoards can be mobilised by devising some suitable monetary method. Annual wealth tax with high exemption limit may be imposed. 'Expenditure Tax',²⁴ with high exemption limit suggested by Prof. N. Kaldor

²² T. T. Krishnamachari's address before the ACCA published in the Statesman, Dec. 11, 1956.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *An Expenditure Tax*, N. Kaldor, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.

recently, can be imposed with the dual aim to induce saving and curtail the 'conspicuous consumption' of the rich. India can well be pioneer in this respect though Britain herself has not given effect to Prof. Kaldor's recommendation. Profits from the public enterprises can be increased with suitable pricing policy and their more efficient operation and the sphere of 'fiscal monopolies' might be extended. All ostentatious consumptions of the middle class and even the poor beyond what is needed for life and efficiency will have to be reduced and all inessential non-plan and conspicuous consumption expenditure of the government like luxury hotels, air-conditioned transport and costly foreign travels will have to be drastically curtailed. The surplus company profits not meant to be reinvested but kept liquid for trading for windfall profits will have to be directed to channels of productive investment.²⁵ This, however, does not imply any fall in the level of existing consumption. It only means that a large part of the rise in income should be prevented from dissipation and be devoted to capital formation, i.e., be directed to channels of productive investment.²⁵ But all care must be taken that the private enterprise is not left high and dry but can play its complementary role in the planned economy. While trying all such measures the *overall economic stability* and democratic features of the planning (in the sense of something short of a complete regimentation under an absolutely authoritarian economic system) must not be lightly jettisoned. These are apparently conflicting ideals but given the judicious and balanced approach on the part of the government with the necessary degree of enthusiasm and co-operation on the part of the people, these ideals can be translated into reality. It has been rightly said by Mr. Krishnamachari, "It will not be an exaggeration to say that if the plan failed, the prospects of democracy in large part of the World would perhaps be dimmed."²⁶ For India is the greatest stabilising influence in the Asian politics to-day. It will then be an irreparable loss to the free world.

²⁵ This has been secured partially by a recent legislation.

²⁶ T. T. Krishnamachari's speech before the ACCI. already referred to.

Reviews and Notices of Books

1. **A. E. Housman**—By Ian Scott-Kilvert. Price Two Shillings. Published for the British Council and the National Book League by Longmans, Green & Co. Writers and Their Work: No. 69.

2. **John Dryden**—By Bonamy Dobree. Price Two Shillings. Same Publishers. Writers and Their Work: No. 70.

A. E. Housman died twenty years ago at the age of 77. He shot into fame with a thin book of verse 'A Shropshire Lad,' published in 1896. Its greatest influence seemed to extend from 1910 to 1925. The poems were then eagerly read by the young, and thousands could repeat them from memory. George Orwell, writing some 3 or 4 years ago, put on record his own passionate admiration for the verses, at the age of 17. In his retrospect he finds their enormous influence "not at all easy to understand". The verse he once recited in a kind of ecstasy had no more any special charm for him. 'It just tinkles. But it did not seem to tinkle in 1920'.

Housman is a poet whose mood seemed to synchronise with a mood of the moment. His fame was thus fortuitous. In literature such things have happened before. Swinburne is a parallel. Like him, too. Housman excelled in craftsmanship but unlike him his production was meagre, his total poetic output being represented by 'Last Poems' (1922), besides the other little volume already mentioned.

Scott-Kilvert's survey, in just under 40 pages, combines biography with criticism. We have many interesting details about this aloof and solitary poet and classical scholar. His talk, to which only a very few people were admitted, was marked by an extraordinary aptness and penetration of the phrases he used. In his profound knowledge of the classics his reputation vied with that of Porson. When invited to deliver the Clark Lectures on English Literature, he declined the offer with words which at once showed his great modesty and his understanding of the rôle the critic of literature is called upon to play: 'I do regard myself as a connoisseur: I think I can tell good from bad literature. But literary criticism, referring opinions to principles and setting them forth so as to command assent, is a high and rare accomplishment and quite beyond me'. But here there may be a sting to the tail of his observation. He cannot produce the genuine article and will not be content with producing a substitute. But others will. And shame to them for incompetence and the practice of deception!

Scott-Kilvert has wondered why a man so much in love with poetry as Housman should choose for his life's work an author so little rewarding

as Manilius. Manilius is a Roman poet in the time of Augustus, who wrote an astrological poem in five books, entitled 'Astronomica'. Although not remarkable as poet, he is so for the power of his thought, and his verse-technique possessed great skill and ingenuity. These accomplishments are what Housman himself sought to cultivate. And his preference is, therefore, perfectly intelligible.

Another incident links up with the one already noted above. He declined the Order of Merit 'on the ground that it was not always given to those who deserved it'. In this refusal, too, perhaps the same ironical attitude comes into play. He will not associate himself with organizations and individuals responsible for bestowal of honours and offices because their judgements are often astray and in consequence the wrong men are chosen.

Scott-Kilvert's attempt at the rehabilitation of Housman is worthy of note. He notices in the most faultless of his poems an element of wit, which the poet professed to abhor. "There are echoes of them in a contemporary, whose work bears traces of Housman's influence, Mr. Auden". Wit may be found also in T. S. Eliot but the source of the influence is French Poetry, and chiefly the work of Laforgue. But if Housman can be described as a pioneer, his continued vogue is assured for a considerable time to come.

The little pamphlet is packed with information and valuable comment. Those who read it will find ample guidance in it for a just appreciation of the poetry of Housman.

Bonamy Dobree's John Dryden bears evidence of a masterly knowledge of seventeenth century and a profound insight into the poet who since the Restoration enjoyed for a period of 40 years a fame far transcending that of Milton, whose death in 1674 almost passed unnoticed. Basil Willey, Dobree, and Sutherland are the leading authorities of our time on 17th and 18th centuries. Dobree's work, as every advanced student knows, offers the most authoritative interpretation of seventeenth century drama. Even outside this chosen field, his studies have a marked value. For he is no narrow specialist and, his 'Modern Prose Style' is perhaps the most careful and clear analysis of prose with reference to subject matter, the period in which it is produced, and its defects of incompetence, verbosity and indirectness.

The pamphlet is in forty pages, followed by a select bibliography. Professor Bonamy has written earlier on Dryden, in his two works on Restoration drama and also in his introduction to M. Van Doren's 'The Poetry of John Dryden'. The latter is a gem of criticism and although it runs to only 5 or 6 pages, it very noticeably enhances the value of Van Doren's important work.

Professor Dobree's short study is original and suggestive. He offers an explanation of Dryden's conversion to Roman Catholicism, which

rehabilitates the poet, without appearing to be a special pleading in his favour, such as for example, characterizes the attitude of Christopher Hollis on the same subject. His change of religion was dictated by the desire for 'a creed with authority enough to appease the sectarian feuds that bedevilled politics' He was not carried on the crest of an emotional wave to abandon the Anglican Church, such as some critics have implied on the evidence of 'Religio Laici,' but the sober truth in the matter is now told by Professor Dobree: 'It was his mingled scepticism and love of order which more than anything brought about his change of faith, from near Dissent, to Catholicism, by way of the Church of England'.

Dobree remarks on a feature in Dryden's character which gives a rich complexity to the poet's outlook. He belonged to his age when we judge him superficially but, in an important sense, he stood outside his own time by reason of a detachment one can notice in his work. 'Involved by the nature of things in the affairs of his time, he to some extent shared its moral and intellectual fashions: but within him there lay a deep-rooted scepticism as to the value, even the virtue of human effort, a sense that the gratification of ordinary everyday impulses, ambitions, or desires, was hardly worth while'. Reflecting on the Civil Wars, which at a time concluded the Stuart dynasty, and the bloodshed and the expense of spirit to which they led, Dryden saw no justification for this outburst of violence: 'For things are as they were' The following couplet which Dobree quotes anticipates the pessimism of Dr. Johnson:

For all the happiness mankind can gain,
Is not in pleasure, but in rest from pain.

The new standpoint implied by the criticism will provide the basis for a reassessment of Dryden.

The little book contains many indications that the view often expressed of the poet being a turncoat in religion and politics was based upon a complete misunderstanding of the poet's genius and personality.

Professor Bonamy draws attention to a number of passages from Dryden's prose and verse which had hitherto been little noticed. We shall refer to two of these. They reveal a grasp of the essentials of the human situation, particularly in so far as they are concerned with the organization and functioning of public bodies, and the flippant attitude to marriage, fashionable in the court circle and reflected and exposed in the critical comedy of the age. In 'Dedication of Examen Poeticum' 1692, Dryden wrote: 'No government has ever been, or ever can be, wherein timeservers and blockheads will not be uppermost. The persons only are chang'd, but the same juggling in state, the same hypocrisy in religion, the same self-interest and mismanagement, will remain for ever'. In 'Marriage a-la-Mode' 1672 he depicts in 18 lines of verse the gay, irresponsible, philandering spirit of the time, which in Lamb's words, gets out of 'Christendom into the land-what shall I call it-of cuckoldry—the utopia

of gallantry, where pleasure is duty, and the manners perfect freedom'.
The first eight lines of these verses are given below :

Why should a foolish Marriage Vow,
Which long ago was made,
Oblige us to each other now,
When Passion is decay'd ?
We lov'd, and we lov'd, as long as we could,
Till our love was lov'd out in us both :
But our Marriage is dead, when the Pleasure is fled :
'Twas Pleasure first made it an Oath.

Professor Dobree's little pamphlet contains a new point of view in relation to some of the most disputed facts about Dryden's career, and offers helpful guidance, not by special pleas and partial representations but by calling attention to relevant passages out of his works and pointing out their bearing upon his attitude as a whole. This unobtrusive method of conveying information greatly adds to the value of the booklet, which presents a masterly exposition of Dryden as a writer in prose and verse in a simple and attractive form.

SRICHANDRA SEN

Ourselves

CENTENARY CELEBRATIONS


The Centenary celebrations of the University are now over. Thoughtful and inspiring convocation addresses were delivered during the centenary week by Shri C. D. Deshmukh, the Chairman of the University Grants Commission, and Shri Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, the Vice-President of India. A fairly big volume narrating the history of the University during the last one hundred years (1857-1956) has been published on this occasion. This volume gives some idea of the different aspects and activities of the University during one hundred years of its existence. The history of the foundation of the University of Calcutta is interesting. It is sometimes wrongly supposed that the University of Calcutta was brought into existence in the tumult and anarchy of the Indian Mutiny. The fact is that throughout India all was quiet and peaceful when the University was founded in the first month of 1857, and everything appeared to promise a prosperous course to the new University. The Mutiny which broke out in May, 1857, had nothing to do with the creation of the Calcutta University, nor were the newly started Universities at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras in any way responsible for the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny. But powerful minds in England got alarmed, and mistaking the causes of the fearful outbreak, they had misgivings about the success of the plan of Universities, and thought that it would be prudent and expedient to retrace the steps taken.

Lord Ellenborough, the President of the Board of Control in the Derby Ministry, in a letter to the Court of Directors, dated 23th April, 1858, and Sir George Clerk, Secretary to the India Board, in a memorandum, dated 29th March, 1858, sounded the tocsin of alarm as to education, and authoritatively announced "that the promised good had not been derived from the system of 1854. It was erroneously believed in some quarters in England that the rising of 1857 was a popular upheaval against foreign rule. But as a matter of fact, as Sir Charles Trevelyan, whose persistent advocacy of the popular cause and strenuous opposition to Mr. Wilson's budget proposals in 1860 led to his recall from the office of the Governor of Madras, put it, "it was not the

people, but the army which troubled us ; and the remedy is to reduce the army and to put it upon a proper footing." Mr. Halliday, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, rendered a very important service to the cause of education in Bengal at that time by his elaborate and masterly reply to the Despatch and Minute of Lord Ellenborough and Sir George Clerk. He took considerable pains to show that there was not one purpose enumerated in which the plans of 1854, or the establishment of Universities could be proved to have failed of effect. In no respect, according to him, did the scheme of education fail of its "expected good." The Hon'ble Sir James William Colvile, the first Vice-Chancellor of the University, in his first convocation address on the 11th December, 1858, dwelt, in forcible language, upon the hurt and peril to the cause of education which the publication of that Despatch and Minute caused, and eloquently pleaded for a "definite policy," in Indian education which no ministerial changes could disturb. For, it seemed that what Sir Charles Wood planned as the President of the Board of Control in 1854 was going to be rudely disturbed by his successor Lord Ellenborough at the same office. "The ship that was freighted with the enlightenment of millions," as Sir James Colvile put it, "ought to have a definite course—she ought never to be allowed to drift at the caprice of the helmsman of the hour amidst the shifting sands and shoals of party politics." The second Vice-Chancellor of the University, the Hon'ble Mr. William Ritchie, who was also a member of the Supreme Council of India, was a thorough believer in the plan of 1854 and walked in the steps of his honoured predecessor, Sir James Colvile. In his convocation address on 6th March, 1860, he expressed himself in the following terms : "Of all the defences of a state, the surest, the best, and the cheapest is the education of its people. Educate your people from Cape Comorim to the Himalayas ; and a second Mutiny of 1857 will be impossible."

Fortunately for the cause of education in India, Lord Ellenborough was compelled to resign his office of the President of the Board of Control. His place at the Board was taken by Lord Stanley, the son of the Prime Minister, Lord Derby, and Lord Stanley lost no time in turning his attention to the subject of education. But his term of office was short ; in June, 1859, Stanley was succeeded by Sir Charles Wood, the chief author of the policy and the Despatch of 1854. With the arrival of Wood at the India Office, as the Secretary of State for India, education in this country, and University education in particular, was delivered from the peril, which threatened

it at its inception. Since then it has passed through different phases with ups and downs and with varying success. But on the whole, progress and advancement of learning which is the motto of the University, have been well maintained. The history of this progress and advancement of learning is to be found in the Centenary Volume which has been published by the University of Calcutta. .



Notifications

ANDHRA UNIVERSITY

No. S2-2415/56. Waltair, 25-7-1956.

Proceedings of the Vice-Chancellor.

Sub : Misconduct at University Examinations, March-April 1956.

The result of P. Adinarayana, candidate with Reg. No. 5618 for the Intermediate Examination held in March-April 1956 is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing for any of the University Examinations for a period of two years, i.e., he will be permitted to sit for the University Examinations to be held in March-April 1958 or thereafter.

(By Order)

University Office.

V. SIMHADRI RAO
(Dy. Registrar).

ANDHRA UNIVERSITY

No. S2/2415/56. Waltair, 17th July, 1956.

Proceedings of the Vice-Chancellor.

Sub :—Misconduct at University Examinations—March-April 1956.

Read :—Syndicate Resolution dated 30.6.56 and 1.7.56.

Order.

The results of the following Candidates for the Examinations noted against each, are cancelled and they are debarred from appearing for any of the University Examinations for a period of two years, i.e., they will be permitted to sit for the University Examinations to be held in March-April, 1958 or thereafter.

Name of the Candidate	Examination	Reg No.
Mr. K. S. Ramakrishnayya	B.A.	1174
Mr. A. Raghavachari	Intermediate	14015
Mr. C. Virabrahmamurti	Do.	7597
Mr. N. Radhakrishnamurti	Do.	6004

(By Order)

V. SIMHADRI RAO,
Dy. Registrar.

ANDHRA UNIVERSITY

No. S2/2415/56. Waltair, 12th July, 1956.

Proceedings of the Syndicate.

Sub :—Misconduct at March-April, 1956 Examination.

Ref :—Syndicate Resolution dated 30th June, 1956.

The result of N. Purushottama Rao, Candidate with Registered No. 2729 for the Matriculation Examination of March-April, 1956 is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing for any of the University Examinations for a period of two years, i.e., he will be permitted to sit for the University Examination to be held in March-April, 1958, or thereafter.

(By Order)

V. SIMHADRI RAO,
Dy. Registrar.

AGRA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. Cf. 29, 1956-57.

In partial modification of this office Notification No. CF. 52 dated 30.5.56 it is hereby notified that *only* the examination for 1956 of Sri Mahabir Bahadur Sinha (Roll No. 60 B.Sc. Part II Agra College, Agra) has now been cancelled.

L. P. MATHUR, D.Sc.,
Registrar.

AGRA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CF 37—1956.

The following candidates have been debarred from appearing at any Examination of the University during the years 1956 and 1957, as they attempted to use unfair means at the Supplementary Examinations of 1956 :—

S. No.	Roll No. & Exam.	Enrolment No.	Name of the Candidate	Examination Centre
1	804 B.Sc. Pt. I	A55559	Durjan Pal Singh (D. S. College, Aligarh)	Senate House, Agra
2	941 B.Sc. Pt. II	A549230	Prem Narain Verma (D. A. V. Col., Kanpur)	D. A. V. Col., Kanpur
3	8808 B.A. Pt. I	A542995	Mohd. Zaheer Khan Naz. (Holkar College, Indore)	Holkar Col., Indore
4	6937 B.A. Pt. I	A554923 (Kr.)	Mahendra Pal Singh Gautam (D. A. V. Col., Kanpur)	D. A. V. Col., Kanpur

The decision on the cases of the following candidates is under consideration and will be announced later on :—

1	Roll No. 3311	Enrolment No. A54530/	of B.A. Part II Supplementary Examination '56
2	Roll No. 3681	"	" A54127 of B.A. Part II Supplementary Examination '56
3	Roll No. 3770	"	" A54170 of B.A. Part II Supplementary Examination '56
4	Roll No. 3817	"	" A54525 of B.A. Part II Supplementary Examination '56

Senate House, Agra.

L. P. MATHUR, D.Sc.,
Registrar.

AGRA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CF 43, 1956.

In continuation of this Office Notification No. 52 of 30.5.56 it is hereby notified that Raj Kumar Gujran, a candidate for the B.Sc. Part I Examination of 1956 with Roll. No. 1702 Enrolment No. A5513368 has been debarred from appearing at any Examination of the University before 1958, as he attempted to use unfair means at the 1956 Examination.

Senate House, Agra.

L. P. MATHUR, D.Sc.,
(Capt.) Registrar.

AGRA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CF7, 1956-57

In partial modification of this office Notification No. CF. 52 dated 30.5.1956, the result of Sri Preetam Das Gandhi who appeared at B.Sc. (Engg.) Prev. Part I Exam. of 1956 from Engg. College, Dayalbagh, Agra with Roll No. 33, Enrol. No. A5414955 is hereby released and he is declared to have failed at the said examination.

Senate House, Agra.
July 7, 1956.

L. P. MATHUR, D.Sc.,
Registrar.

AGRA UNIVERSITY

Notification No CF/38, 1955-56.

The results of the following two candidates have been cancelled as they attempted to use unfair means at the Examination of 1956 :—

1. Sushil Kumar Roll No. 653, Enrolment No A5111805 B.Sc Pt. I St. John's College, Agra Centre.
2. (Km) Sushma Asthana Roll No. 207, Enrolment No A5512192 B.Sc. Pt. I St. John's College, Agra Centre.

Senate House, Agra.

L. P. MATHUR, D.Sc.,
Registrar.

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR

Dated August 23, 1956

To

Shri J. D. Gode.
c/o Prof. K. D. Gode,
6 Bhushan Lodge, Lanka.
VARANASI.

Dear Sir,

I have to inform that you have been rusticated by the Standing Committee of the Academic Council of the University for two years and are not allowed to appear at any of the University examinations before 1958 for using unfair means at the 1st Professional Supplementary Examination of 1956, vide Standing Committee Resolution No. 77, dated the 4th August, 1956.

Yours faithfully,
Registrar

UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE

No. Ex 3-323/55-56

Office of the University of Mysore,
Administrative Buildings,
Crawford Hall, Mysore
Dated 20th July, 1956.

Notification.

References :—(1) This Office Notifications No. Ex. 3-/55-56 dated 27-6-1955, No. Ex 3-469/55-56 dated 14-11-55, and No. Ex 3-243/56-57 dated 19-5-1956 rusticating certain candidates who had committed malpractice at the University Examinations of April 1955, September 1955 and March 1956 respectively.

(2) University Council resolution passed at the meeting held on 29/30th June 1956, that in cases of malpractice, candidates will loose only the examination at which they have been found guilty of malpractice and that the result, if any, of previous examinations be retained.

Order No. Ex 3-323/55-56 dated 20th July 1956

Pursuant to the resolution of the university Council passed at the meeting held on 29th-30th June 1956 and in partial modification of this office Notifications dated 27-6-1955, 14-11-1955, and 19-5-1956 referred to above, the candidates who are rusticated for committing malpractice at the University Examinations of April 1955, September 1955, and March 1956 will lose only the examination at which they have been found guilty of malpractice and they retain the result, if any, of previous examinations. The other conditions imposed, however, will stand.

By Order,
M. R. Bhimasena Rao
for Registrar

NOTIFICATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF POONA

NO. EX/BAR/30 OF 1956-57.

It is hereby notified that the results of the undermentioned candidates who have been found guilty of having resorted to unfair means at the University Examinations held in

March/April 1956, have been cancelled and that they have further been debarred from appearing at any examinations of this University before 1st January of the year mentioned against their names.

University Seat Number.	Candidate's name.	College.	Date till which the candidate is debarred.
1	2	3	4

INTERMEDIATE SCIENCE

333	Shri Khot, Dattu Gopala	Sir Parashurambhau College, Poona-2	1st January, 1958.
1035	Shri Pavangadkar, Prabhakar Narayan	Nowrosjee Wadia College, Poona-1	1st January, 1959

FIRST YEAR ENGINEERING

152	Shri Salgarkar, Yashavant Narayanrao	College of Engineering, Poona-5	1st January, 1958
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B.Sc (GENERAL)

258	Shri Joshi, Ram Shankar	Nowrosjee Wadia College, Poona-1	1st January 1958
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INTERMEDIATE ARTS

492	Miss Wad, Nalini Sadashiv	Sir Parashurambhau College, Poona-2	1st January, 1959
626	Shri Kuldarni, Laxman Moreswar.	Sir Parashurambhau College, Poona-2	1st January, 1959
1811	Miss Padekar, Kamal Sakharan.	H. P. T. College, Nasik	1st January, 1959
1821	Shri Patil, Vishwasrao Tukaram.	External	1st January, 1958
2086	Shri Bhosle, Janardan Ganapat.	D. A. V. College, Sholapur.	1st January, 1958

It is further notified that the results of the following persons who have been found guilty of practising unfair means at the Intermediate Science Examination held in March 1956 have been cancelled

University Seat Number.	Name.	College.
2815	Shri Bhaskar, Changdeo Muralidhar	Amednagar College, Amednagar.
2873	Shri Shinde, Kaluram Vitthal	do. do.
2924	Shri Pendbhaje, Ranganath Ramachandra.	do. do.
2928	Shri Ramavat, Laxman Govindram	do. do.

Ganeshkhind, Poona-7
August 11, 1956.

Y. D. KHAN,
Registrar

Notification No. Ex/67/56

UNIVERSITY OF SAUGAR

Notification

Dated Sagar, the 25th July, 1956.

1. It is notified for information that the following candidates who appeared at the various Examinations of the University of Sagar held in March-April, 1956, have been found guilty of using or attempting to use unfair means at these Examinations and have,

therefore, been debarred from appearing at the University Examination during the period mentioned against their names :—

Roll No.	Enrol-ment No.	Name of candidate	Examina-tion.	Institution	Year for which debarred.
114	B/8657	Vijay Kumar Rawat S/o Shri Ram Bharos Rawat, Rawat Bros. Katni.	Pre-Univ. (Sc.)	U. T. D. Sagar.	1956 Supp.
98	B/10506	Prem Chandra Jain S/o Shri Hazarilal Jain C/o Smt. Deoka Bai Jain, 135, Subadar ka House, Parkota, Sagar.	Pre-Univ. (Arts)	do.	1956 Supp.
571	B/9013	A. C. Mahajan C/o Shri N. P. Mahajan Singhpur Tah : Nar-singhpur Dist. Hoshangabad.	I.A.	Hitkarni Mahavidya-laya, Jabal-pur.	Any future Examination of the U n i v e r s i t y,
1091	B/7515	Imam S/o Shri Hussain, Padawa Gaulipura, Near Normal Hindi School, Khandwa.	I A.	Shri Nil-kantheshwar College, Khandwa.	1957
1117	B/11767	Vijay Prasad Shukla S/o Shri Ram Prasad Shukla, Rajpura, Burhanpur.	I.A.	do.	1957
371	B/8931	Kailash Jain S/o Shri Nathoolal Jain, Kirana Merchant, Sukra-wari Bazar, Seoni, Dist. Chhindwara.	I.Sc.	Mahokoshal Mahavidya-laya, Jabal-pur.	1957

Note : The Results of Examinations held in 1956 have been cancelled in all these

2. The results of Examinations held in 1956 of the following candidates have been cancelled for breach of examination rules :—

153	B/8519	Mahendra Kumar Jain S/o Shri Deep Chand Jain. C/o Shri Suresh Kumar Vijay Kumar Jain, Cloth Merchant General Lane, Kymore St. Jukehi Dist.. Jabalpur.	I A.	U. T. D. Sagar	
963	B/9936	Jawahar Lal Mishra C/o Shri Bhairav Prasad Mishra, Andhi-yarkhor. Post Navgarh Dist. Durg.	I A.	Chhattisgarh Raipur.	College,
322	B/7181	Malay Ch Chakravorty C/o Shri Manojanjan Chakravorty, 729, West Ghatapur, Baika Bagicha, Jabalpur.	I.Sc.	Ex student.	
43	B/5044	Kranti Kumar Rai S/o Dr. B. B. Rai, Gopalgunj, Sagar.	B.Sc. (Pass)	U. T. D. (Sagar.	
176	B/7586	Dinkar Ganesh Gokhale C/o Shri G. K. Gokhale, Hariganj, Gokhalewada, Khandwa.	B.Com. Pt. I.	Shri Nulkantheshwar College, Khandwa	
12	B/11702	Dwarka Prasad Tamrakar S/o Shri Laxmi Prasad Tamrakar, Purani Basti. Katni.	First Dip. in Engg :	Govt. Polytech. Jabal-pur.	

By Order
ISHWAR CHANDBA,
 Registrar

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY

Hyderabad—Deccan

Notification

In continuation of the Notification, dated 19th June, 1956, Shri B. Chennakeshavl Naidu, son of M. Rangaswamy Naidu, candidate Roll No. 564, B.Sc. Examination, March/April, 1956, is informed that he is debarred permanently from appearing for any of the Examinations of the Osmania University, as the Vice-Chancellor on further scrutiny of the case has found him guilty of grave misconduct inasmuch as

(i) he had assaulted one of the Lecturers,

and (ii) he had suppressed this information in a representation made to the Vice-Chancellor subsequently.

Sd. Illegible

D/27th July, 1956.

Controller of Examinations,

PUNJAB UNIVERSITY (SOLAN)

Notification

It is hereby notified that :—

I. (a) Shri Krishan Kumar, son of Shri Pyare Lal, B Coy 512 Comd. W/Shop, Kirkee (Pona-9), who tried to obtain a duplicate copy of the Matriculation certificate on the basis of a false statement of having passed the said examination in 1945, has been declared as not a fit and proper person to be admitted to any future examination of this University, for having deliberately cheated the University.

(b) Shri Gurdip Singh, son of S. Gurbax Singh, village Himatpur, Post Office Dhona, Tehsil Dasuya (Hoshiarpur), Roll No. 33960, Matriculation Examination, March, 1956, has been disqualified for four years for impersonation under regulation 13, at page 80 of the Calendar, Volume I, 1954.

(c) Shri. Sohan Singh, son of S. Naranjan Singh, Village and Post Office Kotla Nohd. Singh, Via Hariana, District Hoshiarpur (Regd. No. 50-dh-78), who impersonated Gurdip Singh, has been disqualified for five years under regulation 13, at page 80 of the Calendar, Volume I, 1954.

(d) The disqualification for five years imposed on Raj Paul Bhatia, S/o Shri Ram Saran Bhatia, who appeared in B.A. Examination, September, 1954, under Roll No. 5858, has been removed.

II. The concession to displaced persons to appear in certain examinations of this University as private candidates has been extended up to the examinations to be held in 1959. (This is subject to the sanction of the Govt.).

Solon (Simla Hills).

J. R. AGNIHOTRI,

Dated July 1, 1956.

Registrar.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY (SOLAN)

Notification

It is hereby notified that :—

1. A late college student appearing in the B.A. or B.Sc. Examination, can change additional optional subject also in addition to an elective subject, in one academic year, under Regulation 4, at page 17 of the Calendar, 1954, Volume II.

2. (a) Harbhajan Singh, S/o Balbir Singh, V. & P.O. Gunachaur (Jullundur) Roll No 40324, Matriculation Examination, March, 1956, has been disqualified for four years for impersonation, under regulation 13 at page 80 of the Calendar, Volume I, 1954.

(b) Madan Mohan Singh, S/o Shri Shiv Ram V. & P.O. Gunachaur (Jullundur), Regd. No. 55-b-64 (1st year student Sikh National College, Banua), who impersonated Harbhajan Singh has been disqualified for five years under regulation 13, at page 80 of the Calendar, Volume I, 1954.

3. Candidates for the Intermediate Science Examination have been allowed to write answers to question papers in the subject of Geography in English or Urdu or Hindi or Panjabi. (This is subject to approval of the Senate and Government).

4. Honours examination in Urdu has been instituted at the B.A. Examination like Honours in other subjects. (This is subject to approval of the Senate and Government).

Solon (Simla Hills).

J. R. AGNIHOTRI,

Dated August 8, 1956,

Registrar

CENTRAL BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION, AJMER.

The following candidate whose particulars are given against him, having attempted to use unfair means at the Inter. Arts Special Supplementary Examination of the Board for 1956, has been awarded the punishment noted against him :—

Roll No.	Name of candidate	Father's name	Residence	Punishment awarded.
1067	Kharag Singh	Shri Ranjeet Singh	Ajmer	Disqualified from the Inter. Arts Special Supplementary Examination of 1956, and debarred from the Inter. Examination of 1957.

Ajmer,
October 8, 1956.

(G. D. WIDHANI),
Secretary.

THE UNIVERSITY OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR, SRINAGAR.

Notification.

The Syndicate in its meeting held on 14th August, 1956, considered the reports of the Superintendents of Examination Centres on the walk-out staged by the students in the last Intermediate Examination in Chemistry and Physics Paper B together with the explanations submitted by the students reported to have taken a leading part in the walk-out and otherwise misbehaved and took the following decision :—

- (a) that (1) Chaman Lal, Roll No. 300, Intermediate Examination, 1956;
(2) Bansil Lal, Roll No. 278, Intermediate Examination, 1956; and
(3) Jawahar Lal, Roll No. 280, Intermediate Examination, 1956;
be disqualified from passing any University examination for two years (i.e., 1956 and 1957);
- (b) that 1. Ghulam Hassan Sofi, Roll No. 363, Intermediate Examination, 1956;
2. Prem Prakash (Baru), Roll No. 771, Intermediate Examination, 1956;
3. Dushvant Kumar, Roll No. 1042, Intermediate Examination, 1956;
4. Hakumat Singh, Roll No. 229, Intermediate Examination, 1956; &
5. K. L. Kaul, Roll No. 303 of the Intermediate Examination, 1956;
be disqualified from passing any University examination for one year (i.e., 1956).

GHULAM MOHAMMAD,
Registrar.

GUJARAT UNIVERSITY

No. Exam/A/50839 of 1956. Office of the Gujarat University

Ahmedabad—9. Dated 1 August, 1956.

It is hereby notified that the undermentioned candidates who have been found guilty of having practised unfair means at the University Examinations held in March-April, 1956, are declared to have failed at the respective examination, have forfeited their claims to exemptions, if any, earned by them at the examination held this year or in any previous year and that they are further debarred from appearing at any University or College examination before the dates mentioned against their respective names :

Name	College	Debarred up to
INTER. ARTS		
104 Bhatt Arunbhai Manubhai	External student	30.6.1957
1015 Shah Chandrakant Manilal	Do.	30.6.1957
1069 Shah Jayendrakumar Keshavlal	L.D. Arts College & M. G. Science Institute, Ahmedabad	31.12.1956
1180 Shah Pravinchandra Jayantilal	Do.	31.12.1956
2569 Patel Ambalal Hirallal	M.N. College, Visnagar	31.12.1956
2611 Pancholi Mahendrakumar Babubhai	Do.	31.12.1956
2785 Joshi Niranjan Kantilal	Dharmendrasinhji College, Rajkot.	31.12.1956
B.A.		
174 Patel Kanjibhai Manchharam	L. D. Arts College & M. G. Science Institute, Ahmedabad	30.6.1958
1228 Raval Chandrakant Mohanlal	Dharmendrasinhji College, Rajkot.	30.6.1958

INTER. SCIENCE

309 Shah Kantilal Bapalal	Gujarat College, Ahmedabad	31.12.1956
517 Desai Rameshchandra Dinkerbhai	L. D. Arts College & M. G. Science Institute, Ahmedabad	31.12.1956
551 Pathan Resulkhan Hasankhan	Do.	31.12.1956
1192 Gandhi Shaktikant Chimanlal	V. P. Mahavidyalaya, Vallabh-Vidyanagar	31.12.1956
1195 Patel Bharatkumar Manibhai	Do.	31.12.1956
1305 Patel Rameshbhai Maganbhai	Do.	31.12.1956

B.Sc.

1018 Patel Navnilal Kasanji	M. T. B. College, Surat	31.6.1958
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F.E.

263 Parikh Subhaschandra Ramanlal	P. V. Mahavidyalaya, Vallabh-Vidyanagar	30.6.1957
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S. E. (CIVIL)

202 Jobanputra Laxmidas Hansraj	Lukhdhirji Engg. College, Morvi.	30.6.1957
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FIRST LL.B.

519 Pandya Rameshchandra Gaurishanker	A.M.P. Law College, Rajkot.	31.12.1956
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B, COM.

116 Patel Navinchandra Jettabhai	H. L. College of Commerce, Ahmedabad.	31.12.1956
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K. C. PANKLI,
Registrar.

PATNA UNIVERSITY

Patna, the 27th July, 1956.

The undermentioned candidates are debarred from appearing at any University Examination for the period noted against their names as they were found guilty of using unfair means at the Annual Intermediate, Bachelor and Master's Examination in Arts, Science and Engineering Examinations of 1956.

Sl. No.	Centre	Roll No. Examination	Registration No. & College	Candidates Name	Period of Punishment.
1	Tri-Chandra College, Kathmandu, Nepal.	Roll Nep No. 155, I.Sc.	1204-55 Tri-Chandra College, Kathmandu, Nepal.	Ved Vyas Kshatri	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1957.
2	Bihar College of Engineering, Patna.	Roll Pat. No. 38, I.Sc. (Eng.) Part II	708-54 Bihar College of Engineering, Patna.	Paras Nath Prasad	Do.
3	B. N. College, Patna.	Roll Pat. No. 68, B.Sc.	7869-51 B. N. College, Patna	Raghubansh Singh	Do.
4	Senate Hall, Patna University, Patna 5.	Roll Pat. No. 126, B.A.	8735-51, B. N. College, Patna.	Amar Singh	Do.
5	Science College, Patna.	Roll Pat. No. 42, M.Sc.	4061-48 Deptt. of Chemistry Patna University.	Keshav Kumar Dass	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the M.Sc. Examination of 1959.
6	Science College, Patna.	Roll Pat No. 20, M.Sc.	7294 51 Deptt. of Physics, Patna University.	Ram Narayan Sinha.	Do.

S. Y. HUSSAIN,
Deputy Registrar.
Patna University.

BIHAR UNIVERSITY

Circular No. 6. Patna, the 30th July, 1956.

To Directors of Public Instruction of all States, Principals of all Colleges under the Bihar University, Inspectors & District Inspectors of Schools in Bihar, Deputy Directors of Education, Bihar, Registrars of all Indian Universities, Secretaries, Secondary School Examination Board of all States, Secretary, Union Public Service Commission, Delhi and Secretary, Bihar, Bihar Public Service Commission, Bailey Road, Patna.

The undermentioned candidates are debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the examination noted against their names as they were found guilty of using unfair means at the Annual Intermediate and Bachelor Examinations of 1956 of this University :

Sl No.	Name of Centres & College	Name of Exams. & Roll No of the candidate	Reg. No.	Name of the candidate	Punishment
1	2	3	4	5	6
1	Arrah, H. D. Jain, College.	B A Arr. 165	454-52	Alakh Narayan Prasad	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1958.
2	Do.	B A. Arr. 40(H)	14338-55	Ram Ran Bihari Prasad	Do
3	Aurangabad, S. Sinha College.	I.A. Aur. 47	12486 55	Dukhkhani Prasad	Do.
4	Bhagalpur, Marwari College.	B.Com. Bhag. 3	2968-55	Amiya Kumar Das	Do.
5	Begusarai, G. D. College.	I.A. Beg 55	6714-55	Chhotan Singh	Do.
6	Do.	I.A. Beg 414	9125-54	Lala Krityanand Prasad	Do.
7	Do.	B.A. Beg. 4(H)	4465-53	Baidya Nath Singh	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1957.
8	Chapra, Rajendra College.	I.Sc. Chap. 147	8172-55	Hanuman Pratep Singh	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1958.
9	Do.	I.Com. Chap. 65	7995-54	Ram Prabesh Sharma	Do.
10	Darbhanga, C M College.	I.A. Dar. 145	5505-55	Nityanand Singh	Do.
11	Do.	I.Com. Dar. 126	8242-54	Mithila Bihari Thakur	Do.
12	Do.	B.A. Dar. 141	3820-51	Abdul Raquib Khan	Do.
13	Do.	B.Com. Dar. 110	8655-51	Tej Narayan Jha	Do.
14	Do.	B.Com. Dar. 136	2972-48	Yoga Nand Singh	Do.
15	Daltonganj, G. L. A. College.	I.A. Dal. 72	13488-55	Sheikh Md. Qasim-uddin	Do.
16	Do.	I.A. Dal 83	18505-55	Satya Pal Verma	Do.
17	Dumka, S. P. College,	I.A. Dum. 2	4299-55	Anadi Nath Chakravarty	Do.
18	Do.	I.A. Dum 50	6969-55	Man Mohan Prasad Singh	Do.
19	Do.	I.A. Dum. 84	6961-55	Shobha Kant Jha	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1957.

Sl. No.	Name of Centre & College.	Name of Exams. & Roll No. of the candidate	Reg. No.	Name of the candidate	Punishment
1	2	3	4	5	6
20	Gaya, Gaya College.	I.A. Gay. 592	4334-54	Ramashray Mishra	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1959.
21	Do.	I.Sc. Gay. 178	4776 54	Madan Mohan Mishra	Do.
22	Do.	I.Com. Gay. 43	7514-55	Jagat Kishor Prasad	Do.
23	Do.	B.A. Gay. 7	13981-53	Ishwar Chandra Ojha	Do.
24	Do.	B.A. Gay. 11	13910 53	S. Wali Imam	Do.
25	Do.	B.A. Gay. 12	13997-53	S. Razi	Do.
26	Do.	B.Com. Gay. 51	15208 53	Mohammad Qamrul Hassan	Do.
27	Khagaria Koshi College.	I.A. Khag. 38	5340-55	Vidya Bhushan Prasad	Do.
28	Do.	I.A. Khag. 125	5294-54	Baidya Nath Jha	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1957.
29	Muzaffarpur, L.S. College	I.A. Muz. 95	8822-55	Ram Nath Baitha	Do.
30	Do.	I.Sc. Muz. 59	8664-55	Deo Priya Chaudhary	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1958.
31	Do.	B.A. Muz. 144(H)	6385-53	Ram Bilas Sinha	Do.
32	Muzaffarpur R. D. S. College.	I Com. Muz. 160	5655-49	Sheo Shankar Prasad Srivastava	Do.
33	Do.	B.A. Muz. 117	15944-53	Upendra Prasad Singh	Do.
34	Motihari M.S. College.	I.A. Mot. 29	11603 55	Chandra Sekhar Singh	Do.
35	Do.	I.A. Mot. 44	10509 55	Natendra Singh	Do.
36	Monghyr R.D. & D.J. College.	I.A. Mong. 241	2821-51	Janardan Prasad Singh	Do.
37	Do.	I.A. Mong. 299	9088-51	Rajpati Paswan	Do.
38	Do.	I.A. Mong. 375	6646-54	Hira Lal Singh	Do.
39	Do.	B.Com. Mong. 15	12214-51	Janardan Jha	Do.
40	Do.	B.Com. Mong. 48	8068 53	Sudhir Chandra Prasad	Do.
41	Nalanda College.	I.A. Nal. 460	3088-52	Raja Ram Mohan Roy	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1959.
42	Do.	I.A. Nal. 491	8117-53	Shaukat Raza	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1958.
43	Do.	B.A. Nal. 43	1284-52	Balmik Narayan Prasad	Do.
44	Patna Commerce College.	I.A. Pat. 33	201-55	Nagendra Prasad Mathur	Do. (Sup.)
45	Do.	I.A. Pat. 48	1126-56	Braj Kishore Prasad	Do. (Annual)
46	Do.	I.A. Pat. 76	1118-55	Ramansand Singh	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1957.

Sl. No.	Name of Centre & College.	Name of Exams. & Roll No. of the candidate	Reg. No.	Name of the candidate	Punishment
1	2	3	4	5	6
47	Do.	I.A. Pat. 105	1630-55	Harj Prasad	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1958.
48	Do.	I.Com. Pat. 164	15544-55	Ram Pyare Sharma	Do.
49	Purnea, Purnea College.	I.A. Purn. 59	6516-55	Bishwanath Ram	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1957.
50	Ranchi, Ranchi College.	B.A. Ra n. 67(H)	570-52	Prabbakar Binoy Kachehap	Do.
51	Sasaram, S. P. Jain College.	I.A. Sas. 31	4680-55	Dasrath Upadhaya	Do.
52	Do.	I.A. Sas. 3	15993-55	Amir Chand Ram	Do.
53	Do.	I.A. Sas. 110	4905-55	Laxmi Narayan	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1958.
54	Do.	I.A. Sas. 43	4830-55	Nand Gopal Maitra	Do.
55	Do.	I.A. Sas. 65	4854-55	Murli dhar Prasad	Do.
56	Do.	I.A. Sas. 133	4881-55	Syed Mustaq Ahmad Rizvi	Do.
57	Saharsa, Saharsa College.	I.A. Sah. 19)	8728-55	Deep Narayan Prasad Mandal	Do.
58	Do.	I.A. Sah. 196	8921-55	Bhupendra Prasad Yadav	Do.
59	Do.	I.A. Sah. 99	2616-55	Hirdaya Narain Sahu	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1957.
60	Do.	I.A. Sah. 122	1256-54	Shailendra Narayan Jha "Shai:bav"	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1963.
61	Sitamarhi, S. R. K. Goenka College.	I.A. Sit. 70	12587-55	Ram Bahadur Rai	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1957.
62	Do.	B.A. Sit. 1	7953-53	Ghanshayam Jha	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1958.
63	Barh, A.N.S. College.	I.A. Barh. 806	2180-54	Ram Chandra Prasad	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1959.

A. NARAYAN,
Controller of Examinations.

UNIVERSITY OF DELHI

(1) The undermentioned candidates for the various University Examinations held in 1956, who were proved to the satisfaction of the Executive Council to have resorted to unfair means in the course of the examination, have been disqualified from passing the examination of 1956 and debarred from appearing at any examination of the University for a further period of one year. viz., 1957 :—

S. No.	Examination	Roll No.	Name of candidate	Father's name	College
1.	Qualifying Admission	1397	Bhojan Lal Rakhra	Shri Jamna Dass Rakhra	Ramjass
2.		4	Hardial Singh Mehta	Dr. Prem Singh Mehta	—

(2) The undermentioned candidate for the B.A. (Pass) Examination held in April, 1956, who was proved to the satisfaction of the Executive Council to have resorted to unfair means in the course of the Examination, has been disqualified from passing the examination held in April, 1956 :—

Roll No.	Enrolment No.	Name of candidate	Father's name	College
974	R-3403	Ramesh Chander Gaur	Shri Pitamber Prashad Gaur	S. G. T. B. Khalsa

Delhi,
28th July, 1956.

T. P. S. IYER,
Registrar.

ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY

Proceedings of the Syndicate

Subject : Malpractice at the University Examinations March-April 1956.

The Syndicate, having found the undermentioned candidate at the University Examination of April 1956 guilty of resorting to unfair means at the Examination has resolved that the Examination taken by the candidate be cancelled and that he be debarred from appearing from the Examination for a period of a year and for the Examination of 1956. He is permitted to appear for the Examination to be held in March, 1957.

Name of candidate	Reg. No.	Examination taken	Date of birth	Father's name and address
1. K. Narayanan	1594	Inter Engineering Part II.	26-10-1931	N. K. K. Krishnappa Chettiar, Banker, Kilassavelpatti, Ramanad Dt.
Annamalainagar, 4th August, 1956				Sd. Illegible Registrar

CENTRAL BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION, AJMER

Notification


The following candidates, whose particulars are given against each, having attempted to use unfair means at the High School Examination of the Board of 1956, have been debarred from appearing at the High School Examination of the Board noted against each;—

Sel. No.	Roll No.	Name of Candidate	Name of Father	Name of Institution from which appeared. In case of private candidates name of the place of residence.	High School Examination from which debarred.
1	6	Anand Swaroop Sood	Rup Chand	Ajmer	
2	921	Chandra Mohan Sud	Dev Raj Sud	do.	Disqualified from the High School Examination of 1956 and debarred from the High School Examination of 1957.
3	250	Daya Shankar Sharma	Ram Chandra Sharma	do.	do.
4	313	Francis Shanker	Pann Suleman	do.	do.
5	646	Kishan Lal Sen	Mohan Lal Sen	do.	do.
6	672	Kanhaiya Lal Sharma	Dularam Sharma	do.	do.
7	1149	Rudra Datt Sharma	Sohan Lal Sharma	do.	do.
8	1262	Mangal Singh	Bhim Singh	do.	do.
9	1975	(Mrs.) Shyama Devi Sharma	Ram Gopal Sharma	Deoliakalam (Ajmer)	do.
10	1981	Arjan B. Khilnani	Balkrishan Das	Delhi	do.
11	2303	Mohan Lal Kishin Chand Bhatia	Kishan Chand	Distt. Jabalpur M.P.	do.
12	2203	Mohan Gulmal	Gulmal	Maibar (V.P.)	do.
13	2349	Gaj Roop Prasad Sharma	Bhagwan Din	Rewa (V.P.)	do.
14	2889	Ganga Ram Sharma	Sudhan Ram Sharma	Distt. Shahdol (V.P.)	do.
15	3057	Basant Kumar Sitoke	Rameshve Das Sitoke	Bhopal	do.
16	3381	Sunder Rathora	Tulja Ram Rathore	do.	do.
17	3656	Shyam Alimchand Hingorani	Alimchand	Govt. High School for Sindhi's No. 2 Ajmer.	do.
18	3936	K. Vijai Singh	Rugber Singh	Govt. High School, Ajmer	do.
19	3962	Nagendra Nath Sharma	Ghaneshyam Nath Sharma	do.	do.
20	3990	Ramesh Chandra Tailor	Ratan Lal Tailor	do.	do.
21	4094	Ved Prakash	Gele Ram	do.	do.
22	5097	Kailash Chand Patni	Sohan Lal Patni	Vyaparik Inter. College, Nasirabad (Ajmer).	do.
23	5231	Ghan Shyam Dass Sharma	Gokul Prasad Sharma	Govt. Betham High School, Kerkri (Ajmer).	do.

24	5387	Dawa Lal Sharma	Birdi Chand	Narsin High School, Bijnai- nagar (Ajmer).	do.
25	5419	Raj Singh Naruka	Laxmi Narayan Naruka	do.	do.
26	5467	Ram Singh Bari	Shri Bux Bari	Govt. High School, Bhinai (Ajmer).	do.
27	5482	Tara Chand Jain	Mangi Lal Jain	do	do.
28	6598	Mritunjai Prasad Bajpai	Ram Kripal Bajpai	Martand High School, Rewa (V.P.)	do.
29	6749	Saiya Din Gupta	Baij Nath Gupta	do.	do.
30	8140	Virendra Prasad Raizada Verma.	Raizada Govind Prasad Aftab Verma.	Hamidus High School, Bhopal	do.

Dated, Ajmer the 30th June, 1956.

G. D. WIDHANI
Secretary
Central Board of Secondary Education,
AJMER.



THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

Vol. 142]

MARCH, 1957

[No. 3

IS THE U.N.O. RESHAPING ?

ATINDRANATH BOSE

Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations begins with the assertion of the following purpose :

“To maintain international peace and security and to that end :
to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,—”

In pursuance of this objective the General Assembly of the United Nations took up the issues of Egypt and Hungary and came to decisions, the full implications of which are yet to be seen. These decisions, apart from their bearing on the future of international law, involve constitutional questions of great significance. It seems that the international body is passing through a structural transformation without any amendment of the Charter in the manner prescribed under Articles 108 and 109.

On October 31, France and the U.K. started offensive against Egypt. Next day, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. brought two resolutions before the Security Council asking the parties to stop hostilities and to submit to an armistice immediately. These resolutions were in accordance with Articles 39 and 40 which run thus :

39. “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security”.

49. "In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable.—"

Both the resolutions were vetoed by France and the U.K. which are permanent members of the Security Council and were thrown out. On November 4, after Soviet troops had started suppressing the insurgents in Hungary, a similar resolution was brought before the Security Council. This also was vetoed by the U.S.S.R. which is another permanent member of the Security Council.

Did the exercise of veto power in these two cases conform to the Charter? The relevant clause, *i.e.*, Article 27, paragraph 3 goes like this :

"Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members ; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting."

The restrictions imposed upon the exercise of veto power are with respect to the pacific settlement of disputes. When the Security Council wants to settle a dispute by such peaceful means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, etc., as specified in Chapter VI, or through regional arrangements or agencies, as specified in Article 52, paragraph 3, a party to the dispute shall not vote.

The Egyptian and Hungarian issues did not come under these categories. Because here the question was not one of "pacific settlement of disputes" as under Chapter VI but one of "action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression" which come under Chapter VII. The proviso to Article 27, paragraph 3 does not apply to this situation. So it comes to this: when the Security Council is considering appropriate measures for peaceful settlement of a dispute which has not yet caused a breach of peace, a party to the dispute cannot exercise veto power and block the decision ; but when the Security Council is considering more drastic measures to stop an act of aggression or to repair an actual breach of peace, the aggressor or peace-breaker, if it is a permanent member of the Security Council, can exercise veto power and block a decision. Is this strange anomaly in the Charter due to oversight? Or was it made deliberately considering that action against an aggressor state, when it is a permanent member, *i.e.*, a great power, is just impossible?

Assuming that the veto exercised by France and the U.K. on the Egyptian resolution and by the U.S.S.R. on the Hungarian resolution was not barred by the proviso to Article 27, paragraph 3 and was quite legal, the matter ought to have ended there. For the Security Council is the only organ vested with any power of action. The functions of the General Assembly are only deliberative and recommendatory Under Article 11, paragraph 2,

"The General Assembly may discuss any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security—may make recommendations with regard to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question, on which action is necessary, shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion".

So, the General Assembly is not the competent body to take action for restoration of peace or for cessation of hostilities. Thus, the United Nations is brought into a dangerous impasse when the Security Council, in the face of a grave crisis is paralysed by the exercise of veto power by a permanent member. To meet this situation a resolution was passed in the General Assembly on November 3, 1950 by which it claimed to assume the functions of the Security Council when the latter was immobilised. It runs as follows :

"If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in special session within 24 hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session' shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations".

This amounted to a revision of the Charter, secured without going through the formal process of amendment. In accordance with the

powers assumed under this resolution, the General Assembly, on November 4 last, asked the Secretary General to submit, within 48 hours, a plan for setting up an emergency force of the United Nations to "secure and supervise an end of hostilities in Egypt". On November 5, the Assembly voted the international force into existence and the force was sent into Egypt to "secure and supervise an end of hostilities". Such action is clearly reserved for the Security Council under Article 42.

Almost at the same time another resolution was passed in the General Assembly calling upon the U.S.S.R. to halt armed attack on Hungary and to "withdraw all its forces without delay". This step is covered by Article 11, paragraph 2, under which the General Assembly is entitled to make recommendations with regard to the maintenance of peace to the state or states concerned. But the Assembly did not stop at that. It instructed the Secretary General to investigate into and report on the affairs of Hungary, thereby undertaking an action which is not assigned to it under the Charter.

It may seem strange that none of the vetoing states challenged the competence of the Assembly and the legality of its resolutions. In the case of Egypt, France and the U.K. at least formally acclaimed the United Nations emergency force. In Hungary, the Kadar Government and the U.S.S.R. objected to the intervention of the United Nations in what they described as within the domestic jurisdiction of the states. They did not question the jurisdiction of the General Assembly as such. The legal question was not raised for obvious reasons. The General Assembly is the widest representative body of states and a forum of world opinion on governmental level. This opinion had asserted itself in unequivocal terms. Constitutional propriety and legal quibbles would have been a weak shelter against the mounting pressure for collective action exerted through the central organ of the international body. Thus, the Security Council, with the stultifying veto power of its permanent members was shunted aside and the General Assembly, with its universal and democratic composition came to the fore. A new precedent has been created which bids fair to change the basic structure of the United Nations.

It will be rash, however, to be too optimistic about its future. While international law and justice have won the first round in Egypt, in Hungary they have been knocked out at the beginning. It is the military success of the aggressor states which makes the difference. France and the U.K. could not present the United Nations with a fait accompli as the U.S.S.R. had done. Had the former succeeded

to paralyse Egyptian resistance at the first stroke, to set up a puppet government in Cairo and to get their actions supported by it, the emergency force might not have been in Egypt today ; and the United Nations might have ended its efforts pleading for a postmortem examination of the Egyptian affairs as it has been doing in the case of Hungary.

THE ROLES OF CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SOCIETY

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The history of human civilization is largely a history of the appearance of countless interests in man's social life. We can classify these interests, into several groups by making a basis on the nature of the attitude developed in social groups. Interests which lead to the formation of the spirit of cooperation among individuals have been termed *common interests*, while interests which develop a belligerent attitude among individuals are known as *Conflicting interests*. It is easy to see that conflicting interests generate social conflicts, but they are not the only factors which stimulate these conflicts. The ways in which human desires in connection with interests are gratified may also develop social conflicts. In the case of religion, it may be argued, there should not appear any conflict because nobody by being religious stands in the way of somebody else for being religious. But the bitterest conflicts have appeared in the sphere of religion because the ways of expressing its sentiments have been diverse; and diverse doctrines and dogmas of religion have appeared in spite of the fact that all religions are basically one.

Interferences which lead to conflicts may appear in different ways and in different fields. All conflicts that take place (1) between an individual and his society, (2) between two individuals, (3) between two social groups and (4) between two different interests of the same individual have been termed "elementary" because the number of antagonists who start these conflicts is always the lowest. Conflicts in which more than two or groups of two antagonists take part may be termed *Compound conflicts*. For various reasons these terms are highly suitable for use in the field of social studies.

Darwin was conscious of the presence of conflicts in social life, which he tried to justify with the aid of his doctrine of the survival of the fittest. But our concept of the development of the spirit of conflict manifesting itself due to the presence of interests in social groups is more basic than this doctrine. Conflicts in the form of oppositions appear in societies in various shapes; and war, competition

and discussion are the most important of these.¹ A war is, undoubtedly, the most savage and brutal of all kinds of conflicts. The appearance of conflicts is natural in society but that does not mean that a war should come always as a natural answer to conflicts. Conflicts may develop traits that have high social values but wars are extremely antisocial. There are many who think that wars lead, subsequently, to social good of some kind or other but the idea is distinctly erroneous.

It is a mistake to think that only imitation in social groups calms down and harmonises conflicts.² Imitation does establish a sort of equilibrium in social mediums when conflicts are there but its main purpose is something else. Imitation is always present in society; it is present even when there is no conflict. Gabriel Tarde was precisely correct when he asserted—"Society is imitation."³ The force that leads to unification in society is imitation; it is, therefore, an effective factor of coordination. But the process of coordination is not limited to a particular phase of life; it is naturally extended to the different fields of thoughts, feelings and actions. Oppositions and imitations lead to inventions which are of supreme importance to the healthy growth of society. Oppositions are necessary for inventions for they bring individuals to new situations, and imitations are necessary for they extend the advantage of the cumulative records of knowledge. Inventions in the form of artificial instruments and human social life are intimately connected.⁴ The use of tools by primates is, by no means, rare. Baboons often use pieces of stones as weapons and Capuchin monkeys crack nuts with slabs of stones.⁵ And Gorillas have been noticed drawing lines on walls with pieces of charcoal thrown to them for teasing them.

Human society keeps up its continuity through imitation. Traditions which are vital for society owe their existence to imitation. Traditions signify a new mechanism of evolution for they often serve to offer periods of consolidation to social groups. Primitive man labours under the disadvantage of having unkempt thinking processes but he has the advantage of being able to work under the pressure of blind and purblind impulses which are in keeping with his traditions. It is the mind of man that coordinates to form traditions for they tend to conserve things that are already there. Social

¹ The Laws of Imitation—G. Tarde, P. 80.

² Vide Principles of Sociology—F. H. Giddings; Page 109.

³ The Laws of Imitation—G. Tarde; P. 74.

⁴ Creative Evolution—H. Bergson; P. 145.

⁵ Animals and Men—D. Katz; P. 178.

heritage evidently, signifies the working of the urge of coordination in social groups of man. It is the social mind of man that coordinates and conserves bodies of knowledge and information for social use. But mere imitation is not enough; for an extreme form of imitation in the absence of elements of opposition is destined to lead society to stagnation. Imitation in suchlike situations may, in fact, develop a state of social somnambulism.*

In spite of the fact that conflicts seem to be detrimental to the interest of society and in spite of the strong assertions by many profound thinkers like Comte and Darwin who suggest that conflicts are independent identities, they are significant in social life for they seek to develop the spirit of cooperation in groups. Conflicts are deliberately avoided in primitive societies by all means, mainly, with the aid of conservatism but they are not disallowed to appear in advanced societies. These conflicts, above all, are of distinct social values for they incubate the spirit of cooperation and mark the beginning of the formation of conscious ideals for the social life of man. The slightest departure from the beaten path is considered social outlawry in primitive societies but oppositions in the form of freethinking are not unwelcome in advanced societies.

Conflicts contribute to socialization in an indirect way by opening up chances of positive interactions⁷ and by awakening and directing human attention.⁸ But ultimately they generate the social instinct of cooperation⁹ which works as an agent for social consolidation. Conflicts, if taken isolatedly, seem to be breakers of social bonds and as such inimical to social currents that bring individuals or smaller groups together under the pressure of social solidarity. But when viewed in their total perspective they palpably show the origin of certain social tendencies which ultimately join hands to develop cooperation. Conflicts, then, are not what they seem to be; they are neither brutal nor wasteful. They are of immense social values for they, in an indirect way, mean to develop a spirit which is indispensable for social progress. The development of reason in social groups naturally does away with the cruel and savage elements from conflicts. But a total lack of conflicts may bring about a state of atrophy in the structure of society. For the proper operation of the progressive trend of a living society the spirits of conflicts and

* The Laws of Imitation—G. Tarde; P. 87.

⁷ The Social Theory of G. Simmel—N. Spykman; P. 112.

⁸ Social Process—C. H. Cooley; P. 88.

⁹ The Synthesis of Social entities—M. C. Ghose—The Calcutta Review, March 1956.

co-operation must both be abiding ; but there should exist a sort of balance of these spirits. An absence of conflicts means stagnation and a maximum of cooperation brings about social solidification which is also a special form of stagnation.¹⁰ Again, a profound characteristic of conflicts is that they awaken and stimulate.¹¹ How can a society continue to live progressively without ever getting stimulations? Conflict and cooperation are correlative forces that spring from the basic urge of coordination of life and their function is simply to effect social coordinations. Life becomes the richer by their presence.

Societies of insects, such as ants and bees are highly ordered but stereotyped whereas human societies are plastic and full of strifes but open to progress. An ideal society should be destitute of conflicts, yet full of promises of progress but these traits are hopelessly incompatible.¹² The tenor of our argument goes to suggest that society requires both the spirit of conflict and the spirit of cooperation for its healthy development.

A complete lack of conflicts in a social group, as we have already seen, may make social life absolutely rigid and static. A society after all, is a manifestation of life ; and as such if it reaches a state of equilibrium akin to that in the physical world, life loses all its freshness and society all its vitality. And various forms of social atrophy are known to grow as a result. Ross speaks of an extreme form of social atrophy which is termed "Ossification."¹³ This hardening, he suggests, may be broken down and a social group may be made normally supple by the process of individualization. The idea is significant for the preliminary process of disintegration for effecting new coordinations is a fundamental method in nature. The formation of physical bodies of plants and animals, which is a brilliant outcome of the process of coordination, starts and continues its work by the process of division and juxtaposition of cells. Division, in this process takes place as the preliminary part of the process of coordination. Disintegration here, produces a condition which favours subsequent integration.

Spinoza was of opinion that cooperation was not a natural trait in human life and that it could be produced consciously by perceiving the advantages of cooperative living. Many, even today, share his opinion. But it is difficult to be at one with them because our modern

¹⁰ General Sociology—A. W. Small ;

¹¹ Principles of Sociology—E. A. Ross ; P. 167.

¹² Creative Evolution—H. Bergson ; P. 106.

¹³ Principles of Sociology—E. A. Ross ; Chapter XLII.

concepts of Sociology, which are based on observations do not tally with Spinoza's idea. Vico laid great stress upon the common nature and the natural sociability of man; he could, therefore, work out the idea of the development of cooperation as a natural process in social life. He conceived social process as a gradual unfolding of social institutions under the pressure of common needs of individuals. To modern Sociologists Vico is not so popularly known as he should have been. He was a pioneer in the field of social studies, who had a clear concept of the nature of the gradual development of society. When we turn to Vico we are astonished to find the boldness of his writings regarding certain fundamental concepts that are at once modern and scientific.

Kropotkin considered cooperation as a natural trait that evolved in social life. He suggested that although there was always the spirit of the struggle for existence in the animal world, it was never keen among animals belonging to the same species.¹⁴ Kropotkin's vigorous way of developing the idea of the importance of cooperation in human life will encourage us to take to activities that will foster international peace and solidarity.

Hobhouse suggested that the presence of a particular trait—mutual interest—was responsible for keeping individuals together and for generating the spirit of cooperation in human society.¹⁵ Hobhouse conceived social processes as the development of certain human traits of which cooperation was one. Giddings depended upon his concept of the "consciousness of kind" as the basic factor for the development of the social trait of cooperation in life.¹⁶

The impetus for the development of cooperation which is a factor of evolution comes from the basic urge of coordination of life. The growth of cooperation in social life is as natural as the appearance of a useful organ in a species. Cooperation is a trait in social life, which manifests itself at a particular stage of the evolution of society. Its survival value is palpable for we find that even animals that depend upon cooperative living in their social life are the most successful fighters against extinction.

The sociological phase of evolution is not generally, properly understood. The idea that the spirit of evolution finds a congenial field in society for its elaboration and manifestations becomes clear if we trace the rise of complexity in human societies. And as a

¹⁴ Mutual Aid; a factor in Evolution—P. Kropotkin—Page vii.

¹⁵ Social Evolution and Political Theory—L. T. Hobhouse—Page 127.

¹⁶ Principles of Sociology—F. H. Giddings.

matter of fact it is possible to accept the idea that in the highest form of life—in the life of man—evolution concerns itself mainly with his social, and not with his structural, changes. Conditions of emancipation are the goals which evolution proposes to establish in life. Social evolution tends to produce freedom in the lives of individuals much as biological evolution aims to produce liberty in the bodies of organisms.

Evolution is not mechanical ; it is not teleological either, asserts Bergson. Teleology suggests that finality is fixed and that it can be foreseen ; but if no room is left for the appearance of the new, time becomes useless and finalism turns to be nothing but inverted mechanism.¹⁷ Life continues to go on elaborating and complicating itself more and more dangerously in many cases, even when it has adopted itself successfully. In the plan of Nature the future is always open and the vital urge always initiates creations. Evolution is creative.¹⁸ It is true that Bergson has brilliantly established his idea to the effect that evolution is really creative but he has failed utterly to suggest why it is so.

Evolution seeks to convert rigidity into freedom ; and it effects that in gradual stages, in all the different phases of life. But it is the basically vital urge of coordination which is responsible for the appearance of evolution as we know it. The urge of coordination is the basic force which causes life to move and evolution is the effect of this force. There is no reason why the process of coordination should stop with the establishment of the state of security in the life of the organism and this is exactly what we find in Nature. Freedom is the ideal of life and the spirit of coordination which works as the primemover of this ideal is like its inspiration. The ideal recedes along with the continuation of progress and lives as an eternal ideal of life ; and the inspiration grows keener, deeper and more extensive in its expressiveness as life advances. The working of the vital process of coordination causes the precipitation of the general result which we call evolution, to be creative.

Conflict and cooperation are the expressions of the two basic but contradictory tendencies of social life. And it is the balance of these two diametrically opposite inclinations, which goes to build up the stability of social groups. Conditions favourable for this social equilibrium are brought about with the aid of various forms of adaptations.

¹⁷ *Creative Evolution*—H. Bergson ; P. 44.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Pages 7, 110.

The term adaptation looms large in the minds of Sociologists because the principle of adaptation lies at the back of all forms of socialization. Descriptions of various forms of adaptations such as, active and passive, ¹⁹ passive-physical, passive-spiritual, active-material and active-spiritual ²⁰, are now found in literature. These nomenclatures are neither correct from the point of view of the nature of their processes nor suitable from the point of view of any basic organization. It is not proper to call adaptations passive; they are all active. Some of them may appear as passive only when we look at a particular phase of these processes of adaptation. Social adaptations are processes of coordination that are natural in social groups. The basic urge of coordination of life manifests itself in many forms even in social life and adaptation is one of these forms. In one type of this coordination man effects changes in Nature so that his environment becomes suitable for being coordinated to him and in another type he brings about changes in his ownself so that he himself becomes suitable for being coordinated to Nature. Copious examples of these two types of coordinations are found in various stages of human culture, both primitive and advanced. Again, the evolution of the processes of social control either for perpetuating a society or for directing its progress is interesting from the point of view of the concept of coordination.²¹

Social ideals which are precious possessions of man grow out of the social inclinations of conflict and cooperation. Ideals at the beginning tend to establish compromises only, but soon they develop certain spiritual and inspirational elements for which they are always held in high esteem.

Ideals are as important for individuals as they are for societies. Just as individuals are destined to shape their lives with their ideals so are societies destined to reform their structures with social ideals. Social ideals can serve as directives because they have got intimate connections with the greatest sentimental force of life—love. Our ideas become our ideals when we love them. It is the element of love which causes individuals to move towards ideals. All human societies have ideals; sometimes these ideals are conscious but often they are unconscious. It is well-nigh impossible to do without ideals of life; these may, of course, be worthy or unworthy. The presence of false ideals in societies has been the source of all human ills.

¹⁹ Sociology and Social Process—T. N. Carver; P. 9

²⁰ Social Adaptation—L. N. Bristol

²¹ Processes of social control—M. C. Ghose; The Teachers' Journal, January 1955

There are faulty ideals even in advanced societies. There is hardly any society which does not look upon wars as activities that indicate heroism. The idea is as savage as savagery can be. Class superiority is another wrong ideal that is present in some form or other almost in every society. This idea too is not short of barbarism. But History speaks eloquently of instances of various countries where lofty ideals have elevated whole groups of people to higher levels of cultures. Fichte inspired the German nation with ideals that continued to make the people of the country eminently great. But then a false ideal promising the nation a greater prominence came to rule the German nation during the Hitlerian regime. Germany rose as surely as it fell with the moving forces of these two ideals. Individuals who inspire great groups of human beings and lead them on to achieve social and cultural progresses are social architects who help humanity to march towards perfection. Social ideals, and not alterations of racial types, are responsible for effecting social progress.²²

Ideas are ruling forces in life; and they, certainly, are forms of ideals. Ideas then are enduring realities in human life. Plato's concept of the unchangeable reality created by making a basis upon ideas opened a new line of thought in the field of human speculation. Ideas, he argued, were the only permanent entities in the universe, which man must seek to know.

Various forms of forces have worked in human societies for keeping the continuity of groups either by total conservation or by conservation and modification. The form of power which appeared first in human society was physical force which sought to control individuals in groups by tyrannizing them. Then appeared the power of wealth which became respectable in societies. Wealth and riches and their possessors then, came to be held in high esteem by individuals. Ultimately appeared the third form of power—the power of ideas and ideals in societies. These different forms of power in various shapes are all present, perhaps, even today; but the strength of the power of ideas and ideals is gradually gaining ground with the progress of human society. Ideas and ideals are destined to rule human lives.

Sumner, however, considers ideals unscientific and unnecessary for social use for he thinks they are devised either for pacifying the restless or for avoiding the trouble of settling difficult problems immediately.²³ Although all social ideals do not perform only the

²² *Social Evolution and Political Theory*—L. T. Hobhouse; p. 39.

²³ *Ways and Means*—W. G. Sumner; p. 201.

functions indicated by Sumner, it is true that ideals and practices sometimes remain poles apart. Individuals in a social group may talk glibly of lofty ideals while remaining low in practical life. All this may be true but even then it is idle to brand ideals as a class of worthless stuff. If certain social ideals remain far away from the realities of practical life it is generally because they are too lofty. Such ideals are useless for they cannot influence human lives; they may easily enter our literature but not our mores. Only such ideals as, though remote from us, are still within our reach can affect our lives. Ideals then, must have some characteristics to become effective. But an ideal ceases to be an ideal if it is reached; and as such at that stage another ideal or at least another phase of the already realized ideal should appear for further inspiration. Ultimate or supremely lofty goals may be reached only through simpler and intermediate ideals arranged in order of growing complexity so that one ideal may lead to the next, and the next to the next and so on till the ultimate goal is attained. A lofty ideal which is remote may be realized conveniently through various proximate ideals. The practicability of this technique speaks of the possibility of its sure application in the field of Education, for Education after all rests upon ideals. And aims of Education and ideals of life are in a sense identical.

Ideals which are special forms of ideas are effective factors of coordination for they evidently help to form consolidated social groups. Plato could conceive of an unchangeable world of ideas because of the presence of coordinating elements in ideas. Also, ideals are human creations which owe their origin to the coordinating urge of the highest form of life—man. Only man can form ideals; no other animal can form them.

Organization is a social concept but its spirit is virtually present in every phase of life. It signifies a condition where plurality is the basic factor. In the world of life organizations either simplify confusions and complexities or facilitate the smooth, harmonious and efficient working of actions and processes. From this point of view an organism also is an organization. And nor is that all; man's supremacy over animals lies in his superior power of organization. But this power of organization in him has grown out of biological organizations of his body and mind. Even in his conscious life man builds up memberless organizations which may be grouped under three main types of organizations. They are—(a) physical, (b) mental and (c) social organizations. The discussions on the concepts of

thought organizations, will organizations and happiness organizations of Graham Wallas²⁴ are highly useful and interesting from the point of view of Sociology but these concepts do not constitute the basic groups of organizations that man tends to make.

Our delineation of the concept of organization makes it quite clear that it is a useful process in life. Even our concepts of categories, groups, systems, plans etc. have grown out of our life's inclination to organize. But the tendency to organize is a manifestation of the fundamental urge of coordination of life. Organization, after all, is a phase of coordination.

Human civilization has two broad phases ; one is *external* and the other *internal*. The external phase signifies the material condition of a particular type of civilization ; it gives a photographic description of all the material objects created and constructed by a social group. Dwelling houses, wearing apparels, fighting weapons, countless articles for everyday use, objects of luxury and all belong to the external phase. In the modern world, such objects as electric lights, radios, televisions, refrigerators, gramophones, aeroplanes, etc., fall under this phase. Only in an indirect way do these material objects indicate the inner nature of a type of civilization. They are not sure indicators because the factors of imitation and chance may play their roles in the creation of these material objects. A primitive tribe living near a highly advanced community may take to all the civilized ways of living by imitation alone, without an adequate development of its social character. Again, a nation may chance to invent certain objects without preliminary preparations. Conscious preparations and struggles for achievements are elevating in social lives ; when they are absent the mere possession of the technique of preparation and utilization of modern implements does not indicate that the possessor is really advanced. In the modern world factors of imitation and chance have helped modern man to put on a garb of civilization, although in his heart of hearts he is not so advanced as he poses to be.

The other phase which is really important from the point of view of Sociology is the *internal* phase. It indicates the sources of the origin of all social activities and the motives of their extension. The condition of internal activities alone of a community can truly speak of the nature of its advancement from the point of view of social evolution. Modern Sociologists are beginning to understand as to

²⁴ The Great Society—G. Wallas.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

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CHAPTER III

METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS

Metaphysics is a prelude to ethics. Metaphysical truth is the ideal of ethical or moral life.

Metaphysics is the science of immaterial and immovable things or in other words, it is the science which deals with God and His attributes. Aristotle defines metaphysics as the science of something eternal and immovable. He also asserts that metaphysics is the science of something 'separable'. The term 'separable' indicates that the soul is separable from the body. According to Spinoza soul is not separable from the body. He strongly holds that they are inseparable and they are the modifications of His two attributes—thought and extension. Spinozistic philosophy does not say that God is pure thought. It holds that God is both thought and extension or in other words, God is both mind and matter. In Spinozism the old contrast between God and the world disappears and in its place the new contrast between infinite and finite takes place. In our previous chapter we have dealt with that and have showed that the gap between the two remains unbridged. In this chapter we are concerned specially with Spinoza's God and His attributes and we are to show that Spinoza's intention towards metaphysical topics is ethical or moral. The inadequacy with which we may come in contact in this chapter is due to Spinoza's ethical outlook in writing out metaphysical work. Philosophy for Spinoza is a system of necessary truth or in other words, it is a science of demonstrated knowledge. Its aim is to understand completely ourselves and our place in the universe. Metaphysics for Spinoza, is the standard of ideal human life. The complete understanding of our ideal alone can give permanent satisfaction of our nature. Permanent happiness can only flow from the thing which is in itself permanent and eternal. The ethical outlook in philosophical or metaphysical work is developed in his work called 'The Tractatus'. Joachim in his work 'The Ethics of Spinoza', speaks of the conception contained in the 'The Tractatus'.

in the following words: "Experience—he tells us—has taught him that none of the objects which men usually set before themselves can yield complete satisfaction of desire. Pleasure, power, wealth—all fail to serve as a source of permanent unbroken enjoyment. And they fail because of their nature. It is their nature to be perishable and finite; but permanent happiness can flow only from what is itself permanent and unchangeable. To set one's heart on something eternal and infinite—this feeds the mind with unmixed joy: an object of this kind can never be the source of sorrow and disappointment".¹ The complete satisfaction of human nature is the necessary end of human life. The realization of God who is permanent, unchangeable, eternal and infinite alone can yield the supreme satisfaction of life. The highest realisation of truth is only possible from the intellectual love of God. The love for something completely good or supreme good is "the sole remedy for the fatal disease of unsatisfied desire".² The supreme good is that which completely brings to an end those desires of pleasure, power and riches etc. and sets free the human mind from those evils. The pursuit of any of those objects as an end of our life will certainly lead us to despair and destruction. But the intellectual love for God or the ultimate reality as an end of our life will surely enable us to enjoy the highest and permanent satisfaction of human nature, and thereby we will come to realise that we are one with the whole of nature. As soon as our intellect is freed from error we are in a position to realise the ultimate end of our life. According to Spinoza metaphysical truth can only be known through ethical or moral life. Thus we see that Spinoza approaches philosophy from the standpoint of conduct. His metaphysical discussions are nothing but a prelude to his ethical notion of life. He was a true moralist³ for whom the intellectual love of God is the necessary remedy for his moral disease. Spinoza speaks of intellectual love of God because our very notion of that kind of love demands the necessary correct knowledge of God. Unless we know Him and His nature intellectually we are not freed from evils of life and unless we are so freed, we cannot love Him. To love Him is to know or to realise Him and by realisation we come to know the ultimate nature of God and of ourselves. Therefore, Spinoza in his ethical work deals with God, the nature of God and His attributes. Ethics for

¹ Joachim: *The Ethics of Spinoza*, p. 1—2.

² *Ibid.* 2.

³ Prof. Leon Roth's following view supports this statement "ultimate interest for Descartes was in the 'true'; for Spinoza in the 'good.' See Spinoza by L. Roth. p. 234.

him is the science of realising or understanding the supreme good of human life through moral conduct and metaphysics is the science which deals with the ultimate nature of reality. The necessary intimate connection of the former with the latter compels Spinoza to deal with the metaphysical truth in his work 'Ethics'.

DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE OR GOD

There is only one substance and this is infinite (I. prop. 10, schol; prop. 14. Cor. I). With Spinoza as well as with Descartes independence is the essence of substantiality. Spinoza says: "By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived by means of itself, i.e., that the conception of which can be formed without the aid of the conception of any other thing." "Substance is the being which is dependent on nothing and on which every thing depends; which, itself uncaused, effects all else; which presupposes nothing, but itself constitutes the presupposition of all that is: it is pure being, primal being, the cause of itself and of all" (Richard Falckenberg: History of Modern Philosophy, p. 123.)

"Everything which is, is either in itself or in another" (Ethics I. Axiom I). The mediaeval definition of substance is that 'which is in itself i.e., not in a subject.' Spinoza's definition of substance contains a new additional element to that of the mediaeval definition. Spinoza's substance is that 'which is in itself, and is conceived through itself.' According to the mediaevals there are four or five kinds of substances—matter, form, concrete objects, soul and the separate intelligence. The difference between the mediaeval's substance and accident is that of the thing in itself and the thing which is not in itself, i.e., which is in another thing. The accident of the mediaevals corresponds to Spinoza's mode which is not in itself and is conceived through something other than itself. The conflict with which Spinoza is now confronted is this: If substance is that which is in itself (self-dependent Being) how can there be many substances? If there are many substances how can they be called in itself? To Spinoza, only the self-caused being can be in itself and conceived through itself. That which is the cause of everything, is the necessary cause of itself and the necessary and ultimate cause cannot be many. Thus there is but one substance according to Spinoza and that 'substance is by nature prior to its modifications'. (Ethics I, Prop. I). Spinoza says: "By substance I mean that which is in-itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words

that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception." (Ethics I, Def. III). He further goes and identifies substance with God. "Substance is the being in (not above) things, that in them which constitutes their reality, which supports and produces them. As the cause of all things Spinoza calls it God, although he is conscious that he understands by the term something quite different from the Christians. God does not mean for him a transcendent, personal spirit but only the *ens absolute infinitum* (def sexta), the essential heart of things: *Deussive substantia*. How do things proceed from God? Neither by creation nor by emanation. He does not put them forth from himself, they do not tear themselves free from him, but they follow out of the necessary nature of God, as it follows from the nature of the triangle that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles" (I prop. 17, schol) and see Falckenberg p. 124. "They do not come out from him, but remains in him; just this fact that they are in another, in God, constitutes their lack of self-dependence" *Ibid.* p. 124.

He (Spinoza) again says: "By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality." (Ethics I, Def. VI). Spinoza arrives at this conclusion on the basis of his logical (or metaphysical) reasoning. Spinoza criticises the mediaeval's theory of many substances and he declares boldly that there is only one substance which he identifies with God. Here we reach the climax of Spinozistic logic. Some beautiful passages from Will Durant's 'The story of Philosophy' will give us clear ideas of Spinoza's Substance or God. "One error we should guard against: substance does not mean the constituent material of anything as when we speak of wood as the substance of a chair . . . If we go back to the Scholastic Philosophers from whom Spinoza took the term, we find that they used it as a translation of the Greek *Ousia*, which is the present participle of *einai*, to be, and indicates the inner being or essence. Substance then is that which is (Spinoza had not forgotten the impressive "I am who am" of Genesis); that which eternally and unchangeably is, and of which every thing else must be a transient form or mode." Will Durant: The story of Philosophy, p. 171.

"But further Spinoza identifies substance with nature and God. After the Scholastics, he conceives nature under a double aspect: as active and vital process, which Spinoza calls *natura naturans*—nature begetting, the *elan vital* and creative evolution of Bergson;

and as the passive product of this process, *natura naturata natura* begotten, the material and contents of nature, its woods and winds and waters, its hills and fields and myriad external forms. It is in the latter sense that he denies and in the former sense that he affirms, the identify of nature and substance and God " *Ibid*, p. 172.

A passage from Spinoza's correspondence may help us: "I take a totally different view of God and Nature from that which the later Christians usually entertain, for I hold that God is the immanent, and not the extraneous, cause of all things. I say All is in God; all lives and moves in God. And this I maintain with the Apostle Paul, and perhaps with every one of the Philosophers of antiquity, although in a way other than theirs. I might even venture to say that my view is the same as that entertained by the Hebrews of old, if so much may be inferred from certain traditions, greatly altered or falsified though they say that my purpose . . . is to show that God and Nature, under which last term they understand a certain mass of corporeal matter, are one and the same. I had no such intention" (Epistle 21).

"What attracted him (Spinoza) was Descartes's Conception of a homogeneous substance" underlying all forms of matter, and another homogeneous substance underlying all forms of mind; this separation of reality into two ultimate substance was a challenge to the unifying passion of Spinoza, and acted like a fertilizing sperm upon the accumulations of his thought" Will Durant: *The Story of Philosophy* p. 151.

"Spinoza boldly rejects the distinction between absolute substance and conditional substance and uses the term substance in a more restricted sense. By substance Spinoza always understands that which is in itself, i.e. the absolute substance. The conditional substance or the world, Spinoza calls mode. The mediaeval philosophers conceive God as a creator and the world as created object. But Spinoza brushes that view aside and conceives God as a necessary universal cause to particular objects.¹ So Spinoza is in a position to describe substance in all those terms which the mediaevals make use of in describing their God.² According to the mediaevals, God is the highest kind of ens because He exists necessarily, He is absolutely infinite and so on. Like mediaevals' God, Spinoza's substance

¹ Ethics I. Prop. I, axiom. I.

² Wolfson: "The Philosophy of Spinoza", Vol I. p 159.

is the highest kind of ens (Prop. VII*) it is also absolutely infinite (Prop. VIII*), and it consists of infinite attributes which express eternal and infinite essence (Prop. IX-X*). Thus Spinoza brackets together the terms God and substance.¹ So far we see that Spinoza is strict to his logical position.

Spinoza never identifies God with passive nature. In his philosophy God is identified with active Nature. A passage from Spinoza's correspondence will help us to understand his views more clearly. It is however a complete mistake on the part of those who say that my purpose.....is to show that God and Nature, under which last term they understand a certain mass of corporeal matter, are one and the same. I had no such intention" (Epistle. 21).

SPINOZA'S ETHICAL CONCEPTION COLOURS THE METAPHYSICAL
(OR LOGICAL) TERM—GOD OR SUBSTANCE

We have seen that Spinoza is confronted with the conflict between many substances and one substance. It is Spinoza and Spinoza alone, who, firstly, meets with this kind of conflict and boldly asserts that there is one and only one substance, namely, God. To him substance is one and unique. But in mediaeval philosophy there is a classification of substances. All these substances are called "the possible of existence", and God is known as "the Necessary of Existence". The relation between 'the possible existence' and the 'necessary existence' is that of effect and cause. Spinoza's objection against this conception is this: If the relation between God and substances is that of cause and effect how can effect be other than cause. According to him true cause manifests itself in the form of effect.

Spinoza rejects the mediaeval distinction between substance and accident and says that which is in something else, cannot be a substance. To him there is nothing like a finite substance. The finite is that which is not in-itself and is conceived through something other than itself. His argument is this: If substance is in-itself, it must be conceived through itself; that which is conceived through itself must be self-caused and that which is self-caused must be a single and unique Being. Spinozistic Philosophy denies the application of the term 'substance' to finite things of the universe and it also says that there is only one substance which is a simple and unique entity. "That there is no such thing as a finite substance"¹ is the starting-

¹* In Ethics I.

¹ Wolfson "The Philosophy of Spinoza, P. 71, Vol. 1.

point of Spinoza's philosophy. To the mediaevals there are many substances and to Spinoza there is one and only one substance. There is only one substance which is in itself and which is called the Necessary of Existence or God. Thus God alone can be truly called substance. Spinoza's partial departure from the mediaeval definition of substance is also due to his ethical conception of life. He thinks that the pursuit of a multitude of things which are not in themselves cannot yield eternal satisfaction in life. Eternal bliss flows from the pursuit of only one thing which exists by itself, and which is in-itself. This is the ideal of human life.

Some critics say that Spinoza is a hard-headed and clear minded empiricist. He is so called because he never accepts the idea of transcendental God or substance. We have come to learn that he had a horror for such a term. Some critics even go to the length of declaring him a materialist or an atheist. He is called an atheist because he says that God is material. Spinoza was forced by his logic to come to the conclusion that God is natural. In our previous chapter we pointed out that in Spinozistic philosophy the gap between the infinite and finite is left unbridged. Spinoza's logical reasoning cannot prove properly the process or method through which the infinite is modified. According to him, the absolute infinite Being is simple and unique. If it is simple how can it be made of parts? When Spinoza says that the finite is the modification of modifications of God, does he not mean that God is made of parts? Indeed he does! God is looked upon as a whole in which finite individuals are parts. There are many inconsistencies in Spinoza's philosophy from the logical point of view. But from the moral or ethical point of view Spinoza must not be blamed for that. God is infinite and we the human beings are finite. If it becomes an established rule that the finite can never realise its ultimate nature because it is finite, then the finite can never enjoy the permanent satisfaction of its being. Though Spinoza fails to give a satisfactory explanation of the relation between the infinite and finite yet he maintains that "the mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and mind's highest virtue is to know God" (Ethics V. Prop. XXVIII). To know God is to become one with God is his most hopeful declaration. The first thing, which the finite must do is to get rid of errors and the next thing is to strive for the realisation of its nature. Spinoza repeatedly says that every individual must realise his supreme good from which everything springs. The realisation of ultimate good leads to permanent satisfaction in life. Spinoza's attitude

towards finite individual being is this: Every individual is a son of God. As father cannot bear the pang of separation from his dear son, so God, being father of all individuals, cannot necessarily exist apart from His modifications. "God is prior to His modifications". The creator and the things created are not two different entities in Spinozism. The creator necessarily manifests himself in the form of creations, as the properties of a triangle necessarily follow from the definition of a triangle. By this statement we must not think that Spinoza conceives God as a creator. It may be a case that Spinoza is found guilty when he is put to the logical test. But his firm moral belief shines over all difficulties and he strongly asserts that human beings are in a position to enjoy the full bliss in life. He lays stress upon realisation rather than upon logical understanding. Thus he is a moralist and not a logician. He requests every finite individual to concentrate his attention not upon riches, power and fame but upon the attainment of the highest good, His last teaching is this: only the permanent can yield permanent satisfaction. That which is in itself can alone ever-lastingly fill the life-long hankering of human mind because "the love towards God must hold chief place in mind" (Ethics V. Prop. XVI). Only the supreme Good or the highest good can bring unalloyed happiness to a tortured life. The ethical conclusion which is found in pure metaphysical discussions is the necessary outcome of Spinoza's moral basis in life. Spinoza wants ever lasting happiness in his diseased life. First of all, he tries to arrive at the conclusion of metaphysical topics through logical argument. But, being unable to achieve the satisfactory answer, he puts aside his logic and begins a fresh start with a faithful heart looking towards God. This time he becomes hopeful and writes, "I at length determined to inquire if there were anything which was a true good, capable of imparting itself a joy continuous and supreme to all eternity". The statement which he gives in his book "On the Improvement of Understanding" shows that his main interest in life is ethical or moral. Pre-eminently, he is a 'man stricken with moral disease'. So he finds his remedy in acquisition of supreme good. Thus we see that the conflict is between his logical understanding and moral nature. Substance or God is the centre of metaphysical discussion. Spinoza treats substance purely metaphysically in the beginning. But latter on he identifies the supreme good with substance (God) and says that the ultimate satisfaction flows from the

¹ Ethics I. Prop. I.

realisation of God. Thus he brings transcendental reality under the category of realisation. When he maintains that God is infinite, he is one with the mediaeval metaphysicians. As soon as he asserts that God is the highest good and through intellectual love He is realised he ranks with the moral philosophers.

Now we can assert that Spinoza's philosophy is not purely logical but it is moral which sets before it the metaphysical questions for its ideal. The above statement is supported by Spinoza himself also when he says that 'substance is outside the intellect'. If substance is outside the logical reasoning, can we not maintain that ideal (substance) is always unapproachable? It may be unapproachable by intellect but it is realisable by intuition or faith.¹ Professor Wolfson writes: "He* may indeed, in Spinoza's view, be immediately perceived by intuition as a clear and distinct idea, but He is not subject to knowledge that defines its object in terms broader and more general". (Wolfson: Philosophy of Spinoza, Vol. I, p. 142). Being dissatisfied with the mediaeval's logical argument Spinoza begins his philosophical investigation after his own way. At first, he is guided by his own logic but at length he is forced to brush aside his intellectual argument in knowing God and says: "Of His essence we can form no general idea"². His logic does not allow him to know the nature of that ultimate reality but his faith³ unfolds the way of immediate realisation of Him (God). In Spinoza's Philosophy the term faith stands for intellectual love of God. So we can say that Spinoza's ethics is intellectualistic. According to Spinoza virtue is based on knowledge. He says that the virtue which springs from knowledge is alone genuine and the action from insight is alone true morality. The following passage from Professor Falckenberg's History of Modern Philosophy will give us a clear idea of Spinoza's intellectualistic standpoint in ethics. "Spinoza's ethics is intellectualistic, virtue is based on knowledge. It is, moreover, naturalistic—morality is a necessary sequence from human nature; it is a physical product, not a product of freedom; for the acts of the will are determined by ideas, which in their term are the effects of earlier

¹ In Spinozistic Philosophy intuition and faith are identical terms.

*God.

² Epistola. 50

³ As soon as "the mind is capable of intellectual love, it is not only eternal but a part of God Himself" (Ethics of Benedict De Spinoza by White and Stirling preface PXC II). That virtue which springs from knowledge is alone genuine. Action from insight is alone true morality.

causes. The foundation of virtue is effort after self-preservation. How can a man desire to act rightly unless he desires to be (IV Prop. 21, 22)? Since reason never enjoins that which is contrary to nature, it of necessity requires every man to love himself, to seek that which is truly useful to him and to desire all that makes him more perfect. According to the law of nature all that is useful is allowable. The useful is that which increases our power, activity or perfection, or that which further knowledge, for the life of the soul consists in thought (IV. Prop. 26; app. cap. 5). That alone is evil which restrains them from perfecting the reason and leading a rational life. Virtuous action is equivalent to following the guidance of the reason in self-preservation (IV. Prop. 24). Nowhere in Spinoza are fallacies more frequent than in his moral philosophy He relieves the inconsistency by clothing his injunctions under the ancient ideal of the free wise man He renews the Platonic idea of a Philosophical virtue, and the opinion of Socrates, that right action will result of itself from true insight. Arguing from himself, from his own pure and strong desire for knowledge, to mankind in general, he makes reason the essence of the soul, thought the essence of reason, and holds the direction of the impulse of self-preservation to the perfection of knowledge, which is the better part of us "to be the natural one" ¹.

GOD'S ATTRIBUTES—THOUGHT AND EXTENSION

We do not know substance as it is in itself. Only through its attributes substance affects us or in other words, the human mind knows only those attributes of substance which it finds in itself, thought and extension. Each of the two attributes is conceived without the other, hence in itself (*per se*), they are distinct from each other and independent. (*Quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens*). The more reality a substance contains, the more attributes it has. Therefore, the infinite substance (reality) possesses an infinite number of attributes of which two only fall within our human knowledge. "The Reality is not merely extended (material), nor merely spiritual (ideal), nor merely both; it is all forms of positive being". (Joachim: *The Ethics of Spinoza*, p. 103). The nature of the reality (ultimate reality) is never exhausted by one or two attributes of which we are conscious. The Reality consists of an infinite number of attributes. According to Spinoza, the reality is unknowable (indeterminate) and

¹ Flakenberg : *History of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 188-89.

its unity is unbroken. Now the problem that arises in connection with the nature of reality, is this : How can the indeterminate possess properties? Are the attributes merely ascribed to substance by the intellect (understanding), or do they possess reality apart from the perceiving mind (knowing subject)? This question has given rise to much debated contradiction. Professor Richard Falckenberg in his *History of Modern Philosophy* has given a suitable answer of the aforesaid problem in the following manner. "According to Hegel and Ed. Erdmann the attributes are something external to substance, something brought into it by the understanding, forms of knowledge present in the beholder alone; substance itself is neither extended nor cogitative, but merely appears to the understanding under these determinations, without which the latter would be unable to cognise it. This "formalistic" interpretation, which, relying on a passage in a letter to De Vries (Epist. 27), explains the attributes as mere modes of intellectual apprehensions, number Kuno Fischer among its opponents. As the one places the emphasis on the second half ("that which the understanding perceives—as constituting the essence of substance"). The attributes are more than mere modes of representation—they are real properties which substance possesses even apart from an observer, nay, in which it consists : in Spinoza, moreover, "must be conceived" is equivalent of "to be". Although his latter "realistic" party undoubtedly has the advantage over the former, which reads into Spinoza a subjectivism foreign to his system, they ought not to forget that the difference in interpretation has for its basis a conflict among the motives which control Spinoza's thinking. The reference of the attributes to the understanding, given in the definition, is not without significance. It sprang from the wish not to make the indeterminateness of the absolute by the opposition of the attributes, while, on the other hand, an equally pressing need for the conservation of the immanence of substance forbade a bold transfer of the attributes to the observer. The real opinion of Spinoza is neither so clear and free from contradiction, nor so one-sided, as that which his interpreters ascribe to him. Fischer's further interpretation of the attributes of God as his "powers" is tenable, so long as by *causa* and *potentia* we understand nothing more than irresistible but non-Kinetic, force with which an original truth establishes or effects those which follow from it" (*Ibid*, pp. 127-23).

"As the dualism of extension and thought is reduced from a substantial to an attributive distinction, so individual bodies and

minds, motions and thoughts, degraded a stage further. Individual things lack independence of every sort. The individual is, as a determinate finite thing, burdened with negation and limitation, for every determination includes a negation; that which is truly real in the individual is God. Finite things are modi of the infinite substance, mere states, variable states, of God. By themselves they are nothing, since out of God nothing exists. They possess existence only in so far as they are conceived in their connection with the infinite, that is, as transitory forms of the unchangeable substance. They are not in themselves, but in another, in God, are conceived only in God. They are mere affections of the divine attributes, and must be considered as such". *Ibid.* p. 128.

"By attributes Spinoza means that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance. Some interpreters (Hegel, Erdmann) understand by this that attributes are forms of our knowledge, not really belonging to God, but attributed to him by human thought. Others (K. Fischer) regard them as real expressions of God's nature, not merely as human modes of thought, but actual properties of God. The latter view is probably the correct one; Spinoza, the rationalist, accepted necessary forms of thought as having objective validity; what reason compels us to think this more than mental reality. And yet he felt a certain hesitancy in applying definite qualities to the infinite ground of things, all determination being negation. But he tried to avoid this difficulty by predicting of the infinite substance an infinite number of infinite attributes: every one of them, that is, infinite and eternal in its essence. God is so great that he is conceived as possessing infinite qualities in an infinite degree." (Thilly—History of Philosophy—pp. 296-97).

"Of these infinite attributes, the mind of man can grasp but two, extension and thought" . . . as he himself is a physical and mental being. Extension and thought are each infinite in its own kind, but not absolute infinite, that is neither thought nor extension is the sole attribute; since then many other attributes of God, none of them can be called absolute infinite" (*Ibid.* p. 297).

"These attributes are absolutely independent of one another and cannot influence each other: mind cannot produce changes in body nor the body changes in mind. Spinoza here accepts the doctrine of the occasionists and Malebranche, that only like can produce like that mind cannot produce motion nor motion mind." (Thilly—History of Philosophy—p. 297).

Spinozistic philosophy, being unable to solve the contradiction

which it gives rise to, assigns to the attributes of Thought an exceptional place.¹ "The attribute of Thought has a quite exceptional function, viz., that it 'knows'—and for Spinoza this really means 'reproduces' or 'copies'—the contents of the other attributes; it has thus a double status, it exists on its own account and it knows the other attributes".²

This double function of the attribute of 'Thought' helps to conceal the contradictions with which we come in contact. If one is wholly exclusive of the other the relation between idea and ideatum cannot be established. So, Spinoza is forced to assign the double status to the attribute of 'Thought' and thereby tries to reconcile an inner contradiction in connection with the conception of God.

Later critics find another difficulty in Spinoza's conception of the infinite plurality of attributes in God. How can totally different attributes reside in God? Thus Joachim says (P. 104) in his 'The Ethics of Spinoza'; "The unity of substance which seemed so absolute . . . resolves itself into a mere 'togetherness' of an infinite multiplicity".

Spinoza's logic fails to reconcile the contradictory ideas. The only way to save the situation is to abandon the doctrine of the infinite number of infinite attributes. It shows clearly that Spinoza is caught by his own net which he spreads to find out the solution. He tries his best to overcome the Cartesian dualism but his doctrine of infinitely many attributes merely repeats that dualism.

Spinoza no doubt asserts that in the case of a true idea the *essentia obiectiva** brings with it a guarantee of knowing the *essentia formalis*. Here we are confronted with another difficulty. The *essentia formalis* exists as a mode of the attribute of 'Thought'. If attributes are independent of each other how can there be a communion of one with the other?

Thus we realise that Spinoza's absolute separation of the attributes of thought and extension or in other words, of knowledge and reality makes knowledge impossible. "If knowledge is to be possible . . . there must be direct apprehension of reality from the very beginning, e.g. we know extended things by directly perceiving them"³. Though Spinoza fails to give satisfactory answer in support of his conflicting tendencies yet he maintains his boundless confidence in his apriori reasoning. The experience shows us two

¹ Caird is of this opinion.

² Mind, Vol. XLVN, p. 292.

* The *essentia obiectiva* is a particular thing.

attributes only. But Spinoza asserts infinity of attributes due to his blind belief in his self-imposed apriori reasoning. "But when Spinoza comes to apply his apriori reasonings within the field of experience itself the case is very different, for his reasonings may then conflict with experience, and yet his confidence in them may be so great as apparently to blind him to the most evident facts"¹. Thus we see that the metaphysical conflict ends in blind belief or say in faith.

GRADES OF KNOWLEDGE

In Spinozistic philosophy there are grades of knowledge or in other words, there are stages of knowledge namely, imagination, scientific reasoning and intuition. Previously we have seen that Spinoza's philosophical doctrine is based on moral philosophy. The conflict which we noted in the present chapter is also found in Spinoza's 'grades of knowledge'. Firstly, the conflict is between the false and right knowledge and secondly the conflicting tendencies find their expression in the contrast between rational and adequate knowledge. Adequate knowledge is nothing but the knowledge of the absolute reality or God. The chain of conflict is running through the first two grades of knowledge, but it comes to an end in the knowledge of the third kind. The first stage of knowledge, namely, imagination or knowledge of opinion, is false or inadequate knowledge, because it gives not even empirical truth. The second kind of knowledge—rational knowledge gives empirical truth and in that stage we have knowledge of common properties or notions of the actually existing world and of our soul. Here we come from the stage of illusion to the first step or stage of true knowledge and our vague experience gives place to 'reason' or in the language of Principal Caird here begins "the rational contemplation of the world". In the language of Spinoza it is "that in which we contemplate things not as accidental but as necessary things", and again Spinoza defines it as "that in which we know things under a certain form of eternity". The second kind of knowledge is not also the highest kind of knowledge. In this stage we are rescued from the hand of accidental or false knowledge and we find ourselves on the way to the highest kind of knowledge. So we can conclude that this kind of knowledge is a mediator between first and the highest kind of knowledge. Rational knowledge is not false because it has got necessity and universality in its application

¹ Mind, Vol. LXVN, p. 293.

but it is not the highest kind of knowledge owing to its lack of intuitive character. But at any rate it enables human beings to free themselves from arbitrary relations of time and place and it gives them the necessary connection between cause and effect, so that they can think of themselves as being parts of that totality (Cosmos). Spinoza's main interest in defining the rational knowledge is this: It is neither false as imagination nor highest kind of knowledge as *scientia intuitiva*. It is a via-media between the two kinds of knowledge. Spinoza's ethical outlook prevents him from accepting that the absolute is known by rational knowledge. He says that rational knowledge is useful in giving empirical truth but not the highest truth because of its nature.

The conflict of ethics with metaphysics compels him (Spinoza) to confess that rational knowledge is not in a position to know reality. Metaphysics likes to explain the absolute through abstract logic but Spinoza says that through a rigid logical scheme the nature of reality cannot be known. The absolute is known through practice which is based on intuition. The only gateway open to realise the ultimate reality is the gateway of intuition. Thus we see that the logical or metaphysical truth is not known through rational knowledge but through intuition. But this third kind of knowledge comes over us immediately and we conceive that we are one with reality. The conflict among the grades of knowledge is for the realisation of the nature of substance or God or in other words, we can maintain that the conflict is between inadequate and adequate knowledge and that contradiction comes to an end on the attainment of the true knowledge of God from whom all adequate knowledge of everything must follow.

Besides these two kinds of knowledge there is a third kind of knowledge, which Spinoza calls intuitive knowledge or scientific intuition. This is the knowledge which proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of a certain attribute of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.

In order to have adequate idea of anything we must see it in God because adequate knowledge of anything can only be possible through God. The last stage of Spinoza's theory of knowledge expresses a very important feature of his philosophy. This is nothing else than the ethical standpoint of his doctrine. According to him, all adequate knowledge necessarily proceeds from God. Therefore, we can safely conclude that it (scientific intuition) is really a knowledge of the things as it is in God. Spinoza's *scientia intuitiva* is that in which we "proceed from an adequate idea of a certain at-

tribute of God to the adequate knowledge of the nature of things." Caird says about Spinoza's last grade of knowledge in the following manner: "This stage of knowledge is that in which we no longer reason about things, but know them in their essence, no longer proceed inferentially, from premisses to conclusion, from cause to effects, but as by immediate vision penetrate to the heart and life, the inmost reality of the world."¹ In this stage the finite has arisen above the finitude; it conceives instead of its individuality, unity in all and thereby becomes one with God. Here the finite intuitively perceives the absolute law of necessity which is the abiding principle of unity and finds itself free. To Spinoza the bondage of sense and the bondage of inadequate idea are one and the same. Only the adequate knowledge of God and ourselves enables us to get rid of the bondage. Freedom is the highest ethical achievement for a moral person and freedom is achieved only through intuition. To be free is to know ourselves "under the forms of eternity" and that alone can be had in our ethical or moral life. Now we see that Spinoza even through his discussion of stages of knowledge draws the ethical conclusion of life. Therefore, Professor Leon Roth has rightly remarked that Spinoza's philosophy deals not with the 'true' but with the 'Good'. Professor Leon Roth's statement also supports our view that the conflict between the metaphysical 'truth' and ethical 'good' ends in complete freedom from bondage or in moral freedom. Hence we also see that logic* (or metaphysics) fails to draw the conclusion of Spinozistic philosophy and in its place intuition is brought forward to solve the problem of life. Spinoza says, "Love of God as the highest good—this alone can lead to salvation. Whether I love God of my own free choice or whether from the necessity of the divine nature, I shall nevertheless love God and be saved". (Epistola 43). Thus we see that ethics wins the field against metaphysics (or logic), because his "intellectual love" for God is the highest goal of his moral endeavour and aspiration.² "The 'intellectual love of God' is, in Spinoza's view, the culminating point of human excellence into which Fortitude becomes sublimed, and where it reaches its repose".³ Then Spinoza advances his steps to deal with the properly ethical subjects, namely, virtue and vice, good and

¹ Caird, Spinoza, p. 57.

* Because rational knowledge or scientific reasoning does not enable us to know the nature of God as the highest and most perfect Being.

² Caird, Spinoza, p. 53

³ Martineau : Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. I, p. 364.

bad, the standard of morality, love, immorality and blessedness, etc. In his discussion with them he shows his true and sincere love for ethical outlook and that is why he is a moralist. In the next Chapter we shall discuss Spinoza's conception of freedom and try to find out his conflicting attitude regarding the question of freedom and bondage.

(To be Continued).

THE FILM AND FILM ARTISTE *

ABINDRA CHAUDHURY

It has fallen in my lot to open the discussion on the topic which Sri David Abraham has introduced. The title of the subject to be discussed is 'The film artiste is an all important facet of the film industry'. We must not lose sight of the significance of the phrase 'all important facet'. In this connection I will just now relate to you what I have felt and experienced as an actor, having closest connections with the stage and screen for a long time.

A film artiste or the actors who appear in films are not only the offspring of a great theatrical tradition imbibing the cultural heritage of their ancestors in the remote past, but are the natural outcome and modern transfiguration of that great school of unknown actors who flourished in the dawn of early human civilization centuries and centuries back. They belong to the same Band of nameless warriors who fought for their primitive art-forms in the banks of the Nile.

According to the recent estimate and discovery of the great Egyptologist, Professor Mespéro, they displayed their devotional art forms in the temples of the Nile Valley about 3,000 B.C. From Egypt it travelled to Syria in about 1,200 B.C., whence to Greece, who shaped and re-shaped it in the traditional Hellenic garb and presented it in the Athenian amphitheatres five centuries before the birth of Christ.

In its triumphal march, the primitive theatre then moved to Latin Rome in all its pagan splendour from where it infiltrated into all European countries during the Renaissance—centuries later.

This dramatic tradition entered England during the reign of Queen Elizabeth and nearly reached perfection in the hands of Shakespeare evolving ultimately into the "Tennis Court" stage of 17th century France and finally in the Ibsenian "picture frame" theatre of modern times.

The century we live in is a century of mechanical and scientific revolutions. This is an era of quicker communications, of which the cinema is the glorious resultant. It wields tremendous power in mass communications in the quickest possible time and at different zones

Read on 3rd March, 1955, at Delhi Film Seminar in reply to David Abraham's paper on the subject.

simultaneously. In the hands of democracy it is the most powerful agency in forming public opinion. In this drama of life, the cinema artistes play the most important roles and will have to make the greatest contribution as their predecessors used to do several thousand years back.

Sri David Abraham says that the film artists are the offspring of a great theatrical tradition. Of course they are so. They have inherited this cultural heritage from their primitive ancestors, but to be more intimate about the idea of its progress through ages. I intend to put it thus—that they belong to the same School of actors who flared up the torch of acting thousands of years ago—only their methods and manners have changed with the change of time and place. Their external form and body have been metamorphosed into more matured and more refined ones to look not only better but more dignified. The drama with stage and acting, follows the same process of evolutions as the origin of the species. There is oneness of the spirit which can not be separated into different indentities. It therefore need not be distinguished into a progenitor or an inheritor. From the time of the primitive cave-dwellers in their hunting dances to the time of Egyptian civilization down to the silver screen of to-day, the spirit remains the same.

It is true that through the medium of the artiste, the story of the film is unfolded, because he is the mouthpiece of the author and the interpreter of his ideas. He thus carves out such a position in the entire film body that every limb perambulates round this figure. While fully endorsing the opinion, I am tempted to question why they do so? Why do all of them, the entire film body, jostle round him? Is it for the sake of duty that they are thus compelled or for love of the work they have undertaken. No. There might be some such reasons but it is more for the sake of their own interest that they do so. Thus they help him to equip him more—assist him to assume the character imagined by the scenarist or author, to reflect the mood created by the technical collaborators and finally to project them to the audience. Thus the film actor is the bridge between the collaborators and the audience. So the co-workers of the artist are not truly perambulating round him but all of them including the film actor perambulates round the theme of the story. This has been done all through the ages of the theatrical development from the platform to the auditorium and is now being done from the screen to the world audience.

The film actor is loved, adored and honoured by his fans, because he reflects their feelings and emotions moves them to sympathy and antipathy, tears and laughters, and sways them as he likes to human pathos. Because, they identify themselves with the hero (Mr. Sidney Bernstein in the "Footnotes to the Film" says "... his approach to the film is one of identification. For him, the hero is the answer to his own daydreams and the picture, a world of which causes the realities around him to dissolve for a while. The films are his release from the frustrations of a dull day.") The artiste is, therefore, naturally transfigured as their friend, ideal and sometimes idol whom they closely imitate. As such he creates new manners and fashions amongst his followers which actors in the earliest era also did, but in a crude manner. He served as their model from the day he had done away with the mask and buskins and emerged out in full-bloomed personality before the public. In his artistic endeavour he set fashions for the young Patricians in the days of Imperial Rome. To-day, he is still doing so amongst his more cosmopolitan votaries. He is the only human factor whose presence is felt by the audience in the vast cinematographic creation manned by machines and mechanics.

Some School of critics are of opinion that films could be made without a film artiste, such as the cartoons and puppet films. Such cinematographic presentations come as diversions and their creation is needed for depicting social satires and fairy tales and sometimes children's films. It should, however, be kept in mind that even for some kinds of children's films, where depiction of some sort of human emotion is the prime object we cannot do away with an actor.

There was a tendency amongst documentarians and makers of the *Avant Garde* films in France to oust the actors completely from the films or to use them as plastic materials in the hands of the Directors. But now the *Avant Garde* is dead and the documentaries have changed their faces. Every body familiar with the filmcraft knows well the famous story of Pudovkin who in his *Heir to Jenghiz Khan* utilised a few Mongols of the Central Asian Steppes as plastic materials and fully utilised these raw human elements in the film to do away with trained actors. But in direct contradiction of such practices, Mr. Roger Manvell, comparatively of the recent school of film criticism, holds "Russia soon learned ... to have some actors who know their job around the set. For as soon as it comes to acting which requires emotion continuously and carefully developed, the theory of an actor as plastic material in the hands of the director breaks down. The

theory of sticking together the same faces with the same expression but with a different cutting tempo and calling the result a cine-study of hunger or sorrow or mother love, ends where the emotion begins to develop, where the face itself has to move with feelings and mean it."

It is needless to say that people whose life history is being depicted in a documentary being strangers not only to films but to the art of acting are incapable of simulating an emotion as well as any dramatic or sustained acting. It becomes awfully difficult for them to recapture the same mood and interest a second time. This difficulty was actually faced by Mr. Ralph Keene, Director of "Ramdas and Mangri" a documentary on Assam Tea Gardens for the Greenpark Productions. Thus writes Mr. Keene "they could not stimulate an emotion. If we wanted Ramdas to look startled we had to startle him. If drunkenness was required, they had to be made drunk." Mr. Keene further goes on to say "Ramdas was splendid, always quick to understand and respond to whatever was asked of him. And I don't think Mangri even made a clumsy or an awkward gesture. But they were not capable of any dramatic or sustained acting and our story had to be told in the simplest terms."

So he is to-day not only an imperative need in Features and Children's films but is also in great demand even for the documentaries where the main object is to depict pictorially an accurate and more authentic mode of behaviour of the people, their homes, factories and fields. He is to day not only an entertainer but a teacher.

Hence at first sight the actor looms large before our eyes, and creates the illusion that he is the all-important facet of the film industry. But at the second thought, we find he is not so tall or big as he appears to be but his collaborators make him taller and bigger than what he himself really is. They give him voice, a co-ordinated orchestration of various movement patterns, light, habitation and dress, all go to make him look magnificent. Without their help, undraped and unadorned, dumb and in the dark, standing on a bare platform, he is no more a personality than a walker on of the world at large. Mr. Thomas Taig of the Department of English Studies, University of Bristol, writes in "The Anatomy of Film"—"Cinema depends for its production on the combined efforts of a whole team of artists and technicians." Therefore, it will not be a hasty generalisation if we say that the film artiste is no doubt an important factor of the film industry though not an all-important facet of the

trade; as the art of cinema is a co-operative art, every body of its creators is as important as the other. From the director to the make-up man each and every one helps the artiste with all their creative wealth, to speak their language to the world at large.

As regards the contributions of the film artiste towards the social life of the country, opinions are divided. It is no doubt very difficult to gauge their actual contributions towards society in general, for there is no correct statistical data based on scientific observation and sociological research obtainable on the subject. It can well be expected that this difficulty will be removed if there comes up a body to undertake this responsibility in the immediate future. Meanwhile it is satisfying to note that the film in India has re-created in vivid colours different aspects of Indian life from the past as well as of the present, which have opened up new vistas before the eyes of the common man with a tremendous impulse which he can hardly ignore. As a result of this, the avenue of ignorance is gradually receding from him. The impact will be irresistible as time marches on.

If, however, we try to appraise of what contributions the actors have made towards the betterment of society in general, it would seem very satisfactory in comparison with what they did in the past, even if we take into consideration the very poorer background, the absence of adequate training facilities and almost impossible working conditions under which they work. It would not be out of place here if I compare the status and conditions of the actors in the past with those of the present. There was a time when in every country the actors were subjected to severe maltreatment and insult. In the days of Imperial Rome, they were denied the rights of citizenship; they were in infamy, socially an outcast. But in the same Rome in the Republican days, there arose the great actor Roscius, who was a friend of Cicero and a honoured citizen. Then in Europe of Middle ages, we see that actors were treated like thieves, vagabonds and tramps. Then there appeared in France the perfect actor, Talma, who was Napoleon's constant companion, according to whom, he was the ideal artiste. Even in England in the days of Queen Elizabeth the company of actors were looked on with increasing disfavour by the authorities and were finally included in the famous Statute of 1572 as "masterless men" and therefore, "rogues and vagabonds." To escape the penalties denounced against such undesirables the actors sought to shelter themselves under the protection of a noble man by becoming nominally at least, members of his household. In the

self-same England, several centuries hereafter, we see a great actor, Sir Henry Irving, honoured by Queen Victoria, loved by the people and adored by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Gladstone. In our own time, we see a great artiste, Mr. Charles Chaplain, who is not only worshipped as a comedian of the highest order but a real representative of the people. He will even remain famous for his solid contributions to the store of human values which he has effected. From the beginning to the last of his pictures, a strong undercurrent of socialistic outlook runs through all of them. But then Chaplain is not only an actor but the director of his films and author of his stories. We can cite hundreds of such examples where truly magnificent artists rose head and shoulder above their average contemporaries but at a great cost of perseverance, erudition and knowledge.

Actors in our country had also had the same misfortune to suffer from such ignominy, even lately. They have also salvaged the good name of the actors from a sea of degradation, social ostracism and vagabondage of yore to that of a gentleman. Thanks to the grace of Providence they do now wield a great power and influence over the minds of their fans who highly extol them. He is now a potent force in moulding public opinion even to a great extent. He can perpetrate evil just as he does good to society. If he is not cautious, any false move and unauthenticated gesture on his part, any mal-digested expression in recreating a character and environment and in proving the premise of the thematic materials of the story might generate in a common people an inaccurate notion and false impression regarding the authenticity of the time, place and action of the film. For, this is a common mistake which an actor is apt to commit unless he is intimately taught in the historicity of the subject.

Since the manner and customs of our forefathers are little known to us to-day, we possibly cannot reproduce properly an actual portrayal of a life or scene from the past. In this connection it will not be out of place if I incidentally refer to some of them. Those who are interested, can have a fuller knowledge of the subject from ancient texts. The mode of reclining of our forefathers, their methods of sitting, standing and even of moving about were made in the beautiful classical graces and poses. Our rhetorics mention them as Ashana, Bhangi, Hala, Mudras and others. There are various classifications of them all. When modern actors depict classical and epic characters they completely ignore them and move around the sets built by the art designer with meticulous care to represent the period, the attire

of which is completely lost by the most sophisticated mode of movement and behaviour by the actors themselves inspite of their donning up of period costumes. In order to acquire an intimate knowledge of this aspect of the art of acting an actor must need a rigorous training. It is for this reason that in the West they have so deeply felt the need of an extensive film education.

In every dramatic academy of the Western countries there is a class to teach period deportment and handling of the stage properties. From duelling, to moving on with doublet cape and hood crinolin and lace, handling of such stage properties as a snuff-box, a long stuff walking stick, a fan, a rapier, a handled eye glass etc. Elegant manners and graceful demeanour are all taught with as importance as the art of miming and posing. Unfortunately, there is no such academy in our country as yet.

It is needless to point out here that a successful artiste should possess a rich background in the body of traditions, theories, techniques and aesthetic principles that govern his knowledge of the allied arts. This will develop in him the basis of an intelligent artistic judgement. Inspired by such ideals, a Motion Picture Foundation for college and University students has recently been established in New York University where such talents as Orson Wells, Paulette Goddard, Merle Oberon, Ruth Gordon and Burgess Meredith were the sponsors. Laboratory training is annually held in the Amherst College for them.

So we deeply feel to-day the necessity of an Academy to teach the art of acting to our young aspirants. It is an imperative need in our country to-day. It is sad that apprentices of every profession are taught in their own vocations save and except the profession of acting. It is equally strange that actors are criticized for their shortcomings, yet are denied the right to learn their art and thus frame a sound professional career. Whatever little they have learnt, by the trial and error method in the midst of greatest hazards by imitating the performance of actors or actresses who have already established name and fame. Sometimes they learn in the self-taught method of looking into a foreign film. It is a happy augury that a National Film Board for India is soon going to be started in which there will be an Institute for the training of artists and technicians. It is expected that much of these difficulties and inconveniences will thus be removed and young enthusiasts will no longer have to suffer as we had to do in the past.

If we leave aside the question of their training, theoretical or practical, one will have to shudder to think of the working conditions in which they work. In our State of West Bengal, a young popular artist is generally bound down by ten or more contracts at a time. Shifts of two to four hours even are allotted to each producer and he is to fly whether in the day or in the night like a shuttlecock in great speed from one studio to another in order to fulfil his obligations ! He has no leave during the week and rolls on like a reluctant machine. He is to appear in diverse characters—a hero, villain, a lover, a cheat or a vagabond and even a king. The actor appears in the role of a hero in the morning, a villain in the afternoon and near about mid-night—when everyone reposes in balmy slumber—and he is tired, exhausted and drowsy, he is to appear as a lover ! He has practically no relaxation and recreation so needed for a hard worker like him. Thus he has little time to study, think and observe. It is really gratifying to note that inspite of such hardships and inconveniences he has creditably contributed his quota towards the cultural advancement of the country. Once again we deeply feel the need of an institution under whose fostering care he might well take shelter. He being such an important facet of the film trade, can also rightly claim such protection and amenities from the Industry as well as from the Government.

We have already discussed about the important role a film artist plays in the aesthetic and artistic life of India's culture. The sum total of a country's social past and the reality of its present is expressed in that country's culture. It is how we behave with each other, how we express ourselves in speech, how we work, how we create the environment in which we eat and rest, how we love and how we dress. The film artiste has tried to depict them as sincerely and faithfully as is possible under the present conditions of his workings and training. Whatever has been achieved by some talented ones have been acquired by their own individual efforts. But their number is very few. In order to achieve this in a wider scale there ought to be mass efforts by the artists themselves.

Post-independent India, as other parts of the world, is now facing a new horizon with strange and new changes. Civilization is now confronted with great political and economic issues. We are troubled by constant repetitions of strikes, disasters, programmes and plannings and every form of crises, which have crowded our social horizon in recent years and the individual is now tempted to take increasing

interest in public affairs. Film actors as a profession cannot ignore these vital problems of socialism in which we are all involved to-day. Artists cannot ignore these issues. So Paul Rotha writes in his "Documentary Film"—'Politics, for example, are daily becoming of increasing interest to millions of people who only few years ago regarded their discussion as abhorrent. Not politics in the old meaning of the word but politics embracing economics, sociology, culture and in many cases, religion.' So we are confronted not only with the political ideologies to-day but also with the disturbing thoughts of the inevitable future. Every thinking person is now presented with a complexity of political and social problems, which he will have to face. The film professionals cannot ignore them. None is calculated to bring about a greater efficiency in the populace or inspire in them an urge for social advance than the film artiste. In order to have a first-hand knowledge of the life and workings of a farmer and his family, of a labourer, of a man working in a factory or in a mine, an artiste should pass sometimes in a year in their midst so that he might faithfully present, what he has learnt by such a contact, the traits of their character, which alone will be authentic and accurate.

Camp training in the fields with actual people is more necessary than training in the Studio or academy. Unless they do so no sociological contribution of any worth can be expected from them.

Thus for a medium to achieve its highest expression and the widest appeal, there must exist a social atmosphere of a fertilizing kind, a strong homogeneity, an intimate contact with the people. This is true of every cultural medium but it is a thousand times more necessary for the cinema.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY AND DEMOCRACY

PROFESSOR RAGHUBIR CHAKRAVARTI

The term "Social" implies something connected with society, while "Contract" means an agreement between two or more people. Usually, such an agreement creates new obligations. Contract involves surrender of some, and the creation of new rights. As Hobbes points out "The mutual transferring of right is that which men call 'contract'". In short, contract implies a kind of reciprocal obligation and duties that originate out of the free consent of the parties.

The phrase "Social Contract" may mean either a contract which is social in nature or a contract entered into by society. But neither of these interpretations is valid for the present purpose. As a term of Political Theory, "Social Contract" implies a contract for, not by, society. It is a contract which makes society possible. Contract becomes distinctly social in that aspect.

Such a contract for society may take either of the two forms. It might be just a contract of 'every one with every one' for the establishment of a civil society or commonwealth or the State. Hobbes uses this term in this specific sense. Secondly, in addition to a contract for 'community', social contract might mean a contract between the people and their rulers. In this sphere, it means governmental contract. Both Languet² and Pufendorf³ have developed this aspect of the social contract. Even Locke seems to suggest it.⁴ In history, social contract appeared first as governmental contract and then as social contract proper. In fact, as Mr. Gough suggests, social contract proper "was largely a development from the earlier governmental contract".⁵ However, both these forms became current by seventeenth century.

¹ Hobbes, T. : "Leviathan", London (1651), p. 66.

² "Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos" was a famous Huguenot publication (The Grounds of Rights Against Tyrants) of 1573. It was published under the pseudonym "Stephens Junius Brutus". There was a dispute about its authorship. The contestants were Hubert Languet and Duplessis-Mornay. According to Professor Barker, it was definitely written by Hubert Languet.

³ Pufendorf : "The Law of Nature And Nations"—Translated into English by Dr. Basil Kennett, 6th Edn., London (1749), p. 636.

⁴ Pollock, F. : "An Introduction to The History of the Science of Politics", London (1923), p. 76.

⁵ Gough, J.W. : "The Social Contract", Oxford (1930), p. 3.

The idea of 'Social Contract' is almost as old as political philosophy itself.¹ Languet brought out the two sources of this doctrine—old Testament history and Roman Law.²

Although the rudimentary ideas of this theory can be traced back to Plato,⁴ Epicurus⁵ and Cicero,⁶ the doctrine was developed by Buchanan⁷, Richard Hooker⁸, Althusius⁹, Grotius¹⁰ and Pufendorf¹¹ in the Middle Ages. It was fully supported by feudalism. Feudalism instituted a system of reciprocal rights and duties on a contractual tie. Naturally it helped the development of the contract theory.¹² However, the doctrine was given a complete shape by Hobbes in 1651,¹³ Locke in 1690¹⁴ and Rousseau in 1762.¹⁵ For over three centuries, it had an undisputed hold over the mind of serious thinkers.

This study is not so much concerned with the analysis of the doctrine of Social Contract itself as with its relationship to democratic ideals.

The term democracy is indeed an elusive one. It has come to mean almost anything.¹⁶ It may mean a political organisation or a

¹ Laski, H. "Social Contract" in 'Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences', Vol. 14, p. 127.

² Dunning, W. A. "A History of Political Theories". From Luther to Montesquieu, New York (6th Print, 1953), pp. 49-50.

³ Majority of the Indian writers tend to refer to Kautilya as the pioneer of the Social Contract Theory. But none of them give any precise reference to the source. I could not find any trace of it in Shamasastri's "Kautilya's Arthashastra", 4th Edn., Mysore (1951). It is true that in Chapter 19 (The Duties of a King) Kautilya says: "In the happiness of his subjects lies his happiness, in their welfare his welfare..." (p. 33). It means that King is to please (ranj) his subjects. But certainly it does not mean any social contract. That Kautilya is not the source is proved by K.P. Jayaswal's omission of his name in reference to Social Contract in "Hindu Polity", Bangalore (1955). He refers to "Santi Parva Verse" to show the origin of State on mutual contract (pp. 165-66). Certainly the idea of Kingship in ancient India meant service of the people. (Nehru, J. "Glimpses of World History", 4th Edn., London, 1949, p. 51). But that is not enough to conclude that he is the product of Social Contract.

⁴ Plato: "The Republic" Translated by A.D. Lindsay. London (1932), Book II, 359, p. 42.

⁵ Barker, E. "Greek Political Theory. Plato And His Predecessors". London (1918), p. 70.

⁶ Sabine, G.H. "A History of Political Theory," London., 1951, Reprint, p. 166.

⁷ Buchanan, G. "On the Sovereign Power Among The Scots" (1579)—See Dunning, *ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

⁸ Hooker, R. "Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity" (1594)—See Coker, F.W. "Readings In Political Philosophy". New York (1950), p. 387.

⁹ "Politica Methodice Digesta of Johannes Althusius" in Harvard Political Classics Series. Harvard University Press (1932). See the discussion by Dr. C. J. Friedrich in pp. lxxxvii-lxxxviii.

¹⁰ Grotius, H. "The Law of War And Peace" (1625)—See Coker, *ibid.* pp. 415-16, Dunning *ibid.*, p. 181; Hearnshaw, F.J.C. on "Hugo Grotius" in (Ch 6) "The Social Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", London (1926), p. 140.

¹¹ Pufendorf, *ibid.* It was published first in 1672.

¹² Figgis, J.N. "Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius 1414-1625" Cambridge (1928 Reprint), pp. 10 & 180.

¹³ "Leviathan" was published.

¹⁴ "Two Treatises of Civil Government" was published.

¹⁵ Publication of "Social Contract".

¹⁶ Brown, I. "The Meaning of Democracy". New & Revised Edn. London (1926), pp. vii & 26.

social atmosphere¹, an economic structure² or an ethical principle.³ Like other terms in Political Science, it lacks sadly an exact and precise connotation. Naturally as an ideal it is vague.⁴

However for the present purpose, democracy would be accepted as an ideal, which stands for ultimate supremacy of the people, takes consent as the basis of the State, and recognises liberty and equality of all individuals. Democracy appears, in this context, not as a theory but as a number of principles.⁵ On this interpretation alone "Social Contract" and "Democracy" became integrally related.

Contract, as indicated before, is an agreement between two or more people. It means that those who are parties to the contract are necessarily supreme. If they are not so, they cannot create new voluntary obligations for themselves. The supremacy of the people is implicit in the Social Contract Theory. Whether it is a case of social contract proper or of governmental contract, it recognises this supremacy.

The supremacy of people is implicit in Hobbes's nature of the contract itself, Locke's reservation of supreme authority in the community of which government is but a moral trust, and in Rousseau's equation of the sovereignty with the General Will.

Even Hobbes agrees that people are naturally supreme. But they give up this supreme power once the civil society is established. Since then, power of the people is exercised, by virtue of the contract, by the Sovereign. People delegate their authority to one man or one assembly of men⁶ for their own self-interest. They like to preserve themselves and to lead a more contented life.⁷ Free people of state of nature become "subjects"⁸ to a sovereign who is their own creation. Henceforth, it is no longer a question of the exercise of popular sovereignty but one of solely passive obedience. They must obey their new ruler. They have no right of resistance even if he does not rule well. According to Hobbes then, 'whatsoever he

¹ Burns, C D. "Political Ideals" 4th Edn., London (1942), p. 278.

² Sidney & Beatrice Webb : "Industrial Democracy" Ninth Impression, London (1926). Cole, G.D.H. "Social Theory" London (1930). Cole G D H. "Self Government in Industry", London (1922).

³ Willey, M M. "Some Recent Critics And Exponents of The Theory of Democracy" in (ch. 2) "A History of Political Theories in Recent Times" ed by Merriam & Barnes, New York (1932), pp. 46-47.

⁴ Carpenter, F. "Towards Democracy".

⁵ Joad, C.E.M. "Guide to The Philosophy of Morals And Politics" 7th Impression. London (1948), p. 770.

⁶ Hobbes, *ibid.*, p. 87.

⁷ Hobbes, *ibid.*, p. 85.

⁸ Hobbes, *ibid.*, p. 88.

both it can be no injury to any of his subjects nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice'.¹ Transfer of the supremacy of the people to the sovereign is thus completely absolute and irrevocable.

But Locke had a different attitude altogether. Like Hobbes, the key to his political society is security. But it is not security for its own sake. It is security for better enjoyment of life, liberty and possession.² So the contract is made for a specific purpose. The power that is created is "limited to the public good of the society."³ Even the legislative power which is supreme in every commonwealth, can never be absolute or arbitrary.⁴ Power should better be dissolved than used as an instrument of absolutism. As Professor Laski comments "Absolute government" is no government at all since it proceeds by caprice instead of reason. It is wanting in the essential and continuing element of consent without which no law imposes obligation.⁵ In more than one place, Locke specifically remarks that Government is a moral trust.⁶ Once the end is forgotten "the trust must necessarily be forfeited and the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it." Thus the community perpetually retains the supreme power of saving themselves from designs of anybody, even of their legislators, against the liberties and properties of the subject.⁷ So the rulers can be removed if they govern tyrannically.⁸ Revolution is the reserve power of the people. But such revolution should be an act of majority.⁹ As contract is the act of majority, their consent alone can dissolve it.

This aspect of Locke's theory greatly influenced constitutions of certain states in America. Both the Constitution of Maryland of 14th August, 1776,¹⁰ and the Constitution of De Laware, September, 1776,¹¹ declared specifically that "all government is instituted solely for the good of the whole." The Virginia Bill of Rights of June 12, 1776, goes even further. It declares "..... magistrates are their (people's) trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them." It holds that if the government forfeits the trust, "a majority

¹ Hobbes, *ibid.*, p. 90.

² Locke, J. "Two Treatises of Civil Government," Everyman's Library, London (1953 Reprint), p. 164.

³ Locke, *ibid.*, p. 185.

⁴ Locke, *ibid.*, p. 184.

⁵ Laski, H. "The Rise of Liberalism," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. I, p. 118.

⁶ Locke, *ibid.*, pp. 186, 192, 204 & 229.

⁷ Locke, *ibid.*, 192.

⁸ Locke, *ibid.*, pp. 192, 229.

⁹ Locke, *ibid.*

¹⁰ Chafes, Z. "Documents On Fundamental Human Rights", Vol. I, Harvard (1951), p. 194.

¹¹ Chafes, *ibid.*, p. 194.

of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish it."¹ Exactly similar provisions are incorporated in the Constitution of Pennsylvania of September, 1790.²

Rousseau goes farther than Locke in safeguarding the supremacy of the people. People do not transfer their supreme power to anyone. They reserve it to themselves, organised as "a public person—a body politic."³ Rousseau provides the means for expressing the popular opinion. Professor Cole remarks: "For Locke's theory of tacit consent, he substitutes an active agreement, periodically renewed."⁴ People express their sovereignty through General Will.⁵ This aspect of Rousseau's theory has been fully endorsed by the constitution of revolutionary France. The Constitutions of 1791,⁶ 1793⁷ and 1795⁸ specified that "Law is the expression of the general will, expressed by the majority of citizens or their representatives." To Rousseau, government is no more than an agent of the sovereign people, who can revoke it in case of breach of that agency.

So the right to control the destinies of the states both in Locke and in Rousseau, belongs to the people. Such a right is a basic element of democratic creed.

Next to the emphasis upon ultimate supremacy of the people, social contract theory becomes fundamentally democratic by its insistence that "will, and not force, is the basis of the state."⁹ In fact, consent is the basis of political obligation. Dr. Friedmann points out "What links all protagonists of the social contract theory is that they find the source of political power in the people. In that sense, the whole theory of social contract is a forerunner of democratic theory."¹⁰

Although this principle appears to us as a commonplace, in the days of absolutism and new monarchies, it was itself a revolutionary claim. "The heart of the social Contract doctrine," remarks Catlin, "is that all civil order and a fortiori all government rests on

¹ Commager, H. S. "Documents of American History," Vol. I, New York (1949), p. 108.

² Chafee, *ibid.*, p. 233.

³ Dunning, W. A. "A History of Political Theories," From Rousseau to Spencer. New York (1936), p. 76.

⁴ Cole, G. D. H. Introduction to Rousseau's "The Social Contract And Discourses" in Everyman's Library. London (1947 Reprint), pp. xx—xxi.

⁵ Rousseau, J. J. "Social Contract," Book II, Chapters 1 and 4, pp. 20, 24.

⁶ Stewart, J. H. "A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution," New York (1951), p. 114.

⁷ Stewart, J. H., *ibid.*, p. 456.

⁸ Stewart, J. H., *ibid.*, p. 573.

⁹ This was a heading of a Section (G) of Professor T. H. Green's "Lectures On the Principles of Political Obligation," London (1911), p. 121.

¹⁰ Friedmann, W. "Legal Theory," Third Edition, London (1953), p. 39.

consent." So the relation of one with the other in political society is one of reciprocal duties and obligations, not of passive obedience.

For Hobbes, sovereign authority derives itself originally from the consent of the people. The ruler is in fact an agent. But he is an agent with unlimited discretion and an authority. Such authority is irrevocable. Locke's supreme power is set up for a specific purpose and is consequently limited by it. For Rousseau, there is no such external power. It is the people and the people alone who exercise the sovereign power. Government is no more than an office clerk.

This aspect of social contract has exercised tremendous influence upon political developments in America, Britain, France, and in other parts of the world. And this influence is still dominant in contemporary democratic developments.

The Pilgrim Fathers drew up the famous May Flower Compact on November 11, 1620. It was to be the basis of a government in the new American Colony. They declared: "We doe . . . solemnly and mutually in the presence of God, and one another covenant and combine ourselves together into a civill body politick." In the "Fundamental Orders of Connecticut" of January 14, 1638, which was the first written constitution known to history that created a government, the inhabitants of three towns declared: " . . . we . . . doe associate and conjoyne ourselves to be as one [Publike State or Commonwealth."

The connection of social contract with democratic theory of government is made plain by the Constitution of New Jersey of July 2, 1776. The Preamble pointed out " allegiance and protection are reciprocal ties, each equally depending upon the other, and liable to be dissolved by the other's being refused or withdrawn."

Both the Constitution of Maryland of August 14, 1776, and Constitution of Delaware of September 21, 1776, recorded "all government of right originates from the people, is founded in compact only." Theory of social contract was given a specific and clear recognition by the Massachusetts Bill of Rights of 1780. This Bill declared "The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of

1. Gatlin, G. "A History of The Political Philosophers" London (1950), p. 278.

2. Chafee, Z., *ibid*, pp. 59-60

3. Windsor Wethersfield and Hartford

4. Chafee, Z., *ibid*, p. 72.

5. Chafee, Z., *ibid*, p. 182.

6. Chafee, Z., *ibid*, p. 186 and p. 191.

individuals; it is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good."¹

In Britain, the contract theory influenced the thoughts of the Levellers movement. Their basic document "The Agreement of the people"² was an "entrance certificate into the State to which every one had to subscribe before admission".³ It was really a social contract. It was thoroughly debated by the General Council of the Army at Putney in October 1647. On October 29, the Leveller Rainborough declared "every man that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government".⁴ Another Leveller Wildman likewise maintained: " . . . , all government is in the free consent of the people".⁵

John Milton pointed out in his "Tenure of Kings And Magistrates" (1649) " . . . the power of the kings and Magistrates is nothing else but what is only derivative, transferred and committed to them in trust from the people to the common good of them all".⁶ So authority is a trust meant to serve general welfare.

Even the Whig theory of Revolution of 1688⁷ was biased by social contract. When James II left the throne vacant, a controversy arose as how to characterise the event.⁸ Then the Convention Parliament⁹ of 1689 resolved "that King James II., having endeavoured to subvert the constitution of the kingdom by breaking the original contract between king and people . . . violated the fundamental laws and withdrawn himself out of the Kingdom, has abdicated the government and that the throne is thereby vacant".¹⁰ But the idea was not developed any further in any of the constitutional texts.

The French Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen of 27 August, 1789,¹¹ and the decree on the Fundamental Principles of Government of October 1, 1789,¹² maintained "All powers emanate essentially from the nation and may emanate only therefrom". That

¹ Commager, H.S., *ibid.*, p. 107.

² It was published on November 18, 1647.

³ Hill, C. & Dell, E. "The Good Old Cause" 1640-1660, London (1919) p. 149.

⁴ Hill & Dell, *ibid.*, p. 355.

⁵ Hill & Dell, *ibid.*, p. 356.

⁶ "The Works of John Milton," ed. by Patterson, F.A., New York (1932), Vol. 5, p. 10.

⁷ Tenner, J. R. "English Constitutional Conflicts of the 16th Century 1603-1689," Cambridge (1952 Reprint), p. 294.

⁸ Bishop Burnet's "History of His Own Times", Second Edn. Oxford (1833) Vol. 3, p. 378.

⁹ Convention Parliament met on January 22, 1689 and remained in active work till August 20.

¹⁰ Adams G. B.: "Constitutional History of England", London (1921), p. 356.

¹¹ Stewart, *ibid.*, p. 115.

¹² Stewart, J. H., *ibid.*, p. 115.

the consent of the people was the source of authority and civil order was implicit in the French Revolution.

In some sense, the adoption of a constitution may be regarded as a contract entered into by the People. The Preamble of the Constitution of India of 26th January, 1950, modelled on the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States of September, 17, 1787, states, *inter alia*, "We the people . . . do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution . . ." So it may be taken as the example of the impact of social contract on modern democratic constitutions.

All leading philosophers of social contract—Hobbes to Rousseau—make consent, rather than coercion the moral basis of political order and obedience. In fact, Locke asserted like Col. Rainborough:¹ "Men being by nature all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent".² This ideal of consent is the greatest contribution of the theory of social contract to democracy.

The ideal of natural rights of man is also an important element of the social contract theory. In Locke, for example, men preserve the natural rights of life, liberty and property even in a civil society. Even "the supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent."³ The very object of a political society is protection of these rights. The American Declaration of Independence of 4 July 1776 virtually repeats the principles of Locke.⁴ Locke influenced the ideas of various American Bill of Rights.⁵ The French Constitution of 24 June 1793, declared "Government is instituted to guarantee man the enjoyment of his natural and inalienable rights."⁶ "What Locke has sought to do," remarks Laski, "was the effort also of liberals in America and France."⁷ Government thus becomes a defender of "inalienable" rights of man.

It is the basic creed of social contract that man are by nature free and independent, and that they have certain inherent rights from their birth. This creed is the ideological forerunner of fundamental rights

¹ See *Supra*, p. 7.

² Locke, J., *ibid.*, p. 164.

³ Locke, J., *ibid.*, p. 187.

⁴ Ritchie, D. G. "Natural Rights," 5th Impression. London (1952), p. 6.

⁵ For example the Virginia Bill of Rights of June 12, 1776 declared "That all men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty . . . property . . . happiness and safety."

⁶ Stewart, J. H. *ibid.*, p. 456.

⁷ Laski, H. *ibid.*, p. 114.

in modern constitutions and the present international movement for the protection of human rights.

Finally, social contract theory assumes the natural equality of human beings. Even Hobbes admits that nature has made man equal, in the faculties of body and mind.¹ Locke is always emphatic on this that men are equal by nature.² The fundamental idea, in Rousseau is that of human equality.³ His society is based on equality and brotherhood. Both Locke and Rousseau maintain that all rights and privileges are equally shared by all men in civil society. According to Rousseau, every act of sovereignty binds or favours all the citizens equally. The sovereign does not make any distinction between citizens.⁴ The French Revolution abolished all distinctions and privileges. They established the principle that all "men are ... equal in rights."⁵ These ideals are the basis of democratic principle of "equality of status and opportunity."⁶

Social Contract is made by people who are equal. Equality is then central to this theory. It is exactly so in the case of democracy.⁷ As Professor Laski points out "The notion of equality points the way to the essence of the democratic idea—the effort of men to affirm their own essence and to remove all barriers to that affirmation The basis of democratic development is the demand for equality."⁸ In this aspect then the contribution of social contract to democracy is no less significant.

Thus, social contract theory emphasises ultimate supremacy of the people, takes consent as the basis of obedience, and recognises rights and liberties of the individual and the basic equality of human beings. Democracy ceases to be democracy if it is deprived of these four fold ideals. Naturally the relation between the social contract theory and democratic principles is more close than it appears at first sight.

¹ Hobbes, T., *ibid* p. 60

² Locke, J. *ibid*. p. 161

³ Hattersley, A.: "A Short History of Democracy," Cambridge (1930), p. 114.

⁴ Rousseau, J. J. "The Social Contract," p. 26

⁵ Art. 1. of the Declaration of Rights of Man & Citizen and Decree of 19 June, 1790

⁶ Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen, 27 August, 1789

⁷ Preamble to the Constitution of India

⁸ Brown, I. *ibid* pp 170-171. Lindsay, A.D. 'The Essentials of Democracy' Second Edition London (1935) p. 13

⁹ Laski, H.: "Democracy in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 5. p. 76

TRACES OF "NAKKHATTA-VIJJĀ" IN BUDDHISM

SRI SATADAL KAR GUPTA

PROLOGUE

To-day we have stepped into 2500 years, since the day of "Mahā-parinibbāna" of the Buddha. People of all nationalities—irrespective of caste, creed and religion, on the eve of such occasion, besides realizing his spiritual force, are obliged to acknowledge his versatile erudition and towering personality. He is accepted as one of those few "Great Masters" who have come to this planet of ours' to guide and show an everlasting path of peace and progress to the suffering millions.

Buddha did appear at a period when ancient India was entirely pervaded with the influence of Brahmanic culture ; The Church which the Buddha founded on the model of Indo-Aryan tribal assembly, was naturally based on the fundamental traits of Vedic principles.

The sciences of 'Astronomy' (gaṇita-jyotiṣa) and 'Astrology' (phalita-jyotiṣa)¹ were prior to his time not only regarded as eyes of the Veda (veda-cakṣuḥ) but they formed as one of the six (ṣaḍ)—essential component parts of the vedic studies. Reiterating the upanishadic enumeration,² the Pāṇinīya Śikṣā describes the Vedas in the human form (Veda-Puruṣa) ; The limbs of the Veda-Puruṣa consist of five sense organs and the mind, as the sixth. They are :—

Śikṣā (Phonetics), Kalpa (Ritual) Jyotiṣa (Astronomy-Astrology) Nirūkta (Etymology), Vyākaraṇa (Grammar), and Chanda (Metrics)

"Chandaḥ pādaḥ tu vedasya haṣṭaḥ kalpo'ṭha paṭhyate |
Jyotiṣāmayanam cakṣur-nirūktam śrotamucyate |
Śikṣā ghrāṇam tu vedasya mukham vyākaraṇam smṛtaṁ ||"³

¹ A knowledge in the trigonometrical positions of the celestial bodies is known as Astronomy ; Whereas an assessment of the influences, poured from the planets, the sun, the moon and the asterisms, pertaining to our solar system in respect to their trigonometrical positions in the horizon, upon this earth including individual life,—is called Astrology. —Cf :—Studies in Occult Chemistry and Physics" by G. E. Sutcliffe (Adyar 1928) pp. 187ff.

² Mundaka, I. 1.5.

³ Quoted in Hist. of Skt. Lit., by C. V. Vaidya (Poona 1930) I, Section iii, pp. 5.

Amongst these six supplementary sciences of the Veda, the function of the "Jyotiṣa" is understood to lead "one to gaze beyond this limited world as it explains the relation of this world with the whole universe.¹ As a matter of fact both these branches of science originated from the Vedas for the performance of Vedic rituals ; The Vedāṅga-Jyotiṣa of the Yajurveda thus reads:—

"Vedāhi yajñārtham abhipravṛttāḥ
Kālānupūrvā vibitāśca yajñāḥ |
Tasmādiḍam kālavijñāna śāstraṁ yo
Jyotiṣaṁ Veda sa veda yajñam ||"²

This verse of the "Jyotiṣa-Vedāṅga," clearly indicates that the study of "Jyotiṣa" in Vedic time covered both calculative (gaṇita) and predictive (phalita) aspects of the science. It has been remarked by Max Muller in his History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature that the purpose of the study of "Jyotiṣa" in vedic period was not an "object of the small tract to teach astronomy. It has a practical object, which is to convey such knowledge of the heavenly bodies as is necessary for fixing the days, and hours of the vedic sacrifices."³

With the advent of the Buddha, in the Vedic field to preach his "Law of Righteousness" (Dhamma-Cakkapavattana),—it is evident that he was far more well versed brahmin than his Vedic-brahmin opponent.⁴ In the Brahmajāla Sutta and in other places of Buddhist Literature, we find ample instances of his profound erudition on the science of "Nakkhatta-Vijjā (Astronomy-Astrology).

In this monograph we shall see that the Buddha, though was not very much wilful, could not discard the idea of incorporating the study of "Jyotiṣa" in his Saṅgha.

BACKGROUND OF BUDDHIST PERIOD

With the emergence of the Vedas in India, Jyotiṣa has become the last word of science in antiquity. The Vedas are of greatest historical importance with regard to their "influence upon later thinking whether Brahmanic, Jaina or Buddhist."⁵ It is evidently seen that the seed of Jyotiṣa sown in Vedic time grew up steadily

¹ Cf. :—"Jyotiṣa—Vedāṅga as Eye of knowledge" by Dr. P. K. Acharya, Ph D. D. Lit., in The Astrological Magazine (Bangalore 1952), pp. 57.

² Sūrya-Siddhānta,— Edited by Swami Viśvānānanda (Cal.—1909 A.D.) pp. 295.

³ Quoted in "Our Astronomy and Astronomers" by Prof. Jogesh Chandra Roy Vidya-nidhi, (Cal.—1908 A.D.), pp. 80.

⁴ Cf. : Studies in the origins of Buddhism by Dr. Pande, pp. 257.

⁵ A Hist. of Pre-Buddhist Indian philosophy—Dr. B. M. Barua, pp. 7; Cf. :—Vedic Jyotiṣa in J. R. A. S. B. (New Series) Vol. XXVIII, 1932 monograph No I: Bharatiya Jyotiṣasastra (In Marathi)—Pandit Balkrishna Dikshit, pp. 32ff; Cf. Studies in the Origins of Buddhism by Dr. G. C. Pande (Allahabad 1957), pp. 266-273; pp. 315ff.

under different periods with diverse experiments till it developed into a full bloomed stage in Buddhist India. In Buddhist India we witness the appearance of famous astronomers and astrologers like Asita Devala,¹ Brahma Gupta, Āryabhaṭṭa, Varāhamihira, Prithuśā, Bhāṭṭotpala and a host of innumerable others.² In Buddhist literature, mention of specialists in this science are as well frequently found.³ It is tentative to mention here that Parāśara, the doyen of astrology in ancient India, opened a new system of predictive computation, deviating from his predecessors; His method is known as Pārāśariya or Pārāśarīn which even in the present day, stands out as the authoritative and believed to be successful guide for astrologers.⁴ That in Buddha's time this school gained a strong foothold for its expansion is evident when in the Indriyabhavanī sutta of Majjhima Nikāya⁵ the opinions of a certain pārāśariya, a Brahmin teacher, are discussed by the Master. Dr. Rhys Davids holds that this Parāśara "was either the founder or an adherent of the second of these schools."⁶ Incidentally it may be mentioned that in Theragāthā commentary a Brahmin of Rajagaha, expert in three vedas, is called as Parāśariya Thera⁷; Dr. Malalasekera thinks⁸ that this Parāśariya Thera is identical with Padamakutaḡāriya of the Apadāna⁹ and Pārāpariya Thera of Theragāthā.¹⁰ The Bodhisattva is said to have been once born as a brahmin teacher with the title pārāśariya, at Takkaśilā.¹¹

The word "Jyotiṣa" covers the study of the trigonometrical positions of the heavenly luminaries (Ganita Jyotiṣa-Astronomy) and their influence on the course of mundane events (Phalita-Jyotiṣa, Astrology) which according to Nārada (one of the eighteen original promoters of this science, 'aṣṭādaśa' hyete jyotiḥśāstra pravartakāḥ)¹² is an essential subject to ascertain both the prospective and ominous aspects of the world:

¹ According to Papanca Sudani this sage was so proficient in this science that he could predict the exact passage of time without the help of an 'hour-glass' (Yamayanta-nālika)"—Dic. of Pali proper names by Malalasekera, Vol. I pp. 557.

² Vide our Astronomers and Astronomy" (In Bengali)—Prof. Jogesh Ch. Roy 251; Mahāvamsa tika, pp. 272; Dict. Pali proper names I, pp. 73; Buddhist Legends, E. D. Burlingame, Vol. 28, pp. 250, 256; Vol. 30, pp. 132.

³ Jataka, II, No. 289; V, No. 537; VI, No. 546; Sumaṅgalavilāsini, pp. 220.

⁴ Cf. —Studies in Jainist Astrology by Dr. B. V. Raman (Bangalore 1950), pp. 17.

⁵ Vol. III pp. 298.

⁶ Buddhist India (19th edition), pp. 144.

⁷ I, pp. 220ff.

⁸ Dict. Pali Proper Names, II, pp. 190.

⁹ I, 326 ff.

¹⁰ Verses 726 ff.

¹¹ Jataka III, pp. 160; II, pp. 202.

¹² Cf. —A Triennial catalogue of Mss. 1910-11 to 1912-13 for the Govt. Oriental Mss. Library, Madras, Vol. I, pt. I, skt. B. pp. 585.

"Prayojanantu jagataḥ śubhāśubha nirūpanam"¹

Obviously it suggests that to comprehend the trend of course and to foresee the all encompassing aspects of the world, no other mundane science, excepting "Phalita Jyotiṣa", or astrology, come to the forefront².

Bhāskarācārya, the genius of this science in Buddhist India to show the natural interlink between the "Gaṇita and Phalita Jyotiṣa" thus says that for astrological predictions knowledge in 'Lagna' or 'Ascendant'³ is essential in as much as the same is involved in a clear understanding of astronomy⁴.

FUTILE ANTAGONISM

Smooth progress since vedic time in the study of this science met with an antagonism as soon as the Buddha appeared to preach his "Dhamma". He found that the entire atmosphere long before his advent is pervaded with a strong bent upon this science (nakkhattavijjā);⁵ people were so inclined that many important projects and works of emergency in society were done untimely and irregularly owing to the advice of the soothsayers who were used to propound that the specified time of work was inauspicious and disadvantageous or so and so for proper fulfilment of the proposed work.⁶ According to Buddha⁷ blind reliance on the sophisticated sciences (āthabbana) of astrology, divination, miracles etc, not only befooled and paralysed the energetic habits of the lay people (puṭhujjana) but these were regarded by the Master to be hindrances to a meditating mendicant.⁸ The Buddha as such called the practitioners of these sciences as Āthabbhanika⁹ or people who have indulged in the science of sorcery, in accordance with the principles laid down in the 'Atharvaveda', the fourth and the last Veda¹⁰. The Buddha obviously declared that the practice of such sciences and miracles is forbidden to the monks¹¹.

¹ Jātakaballabhāṇ. Edited by Pundit Radhaballabha Jyotistīrtha, preface

² Cf. :—The learned papers of Dr. Naga Raja Sharma, D. Litt. and Dr. V. Gore D.Sc., in the Astrological Magazine, January 1955 pp. 17 and January 1952 pp. 33 respectively; Cf. :—also, Astrology & Modern Thought by Dr B. V. Raman.

³ Ascendant is the position calculated out of birth moment in the nativity (Rāśi, Lakṣa) from where effects of planetary configurations are judged.

⁴ Siddhanta-Siromani, Goladhyaya, Śikṣa, 8-9

⁵ S. B. E. Vol. XX, pp. 291; Jātaka II, pp. 21, 33, 217, 426; V. pp. 459, 476; Jātaka Nos. 283, 587; Sumangalavilasini pp. 22, 251 ff; Cf. :—Buddhist Legends by Burlingame, Vol. 28, (p. 256, pp. 261); Vol. 30, pp. 192.

⁶ Cf. :—Jātaka Nos. 49, 97, 125, 155

⁷ Cf. :—Jātaka No. 49 (I, pp. 238)

⁸ Cf. :—Kautilya's "Artha-śāstra" Ch. IX, Śl. 142

⁹ Sutta Nipāta, 927

¹⁰ Sutta Nipāta 927; These practitioners were mostly brahmanical teachers well versed in vedas and other auxiliary sciences (veda vedāṅga kṛmā) cf. :—S. B. E. IV, 786.

¹¹ In the Buddhist literature this work is disregarded to be a veda Cf. :—Sola Sutta in suttanipāta; S. B. E. X, pp. 98, 189; Hist of Indian Literature—Winternitz, I, pp. 125

¹² Vinaya I, 77; IV, 199.

In spite of such ruling of the Buddha curiously enough indulgence in the study as well in the practice of prognostication were more gaining ground. Thus the *Cūlavamsa*¹ mentions that under the order of king of ceylon, a building called "Vijjāmaṇḍapa" was constructed at Dipuṇṇā to demonstrate to the lay people the various branches of science including nakkhatta-vijjā. In the words of Dr. Copleston², it could be reiterated that "the presence of Brahmin minister and astrologers became, as it had been before Buddhist arose, a necessity of the royal court; and the references are increasingly frequent to magic and astrology. These had never been successfully discountenanced by Buddhist, but they came more and more to the front." Some European scholars are even goaded to think³ that the religions of the Siamese and the Buddhists have been founded upon Astrology. They interpret the twelve "nidānas" (spokes or links) of "Paṭicasamuppāda" (Law of causal Genesis) invented by the Buddha, with those of the twelve divisions of the zodiac⁴. This impression is perhaps based on the affinity of the symbols of animals of the zodiac with Dr. Waddell's find⁵ of a Buddhist diagram of the wheel of life (Bhavacakram) from the frescoes of Ajanta and whose counter copy was brought to Tibet by the Indian monk Bande-Yeshe⁶ in the 8th. Cent A.D.⁷ This wheel (cakram) represent the Buddhistic conception of life that continually rotates on 'death to re-birth' and 'fresh-deaths to fresh re-births in constant succession of changing states dissolving and evolving'. Buddha therefore set himself the task of solving the mystery of life in order to find the way of escape from continual 'Becomings' (bhavataṇhā) which were all misery (dukkha) as explained by the Master in the formulation of 'ariya sacca' or 'Noble Truths'.

In the Buddhist literature⁸ the zodiac (rāsi) is understood to serve the purpose of a barometer to read "wrong doing entailing immutable good results, and that of everything not so determined" (micchatta niyato rāsi, samāṇatta niyato rāsi aniyato rasi). In the brahmanical astrological treatises of Varāhamihira, a parallel idea runs that the day and night (ahorātram) make the twelve zodiacal

¹ Edition, Geiger — Ixxiii 115.

² Buddhism, primitive and present (1908) pp. 229

³ "How To Judge A Nativity" by Alan Leo (7th. Edition, preface p.p. X

⁴ Journal of Modern Astrology (published from London. — Now defunct) vol. xiv (old series) 1904 pp. 7; Vol. xii, 1902, pp. 10; The zodiac is an imaginary circle of 360 degrees, divided into 12 equal parts of 30 degrees each; The quality of each part or sign is not equally spread, but every degree in a sign has its own peculiar qualities.

⁵ J.B.A.S. 1894 pp. 870

⁶ Cf. — J.B.T.S. (Bengal) 1896, III, pt. I, pp. 15

⁷ Cf. — Majjhima. — Sutta No. 141

⁸ Dialogues of the Buddha, II, 210; Mahāvastu (Senart's Edition) I 175; Mahāvastupatti (Bibliotheca Buddhica xiii) pp. 30

signs fully visible to us, that represent the matured state of all good and bad actions done in previous existences and now ready to yield their fruits :—

“Karmārjirtam pūrvabhava sadādi yattasya paktim samabhivy-anakti”¹

These twelve signs of the zodiacal wheel (rāsi-cakra) represent twelve animal symbols in a serial order as below :—The Ram, the Bull, The Twin, The Crab, The Lion, The Virgin, The Balance, The Scorpio, The Saggitarius, The Capricorn, The Aquarius, and The Pisces :—

Mesha Vrisha mithuna karkata sinha kanyā tulātha vrischikabham |
dhanurātha makaraḥ kumbha mīna itica rāśayaḥ kathitāḥ “ ||

The signs of the zodiac, the Ram etc., are represented successively by the twenty seven stars, commencing with Aśvinī;² these zodiacal signs are imagined to be the different limbs of the body of the zodiacal Man, called “ Time-person ” (Kālapurusha): The Ram, etc., are orderly represented by the head, face chest, heart, waist, pelvis, the generative organ, the thighs, the knees, the legs, and the feet; The Pisces (mīna) is represented by a pair of fishes, the tail of each in the mouth of the other; The Aquarius (Kumbha) by a man carrying water-jar the Gemini by a couple,—man with a staff and woman with a harp, the Sagittarius, by an archer whose lower part is like a horse; the capricorn is represented with the face like an elephant (or deer) and body like that of the shark or crocodile; The Libra is represented by a man with a balance in his hand; The Virgo by a virgin in a boat with ears of corn in one hand and fire in the other. The rest, i.e. the Ram, the Bull, the Crab, the Leo, the Scorpio, resemble animals that are signified by their own names respectively :³

“ Vasantatilakā matsau ghaṭī nṛmithunam sagadam sabhānam |

“Cāpi nato’ svajagbano makaro mrigāsyah ||

taulī saśasyadahanā plavagū ca kanyā |

śeśāḥ svanāma sadṛśāḥ svacarūśca sarve ||

The Abhidhānappadipikā⁴ of the Buddhists contain the same description of the zodiac, as has been referred to above.

In the Divyāvadāna⁵ the Buddha himself ordered Ānanda to draw a wheel (Cakram Kārayitavyam) for the purpose of teaching the

¹ Brhājñātakam Edited by Swami Vijnānānanda (Allahabad, 1912) ch. I. sl.3.

² The zodiac is an imaginary circle of light and obviously is without any beginning or end; for the comprehension of measurement of distance, arbitrarily Aries (mesha, where the asterism Aśvinī is imagined), is regarded as the starting point.

³ Ibid, ch. I, sl. 5.

⁴ Cf. Edited by Subhuti, Colombo, 1880.

⁵ pp. 299 ff.

intricacies of life to Maudgalyāyana and others like him who obtained powers of prediction (iddhi) and who tried to popularise the Master's "Dhamma" by applying such magical formulas, known as "iddhipādas".¹ The wheel was constituted of five spokes (gaṇḍikam) between which were to be depicted the hells, animals, pretas, gods and men. In the middle a dove, a serpent and a hog were to be set to represent lust, hatred and ignorance. All round the tire was to show the twelve linked causation in the regular (anuloma) and inverse order (pratiloma); Beings were to be represented "as being born in a supernatural way (aupapādukaḥ) as by the machinery of a water wheel falling from one state and being produced in another."² This the Buddha did perhaps to mould psychologically the people of his time who were captivated by the soothsayers. Surprisingly the Buddha himself at times had to play the role of a soothsayer and predict future events.³ In certain place the Buddha is even led to deliver utterance in favour of these soothsayers and their idols of worship;⁴ Besides, the predictive side, the Buddha was thoroughly conversant with the astronomical side of Jyotisa as a whole is evident from his discourses on the subject in Aggañña Sutta⁵ and in other places.⁶ Buddhaghosa, while commenting upon the 'Brahmajāla Sutta,'⁷ elucidates and differentiates between various heavenly luminaries in the light of astronomico-meteriological sciences. It is imperative to mention that in Buddhist literature upto now only one fragment of a manuscript on Buddhist astrology has been discovered at Eastern 'Turkistan.'⁸ In this manuscript of corrupt reading, sage Kharuṣṭa⁹ similar to the astronomico-astrological topics in the Aggañña Suttanta, professes his knowledge in heavenly luminaries and their respective effects on mundane affairs. In this connection it may be mentioned that a couple of years ago Capt. Bower, discovered a palm leaf manuscript supposed to have been a copy from certain lost original by some anonymous Buddhist Sanskrit Versatile Scholar (?) in 3rd, Cent A.D. Captain Bower handed over the manuscript to Dr. Hoernle, who with great difficulty edited the same with

¹ Samyutta Nikāya, V. pp. 288. Cf :—Majjhima II, 166 ff

² As noted by Prof. Cowell and quoted in Maine's "Dissertation on Early Law and Custom", pp. 50.

³ E. R. E. IV, pp. 786; S. B. E. XI, pp. 19 ff. Jataka II, pp. 21

⁴ Cf : Buddhism, primitive and present—pp. 42.

⁵ Dig' a, III, pp. 85 ff.

⁶ Ibid I. pp. 10 ff.

⁷ E. R. E. XII, pp. 73.

⁸ Mas. Remains of Buddhist literature in Eastern Turkestan, Edited by Dr. A. F. R. Hoernle, I, I, pp. 221.

⁹ Prof. Sylvan Levi has made extensive researches about this sage in the Bulletin de L'Ecole Française d'Extreme Orient, IV, pp....

annotations in 1898 A.D.¹ This compilation is an encyclopædic work consisting of seven chapters. The fourth and fifth chapters of the work deal on "Pāsakakevalī" which is a complicated branch of Hindu astrology in developed stage.² In a manuscript of South India, it is stated that the system of "Pāsakakevalī" astrology was introduced in ancient India by the sage Garga :³

"Yo babhuva jagadbandyo Garganāma mahāmuniḥ |
Tena svayam vinirṇitā satyā pāsakakevalī ||"

The system of "Pāsakakevalī" is known to the West as Cubomancy' which prognosticates immediate future (muhurta) by throwing dice (pāsā); This system incorporates various other methods such as Tājaka and Ramala etc.; These branch systems are *prima facie* Cubomancy or Pāsakakevalī (otherwisely called "Pārṣṇigaṇaṇa) that are mixed up with Hindu progressed astrology. Balabhadra in his Hāyanaratna has stated that certain Yavanācārya wrote a novel treatise on predictive astrology called "Tājaka" in persian language, primarily on the basis of Hindu progressed astrology that deals in prognosticating future event year by year or even by minute divisions of time (muhurta Jyōtisa); This novel method was later on adopted and followed by famous brahmin astrologers like Samarasingha and others;⁴ Ganesa the son of Dhundhirāj of Pārthapura, has said in his Tājaka Bhusana-Paddhati (written in 1550 A.D.) that the Tājaka astrology developed out of the utterances of ancient Indian experts, such as Garga, Yavanācārya, Romaka etc :—

"Gargādyairyavanaiśca romakamukhaiḥ satyādibhiḥ kirtitam
Sāstram Tājikasaṃjñakam".⁵

Ramalapārṣṇī, otherwisely called as Geomancy, has two principles of prognostications: one is by putting "Zero" digit in conformity with eighteen sacred letters which make certain significant correspondence with the Stellar bodies and the Zodiac; The other principle is by throwing an inscribed dice. Patricius Tricassus in his "Chiromancy" has treated the subject and "would convince the reader that Geomancy can do no justice to the subject without basic principles of Hindu Astrology."⁶

¹ Referred to in Vaidyaka-Vṛttānta, edited by Sri Gernpada Haldar (Calcutta 1954) pp. 259.

² Cf : Hist of Ind. Lit —wintercity. I pp. 27 ff; 303.

³ Vaidyaka-vṛttānta pp. 259.

⁴ Quoted in History of Astronomy (in Marathi) by S. B. Dixit, pp. 429 ff.

⁵ Quoted in our Astronomers and Astronomy (in Bengali) by Prof. Jogesh Ch. Roy, Vidyavidhi (Cal. 1908), pp. 494.

⁶ Palmistry, physiognomy, And Metoposcropy by Rasik Mohan Chattopadhyaya (Dacca, 1200 B.S.) pp. 11.

Al Hakim or the so called, Gjamaspis, the Court Astrologer of Persia, in his "Judicia Gjamaspis" is said to have given a clue of calculating method of "Tājaka and Ramala", the two branches of Pāsakakevalī astrology; With the help of these two systems, he could predict "that Jesus should apppear; that Mahammed should be born; that the Magain religion should be abolished etc." Al Beruni's remarks in his treatise on the subject, also confirms the belief of Al-Hakim.

Reviewing these distracted facts, the probable synthesis may be summed up that the Mubūrta Jyotiṣa (Electional Astrology) whose earliest trace is found in the Atharva Veda,⁵ found a further improvement in Buddhist India. The Arabian and Persian travellers in India in course of time received this improved pāsakakevalī astrology from Buddhist India and worked them out to a more advanced stage and termed the method as 'Tājaka and Ramala astrology' (Rhabdomancy) that covered all the branches of Pāsakakevalī;⁶ from thence this method of prognostication was perhaps transmitted to Rome, as "Sortes" or "Sors" meaning, weird or destiny'.⁷

The Buddhist literature refer to the fact that the custodian of this science in Buddhist India, were mostly brahmins with far advanced knowledge in both astronomy and astrology than that in pre-Buddhist India.⁸

SIMILITUDE

Strong inclination of the people on the science of "Jyotiṣa" might have impelled the Buddha and the Buddhists to preach the doctrine to lay people as well to the monks by frequent use of comparisons with planetary or heavenly luminaries.⁹ Moon (Canda)

¹ Tetrabiblos of Ptolemy (Eng. Translation from original Greek by J. M. Ashmole, Chicago, 1936), preface.

² Cf.:—Al-Beruni's India—Dr. E. Sachau (Eng. Translation—London 1910) Vol. II, pp. 211.

³ Cf. Atharvāna Jyotiṣam Edited by Bhagvad Dutta (Lahore 1924,—Punjab Sanskrit series No. 50; Cf.:—Jogesh Vidyanidhi, pp. 142; The Hindu progressed Horoscope by Dr. B. V. Ramau (Bangalore)—5th Edition, pp. 2 ff.

⁴ Cf.:—Sutta Nipāta (P. T. S.) 927; Cf.:—The Buddha and the literature of his school "however, pre-supposes not only the Veda but the vedāṅgas also and indeed brahmanical literature and science in a highly developed state",—Hist. of Indian literature by Dr. Winternitz, I, pp. 27-29 and 303.

⁵ Tājaka is from the Persian word Taiji (Tausik) that represent the Arabo-Persian slave race of Afghaniṣṭhan (Cf.:—The Encyclopædia Britannica, Cambridge 1911, XXVI, pp. 365); "Ramala" is also a word that came from Arabian "Ramal" (Cf.:—Jogesh Vidyanidhi, pp. 493).

⁶ Cf.:—S. B. Dixit, pp. 481, 588, ff; Prof. Jogesh Vidyanidhi pp. 49.

⁷ Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, X, 6808.

⁸ Cf.:—Pre-Buddhist India by Ratilal Mehta, pp. 307.

⁹ Cf.:—The Romantic Legend of Sakya Buddha from Chinese sūtras, sources by Rev. B. Beal, pp. 64, Jātaka, V, pp. 66, 458. Sutta Nipāta (P. T. S.) verse 455; Jātaka I, 158, 274, III, 364, 377 IV, 320; Dhammapadamāṅgalā (P. T. S.) IV, 19 etc.

which is regarded to be the king of planets (nakkhattarāja)¹ is found to be in frequent use of similes and comparisons² e.g. that king gradually began to grow up like the moon³ in the bright fortnight (Sukka pakkha va candima). Next to moon is the planet "Rāhu", the Dragon's head (ascending node of the moon) is found very often to have been used in simile. In the Apadāna commentary it is narrated that the Buddha himself apprehending his newly born son as an obstruction for his great renunciation named him "Rāhula".⁴ In other pali texts⁵ the word "Rāhula" has been explained to mean bond (bandhana); with the birth of a son, the Buddha naturally then found in him (son) a new tie attaching him to household life (Rāhulojāto bandhanam jātam). In Saṃyutta Nikāya⁶ we find the planet 'Rāhu' to devour on one occasion the Moon (Candima) and another time the Sun (Suriya) causing eclipse on earth; When the Buddha was approached, the Master ordered 'Rāhu' to clear off from their path and subsequently 'Rāhu' being frightened at this order ran away to Vepacitti hell.

In Buddhist literature, the astrological role of Rāhu is mainly understood as a cause of bar in the way of smooth progress; It is regarded as one of the four "stains" (upakkilesa) of the Sun and the Moon, obstructing them from shining in all their glory;⁷ He is even regarded⁸ as one of the five causes of draught and lack of rain (Vassassa antarāya); with the legendary description of a dragon's head, the Buddhists have used the word "Rāhu-mukha" to speak of a kind of punishment which is inflicted upon the person by a stick to open his mouth forcibly and then to push fire or spikes through the orifice of the ear into the mouth, which evidently is filled with blood.⁹ The Master is seen to cite occasionally the example of the effulgence of the sun to explain the metaphysical intricacies of his discourses.¹⁰ Sometimes the planet Venus (Sukra) is used in similes to typify constancy,—to wit, like the star Osadhi, which in all reasons, keeps to the same path and never deviates¹¹

¹ Jataka III, pp. 348.

² For a list of the same *vide* J. P. T. S. 1907 pp. 85 ff.

³ Jataka V. 66

⁴ Dict. of Pali proper names II, pp. 739.

⁵ Jataka I, pp. 60, Dhammapadamattakatha I, pp. 70.

⁶ I, pp. 49 ff; Cf:—Anguttara Nikaya II, pp. 17; Sumangalavilasini II, pp. 519, Jataka I, pp. 183, 274, pp. 364, 377.

⁷ Anguttara Nikaya II, 53; Vinaya II, 395 Cf:—also Jataka III, 365.

⁸ Anguttara III, 243.

⁹ Manorethapurani I, 293.

¹⁰ Anguttara IV, pp. 100 ff; Saṃyutta V, pp. 44, 442. Suriya is otherwise called as Adicca (patisaṃbhidamagga commentary pp. 253).

¹¹ Buddhavaṃsa commentary pp. 89.

therefrom (sabba utusu attano gamanāvīthim vijahitvā aññāya vithiyā na gacchati sakavīthiyā va gacchati); On the day of great renunciation the light effulged out of the Buddha and flooded all the dwelling places of the gods like the planet Venus (osadhiviya tārakā) which illumines all directions (obhāsenti disā sabbā).¹

COMPULSORY COURSE

The Buddhist religious rites are strictly followed in accordance with the right moment (kṣana) calculated from the planetary configurations. The Pātimokkha codes and Vinya rules inculcated by the Master speak of such references in profuse. In one place the Buddha makes the study of 'Jyotiṣa' as a compulsory course; the monk who dwells in the forest is to learn the positions of the lunar mansion and their import either in whole (uakkhatta pādāni jānanti) or one section only with reference to the cardinal points.² Besides evidences in canonical literature, "Jyotiṣa" was incorporated in the Buddhistic studies is evident from archaeological finds, has reliefs, carvings in sandstone pillars etc.,—*e.g.* at Nalanda, Bodhi-Gaya³ etc. Havell is of opinion⁴ that in addition to the classes in Jyotiṣa lessons, the Nalanda University maintained a well equipped royal observatory.⁵

MAHĀYĀNA AND HĪNAYĀNA SCHOOLS

The chronicle of ceylon testify to the fact that just after the reign of Duṭṭhagāmaṇi and Vaṭṭagāmaṇi (1st & 2nd Cent, B.C.) and down to the time of Aggabodhi (780 A.D.) there was serious alterations in Buddhism owing to the intermixture with it of Hinduism. The south Indian Hindus who were mostly Brahmins and well versed in astrology and talismanism, became well tolerated.⁶

In the Mahāvamsa, it is stated that in the succeeding stages after Sena I (846 A.D.) Birabāhu, the father of Parākramabāhu I, very frequently consulted astrologers to ascertain his well-being and performed rituals to appease the wrath or displeasure of planets.⁷

It is even noticed that on the occasion of ceremony at home, *e.g.*, during "annaprāsana" (the day when rice-gruel is first allowed to be touched in the mouth of the baby) the bhikkhus (monks) are invited

¹ Vimānavatthi pp. 7.

² S. B. E. XX. pp. 294.

³ Gaya and Buddha Gaya by Dr. B. M. Barua, (Cal. 1934), II, Bk. V, pp. 84-92.

⁴ The ancient and Mediaeval Architecture of India (1915) pp. 141.

⁵ In Support of such observation Havell has erroneously mentioned the name of I-Tsing which should be a record of Hsien-Tsang Cf. —The University of Nalanda by H. D. Sankalia (1914) pp. 86 ff; J. R. A. S. XII (New series) pp. 571.

⁶ Dr. Copleston pp. 228.

⁷ Txi, 88, 48; Ivii, 48; Lix, 34.

to enchant sutras from selected Buddhist scriptures, viz., Jayaman-galagāthā etc., in addition to the casting of a horoscope to see whether any ominous incident awaits the baby in life. Needless to say the bhikkhas are found to do this practice at home in the Panasālā.¹

Such preparation of horoscopes or enchantment of hymns to counteract evil aspects of planets, by the monks, obviously are used to bring in a "considerable income" to the fund of the monasteries.²

This necessarily leaves the impression that "Astrology is the more reputable form of divination practised by orthodox Buddhist monks."³

In the liberal school the monks in matters of almost everyday business as well as in the great epochs of life, are found to seek divination or astrological predictions. In Tibetan Buddhism the nativity (horoscope) of every individual is most carefully preserved by himself to consult his life events at times of need. Thus Rockhill experienced from his long stay at Tibet that the Buddhist monks apply various methods of astrological calculations akin to "Shen Chen" process of Chinese Buddhism which are "surprisingly accurate."⁴

Very recently Dr. Carl Grosser, whose stay in Tibet for thirty six years has convinced him of his new find of a ready made diagram with astrological predictions⁵ about a political incident which according to him would come to practical truth in due time.⁶ In this diagram discovered in a cave at Lasha, it is engraved that in the 'Iron-Horse' year (i.e., 1950 A.D.) Tibet shall undergo invasion by foreigners but in the 'Earth-Tiger year (1959 A.D.) the Tibetans shall again become independent. It may be mentioned in this connection that similar discoveries of old inscriptions in a pillar of pyramid have been made by archaeologists at Egypt⁷ where it is stated that king Forouk shall be banished and the administration shall go to an able military personnel in 1954 A.D. In the Northern Buddhism, Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī is the presiding deity of the astrologers.⁸ At the time of

¹ Dr. Coomaraswamy pp. 228.

² E. R. E., IV, pp. 736.

³ *Ibid*

⁴ J. R. A. S. (1891) pp. 235 ff. Cf.:—Waddell's *The Buddhism of Tibet* pp. 450ff.

⁵ In India still to-day this type of ready made predictions of nativities (Janma-Kundali) are available from "Bṛhgu Samhitā" of Northern India and "Nādi-Grantham" of South India. The present writer has already completed in editing a section of Bṛhgu Samhitā on the basis of a ms., preserved with India Office Library (at London); certain books belonging to the huge collection of Nādi Literature have already been edited by Dr. Khunhan Raja and other eminent scholars and have been published from Govt. Oriental Mus. Library, Madras.

⁶ Himadri (A Bengali weekly newspaper) of 27/8/1954 pp. 1.

⁷ Tibetan Buddhists like the Hindu astrologers use a cycle of 60 years. Cf.:—Nādi Jyotisa by Meena (Bangalore 1945) I pp. 3 and Dr. Waddell's *Buddhism of Tibet*, pp. 452.

⁸ Himadri of 16/7/1954 pp. 1 Cf.:—*Astronomy and Astrology of the cuneiform texts and transcriptions* by Dr. A. H. Sayce in (TSBA Series) III, pp. 145ff.

⁹ Cf. *The Gods of the Northern Buddhism* by Alice Getty, pp. 97.

casting horoscope the Buddhist astrologers are supposed to invoke first this deity in a Buddhist manner keeping in conformity with the sense like "Svasti Sree Ganeśāya Namaḥ" in the horoscopes of Hindu astrology.

IRREGULAR METHOD

In Buddhism there is no such systematised work on Jyotisa. Buddha's strict disapproval might be the cause for it. In spite of this fact here and there, in Buddhist literature references to cursory discussions on both astronomy and astrology are available.

HOROSCOPIC PRINCIPLE

It is almost an established fact that from the primitive stage improvement and more systematic investigations in arts and sciences, especially in astronomy and astrology were sponsored in Buddhist India. As there was no proper instructions from the Master, separate treatises on the subject by the Buddhists are not encouraged to be written. The information on the subject are thus found to be in scattered way in the wide range of Buddhist literature.¹

Buddhists follow the fundamental principle of Hindu astrology. The horoscope is cast by placing the planetary configurations in accordance with the nautical almanac that usually contained nakkhatta yoga,² tithi, karaṇa³ etc., besides a diurnal table of the sun rise and sun set.⁴ On a judgment of the positions of asterisms (Nakkhattān oloketi)⁵ aspects of the planets (nakkhatta cāram) and on computation of them (nakkhattān uggaṇhāti)⁶ which have hold over human destiny,⁷ the astrologer (Horāpāṭhaka,⁸ Nakkhattapāṭhaka,⁹ Nakkhattajānaka)¹⁰ is accustomed to predict (nakkhattān ādisati).¹¹

To follow the customary principle, the Buddhist astrologers during Buddha's time used to predict on the basis of fixing up "Lagna" which was like vedic method always done from canda (moon)¹²; whatever they wanted to predict, it was *prima facie* on the

¹ Cf. :—Pre Buddhist India—Ratilal Mehra, pp. 367, Jataka, II pp. 426; V. pp. 476.

² Jataka I, pp. 82ff.

³ Dhammapada commentary, I, pp. 174.

⁴ Ibid I, pp. 165

⁵ Ibid, 166.

⁶ Paṭṭavattṭhu, III, 4.

⁷ Samyutta Nikaya, I, 208.

⁸ Mahāvamsa, pp. 35, 71.

⁹ Maṭṭi Niddesa, pp. 382.

¹⁰ Jataka V, pp. 476.

¹¹ Mahā Niddesa, pp. 382.

¹² It may be pointed out that the system of computing "Lagna" (Ascendant) from the birth moment as a further advancement over earlier system was introduced in India, perhaps, after the Greek invasion (Cf. :—Our Astronomer and Astronomy" by Prof. Jogesh Ch. Ray, Vidyāvidhi; Mudrā-Rākṣasa, canto IV, 28; cf. : Prof. Jacobi's "De astrologiae Indicae Horae appellatae Originibus (1873)"; In this dissertation Prof. Jacobi has shown that the admixture of purely Indian astrology with the Greek principle, took place, before 4th cent. A.D.

calculation of moon's movement (candayoga vasena) in relation to particular asterism (nakkhatta)¹ constellation or zodiacal sign (ghara, rāsi):

Nakkhattapāṭhaka nakkhattam ādisanti, aṭṭhavisati
nakkhattāni iminā nakkhattena gharapaveso kattabbo,
iminā nakkhattena vāreyyam kāretabbam, iminā nakkhattena
vijanihāro kattabbo, iminā nakkhattena gharavāso kattabbotilī²

The astrologer also considers various other features viz, ascension (nakkhattānan pathagamānan) and retrogression (uppathagamānam)³ courses of the planets (nakkhatapatha)⁴ and their transit (nakkhattagāha)⁵ etc.

For casting horoscope the Buddhists base their calculations on numerical expressions, "space," (on the basis of which Altitude, Latitude and Longitude could be understood) and time (Kāla);⁶ "Time" is split up into smaller periods each of which is an unit (Kṣana); Each unit is supposed to be 90th part of the duration of a thought, or the 4,500th part of a minute. According to Mahāvibhāsa 6.49, 099,980 moments (kṣana) make a full day." In the 'Abhidharma kośa, the minute divisions of Kṣana is given as below :—

120 Kṣana = 1 tatksana
60 tatksanas = 1 lava
30 lavas = 1 muhūrta (= 48 European Minutes)
5 muhūrtas = 1 Kāla (Buddhist hour)
6 Kālas = 1 day (24 European hours)

ZODIAC

In Buddhism like Vedic conception, the zodiac is conceived of twelve signs (rāsi)¹⁰ with 28 lunar mansions (aṭṭhavisati nakkhattāni)¹¹ Though Abhidhānapadikā does not mention "Abhijit" and speaks

¹ Jātaka III, pp. 34-5.

² Mahānidāsa, pp. 382

³ Digha, II pp. 259, III, pp. 85, 90

⁴ Dhammapāda, pp. 208

⁵ Digha I, pp. 10

⁶ Lalitavistara (Lefmann's edition) pp. 149; for other notations vide Avatamsaka and Saddharma; unārika-quoteddin Mc II Govero, pp. 396.

⁷ Manual of Buddhist philosophy, by Mc Govern, I, pp. 41. Māndipāṭha page 59

⁸ Kathāvatthu i 8; ii, 7; Anguttara II, 140; II, 41

⁹ Points of controversy, pp. 394; Milindapaṭha, pp. 271, 288; Kathāvatthu v, 4.6.7

¹⁰ For details vide watters "on Yuan Chwang" section on Indian Time

¹¹ Cf. — Bodhgaya pt. II, by Dr. B.M. Barua, where details of the zodiac are available; Cf. — Abhidhānapadikā under the heading "rāsi"; Cf. — Mahāvastu, I, 175, Mahāvastu-atti, pp. 39

¹² Mahānidāsa II pp. 382; Jātaka VI, pp. 476

of 27 constellations, the Buddhist knew of this asterism¹ is evident from the use of the same as proper name like the planet "Rāhu";² In Chinese Buddhist literature 28 constellations are mentioned.³

Dr. Rhys Davids under misconception ignoring "Abhijit" perhaps in the foot-steps of Abhidhānappadīpā, supported Plunket's view that altogether there are 27 constellations of which Mṛgaśīrā and Agrahāyani are but one nakkhatta, repeated twice in different names.⁴ The Buddhist literature frequently refer to the use of lunar zodiac; This is evident when the astrologer (nakkhattakovidō) calculates the zodiacal signs (tāraka rupāni) and finds out the day's particular 'Nakkhatta' in relation to moon (candayogavasena) and concludes that to-day is Kattikā (skt. krittika, -Latin, Alcyone) or Rohini (Latin, Aldebaran) or so and so.

PLANETS AND CONSTELLATIONS

The Buddhists like the Jainas⁵ regard the heavenly luminaries as vehicles of gods, who are re-born in accordance with their performed meritorious deeds in a region just below in rank to the gods of 'Tāvātimsa world'.⁶ In Buddhist cosmogony it is often—mentioned that the sun, moon, planets like Rāhu and other heavenly bodies, constellations etc., as accompanying gods in the retinue of Sakka' (Indra) used to pay visits to the Buddha.⁷ The Dhammasaṅgaha of Dhammakitti informs us that the moon, the sun, the Rāhu (Dragon's head or ascending node of the moon) are amongst other guardians and protectors of the world.⁸ Rev. Hardy says that the Sārasaṅgaha of Siddhadatta and Dhammasaṅgani of Dhammakitti, are the two Buddhist works that have attempted to systematise the scattered aspects of Buddhist "Jyotiṣa".⁹ In the canonical literature, planets, stars, constellations and other luminaries in the firmament have been used under one common term "nakkhatta",—occasionally "tārakā" as a synonym of the same.

¹ Ancient Calendar pp. 227 ff

² Samyutta Nikāya, II, pp. 201; Cf :—The name Svāti Bikkhu in Bower Mss., Ch VI—quoted in Vaidyaka—Vṛtānta, pp. 261; The Svāti asterism (Latin, Bootis) is the 15th in order of positions in the list of 28 asterisms 5.

³ Melangés posthumus d, hist el de Litt Orientales (1848) by A. Remusat pp. 85; Cf :—The generally accepted theory is that the nakṣatras were 28 or 29 constellations that roughly mapped out the ecliptic" Indian Antiquary Vol L (1921) pp. 44; Cf : Mahāvyaṁṇaputtī, 165; Niddesa, pp 382; Lalitavistara (Mura's edition pp. 592 ff; Divyāvadāna, pp. 63);

⁴ Pali—Eng. Dic., pp. 180; Cf :—"dosagune;ānītum samattho nakkhatta[ṭṭhavi]tiyā n' kottasesu"—Jataka, VI, pp. 476

⁵ Cf :—The Heart of Jainism b. Mrs. Sinclair, H. 269 ff.

⁶ Cf :—Bhārikosīya Jataka IV, pp 63 ff; Manual of Buddhist philosophy by Mc Govern, Vol. I, pp. 65

⁷ Digha II, pp. 269

⁸ 10; Cf :—Legends & Theories of the Buddhists by Rev. S. Hardy, pp. 283.

⁹ Ibid.

These bodies have been differentiated and categorised by Buddhaghosa in *Sumangala Vilāsini*.¹

In the range of Buddhist literature, nine planets² are regarded as the basis of horoscopic computation. Amongst these frequent mention of the following planets are found in a scattered way.

Cāṇḍa (moon) Budha (Mercury) Osadhi tārakā (skt. śukra = venus) Rāhu, Suriya, etc.

The Moon is called as the king of all heavenly bodies-(nakkhat-tarāja)³ and all planets transit or move in proportion to her (moon) attraction.⁴

Next to Moon, the orb of the Sun (Suriyamaṇḍala) is mentioned frequently⁵; specific references to the eclipse of the sun (suriyaggāha)⁶ in addition to his motion and size are as well available. In this connection it may be noted that in the matter of planetary computations the Buddhist literature invariably mention first the name of the moon and then the sun⁷ e.g.,

(a) "Candima Suriyānam patha gamanam bhavissati"⁸

(b) "Candima Suriyānam abhā"⁹

Rāhu is the next much spoken of planet in Buddhist literature, he is described as a best possessor of personality (attabhāva)¹⁰; Ketu is understood to be a beam of light that dazzles with effulgence.¹¹

The Osadhi tārakā, is a synonym of "Śukra" or Venus whose "odāta, odātavaṇṇā" or radiant whiteness and glow¹² have been typically described in Buddhist literature as "obhāsentī disā sabbā osadhi viya tārakā"¹³; Its brightness is understood to symbolize purity—(parisuddha-Osadhi tārakā viya)¹⁴; Besides a description of its brightness, the *Majjhima Nikāya*¹⁵ as well mentions of its visibility in the early morning (vigata valāluke). In the fragment¹⁶ of corrupt reading of the only traceable supposed text on Buddhist Astrology,

¹ Vide commentary on *Brahmajāla Sutta* of *Dīgha Nikaya*.

² Vide under "Gaha" in *Mahāvīryūtpatti* and *Abhidhānappadīpikā*.

³ *Jataka* III, pp. 348

⁴ *Theragāthā* II, 44; *vinaya* I, 246.

⁵ *Anguttara* I, 28; Cf. —The *Bodhisattva Doctrine* by Dr. Hardayal pp. 39

⁶ *Atthasālinī*, pp. 318

⁷ *Jataka* I, 183, 274, III, 52, 361, 377, IV, 330; V, 453; *Dhammapada* commentary IV, 19

⁸ *Dīgha Nikaya*, I, pp. 10

⁹ *Majjhima* II, pp. 35

¹⁰ *Anguttara* II, pp. 17

¹¹ *Theragāthā* I, pp. 51

¹² *Dīgha Nikaya* II, 111.

¹³ *Vimānavatthu*, pp. 7

¹⁴ *Itivuttaka*, 20; *Papañcasūdanī* II, 638, 772; *visuddhimagga* II; 442.

¹⁵ II, pp. 34 (*culasakuladāyī sutta*).

¹⁶ *Ms. Remains of Buddhist Lit. found in Eastern Turkestan—Vol. I*, pp. 12.

there is the mention of "ausatayogavi", i.e., in conjunction with the planet "Osadhi".

In the Mahāvyaupatti¹ osadhi tārakā is called "usanastārakā" and "Usasistārakā"; It may be pointed out here that in Sanskrit "Sukra" is synonymously known as "Usanas"² Dr. Kern is of opinion that "Osadhi" is a corrupt form from Osani=Skt., Ausani, (=ausasi,—'star of the dawn') a derivative of usanas.³ To some ancient⁴ lexicographers the word "Usana" originated from "Kavinām" and represented the meaning, 'one who shows from one end to the other' (Krāntadarśinām): Thus the √vas (meaning, exertion of will) being associated with the affix 'anas' becomes "Usana" in the active voice. It may be mentioned here that in the astrological treatises of Ganesha Daivajña (1520 A.D.) it is said that when "Kāvya" (another synonym of "Sukra") occupies the eleventh house from Lagna in a particular nativity, the person becomes proficient in medicine (osadhi).⁵ In the opinion of parāśara when Sukra occupies the fifth house from "Lagna" the person gets proficiency in education (sutādhisasya vidyāsukham):⁶ In the Srimad Bhagavat Gītā, it is obviously mentioned that "Uśana" (=Sukra) is the best of all poets (Kavināmuśanāḥ kaviḥ).⁷ Dr. Hoernle remarks, "Uśana, with the patronymic kavya, was an ancient sage who was the preceptor of the Asuras—the opponents of Devas. As such he is always represented in antagonism to Indra. It is curious that . . . the composition of a remedy which was a favourite with Indra is ascribed to him".⁸ Buddhaghosa says⁹ that the planet "Sukra" is called "Osadhi" because, when it appears in the sky people collect medicine and drink them by its sign (sukkā tārakā tassa udayato paṭṭhāya tena saññāpēna osadhāni gaṇhanti pi pivanti : pi tasmā Osadhi tārakā ti vuccati); It may be mentioned here that the Itivuttaka commentary furnishes us a different interpretation; According to it¹⁰ that because the planet sukra's illuminating and effulging rays are efficacious to varieties of

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² Aitareya Brāhmana III, 33, Śatapatha I, 7, 4, 1.

³ Verspreide Geschriften, The Hague (1913) II, pp. 250.

⁴ For a detail discussion on the word, vide vaidyaka-vṛttānata (in Bengali) compiled by Sri Gurupada Halder,—and published from 47, Halderpara Road, Kalighat,—(Calcutta, 1954), pp. 337.

⁵ Jātakālaṅkāra, Edited by Pandit Diginendra Nath Pathak (1859 Sakabda).

⁶ Parasari Hora,—Edited by Sri Bimalakanta Lahiri, M.A.B.L. (Cal. 1962 B.S.), pp. 485.

⁷ 10. 37; In the Srimad Bhagavat purana, the geneology is given that "Uśanā" is the son of Kavi, whose father is Bhrigu,—"Kaviścabhārgavo yasya bhagavānuśanā sutah,"—4. 1. 44.

⁸ Bower Manuscript, II, pp. 157.

⁹ Papanca sudani II, 714.

¹⁰ 79.

medicines, it is called "Osadhi" (*usannā pabhā etāya dhiyati osadhi-nam vā anubalappadāyikattā osadhī*). This naturally suggests that the Buddhists knew the characteristic effects of Venus, as a planet ruling over medicine.

Another notable feature in Buddhist astrology is that they knew the immeasurable brightness of Venus as such similes for referring to brightness were used in terms of 'Osadhi tārakā: The first telescopic observation of Venus by Galelio in 1610 A.D. revealed that amongst all planets the brightness of Venus is next to the silvery beams of the moon.'

The other planets in Buddhist astrology, are found to be same in description with these in Brahmanic and Hindu astrology.

The list of twenty-eight constellations (*aṭṭhavisatinakkhattam*)² in Buddhist literature are also like those found in Brahmanic and Hindu Astrology: Thus the Sanskrit *Aśvini* (Latin, Aries) *nakṣatra* (Constellation) whose symbol represents "Horse,"—is known in Pāli literature as "Assayuja"; The *Rohiṇī* *nakṣatra* (Latin, Aldebaran), whose symbol is "Cart" in mediaeval Indian *Jyotiṣa*³ is called in Buddhist literature as "Sakaṭa".⁴ *Abhijit* in Pāli literature is *Abhijik*.⁵ Of these twenty-eight constellations frequent mention of *Āsāḷha*⁶ and *Uttarāṣāḷha*⁷ (Latin, Sagittari), *Kattikā* (Latin,—Tauri Aleyone) and *Rohini*⁸ (Latin—Tauri Aleyon) etc., etc., are evident in Buddhist literature.

PROPHECIES

On an examination of the prophecies and divinations found in Buddhist literature, we are reminded of their close affinity with the astrological predictions of *Nādi* literature of South⁹ and *Bṛhgu Saṃhita*¹⁰ of Northern India.

These astrological works are found to contain ready-made prophecies about persons who are yet unborn, who are already living

Galelio observed :—"Cynthiae figurae simulatur Mater Amorem"—'the mother of the Loves (Venus) imitates the phases of the moon,—quoted in *Life on Other worlds* by Dr. H. Spencer Jones (Mentor series), pp. 93.

² *Abhidhanappadīpikā*, pp. 58-60; *Mahaniddesa*, II, pp. 382; *Lalita vistara* (Mitra's edition) pp. 5-2 ff; *Priyavardana* pp. 639 ff.

³ *Bṛhat Saṃhita* of Varahamihira, ch. IX, Sl. 25.

⁴ *Digha Nikaya*, II, pp. 201, Cf : J.P.T.S. 1909, pp. 13.

⁵ *Sāṃyutta* pt. II, pp. 204.

⁶ *Jataka* I. pp. 50.

⁷ *Ibid* I, pp. 63, 82.

⁸ *Sutta Nipāta* commentary, pp. 456.

⁹ For an information of these literature *vide*, *The Astrological Magazine* (Bangalore), 1951, pp. 99.

¹⁰ *Vide* my article "Historical Evolution of *Bṛhgu Saṃhita*", read at the Gwalior session of the Indian Hist. Congress, and published in *The Astrological Magazine* (Bangalore), 1954, September.

and who are dead (*trikāla*). These prophecies mainly are made on the line of foretelling future events in the person's life including a mention of his name, his parent's and wife's names etc., etc. The conclusion of these prophecies, is drawn by giving a clear indication of the nature of the person's future birth. Obviously these fascinating works, that have bewildered all reasonings¹ for their accuracies and correctness of happenings, have drawn attraction of many eminent researchers;² Besides, Govt. of Madras have already published few volumes out of a huge store house of such collections that are in possession of Oriental Mss. Library (Madras).

In the wide range of Buddhist literature, we encounter similar predictions which apparently appeared to the tradition as spiritual prophecies.³ We call it as predictions in view of the fact that we have seen in anterior pages that study of Astronomy and Astrology had a strong allurements to the votaries and meditating mendicants of the religion of the Buddha. Besides, the vast literature of Buddhist Tantra informs us that to attain perfection and to make frequent spiritual prophecies after acquiring powers in sorceric practices (*iddhipaccays*) are very difficult as well injurious to the person who wants to indulge in such practices⁴; whereas to predict future events from acquiring a scientific knowledge in the heavenly luminaries (*nakkhatta-Vijjā*) are easily practicable to even a lay devotee, not to speak of devout monks.⁵ In the *Milinda-pañha*, we witness the prediction of the Buddha with regard to the exact name and nature of the future births of "a bhikkhu and a sāmanero"; The Buddha could predict that these two in accordance with their services in present life, shall be born after five hundred years of his (Buddha's) *Mahāparinibbāna* as Nāgasena and King Milinda:

"*inama parinibbānanto pañcavassasate atikkante etc. uppajjissanti*"⁶

In the same work, another startling prediction is made suggesting the name and date of composition of the 'Kathāvatthu.'⁷

¹ Colonel Olcott, the founder—President of the Theosophical Society is so moved with the perfect readings of these literature, that he conjectured them to be clairvoyance of the Astrologer who reads them out from the palm leaf Mss,—*vide* Old Diary Leaves, (London edition), 1904, pp. 238, 241.

² Cf :—The Astrological Magazine (Bangalore) 1954 A.D., pp. 49, 589; 1956 A.D.,—pp. 690 etc

³ *Vissuddhi-Magg*—Edition, Mrs. Rhys Davids II, 411 ff.; Cf :—Warren's Buddhism in Transl. pp. 315 ff; Jataka I. 283 ff; *Paṭisambhidāmagga* edition, A. C. Taylor, Sec. III; Cf : Also Winternitz; Hist of Ind. Lit., II, pp. 50, 51, 245.

⁴ *Digha* I 214; III, 112ff; Vinaya declares it as a 'Dukkaṭa' offence for a monk to perform sorceric practices.

⁵ Cf :—The Lakkhana Sutta (No. 30) of *Digha*.

⁶ Cf :—*Milindapañha*—Vāhirakathā.

⁷ *Ibid.*

In the Theragāthā, we notice that in reply to the question as to what the monks of the future will be like, Phussa prophecies a picture which seems to indicate a period of the complete decay of Buddhism.¹

With regard to the origin and spread of Prajna-pāramitā literature, a likewise prophecy of the Buddha is evident in the Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā.²

Prophecies, frequently made by the Buddha and his disciples, besides lay devotees are abundantly available in Buddhist literature,³—but all of them are not to be taken as from spiritual powers,—rather we could assume them to be from the knowledge of the science of celestial bodies (nakkhatta vijjā) in view of the fact that the Buddha expressed his strong dislike in the Kevadha Sutta⁴ and in other places⁵ that no prophecies and likewise miracles (iddhi) should be demonstrated through sorceric practices, “rather than by means of teaching and persuasions.”⁶

TALISMANISM

The Buddhists believe that the planetary forces can hurl down sufferings to mortals on earth ; Such sufferings due to malefic effects of planetary bodies are called “Nakkhatta-Piḷāna.”⁷ The destiny pattern of a person thus changed or curbed due to planetary effects, according to Buddhist astrologers could be stopped, checked or mended.⁸

The above claim of the Buddhists could be taken as rational, provided modern views on latest scientific inventions are taken into consideration.⁹

In Buddhist literature, thus we find remedies generally of three types against malefic planetary effects. These are as follows :—

(a) To wear in person planetary jewels (gaha ratana)

¹ Verses 949-980; Cf.—Anguttara, Sutta No. 80.

² Edition,—Rajendralala Mitra (1888), p. 235ff.

³ Avadāna Śataka, Nos. 28, 34, 36, 64, 100; Laṅkāvatāra (Nanjo edition), Ch. X, 784ff; Rāṣṭrapāṇi-pariprechā (Filot edition) pp. 12 ff; 28ff. etc.

⁴ Digha, I pp. 214

⁵ Ibid., III, pp. 112ff; Vinaya, sūla V, 2.

⁶ Cf.—Winternitz—Hist. of Ind. Literature, II, p. 42

⁷ Dhammapada Commentary, I, p. 116.

⁸ Khuddakapatha—German Transl. by K. S. Indenstucker, Berlin, 1910, p. 3; Cf.—Paper on the subject by M. Grimbéct and Leon Feer in Journal Asiatique, 1871, s. 6, t. XVIII.

⁹ Cf.—Destiny and Cosmic Factors by Prof. V. Gore, D.Sc., (Bangalore 1952) p. 72ff; Studies in Occult Chemistry and Physics by G. E. Sutcliffe (Madras, 1943), p. 137; Buddhism and Science by Paul Dhake (Eng. Transl. from Original German by Bhikkhu Silacara.—London 1913), pp. 16ff; Thought vibration or the Law of Attraction in the Thought world by W. W. Atkinson, pp. 2; sounds we can not hear, by Prof. B. Kudryavtsev, (Moscow 1956) pp. 16ff. As this matter is not within the scope of this paper, I propose to take up the same as separate article for future publication under the title “Science of Buddhist Talismanism in relation to Modern Thought.”

- (b) To wear in person amulets (dhāraṇī)
- (c) To perform 'Shānti' Ceremony (Paritta)

Mr. Cyrus Abayakoon in his learned paper has already presented them in a different way ; To him these purely Buddhistic remedies are systematically recorded in an Oḷa by the High Priest of Pindikassa Ārama of the Jetavana of Anurādhapur at Ceylon, over a thousand years ago.¹ Among the planetary jewels (Maṇi,² the Buddhist literature speak frequently of Nilakānta (Sapphire), Candakānta (Moon Stone), Sūriyakānta (Ruby), Mutta (Pearl), Vaidujja (Cat's eye), Vajra (Diamond), Pucchi (Emerald) etc. A complete list of planetary jewels known to the ancient Buddhists are preserved in detail in Sinhalese texts.³

The Buddhist literature, speak as well of amulets or Dhāraṇī. These are like "Kavaca" that contain protective spells. These Dhāraṇīs are to be worn "for the protection, safety and shelter of the preachers."⁴ Dr. Winternitz, in this connection conjectures, "The protective and salutary magical power of a Dhāraṇī is primarily due to its containing some piece of Wisdom *in nuce*, and not to any occult mystical significance of the words and syllables, though it is true that the Dhāraṇīs do also include 'magic words' (mantrapadāni) of this kind."⁵

In the Mahāyāna Buddhist texts we find the grand picture of the glorification and efficacies of varied nature of these Dhāraṇīs.⁶ In the section on Shānti ceremony (Śānti Prakaraṇa) of ancient Indian astrological works, it has been said on the basis of rulings of vedic literature⁷ that if due oblation and performance of worship are done to appease the displeasure of particular planet or planets, according to one's birth nativity or progressed horoscope (gocara),—the person is supposed to get a relief in his trouble."

"gocare vā vilagne vā ye grahāḥ riṣṭasūcakāḥ |
pujayettān prayatnena pujitaḥ' syuḥ śubhapradāḥ" ||

¹ The Astrological Magazine (Bangalore) 1949, September, p. 377; Cf. Hinduism by Monier Williams, pp. 127; Buddhism in Tibet by Waddell—pp. 267ff.

² Milindapañha, pp. 118; Cf. :—A popular Treatise on Gems in reference to their scientific value by Dr. L. Fruhtvanger (New York 1859).

³ Manimālā,—Edited by Raja S. M. Tagore (Cal. 1891), II, pp. 957ff; Waddell, pp. 391.

⁴ Saddharmapundarika, pp. 319; Divyāvadāna, pp. 613.

⁵ A Hist. of Ind. Lit. (Eng. Transl. from original German), II, pp. 381.

⁶ Cf. :—Mss. Remains in Eastern Turkestan—Ed. by Hoernle,—Aparimitāyuh Sūtra, I, pp. 289, 329; Hoernle in JRAS, 1910, pp. 531ff. Cf. :—also, Bendall in J R A.S., 1901, pp. 122ff.

⁷ Satapatha Brāhmaṇa 17.19; Aitareya Brāhmaṇa. 4th part 34-8. Cf. : Sāmavedhāna Brāhmaṇa; Cf. :—Keith in J R A S, 1910, pp. 934ff; Cf. :—also the position of the Vaitāṭha Sūtra in the Atharvaveda literature by W. Caland in Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes. 18, 1904 A D, pp. 185ff; Cf. :—Winternitz in Ibid 26, 1912 A D. pp. 246 ff.

The Buddha, was not generally in favour of indulging in Shānti performances introduced by vedic seers; He regarded these as mesoromancy, sorcery or magic (iddhi)¹ but nevertheless he is credited with having imparted lessons on these practices,—commonly known as Tantric rituals; The Buddha did give his consent to perform these Shānti practices with a view “that prosperity in this world by virtue of these could be attained by his less advanced disciples who seemed to care more for this world than for the Nirvāna preached by him”². Obviously a supreme personality as the Buddha was,—he even could not ignore the importance of incorporating talismanic practices in his religion from all possible sources to popularise and to expand his monastic scheme. This is clearly manifest, besides a few meagre, references in Pali literature. In Sāntaraksita and his disciple Kamalaśīla’s discussions at full length in Tattvasaṃgraha and its commentary, it clearly testifies to such novel measure taken up by the Buddha.³ As a matter of fact, we could reiterate that these talismanic practices out of which evolved the Buddhist Tantric literature,—have “contributed a great deal to such pseudo-sciences as Astronomy, Astrology, Medicine, Alchemy, Chiromancy,⁴ Horoscopy, Divination and prognostics”⁵. It is interesting to note that these sorceric practices gained such a wide-spread appeal in Buddhist India, that immediately after the Buddha’s period in 4th. Cent. B.C. diplomatic-politician like Kauṭilya is found to have been tempted to recommend “to the king to seek the help of magicians to avert calamities to the state”⁶.

The various modes of Shānti performances are found in scattered way in the canonical literature of the Buddhists. They have been systematised in post Buddha era and grouped in a separate collection called “Paritta”,—a work on ‘Exorcism Formula’. The Cūḷavagga⁷ and the Milindapañha⁸ mention that the Buddha allowed to recite “Parittas” as a watch, a guard, a protection for oneself; The occasion of the delivery of such injunction was the death of a monk from snake bite.” According to Mabel Bode⁹ during the reign of King Anorāta of Burma, intriguing monks used to recite the Parittas as an easy means of clearing “man’s guilty conscience from all wrong doing”.

¹ Dīgha I, pp. 9ff; These vijjā (sciences) according to the Buddha were crooked (tiracchāna); Cf:—the legend of Sārdula Karmāvadāna in Divyāvadāna, pp. 611; Raj. Mitra,—N.p. Buddh Lit. pp. 223ff.

² Cf: Sādhana-mālā,—Edition Dr. B. Bhattacharyya, II, Intro., pp. xvi.

³ Tattvasaṃgraha pp. 905; Cf:—Sādhana-mālā, II, Intro, pp. xvii.

⁴ i.e. Palmistry.

⁵ Sādhana-mālā, II, Intro. pp. xiv

⁶ Ibid, Intro. pp. xii.

⁷ Vinaya II, pp. 110

⁸ pp. 210 ff.

⁹ The Pali Lit. of Burma, p. 4.

In Ceylon King Kassapa V, is found to have performed the Paritta-ceremony to protect his subjects from pestilence and bad harvest.¹

The Paritta-ceremony is performed by the Buddhists mainly on occasions like those which have express sanction in the astrological works of the vedic Brahmins ;² Thus on the eve of construction of a new house,³ disease, apprehended danger, hostility etc.—Buddhist monks recite the Parittas with the firm conviction that they will be protected from all the evils.⁴ The Buddhist Parittas are said to have power to counteract the evil effects of the eclipses due to the moon and the sun.⁵ The Mora Jātaka records that the Buddha in his previous birth as a golden peacock used to recite (imam so parittam kalvā moro carati) a sun prayer daily in the morning and evening to win over his expected dangers (attano jivitam rakkhanto), especially against serpent bites.⁶ Incidentally a typical example could be cited⁷ with regard to saving the life of a monk with the help of enchantment of Parittas and mystic hymns (of Buddhist Tantric practices). It is said while the Lord was staying in the garden of Anātha-piṇḍika at Srāvastī,—at that time, the Svātī Bikṣhu, was bitten by a black snake on the finger of the right feet (Kṛṣṇa sarpena dakṣiṇe padāṅguṣṭhe daṣṭaḥ) and consequently he fell a swoon on the ground (sa klānta-kāyaḥ bhumau patitaḥ). Ānanda, on a sight of such incident asked some advice from a fellow Bikṣu who thereupon said, 'Take refuge under the Triad and then bind the bitten portion with ligature (rajjuvetṣṭana); on doing this, utter the hymns of 'Mohāmāyūrī vidyārājñī'. By a faithful follow of the procedure Ānanda could save the life of the Svātī Bikṣu. The hymns which Ānanda enchanted are some unintelligible mystic sound vibrations :⁸

¹ The Paṭi Lit. of Ceylon, — edition, Malalaseke a pp 75 ff.

² Cf. :—Brihat Saṁhitā of Varāhamihira ; Brihat Jyotiṣa-Siddhānta — compiled by S. Nibaran Choudhury (Cal. 1949 B S.), Ch. I-II.

³ Cf. :—Brihat Saṁhitā of Varāhamihira, Ch. 53

Cf. :—The Development of Hindu Iconography by Dr. J. N. Banerjee, pp. 15.

⁴ German Transl. of Khuddakapāṭha by K. Seidenstucker, Breslau, 1910, pp. 3 ; M. Grinblat and Leon Fier, —Extraits du paritta in Journal Asiatique 1871, s.6, t. xviii, pp. 225 ff.

⁵ E. R. E., IV, pp. 73.

⁶ Jataka II, pp. 84.

⁷ Bower Manuscripts, — edition Dr. Hoernle (1893) Ch. VI.

⁸ Quoted in Vaidyaka-Vrttanta, compiled by Sri Gurupada Haider, (Cal. 1954) pp 261 ; Cf. :—Sādhanamāla I pp. 247, 249 ff. This reminds us the fact that Lord Rutherford, the famous experimental physicist, proved that the pattern or arrangement of the protons, electrons and neutrons can be changed by an outside agency ; This change in the number of fundamental units creates new elements and thus curb or change the destiny of the present element. (Cf. :—Destiny and Cosmic Factors by Dr. V. Goré, D.Sc.—Bangalore 1952, — pp. 14 ; Studies in occult chemistry and physics by G. E. Sutcliffe, pp. 137) ; Dr. Goré defines destiny as interpretation of rest Energy Quanta, with which a human being is born and is analysable in terms of physico-chemical as well as physiological properties ; Synthesising these two aspects of science, we find a proper explanation of the sound vibrations and their reaction over human destiny. The Soviet Scientists claim that the supersonic and ultrasonic waves produced from sound vibrations, are now used in wider application

Idi bīḍi libīḍi nīḍe ade yāḍe drīgaḍe hari
vegudi ḍpaṁṣupīḱācinī arohani orohane ele
mēle tīle kīle tīle mēle mīle," etc., etc.

It may be pointed out that these practices such as the enchantment of mystic mantras, performance of charm for protection (āraḱṣa-piritta) etc., are generally indulged in the school of Vajrayāna Buddhism.¹

In the light of modern science when the talismanic practices of the Buddhist soothsayers are considered, it readily leaves room for us to conclude that the Buddhist astrologers were much proficient in using scientifically these tantric or sorceric means to ward off ominous astral influences,—technically called by the Buddha as "iddhipāda" or miracle work, in which the Buddha at one time took part² to compete with other ascetics, with a view to boast gradiloquently of his marvellous spiritual powers that represented a later stage of the tradition.

"in various branches of human activity. No longer do only physicists use it in their practical work, but also chemists, biologists, engineers, physicians....."; They have decidedly found that these sound vibrations have "control over the course of chemical changes" (Sounds we cannot Hear by Prof. B. Kudryatsev—Moscow, 1956, p. 141).

¹ Cf :—Advaya Vajra,—Edited by M. M. Dr. Haraprosad Shastri; Sādhana-mālā,—by Dr. B. Bhattacharyya.

² Cf :—The Pāṭika Sutta (No. 21) of Digha; Cf :—F. Weller in Asia Major I, pp. 620 ff.

THE SEPOY MUTINY AND THE HINDU- MUSLIM REACTION

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The socio-religious policy of the Government of India during the year preceding the Mutiny and the introduction of greased cartridges towards the close of 1856 reacted adversely on both the Hindus and Muslims of the country. When, through the initiative of the sepoys, the Mutiny broke out in 1857, both the Hindus and Muslims joined it in protest against the attitude of Government towards their religious feelings and social prejudices. It is not, however, a fact that all the Hindus and Muslims of the country rose in revolt. As the Mutiny progressed, Government found its supporters among both the communities of the Indian society. Sometimes in the course of the Mutiny they renewed their old feuds and fell foul of each other. But such Hindu-Muslim feuds were sporadic and were confined to certain districts of the then North-western provinces only. Those Hindus and Muslims, who arrayed themselves against Government, stood, on the whole, united in common opposition to Government during the Mutiny.

The Mutiny thrived on the disaffection of both the Hindus and Muslims. Both of them had grievances against the British Government before the outbreak of 1857. So far as the Muslims were concerned, they could not forget that not long ago the political destiny of India was in their hands. They still sighed for their lost Empire and longed for its restoration on the ruins of the British power in India. The Muslims of those areas, where Muslim fanaticism ran high, swelled the ranks of the mutineers with political motives. Consequently they came into hostility with the British Government so much so that they had to suffer much at the hands of the British Government for some years after the sky of India was cleared of the cloud of the Mutiny. In fact, the failure of the revolt was much more disastrous to the Muslims than to the Hindus. The spread of higher education through the medium of English, though much appreciated by the Hindus, did not find favour with the Muslims who had prejudices against learning English. The 'mollas' used to forbid it on religious grounds. Status in society then depended much on

the knowledge of English. But the aversion of the Muslims to it closed to them every avenue of prosperity in public life and arrested the growth of the Muslim middle-class in the pre-Mutiny days. The eagerness of the Hindus for imbibing western culture, on the other hand, raised their social prestige and decidedly gave them a primacy over the followers of Islam in India. Most of the appointments in the executive and judicial departments of Government were then meant not for the Muslims but for the Hindus, as the latter adapted themselves to the western culture, and the former were loud and strident in their opposition to it. Though the Muslims were thus themselves responsible for being debarred from Government service and for having to face a grave economic hardship consequently, still they entertained ill feeling against Government for their hard economic lot and low status before the Mutiny. The annexation of Oudh in 1856 also wounded their feelings and left them meditating a revenge on the British Government on the eve of the Mutiny.

It was, therefore, natural for the Muslims of India to remain hostile to the British Government during the Mutiny. This Muslim hostility was fomented largely by certain Muslim leaders like the Maulavi of Faizabad, Prince Mirza Muhammad Firoze Shah, Khan Bahadur Khan and others and by the revolutionary Wahabi movement in the country. The Wahabi¹ movement had for its ultimate aim 'the resuscitation of the political supremacy of Islam in the world by a return to the original purity of the faith and by a revival of the spirit of its followers. Wahabism was anti-British and anti-Sikh. As the Wahabs in India plotted to overthrow

¹ The term 'Wahabi' is properly applicable to a body of Arabian Muhammadans and is derived from the name of the founder of the sect, Shaikh Abdul Wah-hab, who was a son of a petty chief of Nejd, a province in central Arabia. As he grew into a young Arab pilgrim, he was deeply struck with the profligacy of his fellow pilgrims and with the endless mummeries which profaned the Holy cities. He first raised his voice of protest against the corruptions and practices forbidden in the Quoran. His views crystallised into a theological system, which came to be known to the posterity under the name of Wahabism. In the beginning of the 19th Century the Wahabi movement was carried to India by the pilgrims, visiting Macca. Wahabism spread to Bengal. Doctrines similar to those of Wahabism were known about this time to have been promulgated in the lower Bengal by a native of Faridpur, Hazrat Shariyatullah. His followers called themselves Ferazis. A Muslim leader, called Saiyad Ahmad, who was a native of Rai Bareilly in Oudh, inspired the Muhammadans of India with the ideal of fighting for Islam and incited them to declare 'jihad' or religious war against the Sikhs and the British Government who favoured the Sikhs. He went to Patna, where he appointed Muhammad Hosain, Wilayat Ali and Inayat Ali as his Caliphs or lieutenants. Followers of Saiyad Ahmad increased in number and an anti-British feeling went on gathering momentum under an organised leadership. Saiyad Ahmad exhorted on his followers the necessity and desirability of carrying on hostility towards the British Government till the day of judgment. Patna was fixed as the centre of conspiracy and Muhammad Hosain was recognised as the chief Caliph there. The followers of Saiyad Ahmad were also commonly known as the Wahabis. But they ignored the appellation and held themselves to be 'Hanfis'. They were closely allied to the Ferazi sect who were perhaps more orthodox Hanfis. After the death of Saiyad Ahmad his principle of 'jihad' against the British Government was sought to be carried on by his disciples in various places of India.

the British rule, they did not stand completely divorced from the sympathy of the fanatic section of the Muslim community in the country. Some of the principles of Wahabism might not have found favour with the orthodox Muslims; still the bond of common religion kept the Wahab and non-Wahab Muslims united together. Above all, the political programme of the Wahabs was appealing to those Muhammadans, who sighed for their lost political supremacy and dreamed of rebuilding the Muslim empire in India. It was a belief of the Wahabs that a prophet (Imam) would be born to lead the true believers to victory over the 'infidels'. It was also their belief that they were under an obligation to wage war against the 'infidels'. Since the Wahabs were anti-British, the term 'infidel' was evidently taken by them to refer to the English. The Wahabs had their own literature which abounded in prophecies about the fall of the British power.¹ The Anti-British activities of the Wahabs in India thus contributed to inflame the feelings of the Muslims against the British Government.

In spite of the grievances of the Muslims of India against the British Government the Mutiny did not find favour with the entire Muslim community. Muslims from several parts of the country were reported to have openly sympathised with Government during the Mutiny. The Muhammadans of Calcutta reposed their entire faith in the policy of the British Government and pledged themselves to support Government during the crisis of 1857-59. On May 27, 1857, the members of the Muhammadan Association of Calcutta held a special meeting at 9/1, Maulavi Imdad Ali Lane, Taltalah and passed resolutions, expressing their loyalty to Government and promising their entire aid and support to the suppression of the Mutiny. Some of the resolutions, which were passed by them, are cited below :—

"The meeting having heard of the havoc and devastation, lately committed in some towns of the North-western provinces, and of the sacrifice of life and property, caused by the disaffection and Mutiny of a small portion of the native soldiery of the British Government, do hereby express their sincere regret and heartfelt sorrow at these lamentable and disastrous proceedings."

"The Committee learn . . . that the cause of the present Mutiny may be traced to an unfounded report, maliciously spread by ill-disposed men, of a contemplated interference on the part of the Government with the religious rites, ceremonies and persuasions of the natives of this country . . ."

¹ Hunter—Indian Mussalmans, pages 58-60 (foot note).

"... This Committee, relying upon the pledge, repeatedly given by the Government, of their determination never to interfere with the religious principles and practices of the natives, are prepared . . . to prevent the dissemination of such an unfounded impression or its taking root in the minds of their native brethren."

"Though the Committee are convinced that only a slight effort on the part of Government is sufficient to stifle the rebellion . . . and to prevent it from causing more damage; yet should the rebellion spread further and endanger the lives and properties of more of their subjects, they are persuaded that it is incumbent upon all, who have experienced the benefits of the mild and beneficent rule of the British Government, to enlist their energies in the preservation of the lives and properties of their fellow-subjects and cordially and vigorously to co-operate with the Government in the restoration of peace and order." A copy of the above resolutions was sent to Government.

Similar instances of Muslim fidelity were brought to the notice of the Secretary to the Government of Bengal by the Commissioner of Patna in a correspondence, dated Patna, October 6, 1857.² A Muslim gentleman, Munsif Amir Ali, who was appointed a special assistant to the Commissioner of Patna, helped the Commissioner by furnishing him with the information on the state of feelings among the natives in different parts of the Commissioner's jurisdiction. The Muhammadan villages of Southern Bihar generally remained quiet, while the Rajput and Brahmin villages rose around them.³ In Southern Bihar the Muhammadans were reputed to be the foremost in acts of devotion to Government.⁴ The attitude of the Nizam of Hyderabad towards Government was friendly. While the so-called Bengal Army was carrying fire and sword from one station to another, Hyderabad was in a ferment. Still Hyderabad remained immune from mutinous outbreaks, thanks mainly to the endeavours of the faithful Nizam, Afzul-oo-Dowlah and of his faithful minister, Salar Jung. Wherever in Hyderabad disturbances were apprehended, the Nizam and his minister took prompt action to nip them in the bud. Both of them received thanks from Government in recognition of the services, rendered by them during the disturbances of 1857-58.

¹ *House Pub. Cons.* June 5, 1857, No. 30, *vide also* *Parl. Paper (House of Commons)* Vol. 44, part I for 1857-58 Paper No. 364, pages 301-302. The above resolutions bore the signature of Fazlur Rahman (President), Abdul Bari, Md. Weyeeh, Vice Presidents, Mr. Abdur Rauf and others. Md. Weyeeh was the then Head Maulvi of the Calcutta Madrasah.

² *Parl. Paper (House of Commons)*, Vol. 41, Part III, pages 99-100.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁴ *Ibid.*

If the Nizam turned against Government, Southern India would have been in a blaze of insurrection. Again, when the regiments at Chittagong and Dacca mutinied, the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal treated the mutinous sepoys with much hostility and hunted them out with much pluck.¹

Surely then, the entire Muhammadan civil population did not rise in revolt in 1857. The Mutiny, in other words, did not thrive on the support of the entire Muslim civil community.

It is pleaded by some writers on Mutiny that the movement of 1857 was the fruit of Muslim conspiracy on an all India basis. The contemporary Calcutta Press described it as a Muhammadan revolt.² Such a view of the Mutiny is not, however, justified by facts. In the first place, the entire Muslim community of India was not committed to hostility towards the British Government during the Mutiny, as has been substantiated above. Secondly, of the three main divisions of the Indian Army, the Bombay and Madras Armies maintained, on the whole, a peaceful front. But the so-called Bengal Army revolted against Government. All the ten regiments of the Native Cavalry and sixty-one out of seventy-four regiments of the Native Infantry of the Bengal Army (thirteen remaining staunch) rose in arms. In 1857 the strength of the Bengal Native Regular Cavalry was 5136, while that of the Bengal Regular Infantry was 84,515.³ The cavalry of the Bengal Army was composed chiefly of Muhammadans, while the bulk of the Infantry was composed of the Hindus. As would be evident from the above figures, the Muslim sepoys were far outnumbered by the Hindu or rather non-Muslim sepoys in the Bengal Army. In other words, in the mutinous Bengal Army the non-Muslim mutineers commanded majority over the Muslim ones. That is to say, the mutinous Muslim sepoys were numerically inferior to the mutinous non-Muslim ones. Thirdly, first symptoms of disaffection manifested themselves in Murshidabad and Barrackpur, where the Hindus formed the bulk of the population, but not in Delhi, Agra, Patna and Lucknow, which were the foci of Muhammadanism in India. The Muslims around Peshawar remained faithful to Government. The Punjabi Muhammadans were,

¹ Sir George Campbell—'Memoirs of my Indian Career' Vol. I, page 294. No better answer could be given, according to Campbell, to those who supposed that the Muhammadans were all hostile to the British. *Ibid.*

² Parl. Paper Vol. 44, part III, for 1857-58, p. 101.

³ Parl. Paper (House of Commons), Vol. XLII of 1857-58, pages 4-5, paper No. 201. Returns relating to the armies of India as submitted by Philip Melvill, Secretary to the Military Department on April 12, 1858. The figures, cited above, stand included in the figure 185767 being, according to Philip Melvill, the total strength of the Bengal Native Army in 1857, *vide* page 146 ante.

on the whole, tranquil. The Muslims of the South were also, on the whole, loyal to Government. Though a fanatic section of the Muslims of Delhi joined the mutineers, the majority of the Muslim population of the district appeared to have kept aloof from the Mutiny. During the siege of Delhi in May, 1857, the mutineers wanted to have king Bahadur Shah II as their leader. But the titular Padshah was then too old to assume the leadership of the mutineers. The court, that was formed at Delhi under the presidentship of Lieutenant Colonel M. Dawes for the trial of Bahadur Shah, found him guilty not only of open sympathy with the mutineers but also of fomenting sedition by assuming active leadership of the mutineers.¹ But the statement

¹ The allegations laid by the court at the door of the king were many and varied. The Meerut mutineers on reaching the palace of Bahadur Shah in Delhi killed many Europeans including the commandant of the palace guards, Mr. Fraser. The court held that these murders had been previously sanctioned by Bahadur Shah. The king's servants, who were alleged to have been accomplices in the crime, were neither dismissed nor was the slightest investigation of inquiry even instituted. In fact, the Court held that the king retained those murderers both in his pay and employment. As per the findings of the Court, the contemporary newspapers referred to the appointment as commander-in-chief by Bahadur Shah of his son, Mirza Mughal who was regarded as the leading chief of the rebels in Delhi. It was this Mirza Mughal who under written orders of Bahadur Shah, sent military help to Maulavi Muhammad Zohur Ali, Police Officer of Najafgarh to fight against the British. Bahadur Shah received many a petition from Muslim enthusiasts, who addressed him as 'Shah of the World' and sought his military aid to exterminate the English. Bahadur Shah used to consider those petitions sympathetically and to issue written orders to his subordinates for necessary help to be rendered. Again, as the court held, on the afternoon of the very day of outbreak at Delhi Bahadur Shah received in the hall of special audience the obeisance of the revolted sepoys and wished them success in their crusade against the 'infidel' British. Bahadur Shah was then declared the Sovereign of India on May 11, 1857. Again, Bahadur Shah was alleged by the Court to have issued orders on September 6, 1857 to the Chief Police Officer of the Delhi city to proclaim by the beat of drum that the war against the British was a religious war and that Hindus and Mussalmans alike should conjointly join the crusade against the British. It was further ordered to be proclaimed that the crusaders fighting against the English would be allowed to remain in possession of whatever property they would plunder from the English and that they would besides receive additional rewards from the king. The court held that the paper containing the above orders was found among other documents in the office of the king's chief police station, that it bore the signature of Bhao Singh, Assistant to the King's Chief Police Officer, and that a more trustworthy and convincing document could hardly be laid in proof of the king's open hostility to the British Government. It was also alleged by the Court that Bahadur Shah sent Sidi Kambar, Chief of the Abyssinians in the palace of Delhi, to Persia and Constantinople as an ambassador with letters to the kings of those countries, soliciting their help in the restoration of Muslim sovereignty in India. The court finally held that in its considered opinion Bahadur Shah was an abettor of conspiracy against the British Government during the Mutiny.

Though found guilty by the court, Bahadur Shah pleaded that he was not guilty. He made a statement in self-defence to the following effect: The appearance of the Meerut mutineers, who were never in previous correspondence with him, sprang surprise on him. To keep them off he ordered for closing the gates of the palace and sent immediate intimation to the commandant of the palace guards, Mr. Fraser for taking necessary precautionary measures. He dissuaded Mr. Fraser from approaching the mutineers and supplied in compliance with Fraser's request two guns and two palanquins for the rescue of some European ladies. When the mutineers broke into the palace, he was made a prisoner at their hands, and he had never given orders for the murder of Fraser and other Europeans. As regards the appointment of Mirza Mughal as the Commander-in-chief of the army, Bahadur Shah said in the court that at first he rejected the request of the army for the appointment of Mirza Mughal as the commander-in-chief, but that subsequently circumstances forced him to give his consent to the above appointment. As regards the orders under the king's seal and over his own signature, Bahadur Shah stated that from the day the mutinous soldiers became masters of the palace and treated him as a prisoner, they themselves stamped with his own seal such papers and documents containing orders and instructions as were suitable

made by the King in the Court in self-defence indicates that he was a prisoner in the hands of the mutineers and that he had no genuine sympathy with them. If he supplied his leadership to the mutineers, he did it most reluctantly.

to their purpose. Sometimes they brought rough drafts of orders and compelled his Secretary to make fair copies of them. At other times they brought the original letters, intended for despatch, and left copies of them in the office. Frequently they had his seal impressed on empty unaddressed envelopes. Bahadur Shah could not know what papers were sent in those envelopes or to whom these were sent. Any member of the Army could have orders written, as he chose, without the king's authority, without even acquainting him with their purport. Bahadur Shah and his secretary could not oppose the Army in any way for fear of life. As regards the petitions over his own signature, Bahadur Shah said that these were forced to be signed by him. In case of non-compliance with its orders the Army threatened to depose him and to make Mirza Mughol King in his place. The King denied that he ever participated in the deliberations of the court, set up by the Army. Tired of the mutineers, the king desired to go to Mecca, but was not allowed by them to go on a pilgrimage to the holy city. To evade them he had once escaped to Humayun's mausoleum from where he was brought back on an assurance of the safety of his life. Bahadur Shah denied the allegation that he had sent the Abyssinian Kambar as an ambassador to the court of the King of Persia. He also denied that the rebellious sepoys had ever saluted him or showed him any other mark of respect. They made him a prisoner and used his name as a sanction for their acts. Bahadur Shah concluded that his statements were true to fact and that he pleaded not guilty.

Vide Selections from the Records of the Government of the Punjab and its dependencies, No. VII, Trial of Muhammad Shah, pages 202-245.

Bahadur Shah appears to have played a double game during the Mutiny. He had his own grievances against the British Government. He felt the pinch of indignity in being reduced to a mere titular figurehead. So, he should have a natural inclination to join the mutineers. But the king was too old to participate actively in the Mutiny. At the same time, the mutineers wanted his leadership. In the circumstances, he bowed to destiny or the force of circumstances. He became their leader, though with much reluctance and disinclination. The rebel Court was formed at Delhi with him at the head. As stated above, the Court, formed for his trial, found him a supporter of the mutineers and charged him with conspiracy against the British Government on more grounds than one. But it is also true that the king lacked the real spirit of nationalism or patriotism in him. He had no genuine sympathy with the mutineers who were struggling against the British Government. The Meerut mutineers on their first arrival at Delhi received no encouragement from him. The palace gates were ordered to be shut against them. He pleaded his inability to come to their help, as he had neither troops nor magazines nor treasury. At this crisis he depended much on his personal advisers of whom the chief were the Hakim Ahsanullah Khan and Mahbub Ali Khan (Mukhtar or agent) both of whom were suspected by the Army as having been in sympathy with the British. In a letter dated August 9, 1857, Col. Keith Young wrote to his wife about Ahsanullah thus: 'The sepoys suspect Hakeem Hassen Oollah (Hakim Ahsanullah) of being in treacherous correspondence with us; and, between ourselves, I believe, they are not far wrong'. (*Vide* Delhi, 1857, page 186). In another letter dated August 10, 1857, Keith Young wrote to his wife about the Hakim thus: 'Hassen Oollah is suspected by the sepoys, and not without reason, of being in correspondence with us'. (*Vide Ibid*, page 190). It was this Ahsanullah who was one of the trusted advisers of Bahadur Shah. It was on his advice that Bahadur Shah sent a letter through a camel driver to the Lieutenant Governor at Agra, informing him of the crisis, developing with the approach of the mutineers from Meerut (*vide* Two Native Narratives, page 83). Delhi was in great tumult. Bahadur Shah yielded for the time being to the force of circumstances. He assured the soldiers that he would be associated with them in a common cause against the British Government but that he would desire them to place their confidence in Ahsanullah Khan, Mahbub Ali Khan and Queen Zinat Mahal. The relations between the King and the insurgent forces at Delhi became bitter before long. The Army demanded more and more of money of Bahadur Shah, but the latter was quite at a loss as to how to meet their demand for more gold. The Army accused him of sheltering European ladies and gentlemen inside the Fort and demanded their surrender. On this point Munshi Jiwanlal recorded as follows:

"I learnt to-day (May 16) that nearly forty Europeans were concealed in the king's palace. The sepoys went into the Palace in great anger, as they said, they had seized a messenger with a letter cursing the mutineers. The sepoys threatened to kill Ahsanullah Khan and Mahbub Ali Khan and also threatened to take away Zinat Mahal, Begum Sahiba and to keep her as a hostage for the King's loyalty. There was a great uproar in the palace, the sepoys on the one hand and the

So, then, the Mutiny should not be ascribed solely to the disaffection of the Muslim community. The entire Muhammadan civil population did not rebel, though many from the Muslim civil society joined the movement; the Muslim mutinous sepoys were numerically inferior to non-Muslim mutinous sepoys; and the Mutiny did not start in the Muslim-dominated areas of the country, as the foregoing paragraphs would show. In the circumstances the Mutiny should not be treated as an exclusively Muhammadan rising on an all-India basis. The Muslim character of the revolt was prominent only in certain parts of the country. In some districts of the North-western provinces, for instance, the Mutiny assumed a Muslim colour. In such districts the hostility of the Muslims towards Government during the Mutiny was quite conspicuous. In Patna also the Muslims stood opposed to Government.

It is as extreme and untenable a view that the Mutiny was due exclusively to the Muslim conspiracy as the one held by Sir Saiyad Ahmad Khan, founder of the Aligarh University, that the Muslims were loyal to Government whether before or during the Mutiny. Sir Saiyad Ahmad, who was a loyal British subject, sought to convince the British Government of the basic fidelity of the Muslim Community to it. In his "Review on Dr. Hunter's Indian Mussalmans" he repudiated the allegations, brought against the members of his community, that they were a source of chronic danger to the British Government of India, denied

king's household on the other, contending with violent language and harsh verifications. To appease the mutineers Mahbub Ali Khan took an oath that he was not the author of that letter, nor had it been written with his knowledge. (It was on this date that the Europeans in the Palace were butchered in a manner that defies description). The King and his assembled councillors stood like dumb puppets. The King ordered the sepoys to separate themselves into two parties, Muhammadans and Hindus, and he appealed to each to consult their religious advisers to see, if there were any authority for the slaughter of helpless men, women and children. But what word will a frenzied murderer obey? . . . " (Vide Two Native Narratives pages 93-94). The bitterness between the King and the Army was gradually on the increase. Jiwanlal writes that native regimental officers experiencing difficulties in getting rations approached the king on May 12 and addressed him, with such disrespectful terms as 'I say, you King'; 'I say, you old fellow, (Ari, Badshah, Ari, Buddha). Some one caught him by hand, another touched the old king's beard. Vide two Native Narratives page 87). The army even threatened to replace Bahadur Shah by Abu Bakr as their king and leader. A sense of security naturally prompted Bahadur Shah to depend more and more on the British Government. Referring to Bahadur Shah's conspiracy with Government during the Mutiny, H. H. Greathed, the then Commissioner and Political Agent of Delhi writes thus: 'I went to the Tubaeel office this morning (May 30, 1857); and the man who had been acting for the king of Delhi made over to me the money he had in the chest, and the sealed order he had received from the king: So I have good proof of Royal complicity.' (Vide his letter written during the siege of Delhi, Page 5.) As, however, Bahadur Shah attempted to sail in two boats, sometimes with the mutineers in the one, and sometimes with Government in the other, he failed in fine either to enlist the confidence of the mutineers or to earn the favour of Government. He was tried by Government was declared guilty, and transported to Rangoon where to pass the rest of his life.

the charge that Christianity was incompatible with Islam,¹ and endeavoured to draw the Muslims and the Government closer to each other. He even went to the length of asserting that even the Wahabs were not anti-British but only anti-Sikh.² Sir Ahmad disavowed, in fact, any design of 'jihad' on the part of the Muslim community against the British Government of India. He held that the thinking and responsible section of the Muslim community was never anti-British and that those who pleaded for a 'jihad' 'were vagabonds and ill-conditioned men. They were wine-drinkers and men who spent their time in debauchery and dissipation. They were men floating without profession or occupation on the surface of society'.³

In spite of Sir Saiyad Ahmad's pleadings that the Muslims of India were loyal to Government both during and before the Mutiny the fact remains that the mutineers were composed not only of the Hindus but also of the Muslims. It was then generally believed that the British sovereignty in India would terminate one hundred years after the battle of Plassey of 1757. The outbreak of the Mutiny was accordingly hailed by the disaffected Muslims as the golden opportunity to render a *coup de grace* to the British rule in India and to make a last desperate attempt at reviving the Empire of the great Mughals.

The reaction of the Mutiny on the Hindus may now be studied here. The Hindus also, like the Muslims, had grievances, many and varied, against the Government. The attempt at westernising the Indian society caused much irritation and discontent among the caste-conscious Hindus of the country. The Brahmins and other upper class Hindus stood seething with thousand and one complaints against the governmental encroachment on their sacred domains of caste and prejudices. The spread of English education, systematic policy of Christianising the native population, legal protection, afforded to widows and converts produced a serious Brahmanic reaction in the country. Government was alleged to have violated the sanctity of caste by bringing the highest and the lowest castes together in schools, in the ranks of the Army and in the railway carriages. The sati

¹ Sir Saiyad Ahmad Khan supported his statement by the contents of the 85th Verse of Chapter V of the Holy Quoran. The verse runs as follows :

Thou shalt surely find the most violent of all men in enmity against the true believers to be the Jews and the idolators : and thou shalt surely find those among them to be the most inclinable to entertain friendship for true believers who say, we are Christians. *Vide* Saiyad Ahmad Khan's 'Review on Dr. Hunter's Indian Mussalmans', page 45.

² *Vide* Review on Dr. Hunter's India Mussalmans, page 21.

³ Saiyad Ahmad Khan—The Causes of the Indian Revolt, page 8.

system was abolished and with it was abolished a source of income of the priestly class. The remarriage of widows was encouraged the use of common utensils in gaols was insisted on. All such steps proved revolting to the caste-ridden and superstitious Hindu population of the country.

The British Government was looked upon by the Brahmins as a menace to Hinduism, as they believed in the current prophecies that Brahmanism would be abolished and that a new doctrine, namely Christianity would come to prevail. Such prophecies about the end of Brahmanical religion excited among the Hindus the apprehension of a mighty change in religious systems. Among the Brahmins of the pre-Mutiny period there was a superstitious belief that in the existing 'kali yuga' all distinctions of caste would be obliterated, and that all men should be of one faith, forsaking the idolatry and worshipping one Supreme Being. Such a superstitious belief cast a gloom on the Hindu society and caused much uneasiness in it. When, however, the Mutiny broke out, it did not find favour with the entire Hindu community. The Hindu inhabitants of the Bhowanipur area in Calcutta remained loyal to Government. On May 23, 1857, a meeting was held by them at the premises of Gurn Charan De of the Chakraberia locality of Bhowanipur to consider the best means of maintaining peace in the Bhowanipur area. A committee was formed with such men as Guru Charan De, Isan Chandra Mallick, Umesh Chandra Mitra, Chandra Kumar Bose, Prasanna Kumar Chatterjee, and others and the following propositions were carried out :

"The Committee being apprehensive of the most deplorable state of things, created by the disaffected sepoys in some parts of the country, consider it as a duty of every loyal subject of Her Majesty's empire to be true to her Government.

"As false apprehensions and unfounded tales regarding the exaggerated affairs of Mutiny have prevailed in and about the town through the maliciously disposed persons, the committee feels it as a necessity to remove them from the minds of peaceful subjects.

"The committee after mature deliberation comes to the conclusion that some of the members . . . will by every means in their power impress upon the minds of the timid and credulous people the idea of the mightiness of the power of the British Government to repel the aggressions of any foreign enemy, however powerful and indomitable, or to put down any internal disturbance of order.

"The committee determine that these noble feelings of loyalty and attachment to the beneficial British rule that had actuated them to meet (here) be most respectfully communicated to the Governor-General in Council."¹

The inhabitants of the town and district of Barasat in Bengal submitted to the Governor-General in Council an address, in which they recorded their high appreciation of the tolerant attitude of Government towards the people of country of India, and conveyed their assurance that they would be unsparing in their efforts to maintain order and discipline amongst themselves during the Mutiny.²

There were besides many Hindu princes and landlords such as Jaya Krishna Mookerjee, Zemindar of Uttarpara, Maharaja Srish Chandra Roy, Bishnu Prasad Narayan Singh, Zemindar of Tirhut, Raja Man Singh of Oudh and the Raja of Hutwa all of whom remained loyal to Government throughout the Mutiny. The Hindu population of several districts of the then North-western provinces also maintained friendly attitude towards Government during the Mutiny.

The entire Hindu community thus refrained from rising in arms in 1857. There is, however, no gainsaying the fact that a large portion of the Hindu society then stood in opposition to Government. The Mutiny, in fact, fattened on the hostility of both the Hindus and Muslims of the country. Though both of them participated in the Mutiny, it was neither the fruit of the conspiracy of the Hindus only nor the result of the hostility of the Muslims exclusively. The Mutiny was a joint movement of both the Hindus and Muslims of the country.

¹ Home Pub. Cons. C. 29th May, 1857, No. 27.

² Home Pub. Cons. 5th June, 1857, No. 22. The address was signed by Mohan Lal Pandey, Munsiff and Dy. Magistrate, Nabin Chandra Dass, Head Master, Government School, Raj Krishna Mitra and others.

NYĀYA-MANJARĪ

VOL. II (23)

JANAKIVALLABHA BHATTACHARYA, M.A., PH.D., *Sankh yatirtha*

Now, the Naiyāyikas refute the thesis of the Sphoṭa-vādins. They state that the thesis of the Sphoṭa-vādins that if the word 'gauḥ' (a cow) is repeatedly heard then a persisting same element is perceived. They now criticise it and point out that the perception of a persisting same element owes its origin to an adjunct, viz., a single vowel. But if words consist of many vowels, e.g., Devadatta etc. then many letters are but slowly perceived by us. Thus, when a piece of cloth is presented to our consciousness its parts are not cognised as separate from its whole. Hence, when a word or a sentence is presented to our consciousness a same identical object is not grasped like a universal or a whole.

Now, the Sphoṭa-vādins contend that consciousness which arises from the generic form of a word but not from its specific form is called the awareness of Sphoṭa. Now, the Naiyāyikas ask, "Do you hold that the universal of sound (soundness) is same as Sphoṭa ? They point out, you cannot answer in the affirmative : A Sphoṭa has a distinct entity. It is not identical with the universal of sound. A universal is called common property (*sāmānya*) because when a particular is perceived another particular of the same class is remembered. When we see a particular cow, called Śābaleya we remember another particular cow, named Bāhuleya. But, in the present case, if the letter 'g' is presented to our consciousness, the letter 'au' is not remembered. Hence, śabdatva is not a universal. It is also to be noted that when letters, words and sentences are presented to our consciousness they all produce similar consciousness. This consciousness points to the same object, viz., the fact of being a sound. Therefore, a sphoṭa is nothing but a sound in general.

The critics of the Sphoṭa-hypothesis join issue with the Sphoṭa-vādins and subject the above suggestion to a severe criticism. They point out that some thinkers of the sphoṭa-school, being apprehensive of the existence of a sphoṭa, have hesitated to identify a sound in its generic character with the universal of sound. They have concealed the

real thing and mystified it. But their apprehension has been misplaced. It is a truism that the universal of sound is not a *sphoṭa*. When each letter is cognised it is presented to our consciousness as a sound. A letter is not a *sphoṭa*. The consciousness of each letter refers to two elements—universal and particular. The universal element is constituted by the universal of sound, *i.e.*, soundness. The above consciousness refers to no other common element. The piece of consciousness which is expressed in the verbal form 'sound', refers to the universal of sound but not to a *sphoṭa*. Jayanta has also conclusively proved the hollowness of the thesis that when a particular of a class is grasped by one another particular of the same class is necessarily remembered. Therefore, a *sphoṭa* is not referred to by such consciousness as is expressed by the term 'a sound'. Similarly, the awareness of a word and a sentence does not involve a reference to a *sphoṭa*. It has been rightly said that the knowledge of words and sentences bears the stamp of sameness because they conjointly produce one and the same effect. It resembles the knowledge of a forest or an army. It is a piece of knowledge which simultaneously refers to many objects. A *sphoṭa* does not bear a resemblance to a universal. Their distinction has been noted before.

The *Sphoṭa-vādins* hold that a word is presented to consciousness as identical with a sentence because they conjointly produce the same effect, *viz.*, the communication of the same meaning. Such a hypothesis involves the fallacy of a vicious circle. The communication of the same meaning is at the root of the awareness of the identity of a word with a sentence. Again, the awareness of the identity of a word with a sentence is the source of the communication of the same meaning. It is not fair to overlook the above fallacy. It has been stated before that the aggregate of letters remembered and perceived helps to communicate the meaning of a word. It is not a universal rule that the knowledge of identity of a word with a sentence brings about the communication of a meaning. Therefore, how does the hypothesis of the critics involve the fallacy of a vicious circle?

The *Sphoṭa-vādins* may now contend that if a word is not identical with a sentence then how is it that the consciousness of an object, denoted by a word, forms an integral part of a judgment, expressed by a sentence? The assumption that a word and a sentence are identical is a foolish one. If objects are identical or different then and then only their corresponding acts of consciousness are identical or different. If two objects are different, the corresponding acts of consciousness

are identical but if the former two are identical then the latter two are also identical. It is a long-standing hypothesis that the acts of consciousness which refer to the same object are identical. It is not a law of Epistemology that if the conditions of acts of consciousness are different then the acts of consciousness are distinct from one another and if the said conditions are the same then the acts of consciousness are identical. Let us take an example. The conditions of the acts of perception of one and the same object, *viz.*, the eyes, light and inner organ are different but they, inspite of their difference, generate such acts of perception as refer to the same object. If acts of consciousness are same then the objects referred to by them should be the same. But one cannot subscribe to the view that several acts of consciousness are same because one and the same word has produced all of them. If different judgments are similar then the object referred to by them is one and the same. But we should not think that they all are similar because they have been produced by one and the same sentence. Many consecutive letters convey an object as their meaning. But they do not point to the identity of a word with a sentence. The grammarians who are under the sway of illusion think of the identity of a word with a sentence as a current view. Their illusion lies in their assumption that a word and its meaning are identical. We have established with strong argument that a word is absolutely different from its object. Our very experience contradicts the attributed identity of a word with its meaning. Hence, we do not accept such a theory. Therefore, we do not feel the necessity of discussing this subject. In fine, we say that a *sphota* is not established by perception.

THE REFUTATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS THAT A WORD OR A SENTENCE IS PARTLESS

A judgment refers to a unified whole of objects which are mutually related to one another. Two judgments will differ if their objects are different ; and two judgments are identical if they refer to the same object. As these two epistemological rules are honoured, there is no inner difference in the meaning of a sentence. The object, referred to by a sentence, should have its abstract identity. The critics admit that the relational object which constitutes the meaning of a sentence is a unified whole. But they point out at the same time that though the said object is a unified whole yet it admits of parts. But those who hold that a sentence conveys a partless whole have no sound theory of knowledge.

The question whether a part exists or not is highly impertinent. But sound thinkers should discuss the problem whether the meaning of a sentence consists of parts or of no parts.

In every sentence a word is distinguished from the sentence itself and the meaning of a word is differentiated from that of a sentence. If in a sentence its parts and their meanings are not distinctly grasped then the sentence remains unintelligible to us. Hence, in every sentence its parts and their meanings are presented to consciousness with their distinctive features. Now, the Sphoṭa-vādins may contend that a sentence and its meaning are partless and if they are grasped by us as having parts then this knowledge is illusory. Such a contention does not hold good since a judgment which is contradicted is illusory but if it does not meet with contradiction, it is not illusory. One cannot pass his judgment on a piece of knowledge as illusory at his own sweet will. An illusion is not baseless. There must be some ground for its falsehood. The Sphoṭa-vādins should mention some ground for its falsity. They may say that the knowledge of a sentence having parts is false because it bears resemblance to an illusory judgment. The critics point out that they fail to detect a false judgment which it resembles. If a sentence is well known as having parts and if another sentence, having no parts, appears as consisting of parts owing to its resemblance to the first one then the knowledge of the second sentence may be called illusory. Now, the sentence in question is partless. It appears to be possessed of parts owing to its likeness to a sentence having parts. If the Sphoṭa-vādins argue in this way then they must admit that there is a sentence which has parts. But they do not make such an admission since they hold that all sentences are partless. Even in the body of a man-lion the two parts maintain their distinction and are presented to consciousness as distinct. Hence, a man-lion is not the instance of a partless whole. Hence, it must be admitted that there are parts in a sentence. In a picture the colour of red Arsenic is distinguished from that of vermillion. In a drink the taste of each ingredient such as Nāga-keśara etc is distinctly felt. In different forms of music the different notes of a scale are distinctly heard. Therefore, there are not illustrations of partless wholes. Now, the Sphoṭa-vādins may cite a new type of illustrations, *viz.*, the awareness of a picture etc. The critics admit that such awareness is partless. They also point out that the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is also partless since every form of consciousness is partless. But an object which is referred to by our consciousness and which is either an illustration or is illustrated

is only possessed of parts. Hence, a sentence and its meaning are not partless.

Let the second thesis of the Sphoṭa-vādins be examined. From the usage of the experienced persons the relation of denotation obtaining between a sentence and its meaning is learnt but not that holding between a word and its meaning. We cannot express an idea by means of a word. The above thesis is not tenable since in order to know the relation of denotation holding between a sentence and its meaning the meaning of a word cannot be dispensed with. If a man is acquainted with words and their meanings then he can even make out the meaning of a sentence newly constructed. If by means of insertion and elimination the meaning of a word is not grasped then each sentence being an indivisible unit the number of sentences will know no limit. In that case one is to know the meaning of each sentence. As such it will be absurd to know the meaning of a sentence. In order to know the meaning of a sentence we must admit that a sentence is divisible into words and each word has its meaning.

The Sphoṭa-vādins have also stated that mere words are never employed and words, for this reason, enjoy no real existence. Such a thesis is not tenable. Let us cite a concrete case in support of our criticism. When a big complex sentence is employed, subordinate clauses are not independently used. Hence these clauses which constitute the said complex sentence turn out to be unreal. Now, the Sphoṭa-vādins may contend that these clauses are real in order to render the said complex sentence significant. Such a contention does not hold water. The Naiyāyikas will also hold that words are invariably employed in order to do the same function, i.e., to make the said sentence expressive. There are a few sentences the meaning of which is obtained through the context. Even, in these cases, words play an important part since they are uttered to convey such matters as are beyond the reach of a context. [The text is very corrupt in this paragraph. In order to have a consistent meaning we have made necessary corrections. We ask our readers to be careful and request them to examine our corrections.] Now, the Sphoṭa-vādins make another suggestion in favour of their thesis. When a boy gets by heart a book he does not realise the result of his study. Similarly, when a sentence is read out one may not realise the distinct individuality of letters or words. In the face of this suggestion the Naiyāyikas strongly assert that letters and words must have a necessary place in a sentence just as parts of a chariot occupy a necessary

place in the chariot though they cannot discharge its function. Now, it may be contended that parts of a chariot are necessary because they render some other service which a chariot cannot do. The Naiyāyikas say in reply that letters and words will also be capable of doing something which a sentence cannot do. The parts of a chariot make a partial contribution towards the function of a chariot. Do letters or words make any such contribution? Yes, letters or words also make a partial contribution towards the function of a sentence. Some letters of a sentence are significant by themselves. Therefore, letters and words are not creatures of our imagination. They enjoy reality.

The Sphoṭa-vādins have also raised an objection that as words constitute parts of a sentence and letters are elements of a word, so letters should have also parts. Such an objection expresses the unprecedented scholarship of the said objectors. A jar is a whole consisting of parts. On that ground one cannot hold that an atom should consist of parts. One determines the nature of an object through cognition and non-cognition. An object possesses only such nature as is revealed through cognition. An object does not possess such nature as is not presented to our consciousness. Parts of a sentence and a word are cognised but those of a letter are not presented to our consciousness. Kumārila has also said to this effect.

If a letter is slowly uttered, it is not at all grasped. If it is distinctly uttered then it is grasped in its entirety. Kumārila means to say that if a letter had been a whole consisting of parts then some of its parts would have been grasped sometimes. He also states that nobody should postulate a whole having parts if its parts are never cognised. Therefore, letters are partless wholes. Therefore, it is a foolish statement that a letter should have also parts like a word or a sentence. Letters have no parts.

A sentence and its meaning are relational wholes because if the constituent words are present then the sentence in question is significant and if such words are absent then the sentence in question conveys no sense. If the same logic is applied then the conclusion that a word consists of parts is arrived at. It is also understood that the stem of a word and its suffix are real. These parts of a word are not merely imaginary. In the inflectional words 'vr̥kṣam,' 'vr̥kṣeṇa' etc. the stem has the same meaning but the case-endings are different. In the inflectional words 'vr̥kṣam,' 'ghaṭam' etc. the stems have different meanings though the case-ending has the same meaning. In those cases the meaning which a particular word denotes is

expressed by it (the word). The above conclusion has been unmistakably established. How can one say that these parts are unreal?

The Sphoṭa-vādins have argued in favour of the reality of a sphoṭa that though the words 'kūpa', 'sūpa', 'yūpa' etc. contain many similar letters yet they do not convey the same meaning. They draw the conclusion from the above premiss that the possession of the same letters does not help to communicate the meaning of a word. The drift of this argument is that the letters, contained in a word, do in no way contribute towards the communication of the meaning of the word. Such a conclusion is contrary to reasons. Every word has its fixed meaning. The mere presence or absence of similar letters does not help to convey a meaning which a word does not denote. If only similar letters had determined the meaning of a word then the words 'kūpa' etc. would have conveyed the same meaning. But a word conveys only the same meaning as is denoted by it. A word which is not denotative of a meaning does not convey it. Our experience points to the conclusion referred to just now. Now, by the joint method of agreement and difference we determine that this word denotes this meaning. If, in a particular case, the constituent letters of a word are similar then it will not be reasonable to enforce the conclusion that in other cases all constituent letters are similar though some of them are not so. [Jayanta means to say that in words 'kūpa', 'sūpa' and 'yūpa' the letter 'u', 'p' and 'a' i.e., the 2nd, the 3rd and the last one are similar but the initial one of each word is different. Hence, one cannot hold that all letters are similar. Therefore, the above words do not convey the same meaning.] If a heap of dust moves along with a row of ants then the latter is not the cause of the former. With this remark the Sphoṭa-vādins take an exception to the hypothesis of the Naiyāyikas. [They mean to say that though a meaning is related to a word yet the constituent letters of the word do not contribute towards the communication of the same meaning.] Such an objection is pointless. Sometimes a heap of dust is raised by the hoofs of horses. It is also noticed that a row of ants is rendered motionless by such a heap of dust. Hence one cannot arrive at the conclusion that a group of letters does not condition the communication of the meaning of a word. We do not definitely know the exact cause of the above heap of dust since it may be raised by horses or by young camels or by elephants. If a condition is wrongly stated of the above effect, viz., the heap of dust then the critic may find

fault with the above suggestion. But still it is unmistakably true that the said heap of dust has been raised by many animals since heaps of dust which have been raised either by horses or by camels or by elephants are similar. Therefore, animals have raised the above heap of dust.

The Sphoṭa-vādins have argued that as the words like 'aśva-karṇa', etc., have lost the sense of their constituent words (aśva and karṇa), so the other compound words may also imitate them. In other words, they suggest that the formation of compound words is futile. They hint at the hypothesis that words have no parts. [The word 'aśva' means a horse and the word 'karṇa' denotes an ear. But the word 'aśva karṇa' denotes a species of tree. Thus, the meaning of the constituent words 'aśva' and 'karṇa' do not contribute towards the meaning of the compound word 'aśva-karṇa'. They generalise that all words are partless.] Such a hypothesis does not stand to reason. The word in question finds a place in the list of such words as convey conventional meaning only. The constituent words do not express their true meaning. A compound word in the above context expresses a distinct meaning. This is the law which governs the meaning of a word. According to this law the meanings of the components of a compound word have gone to the background. Accordingly, the meanings of the constituent words have been given up. If, in a particular context, the meanings of the constituent words have no part to play then it does not follow that the component terms of words like aśva-karṇa, etc., will never convey their meanings. The word 'aśva' and 'karṇa' convey their sense when they remain either compounded or un-compounded. But if the compound word formed by them expresses a conventional meaning then its constituent words lose all their significance. Let us illustrate the point that the components of the compound word 'aśva-karṇa' are significant when they do not form a compound word. Ride a horse (aśvamāroha). There is an ear-ring on the ear (karṇe kuṇḍalam). The words 'aśva' and 'karṇa' are also expressive of meaning when they are compounded. The compound word 'aśva-karṇaḥ' is expressive of its meaning, *viz.*, the ear of a horse. Thus, we see that component words which constitute a compound word are not absolutely meaningless.

The Sphoṭa-vādins have also stated that the analysis of a word into its elements is not logical since the interpreters agree to differ from one another with regard to the said analysis of a word. Hence, the division of a word into a stem and a suffix does not hold good. This

criticism is not sound. As a person places his confidence in the statement of the authoritative persons, so the illustration "Tri-muni Vyākaraṇam" admits of an analysis. This analysis gets the approval of Pāṇini. So it is true but not imaginary. In many details of analysis the interpreters agree. They only differ from one another in vikaraṇas (signs of the different classes of verbs), etc. Such differences are insignificant. Therefore, the analysis of a word into its stem and suffix is really true. One cannot suggest a novel analysis by mere imagination.

The Sphoṭa-vādins have also offered another criticism which points to the difficulty of analysing a sentence. They cite an example "kālenadantināgāḥ" in support of their criticism. There are two sentences "kālena dantinā gāḥ" and "kāle nadanti nāgāḥ". But it is very difficult to find out the constituent words of these two sentences since letters which compose these words are the same. Such a criticism does not stand to reason since difference between the two words constituted by the same letters is detected by their varying accents. A section of grammar deals with accents. So, it is not difficult to learn words with their proper accents. Let us take an example 'sarāmaḥ'. It may be a verb or two distinct words (a pronoun and a noun) or a compound word. If it is a verb (sarāmaḥ= we go) then its accent is different from that of a noun. If the word 'sarāmaḥ' stands for two words, viz., 'saḥ' and 'Rāmaḥ' then words and their accents are different. If it is a compound word denoting one co-existing with Rāma then the word itself and its accent are also different. The contending party will also be able to note these differences. Hence, it is easy to understand the analysis of a sentence.

The Sphoṭa-vādins have also stated in continuation of their criticism that in the examples "Dadhyatra", "Madhvatra", etc. the original words have undergone euphonic changes and do not retain their original forms. How is it that they convey their meaning though they are not perceptible in their original forms? Such a deviation from their original form is not open to a serious defect. These two words have only undergone partial changes since they are recognised. The above defence has been offered by a section of logicians.

The other logicians hold that the words "Dadhi" and "Madhu" respectively end in vowels 'i' and 'u'. Though they respectively end in 'y' and 'v' yet they will convey the same sense as is denoted by the

original words. This is the teaching of the science of grammar that the words 'dadhy' and 'madhv' will respectively convey the same meaning as is respectively expressed by the words 'dadhi' and 'madhu'. Hence, the words, in spite of their euphonic changes, will convey their meaning. No defect will arise from the said euphonic change. Let us stop here since it is fruitless to prolong such discussion.

We, the Naiyāyikas, have got something more to add in this connection. If words are merely imaginary then why do the ancient savants take so much pain to explain the growth of the consciousness of words? The critics think that imaginary objects are also means to the real things. They cite examples in order to prove their hypothesis. They hold that false snake-bite and similar imaginary objects bring about real swoon and such events. If the examples are critically examined then we see that, truly speaking, false snake-bite is not the cause of swoon. It is the apprehension of taking poison that is the cause of such swoon. An apprehension is a form of consciousness. It is not true that consciousness does not produce an effect. Moreover, an act of consciousness is not an imaginary object. Thus, a real cause produces a real effect. The drift of this argument is this that words are real.

The Sphoṭa-vādins also state that scripts are false but produce the consciousness of the real objects. It is a foolish statement. Written letters are nothing but lines drawn on writing materials. These lines in themselves are not false. When they are taught by the trustworthy teachers such as khaṇḍika, a reputed teacher mentioned in the ancient literature, the disciples receive proper training and have deep-rooted impression of these scripts. When they see these lines they infer letters. They have been initiated into the relation of invariable concomitance holding between scripts and letters. Hence, whenever they see scripts they infer letters. When a boy, thus initiated, reads written scripts he at first infers letters and later on grasps the meaning of words. Therefore, imaginary objects are not means to real ends. Why does one mistake a line for a letter? The reason behind this mistake is this that one sees probans but takes it to be probandum in a figurative sense. Examples in support of this view may be cited. We measure a quantity of fried barley powder with a certain weight. We say that this is such and such weight (say prastha). The letter 'g' is inferred from a particular line. We hold that the particular line is

the letter 'g'. If our opponents do not subscribe to this view then an ignorant person who is innocent of scripts should make out a sense out of lines, *i.e.*, a written word since lines which pass under the name of unreal letters exist. But, as a matter of fact, such a person gathers no sense from the above lines. Therefore, one grasps the meaning of a word after having inferred letters from lines. One is habituated to such inference. The different processes of inference are not observed since they take place very quickly. The intervening time-gaps between these processes are too subtle to apprehend. If one does not subscribe to this hypothesis then one cannot explain how a sense is gathered from a few lines. As words and their meanings are real so a sentence and its meaning are not partless wholes. This is our final conclusion. You have embraced the path of concealing parts of a sentence, *viz.*, words and letters and tried to point to Sabda Brahman as the only reality. We shall discuss this topic in a detailed manner later on.

You have admitted the three broad divisions of a sentence. We agree to differ from you in this point. We admit the existence of Vaikharī vāk only since Vaikharī vāk is well known as a sentence (Vaikharī=articulate).

The vāk which has been designated by you as madhyamā is nothing but the mental resolution. It is a form of consciousness. It is not a division of a sentence. An act of consciousness which is expressed in language and refers to its corresponding object does not give up its own character, *i.e.*, the characteristic feature of consciousness.

The form of vāk which is called Paśyanti bears the title 'Indeterminate Perception'. The Naiyāyikas consider it to be so. All forms of consciousness are not invariably associated with words. In other words, all sorts of consciousness are not necessarily verbalised. When an act of consciousness which reveals an object comes into being, it may be or may not be verbalised. But an act of consciousness which is not verbalised does never fail to reveal its object like a material object.

THE CONCLUDING PORTION OF THE REFUTATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS OF SPHŪTA

Let us now refrain from the discussion about the Absolute and discuss the point at issue.

The letters which are objects of our distinct awareness are not imaginary. They constitute words. They also make up a sentence. They are the conditions of the communication of meaning. A sphoṭa which is distinct from letters is not presented to our auditory perception. A sphoṭa which has been undermined by ill luck cannot convey a sense.

(To be continued)

JUSTICE AND POLICE IN BENGAL IN 1765

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The object of this article is to examine the framework and functioning of the indigenous system of criminal administration of Bengal about 1765. At the outset, it is desirable to refer to the circumstances that went to produce the system as it then obtained in Bengal.

After the defeat of Daud Karrani on March 3, 1575, at the battle-field of Tukaroi, Bengal became a subah of the Mughal Empire and the regular subah administration was introduced there by Akbar some years later in 1586-87. The Mughal Government was, however, primarily military in nature and did not basically undertake such wide functions as modern Governments do. Justice and police were two weak points in the Mughal system.

With the death of Aurangzeb the imperial authority began to decline. Lawless elements thrived on all sides. Distant provinces began to assert independence. Murshid Quli Khan, who was appointed in 1700 as Diwan of Bengal, soon became the Diwan of Bihar and Orissa and also Naib Nazim of Bengal and Orissa. On the death of Azim-ush-Shan and the accession of his son Farrukh Siyar as Emperor (1713), he gained for himself the combined offices of Nazim and Diwan of the three provinces, owing only a nominal allegiance to the Emperor. During the administration of Murshid Quli Khan and his son-in-law and successor, Shuja-ud-din Khan (1725-39), the country flourished.

Thereafter, the marauding activities of the Marathas during the rule of Alivardi Khan and the successive revolutions in the Nizamat of Bengal, which followed in the wake of the battle of Plassey (1757), produced a state of instability. In consequence many abuses crept into all branches of Government. The criminal administration with every other department of state fell into a state of disorder. The process of deterioration was also accelerated by the irresponsible way in which the Company's servants exercised power.

During the first administration of Mir Jafar (1757-60), whom the English bayonet raised to the Masnad, there was no apparent change in the criminal administration. But the Company's servants, their agents and free merchants who were engaged in inland trade of

the country often tended to interfere with the judicature and the Government. Mir Kasim who stepped into Mir Jafar's place on his deposition in 1760, had no leisure to check the encroachments of the English on the judicial administration. Mir Jafar's restoration (1763) added to the power and influence of the English and rendered the administration of justice very liable to be swayed by the Company's servants and their banyans who played the role of petty tyrants. The common people groaned under their oppression. For instance, in March, 1764¹ Senior, the Chief of Kasimbazar, reported the numerous complaints that daily came to him of their extravagance. These agents walked in rags in Calcutta, but when sent out on Gomastahships they lorded it over the country-side, imprisoned ryots and merchants and behaved in the most insolent manner with Faujdars and other officers of the Nazim. Wherever they went, they entirely governed the local courts and frequently sat there as judges.¹

The diversity, corruption and the usurped power of individuals that characterised the administration of this period should be judged in the light of the aforesaid factors. The old machinery of criminal administration was still operating but only as a spent force.

I JUSTICE

It appears from a Report of the Committee of Secrecy of 1773 that the judicial structure of the indigenous system, both in the capital and in the interior of Bengal, comprised different branches for the exercise of criminal, civil, religious and revenue jurisdictions.²

Mofussil Courts

The Criminal Court in the mofussil was known as the Faujdari Adalat. The local zamindar,³ says the Seventh Report, was the

¹ (a) Secret Consultations, 7 May, 1764;

(b) Letter to Court, 1 Feb., 1766;

(c) Select Committee Proceedings, 19 May, 1766;

(d) Verelst's View, p. 49;

(e) Letter from Court, 10 April, 1771;

(f) Keir's Evidence, Seventh Report, 1773, pp. 325-26.

² Seventh Report, 1773, pp. 324-25.

This Report is also known as Sixth Report. In the edition of the Committee of Secrecy's Reports, published by the House of Commons, this particular Report comes seventh in serial order. The First Report of this series is omitted in the publication sold by T. Evans of No. 54, Pater-Noster Row, London in 1773. As such in Evans's publication, the Seventh Report comes serially to be the sixth.

³ The zamindar is a general term which was applied to landholders and tenure-holders of several kinds and represented different degrees of status. Generally speaking, the zamindars of Mahomedan Bengal were contractors for land-revenue, though in point of fact the internal administration of their zamindaris was left largely in their hands and so long as they were regular in their payments they were not interfered with. They had to pay revenue, excise and trade duties to the Nawab's officers. They were also held responsible for the maintenance of law and order within the precincts of their zamindaris.

judge in this Court. His jurisdiction extended to all criminal causes. In case of a capital offence, however, the sentence pronounced by him could not be executed until a report of the case had been sent to the Murshidabad Government and its orders received thereon. The procedure of the Criminal Court was summary. The imposition of fine was the most frequent punishment, specially in the case of an opulent person. Every fine was appropriated by the zamindar as his perquisite.

The mofussil Court of civil jurisdiction went by the name of the Adalat. The local zamindar or the Raja appears to have presided over this Court also. He took cognizance of "all causes between party and party". He was entitled to a Chauth or share which amounted to one-fourth or one-fifth of whatever was recovered in his Court.

Matters relating to revenue were under the cognizance of a separate Court which also used to be formerly presided over by the local zamindar or Raja. But, for some years before the grant of Diwani, the zamindar's place in this Court was taken by the Naib Diwan, appointed in every district by the Diwan at Murshidabad. Appeals from the Naib Diwan's decisions lay to the Diwan.

Causes respecting religion, however, were dealt with in a different manner. Questions of this nature were not to be trusted to the sole discretion of any temporal judge whosoever he might be. It is mentioned by the Committee of Secrecy that in a case respecting Islamic religion, the judge before whom the question stood was required to call in the assistance of a local Qazi and even to submit to his authority in the decision of that cause. Similarly in the case of Hindus the judge was assisted by a Brahmin particularly where the cause involved forfeiture of caste. The peculiar punishment of excommunication rendering the offender an outcast from society was considered to be a very serious infliction. The English found it often being inflicted for private pique and personal resentment among Hindus, without a regular process and clear proof of the offence.⁴

The existence of a separate institution called the Caste Cutcherry is traceable as functioning in Calcutta even in Verelst's time.⁵ At that time Maharaja Nabakrishna, banyan to the Select Committee, held charge of this Cutcherry. This Court held jurisdiction over all matters relative to the caste observances of the Hindus. The punish-

⁴ (a) Seventh Report, 1773, p. 324.

(b) Select Committee Proceedings, August 16, 1769.

⁵ (a) Bolts—*Considerations on Indian Affairs*, p. 63.

(b) Verelst's *View*, pp 27-29.

ment awarded by it was generally the sentence of forfeiture of caste. A man once made outcast could not, observes Verelst, be restored except "by the general suffrage of his own tribe, the sanction of the Brahmins (who are the head tribe) and the superadded concurrence of the supreme civil power". Verelst cites an interesting case of a Hindu. He had been bribed to procure some papers belonging to a deceased servant of the Company but was caught red-handed by the son of the deceased and was forced, by way of retaliation, to swallow a spoonful of broth. As a result of this pollution he was degraded from his caste, lost all the benefits of society and was avoided as a "leper by his tribe".⁶

A letter from Verelst supplies a graphic account of the local Courts of Burdwan as they were in 1765.⁷

"Fauzdary"—The jurisdiction of this Court was wholly confined to criminal matters and the judgement of capital offences.

"Bazee Jumma Duftore"—This Court took cognizance of adulteries, abortions and other crimes affecting the peace and happiness of the people. Grants for lands and public works were issued from this court.

"Burrah Adalat"—This was a court of "meum and tuum" for all demands above fifty rupees.

"Chootah Adalut" disposed of all suits for debts not exceeding fifty rupees.

"Bazee Zemeen Duftore"—settled all disputes relative to charity lands and other public aids.

"Karidge Duftore"—It dealt with payments of landholders' accounts after settlement and compromise of debts.

"Sudder Cutcherry" received the land-rents and revenues, issued orders and adjusted all accounts thereof, confirmed purchases and sales of land and property and determined all disputes between the landlord and tenants.

"Ameen Duftore" was concerned entirely with the revenues and the revenue collectors. It was in a great measure subordinated to the "Sudder Cutcherry" which served as a court of appellate jurisdiction to all complaints which first came to the "Ameen Duftore".

Verelst mentions another Court which in point of fact cannot be regarded as a Court of justice. This was "Buxey Duftore". This

⁶ Verelst's *View*, p. 142.

⁷ See Verelst's letter, dated 18 Sept., 1765 in Verelst's *View*, Appendix, pp. 219-20. Verelst was the Chief of Chittagong and later on, of Burdwan, before he became the Governor of Bengal (1767-69).

Court superintended the conduct of and made payments to all the forces, guards and other persons employed for the protection in general and prevention of thefts and disturbances of peace.

Verelst's categorical statement that similar Courts existed all over Bengal does not bear scrutiny. In the insular pargana of Sandwip in the south-east of Bengal, justice was at this period administered by the Daroga. From about the year 1760, this Daroga acted entirely under the authority of the Naib Ahad-dar who used to sit in the Adalat on fixed days of the week. The Daroga and his assistants made the causes ready for hearing. Assisted by the Daroga, qanungo and zamindar, the Naib Ahad-dar determined all cases, civil and criminal. The cognizance of revenue matters rested with the Ahad-dar. In matters of debt this Court retained one-fourth of the sum at issue and exacted discretionary fines for theft, dacoity, fornication, assault and the like. Until 1764, it was customary to exact from the parties a fee (Itlak) of one anna and a half per day for the emolument of the Ahad-dar, together with one anna for the peon.⁸ Besides, in a vast area like Purnea there was no regular Court of justice before 1765.⁹ There was not a single Faujdari Court until 1776 in the large hill tracts of West Bengal and Bihar known as the Jungleterry districts. These districts were never brought to any regular subjection by the Mughal Government. The zamindars of Jungleterry always considered themselves as supreme judges in all criminal cases. Their procedure of trials, observes Captain James Browne, was "exactly the same as those of the nations of Europe in their state of barbarism". The accused were confronted by their accusers. If the accusers persisted in making allegations and the accused continued to deny them, the latter were put to the trial of fire and if they escaped unhurt, they were declared to be innocent. This mode of adjudication was practised by every zamindar there over his subjects.¹⁰ Thus, forms of justice in the interior of Bengal were characterised by diversity.

There was a difference of opinion among the witnesses who gave evidence before the Committee of Secrecy in 1773 on the question of the right of appeal from the mofussil Courts of the first instance to

⁸ Duncan's Report on Sandwip, 1778. For relevant extracts, see Noakhali District Gazetteer, pp. 27-28. Ahad-dar was an officer of the provincial government and a sort of contractor for the revenue of a district.

⁹ Proceedings of the Controlling Council of Revenue at Murshidabad, 13 Dec., 1770.

¹⁰ Revenue Consultations, India Office Copies, 20 Feb., 1776. See the letter of Browne who was sent to occupy and later on was in charge of the Jungleterry districts. A Faujdari Court was first established in 1776 after Browne's reduction of Curruckdeah and Kharakpur in Jungleterry (Calendar of Persian Correspondence, Vol. V, No. 4).

The respective Courts of appeal at the capital. Most of them held that appeals from mofussil Courts lay at Murshidabad.¹¹ All of them, however, concurred in the view that the Murshidabad Government exercised a discretionary power over the proceedings of the Courts of justice and frequently mitigated or inflicted punishments "without the interposition of any judicature". In describing the indigenous judicial system, Reza Khan stated that an appeal from both Adalat al 'Alia (Court of criminal causes) and Khalsa (Court of civil causes) lay to the Sadr "where the cause was ultimately determined".¹² It appears that the process of appeal in those days defeated its own purpose and could really be of little utility to a party unable to purchase the Government's favour and protection. The interposition of Government from motives of favour or displeasure was "a frequent cause of the perversion of justice".¹³

It is also pointed out by the Parliamentary Committee of 1773, that the custom of levying perquisite as commission greatly affected the confidence of the people in the justice of the Civil Court (Adalat) and that parties were very reluctant to resort to it and also that it had long, therefore, been a prevailing practice in Bengal to refer civil disputes to arbitrators chosen by the parties concerned. In the opinion of Reza Khan, matters of debt and commercial disputes only were proper subjects of arbitration.¹⁴

The fact that the people of the interior still continued to settle their disputes locally by resort to such indigenous institutions as arbitration, caste courts and the like, is partly attributable to the tenor of the life of village communities and the respect of the Mughals for the same. Little scope was left to Government for interposition in matters of justice due to (a) the religious character of Hindu and Mahomedan Laws, (b) village organisations which often settled disputes themselves and (c) the close contact with each other among individuals, established by the peculiar nature and needs of society. During the long rule of the Mughals, no further scope was created for greater Government control over the administration of justice.

¹¹ Seventh Report, 1773, p. 324.

¹²(a) Secret Consultations, 13 March, 1775 (b) Calendar of Persian Correspondence, Vol. IV, No. 1662.

¹³ Seventh Report, 1773, p. 324.

¹⁴ Proceedings of the Controlling Council of Revenue at Murshidabad, 6 April, 1772. It was further observed by Reza Khan that arbitration could not satisfy the general body of inhabitants and it was not universally adopted; "otherwise even now," wrote he, "all causes which can be decided by this mode, if the parties consent, are referred to Arbitrators, and many who are not litigiously disposed, without preferring any complaints, or repairing to the court of Adawlat, appoint Arbitrators themselves (to) decide their dispute."

But the good old days of village communities were over. The vigour of the Mughal empire had been irrevocably weakened. The Nawab being unable to maintain the authority of his tribunals beyond the bounds of the city of Murshidabad, regular course of justice in the interior fell into a state of suspension. And naturally this circumstance gave scope to rural personages like Qazis and Brahmins to act as judges without any lawful authority.¹⁵

Role of the zamindar

The role of the zamindar in the indigenous system of justice has been the subject of some controversy. The Seventh Report describes the zamindar as adjudicating in both Civil and Criminal Courts in the mofussil. It also hints that the zamindar's jurisdiction in the Courts of justice had a legal basis in the very tenure of his lands. This statement actually represents the Company's earliest conception of the zamindar's duties. It is confirmed by the description of zamindar's Cutcherry at Calcutta by Holwell and Bolts.

Holwell says that the zamindar acted in two distinct capacities—as collector of revenue and as judge of the Court of cutcherry which was a tribunal constituted for trial and determination of all matters both civil and criminal, “wherein the natives only, the subjects of the Mogul, are concerned”.¹⁶

According to Bolts also, the Zamindari Cutcherry “or Fowzdary court” tried criminal offences among “black inhabitants”.¹⁷ The Zamindari Cutcherry at Calcutta was presided over by a member of the Council or sometimes by a servant of the Council. Both Holwell and Bolts record that the zamindar tried in a summary way and had the power of inflicting stripes, fine and imprisonment and of condemning culprits to work in chains upon the roads for any space of time, even for life. Only in capital cases, the zamindar was required to obtain the President's permission before the sentence was executed.

¹⁵ Select Committee Proceedings, 16 August, 1769. It was to check this evil that the Select Committee at Fort William directed the Supervisors to require all officers of justice as also Qazis and Brahmins administering justice in every village and town, to produce and register their sanads.

As Dow puts it, “every Mahomedan who can mutter over the Coran raises himself to a judge, without either license or appointment; and every Brahmin, at the head of a tribe distributes justice according to his fancy.” (Dow : *The History of Hindostan*, Vol. III, p. civ.)

¹⁶ Holwell and friends—*India Tracts*, pp. 177-78.

¹⁷ Bolts—*Considerations*, pp. 80-81.

Bolts' description of the Calcutta Cutcheries makes an interesting study, although his work, in general, must be handled with caution as coming from an exceedingly biased source.

As zamindar of the three towns of Sutanuti, Calcutta and Govindapur, the Company acquired criminal, civil and religious jurisdiction over them. This they exercised through a number of Courts,¹⁸ namely, the Faujdari Court for trial of crimes, the Court of Cutcherry for civil causes, the Collector's Court for matters of revenue, and a Caste Cutcherry for taking cognisance of all matters relative to castes of the Hindus.

Nevertheless, the accuracy of the Committee of Secrecy's statement as to the zamindar's judicial authority came to be seriously disputed by no less a person than Hastings. Speaking on the authority of the Seventh Report, the three Councillors—Francis, Clavering and Monson contended that the zamindar's jurisdiction in the Faujdari Court formed "an essential part of the Constitution" of Bengal and that the zamindar presided over the local Criminal Court, pronounced and executed sentences on all offences less than capital.¹⁹

On the other hand, Hastings asserted "I venture to pronounce with confidence that by the constitution of Bengal the zemindar neither presided in the criminal court of his district, nor pronounced nor executed sentence on all offences less than capital."²⁰ A zamindar held his official title by a Sanad or Charter which set forth the character and responsibilities of his position. Only one zamindar, Raja of Burdwan, was, as Hastings pointed out, allowed to exercise judicial authority by a special Sanad from the Nazim. If, argued Hastings, judicial authority were inherent in the institution of zamindars, this special Sanad would have been unnecessary.²¹ He also referred to a

¹⁸ There were also other Courts in Calcutta, established by the Charter of Justice granted by the English Crown in 1753. These were the Mayor's Court, Court of Appeals, Court of Requests, Court of Quarter Sessions.

¹⁹ Secret Consultations, 18 Oct., 1775.

Another source of their observation was a minute of Hastings and Barwell which they misconstrued. "It might possibly," they argued, "be supposed that the materials on which the Committee (of Secrecy) formed this part of their report were defective if we did not find their representation confirmed by that of Mr. Hastings himself. We beg leave to refer the Court of Directors to his minute entered on the consultation of the 22nd of April last, containing a proposal for a new settlement." In the 15th article of the aforesaid plan, Hastings and Barwell actually affirmed that the Faujdari jurisdiction was inherent in the zamindar "agreeable to the old constitution of the Empire" (Secret Consultations, 7 Feb., 1776).

In clarification, Hastings said that the Faujdari jurisdiction which was recorded by himself to be inherent in the zamindar had "no affinity with the judicial authority, but meant only the authority vested in the zemindar, to guard and maintain the peace of the country" (Secret Consultations, 29 May, 1776).

²⁰ Secret Consultations, 7 Dec., 1775.

²¹ *Ibid.*

Thus Hastings put it at a later date, "the Zemindar of Burdwan had the entire management of the Revenues and the whole civil and criminal jurisdiction within the limits of his Zemindary and as I am informed, an exemption from the Fougedarry authority or rather the right of executing that authority himself was purchased at different times from the Government" (Revenue Consultations, 29 May, 1776).

For another reference to the Burdwan zamindar's judicial authority, see Long, *Selections*, p. 511, No. 956.

letter of the Committee of Circuit of 1772, which contained in his opinion "a just accurate description of the modes of administering justice which had been established under the Mogul Government".²² This letter enumerated among other prevailing evils the usurpation of judicial power by zamindars and farmers.²³

It is to be noted that while the Committee of Secrecy recorded the information which was sent to them, the Committee of Circuit's statement was based on direct observation of the actual conditions in Bengal. Moreover, Hastings in his early career in this country as the Resident at the Darbar happened to acquire a better knowledge of the Bengal Government than his opponents.

His views were perfectly correct so far as the position of the zamindar in the Mughal Constitution was theoretically concerned. If the Sanad is to be considered the warrant of exact authority, as it should be, the texts of zamindari Sanads hardly support Francis's contention that the zamindar was the judge of the Criminal Court. Yet the zamindar being required by his Sanad "to employ himself diligently in expelling and punishing the refractory",²⁴ it may be argued that this authority to punish is impliedly a judicial authority. In fact, the distinction between the two is so very nice as might be easily ignored in actual practice. It should also be remembered that in times of general uncertainty and confusion, theory and practice are frequently at odds with each other.²⁵

Hence, whatever might have been the *de jure* position of zamindars, factual data are not wanting which depict them as really exercising judicial functions on the disruption of the Mughal Government.²⁶ Francis himself revised his opinion later on. When

²² Secret Consultations, 29 May, 1776.

²³ Proceedings of the Committee of Circuit at Kasimbazar, 15 August, 1772.

In their review of the different officers of justice formerly instituted in these provinces, the Committee of Circuit mentioned Nazim, Diwan, Darogha-i-Adalat-al Alia, Darogha-i-Adalat-Diwani, Faujdar, Qazi, Muhtasib, Mufti, Qanungo, Kotwal. But the omission of zamindar is significant.

²⁴ Translation of a Sanad under the seal of Serfraz Khan, Diwan of the Subah of Bengal, dated the 27th of Ramzan in the 17th year of the reign of His Majesty Mohummad Shah or A.D. 1785-86. (Firminger's Introduction to "the Fifth Report", pp. xlvi-xlvi).
²⁵ "In the general absence of law and order", says Monckton-Jones, "vagueness gave prospect to the ambitious or dexterous which often proved more valuable than the problematical protection which rigid definition might afford" (*Warren Hastings in Bengal*, p. 12).

²⁶ For instance in Sandwip, the Naib Ahad-dar was assisted by the zamindar in his judicial business (Duncan's Report quoted in Noakhali District Gazetteer, pp. 27-28).
 Zamindars of Jungleterry used to try criminal offences in a crude process (Revenue Consultations, India Office Copies, 20 Feb., 1776).

At Nator, the remains of a jail and a spot where the gibbet had stood serve to attest the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the zamindars of Rajshahi.
 (The Calcutta Review, Vol. 56, 1873, p. 19: "The Territorial Aristocracy of Bengal"
 by Kishore Chund Mitra.)

asked by the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1782, he admitted that the result of later enquiries had "in some degree, satisfied him that whatever criminal jurisdiction was exercised by the zemindars, it did not go much beyond petty offences". He believed that it did not extend to life or limb. On this subject, however, he did not presume to speak positively.²⁷

The zamindars were first and foremost Collectors of revenue and additionally Police Magistrates. For good or for evil, they were intimately linked up with the rural folk. Many of them appear to have been defacto heads of villages provided that they paid their revenue. With the weakening of the Murshidabad Government, the power of Faujdars who used to formerly exercise check on zamindars deteriorated and zamindars came to be very much left to themselves. On their part they were ever ready to take advantage of any weakness or relaxation of the bonds of authority.

It is in this background that we actually find the zamindar as the single person adjudicating in matters civil, criminal or otherwise. Thus, in the interior, complaints were frequently preferred before the zamindar's courts and a sharp and summary justice was administered there. Zamindars, farmers, shikdars and other officers of revenue are, therefore, rightly described by the Committee of Circuit as "assuming that power for which no provision is made by the Laws of the land, but which, in whatever manner it is exercised, is preferable to a total anarchy".²⁸

(To be continued)

²⁷ Sixth Report from the Select Committee, 1782, p. 11.

²⁸ Progs. Committee of Circuit, Kasimbazar, 15 Aug., 1772, Vols. I-III, p. 120.

Reviews and Notices of Books

Kalikata Viswavidyalaya.—Satabdir Alekhya by Sri Bimalendu Koyal, M.A., Koyal Pustak-Prakashani, 9/1/M Dr. Suresh Sarkar Road, Entally, Calcutta—14. Price Rs. 3. pp. 104 + 40 (appendix)

The volume, which gives an interesting survey of the history and achievements of the University of Calcutta on the eve of the centenary celebrations held last January, is well-planned and well-written.

It proceeds to the task of setting down a large variety of facts relating to the era immediately preceding the Sepoy Mutiny, when the question of establishing the University was under discussion, by an apt quotation from the convocation address of Dr. Pramathanath Banerjee, delivered as Vice-Chancellor in 1947. Here the great educationist pays an eloquent tribute to a large number of teachers, thinkers, and public men who had advanced the cause of learning by their disinterested labours in the field. The comprehensiveness of the list and the nature of the homage paid reveal the Vice-Chancellor's identification with a noble cause and his power to serve it worthily.

Taking the speech as the starting point of the book, Mr. Koyal in his first chapter tells us that the University incorporation bill was adopted by the legislature on 24th January, 1857, the morrow after the flames of mutiny were lighted in the army barracks at Dum-Dum. The birth of our University was thus heralded by the most dramatic events in the country, aiming at political liberation. The University by the spread of enlightenment was to secure liberation on the intellectual plane. But the history of English Education goes further back, and the year 1823, stands out as a landmark when the General Committee of Public Instruction was organised at the initiative of Mr. Adam, the acting Governor-General. When the dispute arose whether to give preference to Oriental or to Western learning under the system of education sponsored by the British, Raja Rammohun Roy fought as the protagonist of the latter. Macaulay's famous Minute of 1835 (2 February) was important for the final decision arrived at. In 1844 when under Lord Hardinge acquaintance with English was stressed as a qualification for employment under government, the policy proved a great impetus for the spread of English. At this time there were 151 schools and the total number of the students who attended was 18163. The educational budget for the year 1854 was Rs. 594428.

The Council of Education had adopted the proposal for the establishment of the University in 1845. Yet more than a decade was to elapse

before it received a practical form. The next item of interest in the survey is an account of medical education, which was started on a modest scale in 1822, and four years later the Sanskrit College and the Calcutta Madrasah undertook the instruction of medicine. In 1830 it was debated whether the medium of medical instruction should be English. The Calcutta Medical College was established in June, 1835. Ten years later in 1845 Dr. Fred J. Mouat, M.D., Secretary of the Council of Education speaking of the graduates of the Medical College, observed that the examinations they passed were "in extent and difficulty much greater than those of the Colleges of Surgeons in Great Britain". This is very high praise indeed. References are also made to Engineering and Legal Education. Interesting accounts are given of the valuable work done by missionaries for the expansion of education. The details of the functioning of the University from the time of the appointment of Sir James William Colville as the first Vice-Chancellor give a satisfactory picture of the progress made in the field of higher education for a century. The University seal, the University examinations and their results, the University's affiliating responsibilities, the construction of the University Buildings, and finally the organization of Post-Graduate studies and a suitable library, are all reviewed briefly but without omission of any important detail. One chapter describes the programme for the centenary celebrations including the award of the doctorate degree to 20 scholars *honoris causa*. The part played by women's education also gets due notice. In the appendix is included Rabindra Nath Tagore's address at the annual convocation of the University, held in 1937.

The book is written in a simple and attractive style. The value of the work the University is doing has been assessed with sympathy and understanding. The view that emerges from the reading of the book is that of one who has known the University intimately for years and has acquired an insight into its workings. Every one interested in the University and in the education it is giving will find the book useful and informative.

The Green and Red Planet—By Hubertus Strughold, Sidgwick and Jackson London. 7s. 6d. net. pp. 96.

The book is written to examine the possibility of life on Mars, the green and red planet, and the author has shown scientifically the various factors needed to support life, the complex as well as the simple forms. His conclusion is that Mars has an atmosphere which suffers from oxygen deficiency or hypoxia and cannot, therefore, meet the essential physiological needs of human and animal life. Green plants are possible because they produce oxygen for themselves. Bacteria of various kinds like chemoau-

totrophs, which produce their own organic substance, are possible in the Martian atmosphere in spite of its low content of oxygen. The conclusion in the author's own words, based upon a physiological study, runs as follows: "The lack of oxygen precludes any high order of living things, either animal or vegetable. There is good evidence for a primitive type of plant life, similar to the lichens that grow on our desert rocks and Arctic tundras, and we find that biological principles—as we observe them on earth—favour the likelihood of some such elemental species... the odds against any intelligent beings existing on the planet are so great as to place the idea of 'visitors from Mars' in the realm of fantasy."

In 1877 the Milanese astronomer, Giovanni V. Schiaparelli first spoke of the possibility of life on Mars. Percival Lowell followed up the discussion by his own observations made from his Observatory at Arizona in 1907. Until Mr. Strughold's book, the study of the subject had been made almost entirely from the astronomical point of view. There was, therefore, scope for such a work, bringing the question under examination from a different angle.

Speaking as a layman it is possible to doubt, if the planet does not produce some substance, serving to restore the balance of nature, and providing the basic conditions for higher forms of life. There must be unknown factors which may completely change the picture. It is, therefore, unjustifiable in the present state of our knowledge, to speak on the subject in a tone of finality. Meanwhile, we shall await friendly contacts with the travellers who are ranging through the earth's atmosphere in the much-talked-about flying saucers, and learn from them, when the time comes, how life can flourish in spite of oxygen deficiency and evolve new standards in knowledge and virtue still unattained in our altitudes.

India Democracy and Education—By Jossleyn Hennessy—With a foreword by S. Radhakrishnan, Vice-President of the Indian Union. Orient Longmans Ltd., pp. 338. price Rs. 15.

Handsomely bound and printed in clear type on excellent paper, the book has over one hundred illustrations, all of them being concerned with a study of the work of the Birla Education Trust at Pilani.

The author spent many years in India and made a special study of our educational problems. In doing this, he collected a large mass of facts from newspapers, showing that sport and social occasions, which in England and America, were the only reasons for student publicity, do not provide even a single item of news in India. The papers report, on the other hand, students for murder, beating up, violence, strikes, hunger strikes, processions and demonstrations, leading to *lathi* charges, tear-gas firing and casualties.

Mrs. Hennessy's comment upon this singular situation in India is that the educational system must be reorganized, if democracy is to survive, in a suitable manner. For this more money is required and a re-definition of the aims of education. She is aware of a lot of hypocrisy adding to the difficulty of the task. 'The trouble about education is that' Mrs. Hennessy observes with penetration, 'while everyone pays lip service to its importance, only a handful of people understand why it is important'. She has found the recommendations of the University Commission satisfactory. The reforms proposed by it could secure the ends of stability and progress. 'If the Commission's financial and other recommendations were carried out, one could look with confidence to India's future'.

The author carefully examines the educational life in this country over a number of years and by the help of the data she is able to gather she is convinced of the urgency of a complete overhaul of the system. The students live under unhygienic conditions, they suffer from lack of nourishment, their day-to-day life is a burden. The result is that they easily succumb to unwholesome influences of all sorts. The Pilani Experiment has proved a great success. Students there have lessons at school, sports and social life. Their many-sided activities help them to develop character and personality. They become efficient workers and good citizens. The author has a sincere enthusiasm for the work being done at Pilani.

But this is not the only attempt made in India for building up a system of education which adequately meets the needs of students. The Deccan Education Trust is another example. And there are a number of others. A comparative study would have been valuable. But the author does not refer to the sister organizations. Nevertheless the book makes a very useful enquiry and tries to answer some questions, affecting the country's welfare and progress, to which due attention should be given.

Ourselves

THREE YEAR DEGREE COURSE

The University Senate is at the present moment engaged in the discussion of the proposal for the introduction of a three year Degree Course in this University. This will involve the creation and implementation of a Higher Secondary Course in the Schools and the abolition of the Intermediate stage in the University. On the 6th December, 1956, the Academic Council adopted the report of a sub-committee appointed to consider the question in all its aspects. The report of this sub-committee was placed before the Senate at its meeting held on the 22nd December, 1956. The Senate, however, after much discussion postponed decision till a later date. The Senate met again on the 25th February, 1957, to consider the matter. At this meeting, again, a committee of 21 members has been appointed to consider the report of the sub-committee as well as to make further recommendations or suggestions regarding the proposed three year Degree Course. The report of this Committee of 21 members of the Senate is now awaited.

There is difference of opinion with regard to the introduction of a three year Degree Course in colleges and abolition of the present Intermediate Course. Some educationists, after considering the structure of collegiate education in the different parts of the world, are not in favour of the introduction of a three year course in colleges. They, however, feel that the scheme can be given a trial, and it, should stand or fall by its own results. Others are of opinion that the future scheme for the improvement of education in the different States of India should follow the outlines of the scheme as adumbrated by the Central Government. Without entering into the controversy, it can be stated, however, that time-honoured and well-tried institutions should not be abandoned without sufficient thinking and that in the planning of re-organisation that we contemplate, it is necessary that an integrated picture of the whole system of education should be formulated.

LECTURE ON RAJPUT HISTORY

Sri Subimal Dutt, M.A., Rai Bahadur Bissessurlal Matilal Halwasiya Lecturer of the University for 1955, delivered a course of


three lectures on "Beginnings of Rajput History" on Monday, the 25th, Tuesday, the 26th and Wednesday, the 27th March, 1957, each day at 4 P.M., in the Darbhanga Hall, Darbhanga Buildings, Calcutta.

Prof. Pramathanath Banerjee, M.A., B.L., D Litt., LL.D., Barrister-at-Law, Vidyavachaspati, Ex-Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University, Member, Senate and Syndicate of the University and Principal, University Law College presided at the first lecture.

H. K. BASU MEMORIAL LECTURES

Sri Jagadish Chandra Bhattacharyya, M.A., Hiran Kumar Basu Memorial Lecturer of the University for 1954, delivered his last lecture in Bengali on 'Sonnet in Bengali Literature' (Bangla Sahitye Sonnet), on Thursday, the 7th March 1957, at 4 P.M., in the Darbhanga Hall, Darbhanga Buildings, Calcutta.

Prof. Sashibhusan Dasgupta, M.A. Ph D, Ramtanu Lahiri Professor of Bengali Language and Literature, Calcutta University presided.



Notifications

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/14/St/57

It is notified for general information that the following statutes regarding constitution, powers and duties of the Senate, Syndicate and Academic Council as passed by the Senate on 25. 2. 57 have received the assent of the Chancellor :—

(a) The following be inserted on p. 45 at the end of the 1st paragraph of Statute 5(1) :—

“ Graduates registered under the Indian University Act, 1904, who compounded for all subsequent payments of annual fee for retention of their names in the register by paying the sum prescribed in that behalf by the regulations under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 7 of that Act shall have their names entered and retained in the register without payment of any fee.”

(b) The following new Clause viz. clause (8) be inserted after clause (7) on page 46 :—

“(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other statutes, the Vice-Chancellor shall have the power to direct at any time before the issue of his order fixing the dates of taking polls that only those graduates may be enrolled as voters for the Registered Graduates Constituency, whose names are entered in the Electoral Roll before the issue of the aforesaid order.”

Senate House,
The 12th March, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/1/57

It is notified for general information that the changes in the M.Sc. (Ag.) Regulations as shown in Notification No. CSR/17/56, dated the 6th April, 1956, will take effect from the Examination of 1957.

Senate House,
The 13th March, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/13/St./57

It is notified for general information that the following Statutes regarding Register of Graduates as passed by the Senate on 25. 2. 57 have received the assent of the Chancellor :—

Register of Graduates

(1) Any person who—

(a) holds the degree of a Master or a higher degree of the University

Or

(b) is a graduate in any Faculty of this University of at least three years' standing, the period being counted from the date of graduation,

will be entitled to have his name registered on payment of the fee of Rs. 3 together with an application made to the Registrar on or before the 30th June in any year and such registration shall remain valid during the year in which the fee is paid and the year following.

Explanation (1) The date of graduation shall be the date of the publication of the result of the relevant University Examination, except that in the case of a graduate in Medicine, it shall be the date on which he is admitted to the degree by the Syndicate.

(1) In these Statutes, the term 'year' shall mean 'the financial year' of the University.

(2) A graduate whose name had already been registered on payment of Rs. 3 only, may enjoy the rights, and privileges of a registered graduate for life on payment of a compounding fee of Rs. 60 at any time before the expiry of the period of registration.

Provided that a graduate whose name has already been entered on the register may on payment of Rs. 3 at any time before the expiry of the period of the registration fee have his name continued on the register for a further period of 2 years, counting from the expiry of his period of registration.

Senate House,
The 12th March, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/2061/98 (Aff.).

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted the Jhargram Raj College has been affiliated in Logic to the I.A. standard with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the subject at the I.A. Examination from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 8th March, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/2045/131 (Aff.).

It is notified for general information that the Jagannath Kishore College, Purnia, has been affiliated to this University as a special case, from the 1st November, 1956, in the subjects and to the standard in which it is now affiliated to the Bihar University.

The students admitted to the college from the session 1957-58 in the first year I.A. and I.Sc. classes and the third year B.A. class will be taught in accordance with the Calcutta University Syllabus for the I.A., I.Sc. and B.A. Examinations in the following subjects with permission to present its first batch of students taught under the Calcutta University Syllabus at the I.A., I.Sc. and B.A. Examinations in 1959 and not earlier :—

(a) I.A. :—English, Bengali (Vern.), Hindi (Vern.), Civics, Logic, History, Sanskrit. Additional Bengali, Additional Hindi, and Mathematics.

(b) I.Sc. :—English, Bengali (Vern.), Hindi (Vern.), Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics and Biology.

(c) B.A. (Pass) :—English, Bengali (Vern.), Hindi (Vern.), Economics, Philosophy, History, Sanskrit, Hindi, Bengali, and Mathematics.

The present students of the college will continue to be taught in the subjects in which it is at present affiliated, in accordance with the Bihar University Syllabus and that for Purnia students special arrangements will be made for holding I.A., I.Sc., and B.A. Examinations in 1957 and 1958 in accordance with the Bihar University Syllabus.

Senate House,
The 6th March, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/1903/118/Aff.

It is notified for information of the general public that, in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Beth Soorajmull Jalan Girls' College, Calcutta, has been affiliated in Commercial Geography to the I.A. standard, with effect from the session 1957-58, with permission to present candidates in the subject at the examination from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta,
The 20th February, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/1897/68(Aff.)

It is hereby notified for information of the general public that the Shri Sikshayatan College, Calcutta, has been affiliated in Geography and Botany to the I.A. standard and in English, Bengali (Vern.), Hindi (Vern.), History, Economics, Philosophy and Hindi to

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the B.A. pass standard with effect from the commencement of the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the subjects at the examinations from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta,
The 28rd February, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/2089/28/Am.

It is notified for the information of the public that in extension of affiliation already granted, the Institute of Education for Women has been granted affiliation in Content's and Method of Teaching (i) Physical Sciences and (ii) Biological Sciences for the B.T. Course from the session 1957-58.

Senate House,
The 11th March, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/3/57

It is notified for general information that Anaesthesiology has been included in the list of subjects for the D. Phil. (Medical) degree by the Academic Council on 6th March, 1957.

Senate House,
The 20th March, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/5/57

It is notified for general information that the following resolution of the Board of Post-Graduate studies in History has been adopted by the Academic Council at their meeting held on 6th March, 1957 :—

"Resolved— That students who passed the B.A. Examination of Calcutta University in 1954 or earlier be given the option of the old syllabus for the M.A. Examination in History in 1957".

Senate House,
The 28th March, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/9/57

It is notified for general information that the following change in rule 9 of Chapter IV (I. Mus.) of the Regulations was made by the Senate at their meeting held on 11th March, 1957 :—

"That the following proviso be inserted at the end of rule 9 :—

'Provided that a candidate taking up subjects included under papers III & IV of rule 7 aforesaid, must obtain 30% of the marks in each of the language papers'.

The change will take effect from the I.Mus. Examination of 1957.

Senate House,
The 29th March, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar,

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/12/57

It is notified for general information that the Senate at their meeting held on 11th March, 1957, adopted the following changes in Chapter XXXIV-A of the Regulations relating to B Com. Examination :—

(i) In Rule 6 : Delete the first sentence and substitute the following :—

"As soon as possible after the examination, the Syndicate shall publish a list of the candidates who have passed arranged in the following manner :—

- | | |
|------------------|--------------------------|
| (a) First Class | In order of merit |
| (b) Second Class | In order of merit, and |
| (c) Pass | Arranged alphabetically" |

(ii) In rule 10 : Delete the Section and substitute :—

"In order to pass, a candidate must obtain 80 per cent. of the marks in each subject or group of subjects and 86 per cent. of marks in the aggregate, provided that a candidate who takes up an Indian Language must obtain 40% of the marks in the subject, successful

candidates obtaining 80 per cent. or more marks in the aggregate shall be declared to have obtained First Class; and those obtaining 40% or more marks but less than 80% marks in the aggregate shall be declared to have obtained Second Class; other successful candidates shall be declared as having passed and shall not be placed under any Class."

The above changes are effective from the B.Com. Examination of 1957.

Senate House,
The 5th April, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/16/St/57

It is notified for general information that under Sub-section (5) of Section 34 of the Calcutta University Act, 1951, the Chancellor in consultation with the Education Minister has been pleased to assent to the following changes in the Statutes relating to the powers, duties and conditions of service of the Registrar and other officers providing for the Secretary, University College of Medicine and his duties :—

(i) In rule 1 (1) of the Statutes (p. 101) the words—" (xiii) Secretary, University College of Medicine" be inserted after "(xii) Law Officer" and "(xiii)" be replaced by (xiv).

(ii) In rule 1 (2) the word 'and' in line 10 be deleted, a 'semicolon' be put after the word 'Councils' in line 18 and the following be added in the same line :—

"and the Secretary to the University College of Medicine shall be under the direct administrative control of the Vice-President of the Council".

(iii) The following be inserted after rule 17 (er : Law Officer) :

"18 (1) The Secretary to the University College of Medicine shall be a Medical Graduate having adequate experience and shall be appointed by the Syndicate, in the first instance, for one year, on the expiry of which he will be confirmed on the report of satisfactory service. He shall be paid a salary of Rs. 500-50/2-800 per mensem, provided that in exceptional cases the Syndicate shall be competent to give him a higher initial salary within the grade.

(2) He shall be a wholetime officer and shall perform such duties as may be assigned to him by the College Council subject to the approval of the President of the Council".

Senate House,
The 4th April, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/17/St/57

It is notified for general information that under Sub-Section (5) of Section 34 of the Calcutta University Act, 1951, the Chancellor in consultation with the Education Minister, has been pleased to assent to the following changes in the First Statutes relating to the Constitution and function of Faculties for the creation of the Faculty of Journalism :—

"1. In Cols. I and II under Table I of the Schedule attached to the Statutes regarding Faculties insert the following after '6 Faculty of Fine Arts and Music' (page 78) :—

"6A Faculty of Journalism 15"

"2. Under Table II of the same Schedule insert the following after 'Faculty of Fine Arts and Music' (page 78) :—

"Faculty of Journalism

(a) Dept. of Undergraduate Teaching.

(1) Journalism.

(b) Dept. of Post-Graduate Teaching.

(1) Journalism".

"5. Insert "(F) Faculty of Journalism" after 'a Faculty of Fine Arts and Music' in rule 18 (1) of the Statutes regarding constitution of the Senate, Syndicate and Academic Council (p. 57)".

Senate House,
The 4th April, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/6/Ord.57

It is notified for general information that the following new Ordinance in place of Ordinance 24 (p. 113) relating to "Powers and duties of the Council of the University College of Law" as made by the Syndicate on 14th July, 1956, was adopted by the Senate on 11th March, 1957 :—

"24. The Teaching Staff (of the University College of Law) shall consist of—

(a) The Principal who will be a Professor (whole-time)

(b) Vice-Principal who will be a Reader (whole-time)

(c) Lecturers (Part-time)

(d) A whole-time Lecturer with the salary, emoluments and status of a Reader in the usual grade for Readers".

Senate House,
The 29th March, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

**THE
CALCUTTA REVIEW**

An Illustrated Monthly

THIRD SERIES

Volume CXLII

**April—June,
1957**

**PUBLISHED BY THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA**

First Series—1844

New Series—1913

Third Series—1921

THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

APRIL—JUNE, 1957

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
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APRIL, 1957

[No. 1

"ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE SERVICE OF THE EDUCATION OF THE ABORIGINES"

DR. MINENDRANATH BASU

In India we are passing through a stage in our national life when a clear statement of how anthropology can help us to build our future India is essential.

Anthropology, the Science of Man, is divided into two broad sections. One is concerned with the Physical aspect of man and the other with his behaviour : these being known respectively as Physical and Cultural Anthropology. The place for physical science is the laboratory room, whereas for Biological Science, particularly in for Anthropology, the laboratory is the field. Hence it is that the latter are called Field Sciences.

An anthropologist studies the people among whom he lives and works, because from them he can gather data that will throw light on the main problems of his science.

Anthropology is till recently usually believed to be a border line science which has no application in the practical field. But recent trends show definite change in the angle of vision. Today I intend to confine myself to that part of anthropology which will be of practical help of the education aspect of the aborigines.

The Proto-Australoid and the Mongoloid constitute the main aboriginal population in India. The aboriginal population in India is only a fraction of the whole population, from approximately 25 to

* Presidential Address at Thirty First All India Educational Conference, Jaipur, 1954.
Aborigines' Education Section.

30 millions out of nearly 400 millions. The economic occupations of the aboriginal people of India are various : hunting, food gathering, cattle-breeding, agriculture, etc.

Education of the aborigines has an important rôle to play in Free India. Dr. Katju on the occasion of the Annual Convocation address of the University of Calcutta in 1953 emphasised that in the national interest of the security and unity of a Free India efforts must be made for the upliftment of the aborigines.

Education among the aboriginals is usually imparted in the family group in the nature of imitation and association, some get through initiation rites and subsequent discipline. But in the adolescent stage education was imparted through an organised institution even recently their existence is found in Assam, Chotanagpur and Madhya Pradesh. The names of Abors—Mollisup, Garos—Nokpanti, Kukis—Zwalbuk, Nagas—Morung, Mikirs—Terang, Oraons—Dhumkuria, Birhors—Gitiora, Gonds—Ghotul, are well known. Admission to these institutions are sought by a ceremony. Education is imparted to the beginners by the more experienced and senior members of the institution. The members work in many cases in a co-operative system. During festivals in the villages all render service according to their ability by which they learn and acquire experience. An old man when wants to thatch his house or till the soil, he requires help. This is done by an organised group for which payment in kind is given instead of cash. The young batch learn by the guidance of the elder ones. Hunting, collection of food, digging and tilling the soil, weeding, harvesting and threshing, singing, dancing and also entertaining guests all come under the term of their "Education". These show that the community feeling is too much conscious among the groups. We find in the modern schooling system there is examination but among them no such system is formalised. They have standard of their skills with the different processes. Discipline is also maintained in them.

The linking of education at every stage of human life is admitted by all educationists. It can be imparted in the educational institution only if the education of both the children and the adolescents is centered round the main occupational work of the life. The aboriginals are accustomed to this type of education so it should be the duty of the educationists to give proper facilities, by way of their culture-trait, in an institution where their education can be set up. So the type of education imparted to the aboriginals should not encourage them from being alienated from their native soil and environment,

but should rather help them in improving their social and community life. In the Report of the Central Advisory Board of Education in 1944 stress has been given merely to learning 'through activity'.

Imparting education to the aboriginal population in India is an onerous task it is beset with many difficulties which can hardly be realised by any one excepting the anthropologist. Some suggest that these aboriginal folk should be left to themselves to remain in isolation. Others hold that they should be grouped along with the backward or depressed class Hindus. They also think that their language should be abolished. But anthropologists encourage to assimilate the aboriginal folk with the culture of the advanced neighbours, retaining the good elements of their culture. The best means of acculturation is through education. The Report of the Educational Conference of the Pacific Countries in 1938 shows how efficiently it gives shape to 'native institutions, standards of living, moral codes and inherent values'. The conference also admits that 'when we institute a system of education we do not know precisely what we are doing'. It shows clearly how the anthropologist can help the educationist with the results of his investigations. In Africa we also find harping of the same string. In India the educational problem of the aboriginals is rather a complicated one. The aboriginal people of India have come in contact with the advanced groups of Indian population as well as with the Europeans. The aboriginal children are being educated by the Government and also by the philanthropic individuals and institutions like the Ramkrishna Mission, the Bharat Sevasram, Christian Missionaries, etc.

The experience gathered from different paths of life is passed on to generation through traditions. This process of experience is termed 'Education'. We usually distinguish between three types of education:—

- (1) Which uplifts the individual both mentally and intellectually and fits him for the struggle for existence.
- (2) Which is meant for the exploitation of the so-called educated.
- (3) Which the enthusiasts impose upon the poor and the ill-fated conditions by ameliorating them without considering their necessity or capacity.

The so-called education now being imparted to the aboriginals by taking them out of their homes to a town and allowing them to reside in big palatial buildings or mansions, is not a real or suitable education for them. I have gathered from

the Adiwasī Hostels in different regions of India, that those who have been brought to the hostels for their education, have developed fascination mainly for luxury. They do not usually want to go back to their villages even sometimes during the vacation months. They have frankly admitted of their poor, ugly and miserable conditions of their villages. The diet in the village is no more liked. The majority of the students feel and declare that they would be Police Officers, Deputy Magistrates, etc. in their future life, but I wonder to note that not a single soul I did find during my contact with them for the last few years, who would like to go back to the village to educate their villagers. The education which was once intended to create a group of clerks for the East India Company, has no justification for its continuation in Free India today. Instead of copying what has been forced upon India the aboriginals in India could evolve a type of education suitable for themselves with a view to improving their occupations—agriculture, cattle-rearing, cottage industry, etc.

In Assam and Manipur every girl has to learn the art of weaving if she wants to marry. Originally Ibo men preferred an uneducated wife who was less expensive and more efficient. Both men and women laboured equally for the solution of their food. But the present system introduced by education has trained the girls to adopt the fine arts of the young ladies giving to their husbands an uncomfortable life. The same condition can be noticed among the aboriginals of Chotanagpur particularly in the district of Ranchi as well as in the Khasi Hills of Assam by the missionary influence.

Friends, I would now crave your indulgence by placing before you a few suggestions for the education plan of the aboriginal people of India :

Books should be written on the topics like human need for food, shelter and clothing ; early man's ignorance of food growing and cattle-rearing, in the regional or local script. If possible the script of the national language may be introduced. The legends, folk-tales and songs of the aboriginals should be included in the text books. Their children will take more interests in them as these would tell their own stories. The heroic tales of their lives should always be given priority so that they get full impetus for this. If foreign elements of culture are to be introduced, introduce them through their own.

The medium of instruction should be at the elementary stage through their mother tongue. It is seen not only in the aboriginals'

cases but also among the advanced group of people that children can learn better and smoothly through the language spoken at home than a foreign language. In some areas like Assam, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh the States are insisting on their state languages. But this system of introduction of language on these people is disastrous and results in useless expenditure of money. In this connection I would like to point out that the teachers from the aboriginal groups should be recruited to educate their children. I have some practical experiences about the teaching of the advanced groups of people in a Bengali village school, where the teacher is one who speaks Hindi only. The students what I have observed could not follow. The similar thing I have also noticed in several schools in Bengal—that the teachers qualifying themselves with M.A. degrees could not make the students understand. So if the teacher could not feel and realise the difficulty of the students the teaching will be a failure. For this I advocate the idea of selecting teachers from the aboriginal community. What I believe is that by special methods and creation of interests their children can be given quick training.

My second view is not to arrange big buildings for schools at a long distance from their homes, as the children do not have full faith in such schools. Our main effort should be to educate them for their economic usefulness as far as possible. The teaching of arts and crafts should always be encouraged. We know that some groups do not like or even touch spinning machine—the loom—this is almost their socio-religious taboo. But our Basic Education Scheme has forced to accept it. Training in horticulture, agriculture, cattle-rearing, carpentry work, etc., can be given with much success.

Collection of vocabularies of the aboriginal children on the scientific basis has not been worked out in India. In Africa among the aboriginal areas the syllabic and the whole word method has been found to be useful. It makes learning very easy for its readers. Details should be worked out by engaging research enthusiasts in this direction.

Due to culture contact with the advanced groups of people these people are gradually improving their technical competence through the schools. This is also admitted by the Santals and other neighbouring aboriginal people and also by the Khasis of Assam. Modern education and contact through social welfare workers they have adopted the device and applied to their way of life for working. This should be encouraged.

Schools in the primary stage should be within the village. But as the density of population in their areas is low, a full fledged school with 3 or 4 villages combined together should run. If possible one teacher alone from their community can run a school. In larger settlements full fledged primary schools with teachers should be run. At the next stage, i.e., in a large institution the children in the higher classes (after taking their education in the villages) should come where hostel accommodation should be made. The children must have to go to their villages not only during the vacation months but also in short holidays. The idea of giving jobs should be completely abandoned. They must be given education in such a way so that they might utilise their education to train up their villagers in their environmental setting.

Education of the aboriginals should be subjected to well planning and supervision by a board of scholars who have done actual field-work. The sorting out process is crucial to success in field-work. The field-worker must have the full knowledge and interests in educational methods and practices. Field-workers specially the scholars of anthropology are well equipped to understand the underlying principles of the indigeneous system to the moral standards and they can interpret the culture of the aboriginals in a neat and planned way. They can offer the basis of this on their concrete experience and not on vague sympathy. The mistakes committed by the advanced groups in the treatment of the aboriginal people of America, Oceania, Africa and parts of India should not be repeated in Free India. Here in India we have no legacy of past errors but the field is open for a policy based on scientific principles and experiences of Cultural Anthropology. The Science of Man—Anthropology has earned results in other parts of the world. It can play a special role in Free India today for the emergence of a new and integrated society provided it is given proper opportunity and incentive.

To find out the proper type of education to be given to the aboriginal people anthropology will be of great help in creating right teachers. A child's mind is soft like clay, it can be moulded into any shape. Sincere and honest sympathy attract it most. A successful teacher will be one who will be able to attract students. If a teacher comes from a higher culture or class he shows a patronising attitude and behaviour towards the aboriginal students and often he is found to look down upon them. Sometimes this may not find any expression outwardly but every student can feel it in a very short time instinctively. This results automatically an apathetic

condition towards the teacher. A teacher's important asset is the love and respect of the students. His success depends on them. Besides, if a teacher is not well acquainted with the home-atmosphere of his student, it is very difficult for him to realise their defects and wants. Character and knowledge are the vital points which make up a good teacher. A student will always follow instinctively a good teacher as his ideal. So to select an ideal teacher for imparting education to the children of the aboriginal I do always emphasise for one of their community. Thus we find that the activity of an anthropologist is not only to serve the State and his society but also is an adjunct indispensable to the educational life of the aboriginals. This is really the vision of the study of Man.

Education of the aboriginals in India is the hardest problem which the educationist and also the anthropologist have to solve. Could the problem be solved by steering these people to real education Free India today will have the real national assets They are the nationals of Free India with us and we shall have the voice *One India*.

CHINA AND U.S.A.—INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

PARITOSH KUMAR RAY CHOWDEURY, M.A.

It is really strange that China and U.S.A. cannot understand each other in spite of having much in common (The making of modern China: A Short History—Owen and Eleanor Lattimore). But the course of events that gathered round Sino-American relations since the late 40's are but reflections of a bigger issue at stake, the case for and against Communism as the disputing parties often claim to take their stand on. Now, what India, standing geographically only nextdoor and sharing two-thousands years of peaceful commerce in ideas and culture with China, and a democratic system with America, can do to bring to a close the unhappy factors that set these two great nations apart. Napoleon once described China as a giant asleep, who on awakening would shake the world. All other questions apart, if only population is taken into account, one will agree with Mao-Tse-Tung in what he euphemistically said: If all the Chinese breathe together, there will be storm. So, if not for anything else, at least for the overwhelming number by which the Chinese people this world of ours, let us ponder a little.

THE CASE FOR CHINA AS SHE SEES IT

China's first and foremost aim is territorial unification, *i.e.*, logically return of Formosa ("Every three years a disorder, every five years a rebellion"—A Chinese proverb), Quemoy, Matsu and Pescadores to China, which according to all canons of international law form integral parts of the main land (Ref. Yalta Agreement),—even at the proposed price of offering Chiang-Kai-Shek a high post in the Chinese Government. China traces her distrust of the West, specially America to past history, and she reminds with contempt that the whole history of past Sino-West relations is being repeated in regard to Formosa. Historically, Hay's Open Door Policy (1899) was a policy of "hitchhiking" imperialism in preference to active imperialism. And the Chinese opposition to foreign missionary activities is not a persecution of the freedom of conscience, but is in the national interest. They note like Lattimore: "In fact, it is

hardly too much to say that the whole of the Protestant missionary movement in China was more of a subverting force than a converting proselytism (p. 112, *The Making of Modern China*). That the Lansing-Ishi Agreement (1917) was a stab at her back, that the Chinese have still fresh in their memory the Asian Munich, the Manchurian Episode (1931) which "cannot be explained by referring to the diplomatic documents of the time. The problems involved were of the kind known in diplomatic language as 'delicate', so delicate that the world's best diplomatic brains were employed in drawing up documents that would get around the real issue without mentioning them" (p. 147, *The Making of Modern China*). In 1943, Pearl S. Buck noted with regret American silence on making the war-aims clear. The high-sounding words of the Atlantic Charter were drowned in the roar of Churchill to preserve the Empire. Coupled with the reluctance to pronounce on the Cripps-Crisis over India, it closed the door to a solution in Asia, of which China was one of the storm-centres. And the Chinese think, the presence of the U.S. 7th Fleet in the Formosan waters is a clear sign-post of America's imperialistic designs.

THE CASE FOR AMERICA AS HER STATESMEN SEE IT

Now, what prompts America to place her 7th Fleet in the Formosan waters, many thousand miles off her own coast for an alleged line of Pacific defence when she herself will oppose, and naturally enough, the presence of a Communist navy near Long Island? Here are some interesting highlights.

Presenting the case for America before the Conference of South and S.E. Asia (Convened by the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, Aug. 8, 1955), Mr. Walter S. Robertson, U.S., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, asked: Is the present season of sweetness and light, through we are passing, a phase only, or the Soviets and their Communist allies suffered some change of heart as well as tactic? And he believed, they have not. As evidence, later he attached particular significance to a statement by Mr. Khrushchev, Sept. 17, 1955, at a State-dinner in Moscow in honour of the East German Premier: "Anyone who mistakes our smiles for withdrawal from the teachings of Karl Marx and Lenin is making a mistake. Those who expect this will have to wait until Easter Monday falls on Tuesday" (Quoted in the address by Mr. Robertson to the Virginia Bar Association at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, Aug. 8,

1956). Now, what are the teachings of Lenin, to which Mr. Khrushchev gives fresh allegiance? Lenin wrote: "We are living not merely in a state but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and bourgeois states will be inevitable". Lenin depicted the Communist Party as a man ascending a steep, unexplored mountain, who reaches an obstacle impossible to forward progress. "The man then must turn back, descend, seek another path, longer perhaps, but one which will enable him to reach the summit". And Lenin's summit was clearly defined: "First, we will take Eastern Europe, then the masses of Asia, and then we'll surround America, that last citadel of Capitalism. We won't have to attack; it will fall into our laps like an over-ripe fruit". Following this, Mr. Robertson thinks, "Communist objectives in Asia have long been recognised and clearly defined: the manpower of China, the industrial capacity of Japan, the raw-materials and excess food of S.E. Asia .. If the three objectives are ever realised, our Pacific frontiers might well be pushed back to the west Coast, and Lenin's dream of surrounding America would be well on its way to fulfilment. ...Objective No. 1 already has been achieved—China's man-power. The war in Indo-China sparked and supplied by the Red-Chinese makes for Communist bid for S.E. Asia. The attack on Korea in 1950 was in the opinion of many the first step towards Japan's industrial resources". (cf. "Korea has been a blessing. There had to be a Korea either here or some peace in the world"—General Van Fleet, quoted in I.F. Stone's book: *The Hidden History of the Korean War*). And so, following the red-light of Korea, America is up in arms and ready to resist Communism. And as Mr. William Randolph Hearst, Jr. writing in the *Patrika* (*Danger Ahead! Asia*) said: "The luxury of further retreat in Asia is not open to the U.S. because of our exposed geographic frontiers in the Pacific basin".

INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

What are the implications of American policy? They are briefly: support to discredited regimes of Chiang, Dr. Rhee, etc, military bases in the face of popular Asian opposition, even in the S.E.A.T.O. countries, and the suspicion of neutral countries like India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia. Let us analyse and examine India's foreign Policy in this background,

Like all wise foreign policies, India's foreign policy is limited primarily by her geographic situation, strategic importance. (in the North, her frontier touches the frontiers of four countries—Pakistan, Afghanistan, Soviet Union and China, and across the North East Frontier Agency touches the Tibet region of China), ideological connections, economic interests, and a host of other conflicting forces. Now, what is behind India's insistence on the Panch Shila? Observers like Dr. K. L. Sridharani think that India's philosopher Vice-President Dr. Radhakrishnan supplied the philosophical and historical basis of India's Foreign Policy (See: Inside Delhi, columns by Dr. Sridharani in the Patrika, 1954-56). According to this thesis, ideas lose their nascent stings and rigours as time passes. As the endless Crusades of Islam and Christianity have finally settled down, leaving the Muslims and Christians of the Arab countries in peace (and transforming the relations between the Arab countries and the Europeans to a newer basis), as the Catholic-Protestant antagonisms of the past (of which the Massacre of St. Bartholomew is a brutal record) have settled down, so too, given time and peace, the issue of Communism and Western democracy will not seem to be as incapable of compromise as it is to-day. And that both, Communism and Western democracy will give up their militant attitudes towards world problems. India's foreign policy is partly the result of this synthetic trend of thought.

Now, the diplomatic basis is supplied by Dr. K. M. Panikkar, India's ace diplomat in his books: 'The Basis of An Indo-British Treaty,' 'The Future of S. E. Asia,' and 'Asia and Western Dominance': (a) "The Russian and the American expansion both had the result of shifting the balance of power from the colonising nations of Europe. New ages of history are growing side by side, not one after another."

(b) "Russia in Asia is a geographical fact—the influence of which will become increasingly apparent as time goes on—since its power is continental, not maritime."

(c) America and the Far East are neighbours through increased air-communication.

(d) India is a peninsula in Asia. Compared to the Soviet Union and China, together, she had smaller land-mass and population. If she leans too great in favour of Russia and China, she becomes an appendage to their body, of which Central Asia is the heartland. To be powerful, India must ally (but not to the extent of antagonism).

nising Russia and China) a maritime Power. India's obvious choice is Britain (through the Commonwealth) on whom much of her military establishments and the protection of her long coast line depend.

There are some other factors, to be reckoned with for a basic understanding of India's foreign policy which seems to so many friendly observers, to be perplexing, if not a bundle of contradictions. Nehru believes that much of the East-West antagonism could have been avoided, if the Russian Revolution was allowed to be stabilised and her relations with countries normalised: "The Communist Revolution should be viewed in the correct perspective. When the French Revolution came it shook Europe terribly and many people thought it was the end of the world. After a number of years, the French Revolution underwent various changes and things stabilised themselves. Normally speaking, Russia would have stabilised itself after the 1917 Revolution, but it was not allowed to become normal. An important Russian leader said to me, when I said something to him in criticism of his policy: 'You must realise that we have lived for the last 40 years in a state of siege' That remark of his impressed me. Unfortunately in dealing with China, many great countries have not profited by the Russian example." (Speech before the German Foreign Policy Association, Bonn, July 15, 1956). His thesis was re-echoed in the speech of Dr. Radhakrishnan on July 19, 1956. Nehru's Foreign Policy stems from these fundamental premises, e.g., the evidence of Prof. Lattimore, the world-famous American Sinologist: "That many of the harsh and cruel aspects of the Soviet order are in fact scars inflicted on it in its youth by the intolerance and active hostility against which it had to struggle to survive. For this part of the environment of the early years of Soviet history, it was the rest of the world that was responsible. Similarly, the future of China, i.e., the growth of democracy will be favoured if the rest of the world takes it for granted that China is capable of democracy" (The Making of Modern China, p. 197).

The problem of normalising relations with China is significant in the background of her vast landmass. At present, "space is China's chief asset, not her wealth." Given 30 years of peaceful industrialisation, China will emerge as the most powerful nation on earth, besides U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., because of her manpower. But unless her land-problem is solved, unless the advance of the Gobi is stemmed,—and these objectives cannot be fulfilled in a state of cold-war,—her industrialisation will compel her to be imperialistic like Japan. India too needs peace for the success of her Five-Year

Plans, so that both can settle down to peaceful competition in spite of their respective differences of outlook on world affairs, which will ultimately decide the future of Asia and the world. And that is why the Sino-Indian relations are a factor for democracy and, what the Chou-Nehru Agreement on Tibet records (as Nehru himself has several times said) is this historic change in inter-state relations (But misplaced critics like Sri Jay Prokash Narayan would regard Panch Shilla as born of sin). Thus the American assistance to Chiang-Kai-Shek is ultimately having the effect of resisting the emergence of China as a first-class Asiatic power, as predicted by observers during the War. The experience of the resistance against Japan has already led the Chinese to change from the position of a country with her face towards the Pacific to that of facing the vast inland area, to her trade communications with the Soviet Union via land route. And the modern Moscow-Peking Railway has more than broken China's technological isolation. So it is futile that a continuation of American embargo against China can for long bear fruit. Further, it has the effect of imposing on China an isolation more and more within the Russian orbit. But as Nehru has said time and again (and as Mr. George V. Allan, former American Ambassador to India testified from "his experience in Korea) that in Korea China acted independently, that China is primarily Asiatic, in spite of her ideological alliance with the Soviet Union, and that we can help matters if we help her to come to her own from her long seclusion, (which is explained partly by her size and homogeneity of culture, as well as by foreign domination); she was previously more of a world, self-sufficing, self-contained than a nation.

Let us now examine the problems of democracy in China: "The typical Chinese is naturally democratic and in this he is as much as like most Americans as he is unlike most Japanese" (Lattimore). For instance, the Chinese talk to mule-cart drivers in the same friendly way as average Americans do to taxi drivers, and think that the act of getting work from a man is made delightful with some friendly words, unlike in India, where manual labour is still looked down upon by a vast majority of educated people, and that too in spite of a formal democracy. Further, the way of address in the Chinese spoken language is democratic as in English, unlike in many Indian languages (e.g., the Bengali equivalent of the English word 'you' is 'Tumi' while addressing men of the so-called lower professions, and 'Apni' for others; cf. Hindi equivalents, 'Tum' and 'Aap.'). But why is it that a modern visitor in China finds her to be a ~~country~~

meticulously guarding its secrets, (attributed solely to Communist regimentation) more formal than free, compared with the brutal frankness of Americans. The reasons, once again, are traceable to her history: "The typical Chinese is in many ways more 'civilised' than we are. He does not admire frankness the way we do. In fact, he thinks these characteristics are rather barbarian and unsuitable. He is more tactful, his chief concern being to make the other fellow feel comfortable, to give him face, rather than to tell the truth. This comes from thousands of years of having to get along with each other often in crowded and uncomfortable surroundings" (p. 26. *The Making of Modern China*).

An old missionary student of China once remarked that Chinese history is remote, monotonous, obscure, and worst of all, there is too much of it (China has the most continuous and authentic history for more than two thousand years). This may be described as one of the major reasons of the Western inability to understand the Chinese, least her foreign relation. But this requires a lot of explaining away that a rational judgement can permit. Historically, the Chiang-regime (which America presents as a test case for democracy) was essentially a Confucian state, far from democratic with 'Pater familias' centering round the doctrine of 'filial piety', in which power is concentrated in the hands of the father or the head of the family, and the scope of individual action for an individual member of the society is limited. The War-years have done sufficiently to break down the rigours of 'Pater familias', as many contemporary observers have noted.

Further, "one of the most striking things about the culture of China is the intricacy and difficulty of the Chinese written language" (Lattimore) with a host of 20 main dialects and 200 lesser known dialects, and a plethora of characters, of which it is said of criticism by Chinese who have studied in Europe, that 80 per cent of a Chinese student's school life is taken up with the task of memorising characters and even then he is far from written fluency. "It is very probable that Chinese writing (like Egyptian writing) was purposely developed from a very early period in a way to make it as difficult as possible, because writing guarded the secret wealth of powers in controlling the allotments of water, and the opportunity of rent and taxes. Even if this opinion may be called speculative, we do at least know that in working practice the Chinese written language has always been so difficult that to acquire a good education demanded more time and hard work than in any western culture". And Modern

China is democratising her written and spoken language by reducing the ten thousand and more odd characters to an workable extent, by popularising the Mandarin dialect of Peiking among all sections of Chinese (as the standard spoken language of China) preceding their decision to Romanise the script, and thus ending the Chapter of Chinese history when the 3 R's were the exclusive monopoly of a few. These are the stages through which democracy will work itself out in China. Adult-suffrage in England was introduced only since 1728 and she had her reasons depending on her traditions, genius and environment. What is there to call in question in the gradual introduction of democracy in China? The Amrita Bazar Patrika wrote editorially on the Draft Constitution of China : "A Country like China with an ancient civilisation and social order, which survived centuries of clash and strife can hardly imitate the drastic policy of the Soviet leaders. After all, Russia is a new-born child of the West; it emerged from the 17th century barbarism of Peter the Great. Russian society assumed its new shape in the 18th and 19th centuries. Such a society may be changed far more easily than a society which has not yet been able to cut its moorings from its Confucian roots". Further, the present virtual one party-rule is nothing new. It is in a way a continuation of the Kuomintang system in which "only the Kuomintang can decide whether such a party is to be recognised as legal and to what extent its members are allowed to speak in public and circulate printed matter" (p. 182, Lattimore), and "two traditions have always existed in China that the man of education has the right to speak out and that the authorities have the right and the duty to pass final judgement on anything that appears in print. The Press in China to-day shows the continuation of both traditions (p. 185, Lattimores). What has here been said of the mid forties in China, holds good partly regarding modern China. Thus, in China to day, a government of Communist and "other democratic parties, though questionable by the standard of western democracy, is a natural reflection of her tradition coined in Sun Yat Sen's 'Sun-Men' Chu-I' Culture (Nationalism, Democracy and Peoples' Livelihood). And the Mao-regime is a continuation in another form of the unification of China that began under the Suidynasty.

Further, is China as dogmatic and totalitarian as she is made out to be? There are evidences contrary to it. For instance, Mr. A. G. Ayer, Professor of Philosophy, University College, London, noted : "their Marxism is still pretty elastic. Marxism seems to be a symbolic framework rather than which hampers their freedom to carry on

pure research". And the Peiking University teaches philosophies of Lao Tse, Marxism and Western philosophies. Let us now take the case of the Overseas Chinese who traditionally over the centuries were always sons of the yellow soil, although they might have never seen the fatherland and their family might have settled in another country for generations. This was an article of faith, transcending political loyalty. In view of this tradition, S.E. Asian countries having a large number of Chinese settlers had started to look with suspicion and fear on their Chinese minorities as the political control in China passed to Communists. Now, in her frank and categorical declaration regarding the Overseas Chinese that their primary allegiance should be to the countries of their settlement, the Communist Government of China struck a note different from her predecessor. It has been proved again in her positive approach to the Communist rebels of Burma (that "revolution cannot be exported") and in her most recent settlement of frontiers with Burma.

And as Dr. Lin Yutang wrote long ago in "The vigil of a Nation": "There is a bout going now inside China between Master Kung and Karl Marx, and my bet is that Master Kung will win. Time will settle that, not words; and I can imagine that in twenty years from now, the ardent Communist advocate will become as pro-confucian as desirous of having roots in one's own racial and historical traditions". There is a Chinese proverb, it is in the form of a question and answer: "What is the cure for muddy water? The question goes. "Time", is the answer. Yes, time is on our side as it always is on the side of the rational; time will prove the truth of India's Foreign Policy.

HOBHOUSE ON THE NATURE OF THE STATE

PROFESSOR RAGHUBIR CHAKRAVARTI

II

Hobhouse's criticism of idealist theory is a wartime production. War should be an eye-opener to the implications of the Philosophical Theory of the State. German militarism mirrors its ultimate effect.

In the bombing of London, the visible and tangible outcome of a false and wicked doctrine became evident to Professor Hobhouse. The whole conception of the idealist is deeply interwoven with the sinister developments in European politics.

That Hobhouse is not alone who reacts like this will be evident to us if we consult Willoughby and Bryce. Willoughby in his "Prussian Political Philosophy" has pointed out that German militarism owes its inspiration to a long line of tradition. The exaltation of the State has a baneful effect on future.

Professor Bryce in his introductory lecture on "International Crisis: The Theory of the State" has also found in idealist political philosophy the real seeds of World War I. Like Hobhouse, he has also given a clarion call to all responsible thinkers to expose this aspect of idealism with brutal frankness.

Thus it is apparent that Hobhouse writes in a spirit of a crusader with a view to freeing the world from deadly doctrines.

"In substance what Hobhouse did", says one commentator, "under the stimulus of the War, was to throw into relief some of the anti-liberal implications of Hegelianism that English and American Hegelians had considered to be of only passing importance. The issues between Bosanquet and Hobhouse turned chiefly upon two points, both obscure in Green: the ethical relationship between the individual and the community, and the relationship of society to the State."

Hegelianism is viewed as the enemy of mankind. It has been fought on humanitarian ground. Bosanquet is the main target of

¹ George H. Sabine: "A History of Political Theory" (1937). 3rd Edition (1951). P. 617.

attack. It is as acute a criticism as is extant in recent political theory.¹

The capital blunder of idealism lies in the fact that instead of seeking to realize the ideal it idealizes the real. There is no question of improvement. We are already living in the ideal.

In the context of our social life to-day, faith in such assumptions will atrophy our power of revolt, hypnotize our reason and will and paralyse our efforts to improve our present lot.

Though it is commonly known as idealism, Hobhouse characterize it as the subtle and dangerous enemy to the ideal than any brute denial of idealism emanating from an one-sided science."²

This theory starts with the idea that the whole is something more than its parts. It is quite obvious. Out of every assemblage, a new entity emerges. But that should not imply that this new entity is distinct from its parts and can live without them.

Its idea of freedom is equally fantastic. It is said that where will wills itself, freedom emerges. It is said moreover that will is determined by its object. Is it not natural to think then that the object is something external? Over and above it is said that the object of the will is determined by the will itself. Here we move in a circle. How can the will be determined by its object and yet determine the object?

Hobhouse points out truly : "The end of object then is always other than the will as it is when acting for the end. Will has relation to an object, and things that are related are not the same. The identification of subject and object fails here as elsewhere and with it the whole scheme of self-determination breaks down."³

This theory declares that obedience to impulses is slavery and that the life of reason is only free. It is quite true. But why do we forget the fact that the life of a narrow principle is not also free because it necessitates subordination of other parts?

It is proclaimed that in obeying law, we obey the will. But, as Hobhouse remarks, "in society there are many wills and in obedience to law we conform to the will of another. How then can we talk of the will as if there were only one?"⁴

¹ Lewis Roekow : "Contemporary Political Thought in England" (1925), p. 71.

² L. T. Hobhouse : "The Metaphysical Theory of The State" (1918), p. 18.

³ L. T. Hobhouse : "The Metaphysical Theory of The State" (1918), p. 85.

⁴ L. T. Hobhouse ; *Ibid* : p. 83.

From this we come to another aspect of freedom. Freedom is self-determination. Yet it is realized in complete submission to law and the State. Is it not a gross contradiction in terms?

The concept of the "real will" is equally untenable. Strictly speaking there is no part in me which is more real than any other part. My less permanent desires and impulses are as real to my present self as my rational will, is to my reformed self. A thing is either real or not real. And the actual will is just as real as the "real" will.¹

The people in general are not guided by dictates of higher self. Reason plays a minor part. Our emotions and impulses determine our political behaviour. What is termed as real good is not real in the average man nor even in its completeness in the best of men.² The term "real will" is a source of confusion.

The "real will" is identified with the General Will. But it requires a harmony with other wills, which is untrue to facts. The permanent wills of most individuals are far from harmonious unities governed by rational principles.³ "If the real self means that which goes deep, we cannot deny that it contains possibilities of contradiction far more serious than the collision between permanent interest and passing desire."⁴ That is, such an identification negates the possibility of a clash of rational wills.

Such an identification seems to rest on a confusion between content and existence; and breaks down utterly if we insist on keeping that distinction clearly before our minds.

The State is definitely not the outcome of a single purpose alone. It has evolved out of clash of wills, not of a unified will.

Thus we see that the General Will becomes an empty phrase. Even if such a conception exists, there are as many "general wills" as there are social groups.

In so far as it is will it is not general, and in so far as it is general it is not will. "The common good," says Professor Hobhouse, "is explicitly willed by a minority of thinking and public spirited individuals. What is general is more undefined and perhaps undefinable, a participation in the variegated mass of psychological forces out of which the actions and development of the community emerge."⁵

¹ Morris Ginsberg : "The Psychology of Society" 7th Edn. p. 82. (1921).

² L. T. Hobhouse : "The Metaphysical Theory of The State" (1918), p. 47.

³ Morris Ginsberg : *Ibid.* P. 79.

⁴ L. T. Hobhouse : *Ibid.* P. 48.

⁵ L. T. Hobhouse : *Ibid.* P. 126.

Whatever may be the nature of the will, the marginal possibility of conflict must be admitted. And in such a case, the real court of appeal will be individual conscience. Hobhouse is perfectly right when he declares: "Moral action is action in conformity with an inward principle, an action that the agent considers to be right and performs because he believes it to be right. If people are required to give up what they consider to be right, morality is annulled."¹

To look at social institutions as objective reason is to annul the function of reason in human society. Moreover, such a conception necessitates the idea of a common self, which is also untrue to fact.

Underlying Bosanquet's account there is a serious confusion between the State and Society. The State is not society. It is necessary to society. But we must remember that it is one of its conditions. The State cannot be called as "operative criticism of institutions." The entire life of society is a whole, of which the parts act and react upon another. The entire fabric carries out its own self-criticism.

Hobhouse remarks emphatically: "To confuse the State with society and political with moral obligation is the central fallacy of the metaphysical theory of the State."²

Truly speaking, various factors—rational and irrational—play their part in the making of the State. It has evolved out of clash of purposes. There is nothing sacrosanct in it.

To magnify the State is, according to Hobhouse, to sacrifice individuals to institutionalism.³

We are once more tempted to quote Dr. Ginsberg when he concludes: "Men do indeed share in a common life and contribute to a collective achievement, yet nothing but confusion can result from hypostatizing this life and ascribing to it a reality, over and above the reality of the lives which individuals live in relation with one another."⁴

Bosanquet's view of the State in relation to the external world has received a hot reception from Hobhouse. It is condemned as reactionary and ruinous.

Bosanquet had magnified the morality of the State and does not find occasions when the State can commit crimes. Our public morals

¹ L. T. Hobhouse : *Ibid.* P. 92.

² L. T. Hobhouse : *Ibid.* P. 77.

³ Lewis Rockow : "Contemporary Political Thought In England" (1925) : P. 14.

⁴ Morris Ginsberg : "The Psychology of Society" 7th Edn. P. 94.

must be brought up to the level of private morals. Hobhouse is clear on the point that "if a higher international morality is to be achieved, it is precisely by reversing the argument of the idealist."¹

The States are interrelated in various ways. The economic, spiritual, cultural and social contacts are daily on the increase. Days of isolationism are over. Mutual interdependence has been ultimately proved to be the very categorical imperative of everybody's existence. Because of all these the organised moral world is in the making. Yet the idealist does not recognise the need and even the possibility of such transcendence of State limits.

The fundamental fallacy of the idealist lies in the conception that morality depends upon the legal organization which is the distinctive mark of the State. Yet the world trend proves that moral relations can exist without legal relations.

Bosanquet's analysis sets the State above moral criticism, constitutes war a necessary incident in its existence, condemns humanity and repudiates a Federation or League of Nations.²

Let us conclude with two extracts from Hobhouse.

"What has paralysed the development of international law and morality is, on the side of theory, just that doctrine of State absolutism of which the idealistic theory of the State is the most subtle justification."³

"International anarchy is not due to philosophy but to the passions of men, but the restraint which humanitarian philosophy has sought to impose has been fatally loosened by the sophistications of idealism."⁴

Thus Bosanquet's stand point is thoroughly disproved. His concept of freedom involves contradiction and paralysis of will. His concept of the "real will" is discredited as a source of confusion. The identification of "real will—" with the General Will is fantastic. The claim to base the State on reason is equally untrue to fact. The confusion between the State and society is clearly exposed. His idea of the State, "as the guardian of the moral world," is condemned as poisonous and reactionary.

¹ L. T. Hobhouse : "The Metaphysical Theory of The State" (1918) P. 110.

² L. T. Hobhouse : *Ibid.* P. 25.

³ L. T. Hobhouse : *Ibid.* P. 113.

⁴ L. T. Hobhouse : *Ibid.* P. 113.

What emerges is the concept of the State as an association of society, charged with distinct functions—positive and negative—to be limited within its own jurisdiction so that every individual can realise his best self.

What we need to remember is the fact that the State is not an end in itself. It is a means to good life. Therefore, it should be looked upon as convenience, not as an object of worship.¹

¹ Bertrand Russell : "New Hopes for A Changing World" (1951).

MUSIC SEMINAR

KUMARI NIRMALA JOSHI

The Sangeet Natak Akadami held a Seminar of outstanding musicians and distinguished authorities on music in Delhi from April 1st to 6th at Vigyan Bhavan.

The present Seminar is third in the series, the previous ones having been on Film and Drama.

The Music Seminar will bring together for discussion and demonstration eminent artists. Among the artists and authorities who will discuss and demonstrate music are Smt. Kesar Bai of Bombay, Mushtaq Husain Khan of Rampur, Vilayat Khan of Bombay, Smt. Jayaminal and Balasaraswathy of Madras, Alathur Brothers and Palghat Mani Iyer of Tanjore, T. Chowdiah of Mysore and Smt. Suchitra Mitra and Pankaj Mallick of Calcutta. The eminent authorities participating in the Seminar include Prof. P. Sambamoorthy of Madras, Prof. B. R. Deodhar and Prof. A. Lobo of Bombay, Shri T. N. Ramachandran, Joint Director-General of Archaeology, Shri Sailaja Ranjan Mazumdar and Shri Shantidev Ghosh of Vishwa Bharati and Shri C. Chandrashekhariah of Mysore.

The distinctive feature of this Seminar, as contrasted with the two previous Seminars of the Akadami, is that the country's foremost authorities on music and its authoritative performers will be brought together in the same study group.

The discussions and papers of the Seminar will be illustrated by spot-performances of the attending-artists.

All styles (*Gayakis*) of music will be presented, including Dhrupad, Khayal, Thumari of the North and Raga Alapana, Pallavi, Javli and Padams of the South. The various schools or *gharanas* of the same style will be presented in such a way as to bring out their individual flavour and distinctive features. Along with the classical styles other musical forms will also be illustrated including Rabindra Sangeet, film music, devotional music, Ghazals, Qawwalis, Paharis and other folkforms.

Papers being presented to the Seminar will discuss such major questions, as growth of a genuine popular music, relationship between folk and classical music, character and musical education, the possibility of orchestration in Indian music. Separate papers will

problems of training, notation and voice culture. Besides technical papers, there will be informative papers on trends in classical music in different parts of the country, varieties of Hindustani and Karnatak compositions, contribution of devotional music, etc.

From the papers, performances and interchanges among the artists and authorities, recommendations will emerge for implementation by the Sangeet Natak Akadami. It may be noted here that the Akadami has already established committees to implement the recommendations of the earlier Film and Drama Seminars.

Conferences of musicians have a long and honourable tradition in our country. With the growth of nationalism and the subsequent cultural awakening during the twenties of this century, pioneers in the revival of North Indian music, like Pt. V. N. Bhattachande and V. D. Paluskar began to organise music conferences and demonstrations in various cities. At these conferences eminent exponents and patrons participated. They helped to extend the wealth of our great musical tradition. These early conferences combined demonstration with discussion on various problems of music. There is no doubt that these early gatherings played an important part in the popularisation of classical music and in the inculcation of genuine taste for it.

These conferences were, therefore, popular with the listeners, because they provided, at small expense, unique opportunities to listen to unrivalled masters. They were also popular with the artists themselves, who not only heard other fellow artists, and thus educated themselves better, but also exchanged opinion on various aspects of their art. Gradually however the educative and more serious character of these conferences became more and more subordinated to the idea of entertainment and the conferences turned into mere festivals. Eminent artists came to such festivals simply to perform for a fee. Some did not even stay to hear other renowned artists. This general neglect of their own problems by the artists has not been a very happy chapter in the history of our music.

After Independence, when our Government turned its attention to the cultural needs of the people, and eventually established the Sangeet Natak Akadami, it was considered one of the main functions of the Akadami to hold conferences and seminars in which eminent experts, scholars and exponents would gather together, take stock of the existing situation, exchange opinions and experiences on various aspects of their art and try to evolve helpful recommendations for dealing with their pressing problems.

JUSTICE AND POLICE IN BENGAL IN 1765—II

NIHARKANA MAJUMDAR, M.A., D.PHIL

Murshidabad

The judicature at Murshidabad had a more specific framework and as surveyed by the Committee of Circuit in August 1772, a good many judicial officers were in existence there to perform varied functions. They were the Nazim, Faujdar, Kotwal, Darogha-i-Adalat-al Alia, Diwan, Darogha-i-Adalat-Diwani, Qazi, Muhtasib, Mufti and Qanungo.²⁹

A close examination of their functions will show that their occupations pertained more to general administration than to the administration of justice in the modern sense of the term. The Committee undertook the survey on the plain principles of experience and observation without making an intimate study of the judicial framework of the Mughals and the theory of their law.

At the top was the Nazim, also styled as Sipah Salar or Subahdar. He was in the words of Abul Fazl, "the vicegerent of His Majesty". "The troops and people of the province are under his orders and their welfare depends upon his just administration." It was his duty to administer criminal justice and maintain law and order. In his judicial capacity, he was required first and foremost to be most expeditious and not to afflict the people by dilatoriness. He was not to rely on witnesses and oaths but to investigate the matter personally and to treat the parties with courtesy.³⁰ In awarding punishments, he was to be forgiving and mild and to discriminate between persons of different status.

This is to be considered as an ideal from which deviations were frequent even when the Mughal administration was most solidly

²⁹ (a) Letter from the Committee of Circuit at Kasimbazar to the Council at Fort William in Progs., Committee of Circuit, Kasimbazar, 15 Aug., 1772, Vol. I-III, pp. 119-123.

(b) Secret Consultations, 21 Aug. 1772.

(c) Letter to Court, 3 Nov. 1772.

(d) Seventh Report, 1773, p. 825.

³⁰ Jarrett, *Ain-i-Akbari*, Vol. II, pp. 37-39.

"Beware lest justice to that judge belong,
Whose own ill-deed hath wrought the suppliant's wrong".
(*Ibid.*, p. 38).

established in Bengal. The Mughal Emperor loved to pose as the fountain of justice and followed the immemorial tradition of doing justice personally and in the open Court. That form was preserved by the Nawab Nazim of Bengal as the executive head of the subah. But for some years before the grant of Diwani, the Murshidabad power had been considerably weakened. Formerly, the Nawab's deputy on the civil side, the Darogha-i-Adalat-al Alia used to function as the judge over property, real or personal, but his Court was now reduced to a dumb show. The Nawab Nazim still held on every Sunday a Court called the Roz³¹ Adalat and personally presided over it. But he now sat there only to preside in the trials of capital crimes.³² Over other matters he did not practically exercise any jurisdiction at all. The Naib Nazim of Dacca took cognizance of criminal cases there.

"As a subordinate and assistant" of the Nazim, the Faujdar held the first place. The duties enjoined on him in the *Ain-i-Akbari* related broadly to three branches of administration: revenue, police and army. His main function was to guard the countryside and put down robberies and small rebellions. He was expected to keep the local militia well-equipped and in good trim. Another duty of his was to assist the Amalguzars in the realisation of revenue by making demonstrations of force to overawe all opposition to them.³³

It is worthy of note that Mughal historians do not attribute any judicial function to the Faujdar. It appears, however, from a letter of the Committee of Circuit that crimes, not capital, were "tried before the Faujdar, but reported to the Nazim for his judgment and sentence".³⁴ This statement as quoted by the Parliamentary Com-

³¹ "Roy" in the Seventh Report, but "Roz" in the Committee of Circuit Proceedings of 15 August, 1772.

³² In a memorial Raza Khan too stated that trial of capital crimes belonged to the Nizamut.

See (a) Proceedings of the Controlling Council of Revenue at Murshidabad, 8 Dec. 1770, Vol. II, pp. 8-9

(b) *Ibid*, 11 Feb., 1771. Vol. III, pp. 160-61

(c) Secret Consultations, 17 Jan., 1771.

³³ Jarrett, *Ain-i-Akbari*, Vol. II, pp. 40-41

Faujdar, as his name suggests, was essentially a Commander of Military Police.

³⁴ Progs. Committee of Circuit, Kasimbazar, 15 Aug., 1772.

This specification calls for some explanation. It has led many persons to believe that the Faujdar exercised judicial authority. But at a time when a feeble Nazim held a Court once a week only to try capital offences and his deputy Darogha-i-Adalat-al Alia existed but in name, how could a direct subordinate of the Nazim, like the Faujdar, possibly usurp judicial power?

A far more plausible explanation of the Committee's statement is that in those days the term Faujdar was loosely used to mean also judge of the Faujdari Adalat, though the two were distinct entities. It should be noted that the withdrawal of Faujdars in 1770 and again in 1781 did not in any way interrupt the operation of Faujdari Adalats and the

mittee of Secrecy of 1773 has since then intrigued many persons including the gentlemen in the majority in Hastings' Council. The similarity of the two terms—Faujdar and Faujdari Adalat further confused these gentlemen. In course of a controversy in the Council, Hastings made it clear that Faujdari Adalats were Courts instituted for trial of all crimes and misdemeanours, while Faujdars were police officers appointed to maintain the public peace. They arrested all disturbers of peace, but instead of trying and punishing them, committed them to the Faujdari Adalats for trial. This transfer was in his opinion, the only connection between the Faujdars and Faujdari Adalats, "their proceedings and their authority being totally distinct and independent".³⁵ Properly speaking, the Faujdari Adalat was the single judicature for the trial of criminal matters.

Subordinate to the Faujdar, the Kotwal was ranked as a peace officer of night. P. Saran's statement that he was a Magistrate, Prefect of Police and Municipal Officer rolled into one and that as Magistrate, he took cognizance of criminal causes of the whole Sarkar is not corroborated by facts. In Bengal at least, Kotwal was essentially an officer of city Police and not a Judge.³⁶ Describing a Bengali Kotwal towards the middle of the 18th Century, Robert Orme states that the Kotwal's duty was to punish all such crimes and misdemeanours as were too insignificant to be admitted before "the more solemn tribunal of the Durbar".³⁷

By virtue of local influence and police powers, the Kotwal could easily wield coercive authority. It may be conceded also that he dealt with trifling offences. But in those cases, his role might have been of the nature of an informal mediation often exercised by the

term Faujdar also did not go into disuse, for the Daroga of the Faujdari Adalat often used to pass by that name. Not to speak of others, even Hastings was misled by the similitude of the two terms when he wrote,

" For ease the harassed Faujdar prays,
When crowded courts and sultry days
Exhale the noxious fume,
While poring o'er the cause he lays
The lengthened lie and doubts and fears
The culprit's final doom "

(Monckton—Jones, *Warren Hastings in Bengal*, p. 310, footnote).

³⁵ Secret Consultations, 7 December, 1775.

P. Saran wrongly says that towards the close of the 18th century the Faujdar came to have judicial authority over all cases less than capital crimes and refers to the Seventh Report in support of his statement.

(*Provincial Government of the Mughals*—p. 333, footnote).

³⁶ P. Saran (P. 352) holds that Kotwal and Qazi in the main shared almost the whole business of the Sarkar between them. J. N. Sarkar's opinion is that the Kotwal was an urban officer, being the Chief of City Police.

(J. N. Sarkar, *Mughal Administration* p. 57).

³⁷ Orme—*Historical Fragments of the Mughal Empire*, p. 452.

locally important persons. It cannot be satisfactorily proved from the contemporary records that the Kotwal in Bengal had any judicial power.

There were three Courts at Murshidabad for the decision of civil causes, namely the Adalat-al-Alia, Adalat Diwani and the Qazi's Office. The highest authority in the branch of civil justice was the Diwan, the head of the finance department. He was supposed to be the Chief Judge of all causes relating to real estates or property in land.³⁸ In practice, however he used to delegate his powers to his deputy, the Daroga³⁹ of the Diwani Adalat to whose jurisdiction, therefore, appertained the disputes over property in land.

For many years past, the Darogas of the Adalat-al-Alia and the Diwani Adalat were considered as judges of the same cause. The Daroga of the Adalat-al-Alia, who was the deputy of the Nazim, was the judge not only of quarrels, frays and abusive names but also of all matters of property, except claims relating to land and inheritance. His jurisdiction was thus hopelessly confounded with that of the Diwani Adalat and the parties "made their application as chance, caprice, interest, or superior weight and authority of either, directed their choice".⁴⁰ But the Committee's remark that "the general principles of all despotic Governments that every degree of power shall be simple and undivided, seems necessarily to have introduced itself into the Courts of Justice" is difficult to accept without some modification.

It was in conformity with the traditions of the Mughal system of administration that there were two co-ordinate channels of justice in the subah with the Nazim at the head of the administration of criminal justice and the Diwan as the highest judge in all civil and revenue matters. Both of them were appointed independently by the Emperor. But since Murshid Quli Khan's days, the office of Diwan became directly subordinate to the Nazim, who used to appoint the Diwan, Naib Nazim and Naib Diwan according to the needs of administration and these offices were constantly filled by the nominees of the reigning Nazim with the result that the distinct line between

³⁸ In Asaf Khan's opinion all questions of inheritance of lands or relating to rights and boundaries of lands, all cases of oppression and illegal demand upon the ryots and in general, causes of misdemeanour together with all matters relating to the administration of revenue fell under the jurisdiction of the Diwani.

See (a) Proceedings of the Controlling Council of Revenue at Murshidabad, 3 December 1770; Vol. II, pp. 8-9.

(b) *ibid.*, 11 February, 1771, Vol. III, pp. 160-61.

(c) Secret Consultation, 17 January, 1771.

³⁹ The term Darogha is generally written in India with the simple 'g' i.e., as Daroga. (See Wilson's *Glossary*, p. 126).

⁴⁰ Progs. Committee of Circuit, Kasimbazar, 15 August, 1772.

the Nizamat and Diwani tended to be lost and their functions merged.

The Qazi was a judge for claims of inheritance and succession and a dignitary performing weddings, funerals and other rites—thus combining in his person the temporal and the spiritual, at once a layman and a religious personage. In theory, the Qazi must be a Muslim scholar of blameless life thoroughly conversant with the Quranic law. His judgment was decisive for the parties, there being no appeal from it.⁴¹ Appointment of Qazis was not restricted to the capital only; a net work of Qazis was spread over the Parganas. Every town and even a large village had its local Qazi appointed by the Chief Qazi.⁴²

Qaziship was often recognised as a hereditary source of subsistence rather than a public post of responsibility. It appears that Abdul Reza Khan who had been appointed during the regime of Emperor Aurangzeb as the Qazi of Murshidabad was succeeded by his relative Zaid Mohamed who died in the time of Mir Kasim. In the absence of any heir for the time being, the relatives of the late Qazi deputed Mullah Wofa, one of their dependants, to act as Qazi "till heirs should arrive". But the latter usurped the office of Qazi in his own name. The daughters of Abdul Reza Khan made a petition in January, 1771 so that Mirza Abdullah, the nephew and lawful heir of the late Qazi Zaid Mohamed might be appointed Qazi. The Naib Subah corroborated this statement and the Murshidabad Council accordingly recognised "the right of Mirza Abdullah to succeed to the Qazeship".⁴³

The Qazi was assisted by the Mufti and Muhtasib in his Court. The procedure in his court was as follows:—After hearing the parties and witnesses, the Mufti used to write the Fatwa or the Law applicable to the case in question and the Qazi pronounced

⁴¹ *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, II, p. 606.

⁴² The Qazi was an indispensable personality in Muslim life. As an arbiter he settled disputes between persons who appealed to him. He had personally no power to carry out a sentence. He was competent to decide any of the questions affecting the life of the community that might have been dealt with by the Canon law, i.e., marriage, dissolution of marriage, care of orphans, succession contracts of various crimes and punishment of criminals.

See *Muslim Institutions* by Maurice Gaudetory—De Mombynce, trans. by Macgregor, p. 148.

⁴³ While reviewing the condition of Qazis before the coming of Hastings, a Qazi-ul-quzat of Bengal stated that the Nazim of Bengal appointed a Qazi-ul-quzat who sent deputies on his part into each district. The latter were appointed and removed by the Chief Qazi. It was also narrated how in course of time persons from the lower classes such as the common labourers and other ignorant persons were appointed to these offices. They did not know even how to write and read and had no other object than the receipt of Russians paid at burials and marriages (Revenue Judicial Consultations, 25 May, 1792).

⁴⁴ Proceedings of the Controlling Council of Revenue at Murshidabad, 10 Jan., 21 Jan. 1771, Vol. II, pp. 87, 80.

judgement. They were to be unanimous in their judgement. If either the Qazi or Muhtasib disapproved of the Fatwa, the cause was referred to the Nazim, who summoned the Ijlass or General Assembly consisting of the Qazi, Mufti, Muhtasib, Darogas of the Adalats, Maulavis and all the learned in the Law, to meet to decide upon it. Their decision was final. This provision shows that the Qazi's Court was formed on more liberal "ideas of justice and civil liberty than are common" in despotic governments.⁴⁴

In reality, however, the intention of this reference was defeated by the over-emphasis laid on it and the insurmountable difficulties attending the use of it. Very few were the occasions when the decisions of the Qazi and his colleagues were found to concur; there was, therefore, a standing necessity either that one should over-rule the other two, which was undesirable, or that daily appeals must be made to the Nazim and his warrant issued to summon all learned in the law from their homes, their studies, and normal occupations "to form a tumultuous assembly to hear and give judgment." The consequence was that the General Assembly was held rarely and only on occasions which acquired "their importance from that of the parties, rather than from the nicety of the case itself". Hence, the usual practice was that the Qazi either consulted with his colleagues in his own particular Court and gave judgement according to his own opinion, or more frequently decided without their assistance or presence.⁴⁵

As an assistant of the Qazi, the Mufti expounded and applied the law to cases. Originally he was a sort of unofficial Legal Remembrancer of Canon law. Probably his was never a regular post in the judicial department though references to Muftis are of frequent occurrence in connection with judicial administration.⁴⁶

The Muhtasib had cognisance of drunkenness, the vending of spirituous liquors and intoxicating drugs and the examination of false weights and measures. He also figured in the Committee of Circuit's list as an assistant of the Qazi. But properly speaking, he cannot be held as a judicial personage nor does his original counterpart in the Muslim world, even from the days of the Khilafat, claim that

title.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Progs. Committee of Circuit, Kasimbazar, 15 August, 1772.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ See *Muslim Institutions* by Gaudetroy—De Mombynes, p. 153.

⁴⁷ As Islamic state included Muhtasib or censor of public morals originally for religious scrutiny only. Later on, he used to perform the police duties of examining weights, measures and provisions and preventing gambling and drunkenness, in addition to his original religious function.

Another officer mentioned by the Committee of Circuit was the Qanungo. He was the Registrar of lands. Although he was not vested with any judicial authority, he was often made arbitrator in matters of land disputes by reference from the court of the Nazim or Diwan.

Obviously, the judicial officers at Murshidabad, as listed by the Committee of Circuit, ranged from the equivalent of the modern Chief Justice to that of the Registrar of lands and marriages and included the Police Chief, Justice of the Peace, Legal Remembrancer and Judges or Magistrates in civil, criminal and municipal matters. Three of them at least, the Faujdar, Kotwal and Qanungo had no regular judicial power.

Defects

Both Civil and Criminal Courts frequently took cognisance of the same causes. Overlapping of functions in the same officer was a cardinal feature of the criminal administration of Murshidabad.

The Qazi's Court seems to have been formed on wise and liberal principles, but the way in which it was then actually conducted destroyed all hopes of fair justice. The Qazi was to enforce the ordinances of law without partiality or pity. He was forbidden by the law to take presents from the people who appeared in his Court; "but now", writes the contemporary author Ghulam Husain, "since from a length of time, it is become customary to put up everything to sale, the office of Qazi is leased out and underleased".⁴⁸ The fees of the Qazi and Mufti proved always a heavy grievance to the poor and an impediment to marriage. On receiving a suitable fee, the Qazi used to "turn right into wrong and injustice into justice."⁴⁹

Judges were not paid any fixed salaries. They derived their emoluments from fines and the recognised perquisites as commission for adjudication. The authorised exaction of the Faujdari Bazijama or fines for petty offences and the commission of one-fourth called the Chauth levied on the amount of all debts and on the value of all property recovered by the decree of the Court were not only obnoxious practices in themselves, but constituted an additional

⁴⁸ *Seir Mutaqherin*, Vol. III, p. 165.

"We see every day," adds Ghulam Husain: "faithless Qazies who are ignorant even of the principles of Muslimanism, take leases of what they call the Qauzy's rights, and under-lease them openly to others, although the rights are no more than so many new inventions to torment the Mussulmen of this land and to extort money from them under a variety of pretences."

⁴⁹ *Seir Mutaqherin*, Vol. III, p. 166.

incentive to bribery and oppression.⁵⁰ The wealthy culprits, even if guilty of capital offences, could always escape due punishment through agreement by fine and the decision of the judges was in most cases "a corrupt bargain with the highest bidder."⁵¹

Here is an instance of the corrupt ways of these Courts. One day, Muralidhar, an agent of Raja Shitab Roy, was trying in his Court, a case of dispute between two men, while the author of *Seir Mutaqherin* and Rumbold, Chief of Patna, happened to be present there. The sentence was pronounced and both the parties were ordered to pay some money; the guilty person was to pay by way of fine and the innocent by way of thanks-giving. Rumbold was astonished and asked why fine should be levied also on one who had right on his side. Muralidhar and his flatterers had a ready reply to this query. They declared that the decision had been taken according to the rule and customs of the country and that this was no innovation of their own.⁵²

One material circumstance that greatly contributed to the mal-administration of justice was the absence of register of the proceedings of the mofussil Courts. This encouraged the natural propensity of the judge to bribery and fraud, "by making him easy with respect to any future prosecution" by a superior authority on a review or re-hearing of the cases determined by him.⁵³

But the greatest defect of the existing Courts was the want of a substitute or subordinate jurisdiction for the dispensation of justice in such parts of the province as lay out of their reach. In consequence, the operation of the Murshidabad Courts was limited to a circle, comprising a very small area just round the capital. In the interior, only those who lived in the neighbourhood of the zamindari headquarters could avail themselves of the Zamindari Courts. Even in their case, the expenses attending suits in these Courts served to destroy their hopes of legal redress. As for the people of the remote interior, it was only the rich and the vagabond who could travel far for justice. If perchance a poor person was brought from a distant

⁵⁰ (a) *Ibid*, p. 169.

(b) Progs. Committee of Circuit, Kasimbazar, 15 Aug. 1773.

(c) Dow, *The History of Hindustan*, Vol. III, p. civ.

(d) Bolts—*Considerations* p. 160.

(e) Vereist's *View*, p. 136, footnote.

"In Bengal", observes Vereist "the people are so far from supposing justice due from the Magistrate that one quarter of the property in dispute belongs to the judge as a reward for his trouble."

⁵¹ Select Committee Proceedings, Aug 1st 16, 1769.

⁵² *Seir Mutaqherin*, Vol. III, pp. 27-28.

⁵³ (a) Select Committee Proceedings, August 10, 1769.

(b) Seventh Report, 1773, p. 324.

village to answer any complaint and wait the tedious process of the Court, he was liable to be ruined by the expenses of the journey and the prolonged stay near the Adalat and the neglect of his normal occupation during his absence. The consequence would certainly be more oppressive than an arbitrary decision could be, if passed against him, without any legal process whatsoever. "Much these poor wretches will bear," remarked Becher, "rather than quit their habitations to come here to complain."⁵⁴ On the other hand, the principal delinquents could seldom be brought under the authority of these Courts. If at all they submitted to them, it was only to defeat the ends of justice by means of their influence with the Government officers.⁵⁵

The majority of the inhabitants, the non-Muslims, were excluded from all share in the public administration of justice which was jealously guarded by the Muslim Government.⁵⁶

2. LAW

Since the occupation of the country by the Muslims, the Quranic Law had been the "standard of judicial determination" in both Civil and Criminal Courts. No deviation from the Quranic law was allowed except in cases where it afforded no rule of decision. In that case, the ancient customs and usages, if applicable, were resorted to.⁵⁷ But if the Hindus without repairing to regular Courts obtained an adjustment of their difference among themselves in accordance with their own particular laws and customs, it was not the "business of the Magistrate to interfere."⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Select Committee Proceedings, July 8, 1769.

⁵⁵ Seventh Report, 1773, p. 324.

⁵⁶ In remonstrance against the English Government's directions that all matters regarding inheritance and particular customs and laws of the Hindus should be decided by "the established Magistrates" assisted by the Brahmins and heads of castes according to the Hindu Law, this being in their opinion, "the invariable practice of all the Mahomedan Governments of Indostan," it was sharply pointed out by Reza Khan that none of the Muslim Emperors had ever appointed a Brahmin to assist a magistrate.

"To order a magistrate of the faith," added he, "to decide in conjunction with a Brahmin would be repugnant to the rules of the faith and in a country under the dominion of a Mussulman Emperor, it is improper that any order should be issued inconsistent with the rules of his faith, that innovations should be introduced in the administration of justice." Moreover, if the Brahmins were admitted to the judicial service, the decision of disputes would, in his opinion, be delayed by continual contentions between the Judges, owing to the difference of their laws and customs. (Proceedings of the Controlling Council of Revenue at Murshidabad, 20 April, 4 May, 1772)

⁵⁷ "The rules," observes the Seventh Report (p. 324), "derived from these sources were in general very loose and uncertain; and the necessary consequences of so imperfect a system of law, rendered the exercise of criminal and civil judicature in Bengal, in a great measure discretionary."

⁵⁸ Proceedings of the Controlling Council of Revenue at Murshidabad, 4 May, 1772.

In the words of Grady, "In matters of property, ... and in all other temporal concerns (but more especially in the criminal jurisdiction) the Mussulman Law gave the rule of decision, excepting where both parties were Hindus, in which case the point was referred to the judgment of the Pandits or Hindu lawyers."

See *The Hedges*, p. xiv.

According to Islamic Law, crimes are of three classes : offences against (1) God, (2) the State and (3) private individuals. Punishments for crimes may be classified under three heads, namely (1) Hudd, (2) Qisas with its appendage Diyat and (3) Tazir and Siasat.⁵⁹

Hudd (plural : Hudud) or prescribed penalty means a punishment specified by the Quranic Law. It is considered as the right of God, which no man can alter. Its original purpose is to deter people from commission of certain offences. These offences are highway robbery, theft, drinking wine, adultery or fornication, apostasy, slander of adultery and robbery with murder.

Qisas or retaliation is due as a right of man. This is the personal right of the victim or his next of kin to determine the form of punishment in the cases of certain heinous offences against the person, including homicide, maiming and wounding. The judge is bound to inflict the legal punishment if the injured party so desires. Diyat (Arabic Diya) or price of blood is a penalty prescribed for mitigated forms of homicide and wounding. In certain circumstances, the injured party can pardon the offender unconditionally or can be satisfied with the compensation or price of blood paid by the latter. In that case, the judge of the Canon law and even the executive head of the State cannot take any other action. Curiously enough manslaughter is not a violation of God's Law or King's peace, but only an injury to the victim's family.⁶⁰

The extreme rigour of the law of evidence and many scrupulous distinctions frequently bar the conviction of an offender deserving Hudd or Qisas. The Mahomedan Law meets this difficulty by vesting in the Sovereign or his delegate the power of sentencing criminals to Tazir and Siasat or discretionary correction and punishment.

Tazir in its primitive sense means prohibition or restriction. It is legally defined to be a punishment (Akubat) not prescribed by any fixed rules of law, but left to the discretion of the judge for the ends of public as well as private justice. It is incurred by any offence, in words or deed, not subject to a specific legal penalty. Though allowed as a private right also, it cannot be inflicted without a judicial sentence. Tazir includes admonition, public exposure (Tashhir), temporary sequestration of property, scourging, imprisonment and

⁵⁹ (a) *The Hedaya*, pp. 177-205.

b) *Harlington's Analyse*, Vol. I, pp 228-320.

⁶⁰ The amount of Diyat varies with the gravity of the circumstances attending the crime. The indemnity for the murder of a man was fixed by the Sunna at a hundred camels or something equivalent. "The Diya for a crime committed against a woman is half that given for a man, the diya of a Jew or Christian is one-third that of a Muslim."

(Gandefroy-Demombynes, *Muslim Intitution*, p. 151).

even capital punishment. Tashbir was widely applied. The culprit's head is shaved. He is besmeared with lime or dust with his face blackened and then seated on an ass to be paraded round the streets. Siasat literally means protection. This word is used to denote exemplary punishment extending even to death, which may be considered necessary for the protection of the community from the atrocious and incorrigible criminals. Both Tazir and Siasat can be inflicted in all cases where the presumption of guilt is strong.

Of the pernicious practices which sanctioned by the Islamic Law defeated the ends of justice in the judicial system of Bengal, the most remarkable were (a) the privilege granted to the next of kin of the murdered to pardon a murderer unconditionally or to compose the injury by receiving money damages, (b) the barbarous punishments like mutilation or impalement and (c) the infliction of fine, instead of capital punishment, for murder with an instrument not formed for shedding blood.⁶¹

It also frequently happened that the profession of Law was in the hands of men who derived "their knowledge by inheritance" or possessed it "by intuition, without any previous study or application."⁶²

3. POLICE

It has already been noticed that among the officers mentioned by the Committee of Circuit, only two—the Faujdar and Kotwal were responsible for the policing of the capital.

In the organisation of Police, the Faujdar was next in rank to the Nazim. In describing the constitutional powers of the indigenous Faujdari system, Hastings stated that the preservation of peace first and foremost belonged to the Faujdar who was the representative of the Nazim. To him the people looked up for protection. He served as a check even upon the zamindars.⁶³ He held jurisdiction over a large area sometimes comprehending many zamindaris. This area was divided into Thanas or inferior stations which were under the charge of officers called Thanadars. His force consisted of a contingent of armed police and a part of the "land servants" of each zamindar. Its number varied according to the exigency of each place.⁶⁴ The provinces of Bengal and Bihar were

⁶¹ The Mahomedan Law or its dispensation by the existing Courts of judicature was, in the words of Harington, "repugnant to the principles or inadequate to the ends of justice". (*An Analysis*, Vol 1, p. 801).

⁶² Olive's observation in *Long's Selections*, p. xxxi.

⁶³ For Ghulam Hussain's observations, see *Seir Mutaghherin*, pp vol. III. pp 175-177.

⁶⁴ Secret Consultations, 7 Dec. 1775. It was asserted by Hastings that the constitutional powers of the general Police of Bengal were exactly as he had described them.

divided into ten and eight Faujdari districts respectively. In each of these districts a Faujdar was stationed at the head of a body of 500 to 1500 sepoys and a proportional number of the staff. The Faujdari districts of Bengal were Islamabad (Chittagong), Sylhet, Rangpur, Rangamati, Jalalgarh-Purnea, Rajmahal-Akbarnagar, Rajshahi, Burdwan, Midnapore and Hugli. Jahangirnagar—Dacca had a Naib Nazim of its own, with a suitable number of officers. The eight districts of Bihar were Shahabad, Rhotas, Monghyr, Behar, Champaran, Sarun, Tirhut and Hajipur.⁶⁵

The Kotwal was the Faujdar's Chief executive assistant in the town. The Ain gives a full account of the police functions of the Kotwal. 'Through his watchfulness and night patrolling, the citizens were expected to enjoy the repose of security. He was to keep register of roads and houses. It was his duty to receive with the aid of intelligent detectives a daily report about those who arrived at or left the city. He was enjoined to forbid anyone from forcible intrusion into another's house and to find out the thieves and the stolen goods and was answerable for the loss. When night was a little advanced, he was required to prohibit people from entering or leaving the city.'⁶⁶ The Committee of Circuit noticed the Kotwal as discharging police functions at night only.⁶⁷

In the rural areas, there was another powerful functionary for law and order under the Mughal system of Police, which was built on the basic principle of local responsibility. Every zamindar was responsible to the Government for the security of person and property within the extent of his zamindari. This was an essential condition of his tenure. To quote a Sanad, he was bound to "exert his utmost endeavours that no trace of thieves, robbers and disorderly persons may remain within his boundaries; ... take special care of the high roads, so that travellers and passengers may pass and repass in perfect confidence and, if at any time the property of any person shall be stolen or plundered, that he produce the thieves and robbers together with the property; and delivering the latter to the owner, consign the

"Another business of the Fudjdar, "says the author of *Seir-Mutaqherin*, was to give chase to banditti and highwaymen, ... he was to hunt them down wherever he could discover any of their footsteps and to put them to the sword as soon as he had seen them. In short, wherever he could perceive a malefactor, he was to pursue him incessantly, until he had torne up by the roots the hairs of his existence and power." (*Seir Mutaqherin* Vol. III, p. 177). Also see *Ain-i-Akbari*, Vol. II, p. 40.

⁶⁵ *Seir Mutaqherin*, Vol. III, pp. 178-179.

⁶⁶ Jarrett, *Ain-i-Akbari*, Vol. II, pp. 41-42.

The Ain gives an elaborate description of his municipal duties also. It has been suggested by P. Saran that Kotwal combined nearly all the functions of the Muhtasibs of Western Asia with those of the Sthanika of the Hindu period. (*Provincial Government of the Mughals*, p. 397)

⁶⁷ Progs, Committee of Circuit, Kasimbazar, 15 Aug. 1772.

former to punishment; that in case he do not produce them, he himself become responsible for the property".⁶⁸

Thus the zamindar was responsible for the prevention of theft and robbery, apprehension of criminals and restoration of stolen property. In case he failed to restore the stolen effects, he was himself to make good the loss.⁶⁹

In the exercise of his police functions, the zamindar acted only as the subordinate instrument of a larger system. His duty was to give constant intelligence to the Nawab through the Rai Rayan and to assist the Faujdar with all his resources in the apprehension of robbers and in executing the orders given by the Faujdar for maintaining law and order. His "land-servants" were distributed throughout his zamindari. A part of them was always employed to assist the Faujdar. The rest enabled the zamindar not only to make collections, but also to guard the villages.⁷⁰

The zamindari servants, employed wholly or in part, on police duties may be divided into four categories as follows :—⁷¹

- (1) the village staff including the village watchmen,
- (2) the frontier Police of a military character,
- (3) the regular Police force for internal disorders,
- (4) the personal guards.

The village staff consisted of officers of different grades. The double character of the zamindar as the Collector of revenue and Police Magistrate applied to them also. Their main business was the collection of rents. The police duties were subsidiary and generally neglected. They passed under different names in different parts of the country. For example, the village watchmen were variously

⁶⁸ Translation of a Sanad under the seal of the Nawab Serfras Khan, Diwan of Bengal in the 17th year of the reign of the Emperor M^uhumma¹ Shah or 1735-36 A.D.

(Firminger's Introduction to the Fifth Report, 1812, p. xlvii.)

⁶⁹ In a memorial in December 1771, Reza Khan remarked that "throughout Hindcetan, in Bengal as well as in every other province, in case of theft, robbery or murder, the Zemindar in whose territory it is committed, is bound to surrender or produce the murderer with the effects—where the Zemindar possesses the sole power, he alone is responsible and where the authority is jointly vested in the Zemindar and the aumil, they are both answerable. If they could not produce them, they were made to account for them. If they on the other hand did produce them, they were held free and clear. If the robbers were not under their jurisdiction, he from whose jurisdiction they came was called upon."

(Proceedings of the Controlling Council of Revenue at Murshidabad, 30 Dec. 1771, Vol. VIII, pp. 102-3).

For instance in November, 1764 the English Governor requested the Nawab to compel the zamindar of Sitaram to restore the plundered effects of an English Gentleman, Mr. Rose, who was murdered near Bakarganj by some boat people who took shelter in his zamindari.

(Long—*Selections*, pp. 368-69, no. 775).

⁷⁰ Secret Consultations, 18 Oct. 7 Dec. 1775; 29 May 1776.

⁷¹ McNeille's "*Report on the Village Watch of the Lower Provinces of Bengal*" pp. 8-9. This Report contains valuable information on the subject of village police of Bengal.

known as Pasbans, Kotals, Goraites, Barahils, Paiks, Nigahbans and so on.⁷² In Bengal, as in most parts of India, village communities were held in ancient times responsible for offences committed within their limits. The village Police started as an organ of the village community and the watchman was, therefore, originally responsible to and maintained by the village community to which he belonged. He was generally supported by an assignment of land, composed of small parcels and made over to him free of rent. In the organisation of the Mughal Police it was the zamindar who was held responsible for crimes within his jurisdiction and the village watchmen also merged in the zamindari establishment.

Besides this standard establishment, zamindars of the frontier districts of West Bengal had at their disposal large bands of servants of a military character, mainly for purposes of aggression and defence and only incidentally for the suppression of internal disturbances. These were the Ghatwals of Ramghur, Birbhum and the Jungle mahals, the Sowars and Paiks (horse and foot) of Midnapore and Cuttack and the Nugdees of Burdwan.

The zamindars of Nadia, Burdwan, Birbhum and Murshidabad maintained also a regular Police force, known as the Thandari Police. Lastly, there were the Barkandazes kept up by zamindars as personal guards.

It was on the harmonious working of the two organs of law and order—Faujdars and zamindars—that the solidarity of the police system of the Nawabs rested. In times of stable Government the Nawabs of Bengal had often effectively controlled the police functions of zamindars by means of Faujdars and punished the delinquents. As the hold of the Nawabs upon the country became relaxed, the power of the Faujdars naturally deteriorated and it came to be well nigh impossible to co-ordinate the functions of the Faujdars and zamindars. Zamindars of this period appear to have performed their police functions most indifferently. By collusion with those very dacoits and other criminals whom it was their special duty to apprehend, the powerful zamindars exploited the helplessness of the Nizamat and

⁷² It was generally supposed that the village watch in Bengal was an immemorial institution—a remnant of the ancient village system. Mc Neile's researches showed that in the western divisions of Bengal—in Burdwan, Cuttack, Bhagalpur, Patna and a part of Murshidabad, the ancient village system was not entirely swept away, the general assignment of lands to the village watchmen in service tenure being one of its surviving features. But in the rest of Bengal in Chittagong, Dacca, Rajshahi and the remaining portion of Murshidabad, all traces of the village system had disappeared. As regards Nadia and Jessore, McNeile was not very sure. In all these areas the village watch had been instituted by the British Government in the 19th Century.

(McNeile's Report, pp. 3-5).

the lesser zamindars purchased their safety. Thus, practice was far from theory and the official sanads entrusting the zamindars with police responsibility lost all relation to facts.⁷³

For centuries the peoples in the Junglemahals of West Bengal and Bihar and in the riverine districts of East and South Bengal lived under conditions in which the Mughal Government failed to enforce general obedience to the law. Far from the capital city they frequently repudiated their allegiance to the Government and their Chiefs set up themselves as independent rulers. In particular, the Junglemahals never acknowledged the authority of the Mahomedan Government. Having for years carried their depredations with impunity, the inhabitants thereof used to regard robbery and murder scarcely criminal. The waterways of Bengal always afforded dacoits easy means of escape from the hands of justice. During the rainy season, much of the country was a sheet of water. On land, the criminal could be easily tracked down but amidst the innumerable rivers with their net work of channels and swamps, a dacoit had only to step into a boat with his plunder and vanish at a moment's notice leaving no trace of his movements.

Now with the weakening of the Nizamat, the situation was further worsened. The persistent non co-operation of the zamindars with the official machinery and their alliance with notorious criminals paralysed the Police organisation of Bengal and encouraged the lawless elements of the State. The Maghs raiding the coastal districts of Chittagong and Noakhali, boats full of kidnapped girls and boys sailing towards the slave markets of Sandwip and Chittagong, the turbulent Chiefs of Junglemahals and their tenants ever in arms, and professional dacoits going about all over the country in large organised gangs—this was Bengal when Najm-ud-daulah became the Nazim and the East India Company the Diwan.

⁷³ Hastings also admitted that the custom by which the zamindars were compellable to make restitution for stolen goods had become obsolete.

(Secret Consultations, 7 December, 1775).

THE HUMAN FACTORS IN INDUSTRY

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INTRODUCTION

There was a time when ordinary workers in an industry were not recognised as human beings. They were treated as breathing machine parts. But, to-day the mechanical outlook is considerably changed. It is now believed that the productivity of a man is determined very largely by the way he feels about his job and the other employees with whom he works and by his attitude toward the company that employs him. If these facts about men are ignored or remain unnoticed in any plant, inducement of any mechanical improvement will fail to further its future progress. Consequently, in the more recent years considerable attention has been given to such factors as the motivation, feelings, sentiments and satisfaction of people. "This newer approach seeks to understand why people in organised work groups act the way they do under stated conditions and to use this understanding in securing better collaboration throughout the organisation."

THE CASE IN INDIA

Most of the western countries are now prone to recognise human factors in industry. In India, at the present time, the industrialists are becoming conscious of them. Even the government is taking steps to eradicate the difficulties and grievances of the workers as far as possible. But the problem is that neither the industrialists nor the government feel any need of studying the human factors in industry systematically to diagnose the real causes of their difficulties and grievances. On the contrary, they try to postulate the reasons and thus they ultimately help themselves to nip most of their sincere attempts of promoting industrial welfare in the bud.

In spite of the inability of the present government to apprehend the need of conducting studies on human factors in industry, a few such studies have already been done by some distinguished Psychologists of India. Pioneer in this field are two notable psychologists, Prof. S. K. Bose of Indian Institute of Science at Bangalore and Dr. H. C. Ganguli of Indian Institute of Technology at Khargpur.

Both of them conducted some valuable studies on the problems of human factors in industry. Recently the department of applied psychology of Calcutta University, has undertaken a study on Industrial tensions under the guidance of Prof. S. C. Mitra. Apart from these studies a study on the "Supervisory Roles in a Government Factory" is being conducted at Indian Institute of Technology. The present author is connected with this study. All these studies reveal and will reveal valuable information regarding the exact nature of human factors in Indian industries.

THE CONCEPT OF INDUSTRIAL GROUPS

Studies on human factors in industry show that in industrial society the individual as a rule belongs to a multiplicity of groups. One of these is the union to which he belongs; another is the body of workers with whom he works. Both these groups exert considerable influence on him and stand as the important factors in the determination of industrial relations. Moreover they play a big role in maintaining the morale of the people comprising them. In order to appreciate their precise significance we must first of all understand some of the phenomena characteristics of social groups.

A social group is not a mere aggregate of individuals. When an individual is a member of a social group his impulses feelings, and behaviour may be modified in various ways and degrees, dependent on the nature of the group in question. He becomes part of a larger whole which possesses a certain degree of unity and in consequence he thinks, feels and acts in a way different from that in which he would feel and act in isolation. Thus it is obvious that integrity of social group is an essential factor in maintaining industrial tranquility.

An industrial social group may be called a 'community' type of group. It is characterised on the one hand by the complexity of the aims and purposes that bind its members together, on the other hand by the wide range and scope of its activities. Certain factors are, however, necessary to make such a group integrant. Firstly, some continuity of existence of the group, both formal and material is needed. Material continuity is the more important. "That is to say, the labour turnover must be relatively small, the great body of the members of the group remaining unchanged from month to month and from year to year.." Secondly, there must be definite group self-consciousness. The individual workers must be conscious of

themselves as members of the group and have a pride in the group as such. The third and most important factor is the right type of group organisation which depends mostly on the inclusion of the persons who are more or less identical in their nature, habit, custom and tradition.

According to Sherif, social behaviour springs largely from the way in which the individual perceives the world. In fact, the society moulds the individual into membership in the group and insists upon his learning to see the world in one way rather than in another. Same is the case with industrial society. Frames of reference and habits of group perception of the members of an industrial group determine its adequate nature. Thus we observe that, analysis of individual perception is necessary to gain familiarity with any such group either within or without the plant.

SOME FACTORS RELATED TO GROUP PRODUCTIVITY

Reliable studies show that the dominant reason for a group's productivity depends on the extent to which the members can get along together—their "Compatibility". The more energy a group expends on the interpersonal problems arising from lack of compatibility the less energy they devote to the task at hand.

But what makes people compatible? "People will be compatible if they agree on the bases for making interpersonal behaviour decisions." The bases are, of two kinds: (1) the relations existing between the individuals involved in making the decisions and (2) the love relations or personal closeness and liking, existing between the persons involved in making the decision. If the workers working together have in general the same attitude toward the relative importance of these two bases, they should be able to work satisfactorily. If they sharply diverge on the relative importance of these bases, they will have great difficulty working together. These differing orientations will be manifested most acutely when there is pressure and when co-operation is required.

Next we should discuss two other important factors,—personalness and dependence, related to group productivity. An individual, whose orientation is primarily personal tends to emphasise close personal relations. He likes to know people well, to discuss personal affairs, to form strong likes. He wants to be like by other person and much of his behaviour is oriented toward that end. A counter personal individual avoids close personal relation and personal contacts. He tends to treat everyone alike.

An individual who emphasises the dependence dimension expresses it behaviourally in two ways : (1) either he strongly abides by the laws and regulations and follows very closely the expectancies of authority figures by complying with any request of the leaders, (2) or he rebels against any authority figure and rule, by being militantly independent. It has been found that those individual whose orientation is primarily personal tend to like each other more than they like non-personal people. Moreover, two people who are personal prefer to work with each other rather than with non-personal people. If, however, in a group the members are of mixed type, they will evidently show minimum effort to maintain the "group-spirit" properly, This will ultimately cause diminution of efficiency and productivity of the group in question.

GENESIS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN MANAGEMENT & UNION

It has been observed by Dr. H. C. Ganguli, that the membership of a union increases a sense of grievance in the workers and augments his dissatisfaction with his wages and conditions of service. This sense of grievance develops the attitude of restricting normal output. Such an attitude goes against management's deep concern with production.

The industrial warfare is an outcome of a conflict between the two rights. It grows out of the conflict of interests between union and management. Bakke believes that management and union each want something which the other can not give and "still survive in the way they think they have to survive." Management is chiefly production-oriented. It regards worker's interests and his attitude and satisfactions as irrelevant or secondary. But the union is preoccupied with some things which the management thinks to be irrelevant. Because its members and officials are all workers. Consequently, the conflict grows out of these differing orientations and is further sharpened by personal dislikes and annoyances that usually exist between management union leaders.

In order to minimise these conflicts, a sound knowledge of the conflicting motives of individuals and groups is essential. Moreover we are to investigate the "Managerial philosophies and company goals on the one hand and labour philosophies and union goals on the other hand and the discrepancies between these". Such an investigation may afford us an opportunity to develop a "a psychological atmosphere following a change in the attitude of the parties involved" and finally to establish effective co-operation between union and management.

CONCLUSION :

In conclusion we must emphasise that good human relation is desirable everywhere, whether in industry or in business, in the home or in the shop. As a matter of fact, human factors overshadow technical achievements. The application of the knowledge of human behaviour to the understanding of individuals and groups will serve to reduce many of the tragic conflicts in modern industry. It is a fact that, the great advances in employee-morale and production of the future will come through better understanding of the human side.

NYAYA-MANJARĪ

VOL. II (24)

JANAKIVALLABHA BHATTACHARYYA, M.A., PH.D.—*Sankhyatirtha*

THE MEANINGS OF WORDS CONDITION THE MEANING OF A SENTENCE

Thus the hypothesis of a *sphoṭa* being refuted the hypothesis that letters convey the meaning of a sentence comes to the forefront. Some critics take an exception to it. They say, "Let letters convey the meaning of a word. But they are incapable of conveying the meaning of a sentence." Now, an objection arises in our mind. It is this "How is the meaning of a sentence conveyed? In order to meet this objection they suggest that the meanings of words which constitute a sentence help to convey the meaning of the said sentence. They explain the *raison d'être* of their hypothesis thus. Letters exhaust all their powers when they convey the meaning of a word constituted by them. No power is left to them to convey the meaning of a sentence. But the power of word-meanings remains unexhausted to communicate the meaning of a sentence. Hence, they convey the sense of a sentence. The potential energy of letters is assumed by us by means of implications. As we cannot otherwise explain the communication of the meanings of words so we assume that letters have potential energy to convey the meanings of words. But the communication of the meaning of a sentence does not necessarily require letters as its condition. Hence we should not assume the hypothesis that letters have potential energy to convey the meaning of a sentence.

Another point of criticism flashes in our mind in this context. Do letters bring about one and the same impression in order to convey the meaning of a word and that of a sentence? Or, do they produce the two different sets of impressions in order to perform the above two effects? A verse which contains the above point runs thus:—How can one and the same impression bring about two diverse effects? It is well understood that letters produce no new impression other than the old one.

As we can explain the communication of the meaning of a sentence in a different manner so there is no justification for the assumption that one and the same letter produces the different types of

impressions. In the case of words when the last letter is perceived by us it is not very difficult for us to recollect its antecedent letters in their proper order since they have not passed away long ago. But in the case of a sentence, as some of the antecedent letters ceased to exist long before so it is very difficult to remember them in their due order. Hence, it is impossible and unprecedented to hold that such letters are recalled in memory and combined to form a sentence. Moreover, though words which compose a sentence are uttered at intervals yet they are seen to convey the sense of the said sentence. In this case there is no trace of the recollection of the antecedent letters. For this reason, letters do not contribute towards the communication of the meaning of a sentence. Another point may be added to the criticism in question. If letters are to convey both the meanings of words and sentences then do they do it simultaneously or successively? Now, if these letters are uttered only once then it will be unreasonable to hold that they simultaneously discharge both functions since they are incapable of doing them (functions). If it is held that they successively convey the above two meanings then it will be unreasonable to hold that they convey the meaning of a sentence at first since the meaning of a sentence is never observed to be conveyed if the meanings of its constituent words are not known.

Now, the upholders of the above hypothesis may contend that letters convey the meanings of words at first and then convey the meaning of a sentence. But it is a matter of great regret that letters unnecessarily redouble their efforts to convey the meaning of a sentence since the meaning of a sentence is communicated as soon as the meanings of its constituent words are conveyed. Words fully exhaust their capacities in order to convey their meanings. Therefore, it is established that the meanings of words communicate the meaning of a sentence.

Moreover, it is learnt by the joint method of agreement and difference that the meanings of words precede the meaning of a sentence. A person who inattentively listens to words and fails to grasp their meanings does never comprehend the meaning of a sentence. But though a person does not listen towards yet he is acquainted with the meaning of a sentence provided that he is in a position to know the meanings of words through some other sources of knowledge.

One who sees the white colour of an object and hears sounds of neighing and trots knows that a white horse is running. But if a

person is not acquainted with the meanings of words then he is never observed to comprehend the meaning of a sentence.

The above view has been presented by Kumarila in *Sloka-vārttika* (Chapter on a sentence verse No. 358). He intends to convey that a person beholds from a long distance the white colour of an object. He fails to identify it.

Then he hears its neighing. He infers from the sound that it is a horse. He also hears the sound of its trots. He also infers its motion. The said white colour is an attribute. Horseness is a universal. The said motion is an action. They cannot float in the air. They require a locus *i.e.* a substance to stand upon. The co-ordination of an attribute, a universal and motion is possible since they are capable of being mutually related. Their mutual relation is well-indicated by the sentence, "A white horse is running". Words which constitute the above sentence are not presented to his consciousness. But the meanings of such words have been gathered by sources of knowledge other than auditory perception. The knowledge of the meanings of words contributes towards that of the meaning of a sentence. But the meaning of a sentence is never grasped without comprehending the meanings of words.

The knowledge of the meaning of a sentence invariably presupposes that of the meanings of words but does not necessarily presuppose that of words. Therefore, the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence cannot be effectuated by that of words.

The critics raise another objection against the above hypothesis. The awareness of the meaning of a single word fails to condition the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. Moreover, the totality of the awarenesses of all words which constitute a sentence does not invariably precede the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. In some cases, such conditions assemble. Therefore, the relation between the said condition and the conditioned is not universal. The antecedence of the said condition is accidental and hence peculiar. Its uncommonness *i.e.*, non-universality is a defect which prevents the awareness of the totality of meanings of all constituent words from being the condition of the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence.

Such an objection is not sound. The first part of the said objection is pointless since the upholders of the above hypothesis do not contribute to the hypothesis that the consciousness of the meaning of any single constituent word conditions the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. On the other hand, they take share in this

view, i.e., they deny the causality of such a condition. Though the condition *viz.*, the totality of the awarenesses of all meanings of constituent words is uncommon, i.e., non-universal yet the causal relation which has been pointed out to be defective is not really so. The reason behind this defence is this that the meanings of words do not require the help of the knowledge of universal concomitance to indicate the meaning of a sentence. Hence, the said defect of uncommonness which invalidates a mark takes no effect on it. The knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is not an inference. The canons which govern sound processes of reasoning do not apply to it. Though the meanings of all constituent words are not armed with the knowledge of universal concomitance yet they become combined with one another, taking into consideration mutual requirement, proximity and material non-contradiction (*yogyatā*). The mutual combination of the meanings of all words constitutes the meaning of a sentence. The meaning of a word, being related to those of other words, is equivalent to the meaning of a sentence. Thus, as the meaning of a sentence is conveyed through the agency of the meanings of constituent words so the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is not a piece of verbal knowledge. Such a conclusion may be anticipated but does not turn out to be true. Words play an important part in bringing about such knowledge at the out-set. Hence, the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is verbal. Words communicate their meanings. The consciousness of such meanings is followed by the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. Therefore, the conclusion that the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is verbal is free from all defects. Śābara has also said to this effect. He holds that words complete this task by communicating their meanings. As soon as the meanings of words are presented to consciousness, they generate the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence.

THE REFUTATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS THAT MEANINGS OF WORDS COMMUNICATED THE MEANING OF A SENTENCE

Let us now examine the hypothesis proposed in the precedent section. Meanings of words do not convey the meaning of a sentence. But a sentence conveys its own meaning. The reason behind the above remark is as follows. It is well-known that this is the meaning of a sentence. Nobody says that this is the meaning of meanings of words. It is imagined that a word is a collection of letters, such a word which is no better than the collection of letters conveys its

meaning. Similarly, a sentence which is an imaginary collection of words will also communicate its meaning.

Now, the upholders of the hypothesis under criticism may contend that there is no such sentence as is a collection of words and is distinct from the so-called constituent words. These words themselves are equivalent to a sentence. And they satisfy an obligation when they communicate their own meaning. It has been stated before that they exhaust all their power by fulfilling the above duty, and become absolutely impotent to convey the meaning of a sentence. This argument does not stand to reason since the meanings of words have also completed their task and have nothing to do. How do they fulfil an obligation? They have completed their task by producing their own knowledge.

Now, the upholders of the hypothesis in question may contend thus:—"Words have fulfilled their obligation as they completely convey their own meaning. It has been stated that they convey the meaning of a sentence over and above their normal duty. To convey the meaning of a word is one thing and to convey the meaning of a sentence is another thing. How can a word discharge twofold duties which are distinct by their nature? But our hypothesis does not suffer from this defect since the meaning of a word, having produced its own consciousness, does not engage itself in discharging some other duty. Hence, the meanings of words should convey the meaning of a sentence." The critics point out that the above contention is not logically tenable. The reason behind their criticism is as follows. The last word of a sentence has not fulfilled its mission as it has not done some other task. The last word of a sentence, being benefited by the recollection of its antecedent words, is called a sentence. Some say that the meaning of the last word, being mutually related to those of its antecedent words, is known as the meaning of a sentence. Hence, the meaning of a sentence is conveyed only by a sentence.

Now, the contenders have taken an exception to the above suggestion. They put a few questions to the critics. Let us discuss some of them. Do words discharge double duties, viz., the communication of its own meaning and that of the meaning of a sentence on the strength of recollection which is due to a single impression? Or, do they do these two duties by means of different impressions? Let us clarify the purport of the questions. The knowledge of the meaning of each word produces an impression. One type of impressions is represented by it. Another type of impression is produced by such knowledge as refers to the aggregate of all words, constituting

a sentence. The well-known accepted principle is this that the diversity of effects points to the heterogeneity of their causes. In order to explain a particular effect a transcendental impression is assumed. If effects are different in their nature then many diverse transcendental impressions will be assumed in order to explain them. [Thus we see that the above questions are not hard nuts to crack. No gratuitous assumptions are made. The assumption of the two types of impressions is necessary. Such an assumption offers an answer to the above questions].

The defenders of the hypothesis in question have also stated that it is impossible to recollect letters, passed away long ago. Such a statement is not logically sound. We may somehow imagine that as letters are contents of the knowledge of a word so words may be contents of the knowledge of a sentence. We shall immediately discuss this supposition.

Let us now turn our attention to another problem *viz.* "Do letters convey the meaning of a word and that of a sentence simultaneously or successively? We answer this problem thus. Letters discharge their duty in this order. They convey the meaning of a word at first. Afterwards they convey the meaning of a sentence. Now, the upholders of the hypothesis under discussion may contend that the solution, offered by the critics, amounts to this that the meanings of words point to the meaning of a sentence. The above remark of the defenders in question is not logically tenable. The meaning of a word is an object of knowledge. It cannot be included in the source of knowledge. Moreover, the difference of the meaning of a word from that of a sentence is not absolute. Hence, the relation between an indicator and the indicated, which holds between smoke, accompanied by the relation of universal concomitance, and fire and between a lamp, unaccompanied by the relation of universal concomitance and the colour, does not obtain between the meaning of a word and that of a sentence. If the defenders of the above hypothesis look their body through then they will realise that a body cannot be both the illuminator and the illumined. Hence, their verbal statement that the meanings of words point to the meaning of a sentence is empty but not founded upon the rock of solid facts. If they contend that nature divides them into such two halves than they behave like the disciples of the Buddhists who hold that one and the same phenomenon by its very intrinsic nature plays the part of a mark and the object marked.

Now, the defenders of the hypothesis in question may contend thus Words denotes universals. A sentence points to a particular. There is a great gulf fixed between a particular and a universal. As a universal is not cognised without the medium of a particular so a universal points to a particular. Hence, a universal plays the part of an illuminator and a particular is illumined by it. As there is a real difference between an illuminator and the illumined so a universal differs from a particular. The implication of the above contention is this that their suggestion is logically sound and they do not follow the foot-steps of the Buddhists in order to defend the above hypothesis.

Let us examine the above solution. We all accept the conclusion that there is a real difference between the meaning of a word and that of a sentence. But we also submit the following by way of criticism in this connection. If words which constitute a sentence cease to function then no meaning is conveyed by them. Just as the eyes do not reveal an object when they cease to function. Hence, the suggestion of the defenders, "As smoke and such other objects which are knowable objects point to fire and other objects so the meanings of words which are knowable objects point to the meaning of a sentence" does not hold good. Words, conveying their own meaning, are capable of communicating the meaning of a sentence. Why do you not follow the text of your own school. Kumārila has said to this effect.

When words function to communicate the meaning of a sentence as their main task they also convey their own sense which invariably precedes the final meaning just as a bundle of faggots emits flame in order to boil some articles of food. The sense of this statement is that words, having communicated their own meaning, convey the sense of a sentence.

The secondary operation of a cause does not interfere with its main operation. Words have two kinds of power to convey their meaning *viz.*, (1) the power to convey the primary (etymological) meaning and (2) the power to express the inner meaning. Words exhaust their first type of power to communicate their own meaning. The second type of power is fully applied to express the meaning of a sentence.

Though words have fulfilled their mission, to some extent, communicating their own meaning yet they have not as yet completed their main task for which they have assembled. Thus, the knowledge of the sense of a sentence will not fall outside the scope of verbal knowledge. If words do not operate at all in order to convey the meaning of a sentence then the knowledge of such meaning does not

surely come under the jurisdiction of verbal knowledge. If it is admitted that the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is verbal because of its causal connection with the knowledge of words then one should also hold that it is also a piece of auditory sense-perception since it is indirectly connected with the auditory sense-organ. Let us now examine the critical remark of the defenders of the hypothesis under discussion. If they hold that the meaning of a sentence is communicated when words have completely ceased to operate then we fail to understand which kind of proof will effectuate the knowledge the meaning of a sentence. The knowledge of the meaning of words is not perceptual since the meaning of a sentence is supersensuous.

The knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is not inferential since the propounders of the said hypothesis themselves have said that it is not an inference and elaborately refuted the affirmative view. Again, this knowledge is not verbal since words have completely ceased to operate. Universals are not known without particulars. Hence, a universal points to a particular. The drift of this line of argument is that the meaning of a sentence is known through presumption. Do the upholders of the said hypothesis say it in the affirmative? If they say so then the very meaning looks like duty which is revealed only through presumption. Such a conclusion is neither sound nor acceptable to you. Thus, the meaning of a word turns out to be the seventh source of true knowledge. Such a conclusion is not acceptable to you. Therefore the meanings of words do not condition the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence.

The defenders of the said thesis have stated that the joint method of agreement and difference reveals that the meanings of words are the source of the meaning of a sentence. Something may be said on this point. The meaning of a sentence is not an independent reality. It is nothing but the meanings of words in their relational character. The meaning of a sentence is possible only when the meanings of words constitute it. There is no doubt about it. But the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence cannot be causally traced to the meanings of words. Words communicate the meaning of a sentence since words have not ceased to operate. When a man remains inattentive he does not listen to words since he, being attentive, says shortly after. "I have not heard your words as my mind was otherwise engaged. Please repeat them." If words had not conveyed sense then he would have made out the meaning of words, having recollected the words but would not have

made a request to repeat them for his hearing. Therefore, the knowledge of the meanings of words lies at the root of that of the meaning of a sentence. But the meanings of words do not convey that of a sentence.

The defenders of the said thesis have said "One, seeing the white colour and hearing the neighing sound, comes to know that a white horse is running." They have made an observation in this connection that the said judgment is derived from the meaning of words but not from words. Such a conclusion is not convincing. Do we not see a white cow move? Does no sentence convey the sense that a white cow moves. When we perceive her to move the resulting judgment that a white cow moves is a percept. The judgment in question is not the meaning of the sentence that a white cow moves. The judgment that a white horse is running is deductive in its character just like the syllogism that there is fire on the hill. If a judgment flashes in our mind but a sentence is not heard before then we cannot say that the said judgment is the meaning of a sentence.

There is no need of prolonging this discussion.

THE CONCLUDING PORTION OF THE ABOVE TOPIC IS THAT A SENTENCE CONVEYS ITS OWN MEANING

By means of an imaginative synthesis letters are combined into words and a sentence. Thus letters, having assumed the forms of words and a sentence, convey the meaning of words and a sentence. Therefore, the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is not produced by the meaning of words. Such knowledge owes its existence to a sentence which has not ceased to operate.

How do letters constitute a word and a sentence?

What is the hypothesis according to which letters constitute a word and a sentence by an imaginative synthesis and convey their sense? Jayanta refers to it in order to solve the problem thus :—

The ancient teachers of the Nyaya school have framed the following hypothesis. At the out-set the initial letter is presented to our consciousness. When this consciousness passes away an impression which is produced by it survives. Then the second letter is grasped. The awareness of the second letter coupled with the impression of the first letter produces a more effective second impression. Afterwards the third letter flashes on the mind. The awareness of the third letter accompanied by the two previous impressions produces a more powerful impression of the third letter. As

long as the last component letter of a word is not cognised, the inner process of framing impression will go on in this way. When the last letter is apprehended a strong impression is generated. An act of recollection recalls all antecedent letters in memory. The apprehension of the last letter passes away at the third moment of duration of the said recollection. Hence, the apprehension of the last letter is on the point of destruction at the second moment of duration of the said remembrance. The last letter which is an object of apprehension is on the verge of destruction and the group of letters which are recalled in memory constitute a word. Then the knowledge of the initial word produces an impression. Afterwards in accordance with the procedure of letters the knowledge of the second word arises in the mind. The knowledge of the second word coupled with the impression of the first word produces a very strong impression of the second word. Then, according to the order of apprehension, impression and recollection, the knowledge of the third word takes place. All the impressions previously born and the knowledge of the third word co-operate to produce a more powerful impression. Thus, the *modus operandi* will continue unless and until the knowledge of the last letter flashes in our mind. The very powerful impression which comes into being immediatly before the knowledge of the last word revives the memory of all antecedent words since the impression which is born immediately before the knowledge of the last word is exceptionally strong. The collection of words which consist of letters and one of which is known and the remaining ones are recalled in memory passes under the name of a sentence.

A sentence, having thus come into being, communicates its own meaning. One must admit that an impression produces another impression and an impression has skill in producing such impression. If one does not subscribe to this hypothesis then in all cases, the repetition of an act will become futile.

THE REFUTATION OF THE ABOVE HYPOTHESIS REGARDING THE CONSTITUTION OF WORDS AND SENTENCES BY LETTERS.

The critics take an exception to the above hypothesis and point out the following defects in it. They hold that the said solution is not satisfactory since if it is admitted then the simultaneity of the two acts of consciousness should be accepted. They, now, substantiate their charge. As antecedent words are recalled in memory just

after the presentation of the last word to our consciousness so the relation of denotation holding between a word and its meaning will also be at that very point of time recalled in memory since the meaning of a word will not be cognised if the relation of denotation is not remembered. Again, if the meaning of constituent words is not grasped then the meaning of a sentence will not flash in our mind. And without the remembrance of the relation of denotation the meaning of a word is not presented to consciousness. When we employ words to convey objects of every day occurrence the listener follows us without being consciously aware of remembering the relation of denotation holding between words and their meanings. Memory also subconsciously or unconsciously helps us when we infer an accustomed object. The inference of such an object is not preceded by the conscious process of recollecting the relation of universal concomitance. But one is compelled to admit that the relation of universal concomitance is somehow remembered. Similarly, we should also assume that the relation of denotation is subconsciously or unconsciously recalled in memory. The reason behind this assumption is this. An inhabitant of the coconut island who is absolutely innocent of the relation of denotation obtaining between a word and its meaning cannot make out the meaning of a word. As the apprehension of the relation of denotation has happened before so the recollection of the said relation renders the useful service. Therefore, the recollection of words antecedent to the last one and that of the relation of denotation simultaneously take place just after the presentation of the last word to consciousness. Thus, the simultaneity of the two acts of consciousness unavoidably occurs.

Now, the defenders of the above hypothesis may contend that the remembrance of the antecedent words follows that of the relation of denotation. Thus, they try to evade the charge of simultaneity. The critics point out a fresh defect in the present solution. If this is their contention then they will admit that at the time of the recollection of the antecedent words the meaning of words flashes in their mind. Thus, the simultaneity of the two acts of consciousness takes place in another form. They cannot say "The meaning of words does not flash in the mind."

The reason is this that if all the conditions of an effect really assemble and the obstructive element is conspicuous by its absence then the appearance of the said effect cannot be prevented. Now, in order to oppose the charge of the simultaneity of the two acts of consciousness the defenders may suggest that the remembrance of all

antecedent words will succeed the knowledge of the meaning of a word. If this is their contention then the sentence in question will surely be bereft of the last word since the auditory perception of the last word has passed away at that time. Let the point in question be clearly stated. When the relation of denotation obtaining between antecedent words and their meanings is recalled in memory the perception of the last word is on the point of destruction. And when the meaning of words is presented to consciousness the said perception of the last word has passed away.

(To be continued)

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY CENTENARY STUDENTS' FESTIVAL

Centenary Festival of one of the oldest universities of modern India, Calcutta University, was observed very pompously. The students organised the festival from the 24th to 31st January, 1957. A century ago on that very date (the 24th January, 1857) this University was born. The Centenary Students' Festival was inaugurated by Prof. Satyen Bose, the Vice-Chancellor of Visva-Bharati University. The function was presided over by Prof. Nirmalkumar Sidhanta, the Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University. 'West Bengal Students' Calcutta University Centenary Celebration Committee,' which was formed on the 16th September, 1956, consists of the representatives from 128 College Students' Unions, gave the total shape of the Festival.

Twenty-four representatives came from abroad. The IUS delegation consisted of three—Mr. Kurt Vogel (East Germany), Mr. M. Smidak (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Yan Scutnický (Poland). COSEC was represented by Mr. Isaac Omelo (Africa). And the rest nineteen students came from Dacca University (East Pakistan) headed by Prof. Mrs. Kulsum Huda. They staged here a drama "Manchitra" (the Map) which describes the story of a village teacher. On behalf of the IUS delegation Mr. Vogel presented an IUS banner to the WBSCUCCC.

SPORTS

Under the guidance of Sports Council different athletic competitions were held on the 23rd. During Festival-week Mr. Monohar Aich (Mr. Universe) and his party & Srimati Labanya Palit and her party showed their physical feats. The athletic competitions included : (men) 5 miles road race, 3,000 m walking race, 5,000 m cycling race, 1,500 m Run and (women) 100 m flat race, shot put, javelin throw, balance race, high jump. Friendly matches were arranged between Students' Sports Council team *vs* Professors' team (cricket), Jadavpur University *vs* Calcutta University (Hockey), Convenors' team *vs* Joint Secretaries team (basket ball).

EXHIBITION.

We are accustomed to visit many sorts of exhibitions in the city. But this one was of some typical character. The total exhibition

could be divided in seven parts—(i) Engineering and Technical, (ii) Arts and Crafts, (iii) Public Health, (iv) Students' Health Home, (v) Veterinary, (vi) Commerce and (vii) Exhibition organised by the Girl-Students. In short, it could be said that this exhibition was a true representation of modern scientific developments (in a miniature form).

CULTURAL PROGRAMME

It is not possible to go through the details of the vast programme. Fourteen dramas were staged, out of which seven were composed by the students and all, the fourteen were directed and produced by students. In vocal music Rabindra sangeet (songs of Tagore), Classical songs, Modern songs, and folk songs were included. There were also arrangements of different Instrumental musics. During these music and dance programmes the reputed participants were either present or ex-students of the University of Calcutta. The main items of the cultural competition organised by the WBSCUCCC included music, debate (in English and Bengali), recitation, short stories, etc. The 27th January was totally observed as Girls' Day where all the items were staged by the girl students.

I may name some of the plays and dances which took place on that decorated platform for eight days. Musical Debate (Kabir Larai), by Medical students, "Espar-ospar" open-air drama (Yatra) by Law students, "Ritu Utsava" (ballet of Tagore) by Visva Vidyalaya Sanskriti Parisad, "Kabaya", "Sargiya Prahasan" and "Rata-rati" dramas by Girl students of Bethune College, City College South, and South Calcutta Girls' College respectively, "Sedin College-e" drama by St. Paul's College, "Nazrul-Geeti-Parikrama" ballet by Basanti Vidya Bithi, "Abol-Tabol" children's fantasy, "Mamar Desh" one-act play by Maitree, etc., were highly applauded by the large audience. The vast pandel of Ballygunge Science, where this Festival was held, used to be engaged by the visitors of seven thousands daily. The best debators of the University were able to please the people through the Exhibition Debates.

Though it is true that there were some drawbacks in the works of the Festival committee yet it is also true that the unity which is achieved by the students of Bengal will be able to wash away these hardles. This solidarity, like a bouquet, will be the champion of FRIENDSHIP and will blossom in the history of student movement.

Reviews and Notices of Books

Studies in the Origins of Buddhism—By Govind Chandra Pande, M.A., D.Phil. University of Allahabad Publication,—Ancient History Research Series No. I (Department of Ancient History, Culture and Archaeology). The Indian Press Private Ltd., Allahabad, 1957, pp. 600. Price not stated.

Dr. Pande has made studies in the origins of Buddhism under three heads,—(I) Early Buddhist Sources (II) The Historical and Cultural Background of Buddhism,—and (III) Early Buddhist Doctrines.

Seven Chapters under part I contain a historical delineation of ancient Buddhism. In these seven chapters the author has made a most rational stratification of the Nikāyas and Āgamas in order to trace a connected link in the historicity of the "canon of the Hinayāna." Under Part II, the author, has concentrated his studies in three chapters; they concern pre-Vedic and Vedic influences before the advent of the Buddha in the field of Indian religion and culture. Chapters VIII and IX obviously contain exhaustive treatment of the Vedic background and religious conditions in the age of Buddha. In Chapter VIII, the author has made a statement that the recent discoveries and findings in the Indus Valley have completely revolutionized the perspective of the foundations of Indian Culture and Religion. These finds have established a fact that in pre-Vedic time in India there was an existence of a well-organised civilization. This fact naturally invalidates the common assumption that all intellectual and metaphysical thought "in India existing before Buddha, must necessarily have had a Vedic origin." In Chapt. IX, it has been attempted to show that numerous clans and different cultural bodies had reciprocal endeavours that merged in the long history of Indian civilization and ultimately culminated in the synthesis of diverse conflicts. The author, therefore, has made in this chapter a review from this standpoint of the evolution of Vedic culture and religion and of the social and intellectual tendencies of the Age of Buddha and Mahāvira. As a supplementary to these two chapters, the author has in Chapt. X, laid down different narratives of Buddha. This has well grounded the author's findings to correlate his life and quest, experience and mission with Buddha's teachings.

Under part III, the *sumum bonum* of Buddhist metaphysical concepts such as the Noble Truths (Ariyasaccas) Law of Causal Genesis (Pratītyasamutpāda) Noble Eight fold path (Aṭṭhaṅgiko Maggo) and Nirvāṇa, the way to Awakening, etc, are treated. The author has tried to simplify the controversies over the "correct" interpretations of such points of Buddhist doctrines by analysing these ideas with reference to their genuine

relationship. The systematic presentation of these elaborations is made in Chapters XI and XII.

Chapt. XIV, treats Early Buddhism in relation to its rivals and forerunners.

As rivals, Jainism, Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Vedic traditions have been compared on the points of agreements and disagreements with Early Buddhism.

Because of a common cultural stock (as has been shown in chapt. VIII & IX) at the back there is hardly any ground to assume that the Jainism and Early Buddhism had any interdependence. The differences between Jainism and Buddhism are partly due to the personality of the Buddha and partly due to Vedic Influence.

With regard to Sāṅkhya,—it has no distinct influence on Early Buddhism. Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, though shows traces of Sāṅkhya influences, the matter remains yet historically a desideratum.

Nothing is known as yet to us as a decided age of Yoga-Sūtra. Though there is close resemblance between the two systems with regard to meditations, in the present state of our knowledge it is futile to assert which one is prior to the other.

With regard to Vedic traditions, it is clear that Buddha was much influenced by the Sramaṇa and Brāhmaṇa thought that fortified his "ideas of Saṃsāra, of the non-selfhood of body and mind, and of the absolute and ineffable nature of the ultimate principles."

With this Vedic influence Buddha could naturally add a step further to the stock of ancient Indian religion and culture by his original and profound contribution of the Law of Causal Genesis (Pratitya Samutpāda). Besides the influence of this Vedic Sramaṇa thought. Early Buddhism was fundamentally influenced by the Upaniṣads which gave to it its early tendencies towards Idealism and Absolutism (pp. 556). The forerunners of Buddhist influence, were many in post Buddha Era; Prominent amongst them are Śaṅkarāchārya and Gauḍapāda. The author thus concluded "it is undeniable that he (Śaṅkara) was deeply influenced by Buddhism. The Buddhist influence probably reached him via Gauḍapāda whose dependence on Buddhism is beyond question" (pp. 555).

In Chapt. XVI, developments in Buddhism in the post-Nikāya period have been pursued, to wit,—the origin of schism in the order (Saṃgha) and as a consequence to which the lines of development on Buddhological speculations that sprang up in the Mahāsaṅghika Schools and later in Mahāyāna; "A natural instinct led to the glorification of the Buddha and webs of mythical fancies were woven around his personality. He was invested with superhuman qualities" (pp. 564); Besides this the author has shown other developments such as Puṅgalavāda among the vajjiputtaka schools, Sarvāstivāda and Dharma theory in the Abhidharma of Sarvāstivāda and Sthaviravāda.

In the Appendix I of the work under review, the author has given a monograph of the early Jaina Sources for the better understanding of the position of Early Buddhism.

Appendix II, is devoted to the same old complex problem dealing on the Home of Pali.

In the Appendix III, the author has dealt in nutshell about the Maitrāyaṇi Upaniṣad with an assertion that the same being pre-Buddhistic had some influence in the origins of Buddhism.

The work under review, as a matter of fact is basically a historical study in the origins of Buddhism. But the author seems at the same time to have not ignored to treat the institutional aspects and religious-philosophic character of Buddhism. Dr. Pande has mainly for this work utilised Indian sources, with occasional citations of Chinese and Tibetan works. Although the errata contains most of the misprints there are seen some omissions in the diacritical and punctuation marks, which of course do not hinder the sense. Dr. Pande has laid the Buddhist scholars under a deep debt of obligation by this comprehensive work. A study in this subject was made piecemeal by earlier scholars like Bu-ston, Dr. Barua, Dr. Rhys Davids, Prof. S. Dutt, Dr. N. Dutt, Dr. B. C. Law and others, but Dr. Pande's "Studies in the Origins of Buddhism" is a thorough and exhaustive work. It has undoubtedly added a step further to our information of Ancient India, laudable and readable.

M. L. ROYCHOWDHURY.

Ourselves

"THE FAMILY OF MAN" : AN UNUSUAL PHOTOGRAPHIC EXHIBITION .

A rare success occurs when a collection of photographs turns out to be a single unified work of real art. "The Family of Man" photographic exhibition, recently presented by USIS at Ranji Stadium, Calcutta, achieved that high goal. It provided a significant aesthetic experience to many of its observers due to its thematic impact as well as the artistic value of the individual photographs.

Created originally for the Museum of Modern Art in New York by its director of photography, Edward Steichen, this exhibition came to India, after visiting 40 U.S. cities, Mexico, South America, Europe and Japan. Acknowledged as the greatest photographer in the world, Steichen took over three years to finalize his selection of 503 photographs from more than two million submitted from all over the world, representing the work of 273 photographers from 68 countries.

With a view to emphasizing the essential oneness of man, "The Family of Man" has been created in "a passionate spirit of devoted love and faith in man." After the symbolic representations of the triune elements of earth's land, sea and air; the trilogy of life, fertility and sustenance; the link between the past and present in the prologue the first section of the exhibition depicts lovers with James Joyce's lines :

"...and then I asked him with my eyes to ask again yes
and then he asked me would I yes...
and first I put my arms around him yes
and drew him down to me so he could feel my breasts all perfume
yes
and his heart was going like mad
and yes I said yes I will yes."

This love blossoms into marriage, pregnancy and childbirth, each providing a separate section of photographs. Then

"The little ones leaped, and shouted and laugh'd
And all the hills echoed..." (William Blake)

How the children grow, play and gradually become members of the human family has been successively shown.

"The world of man dances in laughter and tears." (Kabir)

This world of men has been brought into focus by Steichen's creative imagination and one is reminded of Montaigne's pithy remark that "every man beareth the whole stamp of the human condition." The superficial differences of language and country, class and creed yield to a living sense of human unity. It may constitute a definite step for man to identify himself with the spirit as opposed to the phenomenal ego.

Spiritual aspirants are also shown in this exhibition, headed with lines by Albert Einstein:

"...To know what is impenetrable to us really exists, manifesting itself as the highest wisdom and the most radiant beauty..."

Divided into 40 sections, "The Family of Man" may be described in the words of Carl Sandburg "a camera testament, a drama of the grand canyon of humanity, an epic woven of fun, mystery and holiness."

In his characteristic language Sandburg says: "You travel and see what the camera saw. The wonder of human mind, heart, wit and instinct, is here. You might catch yourself saying, 'I'm not a stranger here.'" Maybe one may find oneself reflected in this perennial story of common man in the simple direct terms of photography.

The theme photograph reveals the identical harmony of mankind by the gay tune of the instrument and piper's carefree look. Recurring throughout the exhibition, it heightens this accordant feeling.

It is striking that this unique exhibition starts with love and concludes with faith.

"All passes. Art alone
Enduring stays to us."



Notifications

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification.

No. C/2390/50 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted the Uttarpara Raja Peary Mohan College has been affiliated in alternative Bengali and additional Paper in Alternative Bengali to the I.A. standard and in Additional Paper in Alternative Bengali and in Bengali to the B.A. Pass Standard with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e. with permission to present candidates in the abovenamed subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House, Calcutta,
The 15th April, 1957

D. CHAKRAVARTI
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification.

No. C/2404/101 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Kandi Raj College, Murshidabad has been affiliated to the B.A. pass standard in English, Bengali (Vern.), Sanskrit, Bengali, History, Economics, Philosophy, Mathematics and Additional paper in Alternative Bengali with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e. with permission to present candidates in the abovenamed subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta,
The 16th April, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification.

No. C/2410/99 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Ranaghat College, Dt. Nadia has been affiliated to the B.A. pass standard, in English, Bengali (Vernacular), History, Sanskrit, Philosophy and Economics with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e. with permission to present candidates in the abovenamed subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta,
The 16th April, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification.

No. C/2277/62 (Aff.).

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of affiliation already granted the Nabadwip Vidyasagar College has been affiliated in Sanskrit to the B.A. Honours standard with effect from the commencement of the session 1957-59, i.e. with permission to present candidates in the subject for the examination from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House
The 9th April, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification.

No. C/2419/8 (Am.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Gokhale Memorial Girls' College, Calcutta has been affiliated in Psychology to the I.A. and I.Sc. standards and in English (Pass), Bengali (Vern.), Hindi (Vern.), Additional paper in Alternative Bengali, Alternative English, Sanskrit (Pass), Economics (Pass), Philosophy (Pass), History (Pass), Mathematics (Pass), Geography (Pass) and Psychology (Pass) to the B.A. standard with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e. with permission to present candidates in the abovenamed subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

D. CHAKRAVARTI
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification.

No. C/2425/98 (Am.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Jhargram Raj College, Midnapore, has been affiliated to the B.A. Pass standard, in English, Bengali (Aernacular), Sanskrit, History, Economics and Mathematics with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e. with permission to present candidates in the abovenamed subjects at the examination mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta.
The 17th April, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. 2285/19 (Am.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Lady Brabourne College, Calcutta, has been affiliated in Pali to the I.A. standard with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e. with permission to present candidates in the subject at the examination from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 12th April, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification.

No. C/2369/14 (Am.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Asutosh College, Calcutta, has been affiliated in French, to the B.Com. with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e. with permission to present candidates in the abovenamed subject at the examination mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta.
The 12th April, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification.

No. C/2363/105 (Am.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Bolpur College, Birbhum, has been affiliated to the B.A. Pass standard, in English, Bengali (Vernacular), Additional paper in Alternative Bengali Vernacular, History, Economics and Bengali with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e. with permission to present candidates in the abovenamed subjects at the examination mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta.
The 12th April, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification,

No. C/2357/90 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Manimala Girls' College, Asansol has been affiliated to the B.A. (Pass standard, in English, Bengali (Vernacular), History, Economics and Philosophy with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e. with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier

Senate House,
Calcutta.
The 12th April, 1957

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2378/5 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that, in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Bangabasi College, Calcutta has been affiliated in History to the B.A. (Honours) standard with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subject at the examination mentioned from 1959, and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta.
The 15th April, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2397/96 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that, in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Taki Government College has been affiliated in Biology to the I Sc. standard and in English, Bengali (Vernacular), Sanskrit, History and Philosophy to the B.A. (Pass standard, with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates at the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned from 1959, and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta.
The 15th April, 1957

D. CHAKRAVARTI
Registrar

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2384/22 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that, in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Surendranath College, Calcutta has been affiliated in French to the B.Com. standard with effect from the session, 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subject at the examination mentioned from 1959, and not earlier

Senate House,
Calcutta.
The 15th April, 1957

D. CHAKRAVARTI
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2453/103 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that, in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Rampurhat College, Birbhum has been affiliated to the B.A. (Pass) standard, in English, Bengali (Vernacular), History, Economics, Philosophy, Sanskrit and Mathematics with effect from the session, 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examination mentioned from 1959, and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta.
The 22nd April, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2459/100 (Am.)

It is hereby notified for general information that, in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Barasat Govt. College has been affiliated to the I.Sc. standard, in Biology with effect from the session, 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subject at the examination mentioned from 1959, and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta :
The 22nd April, 1957

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS

Notification

It is hereby notified that the undermentioned candidates have been debarred from appearing for any examination of this University for the period noted below, as they resorted to unfair means during the examinations of September, 1955.

Their examinations of September, 1955 have been cancelled. A statement with detailed information regarding these candidates is enclosed.

Examination	Register Number and name of candidate.	Period of Rustication.	The month and year in which permitted to appear for the Examination.
1. Intermediate	1924. K Prabhakaran Pillai	Two years	Till September, 1957
2. Do.	2116 T. Ganesan	Do	Do.
3. Do.	3058. N. Alagiriswami	Three years	Till September, 1958
4. Do.	3962. S. Sonai	Two years	Till September, 1957
5. Do.	4795 P. Dorairaj	Do.	Do.
6. Do	564 M. Jayaraman	One year	Till September, 1956
7. B A	1574. Selvaraj John	Two years	Till September, 1957
8. Do	2764. R. Ramachandran	Do	Do.
9. B Sc.	879 D. Krishnan	One year	Till September, 1956

UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS

Notification

It is hereby notified that the undermentioned candidates have been debarred from appearing for any Examination of this University for the period noted below, as they resorted to unfair means during the Examinations of January-March, 1956

Their Examinations of January-March, 1956 have been cancelled. A statement with detailed information regarding these candidates is enclosed.

Examination	Register Number and name of candidate.	Period of Rustication.	The month and year in which permitted to appear for the Examination
1. Matriculation	419. M. A. Baby	Two years	Till March, 1958
2. Do.	1219. C. R. Bolaguri swami	Do.	Do.
3. Do.	1886. V. G. Purusho- thaman	Do.	Do.
4. Intermediate	144. A. Narayana Reddy	Do.	Do.

5.	Do.	341.	V. Lakshmana Naidu	Do.	Do.
6.	Do.	312.	P. Nagendra Varma	Do.	Do.
7.	Do.	405.	K. Siddaiah Naidu	Do.	Do.
8.	Do.	970.	A. Thirumurthi	Do.	Do.
9.	Do.	1089.	G. Susila	Do.	Do.
10.	Do.	2790.	I. Ramalingam	Do.	Do.
11.	Do.	2791.	M. Ramalingam	Do.	Do.
12.	Do.	4105.	N. Joy	Do.	Do.
13.	Do.	4156.	K. Taranatha Kini	Do.	Do.
14.	Do.	5597.	M. Venugopalan	Do.	Do.
15.	Do.	6273.	A. Srinivasam	One year	Till March, 1957
16.	Do.	6473.	S. Doraiswamy	Two years	Till March, 1958
17.	Do.	9273.	V. Aravindakan	Do.	Do.
18.	Do.	12051.	K. V. Balagangadharan.	Do.	Do.
19.	Do.	12713.	T. S. Balakrishnan	Do.	Do.
20.	Do.	12863.	V. Venkataratnam	Do.	Do.
21.	Do.	13681.	Umai Iymen	Do.	Do.
22.	Do.	16929.	A. Arutpragasam	Do.	Do.
23.	Do.	16930.	V. Balakrishnan	Do.	Do.
24.	Do.	17347.	G. Manjunath Hegde	Do.	Do.
25.	Do.	19115.	V. V. Ramamoorthy	Do.	Do.
26.	Do.	19327.	M. R. Muthuramachandran.	Do.	Do.
27.	Do.	9173.	P. D. Vasudevan Namboodiripad.	Examination cancelled.	
28.	Do.	18562.	V. Raghavan	Examination cancelled.	
29.	Second Examination in Agriculture, January, 1956.	15.	P. Dasaratha Rama Raju.	Three years	Till January, 1959
30.	First Examination in Agriculture, March, 1956.	93.	D. Devasundari Bai	Two years	Till March, 1958
31.	Second B.E., March, 1956.	1005.	K. A. Murugesan	Three years	Till March, 1959
32.	B.A Degree Examination, March, 1956.	43.	K. Venkata Reddi	Two years	Till March, 1958
33.	Do.	105.	N. V. Krishnaswami.	Do.	Do.
34.	Do.	106.	C. Kuppuramaiah	Do.	Do.
35.	Do.	1593.	Josephine Roy	Do.	Do.
36.	Do.	3061.	G. Narayana Kurup	Do.	Do.
37.	Do.	4057.	K. Premachandran	Examination cancelled.	
38.	B.Sc. Degree Examination, March, 1956.	1365.	S. Ramanujam	Two years	Till March 1958
39.	Oriental Title—Vidwan D—Tamil.	1858.	B. A. Santhasam	Do.	Do.

No. B. 17232
University Buildings,
Chepauk, Madras—5,
Dated the 30th November 1956.

D. SIVASUBRAHMANIA MUDALIAR
Deputy Registrar

UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS

List showing detailed particulars of candidates who were debarred from appearing for any of the Examinations of this University for having resorted to unfair means during the Examinations of September, 1955.

Name of Candidate	Examination for which appeared	Register Number	Name of Father or Guardian, Community and Address.	Date and Place of birth.	Institution
1. K. Prabhakaran Pillai	Intermediate	1324	K. P. Krishnan Nair (N.B.). Punnakapillai House, East Kadungallore, P. O. U.C. College, Alwaye	1-5-114. (M.E.) Alwaye.	St. Albert's College, Ernakulam.
2. T. Ganesan	Do.	2916	A. Thiagaraja Mudaliar (Non-Brahmin), Naduvakalappal (Post), Thiruthurai-poondi (Vai), Tanjore District.	31-3-1937. Kalappal.	Government College, Kumbakonam.
3. N. Alegiriswami	Do.	3058	A. Narayanaswamy Chettiar, (Non-Brahmin), 54, S. S. Kod Street, Pollechi.	7-2-1934. Pollechi	American College, Madurai
4. S. Sonai	Do.	3962	A. Sivaperumal Pillai (Non-Brahmin), South Car Street, Sholavandan.	6-10-1932. Sholavandan	Madura College, Madurai
5. P. Dorairaj	Do.	4795	P. Pattan. (Non-Brahmin), South Street, Narasinganallur, Suthamalli P.O., Tirunelveli.	5-12-1929, Narasinganallur.	St. Xavier's College. Palayamkottai.
6. M. Jayaraman	Do.	5364	N. Muthuswamy Reddhar (Non-Brahmin), 22, Madalayam Street, Gugal, Salem.	28-4-1938, Salem	New College, Madras
7. Selvaraj John	B.A.	1574	Kurunthen Villai, Neyyoor West, South Travancore.	31-3-1931, Kurunthen Villai, Trivandrum.	St. John's College, Palayamkottai.
8. R. Ramachandran	B.A.	2784	C/o Sri K. K. Viswanatha Iyer, Consulting Engineer, Gonthor Village, Chittur—Cochin.	5-2-1934, Johore-Bahru	Vivekananda College, Madras.
9. D. Krishnan	B.Sc.	879	Sri K. Duraiswami Pillai, (Non-Brahmin), C/o Venkatesa Motor Service, Turaiyur.	4-6-1934, Turaiyur	St. Joseph's College, Trichy and Private Study,

D. Sivasubrahmanis Mudaliar.
Deputy Registrar.

No. E. 17216
University Buildings,
Chennai, Madras-5,
Dated the 30th November, 1956.

UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS

List showing detailed particulars of candidates who were debarred from appearing for any of the Examinations of this University for having resorted to unfair means during the Examinations of January-March, 1956.

Name of candidate	Examination for which appeared.	Register Number.	Name of Father or Guardian, Community and Address.	Date and Place of birth.	Institution
1. M. A. Baby	Matriculation	449	V. T. Abraham (Christian), Vettimottil House, Viliakkuvelom, Punalur, T. C. State.	29-2-1939, Kozhanchery, Quilon.	Private Study
2. C. R. Balaguruswami.	Do.	1219	K. C. R. Thirunilai Ammal (Non-Brahmin), Guru Vilas, Chetty Street, Porayar P. O., Tanjore Dt.	12-7-1932, Porayar	Do.
3. V. G. Purushothaman	Do.	1336	V. G. Vasudeva Rao (Brahmin), Sub-Post Master, Alandur, St. Thomas Mount, Madras-16.	2-6-1928 Vandyambadi, North Arcot.	Do.
4. A. Narayana Reddy	Intermediate	144	A. Lakshmi Reddy (Non-Brahmin) Kochcheruvu (Village and Post) Dhone, Kurnool.	4-1-1933, Kochcharuvu	Osmania College, Kurnool and Private Study.
5. V. Lakshmana Naidu.	Do.	341	V. Govindappa Naidu (Non-Brahmin) Kaupala Palle, Puthur P. O., Chittoor District.	15-1-1936, Kampala Palle.	S. V. College, Tirupati and Private Study.
6. P. Nagendra Varma	Do.	342	P. Chenchuramiah (Non-Brahmin) V-235, Gandlamitta Street, Tirupati, Chittoor District.	16-3-1938, Tirupati	S. V. College, Tirupati and Private Study.
7. K. Siddaiah Naidu	Do.	405	K. Pitchappa Naidu (Non-Brahmin), Kotala, Chandragiri P. O., Chittoor District.	1-7-1935, Kotala,	S. V. College, Tirupati and Private Study.
8. A. Thirumurthi	Do.	970	P. Arumuga Gounder (Non-Brahmin), 15, Aroyanatha Pillai Street, Polachi.	10-6-1934, Kottampati	P.S.G. Arts College, Coimbatore.
9. G. Susila	Do.	1039	M. K. Gopal (Non-Brahmin), Devangapet No. 2, Coimbatore.	9-9, 7-5-1937, Coimbatore	Nirmala College, Coimbatore

10. L. Ramalingam	Do.	2790	M. Iru'andi Thevar (Non-Brahmin), Pettai Poyatha Pillayar Koil Street, Kumbakonam,	1-7-1937, Kumbakonam	Government College, Kumbakonam.
11. M. Ramalingam	Do.	2721	K. K. Muthucumara Mudaliyar (Non-Brahmin), 23, West Kanjamedu, Papanasam, Tanjore Dist.	15-3-1938, Papanasam	Do.
12. N. Joy	Do.	4105	Nithyanandham (Christian), C/o The Principal, Lady Doak College, Madurai.	3-5-1934, Madurai	Lady Doak College, Madurai
13. K. Taravatha Kini	Do.	4156	K. Vasudeva Kini (Brahmin), Driver, Karkal, S. K.	16-4-1937, Karkal (S.K.)	Government Arts College, Mangalore.
14. M. Venugopalan	Do.	5597	M. Lakshmykutti Vayankaramma (Non-Brahmin), Land Lady, Manakkimpad House, College Road, Palghat.	13-2-1937, Palghat.	Government Victoria College, Palghat.
15. A. Srinivasan	Do.	6273	G.A. Arunachalspandaram (Non-Brahmin), 14, Habeeb Sahib Street, Fort, Salem.	5-1-1938, Salem.	Salem Municipal College, Salem.
16. S. Doraiswamy	Do.	6473	S. Siva-chidambaram Pillai (Non-Brahmin), Partner, Anjaneya Mokri Transport, Post Box No. 10, Erode.	22-6-1937, Bhavani	R.D.M. College, Sivaganga
17. V. Aravindakshan	Do.	9273	K. Krishnan Nair (Non-Brahmin), Vattakat House, Ayyanthole, Kuddam Dessam, Trichur.	3-3-1937, Trichur	S. K. V. College, Trichur
18. K. V. Balagangadharan.	Do.	12051	K. S. Venkatsachalam (Non-Brahmin), Kugalur, Gobichettipalayam, Coimbatore.	5-6-1937, Kugalur	New College, Madras
19. T. S. Balakrishnan	Do.	12713	T. S. Madhavan (Non-Brahmin), 24, Manicks Chetty Street, Choolai, Madras-7.	8-6-1935, Bangalore	Pachaiyappa's College, Madras

20.	V. Venkataratanam	Do.	12863	V. V. Krishnamurthy, (Brahmin), 4, Rajeswari Street, Bharati Road, Perambur, Madras—11.	30-7-1937, Rajahmundry	Sir Theagaraya Madras—21.	College,
21.	Umai Iymen	Do.	13681	Hibatull Bhai, (Muslim) 27, Angappa Naick Street, Madras—1.	27-2-1937, Madras.	Queen Mary's College, Madras	
22.	A. Arutpragasam	Do.	16929	M. Arumugam Pillai, (Non-Brahmin) F. 58/4, Golden Rock, Tiruchirappalli.	8-4-1935, Komal Village	Jamal Mohamed Tiruchirappalli and Private Study.	College,
23.	V. Balakrishnan	Do.	16980	V. Ramasatha Pillai, (Non-Brahmin) Tamil Pandit, S. Ry. High School, Golden Rock.	30-8-1917, Menangudi	Private Study	
24.	G. Manjunath Hogde	Do.	17847	N. Sheenappa Hegde, (Non-Brahmin) Mynadi mane, Post Kota (S. K.)	21-10-1934, Giliyar	M.G.M. College, Udipi and Private Study.	
25.	V. V. Ramamoorthy	Do.	19115	V. Narayanappa, (Brahmin) Thellooru Village, Balapanoru Post, Pul- vendia, Cuddapah.	2-7-1934, Thellooru	Government Arts College, Cuddapah and Private Study.	
26.	M. R. Mothurama- chandran	Do.	19327	R. Komalavalliammal, (Non-Brahmin) 36, Ramaswamy Street, G. T. Madras.	7-2-1935, Madras	Pachaiyappa's Madras and Private Study.	College,
27.	P. D. Vasudevan Namboodiripad.	Do.	9173	P. Aryasaniharjanam, (Brahmin) C/o The Principal, Sree Kerala Varma College, Trichur.	31-1-1937, Trichur	Sree Kerala Varma College, Trichur.	
28.	V. Raghavan	Do.	18762	V. Venkatarama Iyer, (Brahmin) Loan Tahsildar, Nagapatnam.	10-7-1937, Madras	Pachaiyappa's Madras and Private Study.	College.
29.	P. Dasaratha Rama Raju.	Second Examination in Agriculture, January, 1936.	15	P. S. Raghava Raju, (Non-Brahmin) Egavaripalayam (Post.), (Via) Guun- mudipundi, Chinglepet District.	1-2-1935, Egavaripala- yam.	Agricultural College and Research Institute, Coimba- tore.	
30.	D. Devasundari Bai	First Examination in Agriculture.	93	J. Durai Raj Reddier, (Non-Brahmin) Sankarankovil.	8-1-1934, Sankarankovil	Do.	

31. K. A. Murgessan	Second B.E.	1005	S. Angamuthu Mudaliar, (Non-Brahmin), Kumaramangalam P. O., Salem Dist.	9-9-1932, galam.	Kumaraman-	P.S.G. & Sons' Charities College of Technology, Peelamedu.
32. K. Venkata Reddi	B.A. Degree Examination.	43	126, Moberleypet, Annapuram Town and Taluk. E. Godavari Dist.	1-7-1932, E. Godavari	Govt. Arts College Anantapur	
33. N. V. Krishnaswami	Do.	105	Sannachi Street, Chitranool	1934		
34. C. Kuppuramaiah	Do.	106	No 262, New Street, Tirupati	24-12-1934		
35. Josephine Roy	Do.	1533	C/o Sri Royappa Sautary Inspector, 16, Swamiji Periakaruppan Chettiar Street, Devacottai.	18-12-1929, Tiruppathur	Lady Doak College, Madurai	
36. G. Narayana Kurup	Do.	3061	C/o Sri. Karthikeyan Amma, House Number : 360/XX, Karakkamuri Cross R.ad, Ernakulam.	Ennakhad	Sacred Heart College, Thevara	
37. K. Premachandran	Do.	4057	C/o Sri P. Madhava Menon, Chelakkottukuda, Trichur.	8-4-1932, Trichur	St. Thomas College, Trichur	
38. S. Ramanujam	B.Sc. Degree Examination.	1365	K. Sundararajan. B.Sc. (Ag.),—(B) Mirasdar Kulitalai, Tiruchirappalli District.	12-12-1937, Kulitalai	Loyola College, Madras	
38-A. S. V. K. Parvatala	Do.	3632	S. Doranna Chowdary, Advocate, Ungutur, W. G. Dt.	1-11-1933	Do.	
39. B.A. Santhanam	Vidwan 2D Final Tamil (U T.)	1859	Anantha Iyengar, (Brahmin) Kutcheri Street, Bhavani, Via Erode, Coimbatore District.	2-10-1934 Bhavani	Karanthai Pulavar Kalloori, Tanjore.	

D. Sivasubramania Mudaliar
Deputy Registrar

No. E. 17232,
Madras,
The 30th Nov. 1956.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY CENTENARY

Appendix I

PRESIDENTS SPEECH*

I feel very happy today in being able to associate myself with the Centenary Celebrations of the Calcutta University, whose history is largely the history of the beginning of western education or modern higher education in this country, particularly in Eastern India. I say so because in the beginning the jurisdiction of the Calcutta University extended from the Punjab in the West to Burma in the East and from Nepal in the North to Ceylon in the South, with the universities of Madras and Bombay thrown in between so far as the Western Deccan and the Southern regions were concerned. Gradually as the thirst for university education developed, other universities also came into being in the inevitable process of expansion.

For nearly 50 years before the three universities of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay were established, pioneers of Indian renaissance like Ram Mohan Roy had been in the vanguard of an active movement that sought to introduce Western science and thought through the medium of English in our country. The views of the protagonists of Anglicism and Orientalism are too well-known to require recapitulation here. But it was significant that the arena where this battle was fought was predominantly Bengal, more particularly Calcutta. In this conflict of ideas the Anglicists got the better of their opponents, and this fact was reflected in the ushering in of these three universities. The Calcutta University, it may be said, was associated with the Indian renaissance and the awakening of nationalism through its alumni in a special way. While it is not possible to under-rate the importance of the other universities, I might say that the fountain-head of this nationalism was largely opened up by the products of this university.

It is interesting to see how this University developed into a training ground of nationalism almost in spite of the

* President's inaugural speech at the Calcutta University Centenary Celebrations, delivered on January 20, 1957.

intentions of the British authorities in India. Lord Canning, the first Chancellor of this University, expressed himself very clearly that Calcutta University would resemble English universities like Oxford and Cambridge of his days in which the nobility and the upper classes of India would be educated. But in less than 10 years Sir Henry Maine the then Vice-Chancellor found that instead of becoming an institution for the aristocrats, the Calcutta University was fast becoming a popular institution. The education given here began to prepare the soil in which the creative ideals of modern Indian life were to take root and to flower. The very first and second generations of Indians who were the products of this and the other two universities of Madras and Bombay, became the torch-bearers of liberty. Yet in a very deep sense, here was the great consummation of the mission the West was destined to fulfil in the East and also of the mission which the East had to take to the West in the messages of Swami Vivekanand, a student of this university and Gurudev Tagore who was also connected with it, though not a student himself.

You will pardon me if I am in a reminiscent mood for a while and recapitulate the momentous days when I had the good fortune of being a student in this university. During those days we found, on the one hand, the passing of the Universities Act of 1904 giving this University the authority to organise teaching and research; on the other hand there was active expression of patriotism on a very large scale among students. The partition of Bengal set the whole of India in ferment. The cult of *swadeshi* became a creed with the educated people who took it to the masses in the countryside while the universities were expanding their work. Need for radical reform was felt in the system of education and non-official institutions having a different objective and curricula and unrecognised by Government grew up in different parts of the country, laying emphasis on nationalism and Indian culture and way of life. In Bengal the protest against the prevalent set-up took shape in the establishment of the National Council of Education, which was presided over by Sir Gurudas Banerji, an ex-Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University, with a large number of some of the most distinguished alumni of the Calcutta University as teachers and students. On account of its independent

outlook, the position of the Calcutta University remained uneasy for an appreciable time. These difficulties and occasional crises notwithstanding, the University continued to progress and soon became a people's university.

The motto of the Calcutta University is "Advancement of Learning" and I take it that those who have been responsible for guiding and controlling the University have understood by it, advancement both vertical and lateral. Thus there has been vast expansion of the system of education which the University stands for and people have been busy enthusiastically all these hundred years establishing new institutions all over the country. The territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta University has undergone tremendous changes and as against what it covered at the time of its establishment, today its activities are confined to the State of West Bengal alone, all the adjoining and distant areas outside Bengal having been cut away from it. That has happened not on account of any lack of interest in the form of education but because of the intense desire to provide larger and ever larger facilities to our young people by establishing new universities. On the other hand, the university has not neglected advancement of learning vertically and under the dynamic personality of Shri Asutosh Mookerjee, has built up a system of post-graduate studies and research in all departments of knowledge. There is a tendency today to establish more and more residential universities both for humanities and sciences and specializing in particular subjects. Through the impetus given to post-graduate studies and research, the Calcutta University has been in the vanguard of educational progress. Its alumni have to their credit not only a large volume of original work in humanities and sciences, but they are also engaged in technical and technological pursuits all over the country. The University therefore deserves congratulations on its achievements.

I have mentioned above that in the first quarter of the last century before the establishment of the University, there was prolonged controversy regarding the kind of education and the medium of instruction and that Anglicists had won the day. But it was not long before it began to dawn on those who were educated in this system that education to be true and genuine and to be capable of bringing out

the best that was in man, a foreign language as medium of instruction imposes a heavy burden and the result not unnaturally has been a certain amount of superficiality among the largest number of those who have benefited from this kind of education. It is true that even with a foreign medium India has produced great litterateurs, great scientists, great physicians, great lawyers, great engineers—in fact men of high stature in all walks of life. But their number is rather small when you think of the vast numbers who have gone through the mill; and it would be an interesting study to find out comparative figures showing the percentage of those who have made original contributions from amongst persons educated through their own language and those educated through a foreign medium. I have a feeling that this investigation, if it can be held, will give no indefinite answer in favour of the mother-tongue being the medium of instruction.

As I have said, this aspect of the question began to be canvassed not many years after the establishment of universities and some of the experiments in the field of what is known as national education were the result. The cycle seemed to have been almost completed in the second decade of the present century when the Saddler Commission came to the conclusion that the best medium of education would be the mother-tongue of the student, and although this recommendation of that Commission has not been fully considered, much less implemented, in the various universities and other educational institutions, there is no doubt that there is, generally speaking, strong public opinion in favour of Indianizing education. Unlike their predecessors in the first quarter of the 19th century, the protagonists of English are now on the defensive and with the national upsurge and the establishment of an Independent Republic, there is no doubt that it is only a matter of time—and that too not a long time—when our languages will come into their own and be accepted as media not only of instruction but also for all work, literary and scientific, administrative and political.

It was therefore in the fitness of things that our Constituent Assembly devoted a part of the Constitution to the question of Language. While it recognized Hindi as the language for all affairs of an all-India character, it also gave full freedom to each State to develop its regional language

or languages. The States Reorganization Commission gave expression to the longing that was in the minds of the people to have a division of the country into States on the basis of language; and today, with the exception of two States, all the others have only one language prevalent within their territory. This opens up a vast vista for the improvement and progress of the various regional languages.

It is sometimes urged that our languages are not developed enough to serve as vehicles for the expression of all scientific and technological knowledge and therefore it is suggested that we must continue to have a foreign language as medium of instruction if not in all, at any rate in those branches of knowledge. Necessity is the mother of invention and I have no doubt that when the demand is made on these languages to fulfil this function, they will in course of time develop and acquit themselves creditably. It is futile to expect a language to grow while shutting it off from the holy precincts of higher and particularly technical knowledge. I am therefore hoping that in the next few years there is going to be a tremendous resurgence in our languages and the day is not distant when they will be able to discharge the functions which other languages in other countries, with much less resources in human material and culture, do. It is not a political question but rather a question which touches the very roots of our life and culture and we cannot afford to ignore it. I am hoping that the Calcutta University which has played such an important part in the past will yet be in the vanguard of this resurgence.

The expansion of education has been so rapid and vast that it has not been possible either for the community or for the universities to keep pace with it, with the result that there is a big gap between our social requirements and the service which our educated people can render. Universities were originally examining bodies and in spite of the fact that greater and greater emphasis has been laid in course of time on teaching and formation of character of the pupils, the fundamental notion persists that an educated person is he alone who has passed a university examination and obtained its diploma. Apart from deterioration in the standard of education which has happened and which is admitted, the purpose of giving the hall-mark of educational efficiency as the result of these tests has itself been very

largely defeated. It is therefore not surprising that for a small job the duties attached to which do not require any high academic qualifications acquired at a university, there are hundreds if not thousands of applicants with the hallmark of a university. The universities have thus ceased to be even screening agencies for weeding out the unfit. And today the greatest problem before all educationists and also governments is what to do with the vast numbers of degree-holders in the country. Having given up the old habits of their parents and grandparents and also their modes of life and having acquired a smattering of learning which, wrongly but nonetheless truly creates an aversion to manual work, they feel disappointed and frustrated when they cannot get jobs which are simply not available. And yet the habit of associating university degrees with knowledge and efficiency persists and every parent, who can afford the means, has the ambition of sending his ward to a school or college affiliated to a university. There is always a lurking hope in the mind of such a parent that after obtaining the degree, he would be able to make good the investment which he is making.

It has become therefore necessary to consider how best this waste of effort in obtaining university degrees and the subsequent disappointment and frustration can be avoided. It is absolutely necessary that the universities should devote more and more of their time and energy to the advancement of learning vertically and some other agency should be devised for testing the capacity of candidates for jobs of various kinds. This will naturally require decentralization of instruction and a shift more and more to scientific and technological subjects and at the same time those who are keen and fitted by their aptitude to advancement of learning should be given greater and greater facilities in the universities to grow to their full stature.

It is not an easy question which can be answered offhand and I know that all thinkers are trying to think out a solution to the problem. I have ventured to draw attention to this because I feel that the problem of educated unemployment is fast approaching the saturation point which it need not do if only we do this screening at a suitable stage and divert those aiming at jobs in one direction and those with a genuine interest in learning and research, in the direction of universities.

I would like to conclude on a note of optimism and express the fervent hope that the active forces which this University set in motion during a comparatively dark period of our life, will continue to be generated in a still larger measure for the fulfilment of the noble destiny of independent India.

On this happy occasion of the Centenary of the Calcutta University, which has given us an opportunity of meeting together and reviewing the stages through which the Calcutta University and higher education in India in general have passed, I would like, as an old student of this University, to offer my greetings to all those connected with it in any way. Let me end this address with the hope that the Calcutta University would make still greater contribution to the advancement of learning and the building up of the India of our dreams.

CENTENARY CELEBRATION ADDRESS*

PRESIDENT, CHANCELLOR AND FRIENDS :

Today we are celebrating the Centenary of the Calcutta University, the oldest of the modern institutions for the propagation of higher education in India. This institution was established when India under alien domination was dreaming the first dream of independence; today when we are celebrating the completion of hundred years of existence our country is free and strong and the people of our land are fired with hopes of building a new life. For hundred years ideas and ideals have flown from this institution to fertilise the intellects of all Indians; they have helped to enrich human life. We have had to surmount many obstacles, proceed through numerous conflicts, advance through many doubts and disputes to reach the golden gate at which we have arrived today. We have now the glow of satisfaction at having successfully completed this journey and at the same time we look forward to the horizon towards which the path is leading us. In this new awakening we find the essence of our festival, in this synthesis of the joy of achievement and of the plans of aspiration. The past, present and future of Calcutta University, calls us today to engage in our celebrations and to extend a welcome to all of you who have responded to our invitation and assembled here this afternoon. It is through your blessings, affection and good wishes that our festival can be vitalised.

Today we recall with deep humility our predecessors in this land and outside who through the synthesis of our heritage and Western thought sowed the first seeds of a new India, tended the seedling with care and nurtured the tree with love and devotion to attain to its full stature. We do not have the good fortune to have them with us; but believers in our heritage as we are, we recall them with gratitude and reverence. The seedling which they planted

* Calcutta University Centenary Celebration Address delivered by Sri Nirmalkumar Sidhanta, M.A. (Cal. & Cantab.), Vice Chancellor, Calcutta University, on 20th January, 1957;

is now a mighty tree : the torch which they kindled is now illuminating all directions. In the plenitude of our efforts, in the success of our endeavours, they will have a glow of satisfaction.

Of the countless children of this great institution one of the greatest and seniormost we have as our leader in the celebration of this Centenary. He has accepted our invitation to guide us and thereby ensured the success of the function. He is with us today not as the President of India but in the glory of his individuality, enshrining the memory of the days of his youth as a student and as a teacher. We take pride in the fame he has gained, in the stature to which he has risen, in the glory he has brought to the motherland. We welcome him from the innermost core of our hearts with our humble love.

Many of those who are assembled here today are alumni of this University, still connected with the University in some way or other; many of them have reached the pinnacle of success, they have extended the bounds of knowledge, beautified the world with their creation, made history in their life. There are others who have worked within a narrower field, spent their days in humbler vocations, and made good within their own sphere. Then again there are thousands who are still our faithful disciples engaged in preparing themselves for the wider life to follow. All of you are our guests today and we extend our heart-felt welcome to you. It is through you that this University is discovering itself and it is through your help that it will realise its ideals.

Many have come from all parts of the world with messages of goodwill and blessings. We appreciate their kindness and courtesy and our heart is full of gratitude. A centre of learning works in one country for a particular environment, but its glory is not circumscribed because the knowledge that is acquired and the truths which are discovered transcend time and space. Through the congregation of our guests we realise the unity of University ideals, the oneness in all efforts. To the representatives of those institutions from India and abroad, we convey our deepest good wishes and pray that they will be the bearers of our goodwill to their respective institutions.

We have crossed one landmark through completion of hundred years of life. The history of the world, of humanity,

of our country records hundred years. What imprint this institution of ours will leave on the sands of time, it is for the future to judge. We are unable to assess the worth of our achievements to the fullest extent : we only look forward to the future with added strength and courage. In this work we seek the blessings of our ancestors and the goodwill of our fellow-men : we request you all to join in prayer for the success of our mighty endeavour.

APPENDIX II

A. CONVOCATION ADDRESS

SRI C. D. DESHMUKH

CHANCELLOR, VICE-CHANCELLOR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

The Calcutta University has done me a great honour by inviting me to address the Convocation, which is being held on the eve of its Centenary celebrations, and which I deem it, therefore, a real privilege to be called upon to address. I do not say this in any formal sense but out of a consciousness of the special significance of the occasion.

This solemn ceremony of the Centenary Convocation serves to remind us of the noble tradition of the Calcutta University, which has done pioneering work in awakening the complacent spirit of the East to the technological advances of the West. The tireless efforts of Raja Ramanohan Roy and Iswarchandra Vidyasagar were directed to a reorientation of our ancient civilization in the light of modern advances in human knowledge. Asutosh Mookerjee, who was an embodiment of self-respect and self-confidence, carried on a relentless struggle for protecting the academic freedom of the University from the interference of an alien Government, and his successors have carried on the work of the University in increasingly constricted and difficult circumstances. Among the teachers and *alumni* one comes across the names of Bankimchandra Chatterjee and Surendranath Banerjee, of Swami Vivekananda, Pandit Malaviya and Deshbandhu Chittaranjan Das, of Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Abdur Rahim and Dr. Rashbehary Ghose, of Jagadishchandra Bose and Acharyya Prafullachandra Ray, of Syamaprasad Mookerjee and Dr. Meghnad Saha and last but not least of Netaji Subhashchandra Bose. These are names such as should make any successor to the tradition of this University proud of his heritage. When in my mind I run over the illustrious names of persons who have been ushered through the Convocations of the University and who are enhancing its prestige today, I remind myself that our

revered Rashtrapati, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, who is inaugurating the celebrations to-morrow is himself among these distinguished individuals. And then, among those associated with the University as teachers at one time or another are world famous figures such as Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Sriyuts Jadunath Sarkar, C. V. Raman and S. N. Bose.

My sense of privilege is weighed down by an awareness of heavy responsibility. Until lately I have had no special concern with the academic world, although I have been generally interested in, and sympathetic to, institutions of higher learning. While I have tried to be a good student of every subject that I have been called upon to learn, I can lay no claim to scholarship, or profound learning. Moreover, addressing convocations is an art which I have not cultivated. Nevertheless, as an erstwhile administrator and politician I may perhaps be able to make a few useful observations, and in any case there is another capacity in which I am expected to say something to a gathering of University students, teachers and administrators. That capacity is the Chairmanship of the University Grants Commission. Since the main function of that body is to promote and co-ordinate University education and to determine and maintain standards of teaching, examination and research in Universities, my words are likely to be interpreted as representative views, indicating the mind of the Commission. I should, therefore, make it clear that the views that I shall be voicing would be my personal views, although I hope that they would be such as would, at least in a general way, be acceptable to the Commission.

It has not been possible for me to ponder much the philosophy of Convocation Addresses or to conduct a research into the ground covered by generations of past Convocation Addresses, although I confess I have often wanted to do so. I expect to find that they generally draw attention to matters of topical interest concerning Universities and illuminate many a moral maxim for the citizens of the morrow. Over the vista of years the topics of interest will vary, even as the idea or purpose itself of various Universities as contemporaneously understood, in the light of the cultural, social, economic and political background, whether in this country or elsewhere. My understanding of what the content of my

address should be will be found influenced by these thoughts and at the back of my mind will be an awareness of the special significance that most people will be disposed to attach to my observations because of the official position I hold.

In making my observations, I shall remind myself that the Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University was one of the Members of that very distinguished body, the University Education Commission, which presented the monumental report on higher learning in India in 1949, that in his capacity as Member of the Union Public Service Commission, he has had very special opportunities of adjudging the attainments and standards of the young men passing out from Universities and higher professional or technological institutions, and that finally he has been and continues to be a Member of the University Grants Commission. I shall recall that his predecessor, an eminent scientist and educationist, is now Member of the Planning Commission and in special charge of the subject of Education. I need not go further back into the history of the long line of administrators who have been responsible for the affairs of the University, and may safely conclude that if many improvements have yet to be made in the affairs of the University, and much reform has to be carried out, the reasons cannot be lack of realization or guidance in regard to the desiderata, but difficulties, the removal of which does not lie within the power of any single academic authority or, within the short term, indeed, of any authority in India.

The celebration of a Centenary is an appropriate occasion in human affairs for both heart-felt felicitation and earnest retrospect. But the legitimate feeling of satisfaction that a century of existence is behind one should be tempered, in the case of Universities, by the reflection that even by modern standards a University which is a hundred years old is a relatively young University. Then again, India had seats of learning even more ancient than the modern type of Universities. Sufficient is known about these without its being necessary for me to enter into details. I need only point out that all the ancient Indian institutions were residential in character, which made possible the closest communion between the teacher and the taught. Also, apparently, the education was free, thanks to the patronage of

princes and bountiful endowments. The scholars, who were admitted after rigorous oral tests, were even provided with free board and lodging. Lastly, as a matter of topical interest I should mention that the Nalanda University (6th Century B.C. to the 13th Century A.D.) at the height of its glory had a thousand teachers and ten thousand students, a teacher-student ratio of 1 to 10 against 1 to 35 and upwards at present in the colleges in Calcutta city.

It is against this background that one should reflect on the significance of the Centenary of a University in India. Our modern Universities are not heirs to an ancient heritage, but were innovations introduced by the British in an age when the organisation of all types of indigenous system of education, including higher education, had been dislocated owing to unsettled political conditions. The precursors of our modern Universities were the Sanskrit colleges and the Madrasahs founded towards the end of the 18th century for the avowed purpose of encouraging the study of oriental languages, literature and laws, but in reality for training legal assistants to English judges. Many colleges and Mahavidyalayas preceded the Universities as seats of higher education of the Western type in the first half of the 19th century, to be followed a little later by a few professional institutions like the Medical College, Calcutta, and the Bombay Engineering School.

The history of how the first University in India came to be established would be found in the literature on the subject, especially, Chapter I of the report of the University Education Commission. The Commission refers to the famous Despatch of Sir Charles Wood, to the Court of Directors of 1854, which has been described as the Magna Carta of English Education in India. The aim of education was enunciated as the diffusion of the Arts, Science, Philosophy and Literature of Europe. The study of Indian languages was to be encouraged and the English language was to be taught wherever there was a demand for it, both being regarded as the media for the diffusion of the European knowledge. Universities were to be established to encourage a regular and liberal course of education by conferring academic degrees as evidence of attainment in the different branches of Arts and Science. The syllabuses were, it may be noticed, to exclude all subjects connected with religious beliefs. A spirit

of honourable rivalry was to be promoted among different such institutions and the division of University degrees and distinctions into different branches was intended to direct the efforts of the highly educated men to the studies which were necessary to success in the various active professions of life.

The Bill to establish a University of Calcutta received the assent of the Governor-General on the 24th January, 1857. Universities were also established at Bombay and Madras immediately afterwards. While the Governors of their provinces were the Chancellors of the latter Universities, the Governor-General himself was for many long years the Chancellor of the Calcutta University. Significantly enough, the first Indian Governor-General, Sri C. Rajagopalachari became the first Indian Chancellor of the Calcutta University.

The jurisdiction of the Calcutta University was not originally circumscribed by provincial limits. Colleges from Bihar, Orissa, Assam, U.P., C.P., Burma and Ceylon were also affiliated to the University. The gradual establishment of new Universities restricted its sphere of work, but has not retarded the growth in the number of its students. The progressively complete conversion of the University from an examining to a teaching University, so far as Post-Graduate instruction is concerned, was largely due to the vision and drive of Asutosh Mookerjee.

The inexorable pressure of numbers has resulted in Indian Universities losing ground in respect of basic equipment in the broadest sense of the term (*viz.*, quality and number of teachers, accommodation, especially laboratory-space, apparatus, libraries, hostels, etc.) and therefore, in the standards attained. There was a time when within their circumscribed limits of responsibility, the old Universities of India produced *alumni* of as high a standard as anywhere else in the world. Competent critics spoke well of the standard of examination and of the quality of the degree conferred. Writing in 1891, E. W. Thomas, in the Review of the History and Prospects of British Education in India said about them: 'On the whole they (*i.e.*, the degrees) denote much the same standard of attainment as do those conferred by the University of London.' The increase in numbers has probably affected standards adversely even in wealthier countries. The 'Universities Quarterly' of the United Kingdom has stated editorially that although opinions among

University people are varied, the majority hold that the best students are as good as ever and the worse no worse than before, but the average quality is lower on account of a greater increase in the lower ranges. A similar, but probably more emphatic judgment will undoubtedly be valid in respect of the standards of present-day Indian Universities. In the ultimate analysis the main reasons will be found to be three, *viz.*, insufficient expenditure on University Education, the confusion prevailing in regard to the medium of instruction; and undue emphasis on the system of year-end examinations.

This is not an appropriate occasion for me to expatiate on any of these matters, although I cannot refrain from drawing attention once again to the utter inadequacy of the funds devoted by the country to the improvement and development of higher education as compared with other countries. Whereas in the United Kingdom and the U S A , the annual average expenditure per student undergoing higher education is the equivalent of Rs 5,000, in India it is below Rs 500. Out of our national income here in India we are probably devoting to higher education a percentage which is one quarter of what it is in U K. Grave as they are, these disparities will be seen to be much more serious when it is realized that our wastage by failures in examinations is about 5 times that, say, in U K. Lastly, whereas in U K., the increase in the number educated is matched by proportionate increase in grants, with us the increase in grants is disproportionately small, with the result that there is progressive deterioration in all directions.

From the point of view of students within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta University, the picture is more dismal still. It is not perhaps generally realized that today this University has to look after the higher education of nearly 90,000 students, a number which exceeds the total number of students in all the seven British Universities. One city college has over 13,000 students and five others have an average of 6,000. The colleges of Howrah across the river provide for another 18,000, making a total of nearly 60,000 for what may be called the metropolitan area of Bengal.

The number of students who have received their degrees, diplomas and certificates today is 8,822, about most of whom will be leaving the University to face the citizen's life and its problems. To those who will prosecute their studies

further I need say very little. I congratulate them on their good fortune and can assure them that much is being done out of the funds at the disposal of the University Grants Commission to improve the apparatus of post-graduate education. I doubt if lack of employment or a suitable vocation will be a serious problem for them when they finish their chosen courses. They will probably find that their emoluments or earnings will be, at least for a long time to come, disappointingly or distressingly low; but that state of affairs is only a reflection of the still backward state of economy of the country.

Those who have received professional or post-graduate degrees or diplomas will, also, I expect, fare reasonably well. But for the bulk of the graduates, especially in this part of the country, I fear employment opportunities will be poor and uninspiring. I have spoken elsewhere about the Second Five Year Plan and the proposals it contains in regard to improvement of employment opportunities for the educated, and I do not intend to traverse the same ground again. I should, however, like to take this opportunity of supplementing what I said recently with special reference to conditions in Bengal, which are somewhat special.

In Bengal the middle classes have always been a more important component of the community than elsewhere, the reasons being largely, but not entirely, historical. Although its metropolis and its environs hum with commercial and industrial activity, the country-side has no other town important in the modern sense. The result is that prospects of gainful employment draw young men to Calcutta, young men often desirous of bettering their prospects by acquiring higher academic qualifications while earning some sort of a livelihood. In a milieu of large-scale industry and commerce small-scale industry and self-employment has till lately been neglected, and there is excessive reliance on the part of those undergoing higher education on professional careers or clerical and administrative avocations. The dead-end character of secondary education, only now sought to be remedied by proliferation and extension, as recommended by the Secondary Education Commission, has left hardly any choice to the young person of sixteen who has passed the school leaving examination other than proceeding to seek admission to an institution of higher education for a better

chance in life, especially as for many categories of jobs the minimum educational qualification prescribed is Intermediate pass or a degree. Since many a college in the country-side lacks the full complement of facilities, especially for honours or in science, young persons gravitate inevitably to Calcutta.

This mass migration in the past was encouraged, by the educational authorities, in spite of strained resources, under a public pressure difficult to resist and often out of a genuine conviction that it was a public duty to accommodate young people seeking the blessings of higher education, so important to an economically hardpressed community. To this already difficult complex of academic circumstance, have been added the trials and tribulations of the events that resulted in the partition of India, events which have affected Bengal more adversely than any other State in India. While its area and resources have contracted, the burdens on it have increased on the contrary owing to the influx of waves of displaced persons from Eastern Pakistan, a movement which has not ceased to this day and of which no one can foresee the end with any degree of confidence. The phenomenal strengths of colleges in Calcutta and Howrah to which I referred a short while ago are the end results of these diverse influences.

The Government of Bengal, the University authorities and college managements are well seized of the problem, and with a concerted effort, guided and assisted by the University Grants Commission, it should be possible to do something progressively effective to relieve the congestion in Calcutta colleges.

I refer to these matters, not evidently relevant in the context of a Convocation Address, firstly, because I want the fresh graduates before me to know that when I address a few words of advice to them I do so with some awareness of the unsatisfactory nature of the arrangements society has made for imparting higher education to them; secondly, because I feel that society, that is the State, owes a special measure of guidance and assistance to the educated youth of Bengal, on the lines indicated by the Planning Commission with reference to the problem of educated unemployed in paragraphs 22 to 29 of Chapter V of their Report on the Second Five Year Plan. Bengal will have to have a

considerable portion of the pilot schemes which they have recommended and for which they have promised larger provisions should the response be adequate.

There is another aspect of employment which should bring some comfort to those seeking it. Experience has shown in regard to developing economies that estimates of educated manpower are apt to prove to be under-estimates in the gross and in detail. This should be particularly true of India, where there were no estimates worth speaking about in regard to the First Plan and where for the Second they have been at best sectional, especially confined to the professional or technological fields. Even in those fields, it is now conceded, there will be shortages. But in other technical fields, *e.g.*, sociological or statistical, as for instance, for community development and national extension work, there exist pronounced shortages of the right type of educated people. The country-side's needs will soon be clamant and the conditions of work there are steadily improving. What is needed, therefore, is a readjustment of attitudes on the part of the city educated youth, as well as a course of reorientation for them by prospective employers. On the part of the Universities also, a continuous adjustment of educational sights is called for so that the current needs of the nation are adequately met. In the nature of things, Universities, even where they are slightly ahead of society at large in discerning the ever-moving social purpose of education, are nearly always behind the urgency of actual requirements. It is for Planning authorities or implementing agencies of the Plan to alert them betimes. At the instance of the Community Development Ministry I have, on behalf of the University Grants Commission, already drawn the attention of the Inter-University Board to the very large requirements of educated personnel of this important executive agency of the State operating in the country-side.

Even where for the moment, prospects of employment are dim or uninspiring, the great evil to be on guard against is frustration. Employment opportunities reveal themselves to the sanguine and not to the faint-hearted. Frustration is like that bogey of the Himalayan climber, lassitude at the high altitudes, a desire for peace and rest, to give up the struggle, a surrender to which means sure annihilation.

I do not believe that the young person of today in India needs much exhortation about the dignity of labour. Moreover, dignity attaches not to labour so much as to a realization that no one is entitled to ask another to undergo manual or physical labour for him which, in certain circumstances, he would not be prepared, if able, to undergo for himself. When a politician friend of Abraham Lincoln, astonished at finding him polishing his own shoes in his country-house gasped : Why ! Mr. President, you are cleaning your own shoes ! Lincoln coolly countered : "Yes, who e shoes do you clean ? "

I would now turn to matters of fundamental and permanent import, viz., the duties and responsibilities of the educated, the due discharge of which is all the more necessary in a country where employment opportunities for the highly educated are not satisfactory and where improvement in economic and social conditions hangs in the final analysis on the more privileged members of the community, such as the educated, giving of their very best. To put it briefly, the more depressing the environment the greater is the need of specially hard effort on the part of everyone, particularly the instructed. In such a situation the shortcomings of the instructions received should, instead of discouraging, act as a spur to further efforts, if the vicious circle of poor resources, imperfect instruction and continued poverty of resources is to be broken. It should be remembered that University education is only a preparation for enlightened citizenship and that such a citizenship is a life-long business and challenge.

The new graduate will be entering on his career in a dynamic society, which no doubt needs competent scientist, and technologists and professional men of all sorts, but needs still more basically persons of judgment, sincerity, integrity and diligence who can play their part well in a modern democracy.

As I understand it the functions of parliamentary democracy such as is practised in this country and elsewhere are two : firstly, what might be called a floating sense of right and wrong in the community by which at intervals the verdict of society is brought to bear conclusively and definitively on the actions of those who are entrusted with responsibility for the governance of the country ; and secondly,

that this verdict is made up of the personal judgments of all the adult individuals who make up the community. If this is correct the importance of individual freedom of opinion, which is sought to be safeguarded by our Constitution, at once becomes evident. It should, therefore, be the particular concern of the younger generation to ensure that their intellectual independence is fully maintained and developed and is not permitted to succumb to any form, open or disguised, of authoritarianism or dictatorship.

I have already referred to the dynamism of the society into which the new graduate will be moving. This is all the more noticeable in a country like ours which has achieved independence after centuries of subjugation to alien authority and influences. Whatever the fortunes of life may bring to the individual, there is no doubt whatsoever that generations which have the privilege of living in and working for the India of today are among the most fortunate. There is undoubtedly a sense of satisfaction in achievements in a country already in the vanguard of progress. There is also an exhilarating feeling of manhood in waging a war against alien rule, but this cannot compare with excitement and fascination of helping to build up the economy of a backward country which has only lately achieved its independence and which is straining every nerve and sinew to make up for lost time and opportunities in work of reconstruction and development, a process which in a thickly populated country like ours means so much in terms of advancement of human welfare and maintenance of peace in this world.

In a recent thought-provoking article on the paradox of progress Aldous Huxley has put forward certain important propositions. These are : (1) individual life is not necessarily progressive; (2) human beings have an amazing capacity for taking things for granted; (3) the progress which can be observed takes place in what may be called the public domain, but for all children and adolescents and for the vast majority of adults it is private life alone that has value or indeed any real existence; (4) that men and women responsible for progress have always been a minority; (5) that while public life is perpetually changing private life remains enduringly the same; and (6) that although progress can take place all the time it is never completely gratuitous and has always to be paid for. In developing these ideas he writes : " If

private life is not too brutally interfered with and if the bad environment is sanctioned by customs, justified by religion and rationalised in terms of the prevailing philosophy, men will tolerate the intolerable and will go on tolerating it for years, even for generations and centuries." It is this apathy, this pathetic contentment, which it should be the duty of the new generation to be aware of and to make strenuous and continuous efforts to shake off.

In looking around the new world of active citizenship into which the fresh graduates will have entered, the first shock that they will probably receive is in finding that in the university of life what is preached is not always practised. I have great sympathy for the University graduate who after an indifferent course of instruction through his most impressionable age steps into the world of a citizen's life, lagging far behind life in other countries in minimum comforts and adequate opportunities; a world where in addition to lack of the apparatus of material well-being, and in part because of it, he is likely to encounter undesirable pressures on moral values. Concretely, the young graduate faced with lack of gainful occupation may also encounter in addition a low code of ethics encouraged by the scramble for advantage. Unless he is exceptionally lucky he may meet unedifying spectacles of greed for pelf or power, hypocrisy and double-dealing and disregard of the rule of the law. Whatever innate foundation of goodness there may be in him and whatever the extent to which it has been fostered in the case of higher education (unfortunately that extent is not likely to be great on account of modern instruction being entirely void of any element of religious or moral teaching), all that will stand in imminent danger of being eroded by a tainted environment unless he is especially on his guard. He may be driven by penury to a despondent laxness in the discharge of duty. He may be encouraged by the enveloping atmosphere of business or politics or profession or administration to deviate from the high and narrow path of rectitude, tempted by bad example to deal unfairly or inconsiderately with others even less fortunate than he is, in other words, to exploit; persuaded by subtle influences to regard right means as unimportant in securing desired ends. It is in such circumstances that the educated youth of the country must by his internal individual sense of discipline, reinforce

whatever disciplines he may have undergone in the course of his higher education and make a stand for the preservation of the sense of right and wrong. Apart from this sense being the foundation of democratic society, it is the natural heritage of the young and it should have been developed, be it by ever so little, by his University education.

It is for the new generation particularly to resist the sway of bad environment to discharge their moral obligations as the elite of the community, which in a sense they are. It is not given to everyone to rise to high positions or to sway the course of events, but it is possible for everyone to safeguard his moral values if only he means to do so, in spite of every handicap and disadvantage in material sense. Indeed, it is often found that the less advantaged a person is the more acute is his sense of right and wrong. Conscience is a flame which often burns brightest in the hearts of the poor.

Apart from moral values, young men at the commencement of their careers in life should endeavour desperately to retain or cultivate certain qualities. Of these I place intellectual curiosity at a very high level. Indeed, since that is the outstanding characteristic of a student, the ideal would be to remain a student all one's life. It is then only that the full flavour of life can be savoured, no matter what the surrounding material circumstances may be.

Another quality to be cherished and fostered is aesthetic sensibility. I have always lamented the almost universal sway that slovenliness and lack of all sense of order seem to have established over the modern Indian scene. Whatever the cause may be, no effort should be spared to combat this trend; and the best instrument for the purpose is a carefully cultivated and jealously guarded aesthetic sensibility.

The educated youth of today may lack the opportunities for fruitful use of knowledge and even skill acquired at the University. But no wisdom that he may have garnered need ever go waste. In the ultimate analysis, wisdom stems from the conscience and we have the authority of many great men for believing that conscience may be the voice of God.

MAHATMA GANDHI said :

“ You have to believe no one but yourselves. You must try to listen to the inner voice, but if you won't

have the expression 'inner voice' you may use the expression 'dictates of reason', which you should obey, and if you will not parade God, I have no doubt you will parade something else which in the end will prove to be God, for, fortunately, there is no one and nothing else but God in this universe."

B. CONVOCATION ADDRESS*

SRI N. K. SIDHANTA, *Vice-Chancellor,*
Calcutta University

YOUR EXCELLENCY, MR. DESHMUKH, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN

As it is only four months since we had our last Convocation there is not the same volume of material to report. We can now claim to be up to date with our Conventions as we are distributing the degrees and diplomas awarded on the examinations of 1956. The examinations for the M.A. and M.Sc. degrees had, however, to be postponed on account of the unprecedented floods in the State and the successful students will have to wait another year for their formal Convocation. This Convocation is a special one as we are holding it in the midst of our Centenary Celebrations which should be an occasion for stock-taking and for assessment of our work during the first hundred years of existence. This we have attempted to do in a fairly bulky volume which will be available to the public tomorrow. Today we can indulge in some heart-searching as we are going over the happenings of a short period and think more of the future that lies ahead.

CONDOLENCE

As usual I begin with the losses suffered recently. Late Pannalal Bose, ex-Minister of Education, took up this responsible office after retirement from the Judicial Service and ably served the cause of education in the State for several years. Late Joygopal Banerjee, a profound scholar in English literature, held the chair of Professor of English of this University from 1927 to 1936. He died at the age of 84 full of years and honours. Late Suhaschandra Ray, Lecturer in the Department of English, was a teacher in this University for more than thirty years. Late Manindranath Bose, formerly Principal, R. G. Kar Medical College, served the University from 1929 till the coming of the new Act, as a

* Convocation Address delivered by Sri Nirmalkumar Sidhanta, M.A. (Cal. & Cantab.), Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University, on Saturday, the 19th January, 1957.

member of the Senate, Syndicate, Dean of the Faculty of Medicine and on various other Committees. Late Jitendramohan Sen was a member of the Senate, and different Faculties and Committees of the University from 1935 to 1955. He was the Head of the Department of Teaching in this University for about six years. He made over to this University his own ancestral home with the object of creating an endowment for higher studies in Education in memory of his parents, Jnanendramohan Sen and Sarala Sen. In the death of Indubhushan Banerjee, formerly Asutosh Professor of History, the University has lost a well-known historian.

We deeply mourn the loss of these eminent persons and offer our condolence to the bereaved families.

FELICITATIONS

We offer our felicitations to Sri Hemendraprasad Ghosh, on his attaining the mature age of eighty-one years. We are also glad to learn that Sri Amulyakumar Saha, Professor of Surgery, N. R. Sircar Medical College, has been elected Huntarian Professor of Surgery at the Royal College of Surgeons, England

ACTIVITIES ABROAD

Prof. S. P. Chatterjee, University Professor of Geography, has been invited by the Moscow University to deliver a series of lectures at the Geographical Faculty of the University.

SPECIAL LECTURERS APPOINTED

Dr. C. G. Pandit, M.B.B.S., Ph.D., D.P.H., D.T.M., F.N.I., Director, Indian Council of Medical Research, has been appointed Brahmachari Reader in Medicine for 1957.

Swami Tejasananda was appointed Sister Nivedita Lecturer for 1956 to deliver at least two lectures on the life and activities of Sister Nivedita.

Mr. A. A. A. Fyze was appointed Sir Abdulla Suhrawardy Lecturer for 1956 to deliver a course of at least three lectures in Bengali, Urdu or English, on some aspect of Islamic Thought and Culture.

Sri Appadorai, Principal, International Institute of Studies, New Delhi, was appointed Taraprasad Khaitan Lecturer for 1956.

Dr. Subodhchandra Sengupta has been appointed Saratchandra Chatterjee Memorial Lecturer for 1956.

Sri Bimalchandra Sinha has been appointed Vidyasagar Lecturer for 1957.

VISITORS AND EXTENSION LECTURERS

We offered hospitality to French Professor Jean Wahl, and the Italian philosopher Prof. Franco Lombardi, who was visiting India under the sponsorship of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

Prof. C. D. Darlington, Head of the Department of Botany, University of Oxford, has been invited to deliver lectures at the Botany Department of the University.

IMPORTANT CHANGES IN STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

1. Statutes have been framed regarding the constitution of the Faculty of Journalism and are pending before the Chancellor for her assent.

2. A separate integrated course of Commerce, viz., I.Com., B.Com., (Pass and Honours), and M.Com., has been adopted and is going to be introduced shortly.

3. The following new subjects, (i) Household Science, (ii) Household Art, (iii) Child Care and Training and (iv) Social Science, have been added to the subjects for the I.A., I.Sc., B.A. and B.Sc. Examinations for the benefit of women students.

4. A new diploma course in Dermatology has been instituted to enable the medical graduates to have training in Dermatology.

5. Biochemistry has been included in the list of subjects for the M.Sc. Examination.

6. A new diploma course in Museology has been introduced.

Museum methods were being taught in the Anthropology Department since 1936. Now a full diploma course has been introduced.

7. The Regulations for the M.B.B.S. Examination have been revised.

ENDOWMENTS AND GIFTS

An offer of Rs. 10,000 from Sm. Sucharu Devi, for making an endowment in order to commemorate her father, Brahmananda Keshabchandra Sen, was accepted with thanks. G. P. Notes of the face value of Rs. 5 000 were received from the General Secretary, Ramkrishna Mission, on behalf of the Nivedita School, for the creation of a lectureship in the University in memory of Sister Nivedita. A grant of Rs. 60,000 was sanctioned for 1956-57 by the Deputy Secretary, Government of West Bengal, Medical and Public Health Department, for adding to the corpus of the Bangabala Mookerjee Endowment Fund for higher training of nurses. An offer of Rs. 3,000 from Dr. Jadunath Sinha for an endowment for the award of a gold medal in commemoration of his deceased wife Sunila Manjari Sinha to the best female student, who pass the B.A. (Pass) Examination of the Calcutta University was accepted with thanks. An offer of 3% Conversion Loan of the face value of Rs. 1,000 from Sri Satischandria Ghosh, for the creation of an endowment for the annual award of a silver medal to be called "W. C. Ghosh Medal" for the girl student, securing the highest number of marks in English Honours in the B.A. Examination, was accepted with thanks. A sum of Rs. 12 200 has been received from Mrs. A. Basu to found a scholarship in memory of her deceased husband Dr. Premsunder Basu. A sum of Rs. 5,000 in G. P. Notes and also a sum of Rs. 150 in cash for this year's award have been received from Sri Nareschandra Ghosh of Sadhana Ousadhalaya for the creation of an endowment entitled "Dr. Haren Mookerjee Memorial Debate".

Mrs. N. K. Ghosh presented a challenge shield worth Rs. 300 in memory of her father late Maninathanath Bose to be awarded to the winner of the Inter-Collegiate Midnapore-Bankura Zonal Football Final. A sum of Rs. 7,000 has been received from Howrah Motor Co., for instituting a scholarship of Rs. 15 per month for a year and a book prize to the best student in B.A. and B.Sc. Honours in Mathematics. An

offer has been received from Prof. Nalinaksha Datta, Head of the Department of Pali, for donating Rs. 1,000 for the University Centenary Fund. He has also requested the University to deduct Rs. 800 every month from his salary from January to November, 1957, for the creation of a fund out of the accumulation of such deduction, in order to provide for a monthly stipend for a student taking up Pali in the Post-Graduate classes.

Donations from private sources amounting to about Rs. 1,80,000 have been received as Centenary contributions.

The total contributions from these sources do not come up to our expectations and we are hoping that other sources which have been approached will be coming forward with donations within the next few weeks.

In planning for the next decade or two we have to depend mainly on State help. The University Grants Commission has made a generous contribution of one crore on the occasion of the Centenary Celebrations and this will help us with our immediate building plans. The Government of West Bengal has made a special contribution of about 7½ lakhs which also will be extremely useful. We are grateful to the University Grants Commission and to the State Government for these contributions.

VIHARILAL COLLEGE FOR HOME AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

It was decided by the Calcutta University in 1954 to expand and develop the existing Viharilal Mitra Institute into a full-fledged degree college to be called the Viharilal College for Home and Social Science.

The college, as planned, would provide a 4-year degree course with special emphasis on Home and Social Science. The final, i.e., the 5th-year would be devoted to a Post-Graduate Teachers' Training Course leading to a Teachers' Diploma in the subject.

The subjects that would be specially taught in this college are :—

1. Household Art with special reference to Art in everyday life and living, centered on home activities and relationship.
2. Child Care and Training including mental health of the child and Child Guidance.

3. Household Science with special emphasis on food and nutrition, relation of food to individual and family well-being, to national and social security.
4. Social Science including Social Service and Public Health and other allied subjects.

The construction work of the new college building is almost complete. The complete construction of the entire college building would cost a sum of Rs. 5,88,884. The Government of India has very kindly agreed to bear 66% of the total cost of the building construction, i.e., a grant to the extent of Rs. 3,88,600 has been sanctioned for the purpose. Also we have approached the Government of India for sanctioning a recurring grant of Rs. 80,155 yearly for a period of five years. We have also approached the Government of West Bengal for according sanction to a non-recurring grant of Rs. 4,65,220 (Rs. 2,65,000 for equipment and Rs. 2,00,220 for meeting 31% cost of buildings).

The new Viharial College will be opened on 22nd instant by Dr. J. C. Ghosh, Member, Planning Commission.

COLLEGIATE EDUCATION

I think it necessary to dwell here on the state of collegiate education on the completion of a hundred years of the life of the University. The number of colleges affiliated to this University was 60 in 1947 after the partition of Bengal. Today the total number of colleges affiliated to this University is 124. Of these 105 are Arts and Science Colleges, 32 in Calcutta and 73 in the Mofussil. The remaining 19 are Professional Colleges of which 9 are institutions imparting teaching in Medicine, 4 are for the training of teachers, 2 are for Legal Studies, 1 for Engineering, 1 for Tanning, 1 for Agriculture and 1 exclusively for Commerce. The total number of students in the undergraduate classes of the professional and non-professional colleges of the University is 82,400. Of this number roughly 50% have taken up the study of humanities, about 37% read pure science and only 13% are students of professional courses. This comparative paucity in the number of students in the professional courses is not due to the absence of demand for such courses but is due to the limited facilities for taking up such courses. Professional Colleges are not increasing in the same proportion

as Arts and Science Colleges and there is obviously a need for increase in their numbers. If we add to the number of undergraduate students, students in the Post-Graduate classes in Arts, Science, Technology and Law, we have a total of 87,532 students whom it is the responsibility of this University today to look after.

As the University is about to enter the second century of its life, it is faced with the task of introducing a complete change in the structure of collegiate education. I refer to the introduction of the Three-year Degree Course. The scheme has been adopted by the Academic Council and the matter is now pending before the Senate. Recently Statutes relating to the conditions to be fulfilled by colleges seeking recognition as Constituent Colleges have been drawn up and they have been passed by the Senate.

The problem of hostel accommodation for students remains as acute as before. For Post-Graduate students, we have two hostels under construction, one for boys on Hazra Road, south of the University Science College at Ballygange, and another for girls in the Hastings House. The latter is nearing completion and should be ready for occupation by next July, while work on the former is being expedited.

For undergraduate students too,—especially for girls,—there is great need for new hostels. I elaborated the need at some length in my last report and I shall be content with just referring to it again.

BOARD OF HEALTH

Social Service Camps :

During the Puja Vacation the Board of Health organised four Social Service Camps. 350 students and teachers from different colleges participated. One of these, a camp at Dhamua (24-Parganas), about 22 miles from Calcutta, was exclusively meant for women students. Sri Tarakchandra Das, a University teacher of the Anthropology Department, was in charge. He was assisted by some lady teachers from our colleges.

The students established contact with the village women-folk and taught them the broad principles of First-aid,

Home-nursing, and care of the sick, Child Care, principles of health and hygiene, sewing, etc.

An illustrated brochure—"The Role of University Students in Village Development Work",—describing the work done by the students during the years 1955 and 1956, was published and distributed to persons interested in rural reconstruction work. The brochure contains a survey of the socio-economic condition of some villages in West Bengal not covered by the Community Development and National Extension Service programmes.

The Inter-University Youth Festival :

The Calcutta University Contingent has been taking part creditably in the Inter-University Youth Festival organised by the Union Ministry of Education. Like other Youth Welfare activities, participation in the Festival was arranged under the supervision of the Board of Health. In 1956 the Calcutta University Contingent was formed on the basis of an Inter-College Youth Festival held in Calcutta. About 400 students from 25 colleges participated. The contingent to the Delhi Festival was composed of 45 students and 5 teachers. The contingent participated in nearly all the items of the Festival at Delhi with satisfactory results, winning awards in the largest number of items amidst a very keen competition among 31 Universities. The Calcutta University Contingent won awards in the following items :

Painting, Handicrafts, Instrumental Music (Men), Instrumental Music (Women), Group singing, Drama and Radio Play.

THE ASUTOSH MUSEUM

In the months under review the Asutosh Museum of Indian Art of the Calcutta University carried on extensive explorations in different parts of Bengal which resulted in the discovery of rare objects of art and antiquity throwing new light on the yet unknown history of Bengal. In this brief period four new ancient sites were discovered in Bengal, at Bahiri in Midnapore District, Atghara in 24-Parganas and Deriyapur-Boro Balarampur and Deulia in Burdwan District. The antiquities from Bahiri suggest that the site conceals ruins of Kushan and Pala periods, while the numismatic and

terracotta finds from Atghara and Deriyapur-Boro Balarampur show that the places had habitations more than two thousand years ago. Atghara, near Baruipur on the Calcutta-Diamond Harbour Railway line, lies only a dozen miles away from Ballygunge, and thereby it is the nearest archaeological site to Calcutta. Both Bahiri and Atghara have been explored by Sri Pareschandra Dasgupta, Assistant Curator. The three silver-punch-marked coins which have been discovered at Deriyapur-Boro Balarampur represent the early coinage of India, which circulated more than two thousand years ago. Several stone sculptures discovered at Denlia are fine examples of the late Gupta and early Pala periods. Numerous early terracottas and coins and other objects have also been collected from the ancient sites of Chandraketurgarh and Harinarayanpur in 24-Parganas, and Tamluk (ancient Tamralipta) in Midnapore District. Among these, special mention may be made of two terracotta seals, one with Kushan Brahmi and another with letters supposedly in Graeco-Roman character from Chandraketurgarh, and a small gold coin from Tamluk with foreign devices and style.

Important objects of art and antiquity have also been collected from outside Bengal. Among these, special mention may be made of a stone Vishnu from Divakarpur in Jaunpur District, U.P., belonging to c. 11th century A.D., and many objects comprising of rare manuscripts, painted *patas*, figures, etc. from Orissa. A large number of Orissan examples of art and antiquity were collected by Sri Devaprasad Ghosh, Curator of the Asutosh Museum, during his recent explorations in that State.

Some remarkable gifts have been received by the Museum. The presentation of a set of rare books on art and archaeology to the Museum Seminar by Dr. Bratindrakumar Sengupta on the occasion of the Centenary Celebrations deserves special mention.

Mr. N. H. Austen of New York presented a sum of 100 dollars to the Museum to enrich the Folk Art Collections.

ADVISORY BUREAU AND APPOINTMENTS BOARD

The services of the Students' Advisory Bureau are being widely used by students and others. During the last three months 96 applications were received for study and

training overseas. These include one for Post-Graduate course in Business Administration in the U.S.A. and another for Social Science course in Germany. Three students were accepted by the Dundee Technical College for the course in Jute Technology and one for a special course in Community Development at the Institute of Education, London.

The appointments Board recommended 110 candidates to 25 organisations for various posts including those for executives, engineers and chemists

UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

The problem of accommodation which has become a very distressing one with the library and has been proving a handicap to smooth and efficient running and supervision of the library for a long time may now be expected to be solved, as it has been ultimately decided to erect a multi-storied building on the site of the present Senate House to accommodate the University Library along with certain other departments of the University

Extra almirahs have in the meantime, been set up along the walls of the main Reading Hall and the Stack Room to hold part of the overflowing book stock of the Library.

Gifts of books have been received from several sources including a large number of books belonging to the late Chancellor Dr H C Mookerjee.

COLLEGES OF ARTS AND COMMERCE

There is a great rush now for admission into the University Colleges of Arts, Science and Commerce. As many as 2,110 students have been admitted into the Colleges of Arts and Commerce and quite a large number of applicants for admission have been disappointed. The great problem that faces the Post-Graduate Department today is that of accommodation. Increase in the number of admissions has been held up mainly on account of shortage of accommodation and, in some subjects, of non-availability of staff of the requisite calibre. The financial obstacles are always present but we shall try to overcome that as best as we can. Evening classes have been started for the College of Commerce, yet a large number of students are refused admission every year.

As regards the Language Department there have been persistent enquiries as to the opening of other modern European and Asian Language classes, besides the languages now being taught. It is high time for us to have a full-fledged Institute of Modern Languages—Asiatic and European.

SPORTS BOARD

The University Sports Board has been very active under its energetic Chairman Sri N. K. Ghosh. Our Football team has won the coveted Asutosh Memorial Challenge Shield, having been the winners of the Inter-Varsity Football Tournament, 1956. The Calcutta University Tent on the Maidan is going to be furnished with necessary sanitary arrangements at a cost of Rs. 5,000 during the current financial year. As part of the Centenary Celebrations of the Calcutta University the XVth Inter-Varsity Athletic Championship was successfully held at the Eden Gardens in the first week of January. 23 Universities of India and Ceylon with 397 athletes participated. This I consider to be a record for an Inter-Varsity Athletic Meet. An elaborate programme of Centenary Sports was also drawn up in which the past and present students as also teachers were associated. Rangoon, Lucknow and Jadavpur Universities also came to participate in Inter-Varsity Rowing.

UNIVERSITY PRESS

The following publications have been placed in the market after the last Convocation held on 1st September, 1956 :

1. Pali Literature and Language (2nd edition) of Wilhelm Geiger, authorised English Translation by Dr. Butokristo Ghosh.
2. Bangala Sahityer Katha (5th edition) by Dr. Sukumar Sen.
3. Progressive German Reader for Arts and Science students, by Dr. Haragopal Biswas.

CENTENARY

Our Centenary Celebrations are on one hand an occasion of thanksgiving for all that we have received during the last

100 years, for whatever little we have been able to contribute to our community and to the country. At the same time it is an occasion for looking forward to the future in order to achieve the goal which all Universities must have before them. This goal is to be reached through the cherishing of ideals that are universal, ideals that have inspired humanity through the ages. The University and its products have played their part in the struggle for freedom and in the regeneration of the country in the past. Now under more favourable conditions it has to attempt to consolidate the fruits of struggle and ensure the freedom of the human spirit, freedom from want, from fear, from hatred, from exploitation, from greed, from ignorance and from bondage to gross matter. With the enthusiasm generated by our celebrations in our teachers, administrators and students we hope that it will be possible for us to achieve the great task that lies before us.

Appendix III

SPECIAL CONVOCATION ADDRESS*

MADAM CHANCELLOR, DR. RADHAKRISHNAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

On the occasion of the celebration of the Centenary of the Calcutta University, the Senate and the Syndicate of the University decided to confer honorary degrees on certain persons distinguished for their attainments and scholarship. It is one of the privileges of every University to recognise the work of persons, who have served society and humanity in various ways, who have functioned as torch-bearers of knowledge, who have extended the horizon of human thought. Some of them belong to our State and have worked for the greater part of their life in Calcutta; some come from other States of the Union of India; some again are our distinguished guests from abroad. All of them have won distinction and renown in their respective fields and we are proud to be able to recognise this distinction.

PANDIT JOGENDRANATH BAGCHI

Described as a master of logic and philosophy, referred to as an ocean of learning, Pandit Jogendranath Bagchi is a symbol of scholarship for which India has been famous for thousands of years. As an example of plain living and highest thinking, he has set a model before present-day students, which they should try to emulate. In recognising the work of Pandit Jogendranath Bagchi, the University shows its appreciation of our great heritage of Sanskrit literature and the knowledge which is stored in our ancient philosophy.

DR. LLOYD VIEL BERKNER

A distinguished scientist and administrator, his activities have embraced research in technical problems of ionization

* Special Convocation Address delivered by Sri Nirmalkumar Sidhanta, M.A. (Cal. & Cantab.), Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University, on Wednesday, the 23rd January, 1957.

and terrestrial magnetism. Not content only with work in the laboratory he has utilised his knowledge for national purposes and international service. A scientist of today has to lead a full life but it is doubtful if any one lives a fuller life than what Dr. Lloyd Viel Berkner has done during the last 30 years, if any single scientist has done more to co-ordinate the activities of scientists, to direct modern science to human and beneficent ends.

PANDIT VIDHUSEKHAR BHATTACHARYYA

A scholar, who has delved deep into our ancient literature and philosophy, Pandit Vidhusekhar Bhattacharyya has extended the horizon of knowledge through his original work. As Professor of Sanskrit in this University, he guided generations of students on the path of scholarship bringing them first to appreciate the subtleties of our ancient literature and then prompting them to do research on the old texts.

SRI NANDALAL BOSE

A pioneer of the renaissance of art in India Sri Nandalal Bose has guided the efforts of innumerable disciples to express emotions through the visual arts. His own work has conveyed his interpretation of sublimity in the world and in human beings to millions of lovers of art and, standing the test of time, it will continue to stimulate the creative activity of the generations to come. Working in the seclusion of the Poet's Shantiniketan he has made his hermitage a place of pilgrimage for all artists.

SRI RAJSEKHAR BOSE

Pharmacy and Chemistry are not usually regarded as the most congenial surroundings for the creative artist, yet Sri Rajsekhar Bose has, in the midst of his work in Industry, woven patterns of words for the delight of lovers of literature. The short story and social satire have been his *forte* in them he has lightly touched the weaknesses and evils of contemporary society. Genuine humour defies attempts at analysis and the humorist is loved for the happiness which he brings to his fellow-beings, for the relief which he can give in the midst of suffering and misery. On this occasion,

we pay a tribute to the Comic Muse which has its worthiest exponent in Sri Rajsekhar Bose.

SRI SATYENDRANATH BOSE

In the retirement of his laboratory Sri Satyendranath Bose has investigated the truths of the basic sciences and expanded the scope of the greatest scientific discovery of today with his fundamental work. For four decades he has been guiding students of Physics in their attempt to discover the most abstruse postulates of modern science. As an educational administrator he has the responsibility of guiding the Institution which has been our greatest Poet's gift to the world. In his synthesis of the humanism of the past and the rationalism of the present, he is a beacon-light to all University men.

SRI SUDHIRANJAN DAS

As a Member of the Calcutta Bar, as a Judge of the High Court of Calcutta, as the Head of the Judiciary in the Punjab and now as the Head of the Supreme Court of India, Sri Sudhiranjan Das has a unique position in the realm of Law. A great Barrister and a great Judge Sri Sudhiranjan Das has contributed more than any living human being to enhance the confidence of the people in the impartiality of our Judiciary and the soundness of our Judicial System. His knowledge of and contribution to the basic principles of Jurisprudence will be an asset for all times: his friends and colleagues will think of him as the best embodiment of the many-sided interest in life which marks the leaders of the present-day world.

SRI CHINTAMAN DWARKANATH DESHMUKH

One of the most outstanding administrators that India has produced Sri Chintaman Dwarkanath Deshmukh's reputation extends far beyond the limits of officialdom. A seeker after knowledge in Humanities and Natural Sciences, a linguist of no mean calibre, he has taken upon himself the task of the future development of Indian Universities. A guide to the nation in Banking and Finance he is the sheet-anchor for future intellectual enterprise in the country. The quality which took him to the highest official positions, the penetrating

analysis he showed in his examination of financial problems should enable him to understand the difficulties of Indian Universities and to remove the present shortcomings.

SRI JNANENDRACHANDRA GHOSH

A fit disciple of an eminent Savant, a Chemist of international repute, a guide of generations of chemists at Dacca and Calcutta, Sri Jnanendrachandra Ghosh took charge of the Institute of Science, Bangalore, to rejuvenate and revitalise it and to leave it as the most significant centre of Scientific Research in the country. His administrative genius has found scope in varied activities and he has been equally at home in the Directorate of Supply as in the creation of the first Higher Technological Institute in the country. Calcutta University remembers his leadership with gratitude and admires his work in planning for the future of the country. His intimate knowledge of Industry, his familiarity with the methods and problems of Technology and his wide vision should stand him in good stead in his all-important work.

SRI ATULCHANDRA GUPTA

Sri Atulchandra Gupta has been a great jurist and a leader of the Calcutta Bar. He has illustrated in his life the union of legal knowledge and the creative powers of the literary artist. The symbol of the best elements of Indian culture, he has helped to raise the cultural level of present-day Bengal. His professional colleagues admire his skill as a jurist; lovers of literature appreciate his skill as a critic of art and life; the public of Calcutta looks up to him for help in all intellectual activities of the city.

DR. ZAKIR HUSAIN

An outstanding educationist Dr. Zakir Husain brought the Jamia Milia into being and nurtured it for a quarter of a century, conducting new experiments in education and giving a new light to the young people fortunate enough to be educated there. Dr. Zakir Husain is also one of the creators of the system of Basic Education in this country, of instruction through crafts and creative activity, a method, this, which has revolutionised elementary education. He has

guided the Muslim University for eight critical years of its existence, taking up the work when the University was on the verge of extinction and leaving it only after necessary expansion and consolidation of its activities had been assured. The future of education in all stages in this country will depend to a great extent on the execution of the ideas preached by Dr. Zakir Husain.

SIR HAROLD SPENCER JONES

An explorer of the skies, voyaging through the strange seas of thought, not alone, but as the leader of a devoted band of workers, Sir Harold Spencer Jones has illustrated in his life how the modern State depends on the Scientist in war as well as in peace. His presence in this country should stimulate greater and greater interest in the Astronomy-work of our University. Science today is as much exploration as administration: there is no one better equipped to indicate to us the scope and limits of either.

DR. TOSIO KITAGAWA

As Professor of Theory of Probability and Mathematical Statistics, Kyushu University, as the Chief of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Dr. Tosio Kitagawa has made substantial contribution to our knowledge in Mathematics and Statistics. As Visiting Professor in the Indian Statistical Institute, as a member of the Reviewing Committee of the National Sample Survey, he has greatly helped Statistical work in this country. An author of significant scientific work in the past, we expect considerable help in our statistical work through his researches in future.

DR. KARIAMANIKKAM SRINIVASA KRISHNAN

A collaborator of Professor C. V. Raman in some of his most significant researches, Dr. Kariamanikkam Srinivasa Krishnan later worked on magneto-crystallic action and magnetic anisotropy and crystal structure on paramagnetic salts, iron-groups, temperature variation of magnetic anisotropy of graphite. His work on de-polarisation of Tyndall scattering in colloids has been utilised by the investigators in the field for the determination of particle size from

Krishnan's formula. As Director of the National Physical Laboratory he is in charge of a devoted group of research workers and the contributions of the laboratory have won recognition in all centres of research in Physics. Scientific enthusiasm and the spirit of intellectual adventure have no better embodiment in this country.

SRI PRASANTACHANDRA MAHALANABIS

Sri Prasantachandra Mahalanabis devoted his youth to Physics and strayed to the realm of Statistics where he became a permanent resident. As a pioneer of Statistical Research in this country, as the builder of a School of Statistics, as the inspirer of an international centre of statistical work, Sri Prasantachandra Mahalanabis has shown his originality of mind and capacity for organisation. The Indian Statistical Institute in his creation, and will, in future times, bear testimony to the value of his work for Science and India. But it is equally important to remember him as the architect of the Second Five Plan, as the chief scientific helper of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru in his attempts to create a new and better India.

DR. ARCOT LAKSHMANSWAMI MUDALIAR

Educationist, Scientist, expert in Obstetrics and Gynaecology, national and international administrator, Dr. Arcot Lakshmanswami Mudaliar has filled innumerable positions of responsibility and authority and worked for the good of the country and of humanity. The lay public of Madras in particular remember his healing power with gratitude: United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation and the World Health Organisation owe a good deal to his Membership and Chairmanship of their executive. The educational Committees and Organisations that he has guided are many and posterity will know him as the regenerator of our Secondary Education, as the chief author of a momentous Report which has prompted the reconstruction of our whole system. The University of Madras in particular and all Universities of India in general, recognise the worth of his work as a Member of the Inter-University Board, of the University Education Commission.

Central Advisory Board of Education, of the University Grants Commission and of every other authoritative body connected with Secondary and University Education.

ACADEMICIAN ALEXANDER NIKOLAEVICH NESMEYANOV

President of the Academy of Sciences and Chairman of the Committee for awarding the Lenin Prize in the field of Science and Technology, Academician Alexander Nikolaevich Nesmeyanov has been in the forefront of scientific work in the USSR. In Organic Chemistry he is an authority on Tautomerism; he has won universal recognition as a Scientist of world renown. From his further contributions to his special subject we anticipate an extension of the boundary of our knowledge: from his leadership of the scientists of a great country the world has a good deal to hope for and to gain.

DR. J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer will be remembered by posterity for his work in Nuclear Physics, particularly for his research in atomic fission. His work has not only revolutionised our knowledge in fundamental Physics but heralded the beginning of a new era which may witness either the elevation of man to a higher plane or the extinction of the human species. As director and Professor, he has a chosen band of research workers united in their determination to save humanity and extend the bounds of human thought.

DR. ARNOLD JOSEPH TOYNBEE

The historian is no longer a mere recorder of facts nor a narrator of interesting stories. As a combination of the Artist and the Scientist, he traces the path of the past to indicate the direction to which it may lead in future. Dr. Arnold Joseph Toynbee has, through his analysis of past events, posed questions and suggested solutions for some of the momentous problems of the day. Students of History can think of no greater name in the field of historical scholarship.

These illustrious men have agreed to accept the Honorary degrees of this University. In honouring them the University is honouring itself.



THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

Vol. 143]

MAY, 1957

[No. 2

CATHARSIS

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"A tragedy," says Aristotle, "is the imitation of an action that is serious and also, as having magnitude, complete in itself; . . . in a dramatic, not a narrative form; with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish the catharsis of such emotions."

Although much ink has been spent on this catharsis, reconsidering Aristotle is still a good exercise for clearing the head. Like the student of religion, the student of literature has to keep on returning to his fundamentals, of which the idea of tragedy is certainly one; he has to question them to keep their meaning alive. It is also unwise to disregard Aristotle. In the broad synthesis of his philosophy he summed up an outlook that is typically Greek, and almost all of European literature that is not rooted in Christianity is rooted in Greece. More especially the forms of its art were first shaped in Greece to embody Greek values, and the study and practice of them has kept those values alive even in writers who know little of Greek philosophy.

Art was as much a part of life in ancient Greece as politics or medicine, and it may be assumed that Aristotle's definition of tragedy meant something which fitted in with the rest of his synthesis. It was also a methodical definition. Beginning from the view that all the arts are imitations, in different modes and mediums, of aspects of life, he says that tragedy is like epic in being an imitation of action, seriously treated (whereas comedy treats it light-heartedly), but it is

unlike epic and like comedy in staging instead of narrating the action. Like every work of art it must be complete in itself: this completeness or unity is what enables it to epitomise clearly a single idea, which in tragedy is the idea of an action. The catharsis of pity and fear is laid down as the final cause, the end which this serious, self-contained imitation of an action is designed to fulfil.

Why are pity and fear named as the essential emotions of tragedy? And why should these emotions of all others need a purgative? Pity and fear happen to people very often in the normal course of life. At first sight it looks as if Aristotle were treating them as specially regrettable emotions which can and should be drained off, so to speak, by doses of tragedy; as if, after a performance of *King Lear* which makes calls on both, one could face an air-raid or sentence a child to a thrashing with greater equanimity. But, first, it is incredible that he was quite such a bad psychologist, and second, it would be too arbitrary to pick out these two from the many other emotions frequently exhibited in tragedy, such as love, anger, revengefulness and so forth, which also often need to be curbed in daily life. None of them, any more than pity and fear, run short of actual objects so rapidly that the art of tragedy has to be invented to supply them with imaginary objects. There must be some less nonsensical idea.

So we return to the two questions. The first, though it is hard to answer explicitly, is the less often asked: ever since Aristotle said it, pity and fear have usually been accepted as almost self-evidently the special business of tragedy. And yet, though we feel them in all great tragedy, their presence is not in itself a valid criterion of tragedy. Every cinema-addict can recall some film which made him shudder at one moment and moved him almost to tears at the next, and yet did not leave his mind chastened and exalted as great tragic art should. Aristotle's definition is inadequate unless it goes to the heart of the matter and shows us how to distinguish true from spurious tragedy. This is why the second question, about the meaning of catharsis and the need for it, has to be answered satisfactorily to throw light on the first. In what sense is tragedy a "purgative" of pity and fear, and in what sense is this "purgation" so important that it defines the purpose of one of the greatest and most difficult forms of art? I do not believe that a study of Hippocratic medicine will enlighten us much, for the difficulty is not in the meaning of the metaphor but in its application.

Aristotle wrote of tragedy as he knew it in Greece, for he had no other kind to study. One of the first things he noted about it was

that it originated in a religious ritual. It was still a religious ritual; the annual three days' tragic festival was in honour of the god Dionysos, and the dramatists whose works he studied had all written for it. It may be that the solemnity of the rite had declined since the days of Aeschylus, and that there was now more emphasis on grace of form than on depth of content, but nothing in history had yet dissociated drama from religion, and it would have been arbitrary to make the dissociation in writing about the purpose of tragedy.

It is therefore relevant to ask what is religious ritual. In a sense, of course, the answer depends on the religion. But all religion has to do with men's awareness of forces which are beyond their power fully to understand or to control, and rituals are one way of coming to terms with the unmanageable emotions they evoke. We have to come to terms with these, because we can neither altogether ignore nor altogether surrender to them in daily life.

Take for instance the experience of death, or rather since death itself is incommunicable, of bereavement. Consider the awe and bewilderment and personal and collective sorrow which swept all India when Mahatma Gandhi died. Not only is such an experience so immense that no normal man can disregard it, but if he could he would feel that there was something wrong in doing so. And yet to give oneself up wholly to it is to be incapacitated for the business of daily life, which has to go on in the face of the most shattering sorrows or the most uplifting joys. We meet the dilemma by instituting an anniversary ceremony: that is, we appoint a time and a form in which it is proper to give ourselves up to the overwhelming experience, and having done so we can carry on our life for the rest of the year without being haunted by the sense of a big thing ignored or evaded. The ritual serves both to remember and to forget.

This seems to me to be true of religious rituals in general. They give a symbolic form and an active outlet to our consciousness of things at once too real to be disregarded and too big to be fully assimilated in practical life; and in giving them an outlet they save us from being unbalanced. There are perhaps other ways of looking at ritual, but if it is seen in this light the general aptness of Aristotle's medical metaphor becomes clear. In choosing it he is implicitly taking up a position which focuses his gaze on the world of action, rather than on the surrounding infinity which intrudes upon it. It is as much as to say that we honour the gods in order to live well, rather than that we live well in order to honour the gods. But this is consistent with the generally anthropocentric Greek approach to life, and with the broad lines of his own thought. Happiness arises chiefly from right

action, which in turn depends upon a right sense of proportion; and to maintain this proportion a man must neither deny his awareness of what is beyond his understanding, nor allow himself to be hypnotised by it.

If this is a true description of ritual and if tragedy is a ritual, the rest of the argument should follow. In its own terms of mimetic action, tragedy focuses and embodies some aspect of man's relation to the infinite mystery of the universe, an aspect which evokes pity and fear. What precisely is this aspect?

Aristotle never allows us to forget that action, or the plot, is the essence of tragedy, and that the pity and fear must therefore be inherent in the action itself. The story should be such that they are aroused by the mere telling of it, even without the dramatist's presentation; and for illustration of his meaning he cites the story of Oedipus as the perfect plot.

The story is too well known to need more than the barest summary. Briefly, Prince Oedipus learnt from an oracle that he was destined to kill his father and to marry his mother. He promptly left home, determined to stay away till he knew for certain that both of them were dead. In the course of his wanderings he killed a stranger in a casual fight; then he won himself a throne in another country, and married its widowed queen and had four children by her. He remained there, an able and well-loved ruler, till at the height of his glory news reached him that his father and mother were dead. But in almost the same breath he learnt that they were not his true father and mother; that the man he had killed was indeed his father and the woman he had married was his mother. He tore out his own eyes in a frenzy of self-punishment and wandered through the world again, transformed in a moment from a great king into a blind and homeless beggar with the curse of the gods upon him.

What should Oedipus have done when the oracle spoke—waited submissively at home till the moment came for parricide and incest? He acted vigorously like a man whose will was bent on obeying the moral law; but because he was ignorant of something he could not know, he stepped right into his doom. The gods had willed a deed repugnant to the human moral sense, or it may be that fate had willed and the gods only foreknew it. At any rate the human moral will could neither prevent nor consent to a divine decree, and Oedipus punished himself. The story is a dramatisation of man's plight in a world governed by powers he can neither understand nor control, and when we hear it we acknowledge its symbolic truth. The terror and the pity arise from this acknowledgement: terror, when we

contemplate man's utter helplessness before the operation of these powers; pity, for the courage and nobility that is crushed by them.

It is a religious conception, and is perhaps the starting point of all religion. "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom"—although fear is not the whole or the end, and what we fear is called by many names. A man who was aware of nothing in the universe beyond his understanding and control would have no basis for religion and no use for ritual. On the other hand one who thinks of nothing else, living in continuous awareness of the omnipotent and incomprehensible, is unfitted for the day-to-day efficiency of social life. This is true of the superstition-ridden, whose whole life is dictated by omens and spells; they care about successful action but cannot apply ordinary common sense to ordinary problems, because they must always be propitiating powers beyond their understanding. It is true also of the anchorite in the desert and the sadhu in his trance, but for them it is unimportant, since their very awareness has reduced the world of action to a negligible illusion; and this, incidentally, may be why the great contemplative mystics of all faiths become independent of ritual. For the ordinary man, however, and certainly for the ancient Athenian, the life of action is real enough to make constant demands on his physical and intellectual and moral powers. Yet he is aware that beyond a tiny circle of experience he is ignorant and powerless.

People in modern urbanised societies manage to keep their sense of the unknown at two or three removes, for long periods at least. We have enough control of natural forces to surround ourselves with comfortable man-made things, neon lights that shut out the stars: we can drug our minds with business and mechanical distractions; with our monstrous impersonal administrative machinery we can delude ourselves into thinking that however individually helpless we may be "the government" knows how to look after our collective security. Even then we are not 100% secure. Not only are we haunted by collective nightmares of atomic war but there are inescapable moments when as individuals we stand alone before the mystery of life and death.

To the Athenians it was much closer. Physically their life was more precarious; with rudimentary weapons and tools they defended and cultivated a land almost as barren as it was beautiful. In matters such as engineering and civic hygiene they were behind some of their eastern neighbours, and behind civilisations of a thousand years earlier. With all their speculative daring they never even invented a windmill to save the labour of the quern. On land and sea they were playthings of the elements. Yet mentally, what survives of their art and thought

shows that they were more alert, more restless and adventurous than most modern civilised men. . If a whole city could hang spellbound on a performance of Euripides, and if the young men reacted so eagerly to Socrates' teaching that he was put to death as a public danger, their minds cannot have been easy to drug. Such people, in such a life, must have been haunted continuously by the precariousness of all human achievement in the unknowable surrounding darkness. They faced it without abjectness. Man's light was the light of his own spirit and man's heroism was to live by it even while he acknowledged his impotence. But they had to see the human situation as it was, and tragedy was their mode of expressing it.

The pity and fear peculiar to tragedy, therefore, are in the very essence of the human situation, and that is why Aristotle insists that they must be exhibited there. When he describes the kind of hero suitable for tragedy, he is not describing a character specially tragic in himself; he is only explaining what sort of character will least obscure the significance of the action. The famous passage does not come in the section devoted to character, but in the discussion of plot, and this is significant in a writer so methodical. If the disaster is completely arbitrary, the hero completely innocent of bringing it about, it will look like a direct, malicious intervention of the gods, and will stir up indignation rather than tragic fear. If the hero is morally repulsive, and is punished, we shall feel with satisfaction that for once at least the gods see eye to eye with us. There is no tragedy when people get what they deserve. Therefore, he should be great enough to win our sympathy, and should owe his downfall to some incidental error of judgment which makes it credible. What tragedy has to show us is something different from, and greater than, moral edification.

This also explains why tragedy has always been considered the most difficult form of poetry. To bring about its proper catharsis it must confront us with something at once inexplicable and profoundly and convincingly true. It must compel us to assent with all our moral and intellectual insight, but that is not enough; something must remain which is beyond the reach of insight and yet convinces, so that it seems to take us to the extreme edge of human understanding. All this is to be presented in the form of an action. Grand reflections on the nature of the universe may have their place, but have not the direct force of the action itself. Faked-up passion and pseudo-mystery will obviously not do, for all great art needs to be intellectually and emotionally honest. But neither is tragedy possible to the type of mind enclosed in a thesis, which can explain all experience before it meets it and is incapable of meeting what it cannot explain.

It is arguable that the tragic conception of life is possible only to the pagan mind. If one sees the world as an illusion and the infinite as the only reality the pity and the terror melt away, because what happens in life is not worth them. Equally, if one takes life in the world seriously but has full faith in the goodness as well as the omnipotence of God, there is nothing to be afraid of; only believe and endure and hope and all must be well in the end. But tragedy presupposes a full conviction of the reality of life, not as a preparation for some greater reality but in itself. Its perspective focuses the light on human action in time and space, and sees behind it a vast, shadowy, uncertain background.

This was more or less the way the Greeks from Homer downwards, looked at the universe and Aristotle is perhaps closer to the tradition than Plato. They saw life, in time and space, as the great reality. But, before dismissing it as a "materialist" outlook, one should reflect that it is the man who rejects the world, not he who accepts it, who is most likely to see nothing in it but bodily appetites glutted or starved. What they saw in it is expressed in Athenian civilisation with its physical poverty and imaginative and intellectual wealth. They were keenly aware of things of the spirit and their ideal was to embody them in life, thus making them a part of reality, to the utmost possible degree. In the nature of things the embodiment could never be whole or permanent, and there was no reason to think the elemental powers troubled about human values, but the values were unchanged by that. The greatness of man was to live by them, not unrealistically, but fully aware of his loneliness in an indifferent universe. This seems to me to be the grand conception behind tragic drama. It depicted the greatness of the human spirit in life, which is action, stripped it of the adventitious aid of success, and set it against the background of inevitable doom. If the spectator could stare at this naked reality and leave the theatre with renewed conviction that it was nevertheless worth while to be human, then surely the tragic catharsis had served its purpose.

EDMUND BLUNDEN

G. V. L. N. SARMA

In 1905 W. B. Yeats regretted that 'modern literature and above all poetical literature is monotonous in structure and effeminate in its continual insistence on certain moments of strained lyricism.' It is not difficult to offer illustrations of pedestrian form and content from modern poetical literature to justify W. B. Yeats; but there are a few glorious exceptions to this generalisation. Edmund Blunden's poetry is one of them. Like Rudyard Kipling whose romantic nostalgia found articulation in his songs of the Kentish violets, cowslips of the Devon combs and Midland furzes, Blunden also sang of the 'sweet content' of England. But Blunden's is a chastened Muse with Kipling's blatant and brassy tendrils lopped. With John Clare and William Blake, he shared 'a burning deathless discontent'. The result is a body of rich and varied poetry with its feet in the Sussex-soil and its brow in a crowd of stars. It is not superfluous to say that Blunden in one way has given voices and eyes to some aspects of Nature which had formerly been dumb and blind and in so doing he has brought them out as hieroglyphs of the Spirit. Nor is his achievement without recognition. Recently the Queen's gold medal for poetry was awarded to Blunden and the laurel is a significant, albeit a small, token of popular esteem in which his Muse is held.

With characteristic modesty, Blunden styled himself as 'a rustic scribbler', a writer on what he fondly cherishes as the 'fairy Sussex', his land of Naiads. His poems, with their ravishing lilt, steal into the ears of the reader like a cadenza of spring-time. But the sophisticated who are interested in the writer's exploration into the Freudian jungle, fail to respond to his rhythms. The general reader, however, associates Blunden with either 'the Undertones of War' or 'The Shepherd'. The former describes his experience in the theatre of War during the first Global War and has become a classic. The latter won the Hawthornden Prize in 1929. In fact the jewel of Blunden's genius has many facets. He is a poet of eminence, a litterateur of distinction and an authority on the literary history of the early part of the nineteenth century. He enriches literary history with his illuminating studies of Charles Lamb, Leigh Hunt,

Keats and Shelley, Thomas Hardy and Henry Vaughan. He edited and introduced the lyrics, madrigals and chronicles of John Clare and the poems of Wilfred Owen, William Collins and Christopher Smart. He published some travel books, notable among which are *The Bonadventure* and *The Mind's Eye*. The former gives an account of his experiences on a tramp-steamer while the latter surveys his travels through Flanders, Japan, England and literature. His poetic output is no less grand and bold. His major works of poetry include—*The Waggoner* (1920), *The Shepherd* (1922), *To Nature* (1923), *Masks of Time* (1925), *English Poems* (1932), *An Elegy and other Poems* (1937), *Shells by a Stream* (1944) and *After the Bombing* (1949).

With Pope, Blunden could say that he lisped in numbers, for 'the numbers came'. His first book of poems (*The Pastorals*) was written in his twentieth year, a few months after he left school (Christ's Hospital) and joined the Army. Ever since he wrote poetry of pastoral England in the tradition of Cowper, Crabbe and Clare. He completely indentified himself with Nature and sang alike the glories of summer morn and the mire and moisture of Winter. History and Nature are harmonized in the tranquil domain of his poems. So fondly is he attached to Sussex that he regards it as a charming fairy-land. He confesses that even the hunting of hedges in winter for dormouse in his grey has for him some thrill of a troll-and-elf creation in it there. With the exception of Clare perhaps, to Blunden belongs the most unique winter poetry in English. These poems recall the grandeur of the snow and ice of the Italian Riviera. Generally his poems are idylls of graceful charm, vignettes of landscape and glimpses into a rich and cultivated mind. Here is an instance.

Rooks in black constellation slowly wheeling
Over this pale sweet sky, and church-bells pealing
Our homely pilgrims to the fount of healing
The day and hour, the obedience of good people
To the commandment singing from the steeple,
All speak a calm and gentle ripple
I see them now at truce eternal lying,
With no hoarse trumpet summoning, none replying—
Only in sweet content for England vying.
(The long Truce—a poem about the Cavaliers and Roundheads).

He has written some stirring mementos of a few Nature-poets. His elegies of them surge like wood-god's dirges. He imagines to have espied Clare's ghost moving in a delta of Cypress with his streaming hair

And his eyes
Piercing beyond our human firmament,
Lit with a burning deathless discontent.

In as much as he sings in ecstasy of the beauty and the mystery of English landscape, the intimate and indefinable passion for Nature of the Nature-poets, may be regarded as the unacknowledged laureate of the true English poetic tradition. Who in England would not share with him his emotions recorded in his 'Cricket--I Confess'?

" . . . In the English character
That's the chief puzzle I have." "My horn is dry,
If you don't understand it, no more do I."
Far out in the valley the sun was gilding green
Those meadows which in England most are seen,
Where churchyard, Church, inn, forge and loft stand round
With cottages, and through the ages bound
The duck-pond, and the stocks and cricket-ground.
And I felt silent, while kind memories played
Bat and ball in the sunny past, not much dismayed
Why these things were, and why I liked them so.

Blunden is not merely a landscape-painter. The greatness of his poetry lies in his personal note which he skilfully incorporates into his song. His verse is animated by tender humanism. Blunden's humanism peeps in here and there. Consider, for example, the following line from 'Almswomen.'

All things they have in common being so poor.

This line has the ring of the Elizabethan grandiloquence about it. It is worthy to reflect that Blunden's humanism seldom obsesses his art; rather it heightens the poetic grandeur. The poet does not divagate on the poverty of the Almswomen, but tells of their artless simplicity and ingenuity, how they were—

Proud of their wisdom: when on gooseberry shoots
They stuck egg-shells to fright from coming fruits
The brisk-billed rascals.

Perhaps this humanism is the outcome of his chequered career. He was a soldier and fought during the first world war. He travelled far and wide. He was Professor of English in the Tokyo Imperial

University during 1924 to 1927. His journeys, beside enlarging his intellectual horizon, have brought home to him the impelling charm of Imagination's Commonwealth. In his valedictory address to his Japanese students, he assures them—

And I will pray for your soul's health,
Remembering how, deep-tasked yet eager-eyed,
You loved imagination's commonwealth.

Blunden wrote a number of war-poems. But none of them is a writhing effigy of agony or a mound to unjustly punished, atomized youth. These poems betray neither the irony of Hardy nor the bitterness and disillusionment of the Trench poets. Never did roughness or ruggedness claim kinship with the mellow fruitfulness of his poetry. Sometimes Blunden wonders whether man is Nature's wreck. He muses—

I am for the woods against the world,
But are the woods for me?

He has sought them sadly anew; he is plagued with Fate's Mutability. Nevertheless, renewing some sense of common right, he intends gladly to—

And through my armour of imposition
Win the Spring's keen light,
Till for the woods against the world
I kiss the aconite.

Equally unshakable is his faith in human nature. Even after witnessing two world wars, he did not forfeit his faith and cheer because he still holds that the world is peopled by the good and the wise. This is why one turns to him with a sigh of relief after reading A. E. Housman's sombre sketch of the world or T. S. Eliot's estimate of it as a wasteland where nothing grows and where there is a perpetual reverberation of sterile thunder.

It has already been pointed out that many of his poems are hieroglyphs of the spirit. To him the sunlit vale amounts to a pastoral fairy tale. He writes :

I saw the sunlit vale and the pastoral fairy-tale;
The sweet and bitter scent of the may drifted by;
And never have I seen a bright bewildered green,
But it looked like a lie,
Like a kindly meant lie.

Blunden so journeying through Imagination's Commonwealth, sought unity in diversity and found beauty in the haunting Music of life. He embalmed the fleeting glories of Sussex in memorable verse. His poetic craftsmanship consummated in '*Shells by a Stream.*' Even if we ignore the purely pastoral element in his achievement, Blunden still remains one of the distinctive poets of our age. This is due to the fact that he looks inward without shutting his ears to the lessons of the vernal wood. This introspection has sharpened his thought without warping his poetic sensibility. It offered him an unruffled calm and his poetry a bewitching sweetness. Of the very few modern poets whose poetry is neither monotonous in structure nor effeminate in strained lyricism, Blunden's poetry is one. His poems are potential experiences with a singularly penetrating artistic force. They are a revelation and a prophecy because they grope to find Unity in diversity. He bids rise the—

Enchanting haunting faithful
Music of life recalled and now revealing
Unity ...
All difference sheds away,
All shrivelling of the sense, anxious prolepsis,
Injury, starving suspicion,
Fades into pure and wise advance.

SOME ODES OF MIRZĀ GHĀLIB¹

SRI HARENDRACHANDRA PAUL, M.A. (Triple)
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5

Emblem of complain is the playful writ of him ;
Paper is the dress of the picture of diverse forms.
Ask not of the hardship of search in the lonely nights;
'Tis bringing the night to its dawn for the stream of milk.
Do see to the wanton desire with no choice of mine,
The breath of the sword is outside the breast of the sword.
Do spread as thou pleaseth the knowledge-net of the ear,
The subject of my world of speech is '*Anqā*,² the bird
Though entangled, *Ghālib*, yet I am fire underneath;
The ring of my chains, thus hath become coiled through fire.

6

Thou sayest not to give the heart, if found in lying state;
Where is the heart that Thou wilt rob?—Thus our suitor found.
By love nature has got in life a sense of fine delight;
It got the cure of pain, but love itself is incurable pain.
A friend of the enemy it is, so heart's reliance is well-understood;
Its sigh ineffective seen, and its complaint unattainable felt.
Again the bud to blossom began,—to-day the heart of us—
Was seen how it became afflicted, and what it lost, we felt.
No longer do I remember the state of my heart, but this much—
Many times were we in search of You, many times You
in find of me.
The saltish advice of the monitor really sprinkled salt on the
sore;
If any one did ask (O *Ghālib*), how have you enjoyed it?

7

In vain, my neglected heart from hidden burning burnt;
Like as the fire extinguished, may be said, it burnt.

¹ Last appeared in the September issue of *Calcutta Review*, 1956.

² A fabulous bird, often compared to God.

No union, delight and memory of friend remains in the heart;
 Fire took the house in such way that all that was burnt.
 I exceed '*adam*,'¹ although neglectful thousand times;
 From fiery sigh of mine the wing of '*Anqā* was burnt.
 They said, where is thy lustrous gem of reflective thought?
 Some thought of wilderness came, but that the meadow burnt.
 The heart is not to be shown, although the spring of scars;
 What shall I do of these lamps,—whose ruler even burnt?
 I and lowness of spirit, O *Ghālib*, that the heart—
 They saw and the false regard of worldly men all burnt.

8

Love of any form is a rival to any show and form;
 On the screen of fire *Qais* is even of naked form.
 O Lord, the scar could make no good on the lowness of heart;
 The arrow came out confounded through the altar of breast.
 Fragrance of flower, moan of heart and smoke of the lamp,
 Whatever came out of your assembly was found in distress,
 A pleasure-table of misery was the heart of distress;
 The palate of friends was linked up only with lip and tooth.
 O you manly, hardship-accepting young *fanā* adept,
 A problem it is that such a task so easily done.
 Again, in the heart the weeping raised a tumult, *Ghālib*;
 The sigh which drew no tear-drop, has brought a storm.

9

One who died of threat is not in affair of war;
 Love of the nature to fight is seeker of Man.
 With life there was connected the dread of death;
 Even prior to death was I of yellow colour.
 Composing of books of fidelity I did work;
 When no uniformity was in collection of thoughts.
 From heart to liver is now the show of the sea of blood;
 In this passage splendour of flower was formerly only dust.
 Does ever end the hue and cry of sorrows of love?
 If even the heart decays, it is a pity to heart.
 The friends did find no rescue to the wilderness of mine;
 In the prison even phantasm of desert was in move.
 This corpse, O *Āsad*, without coffin is of the wounded heart;
 Let God forgive him,—a free surprising soul was he.

¹ '*Adam* or *fanā*, meaning non-existence (of the Self, by being absorbed in God).

PSYCHOLOGY OF PUBLIC OPINION

DR. PRITI BEUSHAN CHATTERJI

The present age is claimed to be the people's age and a great value is attached to the force of public opinion. The stability of a government, it is said, depends upon its capacity to adjust itself to the demands of public opinion. Some have gone so far as to hold that public opinion is the embodiment of social conscience and wisdom and as such it is unerring and a sure guide in times of crisis. *Vox populi vox dei*—the voice of the people is the voice of God. But there are others, again, however small their number may be, who speak of public opinion in disparaging terms. Flaubert, for instance, characterised people as an "Immoral beast". His theory was that "the crowd, the multitude, is hateful," that the "mass is always idiotic", and that "the people is an eternal infant", and hence their opinion is to be treated with all the contempt it deserves.

What, then, is the true nature of public opinion? To answer this we must try to understand its full psychological import.

The question 'What is public opinion?' resolves itself into two, *viz.*, 'What is meant by the term public?' And 'what, again, does the term opinion signify?'

II

The term 'public' implies people in general—an aggregate of individuals. Such an aggregation is possible because of some common interests, desires and sentiments. But the public is to be distinguished from a crowd, though the crowd is also an aggregate of individuals linked together by a common interest and sentiment. The crowd is a *contiguous*, though temporary, gathering of people around a common object of attention. But the members of the public are not contiguous—they are scattered over a wide area and unlike a crowd the public is a relatively stable association. In the public there is very little face to face physical *cum* personal contact.

In a crowd the feelings run very high—it is dominated by a group of emotions. This predominance of feeling is to some extent, due to this physical contact in a crowd. But feelings have no such absolute monopoly in the public mind.

The crowd is a very simple and crude form of collective life—it is just an unorganized mass of individuals. The public, though

amorphous are more or less organized and may be subdivided into various organizations.

A crowd is formed very quickly and it disappears quickly. It is formed very quickly round a point of common interest. Thus a crowd is gathered when a popular leader or a cinema star passes through the street or when there is an altercation with a hawker or a taxi-driver. With the disappearance of such an object of common attention the crowd melts away. But so long as the crowd continues to exist, the members thereof are simultaneously affected in much the same way by the common object of interest. This simultaneity of stimulation is, however, lacking in the public inasmuch as it is not a contiguous association of individuals.

The crowd mind receives all its stimulation from one direction, but the public is affected in diverse ways through diverse opinions. These different opinions often neutralize one another and hence the public is not always as susceptible to suggestion as the crowd. The crowd becomes easily suggestible, but the public takes some time to act up to suggestions, specially during times of peace. In some cases, however, the public may be impressed by suggestion. There are powerful agencies like the press, the radio, the cinema which may under the direction of the state operate in such a co-ordinated way that they may create a cumulative and naturally powerful suggestion. As a result of this cumulative suggestion the rule of reason may become very much weakened, and powerful emotional and instinctive tendencies come into play. But it is obvious that the public takes more time than the crowd to be influenced by suggestions.

Again, an individual may be a member of one crowd at a time whereas he can come in contact with different 'publics' as by reading different newspapers. The creation of complex publics is due mainly to the modern mechanical means of communication which influence the individuals from diverse directions.

III

We have described above the general features of the public as distinguished from a crowd. From the foregoing remarks it is clear that public opinion is not the expression of a mere fitful momentary passion. At the same time public opinion is *opinion* and as such it falls short of adequate knowledge. To quote Ginsberg, "Opinions stand for that mass of ideas and beliefs in a group or society which has a certain stability and is not a mere series of momentary reactions,

but is yet not based on clearly thought out grounds of a scientific character." (*The Psychology of Society*, p. 144).

What, then, is the nature of public opinion? Is it something static—the resultant of different views held by different persons, their uncommon elements being cast off? Or, is it a *process*—an interactional growth of opinion? Indeed, public opinion can be looked at from both these standpoints. But it is better to treat it more as a process, as something dynamic, than as a finished product.

As has been already pointed out, an individual may be a member of different 'publics'. The public itself is a series of groupings which are themselves always in a state of flux. In these smaller groupings there are some floating ideas which are not crystallised and organized. This accounts for the flexible nature of the groups. In spite of this flexibility the different groups have some common elements as the same individual belongs to different groups. The common members carry ideas from one group to another. All these result in a contact and clash of ideas, a 'give and take of ideas', and an overflow of ideas from one group to another. Thus the public opinion is in its essence dynamic. "When we say that an opinion is public, we mean that among the several public opinions that exist within each of the groupings or minor publics, on the subject in question this particular one predominates". (*Ibid.*, p. 140). But such predominance does not mean unanimity. To quote Ginsberg again: "Public opinion is like a harp of million strings upon which there play winds from all directions. The sounds that emerge are not always unitary or harmonious. The most varied streams of melody cut through each other. It is subject to constant change both in regard to objects on which it is directed and in regard to the mental elements through which it works. Now it demands this, now that. To-day it works on the passion, to morrow it makes its appeal to calm deliberation. The word opinion is thus appropriately chosen, for in the history of thought opinion has always been contrasted with adequate knowledge and has been characterised by the fact that it is based on hearsay evidence, rough empirical generalizations on a mere enumerative basis, and accepted traditions and prepossessions". (*Ibid.*, pp. 143-44). Public opinion is thus preponderant opinion.

But it is not merely the preponderant opinion. There may be preponderant opinion as to co-education or monogamy without there being any public opinion. Public opinion implies focalization of public attention as well. When the accepted codes or standards are called

in question, there is a stirring of public sentiments and public opinion begins to grow. Thus in India there is a preponderant opinion supporting the traditional Hindu manners and customs. But when these are sought to be changed by legislative measures, popular sentiments developed round the traditional manners and customs are stirred, public attention is called forth, innumerable discussions take place and the personal laws of the Hindus at once become a topic of public opinion.

But is public opinion the same as the expression of the general will which can be determined only by the wise legislators and which is thus believed to be unerring? There is a difference of opinion on this point. Lowell, for example, identifies public opinion with the general will, while Tarde would prefer to exclude desire and volition from the connotation of opinion. In Politics when we say that the government acts according to public opinion, we mean it to be guided by the general will. But strictly speaking, public opinion is something different from, and wider than, general will. The term 'will' implies the active side of consciousness and applies to acts of self-conscious personality. But 'opinion' is just a medley of vague desires confused ideas as well as strong sentiments. Hence it is not proper to identify opinion with will. In fact public opinion often develops from the opinion of the few and hence 'general will' in the sense of public opinion is neither general nor will.

Is not public opinion, then rational? Man is traditionally defined as a rational animal and hence it is claimed by some that public opinion is a 'rational group judgment' and is something different from public emotion or sentiment. It is believed to be a form of infallible commonsense. But others hold that man is an emotive-conative being and he is guided more by sentiments and emotions than by thought. Intelligent thought is lacking in the masses and public opinion is a medley of cheap sentiments and emotions. The truth lies between these two extreme views. As has been pointed out before, when men feel a strong necessity for a change in their settled modes of living and their traditions and customs, a commotion is created, repeated discussions take place and gradually a public opinion is created. Thus the issues that lead to the formation of public opinion are determined by deepseated needs, and these are coloured by emotions and feelings. The different opinions are backed by emotions and are based not simply on logical grounds. The divergence of views is determined both by logical and illogical grounds. It is not denied that individuals must think over the issues. But such thoughts

are coloured by strong emotions. Sentiments are already developed round the old behaviour patterns, and in order to modify or remove them equally strong emotions are needed. Public opinion which shapes itself as a result of this attempt at modification or removal can, therefore, be neither wholly rational nor wholly irrational. As Young points out "Opinions based on fact and logic are incorporated into the larger value system made up of emotionalized desires, beliefs and meanings. . . . Public opinion is formed by verbalized attitudes, by ideas and convictions, on some disputed topic. The special-interest groups become the centres of public discussion, but the sentiment and opinion of general public usually play the deciding part in finally formulating majority opinion. . . . In short, public opinion arises when groups are faced with issues, when old modes of behaviour are breaking down. Because the old ways are deeply ingrained and represent emotionalized values, they cannot be changed merely by rational considerations. New emotional attitudes and values must be developed. That is, public opinion is derived both rationally and irrationally". (*Handbook of Social Psychology*, pp. 43-39).

We may now summarise the chief characteristics of public opinion. (i) It is flexible and changeable. (ii) A discussion that attracts general attention finds its natural issue in a state of public opinion. (iii) Public opinion does not depend on mere number. It is not the unanimous opinion, but rather the predominant opinion. (iv) This predominance does not always depend on rational grounds. (v) It is moulded by rational considerations as well as by such non-rational elements as the settled modes of conduct habits, instinctive tendencies etc. (vi) There is a feeling of identity of interests amongst the members of the public. (vii) There is a 'sense of actuality'—there must be a general recognition of the public opinion on certain topics as the common opinion. (viii) It is essentially a social product and owes its origin to the interaction of many minds. (ix) It is not always unerring, but it is right on occasions, and it should not be completely ignored.

IV

Our next question is : How is public opinion gradually formed? An individual feels dissatisfied with some old manners and customs—he begins to experience a vague feeling of uncertainty and insecurity. The individual may approach the matter in a logical manner or he may try to have an imaginative satisfaction through fantasy and the like. But such a private approach does not become public

opinion It assumes the form of public opinion when we talk out our minds to others and when those others, confronted by similar problems, are anxious to have solutions. In this way begins social interaction, and an atmosphere congenial to the development of some common opinion is created. Problems begin to become public when the entire community or a considerable part of it takes interest in such problems. Such verbal interactions or public discussions gradually lead to the emergence of *public* from private views. During such public discussions appeals are often made to patriotism, traditions, culture, religion etc. When a certain issue assumes some importance and a particular opinion gains currency, many persons begin to share the same view. This sharing in of the same view by larger and larger number of individuals is to some extent due to the desire for social conformity. As social beings, we have a desire for conformity, agreement or identification with other members of the society—a desire for ‘socialization’. But along with it there is an opposite tendency—the tendency towards individualization and differentiation. Because of this latter tendency, public opinion after it has gained in volume, results in a sudden split. Different persons take different sides and a clash of opinions takes place. During this clash of opinions powerful suggestive and persuasive agencies like the radio, the press and the cinema come into play, and at this stage irrational elements naturally dominate the field. The popular leaders come to the fore front. They use their “fiery harangue loaded with emotion arousing stereotypes”. The leaders may play different roles. They may define the issue and may present the problem in a suitable manner to the public. They may give concrete shape to the vague ideas and feelings that are already present in the minds of the masses. But the leaders may also play the part of demagogues and may use the unsophisticated masses for their own ends. The leaders of ‘special-interest groups’ employ every means of propaganda to win support for their side of the controversy. The ordinary masses are often found to be mere spectators—the real fight is fought out by ‘special-interest groups’ and the public accept the view of the winning party. It should, however, be borne in mind that mere demagoguery or sentimental appeal does not ensure the victory of the leaders. Even the most powerful demagogue or the wildest dictator cannot thrust an opinion upon the masses and unmake all the traditional values unless there is a strong predisposing tendency in his favour. If the masses are educated, they show a tendency to listen to experts like the economists or statisticians who supply them with facts and figures. We cannot,

however, attach undue importance to the role of experts in moulding public opinion. We may simply assert that demagogues cannot have a free play. If the leaders make the masses, the masses, too, make their leaders. The leaders also have to "suck at the breast of the universal ethos".

It should be noted in this connection that there is something like the biological phenomenon of natural selection in the process of opinion-formation. Here the war of natural selection is carried on not against the weaker or incompatible individuals as in the animal kingdom, but against the ideals or modes of life. Professor Alexander explains the position very clearly thus: "A person arises (or a few persons) whose feelings, modified by more or less deliberate reflection, incline him to a new course of conduct. He dislikes cruelty or discourtesy or he objects to seeing women with inferior freedom, or to the unlimited opportunity of intoxication. He may stand alone and with only a few friends to support him. His proposal may excite ridicule or scorn or hatred: and if he is a great reformer, he may endure hardship and obloquy or even death at the hands of the great body of persons whom he offends. By degrees his ideas spread more and more; people discover that they have similar leanings; they are persuaded by him, their previous antagonism to him is replaced by attachment to the new mode of conduct, the new political institution. The new ideas gather every day fresh strength, until at last they occupy the minds of a majority of persons or even of nearly all Persuasion and education, in fact, *without destruction*, replace here the process of propagation of its own species and destruction of the rival ones, by which in the natural world species become numerically strong and persistent." (*International Journal of Ethics*, Vol II, No. 4)

V

We now pose another important question: What is the value of public opinion? Public opinion is not the result of any clear cut argumentation. Had it been so, much reliance could have been placed on the verdict of the public, on the social conscience of the community, on the *vox dei*. In the public opinion there is a non-rational element and it cannot, therefore, be looked upon as unerring. The irrational emotional element has made public opinion unstable. It is not, therefore, surprising to find some writers make a rather hard judgment: "To be independent of public opinion is the first condition of anything that is great and rational". But in spite of its

instability and suggestibility there is a great belief that public opinion has an insight into the right thing. When an opinion is accepted by a large majority and it assumes the nature of *public opinion*, it is presumed to be right, since it is believed that so many different persons giving the same opinion cannot be wrong. But this practical unanimity or universality of public opinion may be due to a greater emotional control and lesser intellectual thought. On grave occasions when public opinion seems to give a correct view, an instinctive resentment takes the place of dispassionate judgment. Our basic instinctive and emotional reactions have a tendency to be uniform, and hence the unanimity of public opinion in times of crisis. We must therefore avoid the two extremes—we should neither characterise public opinion as entirely wise and unerring nor should we always call it rash and valueless. In order to determine the value of public opinion on a particular subject we should take into account several factors—the nature and kind of the public, the degree of its organisation, the nature and complexity of the subject-matter demanding a verdict, the means for a collective discussion and propagation of views and the like.

The strength of public opinion lies chiefly in its persuasiveness—in its being a means of social control. Public opinion is analysable into public judgment, public sentiment, and public action. Public judgment is the public pronouncement upon an act as right or wrong. With such valuational judgments are associated certain sentiments or feelings—*e.g.*, feelings of approbation and disapprobation, admiration and abhorrence. Public action implies those actions which are taken by the public to modify conduct. The sanctions behind these three are respectively, as Ross points out, the sanctions of opinion, the sanctions of social intercourse and the sanctions of violence. It is well known that as social creatures we are interested in what others think of us. We all desire fame, 'that last infirmity of noble minds', and when we find that fame can be achieved if we act according to the verdict of the public, we shall naturally have a tendency to do so. If a person does not care to take notice of public judgment, specially when it is an adverse one, he will have to incur the displeasures of others. He will be castigated by his society. He will have to face "the open snub, the patent flight, the glancing witticism", and in graver cases "the catcalls of the street, the taunts of the corner loafers, the hoots of the mob, the groans of the regiment, the hiss of the audience, or the stony silence of the dinner party." Few there are who can remain in stolid indifference when they are faced

with such expressions of public opinion. Even if a person dares do that, he will be subjected to physical violence, the *argumentum ad baculum*. With the advance of civilization this has, however, been gradually replaced by the sanctions of law.

As contrasted with law, public opinion is less mechanical in operation. Law is more or less rigid: but public opinion is flexible, since "the public can weigh provocation better and can take into account the condoning or aggravating circumstances of time, place, motive or office". (E. A. Ross). Because of its rigidity law cannot always enforce all moral claims that the exigencies of a particular situation may demand. "The law frequently upholds," remarks Ross, "the right of summary conviction, grants the widow's cow to the rich creditor, permits a railway company to turn adrift an employee crippled in its service, and confirms the right of a husband to administer moderate chastigation to his wife." Again, law can take cognisance only of overt acts—of such visible effects as theft of property, neglect of wife and children, etc. But public can act in anticipation of an offence and may in this respect operate as a preventive. Public opinion is also prompt in its action but law's delay often defeats its own end. Moreover, the sanctions of public opinion are very cheap. Public approbation and disapprobation hold a wonderful sway over the minds of ordinary men.

VI

No democratic government can afford to ignore the common verdict of the public. No government can thrive unless it is supported by the people. Hence to defy the verdict of the public is to invite disaster. In a modern democratic state each citizen cannot have a direct share in the governmental affairs. A democracy is a rule by majority. To avoid any oppression every government should, therefore, try to realise, as far as practicable, the ideal set forth by Lowell, namely, the opinion must be such that while the minority may not share it, they feel bound by *conviction*, and not by fear, to accept it, and if democracy is complete, the submission of the minority must be given ungrudgingly.

Public opinion by its criticism always keeps the government alert and makes it remedy its defect. It may be argued that the members of the public are not always enlightened. How then can they point out the defects of the experts, the knowledgeable men, who control the government? As Aristotle pointed out long ago, though an ignorant man may compare unfavourably with an expert in regard to

knowledge, he may often be a better judge of the thing made by the expert than the expert himself. The guest, for example, is often a better judge of a feast than the cook who has cooked the food.

But inspite of these merits, public opinion suffers from some grave defects. The sanctions of public opinion are not always definite. There cannot be any uniformity. Nobody knows how much praise or blame is necessary under particular circumstances. The verdict of the public is often given on the heat of the moment, and hence there are chances of mistakes. Again, public memory is proverbially short and hence public opinion loses its force when the commotion subsides. Thus the public opinion does not provide us with a very satisfactory technique of social control.

Public opinion, we conclude, is a social force, but its value lies in its capacity to coerce the individuals in a particular direction which is likely to be right. In fact, public opinion is a tremendous force not because it is always unerring, but because it is risky to go against a large number of individuals who are under 'the illusion of universality'—the belief that all are thinking and doing the same thing. As Ginsberg puts it, "Public opinion is of importance, not so much *qua* opinion but *qua* public." Hence a great responsibility devolves upon those that control the media of opinion-formation—the newspapers, the radio, the cinema and the like. To make the public opinion a valuable asset every state should take up in right earnest the task of educating the public mind.

EDUCATION VIS-A-VIS INDISCIPLINE.

SRI CHUNILAL MITRA, M.A.

Of late there is no other single problem which has so rudely agitated the heads of thinkers as the problem of students' indiscipline all over the country. That the students in recent years have become rowdy and defiant, undisciplined, unruly and disobedient is universally acknowledged. By their violent spirit and defiant disrespect they have almost given a goodbye to a decent living. They have been devoid of any sense of decency, decorum and proportion with the result that normal functioning in schools and colleges have almost become impossible. Attempts hitherto made both in official and non-official capacities have only touched the fringe of the problem and as such, left it where it was years back. Nevertheless, all are agreed upon this that some common factors act and react in bringing about students' acts of lawlessness and defiance. To apportion the relative responsibility we are to cover a wide field.

To start with, all equally feel that at least four things, *viz.*, the Profession, the students, the public and the state are the four pillars on which the superstructure of education stands, and each has its share of responsibility to discharge. But the tragedy of the whole thing here as elsewhere is that, each of the groups is more conscious of the duties of the other three and is prone to exert the rights of its own. Each neglects its own duties and forthwith dictates the duties of others and this respective negligence too is on the plea that others are not doing theirs. This vicious circle born of the spirit of indolence can hardly be broken.

PROFESSORS AND TEACHERS

Teachers' responsibility can never be minimised. It is they who come in close contact with the students day in and day out. They know best how, when and where from indiscipline is brewing. Both the young and the old, adolescent and the adult owe their upbringing, their allegiance to the teacher. Hence, not only for the overwidening spirit of indiscipline amongst the students community but also for the wider disorder and chaos, for the anti-social and subversive actions in society, the teachers are held greatly responsible. For good or bad, blessing or curse, praise or blame, credit or otherwise, the teachers are liable. Teachers should be

eternal learners as well. Before the typical teachers like a Ramendra-sunder, and a Brojen Seal, a Jagadish Chandra and a P. C. Ray, an Iswar Chandra and a Harinath Dey, no student however turbulent could raise his head or voice in disobedience and defiance. Of late, majority of the members of the teaching profession in schools and colleges do lack in having personality, personality born of integrity of the profession and mastery over the subjects they are asked to teach. They have scrupulously developed a sense of indolence, feeling of complacency and timidity, and a spirit of lethargy and ease loving. In spite of the fact that they get a petty pittance and in spite of the fact that the Mudaliar Commission have paid high tribute to the teachers in the glowing terms that no average Indian teacher is inferior to any other teacher in the world, there is no gainsaying the fact that they are not eternally conscious and vigilant of the sacred trust reposed on them. To some of the teachers the students look reverentially, to others, disdainfully. This difference is because of the difference between one teacher and another. As the students do not get love and affection from the teachers, the teachers in turn do not command respect and obedience from their students. This sorry state of affairs must go. Teachers must not remain idle and passive onlookers to the disintegration and deterioration of the society, but must rise up to the occasion and cry halt to the growing rot, check the first unruly action of the first pupil at the very first instance. Owning their relative responsibility they must be true to the salt, faithful to the noble task they have been assigned to discharge. A disciplined society owes its everything to the band of teachers, who profoundly influence not only a section of people but also a whole race. They are the privileged few who enjoy prerogatives in the sense that they have got social sanction for all whatsoever they say or do. A teacher must give all food to his pupil—at once physical, mental and spiritual. A human child is not mere physique, he is neither an intellect nor emotion, nor a sumtotal of all these three. He has a soul within which is at once Knowledge, Science and Bliss infinite. He has, as the Upanishads say, the *anna-moy*, *prānamoy*, *manamoy*, *vijñānamoy* and the *ānandamoy kośas*. To the degree a teacher fails in his job to provide his pupils with all these requirements to that extent the latter becomes restless and mal-adjusted.

STUDENTS

The tragedy of the students community is that of all the things on earth they have made study secondary. They consider reading

to be the job of their elders, parents or guardians. Moreover, before knowing anything in full, they pretend to have understood all. This pretension, hypocrisy and depravity mostly account for their failure in final performances and consequent frustration and restlessness in life. They thus become victims to their own faults, and no amount of sermons work on them well. Solace from any quarter cannot redeem their pledge of life. They cast to the four winds the cardinal virtue of the maxim :

“Let knowledge grow from more to more,
But more of reverence in us dwell.”

and become disobedient.

SOCIETY AND THE PUBLIC

Having suffered the onslaught of two devastating wars Indian society has been uprooted from its original setting. And to make the social—and with it the moral breakdown complete, we have had the partitioned Independence and vivisected country. That the society has been corrupted beyond measure from top to bottom, that administrative machinery and anticorruption measures have gone out of gear to prove effective in checking the rampant vices around us are admitted by all. Indiscipline is contagious. Students coming from indisciplined homes and corrupted society cannot but be indisciplined. Within the walls of educational institutions they do not feel at home. Even they feel themselves embarrassed in the atmosphere of the class rooms or in the vicinity of teachers and professors. This unfortunate state may be obviated if and only when students are helped to make the right choice of right values almost instinctively. This, again, is only possible if they come from homes where at least the fundamentals of moral and religious instructions are imparted. As a matter of fact, high standard of integrity and discipline *without* can instil in our boys and girls a high standard of discipline *within*, and not vice versa.

Political parties greatly account for the indiscipline among the younger generations. Our erstwhile leaders taught our students the first act of indiscipline, to rise against their elders and their ‘alma mater,’ to break everything that is already established—something good, great and glorified. It has therefore very well been suggested that for at least a quarter of a century hence the educational institutions all over the country should be declared a prohibited zone, *

protected area for all political parties to carry out electioneering campaign and for all other practical purposes.

STAGE AND THE SCREEN

But, perhaps the worst act of indiscipline and lawlessness in the rising youth are being engineered by the stage and the screen—more by the latter than by the former. The greatest mental diversions and deviations from the right track are being perpetrated by the cinema. As such, it is a national curse, a social scourge. Far from being an educative device it has miserably been degenerated into a demoralising weapon for all—the young and the old. It is eating into the vitals of our society and sapping the very foundation of morality of our being. The Cinema has not been improved in the least in our country in course of the last ten years, and that too is not for want of any plan or attempt on the part of our Government, but *inspite of their measures*, as these have hitherto been directed towards a wrong end—that of money-making and money-making only. The policies for control and development of the industry have all along been left in the hands of the capitalists, who hardly look to the interest and welfare—the moral progress—of the nation. *The unrestricted and unscrupulous development of the Film can, therefore, never be justified and its inherent goodness is never to be calculated on the plea that a great many people see it daily, or that all 'houses' are 'full' for all 'shows' of the day. Truth is not to be measured by counting heads.* The expansion of the cinema can never be a proof positive that we are a highly cultural people. Neitzsche remarked not without reason that there was only one Christian in the world and he died on the Cross.

EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Last, though not the least, our educational system is fifty per cent liable for the rowdy elements in society and indiscipline among the students community. The Biblical dictum that men do not live by bread alone has niggardly and mischievously been explained here. Our education cannot provide the multitude even with bread. Hence, frustration and insecurity stare large in the face of our youngsters, who in no time become violent and furious against anything that is good and stable. . . Formerly, education was conceived as meditation. At present, multiplicity and complexity of syllabus has compelled the boys to take recourse to 'short cut,' 'digest' and 'sure success,'

and they cannot help indulging in cramming. This, again, leaves the pupils little to be humble, modest and obedient. The syllabus is not in touch with life, inasmuch as *there is no scope in it for the moral development of the educand*. Sri Aurobindo pointed out that to neglect moral education altogether is to corrupt the race. In the extant system we can hardly teach our boys and girls the virtues of truthfulness, justice and righteousness.

In several years time we are going to have the Senior Basics, Higher Secondaries, Multipurpose XI Classes and Sponsored Colleges, in short, complete Governmental control of education all over the country. This would likely to create a hospos and more likely would result in more regimentation—and hence stagnation—of thoughts and ideas, and greater inefficiency. With the corresponding result that service would deteriorate with the parallel deterioration in the morals of the taught. It is as we are *extravagantly* planning to have the Giant Metropolitan water Control Board for the supply of filtered water to several dozen municipalities in and around Calcutta, when the entire population of Calcutta itself are facing impending epidemic due to poisonous filtered water. But then, all these are going to take place in hot haste in our zeal to wage crusade against illiteracy, because Govt. think and work on a wrong postulate that everything would be safer in their hands.

Next, to make the rowdism and indiscipline complete the present education is irreligious. It is truncated from Indian ideal and culture. An education which denies the soul and feeds the brain and more grossly makes meagre provision for the body only cannot but result in creating disruption and chaos. Moreover, if it does not equip the teachers and professors to teach young learners under their control the eternal verities of life and the earth, if the heads of educational institutions are handicapped to materialise and put into practice their best ideals and plans due to mechanisation of circulars, the rowdy and subversive elements cannot be eliminated from society altogether. Even then *the wisest implementation of the best plans of education would turn the wheel of progress of the country back by several decades*. To minimise the defects of the present system, at least the planning of education should be entrusted with the *emminent educationists of the country*.

If the majority of the causes are conscientiously and effectively remedied then and then only the growing indiscipline and lawlessness can be reduced to the irreducible minimum and the country may have immunisation from rowdy and antisocial elements in course of,

twenty years hence. But to have that cherished end concerted labour and whole hearted devotion are required and all resources must have to be diverted and utilised to the best purpose. No paucity of fund must stand in the way. Education must have to be declared an essential service and an end-in-itself without an ulterior end. If it is considered as a means without any clearcut and chalked out end, it is just to have then the body without the soul, a ship without its rudder.

NYĀYA-MĀÑJARĪ

VOL. II (25)

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THE REFUTATION OF THE ABOVE HYPOTHESIS REGARDING THE CONSTITUTION OF WORDS AND SENTENCES BY LETTERS

Now, the defender may argue in his defence that the last word continues to exist though it is no more presented to our consciousness. We say only by way of criticism, "May the elaborate system of Logic be safe." [The critics suggest that such an admission contradicts all accepted hypotheses and invalidates the system of logic itself.] Again if it is held that the last word is not presented to consciousness though it persists then we simply put this question to them *viz.*, "What service does it render, thus persisting?" He may say in reply to the question that it will be presented to our consciousness again. We put another question to him. The question is "What is the source of the second consciousness?" If the auditory organ once suspends its function then it does not resume its work. At least we have no knowledge of such working of the auditory sense-organ. Nobody has direct knowledge of an external object in and through mere introspection. The inner organ has no direct access to an external object. When it receives the aid of an external organ it is able to be aware of an external object. If the consciousness of the last word re-appears any how then the charge of the simultaneity of the two acts of consciousness stands irrefutable.

Moreover, all these antecedent words are mere empty sounds and as such they continue to exist as sounding brass and a tinkling symbol. Such unintelligible sounds, being remembered, convey no sense. What benefit do we derive from their recollection? Now, if you (the upholder of the thesis under criticism) hold that those words along with their meanings are recalled in our mind then in every case the simultaneity of the two different acts of consciousness will be inevitable since an act of consciousness will surely be crossed by an act of remembrance, *i.e.*, the remembrance of the relation of denotation. Therefore, the hypothesis of this type is highly inconsistent.

A REVISED HYPOTHESIS THAT LETTERS CONSTITUTE WORDS AND
SENTENCES IN ANOTHER WAY

Some interpreters represent the process of the word-building in a different manner. All letters are combined in a single unit to form the first word. The first word, thus formed, is presented to our consciousness at the outset. Then the relation of denotation is recalled in our mind. When the said relation flashes in our memory the consciousness of the first word is on the eve of destruction. During this state of crossing the antecedent act of consciousness, referring to the first word, produces another event of knowledge which points to such meaning as is denoted by the first word. Afterwards, the knowledge of the said meaning gives birth to an impression. Then, following the order of events stated above, the consciousness of the second word comes into being. Then, the relation of denotation holding between the second word and its meaning is recalled in our memory. The consciousness of the second word is on the eve of destruction at that time. At this stage of its life the immediate antecedent consciousness of a word, in co-operation with the remembrance of the relation of denotation, produces the knowledge of the meaning of the second word. The meaning flashes in our mind as determined by its own denotative word. The knowledge of the meaning of the second word, in co-operation with the impression of the knowledge of the meaning of the first word, produces a stronger impression. Now, comes the turn of the formation of the third word. A few letters which consecutively follow one another are combined into a word. Thus, the third letter is formed. It is presented to our consciousness. Again, the relation of denotation which obtains between the third word and its meaning is recalled in our memory. Again, the consciousness of the third word on the verge of its destruction, assisted by the memory of the relation of denotation, produces the knowledge of the meaning of the third word as determined by the third word. This knowledge in co-operation of its antecedent impression, produces a stronger impression. Thus, the process of the growth of knowledge goes on unless and until the last word of the sentence is presented to our consciousness and its meaning is communicated. At last, the awareness of the last word produces the knowledge of its own meaning as determined by the denotative last word. Afterwards, the antecedent strong impression produces a judgment of memory which refers to all meanings as determined by the past words. The said judgment of memory

and the judgment which refers to the meaning of the last word point to all words as determinant of their contents. The collection of words, thus revealed, constitutes a sentence. The meanings which are presented to our consciousness as denoted by these words constitute the meaning of the sentence in question. Thus, a collection of words and their meanings some of which are recalled in memory and some of which are directly experienced constitutes a sentence and the meaning of a sentence respectively.

THE REVIEW OF THE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS.

The alternative hypothesis does not stand to reasons. When the meaning of the last word is known by us the last word is also presented to our consciousness as its determinant in the capacity of a denotative word. The word in question is undoubtedly one of the conditions of the knowledge of the said meaning. There is no divergence of opinion regarding the view in question. If the word is cognised, no body can deny existence to it. The word cannot cognise itself. It must be an object of some kind of cognition. Let us now define the exact nature of this cognition. What is its cause? The cognition in question does not owe its existence to the auditory sense-organ. The first apprehension of the last word is perceptual. The perception in question is auditory. The auditory sense-organ, having produced the above perception of the last word, has become inactive with regard to the same effect. As it has been inactive so it cannot denovo produce that cognition which points to a word as a determinant of some meaning. We cannot directly introspect an external object with the help of our inner organ. If an external object had been directly introspected then all the words first, second and so on would have been thus introspected. In that case why do you say that they are recalled in memory? As the last word is the cause par excellence of the knowledge of its meaning so it will also be the cause par excellence of such cognition as reveals itself as a determinant of a meaning. Such a hypothesis is contrary to reason since as a word is cognised, it is an object of cognition. One and the same thing cannot be both an object and cause par excellence of the same act. We have elaborately discussed this point in our definition of perception. We have also refuted the hypothesis that an object, qualified by its denotative word, is perceived. An elaborate refutation of this point is superfluous.

THE HYPOTHESIS THAT A SENTENCE CONVEYS ITS OWN MEANING
IS SOMEHOW ESTABLISHED.

Some other interpreters put forward an alternative suggestion. At first the first word is cognised. Then the relation of denotation holding between it and its meaning is recalled in mind. It is followed by the knowledge of its meaning. The knowledge of the meaning acts as a destructive agent of the cognition of the first word. [A law is honoured in the Vaiśeṣika system that a distinctive attribute of an all pervasive substance is destroyed by its immediately succeeding attribute.] The auditory sense-organ, receiving the help of the cognition in question which is about to pass away, produces the cognition of the second word which is qualified by its immediately antecedent word. Thus the cognition of the second word comes into being. It is again followed by the recollection of the relation of denotation holding between the second word and its meaning. Then the knowledge of the meaning of the second word follows in its wake. It goes to destroy the cognition of the second word. The auditory sense-organ, co-operating with the cognition of the second word which is on the verge of destruction, produces the cognition of the third word as qualified by the second word in the capacity of its immediate predecessor. In this way the cognition of all the remaining words of a sentence takes place. This process continues to work until and unless the last word is not cognised. When the cognition of the last word takes place the recollection of antecedent words is no more required as an accessory condition in accordance with the process of ideal construction mentioned above. The reason behind this statement is this that the remembrance of antecedent words yields such a result as is automatically established by the cognition of a word which is on the eve of destruction. The contribution of the said cognition towards the form of its immediate successor is this that an antecedent word is presented to our consciousness as qualifying its immediately succeeding word. Let us now see the result of the act of remembrance. When the last word is cognised all the antecedent words are also presented to our consciousness. The cognition of an antecedent word which is on the verge of destruction produces another cognition which refers to a relational whole in which the antecedent word qualifies its immediate successor-word. Thus, the arrangement of words in a definite order is worked out by the above cognition itself. What is the need of remembering all past-words? As an additional act of recollection is not required, there is no occasion for the simul-

tensity of the two acts of cognition. We have already mentioned how the cognition of the last word comes into being and presents its content to our consciousness. The cognition of the last word working out its effect in the way mentioned above, brings about the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. Thus, the hypothesis that the meanings of the constituent words of a sentence imply the meaning of a sentence does not stand to reasons. Therefore, a sentence will convey its own meaning and the meanings of words will not point to the meaning of a sentence.

A REFUTATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS

Some other interpreters subject the above hypothesis to severe criticism. They point out that the said hypothesis is not immune from defects. The second word is never cognised as being qualified by the first word. The cognition of the first word comes into being at first. It is followed by the recollection of the relation of denotation. This act of remembrance acts as a destructive agent to the cognition of the first word. The said cognition is now on the verge of destruction. When the meaning of the first word is conveyed to us the cognition of the first word has passed away. We are generally informed of a maxim that a piece of consciousness which has passed away renders no service favourable or unfavourable to any other event of consciousness.

Now, the upholders of the hypothesis may contend thus:—An act of consciousness which conditions another act of consciousness is opposed to the latter, as the former is destroyed by the latter. But we should also bear in mind that one act of consciousness is not necessarily opposed to another such act because the relation of the destroyer and the destroyed obtains between them. Such a statement is not sound because in some cases the relation of the destroyer and the destroyed does not hold between an act of consciousness and another act of consciousness. Though we admit the truth of the above critical remark yet we say “Let the relation of the destroyer and the destroyed be fixed between the cause-consciousness and the effect-consciousness”. Though such a relation obtains between the said acts of consciousness yet the consciousness of a word is held to be the condition of the recollection of the relation of denotation just as an impression conditions the remembrance of the said relation. Because the said relation of denotation will not come into being if it is not conditioned by the cognition of a word just as it does not

appear if an impression does not revive it. If it is held that the revival of an impression is the function of the said cognition then the cognition in question is surely the condition of the act of recollection since the former produces the latter through the intermediate process *viz.*, the revival of impression. Thus, the three acts of consciousness *viz.*, the cognition of a word, the remembrance of the relation of denotation, and the knowledge of the meaning of a word, are simultaneously present. Thus, they commit a serious blunder.

Moreover, the cognition of a word is not that of a partless whole. But it is an ideal construction of a series of consecutive letters since the hypothesis that a word consists of no parts has been refuted. We should also remember in this connection that two or three, or three or four or five or six letters constitute a word, these letters are consecutively presented to our consciousness, and the consciousness of each letter comes into being and passes away in a consecutive order. All the letters which constitute a word are never simultaneously presented to our consciousness. The cognition of the last word turns up in this way. The cognition in question does not endure long. The antecedent ones among letters which constitute the last word will also pass away. Hence how does a judgment present its content in which the last word is a subject and its antecedent word is a predicate qualifying it? They build castles in the air.

A sentence conveys its sense even if its constituent words are uttered at intervals of time. The master of a house who is busy with various calls of duty directs the attention of his servant, uttering his name "Kandalaka" and then attends to some other business. Having finished it he says "On my horse". Another call of business interferes with his order. He pays his attention to it. Having completed it, he says again "Put harness". Having done something else he says again "And bring him". But his servant follows the sense of such a sentence *viz.*, "Oh Kandalaka put harness on my horse and bring him". It is impossible from your point of view to make out the meaning of the sentence in question since an antecedent word does not qualify its succeeding word and all words of a sentence are not called up.

Moreover, as the followers of the master logician (Pravara) hold, these logicians also subscribe to the thesis that a judgment which is relational in character does not refer to its subject and predicate. But it refers only to the subject. The distinction of the awareness of a mere successive word from that of a successive word following an antecedent word is explained by the diversity of their conditions.

Though the antecedent word qualifies its succeeding word yet it is not presented to our consciousness. Hence, the second word is only grasped by our consciousness. If this is so what is the good of admitting that an antecedent word qualifies its succeeding one?

The suggestion that an antecedent word does not qualify its succeeding word does not hold water since the relation of denotation which obtains between the second word and its exclusive meaning has been only recalled in mind. The word has been employed, in some cases, to convey its own meaning. But it is, now, qualified by another word. But the meaning of the second word as qualified has been never grasped. Hence such a qualified meaning cannot be communicated. Let this discussion be stopped. This speaks of the unprecedented scholarship of Sankara Svāmin.

JAYANTA'S OWN THEORY REGARDING THE COMMUNICATION OF THE
MEANING OF A SENTENCE BY ITSELF IS ESTABLISHED

An objector comes up and points out "If all suggestions, put forward by the expert logicians, are defective then you should frame a better and defectless hypothesis and place it before us". Jayanta says in reply to the above remarks, 'We cannot suggest a novel theory which is highly original. Short-sighted as I am, I cannot discover even a blade of grass which my predecessors, logicians of keen insight, have failed to take notice of'.

Now, you may put a question to me viz , "Why do you entertain an ardent desire for composing a logical treatise—a sphere of rational thinking of the great scholars? My humble reply to this charge is that the ardent desire, referred to, does not invite criticism and an advice, given by others to relinquish it, will take no effect on me.

The king of Kashmere has confined me in a solitary cave—a prisoncell. I have been passing my days in pleasure of composing the book in question.

Though it is a recreation to me yet I should explain how the constituent letters communicate the meaning of a sentence, constituted by them.

Our humble suggestion on this point is as follows. The recent or remote destruction of objects which are recalled in mind does not condition our memory. It is an impression which is only responsible for memory. The objects which are remembered may have passed away recently or long ago. But their passing away does not affect the impression in question in the least. In conformity to the law of

memory all antecedent words which had passed away long before and had been uttered at a long interval left an impression on our mind. This impression will revive memory. Now, if we admit that earlier words are called up and the last word is directly apprehended then we are to face the charge of the simultaneity of the two acts of consciousness. In order to avoid this problem we should rather admit that the remembrance of the last word takes place immediately before the communication of the meaning of a sentence. All the words of a sentence, being recollected, will convey the meaning of a sentence. To this effect we make the following suggestions. At the outset we cognise the first word which is a combination of some consecutive letters. It is followed by the recollection of the relation of denotation together with the impression, left on our mind, by the cognition of the first word. We suggest that the said recollection and the said impression simultaneously appear in our mind. The hypothesis of the simultaneity of the two acts of cognition has been disapproved by the recondite logical treatise but compresence of two mental phenomena, such as an event of cognition and an impression, has not been disfavoured. The knowledge of the meaning of a word follows in their wake. It also leaves an impression on our mind. Then we again combine a series of consecutive letters and construct the second word. We cognise it. Then we remember the relation of denotation which holds between it and its meaning. At the same time the cognition of the second word receiving the co-operation of its antecedent impression produces a stronger impression. Again, just as the earlier two series of consecutive letters have been combined to form the first two words so the third series of consecutive letters are combined to form the third letter. The third word is now presented to consciousness. The relation of denotation obtaining between it and its meaning is also called up. Receiving the help of its antecedent impression a stronger impression of this word and that of the knowledge of its meaning came into being. In this way the cognition of a word produces a deeper impression and the knowledge of the meaning of a word, also, produces a similar impression. All these impressions survive in our mind. Our subconscious mind is a store-house of all such impressions. In this mental back ground the last word of a sentence is presented to our consciousness. This consciousness is followed by the remembrance of all words as the impressions of all words survive in our mind. The impressions of the meanings of words revive their memory. As the impressions of words precede those

of their meanings so these two sets are successively recalled in accordance with the order of their succession. The collection of words which are recollected constitutes a sentence. The other assemblage of meanings which are recalled constitutes the meaning of a sentence.

Now, a fresh objection arises. As recollective knowledge *per se* is erroneous so the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence, being representative in character, is not true. Such an objection does not hold good since the representative knowledge of a meaning in question perfectly accords with the direct acquaintance of the relation of denotation of a word. If we know that this word denotes this particular object but remember that it denotes something else then our remembrance is faulty. Just as if we know that smoke is the right probans of fire *i.e.*, the relation of universal concomitance holds between smoke and fire but infer fire, seeing mist then our knowledge is wrong. But in the present case the consecutive letters have been recalled in that very order of succession in which they have been presented to our consciousness at the time when the relation of denotation holding between the word, constituted by these letters, and its meaning has been taught. So, the hypothesis suggested by us, suffers from no defects. Representative knowledge which immediately follows a presentative one bears a close resemblance to the latter.

There is no need of entertaining the suggestion of judgments of memory. When the meaning of the last word is known to us a judgment of introspection will arise. It will refer to all words and their meanings. It will resemble the referential knowledge of the number 'hundred' etc. Words which are introspected constitute a sentence. Their meanings which are introspected constitute the meaning of a sentence. Such an introspection cannot be disapproved since every body bears witness to it.

Now, a fresh question arises in our mind. Why you hold that the recollection or the introspection of all antecedent words and their meanings follows the knowledge of the meanings of the last word? What is the motive of framing such a suggestion? If the meaning of the last word is known to us then all our task has been completed. What remains to be done? Say what will be referred to by a judgment of memory or by that of introspection. Such an argument does not carry conviction since no body can dare deny that the meaning of a sentence which is experienced by every body is presented as an integrate whole. If its parts are neither recalled nor introspected then such a whole cannot be constructed. Thus we

see that recollection or introspection renders some service. In this way, words, being recalled and referred to by a synthetic judgment, constitute a sentence. And the meanings of words, being thus recalled and referred to by such a judgment, constitute the meaning of a sentence.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HYPOTHESIS OF MUTUAL RELATIONS

Let not a sphota which stands for a word or a sphota which stands for a sentence convey a sense. Let not a sentence or the meaning of a sentence be partless. Let the hypothesis of words or sentences as suggested by you be approved. But say how are the meanings of words mutually related.

The meanings of words such as a cow, a horse, a man and an elephant remaining unrelated do not constitute the meaning of a sentence. A judgment of memory or of introspection which closely follows the knowledge of the meaning of the last word only refers to the meanings of words as cognised before. Now, we should discuss how the knowledge of their mutual relation comes up.

RIVAL HYPOTHESES ON THIS TOPIC

We admit that teachers differ in opinion so far as this point is concerned. Some hold that words convey their meanings as mutually related. If we do not subscribe to it, words cannot constitute a sentence. Others hold that words denote their meanings as mutually unrelated. They being thus denoted, point to their mutual relation when they are judged from the stand-points of reciprocal reference, material non-contradiction and proximity.

This point is to be debated. Instruction plays the very important part to reveal the meaning of a word or of a sentence since a word or a sentence remains ever unintelligible if the meaning of a word or of a sentence is not taught. Are we initiated into the meaning of a sentence or into that of a word? Are we taught that this sentence conveys this meaning or that this word conveys this meaning? If we hold that we are initiated into the meaning of a sentence then we advocate the doctrine of Anvita-abhidhāna. If we hold that we are introduced into the meaning of a word then we subscribe to the doctrine of Abhihita-anvaya.

(To be continued)

VIRGINIA WOOLF AND THE CAPTURE OF THE MOMENT

SISIR CHATTERJEE

I

[A study in technique with special reference to time, characterisation and narrative method]

Time is a problem for most modern novelists and with Virginia Woolf it constitutes the greatest of all problems. The novelist generally feels bound and circumscribed by the supreme necessity of following a strict sequence of events in time. E. M. Forster, was probably the first critic and novelist to sound a note of revolt against this convention in 1927. In *Aspects of the Novel* he strongly criticised the "time-obsession" which did so much harm to the novel. Virginia Woolf at once took it up and as her subsequent novels show, she was considerably influenced and encouraged by E. M. Forster's remarks, which constituted the first open statement of revolt. She had even before 1927 been formulating her own aesthetic theory. She put strong emphasis on the autonomous, self-perpetuating nature of a work of art, which should have as its sole end the communication of emotion and sensibility. In her own mind, her own novels could be divided into two distinct groups—novels of *fact* and novels of *vision*, although her ultimate aim was to blend and fuse the two, as she attempted to do in *Between the Acts* (1941). In actual practice, she always dealt with *fact*, by which she meant the exterior and external world, as it is illuminated and epitomised by her own mystic vision of *reality*. In delineating her characters, particularly the feminine ones, she always concentrated on their *consciousness*. This is a semi-mystic state of mind in which the environmental sounds, objects and persons become fused into a unified whole that is a vision of ultimate reality. Thus the form of her best novels is a pattern of such illuminated moments of vision as they occur on one or more typical days during which the characters concerned anticipate and ultimately enjoy some social communion, such as the party in *Mrs. Dalloway*, the dinner or the final trip in *To The Lighthouse* and the pageant in *Between the Acts*, which leads to the attainment of the final vision. Mrs. Woolf believed that each individual is composed of a multiplicity of selves which blend

under the direct control of a master-self during these moments of vision. Since she was hyper-sensitive to *time*, she also maintained that in such moments of ultimate vision the sense of the past and the multitudinous and complex apprehension of the present become a unified whole. In the same way, the varied consciousness of time in the individual and the consciousness of the multiple selves in him or her, are suspended in such moments of vision. The work of the greatest artists, she contends, is pervaded by a sense that the writer's self is everywhere in control but nowhere to be seen.

In an essay called *Notes on an Elizabethan Play*¹, Virginia Woolf discusses the different ways of looking at reality :

“ The reality to which we have grown accustomed is, speaking roughly, based upon the life and death of some knight called Smith, who succeeded his father in the family business of pitwood importers, timber merchants and coal exporters, was well known in political, temperance, and church circles, did much for the poor of Liverpool, and died last Wednesday of pneumonia while on a visit to his son at Muswell Hill. ’

That is our world—the world we know so well and with so much details. “ That ”, according to Virginia Woolf, “ is the reality which our poets and novelists have to expound and illuminate ”. But with the Elizabethans it was all so different .

“ Where is Smith, we ask, where is Liverpool? And the groves of Elizabethan drama echo ‘ where ’? Exquisite is the delight, sublime the relief of being set free to wander in the land of the unicorn and the jeweller among dukes and grandees, Gonzaloes and Bellimpenias, who spend their lives in murder and intrigue, dress up as men if they are women, as women if they are men, see ghosts, run mad, and die in the greatest profusion on the slightest provocation, uttering as they fall imprecations of superb vigour or elegies of the wildest despair.”

Now this world is not ours by any stretch of imagination. But, Virginia Woolf asks, which is *reality*? Not this Elizabethan wonderland, neither the life-history of the man Smith who lived in Liverpool and died at Muswell Hill. But any literature that endeavours to express *reality* “ must somehow be based on Smith ” who lived in Liverpool. She concludes by saying : “ there is a station, somewhere

¹ *The Common Reader* (1929), pp. 72-74.

in mid-air, whence Smith and Liverpool can be seen to the best advantage; that the great artist is the man who knows where to place himself above the shifting scenery; that while he never loses sight of Liverpool he never sees it in the wrong perspective."

This problem of rendering *reality* is with Virginia Woolf, a cardinal problem, at once aesthetic and philosophical. Moreover, as a novelist and a critic, she had perforce to answer the question of what constituted *reality*, and having answered that question she had to devise a novelistic technique that could express that reality in language. Virginia Woolf's critical and biographical essays and her diaries clearly reveal that her sensibility was shaped by her wide reading and by the interests of her friends in the Bloomsbury group. She was drawn to Defoe, Sterne, Jane Austen, Conrad and Hardy, "the great plain writers" as she calls them, for their straightforward and honest treatment of the problems of life. She was also attracted to Thomas Browne, Donne and Montaigne by their bold exploration of the self. She supplemented what she learned from these by reading in the Russians who investigated both the self and its relations to external and social reality. And from G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica* she drew her system of values which above everything laid the maximum emphasis on "good states of mind". The Bloomsbury Group, particularly Roger Fry and Virginia Woolf, believed that art is the best method of communication, a medium for the exchange of states of mind, and being at the same time art, less subject to the exigencies and accidents of time and space, and is an absolute way to reality. A vision of this universe was a necessity and it could easily be attained by artists in the visual arts. Virginia Woolf believed that the writer, the novelist, might have this vision too and communicate it to his readers. This is what she says in *A Room of One's Own* (1929):

"The writer, as I think, has the chance to live more than other people in the presence of this reality. It is his business to find it and collect it and communicate it to the rest of us. So at least I infer from reading *Lear* or *Emma* or *La Recherche du Temps Perdu*. For the reading of these books seems to perform a curious couching operation on the senses; one sees more intensely afterwards; the world seems bared of its covering and given an intenser life." (P. 166).

Lytton Strachey used to say the same thing about Racine's art—that it "represents the sublimated essence of reality, save that, after all, reality has no degrees." Thus, *reality* for the novelist is determined

by what Virginia Woolf calls "the inexhaustible richness of human sensibility". There is an admission of a certain amount of subjectivity here, that is, an interpretation, and then communication, of reality in terms of human reaction. She maintains that prose can never be as effective as poetry or music. In poetry and music the artist is freed by the very nature of his medium of communication from the need of rendering reality piecemeal, that is, part by part or one proposition at a time. Poetry can and does exploit all communicative aspects of language other than the merely semantic in order to convey different aspects of reality simultaneously. As such a novelist by approximating his medium of communication to that of a poet or a musician can become more effective. That is exactly the position taken up by Virginia Woolf in the role of a novelist—a position of unstable equilibrium. Hence all her life-long experimentation in the novelistic technique.

"Princes appear to me to be Fools. Houses of Commons and Houses of Lords appear to me to be fools," wrote Blake long ago. "they seem to me to be something Else besides Human Life" Virginia Woolf shared the same opinion. The grandeur of big business, the adventure of science, the romance of politics and social reform—all these seemed to her "something Else besides Human Life". And human life was her theme. Life, reality and human life formed the basis of her novelistic art and all through her life she endeavoured to communicate her own vision of life in terms that would catch the imagination of her fellow mortals. Like H. G. Wells, Bennett and Galsworthy, she did not want to scratch about on the surface, to heap incidents to form her plots, to overwhelm her readers with information, details and prophecy. Rather, she endeavoured to reveal the springs of human action, to show men and women in the real act of living, alone and in society, and dealing with ordinary human things. She had her moments of vision when she could see reality in proper perspective. She recorded "the atoms of experience" as they fell and in her desire to communicate the whole of this recorded vision of experience and sensibility she had to stand aside from the accepted forms of contemporary fiction and create her own form. That is the whole content of her numerous broadsides on Edwardian novelists and that is also the complete explanation of the attitude taken up by her as a writer of fiction.

Dorothy Richardson entered the world of fiction determined to "give a feminine equivalent of the current masculine realism". She did not of course stop there, as her *Pilgrimage* clearly indicates.

Virginia Woolf was also from the very beginning supremely conscious of making a different thing out of the novel. The novelistic form had been developed in a particular way by men and exploited by them. But she was a woman, and as such she was determined to create a new form,—her own, a “feminist equivalent”. Jane Austen had done it before her. But the Brontes and George Eliot had been hindered by their close adherence to the masculine tradition and practice. Virginia Woolf, like Dorothy Richardson, contended that the feminine mind and sensibility cannot go on imitating the masculine for ever. A woman novelist has something new to say in her own way. That is why, Virginia Woolf experimented ceaselessly in new forms and techniques in her desire to get nearer to an intense realization and an adequate and comprehensive expression of life. This is the only truth: how a thing is said and what is said. The form and pattern of the conventional novel is not true in so far as it fails to express what is felt as also in so far as it fails to create an adequate medium of expression. The conventional novel is stereotyped in form and superficial in content. It moves on the surface of life despite the careful and laborious collection of the so-called facts of life that is so apparent everywhere.

Virginia Woolf, of course, was always ready to learn from others. She learned mostly from her contemporaries, Dorothy Richardson, Proust and Joyce. But she also learned from the old masters, particularly those who like Sterne had the experimental quality and the same desire to focus on an interior world. The novelist has the whole world at his disposal. He must make experiments to come closer to reality. In her essay *On Re-reading Novels* she makes some very shrewd observations:

“ We must have known that a novelist, before he can persuade us that his world is real and his people alive, before he can begin to move us by the sight of their joys and sufferings, must solve certain questions and acquire certain skill In excuse of our slovenliness it must be admitted, not only that the methods are unnamed, but that no writer has so many at his disposal as a novelist. He can put himself at any point of view; he can to some extent combine several different views. He can appear in person, like Thackeray; or disappear (never perhaps completely), like Flaubert. He can state the facts, like Defoe, or give the thought without the fact, like Henry James. He can sweep the widest horizons, like Tolstoy, or seize upon one old

apple-woman and her basket, like Tolstoy again. Where there is every freedom there is every licence; and the novel, open-armed, free to all comers, claims more victims than the other forms of literature all put together.....

From all this some conclusions seem to emerge. First, that when we speak of form we mean that certain emotions have been placed in the right relations to each other; then that the novelist is able to dispose these emotions and make them tell by methods which he inherits, bends to his purpose, models anew, or even invents for himself. Further, that the reader can detect these devices, and by so doing will deepen his understanding of the book, while for the rest, it may be expected that novels will lose their chaos and become more and more shapely as the novelist explores and perfects his technique. . . ."²

Even Jane Austen, whom Virginia Woolf admired so much, seems to suffer from a narrowness of vision. Jane Austen was indeed a fine novelist "who knew exactly what her powers were, and what material they were fitted to deal with as material to be dealt with by a writer." Yet,—yet, she lacked a profounder vision which it was quite within her powers to attain. She died early. If she had lived a few more years everything would be well. "She would have stayed in London, dined out, lunched out, met famous people, made new friends, read, travelled, and carried back to the quiet country cottage a hoard of observations to feast upon at leisure"'. And that is not all. "She would have devised a method, clear and composed as ever, but deeper and more suggestive, for conveying not only what people say, but what they leave unsaid; not only what they are, but what life is. She would have stood farther away from her characters, and seen them more as a group, less as individuals. She would have been the forerunner of Henry James and of Proust—but enough"'. But it is not enough. She became the forerunner of Virginia Woolf, and all these speculations really concern the art of Virginia Woolf herself as a novelist.

It is significant that both in her essay on the Elizabethan Play and on Jane Austen, Virginia Woolf is primarily concerned with the novelist's eternal problem of how to reconcile the events patterned and recorded objectively with their expression given effect to by an interested observer who acts as a monitor. This is an old debate. And Virginia Woolf played an active part in this general debate. She

² *The Moment and other Essays* (1947), pp. 181-84.

³ Jane Austen. *The Common Reader* (1929), pp. 166-69.

debated as a critic and practised as a serious artist. She took up the cry of Henry James: Do not state but render, do not narrate what is happening, but let it happen. She echoed Flaubert's advice: The artist should be in his work, like God in creation, invisible and all powerful; he should be felt everywhere and seen nowhere. She supported Dorothy Richardson in her endeavour to create a new feminine prose that would be able to communicate "contemplated reality", and like Joyce tried to epiphanize human experience under the direct impact of her own vision of life.

Virginia Woolf died in 1941. *A Writer's Diary*, which is composed of extracts from her diaries, was published by her husband in 1953. She began to write a diary regularly from 1915, the year her first novel, *The Voyage Out* was published. Let us consider some extracts from her diaries. These would enable us to look into the ideas and thoughts that passed through her mind as she went on experimenting with fictional technique in her endeavour to comprehend reality as also to master the method of communicating her experiences of that reality. This is the inside story.

1922. Tuesday, August 22nd.

It is a mistake to think that literature can be produced from the raw. One must get out of life—yes, that's why I disliked so much the irruption of Sydney [Sir Sidney Waterlow]—one must become externalised; very, very concentrated, all at one point, not having to draw upon the scattered parts of one's character, living in the brain. Sydney comes and I'm Virginia; when I write I'm merely a sensibility. Sometimes I like being Virginia, but only when I'm scattered and various and gregarious. Now, so long as we are here, I'd like to be only a sensibility. . . . (P. 48).

Virginia Woolf was a serious artist. Here we get a picture of the artist at work, and busy as usual with the difficult task of giving expression to the world of reality, "the raw" as she calls it, in terms of her own sensibility.

1925. Tuesday, April 8th.

I wonder if this time I have achieved something? Well, nothing anyhow compared with Proust, in whom I am embedded now. The thing about Proust is his combination of the utmost sensibility with the utmost tenacity.

He searches out these butterfly shades to the last grain. He is as tough as catgut and as evanescent as a butterfly's bloom. And he will, I suppose, both influence me and make me out of temper with every sentence of my own. . . . More and more do I repeat my own version of Montaigne—"It's life that matters." (P. 72).

Monday, April 27th.

But my present reflection is that people have any number of states of consciousness: and I should like to investigate the party consciousness, the frock consciousness, etc. (P. 75).

These entries follow closely the completion of *Mrs. Dalloway*. Virginia Woolf had been reading Proust and Joyce extensively at about this time. The influence of both these writers is discernible in *Mrs. Dalloway*. It would, however, be wrong to think that she was carried away or influenced so profoundly by Proust or Joyce as to fall completely under the spell of their way of writing. She was influenced. There can be no doubt about that. But she was also going the same way. To her too, "It's life that matters". She too was out to trace the path of the evanescent human consciousness.

1926. Thursday, September 30th.

Life is, soberly and accurately, the oddest affair; has in it the essence of reality. I used to feel this as a child—couldn't step across a puddle once, I remember, for thinking how strange—what am I? etc. But by writing I don't reach anything. All I mean to make is a note of a curious state of mind. I hazard the guess that it may be the impulse behind another book (*The Waves*). At present my mind is totally blank and virgin of books. I want to watch and see how the idea at first occurs. I want to trace my own process. (P. 101).

1926. Tuesday, November 23rd.

...Yet I am now and then haunted by some semi-mystic very profound life of a woman, which shall all be told on one occasion: and time shall be utterly obliterated; future shall somehow blossom out of the past. One incident—say the fall of a flower—might contain it. My theory being

that the actual event practically does not exist—not time either. But I don't want to force this. I must make up my serious book. (P. 102).

Virginia Woolf was always concerned with the problem of life and its flux. She wanted to get at the bottom of it and to catch "the essence of reality". When she made the above entries in her diary she had just completed the first draft of *To The Lighthouse*, and was probably getting ready for her next novel. As soon as she attained one particular vision of life, she wanted to press forward and find something still more satisfying, artistically at any rate. "Semi-mystic" visions come to her and under their impact she obliterates time. The "moment" is about to be captured.

1928. Wednesday, November 28th.

So the days pass and I ask myself sometimes whether one is not hypnotized, as a child by a silver globe, by life; and whether this is living. It's very quick, bright, exciting. But superficial perhaps. I should like to take the globe in my hands and feel it quietly, round, smooth, heavy, and so hold it, day after day. I will read Proust I think. I will go backwards and forwards. *Orlando* has done very well. Now I could go on writing like that—the tug and suck are at me to do it. People say this was so spontaneous, so natural. And I would like to keep those qualities if I could without losing the others. But those qualities were largely the result of ignoring the others. They came of writing exteriorly; and if I dig, must I not lose them? And what is my own position towards the inner and the outer? I think a kind of ease and dash are good;—yes: I think even externality is good; some combination of them ought to do is to saturate every atom. I mean to eliminate all waste, deadness, superfluity: to give the moment whole; whatever it includes. Say that the moment is a combination of thought; sensation; the voice of the sea. Waste, deadness, come from the inclusion of things that don't belong to the moment; this appalling narrative business of the realist: getting on from lunch to dinner: it is false, unreal, merely conventional. Why admit anything to literature that is not poetry—by which I mean saturated? Is that not my grudge against novelists? that they select nothing? The poets succeeding by simplifying: practically

everything is left out. I want to put practically everything in : yet to saturate. That is what I want to do on *The Moths* (The Waves). It must include nonsense, fact, sordidity : but made transparent. (Pp. 138-39).

This was written after the completion of *Orlando*. She calls it 'superficial' as a work of art. She has dealt with the surface of life and written "exteriorly". Naturally she is dissatisfied with her own performance. Externality may be good, but what about the inner life. She now thinks of combining the exterior and the interior—the world of fact and the world of vision, "to saturate every atom" of experience as it falls and get registered on her sensibility. She wants "to give the moment whole" and cut out all wastage. This "moment" would include all "thought; sensation; the voice of the sea". She tries to bring into being this kind of novel in *The Waves*.

1929. Friday, January 4th.

Now is life very solid or very shifting? I am haunted by the two contradictions. This has gone on for ever; will last for ever; goes down to the bottom of the world—this moment I stand on. Also it is transitory, flying, diaphanous. I shall pass like a cloud on the waves. Perhaps it may be that though we change, one flying after another, so quick, yet we are somehow successive and continuous we human beings, and show the light through. But what is the light? I am impressed by the transitoriness of human life to such an extent that I am often saying a farewell—after dining with Roger for instance; or reckoning how many more times I shall see Nessa. [Vanessa Bell, Virginia Woolf's sister]. (P. 141).

Virginia Woolf is at this time actually writing *The Waves*. She is still haunted by "the moment". Probably the reading of Proust too intimately has something to do with these speculations.

1934. Tuesday, April 17th.

An idea about Shakespeare.

That the play demands coming to the surface—hence insists upon a reality which the novel need not have, but perhaps should have contact with the surface, coming to the top. This is working out my theory of the different levels in writing and how to combine them : for I begin to

think the combination necessary. This particular relation with the surface is imposed on the dramatist of necessity: how far did it influence Shakespeare? Idea that one could work out a theory of fiction, etc., on these lines; how many levels attempted, whether kept to or not. (P. 215).

This indeed is very interesting. This reminds us of the discussions that took place in Joyce's *Portrait* between Stephen Dedalus and his friends. Joyce's theory of epiphany seems to have a direct bearing on this observation of Virginia Woolf. Joyce was also very much concerned with different levels of writing: "lyrical-epical-dramatic".

1934. Monday, August 7th.

But I am thinking all the time of what is to end *Here and Now* (*The Waves*). I want a chorus, a general statement, a song, for four voices. How am I to get it? I am now almost within sight of the end, racing along: becoming more and more dramatic. And how to make the transition from the colloquial to the lyrical, from the particular to the general" (P. 221).

Tuesday, August 30th.

The lesson of *Here and Now* (*The Waves*) is that one can use all kinds of "forms" in one book. Therefore the next might be poem, reality, comedy, play, narrative, psychology all in one. Very short. . . . (P. 222).

1935. Wednesday, October 16th.

What I have discovered in writing *The Years* is that you can only get comedy by using the surface layer—for example, the scene on the terrace. The question is can I get at quite different layers by bringing in music and painting together with certain groupings of human beings? This is what I want to try for in the raid scene: to keep going and influencing each other: the picture; the music; and the other direction—the action—I mean character telling a character—while the movement (that is the change of feeling as the raid goes on) continues. Anyhow, in this book I have discovered that there must be contrast: one strata or layer can't be developed intensively, as I did I expect in *The Waves*, without harm to the others. Thus a kind of

form is, I hope, imposing itself, corresponding to the dimensions of the human being; one should be able to feel a wall made out of all the influences : and this should inn the last chapter close round them at the party so that you feel that while they go on individually it has completed itself. . .

(P. 257).

These observations are still more important. Virginia Woolf was working on *The Years* and *Between the Acts* was in her mind too. She was out to use all kinds of " forms " in one book : " poem, reality, comedy, play; narrative, psychology all in one ". Joyce before her had tried to do the same in *Ulysses*. But Virginia Woolf went a step further and carried forward her investigation into the possibilities of communicating the entire *reality*. She gave *action*, which meant " character telling a character ". She gave *movement*, which again meant, " the change of feeling ". And above all she gave *contrast*—that is, an intense rendering simultaneously of the different " strata " or layer of human sensibility. In this way she made what Henry James had characterized before as : " a new way of statement ".

(To be continued.)

LORD LYTTON'S AFGHAN POLICY

(To the Treaty of Gandamak, May 26, 1879)

DILIP GHOSH

(I)

In Lord Lytton the Forward School¹ found its most extreme exponent. Even before the Viceroy-designate had left the shores of England he had independently come to the conclusion that Russia's advance in Central Asia necessitated an active interference in the affairs of Afghanistan, and that if the Amir should refuse to come under the influence of the Indian Government, it should cast about for some alternative arrangement in that country. Fortunately for Lord Lytton, his views at the time coincided in some respects with those of Sir Bartle Frere, and as Lytton claimed, even with the views of Lord Salisbury and Mr. Disraeli.² This perhaps encouraged him to believe that he would receive the full support of Her Majesty's Government in pursuing his own policy which, Lytton asserted, was strengthened by his "subsequent knowledge and active experience of Indian frontier administration".³

Lord Lytton came to India with instructions from the Home Government to improve British relations with the Amir, Sher Ali Khan. That prince had been alienated by the British award of Seistan to Persia,⁴ by the proceedings of the Indian Government in Kalat which was believed to be a part of Afghanistan, and by the support that was given to his eldest son, Yakub Khan,⁵ contrary to the pledge that the British Government would view with severe displeasure all attempts to disturb the Amir's authority.⁶ While drafting his instructions⁷ to Lord Lytton, Salisbury, then the Secretary of State for India, was quite aware of the Amir's estrangement, so that he impressed upon the Viceroy-designate the necessity of taking into account the alienation of Sher Ali's confidence in the sincerity of the British Government. To restore that lost confidence was the task given to Lord Lytton, and he was directed to fulfil it by the frank expression of hopes and careful avoidance of ambiguities or evasions, which were likely to make Sher Ali suspicious and mistrustful of the offers that might be made by the Indian Government.

Lord Salisbury acknowledged the necessity of maintaining in Afghanistan a strong and friendly power which had ever been the object

¹ For a discussion of "The Forward Policy" see the author's articles in the *Calcutta Review*, September and December, 1955.

² Letter to Frere, March 26, 1876, Martineau, *op. cit.*, II, p. 155.

³ Letter to Cranbrook, 3rd August, 1878, Lord Lytton's Private Collection, Commonwealth Relations Office Record.

⁴ See next issue.

⁵ For his hostile activities against his father Yakub Khan was then under surveillance.

⁶ Parl. Pap., 1878, Afghanistan No. 1, p. 181.

⁷ Salisbury to Lytton, 28th February, 1876, Parl. Pap., 1878, Afghanistan No. 1, pp. 156-59; also Balfour, Lord Lytton's Indian Administration (1899), pp. 88-99.

of British policy. The attainment of that object, he now averred, was to be considered with due reference to the situation created by the recent and rapid advance of the Russian army in Central Asia towards the northern frontiers of British India. Lytton was, therefore, urged to negotiate with the Amir with a view to establishing permanent British Agencies in Afghanistan, in lieu of which certain assurances were to be offered to Sher Ali Khan, such as a fixed and augmented subsidy, the Viceroy retaining the freedom of determining the circumstances, in which the pecuniary assistance was to be given; a more decided recognition than had yet been accorded by the Government of India to a *de facto* order of succession in Afghanistan by a *de facto* Government; and a promise, strictly guarded, of material aid in some clear case of an unprovoked aggression on Afghanistan by a foreign power, the British Government reserving to itself the right of judging the circumstances that involved the obligation of such support. Thus, while Lytton was asked to avoid ambiguities and evasions in his dealings with the Amir of Afghanistan, he was instructed to offer assurances to the Amir which, in themselves, were vague and ambiguous. And, together with the freedom of judging the circumstances, in which the offers were to be made, Lytton was given the right to reconsider "from a new point of view the policy to be pursued in reference to Afghanistan", should the fear be confirmed that the Amir was unwilling to receive British Agents in his country. Such freedom, given to a man who had left for India with preconceived notions on Central Asian politics, was destined to precipitate a crisis, which it was the avowed interest of the British Government to avert.

Salisbury's instructions were occasioned by the recent activities of Russia along the trans-Caspian steppes. General Lomakin's expedition against the Tekke Turcomans, and his occupation of Kizil Arvat, though eventually proved to be abortive, aroused suspicion among British officials, and they saw in them a design to absorb Merv and threaten Herat, as a preliminary to establishing Russian influence in Kabul.⁸ Moreover, events in the Balkan Peninsula were also moving fast and tending rapidly towards the possibility of a rupture between the Russian and the English Governments, so that the whole trend of Muscovite expansion and the rumours of their massing troops on the Oxus with the intention of operating against Merv created an alarm in Indo-British quarters.

On his arrival in India, Lytton proceeded to study the situation on the north-west frontier, and approached it in terms of his exaggerated notion of the Russian danger. Circumstances, he observed, must inevitably bring Russia in close contact with the states on India's north-west frontier, and "the possession of Afghanistan, whether military or political", would give her, "if not the command of the Indian Peninsula, at least a most potent purchase over it".⁹ So he feared that the Czar would soon take steps "to weaken British and strengthen Russian influence at Cabul"¹⁰

⁸ Despatch to the Secretary of State, 2nd July, 1877, Lord Lytton's Private Collection, Commonwealth Relations Office Record. Also, For. Dept. Sec. Progs. Nov. 1877, Cons. 129; May, 1875, Cons. 22-26; July, 1874, Cons. 101.

⁹ Minute, dated 12th August, 1876, For. Dept. Sec. Progs., August, 1877, 102/106 k.w.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

by every means in his power. He viewed with distrust the harmless correspondence that had passed, within the knowledge of the Indian Government, between Sher Ali and Kaufmann since 1870, and urged Her Majesty's Government to call the attention of the Czar to this gross breach of faith, asserting conclusively that the question was "whether the influence of England is to be superseded and replaced by that of Russia at the court of the Ameer".¹¹

Side by side, Lord Lytton opened negotiations with Sher Ali for the reception of a British Envoy in his kingdom. He approached the Amir to receive Sir Lewis Pelly on a temporary mission for a discussion of "matters of common interest to the two Governments".¹² Sher Ali on his part was afraid of the personal security of the British Agent, both owing to the religious fanaticism of the people and hostility to him of certain sections thereof. But he knew at the same time that his refusal to consider the British demand might lead to a breach with the Indian Government, and so he made the alternative proposal of deputing his own envoy to learn what the Government of India wished to communicate to him.¹³ Lytton, however, disapproved the Amir's proposal to send his own agent, and threatened him that the British Government would be obliged "to regard Afghanistan as a state which has voluntarily isolated itself"¹⁴ from its alliance and support. The Amir, therefore, after long deliberation, put forward two alternative proposals for the sake of goodwill and amity between the two Governments: first, that the envoy of the British Government and his own representative should meet on the frontier; or, that the Indian Agent at the Court of Kabul might be summoned by the Viceroy to "expound the whole state of affairs", and to report it to the Amir on his return to Kabul.¹⁵

Lytton accepted the latter course, and had two interviews at Simla with Atta Muhammad Khan, the Indian Agent at Kabul, on the 10th and 13th October, 1876. Throughout the interviews the Viceroy's tone was one of threat,¹⁶ and he insisted on the location of British Officers on the Afghan frontiers without which no friendly relation could develop between the two Governments. With unusual bluntness, he expressed his attitude towards the Amir by suggesting that "the moment we have cause to doubt his sincerity, or question the practical benefit of his alliance, our interests will be all the other way, and may greatly augment the dangers with which he is already threatened both at home and abroad."¹⁷ With regard to external danger, the Viceroy observed: "Our only interest in maintaining the independence of Afghanistan is to provide for the security of our own frontier. But the moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and firmly allied state, what is there to prevent us from providing for the security of our frontier by an understanding with Russia, which

¹¹ Lytton to Salisbury, 18th September, 1876, *For. Dept. Sec. Progs.* August, 1877, *Cons.* 102/106.

¹² *Parl. Pap.* 1878, *Afghanistan* No. 1, p. 174.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 182-85.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether? If the Amir does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us, Russia does; and she desires it at his expense."¹⁸ That Russia, either alone, or in collaboration with England, desired the partition of the Afghan Kingdom was one of Lord Lytton's curious convictions which he had come to possess even before he assumed the Viceroyalty of India.¹⁹ But there is hardly a single statement in Russian official correspondence that fully confirms this view; and it was only the Viceroy's fondness for metaphors that led Sher Ali to believe that Britain's military power was like a ring of iron round his neck, which "could break him as a reed".²⁰

Nawab Atta Muhammad Khan left Simla charged with the mission of persuading the Amir to accept British Officers in Afghanistan—a condition without which the British Government could not at all maintain any relation with the Amir.²¹ Its non-acceptance, Lytton firmly affirmed, would leave the Viceroy "free to adopt his own course in his rearrangement of frontier relations, without regard to Afghan interests".²² In return for this concession the Viceroy agreed to aid the Amir when unduly assailed from within or from without, and also to recognise Abdulla Jan as his heir-apparent.²³ On the basis of this sort of reciprocity the Amir was permitted to send his accredited representative for any further discussion and conclusion of a definite agreement with the British Government. It was further added that unless "the Amir was prepared to enter into such a treaty as proposed by his Excellency it would be useless for him to send his Agents to discuss matters further, as no discussion on any other terms can be admitted".²⁴ Threatened by this unequivocal demand the Amir held long consultations with his chief officers, and at last agreed to send his Prime Minister, Nur Muhammad Shah, and Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan to represent the views of the Kabul Government and settle the question of residence of British Officers on the Afghan border.²⁵

The discussions between the Afghan Envoy and the British plenipotentiary, Sir Lewis Pelly, at Peshawar converged upon the question of employment of British Agents in Afghanistan which, as Lytton had urged and Pelly asserted, was the *sine qua non* preliminary to the negotiations that had been opened.²⁶ Nur Muhammad Shah, however, tried to take his stand on the previous agreements between the two Governments, and

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ This conviction was based upon a letter of General Kaufmann, which was read out to Lord Lytton by Count Schouvalov, the Russian Ambassador in London, in course of a meeting which Lytton had with the Russian Ambassador shortly before he left England for India. In spite of Schouvalov's assurance that Kaufmann's views must not be confounded with those of the Russian Government, and that he accepted without reserve, in regard to Afghanistan, the position as Lord Lytton had defined it, the interview left upon the mind of Lytton the conviction that Russia was desirous of coming to an understanding with England for the partition of the Afghan Kingdom, and the establishment of one common frontier between the two empires. Balfour, Lord Lytton's Indian Administration (1899), pp. 33-38.

²⁰ Parl. Pap., 1878, Afghanistan No. 1, p. 183.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 183-84 and pp. 185-86.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 185.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 192-93.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 169 and p. 213.

observed that the arrangements arrived at in the Ambala and the Simla Conferences were sufficient to entitle the Afghan Amir to British protection.²⁷ He referred to clause 7 of the Treaty of 1857 which prohibited the appointment of a British Envoy, and provided for the employment of a native agent, at Kabul. Against these arguments, Pelly pointed out that the assurances given at Ambala or at Simla were not stipulated by any definitive treaty, and as such, they "committed the British Government to no pledges which were not carefully guarded on every side by positive conditions... .."²⁸ As regards the Treaty of 1857, he argued that it was contracted for a special and limited purpose, with an exclusive reference to an occasion (the Persian War) which had long since passed away, and therefore belonged to that class of treaties known as Transitory Treaties; and on both sides the obligations contracted by it had lapsed, as a matter of course, with the lapse of time.²⁹ The only treaty, he maintained, extant between the two Governments, was that of 1855, which had imposed no obligations on the British Government.

The legality of the arguments adduced by the British plenipotentiary at Peshawar cannot be fairly questioned. The assurances given to the Amir by Mayo and Northbrook lacked any definitive character, and both the Viceroys had categorically denied to enter into treaty engagements with Sher Ali Khan. In the absence of a well-defined agreement, imposing duly weighed obligations on its signatories, Lord Lytton's Government were not bound to observe the verbal assurances, given to the Amir by their predecessors, especially when, in their opinion, the Amir had latterly evinced no disposition to comply with his share of the obligations contracted under the previous agreements.³⁰ The Treaty of 1857 was indeed concluded only for the period of the Persian War, after the termination of which it was abrogated as a matter of course, and notwithstanding that the seventh article of that treaty had, alone among all its clauses continued to operate beyond the period of the war its continuance, as Pelly rightly argued, could never bind the Amir to non-acceptance of British Officers in Afghanistan, nor could it preclude the British Government from pointing out at any time to the necessity of stationing British Agents on the Afghan frontier.³¹

Thus far indeed Lord Lytton, though often using threats to coerce the Amir to submission, had not deviated in any very material degree from the policy laid down for his guidance by the Home authorities. Nor was the Amir to blame for objecting initially to the proposal of appointing British agents in Afghanistan. Reluctant as he was to admit British Officers in his country, he was prepared to accept them only as a last resort, after the question had been thrashed out in all its details. And if the Afghan Envoy, who was ill throughout the negotiations, had not suddenly died before a conclusion was reached, the Peshawar Conference might well have yielded very different results. But, as ill luck would have it, Nur

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 204-09.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

Muhammad Shah died on the 26th March, 1877.³² Lord Lytton, who ever suffered from a false notion that the alienation of the Amir had gone beyond redemption, seized this opportunity to close the Conference four days later, instructing Sir Lewis Pelly not to receive any new Envoy from the Amir.³³ But the Viceroy was aware at the same time that "a fresh Envoy was already on the way from Cabul to Peshawar" to reopen negotiations, and that he was reported to have "the authority to accept eventually all the conditions of the British Government".³⁴ Why, yet, did Lord Lytton close the Peshawar Conference so suddenly is a vexed question, especially as he knew that the Amir, though strongly disinclined to admit British officers in Afghanistan, would have, if the point were pressed, accepted such a condition rather than forfeited the advantage of a long-desired alliance with the British Government.³⁵ The Viceroy, of course, tried to explain away his conduct by asserting that the "liabilities which the British Government might properly have contracted on behalf of the present Ameer of Cabul, if that Prince had shown any eagerness to deserve and reciprocate its friendship, could not be advantageously, or even safely, accepted in face of the situation revealed by Sir Lewis Pelly's energetic investigations", and, therefore, "the prolongation of the Peshawar Conference could only lead to embarrassments and entanglements best avoided by the timely termination of it."³⁶ But, then, there was no investigation made, nor is it easy to comprehend what embarrassments and entanglements Lytton could foresee in the elementary explanations of the Afghan viewpoints made by the Amir's representative, Nur Muhammad Shah.

It might be difficult to probe into the mind of Lord Lytton at the time of the closing of the Peshawar Conference, but from what he wrote both before and after that incident, it seems clear that in Sher Ali Khan he wanted to have a subordinate prince, eager to respond to the dictates of the British Government in pursuance of their policy of checkmating Russian advance in Central Asia; or else he would have nothing to do with that 'savage' prince, as Lytton understood him. And to Lord Lytton the Amir's alienation, irredeemable in itself, was a source of danger, more so because the Afghan chief had grown susceptible to Russian influence at his court.³⁷ Such a conviction had remained firm in him since Lord Lytton had been tipped for the Viceroyalty of India.³⁸ To him the idea of a strong and neutral state in Afghanistan was illusory, and that country, he felt sure, must lean either to Russia or to England. But a "tool in the hands of Russia" he was resolved 'never' to "allow him (the Amir) to become." "Such a tool" he felt it to be his "duty to break before it could be used".³⁹

³² *Ibid.*, p. 222.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Lytton to Salisbury, 10th May, 1877, *Ibid.*, p. 171.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

³⁶ Lytton to Salisbury, 10th May, 1877, *Ibid.*, p. 171.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, also, Balfour, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

³⁸ Balfour, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-40.

³⁹ Letter to C. Girdlestone, August 27, 1876, Balfour, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

With ideas such as these Lytton hastened to close the Peshawar Conference; and its termination, if not premeditated,⁴⁰ was at least designed to wriggle out of it a situation in which his Central Asian policy would have the scope of full play. Shortly before the Conference was officially closed Pelly was instructed to communicate to Nur Muhammad Shah that the British Government had repudiated all liabilities on behalf of the Ameer and his dynasty, though they would continue to respect "the Ameer's independence and authority throughout those territories which, up to the present moment, it has recognised as being in the lawful possession of the Ameer, and will duly abstain from interference so long as the Ameer, on his part no less scrupulously abstains from every kind of interference with tribes or territories not his own."⁴¹ Here was a dangerous suggestion which, read in the context of the occupation of Quetta and the subsequent elucidation of Lytton's Central Asian policy, gives a clue to the Viceroy's motive in breaking up the Conference at Peshawar. Sher Ali Khan, whose territories were acknowledgedly ill-defined, was apt to look upon such a statement of policy with considerable fear and suspicion, and the abrupt termination of the Peshawar Conference only served to widen the breach between the Indian and the Afghan Governments.

About this time General Lomakin led an invasion against the Turkoman tribes of Kizil Arvat which drew from Lord Lytton a clear statement of his views on Central Asia. The occupation of Kizil Arvat, though temporary, was yet considered to be a preliminary step to the ultimate conquest of Merv, which, it was believed, would necessarily lead to complications with the Kabul Government, involving the occupation of Herat, and the extension of Russian sovereignty, or influence, over Afghanistan.⁴² Such influence could only be counterpoised by the establishment of a commanding British influence at Herat, and it was at this point, Lytton proclaimed, that Russian advance in Central Asia must be stopped.⁴³ In fact, Lytton was convinced that sooner or later the Russian and English possessions in Central Asia must become conterminous, and that as a remedy against that "inevitable misfortune" the Indian Government should secure a strong line of defence on India's north-west frontier.⁴⁴ "The Hindukush," he remarked, "is the natural rampart of India; and in order to utilise it properly, we ought to hold Cabul, Ghuznee, and Jellalabad, as our principal bastion, with Quetta as a curtain, and advanced posts at Candahar, Herat, Balk, etc."⁴⁵ Such theories, however, did not meet with the approval of the Secretary of State for India, and Salisbury warned the Viceroy against wild military advice that might be given him from time to time. This caused so much of irritation to Lord Lytton that he accused the British Cabinet of weakness, vacillation and indecision, and complained

⁴⁰ Richardson says that the termination of the Peshawar Conference was premeditated. *Cabinet of Lord Beaconsfield in its relations with Afghanistan*, p. 13.

⁴¹ Parl. Pap., 1878, Afghanistan No. 1 p. 220.

⁴² Lytton to Salisbury, 2nd July, 1877, Lord Lytton's Private Collection, Commonwealth Relations Office Record.

⁴³ Lytton to Salisbury, 10th July, 1877, Lord Lytton's Private Collection, Commonwealth Relations Office Record.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

that if the Indian policy was entirely dictated from Downing Street, and the Viceroy was given no liberty of action, Russia would continue to advance and weaken British hold on India.⁴⁶

After dwelling upon the importance of Herat Lytton emphasised that, since the establishment of British influence at that place was no longer possible in alliance with the Ameer, some measure, wholly independent of the co-operation, and wholly regardless of the resistance, of Sher Ali Khan ought to be taken, failing which Afghanistan would be lost to India.⁴⁷ So he observed that a time might come, and at no distant date, when, in order to maintain the British power in India, it would be absolutely necessary to disintegrate the Afghan Kingdom, and establish a separate Khanate in Western Afghanistan, with predominant British influence at Herat.⁴⁸

The Home Government, however, did not believe with the Viceroy that the Ameer had been irredeemably alienated. Salisbury repudiated the idea of an immediate Russian move upon Merv, and instructed the Viceroy to desist from any aggressive operation in Central Asia.⁴⁹ In Lytton's own words, his anxieties were characterised as 'nightmares', and his calculations as "the crude excursions of an untutored fancy".⁵⁰ Nevertheless, abstinence from aggressive action was not considered incompatible with the duty of maintaining an attitude of due preparation against any dangers that might arise; and so, Lord Salisbury urged the Viceroy "to obtain a friendly influence over the Ruler of Afghanistan".⁵¹ Lord Lytton's desire for carving out an independent principality in Western Afghanistan thus met with a rebuff, and he had, therefore, merely to bide his time.

With the arrival of the Abramoff Mission at Kabul⁵² Lytton again got the opportunity of urging upon Her Majesty's Government the necessity of reconsidering their Central Asian Policy. Meanwhile, Lord Salisbury had gone to the Foreign Office, and Viscount Cranbrook had become Secretary of State for India. In the new Indian Secretary Lytton had a man after his heart, and, therefore, with renewed vigour he now tried to drive his point home. On the 2nd August, 1878, he cabled to the Secretary of State, "To remain inactive now, will . . . be to allow Afghanistan to fall . . . completely under Russian power and influence . . ."⁵³ And, then, demanding freedom of action in Afghanistan, he emphasised the necessity of sending a British Mission to Kabul. This was reiterated in a very lengthy letter to Lord Cranbrook, which Lytton wrote on the 3rd August, 1878.⁵⁴ In this letter he submitted an eleven-point thesis on Central Asia for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government which

⁴⁶ Lytton to Salisbury, 16th July, 1877, Lord Lytton's Private Collection, Commonwealth Relations Office Record.

⁴⁷ Lytton to Salisbury, 2nd July, 1877, Lord Lytton's Private Collection, Commonwealth Relations Office Record.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ For. Dept. Sec. Progs., Oct. 1878. Cons. 11.

⁵⁰ Lytton to Salisbury, 3rd August, 1878, Lord Lytton's Private Collection, Commonwealth Relations Office Record.

⁵¹ For. Dept. Sec. Progs. October, 1878. Cons. 11.

⁵² Parl. Pap., 1878, Afghanistan No. 1, p. 228.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Lord Lytton's Private Collection, Commonwealth Relations Office Record.

embodied fully his complete views on the subject. Lytton prefaced his thesis by a frank admission that these views he had held even before he reached India, and he believed they were also the opinion of his revered and honoured chief, Disraeli. Even so, he could never feel sure whether these views had merely the private approval, or the assured public support, of Her Majesty's Government!⁵⁵

The policy formulated in the above letter was thus clearly stated by Lord Lytton:

I. Although a small, friendly, and comparatively weak Asiatic State would be a more convenient neighbour to British India, yet it was almost absolutely certain that in the ordinary, uncorrected and probably incorrigible course of events, all intermediate States between Russia's Asiatic Empire and that of Britain must, before long, be absorbed by one or other of the two rival Powers: "and we shall then find ourselves conterminous with Russia along our north-west frontier."

II. It should, therefore, be carefully considered and decided beforehand where such contact could be admitted with the least inconvenience and injury.

III. The line of contact between the two Empires must be a strong military line.

IV. But the Punjab frontier was a hopelessly bad line since it left in the hands of Russia all the outer debouches of the passes leading into India. The great natural boundary of India to the north-west was the watershed, formed by the range of the Hindu Kush and its spurs, "and that range, with such outposts as may be necessary to secure the passes, ought to be our ultimate boundary."

V. The gradual occupation by Russia of the Turkoman country up to Merv, and the establishment of communications thence to Chargui or to Karki, was forced upon her by every consideration of political and military necessity.

VI. The completion of this territorial extension could be suddenly effected by Russia, even while Britain was quite unprepared to deal with the results of it. "The trial of strength for supremacy in Afghanistan between us and Russia, would then begin; and under conditions which, as regards Western Afghanistan, would be extremely unfavourable to us."

VII. It was, therefore, necessary to decide beforehand what were the ultimate points at which Russian advance in Central Asia must be checked, if necessary by force; otherwise "we may come to a conclusion when it is too late to enforce it."

VIII. Although Merv was beyond "our sphere of practical action", in reference to other points more vital to the existence of the Indian Empire, it would be advantageous to delay, if possible, and by all available means, the occupation of Merv by Russia.

IX. Between the Asiatic Empires of Britain and Russia, Herat was the really crucial point, and though military considerations preponderated in favour of taking up a line of virtual resistance nearer India, all political

⁵⁵ Lord Lytton's Private Collection, O.R.O. Record, Lytton to Cranbrook, August 8, 1878.

considerations were strongly against the abandonment of Herat to any other Power, Persia or Russia.

X. "The more northern boundary of our political influence", was a question which called for immediate decision, for an insurrection in Balkh and Badakshan, headed by Abdur Rahman, and supported by Russia, might at any moment place those provinces irretrievably under the permanent influence of Russia.

XI. Finally, there were three, and only three, courses of action to obtain an effective command of a suitable northern frontier.

(a) To secure by fear or hope such an alliance with Sher Ali as would effectually and permanently exclude Russian influence from Afghanistan.

(b) Failing this, to withdraw, promptly and publicly, all countenance from him, to break up the Afghan Kingdom (which Lytton thought could be done without much difficulty), and to put in the place of Sher Ali a sovereign more amenable to British interests.

(c) To conquer, and hold, so much of Afghan territory as would, in case of failure of the two above-mentioned precautions, be absolutely requisite for the permanent maintenance of the north-west frontier.

Dilating upon the pros and cons⁵⁶ of his thesis, Lytton argued that the theory of standing on the defensive behind a mountain range was a pre-Napoleonic idea, and that in modern times, whenever it was attempted, the result had been disastrous. So he urged a forward move along the north-west frontier; and examining the relative merits of the various routes through which foreign invasion was possible upon India, he classified her line of defence in three parts. "To the left," Lytton observed, "our flank rests on the Persian Gulf, of which we have the command, and is covered by the sandy deserts of Western Baluchistan. Our occupation of Quetta fulfils all the requisite of a strong military position on that side. For, while we can thence debouch at any moment on to the open plains, . . . any adversary trying to enter India from this direction, would first be obliged to besiege, and capture, Quetta, giving us ample time to prepare for his reception, and then to force the long gorges of the Bolan Pass. In fact, I look upon our frontier, from Mooltan to the Sea, as now so well guarded, by our position at Quetta, that it leaves almost nothing to be desired. . . ."

Turning to the extreme right, Lytton pointed out that there the Empire was well protected by the Himalayan ranges and the deserts of Tibet. He found no necessity of occupying the outer debouches of the passes leading on to Kashgar and the Pamir steppes. Moreover, these passes were so few and so difficult that any army trying to force its passage through them could easily be stopped. For all these reasons he conceived that "in this direction, our ultimate boundary should be the great mountain range, or watershed dividing the waters of the Indus from those which run northwards. . . ."

Coming to the question of the central line of defence which he considered to be the most difficult problem, Lytton advocated "the continuation of the Hindu Kush and its spurs to Herat, as our main line, with outposts at Balk, Maimena and Herat, and the Oxus as our visible

⁵⁶ Lord Lytton's Private Collection, C.R.O. Record, Lytton to Cranbrook, August 8, 1878.

boundary. . . . " The choice here, he pointed out was between this outer line and an inner one following the mountains from the Hindu Kush to the Helmand. But instead of confining the point of defence to the inner line formed by the Hindu Kush and the Helmand, he preferred to fix the ultimate point of resistance to Herat. Russia, he believed, would be at Merv in two years, and a Russian occupation of that place would threaten the security of Herat and "send down a thrill to the heart of India". Lytton concluded that the responsibility for the protection of Herat "must be taken now or never", and once committed to it, "I feel no doubt whatever that, at sometime or other, and in some form or other, we shall eventually be obliged to absorb the whole of the mountain country between Herat and Kabul."

As regards Afghanistan, the Viceroy acknowledged that there was no man of ability and character equal to Sher Ali, and no one, for many years to come, would be able to wield so much power as he did. He knew that the Amir was unquestionably the man for him, and that he would be able to carry with him the whole of Afghanistan if only he could enlist Sher Ali on his side. And yet, Lytton could not feel sure if it was possible to win over the Amir, although to do so he desired to make "a last" attempt by sending a mission to Kabul charging the British Envoy with the task of concluding a treaty with Sher Ali. The object of that treaty would be to so bind the Amir that he might desist from any negotiation with, or receiving agents from, any other state or nation; to allow British Officers at Kabul for special purposes; and to agree to the permanent location of a British Agent at Herat. The Viceroy did not propose to offer the Amir any dynastic guarantee or subsidy, and desired that the Envoy should be authorised to clearly impress upon Sher Ali that if he rejected the British offer, the Government of India would openly break with him.⁵⁷

If the attempt to effect some understanding with the Amir by this means should fail (in consequence either of the non-reception, or the abortive result, of the proposed mission) the disintegration of Afghanistan ought then to be undertaken. Lytton believed that some such course would be necessary, either immediately, on the failure of the proposed mission, or, 'in any case', after "Sher Ali disappears from the scene." So, in anticipation of it, he had opened secret negotiations with different parties or persons in Afghanistan with a view to ascertaining their relative prospects in case of a vacancy upon the throne. He impressed upon Lord Cranbrook that, peace being concluded in Europe,* the most favourable time had come for bringing pressure to bear upon the Amir, due mainly "to the cogent fact that, from our commanding position at Quetta, we could now at any moment lay our hands swiftly upon Candahar; where our superior weapons and organisation would sweep away, like flies, the badly armed, badly drilled and badly disciplined troops he (the Amir) could oppose to us"⁵⁸

(To be continued)

⁵⁷ Lytton's Private Collection, C.R.O. Record, Lytton to Cranbrook, Aug. 8, 1878.

* The reference is to the Treaty of Berlin.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN SHAKESPEAREAN CRITICISM

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Matthew Arnold wrote the line ' Others abide our question, thou art free ', after the rich harvest of romantic criticism had been gleaned. No less significant is the fact that one of the sanest literary critics of this age, T. S. Eliot, wrote so little of Shakespeare, and when so many of his contemporaries had been beating new grounds in Shakespearean studies he acclaimed their novelties, but without any optimism regarding the result. But is the prospect so di-mal as that? Already Shakespearean criticism has become a by-word for the insignificance of human learning. It has become necessary therefore to reassert from time to time that it is no mere wild-goose chase or a collection of the dry bones of adventurers who have given their lives in discovering the ' siren's song '. Much yet remains to be done. But let not the ' undone vast ' fling back its lengthening shadows to obliterate the lighted tracks. So many new adventurers are out on the field that a bare enumeration of their names will exhaust the reader. The scope is therefore limited to some dominant trends.

The great advance in recent Shakesperiana does not owe itself so much to the literary critics in the field of interpretative criticism as to the textual critics, producers and scholars. So many decades have passed in realizing what now seems so obvious that Shakespeare need be approached as he was, and not as critics and editors have made him out to be. Let Shakespeare speak out his tales without the medium of an interpreter. We prefer not to understand him rather than misunderstand him. Let us have him with all the imperfections on his head! It was a significant first move which led to the stripping of the text of editorial accretions, and clearing the stage of its scenical subbishes. In fact those passages of Shakespeare which are devoted to the purpose of word-painting, and they are too many to need mention—would sound hollow if there be the scenic representation simultaneously. So the producers of Shakespeare must choose between these poetical passages, and the so-called scenic realism. But his property belongs to the province of stage and film, and not to the subject under review, for

critics mostly deal with Shakespeare's plays as books, and not as 'prompt books' which they were originally intended to be. There is of course excellent scope for revaluation of Shakespeare in the light of the 'spoken word', and on the bare stage modelled on the Elizabethan pattern, though it is not known how the plays were actually staged and the words spoken on the stage. The potentialities of this method was recognized by Granville-Barker, who being both a playwright and actor, was admirably fitted for the task. His 'Prefaces to Shakespeare' are a pioneer-work, and his death before he could complete the series has left a void indeed! Of the many new lights he has thrown on the plays one of the most significant is his refutation of Lamb's charge that 'King Lear' cannot be staged. Stoll's works on Shakespeare though different in method place an equally strong emphasis on 'stage-effects', and 'visual realism', but to him I shall turn later again while dealing with 'characterization'.

It is now almost a critical common place to refer to the Elizabethan world picture, the macrocosm and the microcosm. In the great chain of being every existing being occupies a place above one thing and below another. The conception of the hierarchical universe, and the Divinely ordained order were parts of the intellectual atmosphere which Shakespeare as an Elizabethan breathed. The exposition of the intellectual and psychological content of the renaissance is far more valuable in interpreting Shakespeare than any other writer of the period. He might have consciously or intuitively avoided contemporaneity, the pressure of immediacy which are so fatal to artistic universality. Nonetheless he did not write in a vacuity nor had he like Coleridge's great artist the ambition to create a taste by which he should be judged. Far from it. On the other hand he wrote his plays for immediate stage performances, and in no other branch of literature is the praise or blame so immediate. Naturally there are some basical tenets of human faith and philosophy he could not but share with all others of his time. A substantial work on these lines has been done by Tillyard, Theodore Spencer, Hardin Craig, Bamborough and a host of other writers in recent years. These may be of immense value in explaining Shakespeare's reorientation of source materials and the consequential reassessment of Shakespeare. I suggest some typical line of approach. In the concept of the order-disorder antithesis narrowed down to the domestic milieu the father may be regarded as the centre, 'the lord of duty' to whom honour and respect are due. Marriage de convenance being the order of the day in all classes of society, and love being a matter of minor consideration, the importance of the father in arranging

marriages of daughters was paramount. The daughter's forwardness in choosing her mate is a violation of the domestic-order. Brabantio, Egeus, Capulet are all outraged fathers whose parental authority has been set aside. They are naturally infuriated. Neither Egeus, nor Brabantio can believe that his daughter could behave so un-daughter-like unless 'bewitched' by 'charms bought of mountebanks' or other 'strong prevailments'. Capulet fumes at Juliet's refusal to marry Paris :

At home, abroad, alone, in company
 Waking or sleeping, still my care hath been
 To have her matched; and having now provided
 A gentleman of princely parentage
 Of fair desmesnes, youthful and nobly trained
 Stuff'd as they say, with honourable parts

* * * * *

And then to have a wretched puling fool,
 A whining mammet, in her fortune's tender,
 To answer—' I'll not wed—I cannot love '.

Portia's father guarded against a rash marriage. " The will of a living daughter is curbed by the will of a dead father."

Critics who characterize Shakespeare's fathers as having been in a general very ironically portrayed show an imperfect perception of the order-myth. The dramatist seems to stress the order-disorder antithesis here, and the disobedient daughters are the disorder symbols against whom the fathers have a righteous indignation. Leonato and Prospero who play the reasonable and benevolent fathers have no cause against their daughters. Prospero finds his daughter and Ferdinand have " changed eyes ", but the latter has been brought by his ' tempest-magic ' for the purpose. Yet in this isle of magic and romance the omnipotent father who can control fate and command the goddesses does not forget caution and prudence. Ferdinand has to pass a period of apprenticeship as ' a logbearer '. Hero's love in ' Much ADO ' is ' shorn of the vestiges of romance, even though the sources pointed to that direction. So the Elizabethan audience might sense an evil augury in the daughter's disobedience, and they had at least less difficulty in reconciling themselves to their undeserved misfortune than we have. Cinthio's novella, the original of Othello makes no mention of the father at all, and refers only inconsequentially to the objection of Desdemona's relations to her choice of the Moor. But Shakespeare makes much of Brabantio, and in fact in the earlier scenes he even throws Othello and

Desdemona into the shade. It is only after the public pronouncement of Desdemona's transference of allegiance from the father to the husband, i.e., from one order—symbol to another that the heart-broken father passes into obscurity. His last ominous warning to Othello rings throughout the play as the voice of accusing sanity. No less significant is the fact that the warning is addressed to Othello against Desdemona, the offender against the order. Read in the context of the universal order, of which the domestic sphere is a component even so crude a play as 'The Taming of the Shrew', which seems so barbaric in taste to the modern men, may not appear so revolting. The husband's persecuting ways to make the shrewish wife submit to his authority seemed to the Elizabethan audience nothing more than an extreme case of sternness necessitated by the wife's perversity. Even so, Katharina's eloquent sermon on wifely obedience at the close of the play, is enough quittance for Petruchio:

Thy husband is thy lord, thy life, thy keeper,
Thy head, thy sovereign; one that cares for thee
And for thy maintenance commits his body
To painful labour both by sea and land.

This line of approach may be very profitably extended to almost all the plays.

In the sphere of English historical plays Tillyard's 'Shakespeare's English Historical Plays' is a significant new study. This profound scholar probes deeply into all possible sources of Shakespeare's English Histories, and displays Shakespeare's essential historical sense through his presentment of characters, situations and environments. Without always closely adhering to Holinshed, Hall or Froissart, sometimes sailing too close to the shore, sometimes adventuring out in the high seas without substantial warrant of his sources, he has given the essence of medieval history—its symbolism and ceremonialism—in 'King Richard II'. The transition to the new age has been symbolized by Bolingbroke and his successors. The other plays of the group also indicate how historical imagination alone can lend meaning and significance to the study of characters and incidents set in a particular milieu.

There is a new voyage of discovery started in the realm of Shakespearean text by Dover Wilson and others in 'The New Shakespeare' edition of the plays published by the Cambridge University Press. They believe in the existence of larger editions of the plays written by Shakespeare himself, which he later tightened up for the

is autonomous, the positive values are themselves antagonistic. In 'Antony and Cleopatra' love triumphs over honour, and in 'Coriolanus' again woman's love saves Rome against the overweening sense of honour.

The method though original and often fruitful has been pushed too far. Moreover W. Knight does not consider the plays as acted dramas on the stage or the screen, but as books to be imaginatively recreated in consciousness. But they were never conceived as such by their creator, or even if the vision originated in him as such it was subjected to the limitations, to a part at least,—allowing for the shortcomings of the Elizabethan stage, of the visual realism. So when Wilson Knight says that Hamlet is a 'darkforce' though he may not appear as such on the stage, or that Macbeth an emblem of Evil never seems so blameable over there, he in fact contradicts himself. Further, the imaginative consciousness is more easily attained in course of the rush and tension of acting, and the vocal words, than through the inevitably slower process of reading. Even when Cleopatra who is "wholly good" in the language of imaginative interpretation—expresses her doubt that the comedian will "boy her greatness" in the posture of a whore she means no stricture on the dramatic illusion, but only re-inforces it. In fact the tragic dignity she attains on the stage is apocryphal, and no written word can convey it. The ethical judgement, which this critic so much detests flourishes more in reading than 'seeing' a play. Moreover the absolute unimportance which this new criticism accords to 'characters' curtails appreciation. The main protagonists become merely symbols, and the minor characters are more or less sacrificed to the centralized tyranny of the atmosphere. Yet most of these characters stay in the mind not as human beings we can talk to, but as lively figures whose talks we cannot forget.

The poetic visions to which he reduces the plays have their genesis in the frame-work of some story-material which of course suffers itself to be transfigured in the total vision. The cuckoo's voice which sends the rapturous fancy of Wordsworth to the fairy-land is sublimated into virtual non-existence. The story-base of a play is not however at par with the Cuckoo's voice in its relation to the organic vision. The source-material is no catalytic agent; it is truncated, superadded, and even transmuted beyond recognition in the final shape, but is never reduced to nullity. On the other hand it is very useful as a measure of the imaginative transfusion, and value-analysis.

Wilson Knight's imaginative method has been rudely attacked. Nonetheless its value as a strikingly original method, occasionally conducive to a new vision into the heart of a play cannot be minimized.

Even standard critical works like those of Ray Walker are much indebted to it.

Miss Caroline Spurgeon's method of studying the dominant imageries in Shakespeare is more thorough than that of Wilson Knight, but she abstracts the imageries from the totality of the play, which Wilson Knight does not. The images are automatisms of the mind and where the mind recurrently turns there may be some magnetism. This method has its clinical value though as a study of the unconscious it has its shortcomings. The images are a part and parcel of the situation, character, peculiar attitude of the speaker, the impact of other characters, from which they cannot be separated without losing the perspective. Moreover the psychiatric method cannot be expected to bear fruit in the case of this master-mind whose perceptive range is as wide as the mighty ocean, and the 'depth charge' may only reveal the myriad possessions underneath, baffling by reason of their multiplicity the attempt to systematize them. No wonder the various conclusions she has arrived at are unconvincing, and offer no short-cut to the interpretation of Shakespeare. Koble, Heilman and so many others are out on the same territory. The approach is seemingly enchanting so far, and time only will show its value as an illuminant.

Far less effective, but more fashionable is the modern tendency to describe Shakespearean characters in the terminology of psychoanalysis. The characters are treated as if they were real patients in the critics' consulting room. The psycho-analyst takes a whole play then, and produces an analysis of Shakespeare's own psyche at the period when he produced it. Dr. Jones' theory that Hamlet suffered from 'Oedipus complex' is only an instance. Shakespeare may have produced a character to whom we now apply such diagnosis, but the idea of 'Oedipus complex' could hardly have been present in his mind. This type of clinical diagnosis may be effective in the case of a living man, but not in the case of fictional character. The attempt to press Hamlet into this mould can only result in distortion. Dover Wilson's fascinating book 'What Happens in Hamlet' is far more convincing as it is a study of the Elizabethan beliefs.

Let us further revert to 'characterization', which though so much in bad odour recently does yet hold its sway as the most popular method of Shakespearean study. Bradley's monumental work on tragedy has been the starting point of a good deal of analyses. The 'psychological realism' of Shakespeare's characters which is the fundamental tenet of Bradley has been challenged by Stoll, George Gordon, and so many others. Even Wilson Knight whom we have considered earlier was

provoked by Bradley's method. Prof. Stoll analyses some of the principal characters : Othello (whom he calls the crucial case), Macbeth, etc., and suggests that the manner in which each is prompted to action is not psychologically convincing, *i.e.*, real men and women would not have behaved in the manner they did. No noble hero as Othello was in the first part of the play, so reasonable as to be considered "all in all sufficient" by the entire Venetian Senate would be led by the nose. Similarly there is a 'steep tragic contrast' in Macbeth. Shakespeare has not bestowed any reasonable motive on him. On the other hand he has been stripped of the last vestiges of motive to make him dramatically more effective. Stoll emphasizes the central improbability, and points out the distinction between the real life on the one hand, and dramatic art on the other. What Shakespeare is concerned with is "not primarily the image of life, but an illusion, and as its consequence, a greater emotional effect than the image of life can give". Gordon and Benthall have supported him by emphasizing the essential unreality of certain characters, like Viola, Rosalind, etc. A character like Iago has no existence outside the stage. Such characters are "alive with the life of the play". As against the detractors of Bradley there is a double-defence rendered by Stewart, Dr. Jones and others who belong to the psycho-analytical school. They justify the psychological realism of Shakespeare's characters by an analysis of the sub-conscious springs of action. Stewart in his book "Character and Motive in Shakespeare" defends Macbeth's fall as psychologically justified by referring his state of mind to a passage in a book on criminology.

Every fictional character is more or less moulded in the conventional psychological pattern, and in course of time what is purely conventional loses its meaning and has to be recreated by historical imagination. But what is eternal in such characters, *i.e.*, the elements which correspond to the unchanging aspects ever remain fresh and original. Such fundamental qualities admit of psychological analysis in every age. So if Bradley looks for the psychological realism of his characters he cannot be said to have chosen a wrong track. The characters have to be judged with reference to living men and women if the analysis is to have any worth. Of course there are limitations and no body denies them. There is however no scope for dogmatism in either of the methods. Charlton's latest book on Shakespearean tragedy is an able defence of characterization both against Wilson Knight's 'Imaginative interpretation' and Stoll's 'Dramatic illusion'.

These then are the landmarks in recent Shakespearean studies, and in the light of the new scholarship enough scope remains for the reconsideration of Shakespeare.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

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CHAPTER IV

GENERAL CONCEPTS OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN SPINOZISTIC PHILOSOPHY

The great sage Spinoza concentrated his cent per cent attention for spiritual realisation than for purely logical understanding. He respects the spiritual values of life and himself embraces the same with whole heart and mind. This has been thoroughly proved by his disciplined way of life and conduct. As the sages honour and love freedom from passions and desires more than anything else in the world, Spinoza also like them showed profound admiration for freedom from emotions, or in other words, blessedness of the mind. He says (in the Preface to Part V Ethics), "At length I pass on to the other division of my Ethics, concerning the method or path which leads us to freedom. And in this I shall treat of the power of reason, and show what is its native strength against emotions, and thence what is the freedom or blessedness of the mind. Whence we shall see in how much better case is the wise man than the ignorant. But by what means and method the understanding is to be perfected and by what skill the body is to be tended that it may truly do its office, pertains not to this inquiry, for the latter of these is the concern of medicine, the former of logic. Spinoza's aim was practical. He has taken up the work of scientific analysis of the passions and told us how they can be mastered, i.e., how man's happiness (freedom) can be assured. The two terms 'bondage' and 'freedom' are self-contradictory because the former excludes the latter and the latter denies the influence of the former. But in Spinozistic philosophy the conception of man's moral life is nothing but a movement from bondage to freedom. The conflict of Spinoza's moral philosophy is the conflict between the stage of passivity in which the man is said to be dependent on the series of cause and effect, i.e., in which he is not in himself, and to that of activity or in other words, "life according to reason", in which the man is "the adequate cause of his own action". In the passive stage or in the stage of bondage the individual is regarded as a mode in the midst of the infinite series of modes and in that stage he is only "•

part of nature "; and thus his freedom is illusory freedom because at that time he is conscious of his own thoughts but not of the causes which determine his nature. From the logical point of view, as long as man is taken to be a part of nature, his freedom seems illusory. But Spinoza being dissatisfied with his own logical argument, holds that moral perfection or freedom is not denied for him who is morally enlightened. Here the conflict is between the man's passive nature and the man's moral or active nature. The passivity of man's nature only indicates that he is not free from his bondage. The stage of activity implies that the man is free, *i.e.*, his life is according to reason. To Spinoza the man of reason can overcome all the encroachment of passions and it is reason which enables him to realise his self-determinate nature.

By holding the above statement Spinoza is confronted with some difficulties. Spinoza treats man as "a part of nature", or in other words, he holds that the individual is nothing but a mode amidst the infinite multiplicity of other finite modes. The conception of Spinoza's finite individual shows that the individual is never free because it is conditioned by another individual which is again conditioned by some other individual and so on. Now the questions which generally arise, are the following:—How can a finite which is conditioned by endless series of natural forces claim freedom for itself? If the finite derives its origin from God who is eternal and ever free how can it be in bondage? In this chapter we shall try to show that the conflict is between naturalism and spiritualism, because Spinoza maintains that man is "a part of nature" and again he holds that man is something more than "a part of nature".¹ If the former proposition is true then it is useless to strive for freedom and even though the individual tries he cannot achieve freedom from bondage because the uniformity of nature is ever permanent. But Spinoza does not stick to that position. He asserts boldly that freedom is possible for a man who is morally strong. The moral man is not a slave in the hand of nature; he can exert his own power to achieve freedom. Though Spinoza cannot supply us with adequate answer for his theory of moral freedom, yet he, being a moralist, believes in moral freedom or in freedom from bondage. Man is not a passive creature but he has courage enough to realise his own self-determinate or active nature, and as soon as he conceives his self-determinate character by reason he is freed from the tie of bondage. According to Spinoza freedom is achieved only by the

¹ Caird, *Spinoza*. p. 260.

elimination of the negative element or passive element of man's nature. As soon as the negative character of man's nature flies away the positive or active character shines and thereby freedom is gained by him. Here also the germs of conflict can be detected in his conception of freedom and bondage. Spinoza as a true thinker has made it clear that freedom can be achieved by a man of reason and intuition. Spinoza's conception of freedom is similar to that of Plato and has been accepted by Kant, in the manner stated below :—

Kant's original conception of freedom was that of being determined by oneself, as opposed to be determined by others. His new conception of freedom has emerged from the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy.² The distinction between determination by oneself and determination by other than oneself has been reduced to a distinction between two principles working with us in his new conception of freedom. Heteronomy according to Kant means that which is ruled by the principle of pleasure which is other than the pure law of reason or the conception of duty for duty's sake. Kantian conception of freedom has a connection with the conception of freedom of rationalist like Plato and Spinoza. The older rationalists understood freedom in the sense of freedom from the bondage of the senses. Plato in his *Phaedo* tells us clearly that deliverance from the bondage of body or in other words, from everything that is sensuous and material, is a true freedom. It shows that the philosopher does not fear at all. He also tells us that philosophy imparts us true knowledge which in turn frees us from the captivity of the body. Spinoza also understands freedom in the same way.³ He says, "a free man, that is to say, a man who lives according to the dictate of reason alone, is not led by fear of death" (*Ethics*, Part IV, Prop. 57). "I have said that man is free who is led by reason alone. He, therefore, who is born free, remains free, has no other than adequate ideas, and therefore, has no conception of evil and consequently none of good (for good and evil are co-relative)." ⁴ "As for the term good and bad, they indicate nothing positive in things considered in themselves, nor they anything else than modes of thought, or notions, which we form from the comparison of things mutually. For one and the same thing can at the same time be good, bad and indifferent, e.g., music is good to the melancholy, bad to those who mourn, and neither good nor bad to the deaf" (*Ethics*, Part IV, Preface). "The importance of man", he says, "to govern or

² *Metaphysics of Moral*, vide Abbotts, *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, p. 59.

³ The reader may consult Dr S. K. Maitra's *Spirit of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 109-11 (ed. 1947).

⁴ *Ethics*, Part 4, Prop. 58.

restrain the effects, I call bondage, for a man who is under this control is not his own master, but is mastered by fortune, in whose power he is, so that he is often forced to follow the worse, although he sees the better before him " (*Ethics*, Part IV, Preface).

Spinoza's Theory of Bondage and Freedom

So far we have seen that passivity is bondage. That which is conditioned is dependent upon external causes and that which is dependent upon external causes is in bondage. It shows that we are passive because Spinoza himself says: " We are said to be passive when something arises in us, whereof we are only a partial cause (Part III, Def. 2), that is (Part III, Def. 1), something which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature. We are passive, therefore, in so far as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without other parts " (*Ethics*, IV, Prop. 2). The quite opposite stage of it is the stage of our freedom. " Freedom is self-activity or self-determination, bondage is subjection to external causation." ⁵ We are free or active when anything takes place within us of which we are the adequate cause or in other words, we are free when anything can be deduced from the laws of our own nature. Thus we see that here the conflict is between man's passive and active nature. The man cannot be in bondage for ever and for ever. There is in him the self-determinate or self-active power by exerting which he can be freed at any time. But this stage of freedom is the stage of adequate knowledge which can be reached through reason alone although it goes beyond reason. But truly speaking, reason is not an adequate knowledge because it cannot have any access to the world of the ultimate truth. On the other hand, another difficulty will arise if we accept reason as an adequate knowledge. There is some confusion in Spinozistic philosophy regarding reason and intuition, but we can assert that reason is useful to make ourselves free from passions but it fails to have any access to the world of transcendental reality. Thus Spinoza says about intuition (immediate experience) as the source of passing from empirical truth to the world of transcendental God. But reason is also necessary for a rational man. The importance of reason is to get rid of passions (or animal passions). As long as we are not men of reason we are in the lowest kind of bondage. We conceive ourselves as a part of nature and we undergo changes. " It is impossible, that man should not be a part of Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes, save such as can be understood through his

⁵ Caird, *Spinoza*. p. 262.

nature only as their adequate cause" (*Ethics*, IV, Prop. IV). Here Spinoza wants to say that "man is necessarily always a prey to his passions".⁶ The man is bound to follow and obey the general order of nature and to undergo changes. But man is not required to undergo any change of which he himself is the adequate cause. Now it is true, as we have seen, that Spinoza introduces into his conception of the individual being "an element which seems to modify the law of absolute external causation, a self-maintaining impulse or capacity to react on outward influences".⁷ Once Spinoza's individual is a subject to undergo any changes and at another time it has within itself an element of independence which will preserve its own moral activity. How these two conflicting tendencies can be reconciled? Once the individual is forced to accept the natural influences because the part must submit itself to the hand of the whole for the maintenance of its relationship and again there is some need for the individual to get rid of the bondage. If there is "no free will in the mind"⁸ of the individual how can he be aware of need of freedom? The individual is necessarily in subjection to passion and therefore it is destined for him to undergo changes without knowing any freedom. Logically it follows that human being can never be free. But Spinoza does not stick to that position and so he requires freedom "What he wants in mind is a self which can be the source of its own activity, and which, in so far as it is not so, is a bondage" (Caird, *Spinoza*, p. 270). Man should be something more than an individual in order to achieve freedom from bondage. There must be a self-maintaining impulse in his mind, otherwise the question of freedom seems impossible for him. The essence of man's mind is understanding or reason which always requires the adequate ideas of anything or everything. In the act of mind's own perfect activity the idea of God is involved. When human mind realises that every individual being is nothing but the manifestation of God or when individual being conceives everything is in God, it is freed from bondage. Professor Will Durant has given a true picture of Spinoza's conception of freedom in the following lines —

"The passivity of passion is 'human bondage', the action of reason is human liberty. Freedom is not from casual law or process, but from partial passion or impulse, and freedom not from passion, but from unco-ordinated and uncompleted passion. *We are free only*

⁶ *Ethics*, IV, Prop. IV Corollary

⁷ Caird, *Spinoza*, p. 262

⁸ *Ethics*, II, Prop. 48.

where we know.* To be a superman is to be free not from the restraints of social justice and amenity, but from the individualism of the instincts. . . . To be great is not to be placed above humanity, ruling others, but to stand above the partialities and futilities of uniformed desire and to rule one's self" (Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy*, p. 185).

Is Bondage possible?

Spinoza's theory of bondage tells us that for a moral man bondage is impossible. It is only the first state of mind from which the moral history of a man begins. As soon as we are aware of our bondage we begin to strive for the realisation of freedom. "It is necessary to know the infirmity of our nature before we can determine what reason can do to liberate us from their control" (*Ethics*, IV, 17, Schol.). The questions which will naturally come in connection with the above statement of Spinoza is this: When we are in bondage (*i.e.*, when we are under the control of external causation) how is it possible for us to know that we are under such condition? If we are aware from the very beginning of such influence then we are not completely in bondage because bondage is not possible for a conscious subject. If the self-determinate impulse is within us¹⁰ how can we fall into the trap of bondage? Spinoza's answer to the above problems seems to be this: The individual is in bondage because he lacks adequate ideas. The confused ideas or passions are the main sources of bondage. As soon as the individual liberates himself from confused ideas by reason he becomes free.

The bondage of man arises from his conditioned or determined nature which every individual, being a man of passions, is sure to share. If God manifests himself in the form of the finite things how can there be any bondage at all? God is free, being self-caused, and He is the ultimate and necessary cause of the finite individuals. Spinoza says that "all beings live and move in God and without God their existence is impossible". He at another time asserts that the finite things by all means can be one with the ultimate truth. When it is possible for the finite things to become one with God the question of bondage becomes useless to discuss because there must not be any bondage for those liberated souls. If they (finite things) are not necessarily free from the very outset then God through His manifesta-

* Cf. Professor Dewey "A physician or engineer is free in his thought and action in the degree in which he knows what he deals with. Possibly we find here the key to any freedom". *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 308, New York, 1922.

¹⁰ When Spinoza regards God as the necessary cause of the finite individuals he certainly assigns self-determinate nature to them.

tion becomes conditioned and limited. Spinozistic pantheism does not teach that God transcends the world of finite things. If everything is in God and without God nothing can be conceived then how does the question of bondage arise? "Human bondage", therefore in Spinoza's sense of the words, "is not thinkable, and could only be made to seem thinkable by a false separation between motives and volition between passions acting on the mind and mind on which they act" (Caird, *Spinoza*, pp. 267-68).

"To make freedom a possible attainment, there must be some germ of it to begin with" (Caird, *Spinoza*, p. 268). In order to answer the above question Spinoza tries to put forward 'reason' to solve the difficulty. Reason, in the opinion of Spinoza, alone can liberate man from his bondage and enable him to enjoy freedom and blessedness of God. But Spinoza holds definitely in his theory of human bondage that it is impossible for a man not to be a part of nature. Hence it follows that man is always under the subjection of passions and freedom is impossible for him. If passions rule man from the very beginning of his life he must remain always under the control of external causes and thus freedom is very far from him. But Spinoza, as we have seen, is not true to his standpoint and he holds that freedom is the inner necessity of man's life. He maintains that there is something in mind which is not subject to bondage and it enables man to achieve freedom from bondage. Now we can conclude that owing to false knowledge man seems to be in bondage but truly speaking there is no bondage for him because he is ever free owing to divine origin. Thus we see that Spinoza's conception of bondage is self-contradictory and he believes that there is no bondage for a man of reason or intuition.

Passion and Reason

Passion must be a foreign element to the mind. Because it is foreign and harmful to the human mind, therefore we try to get rid of this. Passion can give satisfaction to the mind for a short time. But as soon as it manifests its nature we no more stick to it. Passion is an evil element and it urges the mind not to wake up and to take notice of its evil doings. "Through the medium of the passions, a foreign element gains access to the mind" (Caird, *Spinoza*, p. 272). Undoubtedly passion for a time being at least conquers the human mind but it has performed a great deal of good to the mind also by bringing with it the message of freedom. Man cannot be perfectly happy living all the time under the rule of passion. If he is perfectly happy under its (passion's) sway, his moral condition would be utterly hopeless.

¹¹ Caird, *Spinoza*, p. 275.

As long as a man is under the influence of passions he lives in the lowest stage of the moral life. But there is a spiritual element in him by which he can rise up to the highest position of man's moral life and that element is reason. According to Spinoza, the essence of mind is reason and reason alone can enable the man to escape from the trap of passions. Spinoza says. "Man is free in so far as he is led by reason, for then only he is determined to act by causes which can be adequately understood by his own nature alone" (Caird, *Spinoza*, p. 274). Here the conflict is between passions and reason. Freedom is achieved when reason conquers the passion. The man who is under the sway of passions is a slave and the man who has adequate idea (reason) is a free man. Spinoza writes "We see thus the difference between a man who is led solely by emotion or opinion and a man who is led by reason. The former does those things of which he is utterly ignorant, the latter does those things only which he knows to be of the highest importance in life, and which therefore he desires above all. Therefore I call the former a slave, the latter a free man" (*Ethics* IV, 66, School). The human being is a son of God, therefore, he cannot be a slave of passion. "An emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it" (*Ethics*, V, Prop. 3). Thus we see that the conflict between passions and reason comes to an end at the appearance of a clear and distinct idea. It also proves that the man is a free man from the very beginning, otherwise to become free all on a sudden seems quite irrelevant. According to Spinoza he is like who is a man of 'reason' and he is a slave who yields to passions. But the result of the conflict between passion and reason is essentially pleasurable, because man in spite of the conflict wins freedom in the long run and gets rid of the bondage of passions. Thus, self knowledge becomes tantamount to self-mastery" Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. 1, p. 366).

"The knowledge of passion annihilates passion, and substitutes for it the calm and deliberate activity of reason" (Caird, *Spinoza*, p. 279). As soon as we are aware of passions within us we begin to conquer the field (passion) by the knowledge of it. "To render passion harmless, we must get to know it"¹² The man who is devoid of all sorts of passion is wise and he who is wise is certainly passionless. "A perfectly wise man would be absolutely passionless, and therefore, absolutely free" (Caird, *Spinoza*, p. 279). The wise man neither hates nor envies, neither loves nor shows pity towards anybody. He

¹² Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. I, p. 365.

orders his life by rational motives and he does everything for the general good.¹² The wise man is more powerful than the man of passions owing to his rational standpoint of life. Spinoza also supports this view when he says that the "remedy for the passions" is to be achieved by knowing the common properties of things or by knowing God to be the cause of everything. This kind of freedom is only possible for the rational or wise man and thus the conflict of life comes to an end with the adequate idea of God.

Absorption in God is the Highest Kind of Freedom

So far we have seen that reason and passion cannot co-exist. As soon as the conflict begins between the two (former and latter) the latter vanishes. "The triumph of reason is not the subjugation but the extinction of passion" (Caird, *Spinoza*, p. 284). But even the life of reason is not the highest life because reason cannot know the absolute reality fully. The free man who enters into the life of reason, still hungers and thirsts and he yet requires a still higher position for which he must still be striving. Here the rational free man is confronted with another kind of conflicting situation and strives more and more for higher realisation or self-realisation. Now the free man feels the inner requirement of his free or moral life to become one with the absolute truth and thus to get rid of the universe in which all beings are controlled by external causation. The moral striving of the free man enables him to realise his oneness, with the universal nature and thus he begins to conceive the immortality of his soul. The activity of the moral life ends with the absorption of human soul in God and the man becomes one with God. The conflict of human life comes to a complete end at the realisation of absolute oneness of human souls with God. Thus we can say, that he is free who is self-realised. To Spinoza, the complete freedom or absorption in God is possible through the intellectual love of God. In order to achieve cent per cent freedom we must even get rid of the understanding. The conflict which begins between passions and reason, ends in the adequate ideas of the understanding. But then another kind of conflict begins; that kind of conflict is not between passions and reason but between reason and intuition. The complete freedom is achieved not through reason but through intellectual love or intuition. "The complete freedom which is attained in the intellectual love of God consists in escape from

¹² Caird, *Spinoza*, p. 279.

the inadequate ideas of the imagination and the final dominance of the adequate ideas of the understanding. Prior to this emancipation, we are the subjects of both" (Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. I, pp. 364-65. But after emancipation we are slaves to none and enjoy blessedness of God. The final or complete freedom is attained as soon as we are absorbed in God and then the conflict of human life ends. "The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God and the mind's highest virtue is to know God." ¹⁴

(To be continued.)

¹⁴ Bertrand Russell *History of Philosophy* p. 596

INFLUENCE OF ENGLISH LITERATURE ON ONE ACT PLAYS IN HINDI

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There are certain one act plays in Hindi Literature (of course their number cannot be large in view of the brief history of this type of Literature), which bear traces of Western plays. A detailed examination of such plays is necessary in a study of the direct influence of English Literature on Modern One Act Play-writing in Hindi. An attempt, therefore, will be made in the following pages to point the resemblances between them.

“ Devil ” of Bhuvneshwar Prasad, certainly, first strikes us. It bears a pronounced impress of Bernard Shaw’s “ Devil’s Disciple ”, as the play-wright acknowledges. Besides a resemblance in the title, the only difference, if at all, being that in the one case it is simply “ Devil ”, in the other it is “ Devil’s Disciple ”, there is a curious affinity in the contents of the two plays; both have the same theme for their subject-matter so that Bhuvneshwar Prasad’s play gives one the impression that he wrote his play with Bernard Shaw’s before his eyes. Nowhere perhaps in the whole range of Modern Hindi Dramatic Literature shall we fall upon such a direct borrowing. In the “ Devil ” there is the picture of a hero who is guided by his own instinctive morality and who makes light of the accepted mode of religion, economics, social conventions, and mutual adjustments, without which life appears not to have a smooth go. The title does not seem to describe the hero well. He is anything but the disciple of God, but that does not necessarily signify that he is a devil. Of course he believes that time does not move at all for him, the world is not what it had been ten years ago. His faith in God is shattered on account of the narrow sectarianism of the people of various religions to pin God within the religious tenets; God, if he were believed to exist, must needs have the whole of humanity, irrespective of national differences, caste, creed and colour within its fold. He worships Mammon. He has been led to do so on account of the continual pricking of destitution and wretchedness of poverty and want. To him there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so, stealing and pilfering included. As a matter

of fact Rajan (the hero of the play), does not belong to any Church whether of God or Satan. He is a man, on the other hand, with an original morality and is guided by his own instincts. Society looks down upon him as an outcast. Raja Hardeo Singh and his wife eye him with suspicion, dub him as an atheist, an irreligious person, a revolutionary, and are afraid of him lest he does something, which should prove inimical to their best interest. They hate and curse him because their religion and morality are foreign to his nature. They entertain dark insinuations about him but he seems to have done nothing that is positively shady. They accuse him of devilry but cannot quote from memory any particular action of his that is devilish. They, however, include the one action which he performs at the end of the play, in their moral code, at least not very much different from it. They regard it as a deed of self-sacrifice done at the call of a moral force which lies outside the instinct, while for him this is done for the purpose of only a gratification of the inner will. In this drama, the play-wright aims at a contrast which he institutes between the conventional moral code of Raja Hardeo Singh and his wife, on the one hand and Rajan, the hero of the play, on the other hand.

A detailed examination of the play has been necessary to point out how much this owes to Bernard Shaw's "The Devil's Disciple", which in the first act contrasts the principles of the devil's disciple with those of his puritanical mother. Even this exposition of principle is not altogether without action. It arises out of the hanging of Peter Dudgeon and the death and will of William Dudgeon. In the two succeeding acts, we have the real action of the drama, the self-sacrifice of Richard Dudgeon and his rescue by Anthony Anderson. Richard Dudgeon is a contrast to both Anthony (in the same way as Rajan is a contrast to Raja Hardeo Singh and his wife). Anthony and Judith are a respectable couple with generous sentiments, they have not got the puritancial prosity of Mrs. Dudgeon but they accept conventional morality with all the external compulsion.

When Judith finds that Richard Dudgeon sacrifices himself (sacrifice here of Rajan for Raja Hardeo Singh) she thinks it must be for love of her, a purely external stimulus. She does not understand him when he says that he did it for himself; bred on the mechanical morality of conventional society she does not understand a self-acting hero.

"Devil" both in conception, for the dramatic methods employed by both Bernard Shaw and Bhuvneshwar Prasad are pretty much the same, in so far as both expose the hollowness of conventional morality

and an ancient Code of life by bringing them to the searching gaze and deeper analysis of irony, is modelled after Bernard Shaw's "The Devil's Disciple", as a detailed examination of the subject matter of both the plays would show. Of course Bernard Shaw's play is conceived and planned upon a larger canvas than Bhuvneshwar Prasad's and is much more successful too, yet this does not in any way underestimate the debt of the latter to the former. This is noticed particularly in the last scene, which in the case of "The Devil" is related to the self-sacrifice of Rajan for Raja Hardayal Singh by offering himself to the Police as Raja Hardayal Singh, while in the second case, it is taken up with the rescue of Richard Dudgeon by Anthony Anderson. Bhuvneshwar Prasad finishes off his play within of course the limited scope of a one act play, with the self-sacrifice of Rajan, while Bernard Shaw, as his compass is much larger and more extensive, pushes the action of the play to the rescue of Richard Dudgeon by Anthony Anderson. Rajan strikes one as Richard Dudgeon; Raja Hardayal and his wife as Anthony Anderson and Judith Anderson.

"Syama",—travesty of marriage—is another one act play which is shadowed by Bernard Shaw. It has the echoes of Shaw's "Candida". In this play the aim of Bhuvneshwar Prasad is, like Shaw, to show the hollowness of the economic system of society in its greatest and most popular institution—marriage. Marriage is founded upon a sexual contract between man and woman and the economic slavery of the latter. Like Candida "Syama", therefore, is not only economic but also a sex drama. Like James Mayor Morell, Mr. Puri, husband of Syama, sometimes Mrs. Puri in the play, is estimated in the society as a highly respectable gentleman and is devoted to her. Mr. Puri is stunned, however, on the revelation in the course of the normal incidents of a normal day, that his wife is bestowing loving care on a delicate windbag of a poet, which fact incites him to a fit of jealousy. He endeavours to suppress this feeling of jealousy in the presence of his wife, which naturally vents itself in her absence before the rival in love. He importunes him not to speak of it to her, but all is overheard by her from behind the arras, and as she is about to retire to the garden with this new-fangled lover of hers, instinct prevails over emotion, on hearing that her husband is rather feeling bad, and she decides to stay behind with the husband, the poet in Manoj of course goes all alone to the garden to indulge in a pleasant revelry of his fancy. This play is, therefore, similar in theme to Bernard Shaw's, and is like it a study in eternal triangle, i.e., one woman being loved simultaneously by two men.

Mr. Puri, like Mr. Morell, swings like a pendulum between smile and tears, he is taken in by violent fits of jealousy, but in the greatest crisis of his life he acts in a manner quite characteristic of him. He does not behave like the typical jealous husband. He does not, at least before his wife, drive away his rival, nor confine and punish his wife. He keeps his head cool and proceeds to act with the dignified fairmindedness of an honourable gentleman. Wife is given a free choice. She could live with her husband or fly with her lover. Of course she decided to stay with her husband as Candida chose to remain behind and not follow Eugene the poet. Morell in "Candida" frets and fumes and cries out, "Out with it, my wife, is my wife" which reminds one of the following speech of Mr. Puri :

"Mr. Puri (Trembling with rage), Out, out of my house, you shame-faced loon (Runs to beat him)." Both Mr. Puri and Mr. Morell show their generosity by leaving their wives in the custody of Manoj and Eugene Marchbanks, but they also show their weakness and narrowness, when in "Candida" on his return, he appeals to his rival saying, "Eugene, if that is not a heartless lie, if you have a spark of human feeling left in you, will you tell me what has happened during my absence", and when in "Syama", after Manoj threatens to commit suicide, Mr. Puri begs of him not to do so, out of consideration for the feelings of his wife, whom he dearly loves.

There is again like Morell a contradiction in the character of Mr. Puri. There is a conflict throughout between his strength and his weakness, his generosity and his narrowness. This play is neither a tragedy nor a comedy. It is a serious comedy after the fashion of "a new specimen of drama which Bernard Shaw claims as his own. The play deals with a social problem concerning an honourable gentleman who faces it in a grave and dignified manner. The play once again like "Candida", portrays with remarkable skill the character of the husband who is held in deliberate contrast with the poet who is unlike him in age, appearance, ideas, and character. Mr. Anarnath Puri is a fastidious young respectable gentleman who prizes his wife as a treasure and is possessed of a proprietary conscience. The poet Manoj is like a gossamer, who flits in fancy like a butterfly. Manoj is like the gradually wearing off intoxication and he considers Mrs. Puri, epicure as he is, as the wine of the eyes. This contrast between the two lovers, besides adding to the vividness of the picture, makes for economy in technique also.

The conclusion of both the dramas calls for special attention as a very fine example of similarity between the two plays. In the conclu-

sion of both the plays, both playwrights aim at the exposure of the hollowness of conventional respectability and its ideal of happiness. Like Shaw, Bhuvneshwar Prasad takes care to reclaim his play from a melodramatic conclusion, and as in "Candida" he shows Syama staying behind with her husband. The poet Manoj retires from the scene all alone. Like Shaw he attacks the domestic life within, appearances are designed to be kept up between husband and wife, which brings out the difference between nobility without happiness and happiness without nobility in Syama's desire to live with her husband.

"Usar" is a play of a different kind. It is the only play of its kind in Hindi Literature. It is dramatised form of Freud's doctrine of psycho-analysis with the assistance of which the playwright has woven his plot. There is no attempt at characterisation here, nor any at the unfolding of the story. It merely gives us a lurid criticism of the present-day society and its problems through the figure of a tutor, who is engaged to teach children in a respectable family. The method employed here, quite western in its origin, is that of empirical psychology, by which the dark interior of the mind of a person is accurately photographed as on a photographic plate. "One of the psychologist's methods of exploring the dark interior", says Cecil Day Lewis, "is that of free association, a list of words is spoken to the subject to each of which he answers the first word that comes into his head." "Usar" demonstrates the new tendency in English Literature of "free association", which has affected poetry, novel, and drama alike. Exponents of this new movements in English Literature are James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, D. H. Lawrence, T. S. Eliot, and Edith Sitwells, and many more. The adoption of this method shows the tremendous strides which Hindi Dramatic Literature has taken in recent years, Drama in Hindi growing in the endeavour of its dramatists to try their hands at new experiments and fresh methods.

"Usar" has for its scene the parlour of a bungalow in a respectable household. It has for its characters the Tutor, the boy, the fat lady, a small puppy, the owner of the house, a youth, a little girl, and the mistress of the house. It turns round the treatment which the Master of the House meets out to the poor Tutor. Both have a different ideology. The master of the house, belonging to the older generation, believed in an exploitation whether it be of intellectual labour, matters little or nothing, and thus the money which is saved by playing hide and seek with the conscience of others and his own, he expends on the comfort item of his own family. The Tutor belongs to the younger generation and has partly been driven to undertake

tuition as an intellectual experiment and partly on account of his financial straits. He appears to have been, like all the young men of his generation, affected by the Socialist ideology, which ensures equal opportunities and a fair treatment to all beings on earth. Only one man in the play has sympathies with the Tutor, and he is another young man, who is a guest at the house of the master. The play, on the whole, fails to hold us throughout. The playwright has not been able to make its meaning clear. There is no artistic unity either. Whatever little is there in it, is provided by the character of the Tutor who comes up in the beginning and eventually at the conclusion of the play.

Govind Das Seth seems to have taken cue for writing "Spardha" from John Galsworthy's "Loyalties". "Loyalties" is a study in racial pride and social convention. In it we are shown characters faithful to their own certain principles in life. "Prejudices, Anela, or are they loyalties—I do not know, criss-cross, we all cut each others' throats from the best of motives". Throughout the play runs clearly the idea that the supporters of one party are prejudiced against those of the other, instead of bringing the matters to a close, they are pulling the wires harder and stronger, thus bringing the matters to a crisis. Of course they do with the best of motives, yet it is the main cause of tragedy. The sufferings and miseries of the modern social life are actually brought about not by wicked people, but by persons with good intentions. Like "Loyalties", "Spardha" realistically portrays a fashionable Indian Society, at this time, as the title of the play suggests, engaged in settling whether women need men's protection for their safety and security in life. In both the plays the dramatist aims not at characterisation, but at a conflict of ideologies, which various characters represent cleverly; for this they are brought in a club where they get sufficient opportunity to indulge in their long wordy warfare and idle prattle, which practically leads us nowhere. In "Loyalties", also John Galsworthy brought two sets of characters, with different ideologies of their loyalty to a certain esprit de corps, pitted against each other, and endeavouring for their triumph over the other; similarly in "Spardha" there are, for instance, women, who claim equality with men who are reluctant to part with their age-long supremacy over women. Discussion goes on this point, and eventually ends in the suggestion of Krishna Kumari to Vijya to withdraw her resolution, showing that discussion led none of the party anywhere and they were just at the same place in the end of the play as at the beginning. Individual point of view of every character has been depicted regarding the problem of relationship between men and

women, nothing less, nothing more. Of course in "Spardha" there is no resemblance of subject-matter and theme as in the plays of Bhuvneshvar Prasad with the play of the same class in English literature, but that there is a subtle influence of Galsworthy on Govind Das none will deny. A conflict of ideas, a detachment practised by the dramatists in the handling of their material, stating as many points of view of the problem as are connected with its issue, naturalistic dialogue, employment of irony to expose the hollowness of the controversial points, the idea of waste embodied in both the dramas, the characters as types rather than individuals, are certainly some of the points in which a similarity can be traced between Galsworthy's "Loyalties" and "Spardha".

There are some one act plays which have come to our view in recent years in Hindi Literature, whose nomenclature is English. This marks another advance in the influence of English Literature upon one act play in Hindi. Such plays are, 'I Know', 'I See', 'Hunger-Strike' and 'Vitamin' of Govind Das. The dramatist has retained English phrases to denominate their names deliberately to naturalise the tone of Hindi Drama, for these are the very words which the Indians of today have adopted in their tongue as belonging to the natural stock. There is, however, no direct borrowing in these plays from English Literature except the names.

"Sab se bara admi" of Bhagwati Charan Verma is another play in Hindi Literature, which in its method owes to English Literature.

It is a very fine instance of dramatic suspense and the only one of its kind in our Literature. We have in it the lightness of touch and the board humour of E. V. Lucas and A. J. Gardmer. Bhagwati Charan Verma is the first originator of this tendency in Hindi Literature. What a fine comparison can be made between E. V. Lucas's "The Face on the Wall" and this play? Of course the first is a story and the second a play. Both these interesting works are note-worthy for their smart ending, in which dust is thrown into the eyes of so many people by one clever person, but also for the under-current of keen almost impish humour that runs throughout. In E. V. Lucas's "The Face on the Wall" the narrator of the funny story cleverly brings about a willing suspension of disbelief during the course of the story and surprises the hearers at the end saying "Oh the third thing" he said as he opened the door, 'I was forgetting that. The third extraordinary thing about the story is that I made (it up) about an hour ago. Good night, again'. After coming to our senses we looked round for Rudson-Watte who had brought this snake, to bite our bosoms, but he too had disappeared. In Bhagwati Charan's

play some friends have assembled in a restaurant, when they are joined in by Rameshwar and they are discussing among themselves as to who is the greatest among them all, but before their discussion ends and as they are about to retire from there, to their bewilderment they realise that their pockets are empty and Rameshwar has disappeared with all their money. He really was the greatest among them all. The play ends in a similar unexpected note as in "The Face on the Wall".

Shanker : I feel there is something wrong with his head.

Ahmed : (Laughing) He wore a mask.

Mr. Verma : Vain Chap.

* Radhey : But he spoke well.

Sharmaji : He deserves our pity.

Shanker : Let go Radhey, we have'nt settled as yet (Gets up. Radhey follows. Both put their hands inside the pocket and take them out).

Shanker : Purse disappeared.

Radhey : Even my pocket is removed (shows the pocket of his shirt).

Mr. Verma (one after another they feel their pockets) : Oh! I got a five rupee note in a week, and that's also missing.

Sharmaji : Eh! Where 'as my bag gone? It contained fifty rupees I brought as subscription.

Ahmed : Mine mine too, has been cashiered (they all look up at each other).

Gajati : Prepares to put in an anna bit in the cash box, but finds that too missing. (Curtain falls).

Bhagwati Charan Verma has developed for the first time an unusually pleasant racy style, and upon him has fallen the mental of E. V. Lucas particularly.

Thus it may be said that there are One Act Plays in Hindi Literature, which very closely resemble the plays in English Literature, like Bhuvneshvar Prasad's "Syama", "Devil" and "Usar", others for their subject-matter take the cue from English phrases and words for their names as "I Know", "I See", "Vitamin", and "Hunger Strike" of Govind Das, and lastly which owe for their smart ending, under-current of impish humour, and pleasant and racy style to some work or works in English Literature as Bhagwati Charan Verma's "Sab se bara adam". Anyway all these works point out to the richness and variety which One Act Play has attained within such a short time of its growth and development in Hindi Literature.

Reviews and Notices of Books

Inductive reasoning—A study of Tarka and its Role in Indian Logic.

By Sitansusekhar Bagchi, M.A., LL.B., D. Lit., Calcutta, 1953,

The title of this book gives us the impression that it is a treatise on Induction. But, to be sure, the book is not on Inductive Reasoning, though the author does deal with the inductive procedure in the course of his discussion. That the main subject dealt with in the book is not Induction is shown by the fact that the author is occupied with the theories of *Tarka*, which is one of the central topics of Nyāya and taken by him to be reasoning. If *Tarka* is reasoning and as such the main theme of the book, how can it have the title *Inductive Reasoning* I wonder.

Now, as regards *Tarka* itself, it is doubtful whether we can take it to be reasoning at all.* "Reasoning" is indeed a common word, and it in its common use means inference. Thus Logic is often defined as the science of reasoning; "reasoning" here evidently means inference. "Reasoning" in its limited use, however, means or may mean argument, which in its turn is a series of inferences. In any case, *Tarka* can be regarded as a special kind of reasoning which in European Logic is called *Reductio Ad Absurdum*. One might call it dialectic as well. As the author does not translate "*Tarka*" by one definite word or phrase with a fixed meaning, the discussion on the theories regarding *Tarka* naturally becomes all hazy. The translating of the Sanskrit terminology or texts into English is a tough job. To this end, the scholar concerned must be proficient in Sanskrit as well as in English, and must be well grounded in European Logic and conversant with its technique *cum* terminology. From the book it appears that the author is a Sanskritist and well read in the vast literature on his subject. But obviously he is not familiar with the technique of Western Logic. I am at a loss to understand how a thesis for the highest Degree of the University could be written in school-boy English. The very preface to the book would fill readers with revulsion.

The author has evidently laboured hard and, as he himself says, he worked for six long years over the book. But, in my opinion, it is not commensurate with the amount of labour bestowed upon it. The author is indeed a specialist in Nyāya Logic. But in his treatment of the various themes and theories he is rather repetitive and his procedure unsystematic. Sometimes, again, his own views get mixed up with the views he discusses and describes. The book is thus rendered unreadable to a degree and, as a jumble of details, is perhaps the first of its kind in so far as publications on Nyāya Logic are concerned.

ADHAR CHANDRA DAS

A guide to Historical Research *

At a time when new light is being thrown upon what happened in Indian History hundred years ago, Societies are holding their sessions to

*A Review article based on Dr. K. K. Dutt's "A Survey of recent Studies on Modern Indian History", Patna University, 1957.

publicise the importance of their national past, worldly anomalies are perplexing even the lowliest among the commoners, and the searchlights of the social high-ups are merely producing a blinding effect, "Light, and more light" is invariably the cry of an ordinary researcher, frantically groping in the dark—be it in pursuit of fresh knowledge, or the barest subsistence to keep the body and soul together. Whatever may be Dr. K. K. Dutt's apologies for his delay in bringing out his handbook on recent studies in Modern Indian history, it is yet a timely publication, now that the Mutiny Centenary is being celebrated in India, and Historical Research has almost become a craze with all shades of the Intelligentsia.

Urged by "the great need for a proper understanding of the various forces that have influenced human society in different countries" Dr. Dutt has taken much pains to bring out this publication to facilitate a "comprehensive and correct study of Modern Indian history in its manifold aspects". India's "intimate contact with the outside world", the impact on her "of the various trends of civilisation", and the influence which she exercised "on the minds of the people of other countries" entitle her to be ranked among the great nations, and her history, as the author says, deserves "careful and critical appreciation". Writers on Indian history, through their patient investigations, have unfolded the glorious past of this vast subcontinent for the benefit of humanity. Due to the joint efforts of the English and the Indian Scholars we have today a vast storehouse of historical information regarding India that helps us to ascertain her role in the different political, cultural and economic movements which have shaped human history. Much has been done indeed, but enough still remains to be done; and Dr. Dutt's work serves as a clarion call to modern researchers to keep alive that spirit of enquiry which urged the Indian scholars to make a critical study of their nation's history.

Promoted by the Rockefeller Foundation, Dr. Dutt's work, as its title suggests, is a catalogue of recent investigations in Modern Indian history. The author has attempted a review of the important works of Indian writers in their different aspects—Political, Administrative, Economic, Social and Cultural. It is indeed encouraging to find that if India has been indebted for her comprehensive history to a long list of foreign writers from Orme, Watts, Tod, Duff and Cunningham to the modern scholars like Professors Philips, Spear and Davies, the contributions of her own historians have been no less significant. When all the works of modern Indian scholars which are now under preparation will be completed, we will have a comparable size of historical writings of which any nation can be reasonably proud.

Recent studies in the field of Political history have been so many and so frequent that their statement covers more than half of Dr. Dutt's book. Even so, not much has been done by Indian writers to reveal an important aspect of Modern Indian history; not many scholars have turned their attention to a thorough study of India's International Relations. The India Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, which planned to bring out a comprehensive history of India's Foreign Relations, has so far produced only one volume of their contemplated work. Much has still to be done to

complete this vast undertaking, and the Indian public is eagerly awaiting the subsequent volumes.

Investigations in other fields have been comparatively much fewer--particularly in the Economic and Social spheres. It is, therefore, time that our own scholars had focussed their attention on these aspects, and begun their pursuit in building up a comprehensive Social and Economic history of our country. We must try, by the application of proper methods of historical research, to ascertain the material conditions and economic resources of the common man, the tiller of the soil, and the ordinary day-labourer, and also the nature and extent of India's mercantile and financial transactions, so that our knowledge of the past may be fruitfully utilised for national planning and economic reconstruction.

The nineteenth century proved to be a marvellously creative age, marked not only by the growth of a new political consciousness in different parts of the world but also by splendid achievements in the domain of knowledge, science and culture effecting a remarkable transformation in social life. In the early years of the nineteenth century new forces and influences "caused a splendid awakening of Indian minds, a luxuriant unfolding of India's intellect in manifold petals, and the renovation of her society by purging those evils and anomalies which had accumulated through unwholesome and adverse influences of the preceding periods. . . " The birth of the new age, and its progress on various lines, were facilitated by certain factors, exotic as well as indigenous. The inspiring political and scientific thoughts of master-minds like Bacon, Locke, Voltaire, Burke, Bentham, Mill and Newton and the humanitarian ideas of the philanthropists like Wilberforce and his friends, which penetrated into this country through various agencies, created stimulating forces in favour of progressive changes in government, society and culture. By a happy coincidence the age also saw a mighty reawakening of India's intellect seeking to discover the true glory and majesty of her past culture, and the mingling of the progressive ideas of the West and the revived classical lore of India produced happy results in the social and cultural spheres.

Study of this aspect of Modern Indian history is bound to be highly fascinating and instructive. For it we can glean precious materials from the Reports of the Social Conferences which met along with the annual sessions of the Indian National Congress, the Reports and Presidential Addresses of the Indian National Congress from year to year, Reports and other publications regarding the activities of the Brahmo Samaj, the Prarthana Samaj, the Arya Samaj, the Ramkrishna Mission and the Vivekananda Movement, and the Servants of India Society, etc. Memoirs, autobiographies and biographies of those, who were the leaders of these activities from Rammohan to Gandhi, are also full of relevant information of great interest. Writings of the Christian missionaries, then working in India, contain accounts of Indian social life, which can be utilised with due care and scrutiny. Old newspapers and journals, Census Reports and other state papers also supply us with valuable materials, and since Literature is the most ruthless mirror of a country's life, one must as well study the different literatures of modern India for proper appreciation of her social changes.

Thanks to the various Record Offices and Regional Committees, historical research has made considerable progress in this country. There is yet many a gap in our knowledge of Indian history, and if "we must build an India greater than she has been", it must be built out of the "consciousness of our past greatness". Historical research alone can produce that consciousness, and those Indian scholars who are today working in the midst of great handicaps should receive adequate encouragement from Governmental and other Statutory institutions. On his own part, Dr. Dutt has tried to encourage historical research by recording a truthful impression of all sorts of investigation, made in the field of Modern Indian history in recent years. From Sir Jadunath, Sardesai and Dr. S. N. Sen to the humblest of the research scholars, everyone has found his proper place in Dr. Dutt's Survey—not even excluding one whose sole contribution to Indian history has been a four or five page article in one of the Indian History Congress Proceedings! As such, this little handbook will serve as an excellent guide to all those who are doing valuable research in Indian history, and who still intend to take it up as their field of investigation.

—
DILIP GHOSE

Mahatma Lalan Fakir—By Sri Basanta Kumar Pal, Mansatala Para, Gopalnagore Road, Nasra, P O, District Nadia, West Bengal, Price Re. 1-12-0. Pp 114 + 10 + 30.

This small volume depicts the life history of the great saint of Nadia and throws a flood of light on the religious sect founded by him. As no recorded and historical data of the famous life are available the author has to rely upon the meagre materials which are current only in popular beliefs.

The saint was not a Fakir, who are generally haggardly but belonged to the Darvish class, who usually spend their lives in spiritual meditation and yet keeps their homes and families. Thus Lalan Fakir was both an ascetic and a householder. Possibly he was born in 1774 and lived up to a good old age. He died on 17th October, 1890, at the ripe old age of 116 years.

Lalan Fakir was born a Hindu, was reared up by a kindhearted Muslim woman of the village, had spiritual illumination in the hands of Siraj Sai, a Muslim darvish, died a Vaisnab and left behind him a host of disciples in both Bengals, both Hindus and Musalmans.

The teachings of the Mahatma have been elaborately discussed by the author in simple Bengali prose so that the complex philosophical implications might be easily understandable. He has also cited good many poems, mostly spiritual in tone and fervour which are supposed to be written by Mahatma Lalan Fakir. Frequent quotations have been made from Rabindranath to prove the analogy of the views of life between these two great sons of Bengal. It may be remembered in this connection that the poet met the Saint at Silaidah on the Padma and Maharshi Debendra Nath Tagore had a religious discussion with him.

B.K.

THE CALCUTTA REVIEW



The Late Dr. Hemchandra Raychaudhuri

Ourselves

DEATH OF PROFESSOR HEMCHANDRA RAYCHAUDHURI

Death occurred in Calcutta on 4th May, 1957, of Professor Hemchandra Raychaudhuri at the comparatively early age of sixty-five years. The country and the University of Calcutta, in particular, of which he was a distinguished and outstanding product, are the poorer by his death. With his passing away, the University has lost a profound and erudite scholar, and the country has lost one who was, by universal consent, in the foremost rank of her men of learning. He belonged to an old middle class family of Barisal in East Bengal and had his early education in his native district. After a very brilliant career in his school, he came to Calcutta for College education. Here his progress was equally striking. In the B.A. Examination of 1911, he stood first class first in History Honours, and won the coveted Eshan Scholarship as the best Honours Student of the University in that year. He secured the first place in the First Class in the M.A. Examination of 1913 also, and chose the profession of a teacher in our Colleges and University. The history of ancient Indian culture and civilisation was the all-absorbing interest of his life and he dedicated himself to the task of illuminating the dark corners of this history by the light of his learning. The value of his researches and his learned contributions was soon recognised, and he was appointed the Carmichael Professor of Ancient Indian History and Culture in 1936. Academic honours and distinctions came to him in rapid succession. He was elected a Fellow of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1946, and became the President of the Nagpur Session of the Indian History Congress in 1950.

It was a life externally uneventful, but full of thought and work, and latterly crowned by great influence over his students and great respect from the senior members of the University. His appearance had a peculiarly steadfast look, and there was in him a remarkable seriousness of expression, an air of solidity and quiet strength. He knew comparatively few people, and of these only a very few intimately, having no taste or turn for those sports and socials in which University acquaintances are most frequently made. This caused him to pass for harsh or unsocial. But those who came to know


Professor Hemchandra intimately, soon perceived that under his reserve, there lay not only a capacity for affection—no man was perhaps more tenacious in his friendships—but qualities that made him an attractive companion. His tendency to solitude sprang less from pride or coldness, than from the occupation of his mind by subjects which he so dearly loved and made his own. He had been of an earnest and serious disposition from his boyhood, and this had given a tinge of gravity to his manner. Though apt to be silent in general company, no one could be more agreeable when you were alone with him. One never talked to him without carrying away something to ponder over. On everything he said or wrote there was stamped the impress of a strong individuality, a mind that thought for itself, a character ruggedly original wherein grimness was mingled with flashes of humour and a genial personality. His independence appeared even in the way he pursued his studies. With abilities of the highest order, he cared comparatively little for the distinctions which the University offers, choosing rather to follow out his own line of reading in the way he judged permanently useful than to devote himself to the pursuits of honours and prizes. His intellect worked like a conscience in the field study and research. While others became involved in the dust and heat of worldly life and activities, Professor Hemchandra kept the noiseless tenor of his way along the cool, sequestered vale of academic life. He had no ambition to become an administrator because he was constantly aware of the danger of the exaltation of the administrator in the University office. As a University teacher he correctly understood his three great obligations which were the need for constant research, the necessity of keeping a fresh mind and finally the duty to know and cultivate his students as friends.

Every student and fellow worker of Professor Raychaudhuri will admit that he was a miracle of learning. Learning was the business of his life. He had no other business or interests. He was gifted with a singularly tenacious memory. His industry was untiring. He worked for almost all hours of the day, and sometimes far into the night. Yet, even after making every allowance for his memory and his industry, his friends and admirers stood amazed at the range and exactness of his knowledge in the domain of History and Ancient Indian History in particular. He asked for no reward for his worship in the shrine or sanctuary of learning. He avoided publicity and popularity with the tranquil dignity of one for whom the world of knowledge and speculation was more than sufficient.

He has gone to his rest in the other world. But the value and quality of his work endures. His books and publications bear unmistakable evidence of an unsurpassed, and indeed a scarcely rivalled, mastery of every subject which he touched. The *Political History of Ancient India from the Accession of Parikshit to the Extinction of the Gupta Dynasty* is, in the opinion of competent western scholars a monumental piece of work and craftsmanship which will give guidance to scholars for years to come. The *Early History of the Vaishnava Sect* is perhaps the first systematic attempt to present a historical figure of Krishna and to provide a sound, sober and rational history and interpretation of the Bhagabata cult and Vaishnavism. It has been said that the lectures of Professor Raychaudhuri on the *Early History of the Vaishnava Sect* "read almost as would a Bampton Lecture on the Historical Christ to a Christian audience. They are an attempt to disentangle the authentic figure of Krishna from the mass of Puranic legend and gross tradition, from the wild conjectures and mistaken, if reasoned, theories which surround his name". His *Studies in Indian Antiquities* are always well-informed, thoughtful and suggestive. They have suggested and mapped out lines of further investigation in different fields of study and research.

A promising career—a career full of immense possibilities has been cut short by the cruel hand of death. The last years of Professor Raychaudhuri were darkened by a fatal illness from which he did not recover. But he loved life, and more than that, the all-absorbing passion of his life—ancient Indian Culture and Civilisation. Providence decreed otherwise. But even on his sick-bed he never for a moment shirked his duty. He laboured on under strain and anxiety; and under a disabling illness which perpetually tormented him, he was always ready to respond to every public demand, the demand of his *alma mater*, the demand of his friends and admirers. He was stricken down in the midst of his work, a martyr to conscience and duty. But we love to remember his serene patience, his untroubled equanimity, and the quiet trust with which during these long, weary days, he awaited the call which he knew was soon to come. He has gone to his rest, and to-day we pay our homage to a cherished memory. We also convey our sincere condolences to the members of the bereaved family.

TRIPURARI CHAKRAVORTI



Notifications

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No C/2563/89 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Dum Dum Motijheel College be granted extension of affiliation in Alternative Bengali and Additional Paper in Alternative Bengali to the I A standard, in English, Bengali Vernacular, Additional Paper in Alternative Bengali (Vernacular), Sanskrit, Bengali, History, Economics and Philosophy to the B A Pass standard and in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics to the B Sc pass standard with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 28th May, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2645/65 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Gobardanga Hindu College has been affiliated in English, Bengali, General Economics, Indian Economics, Commercial Law, Business Organisation, Commercial Geography, Accountancy, Advanced Accountancy and Auditing to the B Com standard, Botany and Zoology to the B.Sc. pass standard and Bengali to the B A. Honours standard, with effect from the session 1957-59, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 28th May, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2640/132 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that the Trivenidevi Bhalotia College, Ramganj has been affiliated in English, Bengali Vernacular, Additional Paper in Alternative Bengali, Hindi Vernacular, Alternative Bengali, Sanskrit, History, Civics, Logic, Commercial Geography, Commercial Arithmetic and Book keeping and Mathematics to the I A standard, in English, Bengali Vernacular, Hindi Vernacular, Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry and Biology to the I Sc standard and in English, Bengali Vernacular, Hindi Vernacular, Additional Paper in Alternative Bengali, History, Economics, Bengali and Mathematics to the B.A. Pass standard with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 28th May, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2658/16 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the South Calcutta Branch of the City College has been affiliated in Social Science for women students and in Psychology and Anthropology to the I.A. and I.Sc. students with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e. with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 6th June, 1957

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2686/100 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Barasat Government College has been affiliated to the B.A. (Pass) standard, in English, Bengali (Vernacular) Additional Paper in Alternative Bengali, Sanskrit, History, Bengali, Philosophy, Economics and Mathematics with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e. with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examination mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 29th May, 1957

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2658/37 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Contai P. K. College has been affiliated in Economics to the B.A. Honours standard with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subject at the examination mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 28th May, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2663/33 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Victoria Institution Calcutta has been affiliated in Alternative English to the I.A. and I.Sc. standard with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subject at the examination mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 28th May, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

Notification

The following subjects have been selected for submission of theses as mentioned against each —

(1) *Rani Ramakshi Gold Medal*

Subjects for 1958—(i) The Cult of Bhakti in the Vedic hymns.
 (ii) Contribution of Sanskrit Inscriptions as a source of Indian History in the Pala and the Sena period.

Re : details (*vide* Calcutta University Calendar 1952, Vol. I, p. 244).


(2) *Anandaram Barua Gold Medal*

Subject for 1958—(i) The part played by the Vishnu Purana in the evolution of Modern Hinduism.

Re : details (*vide* Calcutta University Calendar 1952, Vol. I, pp. 241-242).

(3) *Mrinalini Gold Medal*

Subject for 1958—(i) Religious condition of Pre-Muslim Bengal.
 Re : details (*vide* Calcutta University Calendar 1952, Vol. I, p. 242).



THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

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JUNE, 1957

[No. 3

THE STATE OF PHILOSOPHY IN MODERN INDIA

PRAVAS JIVAN CHAUDHURY, M.A., M.Sc., D.Phil.,

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If we take for our standard the performance of any advanced country (like England or France) in philosophical study and research we have to grant that philosophy in India in marking time. This is well-known in the academic circles. Of course, by philosophy we mean here serious and undogmatic effort directed towards the solution of the fundamental questions of the universe and human life and, so, we leave out of account the works of Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi and Sri Aurobinda. These may be more valuable than any strictly philosophical literature and the personalities mentioned are surely greater than most of our important philosophers proper in the East and West to-day, yet this is another question. We are concerned here with academic philosophy, and though this may be refreshed by the insights of these master-minds, insights are not philosophical theses. There are rich philosophical implications of these insights and visions, but as they are not presented in an explicit manner and not reasoned out, they have an appeal to our emotions and that mysterious faculty called intuition more than the intellect of man. In fact, these authors, like most of our poets and prophets, were suspicious of reason and relied more on some non-intellectual approach to truth. A philosopher, however, will have truth so far as it is rationally approached and, so, easily communicable to and shareable with others. He presents his thesis before his readers in a

manner such that they can weigh and consider it and judge it to be true or false. A prophet merely delivers his message to his people who accept it on grounds other than rational and, so, only take them instead of knowing them to be true. Thus the truth of a prophetic message necessarily fluctuates with time and temperament of the people and, so, is relative, while truth of a philosophical thesis is at least claimed to be absolute like that of a mathematical demonstration. Thus if we leave out of account any prophetic literature, we are left with the writings of only a very few persons in philosophy of modern India. We can only mention the names of Brajendranath Seal, Radhakrishnan, K. C. Bhattacharyya and Surendranath Dasgupta. But even regarding these persons we have to observe the following. Seal has not left behind him any original work of quality and magnitude. He was a great scholar and expositor and inspired philosophical study and research amongst his students. Dasgupta's contribution to philosophy is also of this nature. Radhakrishnan is no doubt a great scholar and an original thinker but much of him belongs to the order of Tagore, Aravinda and Gandhi and, so, is lost to philosophy in our sense. He has revealed the soul of India to the world at large and has also developed a world-view of his own based on the insight of the Upanishads, but his is not a thesis in philosophy proper. "The worse for philosophy!" one may reply, but this is another question, viz., one of relative worth of philosophy and such noble literature as have a multiform appeal. What we wish to show just now is the poverty of intellectual philosophy in modern India. K. C. Bhattacharyya was an original thinker who kept to the business of strict philosophising and did not mix it up either with that of a historian or with that of a prophet. His contribution to philosophy is solid, though very few people even in India read his writings which are very terse and abstract.

So that modern India has not produced in academic philosophy an output comparable to, say, modern England or America. Whereas we find in England of the last one hundred years such substantial and serious philosophical theses as those of Green, Caird, Bradley, Bosanquet, McTaggart, Russell, Lloyd Morgan, Moore, Broad, Ayer and Ryle representing the various shades of idealistic and realistic schools of thought, and we find such scholarly expositions of Paton, Kemp Smith and Mure, here in India we can but mention the works of these four, and perhaps one or two more, to compare with them. We may mention the excellent works of Ranadey, D. M. Datta, T. M. P. Mahadevan and P. T. Raju on Vedanta philosophy, of T. R. V. Murti on Buddhist philosophy, of S. C. Chatterjee on Nyaya logic, of S. Bhaduri on Vaisheshika system, and S. K. Dey and K. C. Pandey on

Indian aesthetics. Yet all this output of work is not much in comparison with what England has produced during the last hundred years. Both in the sphere of original thinking and scholarly expositions England, or any other advanced country like America, Germany and France, leaves us far behind. We find in each of these countries much philosophical ferment and development of schools of thought such as absolute idealism, new and critical realism, logical positivism, philosophical analysis, phenomenism, existentialism and neo-Thomism.

Now it may be said in reply that India has not been free till the other day and the Indians did not receive such generous education as the peoples of these free countries enjoyed. But we may point out that India, despite its inadequate educational system, has made excellent progress in the sciences. Indian scientists have international reputation which Indian philosophers have not. Research publications by Indian scientists in various branches of science contribute to the international co-operative enterprise in these subjects and receive universal recognition. But we have no such active research work in philosophy here which may, by the importance of its subject-matter and seriousness of approach, draw the attention of the students of philosophy at large, in India and abroad. Some of our Indian scholars in philosophy publish their papers in Western journals to get a good hearing. This reveals the sorry state of affairs at home. For the Indian journals of philosophy (there are only two at present) are not read in the West and even in India they have barely one hundred and fifty subscribers, while the Indian subscribers of some of the good Western philosophical journals have a comparable number. Unless Indian scholars in philosophy raise the quality of their research they cannot hope to compete with their Western brothers in philosophy and Indian brothers in science. It will not do by saying that the West is not interested in Indian philosophy and hence this difference in the appeal of Indian scholarship in philosophy and science. For the West is interested in Indian philosophy and is ready to recognise any Indian scholar provided he is himself seriously interested in Indian philosophy. He must be a philosopher first with an eye for essential philosophical issues and a genuine concern for their solutions. But our scholars too often confuse Indology with Indian philosophy. They are more interested in enumerating the views of ancient Indian thinkers than thinking over them and judging how far these views help to solve certain philosophical questions. The West is interested in Indian philosophy so far as it sheds light on our age-old problems of philosophy. So that if we do not approach our own philosophical literature with proper historical sense and philosophical appreciation we cannot hope

to do anything worthy in the field to attract the serious interest of anybody whether in India or abroad. That the West is immensely interested in Indian philosophy when properly approached is seen from the high recognition that the works of Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta have received there. In fact, our rich heritage in philosophy is there to help us in this line of study and fame while our scientists have no such advantage. So if the Indian scholar in philosophy lags behind his brother in science we should blame the former rather than any external circumstance. Our scientists suffered more from lack of proper facilities in their study and research than our philosophers. We should know under what handicaps our pioneers in scientific research in India worked,—our Jagadish Bose, Raman, P. C. Ray, Saha and Satyendranath Bose. We can then justly compare the performance of our philosophers with that of the scientists. To judge is to compare.

Thus we find that philosophical study and research in India has been poor in comparison with that in other advanced countries and the complain that we have set a rather high standard is untenable. This is all the more apparent if we consider the philosophical tradition of India with any of these advanced countries. India had a clear lead over all other countries of the world in philosophy some five hundred years ago and our philosophical heritage today is vaster than that of any other country or nation. Moreover, we compare very favourably with other advanced countries in our performance in science, literature, religion and politics. We have had in India during the last hundred years a galaxy of geniuses of such high order in these various fields that India's place is easily amongst the very few top-ranking nations of the world. Why should we not then compare India's philosophical performance with that of any one of them?

We have to admit our lack in any sphere of our activity if we have it. Only then can we attend to it and help it. It is with a constructive outlook and not with any morbid desire to criticise that one should approach this rather delicate question. It gives no one any pleasure to find and expose a malady that has seized one particular organ of our cultural body. But we have to be as hard and resolute as a surgeon probing a deep wound and we should be as merciless in handling the case as he is. Particularly now that we are free, we should look sharp into every nook and corner of our cultural life to see if there is anything wrong anywhere, and if we find any we have to attend to it with serious and immediate concern. We have to subject our cultural life to constant and thorough scrutiny now that it is recovering from a major illness, *viz.*, our loss of freedom. So that we must admit that academic or intellectual philosophy is suffering

from neglect at present and must find out ways and means to improve the situation. The task is important as philosophy as an organ of culture of a people is a vital one, more so in India where philosophy always had an honoured place amongst the various disciplines. India, despite her present day poverty in philosophy, is known in the abroad for her past philosophy, and if India is to excel in any sphere over other countries in the world she can do so in philosophy, and perhaps in religion too. For every Indian has inherited an aptitude for these two allied disciplines from his fore-fathers. The Indian mind is naturally metaphysical. High abstractions, profound speculations and bold visions beyond our common experience tempt instead of frightening him. He moves with ease amongst them. Other-worldly attitudes and metaphysical probings are to be found even in the folk-lore and folk-dramas and the so-called ignorant masses enjoy them. These unlessoned people are familiar with the major questions and idioms of religio-philosophy which are in the air they breathe. In no country the institution of asceticism is so prevalent and held in honour. These ascetics of various orders move from place to place and sing their lores which are as rich in philosophical ideas as in pious sentiments. Thus Bengal has her *Bauls*, the *Saibis* and the various sects of *Vaishnavas*. North India has the *Kabir-panthis*, *Nāth-panthis* and many others, while South India is famous for her *Alvars*. Each order of ascetics has its own system of philosophy which is expressed through its songs and religious practices. These ascetics charge the atmosphere of India with rich philosophy. They work in the villages and also in the places of pilgrimage where the common people throng on particular auspicious occasions when fairs are held. India lives truly in the villages where though poverty and ignorance persist in one sense yet man's soul is still full of the rich lore of love and wisdom that his prophets and saints gave him. The average Indian in one of its cities is poor in this respect. With all his modern enlightenment and animal comforts he is a blind man fumbling in the dark and easily carried away in any direction by any stray light. It is here that our prophets of modern India, Vivekananda, Tagore, Gandhi and Arambinda have helped him to see for himself what path he ought to follow, what light is to guide him.

So the soul of India is awake. We are aware of our vast philosophical heritage both in the form of extant literature and traditions and of our native aptitude. Yet with all these advantages on our side we have not done much in philosophy during the last century. We should have during this time at least finished the scholarly spade-work of editing and translating into modern Indian languages

and English all the principal Sanskrit and Pali texts in philosophy. We have not many translations and very few of them can be compared with such authoritative translations from Greek and Latin texts as English scholars have done. The value of such translations for the spread and development of philosophical study in India and abroad is obvious. Europe started a new life of intellectual culture when her people came to learn the Greek texts and the Indian Renaissance has been mostly a revival of our ancient Vedic culture though certain Western influences have worked into it. Rammohan Roy, Vivekananda, Tagore, Gandhi, Aravinda and Radhakrishnan—the prophets of modern India—are all essentially Vedic revivalists. But though the essential Indian thought has got its modern expression through these illustrious sons of India and has awakened the nation to a high sense of intellectual and moral responsibility, much remains to be done on the academic side of the matter. The vast amount of Indian philosophical literature, the record of more than a thousand years of very active thought by a very acute and enterprising people, has to be properly translated and interpreted in modern terminology in the context of our modern thought. Much comparative study of a serious sort have to be done. We need for this sort of work at least one hundred scholars of the highest rank, yet at present we cannot find more than five such persons in the whole of India. Besides this work of recovering our philosophical treasures the Indian scholars in philosophy have also to produce some original thought to justify themselves. Surely, original thought cannot be produced at will; it requires genius which is born and not made. Yet this is also clear that if we can by some means draw the more intelligent section of our students in greater number into philosophy and arrange for a more substantial and thorough training in this subject, we may expect better results. With respect to geniuses, even they have to be drawn into philosophy and properly guided in order that they may enrich this discipline.

And this leads us at once to the chief contention of this paper. We believe that if we are sufficiently cognisant of this poor state of academic philosophy here and are determined to improve it, we can do something. We can start at once with a very definite programme. We must first raise the general standard of the course of study in philosophy so as to bring it on par with other subjects like physics or Chemistry. It is very strange that while in six years of college education a student of physics is required to learn so much, one of philosophy is not required to learn even a third of this quantity. The number of books that the former has to read during these years and the number of new concepts he has to master are several times the

corresponding numbers in the case of the latter. So that while an average graduate, who has not read logic or philosophy in his B.A., can take philosophy for his M.A. and can easily pass the examination with but a year's preparation, this is unthinkable in the case of physics. In the Intermediate classes the prospective philosophy student reads for two years his logic which is covered by a text book of about three hundred pages. The physics or the mathematics student has to read about six hundred pages. Any intelligent student can prepare the whole course of Intermediate logic in one month. Now, why should not the Indian universities double or treble this logic course by introducing symbolic logic and Indian logic? Why should we not prepare the prospective philosophy student more seriously and, so, provide him adequate nourishment from the very start as other departments of arts and science do for their own students? While admitting students in the B.A. honours classes in philosophy we should at present give more preference to those who had mathematics or any science subject in their Intermediate stage than to those who had logic though we know that logic is more directly helpful for the study of philosophy. This is because the former students receive a more substantial intellectual training than the latter who have been fed on milk and sop for two precious years. And our experience proves that the former class of students do better in philosophy than the latter. These students who did not have logic in their Intermediate have to pass (according to Calcutta University rules) logic examination in order to regularise their taking up philosophy in the B.A. class. Most of them pass this examination very well with but a month's preparation. Now logic itself is neither easy nor limited as a subject. So, why not make it as difficult and wide as it is needed to match with other subjects taught in the Intermediate classes and as it is calculated to help the prospective philosophy student. In the B.A. (Hons.) stage too we find a very great difference between the philosophy course of study and others. There are six papers in philosophy like other subjects but they overlap so much that practically there are four papers. For instance (talking of Calcutta University standards), one half of the metaphysics papers is covered by that of history of philosophy and about a third of it is covered by that of philosophy of religion. The general standard demanded from the students is very low in comparison with other subjects, say, physics or mathematics. There are very stereotyped questions which are repeated in one form or another so that a good student can prepare the whole course privately in a few months. The result is that the good students in the philosophy classes are not nourished at all. Why not give them a good lot of serious things? Why not work them as the other

students? This we can easily do for philosophy can easily be made difficult and more substantial and challenging for the young intelligent minds. Give them a good number of basic texts for detailed and critical study. Let them read the modern analytical philosophers thoroughly and see that they cannot avoid any of the systems of Indian philosophy. Philosophy is so vast a subject that if we agree that a honours graduate must know as much of it as one of physics or mathematics knows his subject, then the present course of study has to be trebled. And without this adequate training in philosophy at this stage, a young mind, howsoever bright, can hardly do anything in philosophy subsequently by way of further study and research. He requires a substantial solid meal at this stage and we give him a liquid diet fit for weak stomachs. Thereby we are doing an injustice to our students who are mostly bright and industrious.

The M.A. course of study has to be totally recast. At present more than half of it is a repetition of the B.A. course and the general standard of study and appreciation demanded from the students is so low that it is universally considered as the easiest subject to pass as a private candidate. Most students get a good second class with a preparation of about three to four months with the help of some notes,—some printed, others typed or handwritten. Most of the students do not read any of the basic text books, for they are not available to them and they can manage without them. This state of affairs must go. There should be alternative courses in various branches and systems of philosophy so that a student may get a thorough expert knowledge of some line of thought in which he may later on do some research. Students taking up a particular alternative course may be required to read one or two allied subjects or master one or two languages so that there may be a few subsidiary subjects. Two compulsory papers may, however, be prescribed: one on any one of the languages: Sanskrit, Greek, Latin and German, another demanding an acquaintance with the philosophical aspects of modern science, of contemporary movements in art, religion and politics. The value of these papers for the prospective research workers can be easily imagined.

So that a candidate for the Master's degree in philosophy must *master* a certain portion of philosophy. Only then can he be able to appreciate some of the problems of philosophy and to be drawn to devote himself to the development of this subject. If he has talents he will do much significant work of interpretation, criticism and interrelation in philosophy, surely of a much higher standard than we generally find to-day. And if he has genius, it will get the proper

conditions for its flowering. Genius must be provided with proper knowledge to help opening it and also to prevent it from becoming flighty. Thus we propose that by raising the standard and judiciously recasting the course of study in philosophy at various stages and, of course, by a corresponding improvement of teaching and library facilities, we can help the sorry state of this particular discipline in India.

NYĀYA-MĀÑJARĪ

VOL II (26)

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THE DOCTRINE OF ABHIHITA-ANVAYA

Now, a question arises *viz.*, "which one (of the above two hypotheses) is to be accepted?" Our simple answer is that the hypothesis of Abhihita-anvaya should be approved since the ascertainment of the meaning of a sentence presupposes the determination of the meanings of its constituent words. If one is not acquainted with the meanings of words, he cannot make out the meaning of a sentence. The meanings of words are classed under different heads. We say "This word denotes a universal, this word means a substance, this word stands for an attribute and this word conveys an action. This statement becomes relevant if words express the above meanings which remain at first unrelated. But if the meaning of a word is qualified by the meanings of other words then there is no hard and fast rule that a particular meaning is determined only by another particular meaning since all meanings are simultaneously presented to our consciousness." In other words, the propounders of the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya substantiate their hypothesis by a negative argument. They hold that if the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna had been true then the meaning of each word would have been presented to our consciousness as qualified by the meanings of all other words since it is impossible to draw a line of distinction. Now, the upholders of the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna may contend that by the joint method of agreement and difference the meaning of one word is distinguished from that of another word.

Such a contention does not hold water since there is (no) occasion for the application of the joint method of agreement and difference to individualise the meaning of a word. The presentation of all meanings as being mutually related does not come to a stop. We do never hold that a sentence is constructed with words the meanings of which are mutually related. But if words are isolated from a sentence, they express such meanings as are in themselves, *i.e.*, as stand unrelated. If all words which are the source of meanings assemble together then all the meanings of words are also

presented to our consciousness in their mutual relation. In that case, it is very difficult to single out the meaning of a word. Now, if a sentence is independant of the meanings of words then the sentence "Bring a cow" may be taken as the mandate "Tie down a horse." Thus we see that real meanings of words are required for the understanding of a sentence. If they are so required then they should be grasped in their well-defined character. Hence, one is compelled to admit that the relation which holds between a word and its meaning is natural. When one learns the meaning of a sentence from the usage of the experienced persons he does so deciphering the meaning of each constituent word. If one does not subscribe to this view then he will have to learn the meaning of each sentence. As sentences are infinite in number so it is impossible to obtain mastery over language. The net result of this hypothesis is this that all verbal transactions will be defunct. It is also noticed that a person who is conversant with word-meanings makes out the sense even of a new poem, composed by a poet. This is possible because of the knowledge of words and their meanings. If one subscribes to the hypothesis that a sentence is the indivisible unit of a language and the meaning of a sentence is to be learnt then none will understand the meaning of a new poem. Therefore, the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna is not sound.

Reasons which invalidate the rival hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna are as follows. If the hypothesis under discussion is accepted then only one word in a sentence should be competent enough to express the meaning of the sentence and all other words should be redundant. As we know the meaning of a word, we also, know the meanings of other words which qualify it. The dictum of anvita abhidhāna-vadins is that a word conveys its own meaning as qualified by the meanings of other words. Thus we see that a single word conveys a world of objects to be denoted by other words. Now, let all our verbal transaction be executed with a single word. But, as a matter of fact, we cannot transact all our business with a single word. If we say "A cow" then all predicable attributes and actions flash in our mind. But we cannot select the acceptable meaning. To know all things at a time is in a sense to remain ignorant since a listener can take no action upon a word. To a man of taste an ocean, full of water, does not appear to be distinct from a desert since saline water does not serve the purpose of pure water. But we see no reason why the word 'cow' will convey its own meaning as qualified by the exact attribute or action which will suit the purpose of the listener.

Now, the upholder of the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna may contend that the word in question is accompanied by other words and these accompanying words will fix up the exact meaning of it. Does the said association of words help to convey the above meaning? Or, does the word itself communicate its own meaning? If you insist on the truth of your suggestion then we say in reply that the association of other words is not as significant as that of some words in a mantra which is muttered. It makes no difference whether these words are present or absent since a word serves no useful purpose if we do not know that it denotes such-and-such meaning. Now, if you hold that other words help to determine the meaning of the said word by conveying their own meanings then you subscribe to the hypothesis of abhihita-anvayā. Therefore, we arrive at the conclusion that the hypothesis of abhihita anvaya is better. The meanings which are conveyed by words become related to one another from the stand-points of mutual requirement, reciprocal proximity, and absence of contradiction.

The meaning of a word which is required by that of another word is related to that. The objects denoted by words which are adjacent to one another are mutually related. If the object denoted by a word is not incompatible with another such object then they are mutually related. In other words, an object which is related should be fit to be related. If these conditions of being related are not fulfilled then a relation between two objects does not take place. For this reason, the sentence, "A hundred herds of elephants stand on the finger-end" has the meanings of its words mutually unrelated since these meanings are unfit to be related. In other words, there is material contradiction. Thus, the above sentence conveys no meaning. But if we subscribe to the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna then the said sentence should convey a sense since according to the above hypothesis a sentence does never express a meaning which is unrelated. But, in reality, the said sentence communicates no meaning. Hence, it is reasonable to hold that the meanings of words which are conveyed enter into relationship. Some scholars have also said to this effect that words, having conveyed their own meanings, complete their task and afterwards these meanings, being grasped, point to the meaning of a sentence.

THE REFUTATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS OF ABHIHITA-ANVAYA

Now, the upholders of the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna take their stand and review the remarks of the propounders of the hypo-

thesis of *abhihita-anvaya*. They point out that a word does not illuminate an object just like a lamp since a listener must be initiated into the meaning of a word in order to understand it. One learns the meaning of a word, noticing the usage of experienced persons. The experienced employ sentences in order to communicate their ideas. These sentences are never replaced by words. The reason is that mere words are never used to express one's ideas.

When a matter is discussed some other matter flashes in our mind. A word is employed to communicate this new idea. This word should be considered as a sentence. A speaker employs a sentence in order to communicate a system of ideas in which all ideas are mutually connected. The listener also understands in that way. A third person who stands by them also learns the meaning of a sentence in that manner.

This is what is called the communication of the meaning of a sentence. Do you say what is a sentence? Words which conjointly express a unity of meanings are called a sentence. Linguists hold that a collection of words, expressing a unity of meanings, is a sentence. If we subscribe to this view then a collection of words conveys a unity of meaning. If only a single word had expressed such a unity of meaning then words could not conjointly convey a complex whole of meaning. As external conditions such as faggots etc. conjointly maintain the act of cooking, all bearers conjointly carry a palanquin and three pieces of stone keep a pot boiling so all words without an exception point to the meaning of a sentence. This is what is called *anvita-abhidhāna* (an expression of mutually related meanings). If a word could express a self-complete meaning which is in no way connected with the meanings of other words then all words would have no usefulness to convey the meaning of a sentence.

Now, the adverse party invites the attention of the upholders of the hypothesis in question to the open question, *viz.*, if a single word is capable of conveying the same meaning as all words conjointly do then the utterance of all other words is superfluous since a single word completes the whole task. The said objection is not tenable. It is impossible for a word to express a complete idea without receiving the assistance of other words. Now, you admit that a single word cannot convey a complete meaning. Such an admission is contrary to the corollary of your own hypothesis. The reason is as follows. Each word falls within those the operation of which yields a complete result. If such a single word is present then an operation which

brings about a complete result takes place. Again, such an operation does not take place if such a single word is not present. Thus we say that a single word produces a complete result.

Now, if the above objection goes to such a length then we say "Let the collection of words convey the requisite meaning." We also feel no necessity of holding that individual words which constitute the said collection convey the meaning in question. The hypothesis, thus revised, amounts to this that a sentence and its meaning admit of no parts. Such a logical conclusion is not sound since as the working of an assemblage is noticed so the working of an individual is also observed. What is the working of a collection? And what is the working of an individual? The communication of the meaning of a sentence is what a collection does—whereas the exact expression of the meaning of a word is the work of an individual word. Let us cite an example. The assemblage of all conditions produces an act, *viz.*, the act of cooking whereas individual conditions perform separate acts, *e.g.*, faggots burn and a pot holds articles to be cooked.

If a word has a distinct operation of expressing its own meaning then it should be admitted that the meaning of a word keeps itself aloof from those of other words. Now, the upholders of the hypothesis under discussion join issue with their opponents and emphatically assert that the meaning of a word does not stand unrelated. The reason is this that a word is employed to serve the purpose of a collection of words. Though a word is included in a collection of words yet it is not a fact that the specific operation of a word is not grasped. Hence, we do not share with the view that a sentence is partless since the specific contribution of each word comprised within an assemblage of words is known to us. It is also observed that words which fall within a collection of words conjointly perform the work of the collection. The said collection is not noticed to maintain itself as distinct from the constituent words themselves. Though words in a body perform a team work yet the individual activity of each work is detected by us. Let us cite an example to illucidate our point. A carriage consists of several parts. We do not single out each part and say that this part, being made up of this stuff and that part, being made up of that stuff, separately perform the action of a carriage. Similarly, a single word is never employed. Even if it is employed, it does not point to the meaning of a sentence. But a word, being combined with other words, engages itself to convey the meaning of a sentence. So, it is resonable to think that

the above word throws light on the hypothesis of a complex whole of meanings. Hence, we have stated that words conjointly convey their meaning. Words which convey their meanings in this way constitute a sentence. In other words, a collection of words which express a complex whole of meanings is a sentence. For this reason as we know the contribution of each part so we agree with grammarians in not denying etymological meanings to words. Again, as we definitely know that each word goes on with its operation unless and until the final goal is reached so we agree to differ from other Mīmāṃsakas in the point that a word denotes its meaning as qualified by those of other words.

AN ANSWER TO THE CHARGES LEVELLED AGAINST THE HYPOTHESIS OF ANVITA-ABHIDHĀNA

Our objectors have pointed out that if one subscribes to the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna then he should admit that the meaning of each sentence is to be learnt, otherwise, a person who knows only the meanings of words cannot make out the meaning of a verse composed by a modern poet. Such an objection has been raised by one who is ignorant of the science of meanings. The word 'a cow' does not convey its meaning, viz., a white cow since an exception is noticed. It also refers to a black cow as its meaning. One cannot also hold that the word 'a cow' denotes cows having all sorts of attributes since objects, thus denoted, are infinite in number and difficult to comprehend. But the meaning of a word is fixed up by means of requirement, fitness of relation, and proximity. A sentence is only competent to suggest the meaning of a word. The ascertainment of the right meaning is arrived at by means of the joint method of agreement and difference. The application of this method is also confined only within the four walls of a sentence. Though the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence extends up to that of a word yet the starting point of the knowledge of a meaning is that of a sentence. From this we understand that there is no reference to a meaning which remains unrelated. This reason behind the above conclusion is this that an experienced man who orders and an experienced man who is ordered do never employ a mere word. This point has been stated before. Though we subscribe to the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna yet it is not a truism that the exact meaning of a word is not determined. With the illustration of the different functions of various parts of a carriage we have shown the different workings of various words in a sentence by means of the

joint method of agreement and difference. Thus we see that the meaning of a sentence does not necessarily constitute an indivisible unit. With the help of accessory conditions such as requirement, fitness of relation and proximity we have sometimes determined the meaning of a sentence together with those of words. These meanings of words are also exactly determined. This knowledge of the meanings of words furnishes us with a clue to understand the meaning of other sentences which consist of these words since the denotation of a word, properly deciphered, does not change. Hence, we shall be able to understand the meaning of a new poem, composed by a modern poet. We have also stated before that if words denote merely isolated meanings then we shall have never an access to the meaning of a sentence since such meanings are not the means of the determination of the meaning of a sentence.

Another objection to this hypothesis has been recorded to this effect that the utterance of other words is superfluous. An answer to it has also been given. The reason behind our answer has been stated thus—"When other words come in close proximity all words play their part full well. You may ask, "If other words come in close proximity, what does a word do?" Our answer is that the same charge may also be levelled against all conditions. But you admit that all conditions conjointly bring about an action, *i.e.*, produce a result. Similarly, if all words co-operate to convey the meaning of a sentence, expressing their own meanings then the hypothesis of *abhihita-anvaya* (unrelated meanings) does not stand to reason since one is never initiated into the unrelated meaning of a word. Again, if we do not admit that the meanings of words are presented to our consciousness in their relational character then we cannot establish that they are related to one another after words, since a unrelated meaning finds no ways and means of being related.

Now, the objector may contend that unrelated meanings may relate themselves to one another with the help of accessory conditions such as requirement, fitness and proximity. This point has been already discussed. Our reply to this contention is this that the said contention is not tenable. This requirement belongs to whom? Does it belong to a word, or to its meaning, or to a knower? As a word and its meaning are unconscious so they have no requirement since requirement presupposes consciousness. Hence, we simply display empty words when we say that a word requires another word and a meaning requires another meaning. But a knower who definitely understands the meaning of a sentence

enjoys the freedom of thought. But his requirement is not a source of valid knowledge since one cannot acquire the true knowledge of things by an act of will. At the outset words reveal things as they are the source of valid knowledge. Then, a desire for relating these things springs up in the mind of a person. It follows the direction of words. It is, thus, the source of the knowledge of mutual relation among things. If words are held to be responsible for the knowledge of things then we are to admit that words have long-lasting operation like arrows since, if words pass away then the mere desire of a person cannot manufacture the mutual relation of things, denoted by words.

Thus, we see that the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is not derived from the verbal source without an impediment. If we are in a position to demonstrate that words directly convey the meaning of a sentence then it is unwise on our part to hold that words indirectly convey the meaning of a sentence.

THE CONCLUDING PORTION OF THE HYPOTHESIS OF ANVITA-ABHIDHĀNA

In fine, we arrive at the conclusion that words convey relational meanings since it is the only way of communicating relation.

As we know for certain mutually related meanings so it is understood that related meanings have assembled. There is no other source of the knowledge of relation. If one says "Bring a white cow," he does not necessarily refer to a relation. In some cases of usage the experienced persons make mention of words denoting relation. Though an ignorant person uses a sentence involving a word which points to relation yet the relation does not function as a bond of union. Let us cite an example. If such a person says "There are ten pomegranates," the meaning of the word 'ten' is not related to that of the word 'pomegranates.' Thus we see that the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna (related meanings) is reasonable.

Now, an objector looks for an answer to the problem "How do you explain the sentence that there are a hundred herds of elephants on the tip of a finger from the stand-point of anvita-abhidhāna?"

The defender puts the same question to his objector and says "Oh upholder of the hypothesis of abhidhāna anvaya! how do you solve this very problem? As you hold that meanings, being expressed, enter into mutual relation so you just explain how the meanings of words contained in the sentences are related to one another after their expression."

Now, the upholder of the hypothesis of *abhihita-anvaya* says in reply to the question, "As the meanings of words of the sentence are not fit to be related, they are not mutually related. What we intend to say is this that expressed meanings are mutually related only when the conditions of mutual relation, *viz.* , requirement, fitness and proximity are satisfied."

The upholder of the hypothesis of *anvita-abhidhāna* (expression of related meanings) says, "I have also held that words convey mutually related meanings provided that they satisfy the conditions of requirement, fitness and proximity. As the said conditions are not fulfilled, words contained in the above sentence, do not express related meanings".

The propounder of the hypothesis of *abhihita-anvaya* presses his point with the following words, "As you preach the doctrine of *anvita-abhidhāna* so you hold that the above sentence will convey no sense since it is absurd for the meanings of words to be mutually related. In other words, if the meanings of words cannot unite themselves with one another then a sentence which contains words having unrelated meanings clearly fails to communicate its meaning. But I advocate the doctrine of *abhihita-anvaya*. Hence I hold that though the meanings of words in the above sentence stand unrelated yet the sentence conveys its meaning. Saying this I am not open to the charge of inconsistency."

The upholder of the hypothesis of *anvita-abhidhāna* retorts thus:—"Though you are a judge, having keen insight yet you have not followed the process adopted by a word to convey its meaning. It is the natural function of a word to convey its meaning. But the speaker may have merits or demerits. When they are taken into consideration it is determined whether these words of the speaker have been rightly or wrongly used. Words convey an additional sense. It is this that they point to the relation which holds between a case and a verb. But owing to the perversion of the intellect of a speaker the knowledge of relation which holds between a case and a verb becomes false."

Some thinkers have said on this point that knowledge, derived from other proofs, contradicts the truth of the said verbal knowledge.

Now, the upholder of the doctrine of *anvita-abhidhāna* says, "The intrinsic validity of verbal knowledge is, therefore, supreme. This or that sentence produces verbal knowledge without being disturbed as long as it does not face an opposition. Let us discuss whether the sentence that there are a hundred herds of elephants

communicates a meaning or not. 'There is nothing wrong with the syntactical arrangement relating to words since the sentence consists of words which indicate the locative case, the subject standing upon the locus and the verb and this meaning is clearly communicated to us. If the said meanings were not communicated, the said sentence would not have been constructed. But, in reality, both of us hold the same view that it is an impossible feat for the meanings of words to be mutually related since they are not fit to be so related.

If it is held that there is no syntactical arrangement of words in the above sentence then the so-called sentence should be a mere enumeration of several letters like a mention of letters such as ka, ta, ca, ṭa, ta, pa, etc. but should not be a real sentence. If we take into consideration the mere syntactical arrangement of words in this case as we do in the case of the sentence "There are ten pomegranates" then the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna does not violate the rules of reasoning.

The sentence is formally correct but materially incorrect. The opposition which it faces comes from another quarter but not from the quarter of words. This point has been clarified already. Words have an intrinsic power by dint of which they operate smoothly. Under these circumstances we can boldly assert that the Vedas will carry their intrinsic validity without facing any opposition. As the Vedas do not owe their existence to an author so they do their work i.e., correctly convey their meaning without any hindrance. The knowledge which is derived from the Vedas bears the stamp of intrinsic validity. It is above all defects. A lengthy discussion on this point is unnecessary.

Thus we see that if we subscribe to the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna, we can explain how a sentence communicates its meaning. May we also suggest that the learned scholars should discard the hypothesis of abhivācānvyāsa since it has no educative value.

THE REBUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ANVITA-ABHIDHĀNA

The critics do not endorse the above solution. Your statement that one learns that from the usage of the experienced persons is true. It is a truism that all verbal transactions are executed by means of sentences. It is a fact that all words, like the bearers of a palanquin, assemble together to convey the meaning of a sentence by their joint effort. Let us now discuss how one acquaints himself with a meaning. Does he acquaint himself only with a composite meaning which is worked out by the totality of all words? Or,

is he taught only the meaning of each word! Now, if one is to learn an indivisible whole of meaning then it is unavoidable for him to gather the meaning of each discrete sentence. In that case, as we have pointed out, learning will be impossible since sentences are infinite in number. If the truth of the second suggestion is admitted, the exact meaning of each word should be ascertained. The propounders of the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna have cited an example, viz, the different parts of a carriage have distinct functions. The narration of it suggests that the distinct function of each word is to be admitted. If the truth of the above suggestion is denied then the necessity of the knowledge of the etymological meaning of a word will not be required for the understanding of the meaning of a sentence. In that case, a speaker who intends to communicate the meaning of the sentence "Bring a cow" may also use the word "a horse" instead of the word 'a cow'. Unlike the grammarians you hold that the knowledge of the meaning of a word is necessarily required for the understanding of the meaning of a sentence. By the joint method of agreement and difference one picks up the extent of the meaning of the word 'a cow'. The same extent of this meaning becomes active to constitute the meaning of a sentence in which the word 'a cow' finds a place.

(To be continued)

THE IDEAL CONTENT OF A SENTENCE

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1. 'The purpose of language is to express thought ; and thought is embodied primarily in sentences. Sentences are the basic units of language ; for we do not think in isolated words, but in relevant combinations of words, called sentences or propositions. Every sentence is made up of some significant words which are related to one another through mutual expectancy and compatibility so that they give rise to a coherent and logical verbal cognition.' The meaning of a sentence, however, is different from and greater than the meanings of its component parts called words ². In other words 'śabdārtha' and 'śābdabodha' are two different things. The former conveys the meanings of the words employed, while the latter communicates a unified idea as such. The principles of proximity, expectancy,³ and compatibility⁴, govern the logical aspect in the correlation of the meaning.

Language, the vesture or embodiment of thought, is a powerful instrument of communication. In the first place, it crystallises and embodies thought, for it is the manifestation of internal consciousness.⁵ A significant sound, called word, is at the basis of language which has neither life nor reality apart from the mind. As M. Breal observes, "Through all the centuries humanity has deposited in Language the acquisitions of material and moral life" ⁶. The language of a community thus represents the ideas, beliefs, aims and struggles of that community; and with this, human life proper commences, and human values are developed and preserved.

But a single word can, at times express a complete idea and function like a sentence, as the verb in the imperative mood, or as the word emanating from an emotional excitement. Vyāsa goes to the extent of saying that every word has the force of a sentence ⁷, and

¹ "Vākya bhāvam avāprasya sārthakasyāvabodhataḥ, saṁpadyate śabda bodho na tanmātrasya bodhataḥ". (Jagadīśa : Śabda śakti Prakāśikā, 12).

² "Vilakṣaṇo bodhah" (*Ibid.*).

³ "Ayeṁ artho 'rthāntara sākāṅkṣa iti vyavahārah (Laghumanjūṣa, p. 497). cf. "Padam sākāṅkṣam iti tu sākāṅkṣārtha bodhakam ity artham" (*Ibid.*, p. 503).

⁴ "Arthanigṛhṇa योग्या" (*Ibid.*, p. 503).

⁵ See Puṇyārāja on Vākya-pāṇini, I, I.

⁶ Semantics, p. 1.

⁷ On Yoga Sūtra 3, 17 : "Sarva padesu cāstī vākya śaktiḥ vṛkṣa ityukta stitī gamyate".

some words retain the meaning of a sentence.¹ But by a word he does not mean a word taken by itself in isolation; for he states that the simple utterance of the word “*Vṛkṣa*” means for us the sentence “*Vṛkṣo ‘sti*”. That is, a word does not exist, as significant and communicative, apart from a sentence. And it is only in and through a sentence that a word acquires its power to convey or communicate an idea. Thus the denotative and connotative powers of words depend upon sentences. The problem of the import of a word therefore is the same as that of the import of a sentence.

This raises important and interesting problems. Is the sentence the unit of language, or is it the word? In the Vedic we come across passages which speak of sentences as though they are not originally divided into parts. Thus in the Taittirīya Saṁhitā we read ! “*Vāg vai parācy avyākṛtā*”.² And the Ṛk Prātiśākhya states: “*Pada prakṛtiḥ saṁhitā*”.³ And Durga observes that the seers beheld the mantras in the form of Saṁhitā, as a coherent system and not as isolated words.⁴ In this wise, the grammarians treat the vākya-sphoṭa as the only significant and real one.⁵ Consequently the splitting of a sentence into its units is an unnatural fiction sanctioned not by any rational necessity but by mere convenience.⁶ It is for purposes of instructing the undeveloped minds that a sentence is split into so many words. Even Patañjali speaks of “*padakārāḥ*”.⁷ Only to point out that the words (‘*padas*’) are created and therefore unreal. But the sentences, as complete expressions or utterances of the ideas, thoughts, and feelings of the individuals, are natural. They emanate from the nature of a situation or mood. As a result every word in a line of poetry is surcharged with the poetic emotion and imagination; for, the parts breathe the spirit of the whole. This characteristic feature condemns all divisions and analyses of sentences as artificial and false to experience. The verbal cognition of the words severally is not true to experience. As Puṇyarāja puts it :

¹ “*Dṛṣṭam ca vākyārtha pada racanām śrotṛīyas cando ‘dhīte’ (Ibid). cf. “Śrotṛīyas cando ‘dhīte’ (Pāṇini).*

² 6.4.7.

³ 2.1.

⁴ “*Sanhitāyāḥ prakṛtīvaṁ jyāyāḥ Mantraḥ by abhivyaḥyamānaḥ pūrvam tser mantredīśāḥ saṁhitavāḥ abhivyaḥyate, na padaih. Atāś ca saṁhitām eva pūrvam adhyāpayanty anūcāna brāhmaṇā, adhiyate cādhyetāraḥ. Apica yajño karmani saṁhitayaiva vimiyujyante mantrā, na padaih*” (On Nirukta, I. 17).

⁵ “*Yady apilīṅgaṇaṁ pakṣā uktāś tathāpi vākya sphoṭa pakṣe tātparyam grantha kṛtām*” (Śabda kaustubha).

⁶ “*Yākvapadiyam, II. 240 cf. Puṇyarāja on II. 257: “Tasmān manyāmahe padāny asatyāni, ekam abhinna svabhāvakam vākyaṁ. Tad abudha bodhanāya pad vibhāgaḥ kalpitah”.*

⁷ On 6.1.207: “*Na lakṣaṇena padakārā anuvartyāḥ*”.

“Upādhi bhédenaiva śabdasya bhedapratibhāso,
na svato, nityatvāt.”¹

A word appears to differ from the others and seems to stand in isolation mainly because the difference lies not between words, but in the determining sounds.

“Abhijanyatvam adhyāsa rūpatvam āgataḥ śabdām.”² This we can analyse a word into its components, but these units cannot be further analysed. With reference to the sentence too, the words stand in the same predicament³. As we analyse a word into its “prakṛti” and “pratyaya”, so do we handle the sentence⁴. This also goes to show that the word cannot be a significant unit of sense, since the root or the suffix is devoid of any complete sense.

Jagadīśa observes that verbal cognition arises from words that are logically and significantly related to one another in a sentence.⁵ The sentence thus is the significant and relevant unit of speech, and it presupposes the inherent relatedness of words.⁶ This requires the correlation of a group of words and of a system of meanings.⁷ That is, the process of thought manifests itself in the syntax. Thus, for example, in a compound different words are combined, and their meanings are so related to one another that they yield one specific idea. Two different concepts are made to evolve a synthesis at the bidding of the mind and of reality. Hence they have a reciprocal competency (sāmarthyā), and they together form into a single inflected word. This feature is reflected in the sentence, for the sentence is the expansion or widening of the same principle. The sentence is an indivisible unit expressive of sense. The meaning of the sentence is indivisible,⁸ and to understand the sense we have to take the sentence as a whole. In such a case, words lose their identity and individuality as they

¹ On Vākya-padīyam, II. 22.

² On II, 129.

³ “Pade na varṇā vidyante varṇesu avayavā iva vākyaṭ padānām atyantam pravireko na kaścana” (Vākya-padīyam, I. 73).

⁴ “Yatha pade vibhajyante prakṛti pratyavādayaḥ, apoddhāras tathā vākyaḥ padānām upavarnyate” (Ibid., II.10).

⁵ “Vākya-bhāvam avāptasya sārtha kaśāvabodhataḥ sampadyate śāślabodho na tan māśasya bodhataḥ.” (Śabda śakti Prakāśikā, 12).

⁶ “Pada samūhāvākhyam artha samāptāvati” (Vātsyāyana on N.S. 2.1.55).

⁷ Padajñānam tu karaṇam dvāram ca tatra padārtha dūḥ
śāślabodhaḥ phalam tatra śaktidhīśa hakāri
(Viśvanātha : Bhāṣā Pariccheda, 91).

⁸ “Śabdasya na vibhāgo'sti kuto, 'rthasya bhaṣyati
vibhāguḥ prakṛtyā bheḥ am avidvān prat padyate”
(Vākya-padīyam, II, 13).

enter the sentence and occupy their proper stations.} All the propositions are, therefore, both mental and linguistic at the same time.

2. What is the import of such a sentence which is a unity and a system of many words, where the many are to serve to the interests of the whole? Here we have a variety of answers offered by the ancient thinkers. The force of a sentence is said to be gathered in in the verb, and as a result a verbal form is enough to constitute a sentence. This means that the essence of a sentence lies in action, in a conation.² In association with an indeclinable, *kāraka*, or adjective, a verb can be the nucleus of a sentence. If these associates only qualify the verb, then such a united or qualified predicate can make a sentence.³ From this position one can push forward to say that a verbal form itself is a sentence.⁴ But if there are two finite verbs in a sentence, one of them is to be taken as qualifying the other, since a sentence can express one and only one idea.⁵ In every sentence, therefore, we have a verb, and a verb refers to or implies a noun.

A verb denotes an action, and a noun denotes a subject or substance.⁶ According to Vārṣṇāṇaṁ 'bhāva' reveals itself in six ways :

“ Sad bhāva vikārā bhavantīti vārṣṇāṇaṁ jāyate, asti, vipari-
namate, vardhate, apakṣiyate, vinasyatīti ”.⁷

In the 'ākhyāta' or verb the primary factor is the idea of action, and activity is said to be silent in all things. In sentences where the verb is not explicitly expressed, action is to be understood. This action gets itself transformed into a subject or substance, when the verb is predicated by a 'kṛt-pratyaya' revealing the completion of an action.⁸

“ Kriyābhi nirvṛtti vaśopajātah
kṛdanta śabdābhūhito yadā syāt
sankhyā vibhaktyavyaya lingoyukto
bhāvas tadā dravyam ivopalakṣyah ”.⁹

¹ “ Brāhmanārtho yathā nāsti kaścid brāhmaṇa kambale
devadattādayo vākye tathaiiva syur anarthkāk ” (*Ibid.*, II. 14).

² Vārtika 9, on Pāṇini, 2.1.1. “ Ākhyātam sāvyaya kārakanīṣeṣaṇam, vākyam ”.
cf. Puṇyārāja on II 1 : “ Ākhyāta śabdō vākyam ity asmin pakṣe kriyā vākyārthah ”.

³ Mahābhāṣya, 2.1.1 : “ Aparā āha : ākhyātam sa viśeṣaṇam ity eva Sarvāṇi hy
etāni kriyā viśeṣaṇāni ”.

⁴ Vārtika 10 : “ Eka tin ”.

⁵ See Vākyayadiya, II, 6.

⁶ Nirukta I, 1 : “ Bhāva-pradhānam ākhyātam, sattva-pradhānam nā nāni ” *cf.* Dīrga :
“ Bhāvah. Karma, kriyā, dhātva artha ity anarthāntaram ”. See Patanjali on 5.3.66.

⁷ Nirukta, I, 2.

⁸ Patanjali on 5.4.19 : “ Kṛd abhūhito bhāvo dravyavad bhavati ti ”.

⁹ Brhad Devatā, I. 44.

In other words 'dravya' or 'sattva' and 'bhāva' are not different from one another.¹ The difference between the two is only one of emphasis, and it depends on the intention of the speaker :

“ Sabdenoccāriteneha yena dravyam pratiyate

Tad akṣara vidhau yuktam nāmety āhur manīṣiṇaḥ.”²

Even the 'prātipadikas' of Pāṇini are merely nouns.³ This points to the conclusion that the differences between those who emphasise the noun and those who insist on the verb, are not fundamental. These differences do not alter the nature of the meaning which a sentence offers. As Henry Sweet points out, we think simultaneously of both the subject and the predicate, presumably because they are not different, nor are they mutually exclusive. And Sayce tells us : “ So far as the act of thinking is concerned, subject and predicate are one and the same, and there are many languages in which they are so treated ”.⁴ There is an intimate relation of interdependence between noun and verb; and the Aryan verb was originally a noun, as much as the Aryan noun was originally a verb. We have the verbal roots, “ dhana, jana, vadha, gaveṣa ”, which appear to be substantives. The Kambojas, says Yāska, took 'śava' to be a verb, while the Aryans accepted it as a noun.⁵ We have also a series of denominative roots.⁶

Noun and verb are closely related to one another. According to Sākaṭāyana, all words are derived from verbal roots.⁷ If so, we have to call every passerby an 'aśva' or horse, for the word 'aśva' etymologically refers to walking. And if an object can give rise to a variety of actions, it has to be designated by a varied list of words.⁸ Etymology, if this were the principle at work, it would have correlated the words “puruṣa”, “aśva”, and “tṛṇa”, into “puriśaya”, “aṣṭa”, and “tardana”, respectively.⁹ According to this view, the root

¹ “ San mātram bhāva lingam syāt ” (quoted by Durga on Nirukta I. 9). cf. Durga on Nirukta on I. 1 : “ Yativa hy ākhyate vidyamānam api dravyam avivakṣitam evam ihapi vidyamānāpi kriyāvivakṣita dravya paratvāt sattva śabdasya ”.

² Bṛhad Devatā, I. 42, cf. Rik. Prātiśākhya, 22.5.

³ See Śaṅkara Sakti Prakāśikā, 14.

⁴ The Science of Language, II. 323.

⁵ Nirukta, II. 2.

⁶ See on Pāṇini 3. 1. 23 and 3. 1. 32.

⁷ Nirukta : I. 12 : “ Nāmānyākhyāta jātāniti śakṭāyano nirukta samayaś ca ”. cf. Patanjali on 3. 2. 115 and 3. 3. 1 : “ Vaiyākaraṇānām ca śākaṭāyanaāha, dhātujam nāmeti ”.

⁸ “ Athāpi cet sarvāni ākhyāṭayāni nāmāni syuryāvadbhirb pāvaiḥ sam prayujyate, tāvadbhyo nāmadpya pratilambhaḥ syāt tatraivam sthūpa darasayāvā, sanjanica syāt ” (Ibid.).

⁹ “ Athāpi ya eṣām nyāyavān kārmanāmi kaḥ samskāro yathā cāpi pratilīkārthāni syus tathāivānyān ācakṣīran puruṣam puriśay ity ācakṣīran, aṣṭ ty aśvam, tardanam iti ” (Ibid.).

precedes the noun in order of existence, and action determines a noun. But how is the earth called 'pṛthivī' before it was extended in space?¹ Gārgya and the grammarians do not accept this principle as universally applicable and valuable :

“ Na sarvāṇīti gārgyo vaiyākaraṇānām caike ”.²

The emphasis on noun and verb had a varied history; the former gave rise to the cognitive understanding of a sentence, while the latter drew attention to the conative side. Thought and action are respectively the spheres of discussion and the truth lies somewhere between the two.

3. The verb is an important element in the sentence, and the meaning of a sentence depends on the meaning of the verb. Maṇḍana, the Mīmāṃsaka, held that the verbal root conveys the idea of the result of an action, for the verbal terminations denote the action proper.³ Some other reverse this process, for a result generally follows an action.⁴ But if the root denotes action, the verbal terminations are meaningless and superfluous.⁵ Hence the root must denote some qualified action.⁶ And Patañjali observes :

“ Kā punaḥ kriyā? Ihā, Kā Punaḥ ihā? Ceṣṭā. Kā punaśceṣṭā? vyāpāraḥ ”.

This 'kriyā' or action is said to be an immaterial reality,⁷ for its meaning cannot be explained precisely.⁸ It can only be inferred. On the other hand in the realist systems of logic, the verb originally served the function of a noun and gradually came to serve the function of an adjective. In the grammatical systems the verb became more and more comprehensive. As Bhartṛhari observes :

“ Guṇabhūtairavaṣavaiḥ samūhaḥ kramajanmanān
buddhyā prakalpitaḥ bhedaḥ sū kriyety abhidhīyate ”.

Thus a verb like 'pacati' evolves in itself a synthesis of pot, fire, fuel, cook and the rest :

¹ “ Prathanāt pṛthivītyāhub. ka enām aprathayīṣyat? Kim ādhāraś ca ” (*Ibid*)

² *Ibid*.

³ Atia Maṇḍana Miśraḥ... phalamātram dhātvarthaḥ, vyāpāraḥ pratyayārthaḥ ” (*Manjūsā*) cf. Tattvacintāmaṇi : “ Dhātvarthaḥ phalam iti Maṇḍanācārjāḥ ”.

⁴ Gaṅgeśa : Tattvacintāmaṇi : “ I bahāṅkkūlo vyāpāra eva dhātvarthaḥ ”.

⁵ Gadādhara : Vyutpattivāda, p. 37 : “ Dhātor vyāpāra n ātra vācīve.... avilakṣaṇa bodha prasāṅgaḥ ”.

⁶ “ Navyās tu samyagādi rūpa phalaviśeṣāvacchinnaśyaiva gamyādyarthaḥ ” (*Ibid*).

⁷ On 1. 8. 1. cf. “ Kriyā vacano dhātuh ”, “ bhāva vacano dhātuh ” (*Ibid*).

⁸ “ Sarvathā bhavān śabdau na kincid arthajātam nidarśayaty evam jātīyikā kriyeti ” (*Ibid*).

⁹ “ Kriyā nāmeva atyantāparidīṣṭa. Asakya kriyā puṇḍrībhūtā nidarśayitum ” (*Ibid*).

“Iha sarvesu sādhanēsu sannihiteṣu kadācit pacatītyetaḥ bhavati, kadācin na bhavati. Yasmin sādhanē sannihite pacatīty etaḥ bhavati sa nūnam kriyā”.

“Kriyā”, therefore, is the ‘śakti’ or activity inherent in all things and capable of uniting the individual with his object into a harmonious system. And Bharṭṥhari says: “Sarva’ra saha-jā śaktir yāvad dravyam avasthitā”¹.

But the apprehension of the meaning of a sentence is not necessarily dependent upon an action. In the sentence ‘he cooks rice in the vessel with faggots’, we have an action no doubt; but there are sentences referring to existing things. In such sentence as ‘who is this king?’ and its answer ‘He is Pāṇḍala’, all reference to action is absent². Some words when they are first used may relate to action, but they are subsequently seen to refer to existing things. Further when a sentence communicates pleasant news, we find that the words denote an existing something which is the cause of joy. There is no invariable rule that words should signify action³.

In Mīmāṃsā the verb is a combination of many words: and action is inherent in every noun⁴. Action demands effort⁵ which unites action with the goal or result. Hence Koṇḍabhaṭṭa observes that a root denotes action and result as well, while the verbal termination refers to the substratum⁶. Thus the root refers to the time, mood, and action: while the termination involves action, time, number, and ‘kāraṇa’.

The meaning of a sentence depends upon and involves a reference to the consequences that can be derived from it in action or otherwise. It is here that insight and understanding work together in close co-operation. The consequences depend not on one word or two, but on the system of words called the sentence⁷. This system is a unity; and Patanjali takes this up even when he interprets the compounds. Regarding the “ekārthibhāva” he observes there:

“Tattedam aparam dvaitam bhavaty ekārthī
bhāvovāsāmarthyam syād vyapekṣā veti

¹ III. 28.

² Pārtha-sārathi: Sastradīpikā, Tarkapāda: “Tathāpi piścād bahusāh siddhārthe sabda prayoga d-rśanāt 'ko 'ya'n rāja 'pā 'cā'ah' ity ādiṣṭa prasaṅga prativacanādāsu kāryasya vyabhicārād avyabhicāry artha mātram vācya'n na sujānam” (pp. 16-17).

³ “Naikāntatāḥ kāryārthasā śabdānām” (Ibid. p. 17).

⁴ Durga on Nirukta, I. 1: “Dhātus ca punaḥ kriyā vacinaḥ sa ca tādāni vidyate”.

⁵ “Yāvad siddhim asid ham vā sādhyatvenābhidhīyate āśrita kriam rūpatvāt kriyeti vyapadiśyate (Vākya-pāṇiniyam).”

⁶ “Phalavyāpārāy dhātur āśraye tu tinaḥ svaṛtā” (Va yākarāṇa bhūṣaṇa, 2).

⁷ On Pāṇini: 2.1.1: “Samānāḥ pāda vidhiḥ”.

Evam hi dr̥śyate loke. Puruṣo yam para karmaṇi
pravartamaṇaḥ svam karma jahāti. Tad
yathā, takṣā rājakarmaṇi pravartamānaḥ
svam karmajahāti".¹

The words denote only one un-differentiated meaning, by surrendering their individual meanings; for, the union of the words in a compound gives rise to a new meaning.² This same principle must be and is found in a sentence too.

4. There are eight views in the interpretation of the ideal contents of a sentence.³ All those who speak of it in terms of a verb, a significant word, and a series of related words, are in favour of "Anvitābhdhāna vāda". Here the import of a sentence is made to centre round a significant word or round the related words. Those who emphasize the combination of words and on the sequence of words accept the "Abhihitānvaya vāda". Here the principle according to which the words unite with one another is made to hold the key to the entire problem. There are others who insist on the nature of words as universals, on their unity, and on the intellectual awareness; and according to these thinkers the sentence is an indivisible unit. All these views once again presuppose "yogyatā" "ākāṅkṣā", and "āsatti", and these help or aid the "anvaya". They are not the main factors that give rise to the apprehension of meaning, for they are taken to be only the co-operative and aiding factors. Hence it is said that 'ākāṅkṣā' or expectancy depends on the word, while 'yogyatā' or propriety thrives on the meanings of the words,⁴ though they do overlap. As regards 'āsatti' or the proximity of words, we are told that this feature is of no importance at all since the slow-witted understands the words violating proximity while the quick witted does not require it.⁵ So far all thinkers agree with one another, and from this point onwards they diverge; for the point of divergence is the principle of the relation that subsists between one word and another in a sentence.

¹ Cf. 'Bāhūnām vṛttidharmaṇām vacanair eva sū bhāve syām mahat gauravam tasmā/ ekārthibhāva āsṛitaḥ' (Vaiyākaraṇa bhūṣaṇa).

² "Samāsekhalu bhinnarīva śaktiḥ pañcaka śabda vaṭ" (Ibid) Cf. Patañjali: "Kā punar vṛttir nyāyivā? Jahat svārthā". See Śabda śakti Prakāśika, p. 83.

³ "Ākhyāta śabdām, sanghāto, jātiḥ sanghātavartini, Eka 'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ, kramo, buddhy anusambr̥tiḥ, padam ādyam, pr̥thak sarvapaṭam ākāṅkṣam ity api, vākyaṁ pratimatiḥ bhinnā bahudhā nyāyavādirān." (Vākyapadiyām, II 1,2).

⁴ "Yogyatārthagatākāṅkṣā śabda niṣṭhānubhāviā pratyekam vā mūlītvā vā naite lingam asiddhitaḥ" (Śabda śakti Prakāśikā, 4).

⁵ "Āsattiḥ śabda bodhe na kāraṇam. Mandasya avilambena bodhe kāraṇam, amandasya tu āsatti abhāve 'pi bodho bhavaty arthāḥ". (Manjūśā : Kunjakaṭikā).

5. The meaning is immediately apprehended by the mind¹, and the mind recalls the deep-rooted impressions.² These impressions enter into our understanding of a sentence, idea, or fact. A sentence, therefore, signifies the meaning that abides in intelligence³, and this meaning is treated as "pratibhā"⁴ by the Grammarians. It is manifested through the words that are related to one another in the form of a sentence. According to Bhartṛhari, "Pratibhā" brings about an association of the meanings that appear to be otherwise unrelated ('asamsiṣṭa'); and the sentence conveys the objective fact as such :

"upaśleṣaṃ ivārthānāṃ sa karoty avicāritā
sarva rūpyaṃ ivāpannā viṣayatveṇā vartate"⁵.

"Pratibhā" reveals itself through words, and is expressed by the intellect that is aided by experience and memory; it determines the ultimate reason for inclination or activity⁶, for it is an innate function of the mind, an intellectual heritage⁷. This meaning is at the basis of all instinctive and well thought out activities; and words stimulate this intelligence :

"Bhāvanānugatād etad āgamād eva jāyate
āsati viprakāṣābhyāṃ āgamas tu viśiṣyate"⁸.

"Pratibhā" or intuition is therefore the meaning of a sentence according to the doctrine of 'sphoṭa'.

According to the Indian grammarians, the words that constitute a sentence have no separate meanings at all. They are meant to convey the united or synthetic meaning of the sentence as a whole. But as Aristotle observes: "A sentence or phrase is a composite significant sound, some at least of whose parts are in themselves significant; for not every such group of words consists of verbs and name—but it may dispense even with the verb."⁹ That is, the meaning of a sentence is not merely an aggregate of the meanings of its words; nor does it repudiate the meanings of the words entirely. In the sentence we find the words combined in a new or specific

¹ "Tatrākhaṇḍa pakṣe pratibhā vakyārthah." (Puṇyārāja on vākyapadīyam, II. 1).

² Cf. "Mano hi janmāntara sangatijñam" (Kumāra Sambhava); "The cetasā smarati nūnam abodhapūrvam bhāva sthūlānjananūntara saubhāni (Aśhijāna Śakuntalā. 52).

³ "Bauddhārthasya vācyatvam".

⁴ "Viccheda grahaṇe 'rthānāṃ pratibhānyaiva jāyate vākyārtha itī tam āhuḥ padārthair upapāditam". (Vākyapadīyam, II. 145).

⁵ *Ibid*, II. 147.

⁶ Samasambhāh pratīyante tīrascā nāpi tad vaśāt, pramāṇatveṇa tam lokah sarvaḥ samanu paśyati" (*Ibid*, II. 149).

⁷ Cf. Puṇyārāja : "Janmāntarābhyāsa hetukeyam".

⁸ Vākyapadīyam. II. 63.

⁹ See Butcher : Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, p. 75.

way, and therefore the sentence comes to possess a new meaning. This principle clearly proves that the contention of the grammarians is contrary to normal experience: for if the meaning of a sentence is totally different from that of the word, we can never understand it. And if the sentence can offer nothing but the aggregate of the meanings of the words, it can never be new. On the contrary, we do experience a new unity or a new synthesis in every new sentence. "A sentence or phrase may form a unity in two ways,--either as signifying one thing, or consisting of several parts linked together¹". This unity is a special feature of a sentence, and it is a unity based upon the relation between the parts and the whole. The parts are integral to the composition of the whole; and yet the whole is always greater than the sum of its parts. It is this strange feature that makes the whole unique and one; and in this sense "the Iliad is one by the linking together of parts²". The same remark applies to any great work of art. The meaning of a sentence, therefore, runs through the meanings of the words; for, as the grammarians have correctly observed, we always begin with sentences and arrive at words through analysis. Consequently the separate words do really breathe the spirit of the whole sentence and are determined and conditioned by it. Thus at times, for example, we find ourselves to be in a difficulty regarding the meaning of a particular word; and this difficulty is resolved only when we come across the sentence in which it is employed.

6. Thus we find ourselves in the midst of two views, one emphasizing the final import of the whole, and the other insisting on the import of the parts only. To resolve the entire problem we have to examine closely the nature of 'tātparya' or ideal content which is said to be the import of a sentence. Some thinkers hold that a definite knowledge of the 'tātparya' is essential for the understanding of a sentence. For some others this 'tātparya' should be known only when the words are ambiguously employed. For some, it is necessary for verbal knowledge but it is comprehended in "ākāṅkṣā" or mutual expectancy of words:

"Yat padena vinā yasyānanubhāvakatā bhavet
ākāṅkṣā vaktur icchā tu tātparyam parikīrtitam"

The mutual expectancy is a demand born out of the need to convey the intention of the speaker.

¹ *Ibid.* p. 77.

² *Ibid.* p. 77.

³ *Muktāvalī* p. 390.

But is "tātparya" nothing but the intended meaning? The parrot and the child imitate the sentences of the elders; but they have no intention to convey and yet we understand those sentences. There are people who chant Vedic hymns without knowing what they mean, and yet the hearer can and does make out the meaning. That is, we have to distinguish between the personal meaning or the intention of the speaker, and the objective meaning. The objective meaning is conveyed by the fitness of the words of a sentence. In other words, 'tātparya' means "tat pratīti janana योग्यत्वम्"¹.

Language makes us know things and also experience them. It shows the facts and states them in a way that evokes and organises our moods and emotions with the result that the words employed vivify our experiences. In this process the words that refer to facts are united with and synthesised in an experience, for the words induce in us a vision of those mysteries and secrets that are seen in a light that never was on sea or land.² This dual function arises from the twofold nature of the word, its sound and its sense. On the one hand language refers to reality, and on the other to the intelligence or thought. Things like theories, systems and worlds, are brought to our attention because of the intellectual function of language. This accounts for the minor role given to all distinction between sensation and imagination in aesthetic expression.

Meaning does emerge at times from the context or situation, and the verbal meaning is liable to be controlled by intention. The meaning of an object or word is no other than the value it has for us, and it is from the standpoint of value that we cognise and experience. Thus the meaning of a word might appear to be the meaning of those who use it. Dr. F.C.S. Schiller observes: "We can all understand that the three little words 'I love you' mean a declaration of love, though we should not know what they actually meant in use until we are told who 'I' and 'you' were".³ That is, we have to take into consideration the context in which the words are uttered along with the attitude or outlook colouring this utterance. The real meaning of a man cannot be understood, however, apart from the words he employs. And these words must have agreed meanings, meanings that are accepted by the speaker and the listener as well. Without this agreement, the speaker cannot convey his real meaning. As such the distinction which Dr. Schiller effects between verbal meaning

¹ See Vedānta Paribhāṣā.

² See also Virgil C. Aldrich: Language, Experience, and Pictorial Meaning (*Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 45, No. 4).

³ The Problem of Meaning (Aristotelian Society—Supplementary Volume VII, p. 101).

and personal meaning is rather futile¹; for he observes: "Commonsense is willing to recognise that personal meaning is the primary and important meaning, and that verbal meaning is secondary and derivative; it always allows an appeal from the meaning of the words to the meaning intended by the man who used them, and condemns an argument from the latter to the former as 'merely verbal'². Dr. Schiller apparently refuses to recognise the fact that the meanings of the pronouns, relative words, and demonstrative words, are determined by the context in which they are employed. By Language we do not mean a system of personal meanings, since language by its very nature is a social activity. It offers to us a system of meanings mainly objective and impersonal, and therefore concrete and complete. This is the major contribution of context; for, as the context is classified and defined more and more sharply, the reader or listener comes to apprehend the same objective system as the author or speaker. Thus, two laymen might talk about motor cars, each meaning all the while a thing different from that of the other. And when two Mathematicians begin studying the works of one another, their personal meanings disappear; they are at home in an objective system of meanings. This objectivity eliminates the possibility of misunderstanding.³

The sentence, 'the sun is setting' is fit to convey the relation of the sun to the act of setting, and not to the act of rising. It refers to the evening, to night-fall, whatever may be the intentions of the speakers. In the context of time it denotes the onset of the night. But if two robbers are talking, it will assume a special context and also denote their intention to steal that night. If it is a mendicant speaking, the context will focuss our attention on his evening prayers. If a lover is the speaker, it denotes the amorous sports that are to come. In all these cases we find that the meaning determined by the context is to some extent personal, relative to the speaker's intention. But this meaning is only an extension of the primary meaning which is objective and which does not involve the intrusion of one's intentions into the understanding of the sentence. This is the direct consequence of the view that the primary meaning is inherent in the word, and not something imported into it.

Consider these instances where we do have knowledge of the meaning of words used by one who is ignorant of their sense, or who

¹ Cf. A.C. Ewing : The Problem of Meaning (Aristotelian Society—Supplementary Volume VII, pp. 108f).

² *Ibid.*, p. 104.

³ Cf. H.F.R. Hardie : The Problem of Meaning (*Ibid.*, p. 119).

being in a state of sleep has no control over his will.¹ Here the personal meaning has little to modify the actual meanings of the words. Further, the meaning of the important word determines the import of the proposition. In the sentence, 'bring the cow', it is bringing that is emphasized and the other words qualify or condition it. They are adjectival and as such give rise to a particularised meaning of the word 'bring'. This particularised meaning is not personal but relational and specific. This idea is expressed through the denotation of the word. Here we notice how the meaning of a word gets modified in a context as it is related to other words².

7. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas accept the 'anvitābhidhāna vāda' according to which the sentence is a verbal form (ākhyāta), or the first inflected word (ādyam padam), or the group of inflected words that are related to one another (Sarvapadam sākāṅkṣam)³. If the sentence is a verbal form, the meaning of a sentence lies in action⁴ as specified by the verb. In the other two alternatives too, the meaning does not fall outside of the given words. The meaning of the sentence therefore, is the same as that of the words contained therein.

Words are first related to one another before they can express their consistent meanings, and it is from the special connection of one word to another that we derive the meaning. This theory proceeds from a peculiar doctrine concerning words. All sounds, we are told, are made up of letters, and the word is the same as the letters that constitute it. The order of the letters determines the form and meaning of the word; and these letters are cognised much in the same way as the Nyāya thinkers cognised and understood with the aid of the impressions left behind by the letters. The letters themselves have the power to bring about the understanding of the thing denoted by the words. The letters or syllables, therefore, are the means of verbal cognition. But words denote objects only as related to the other factors of a sentence; and the sentence enjoins some duty or other. Words thus acquire their denotative character only as the instruments of an injunction. Thus it turns out that the meaning of a sentence is not a simple gathering up of the separate meanings of its words, for the meaning

¹ Pārthasārathi: Śāstradīpikā, p. 91: "Arthābhīprāya śūnyenānī svāpādy avasthāyam para vasa pratyuk'tar apī śābīlar artha pratipatti darśanād ... Tasmāt pratyāyakaḥ śabdah".

² "Yatra yatra vākye yogo 'rtho viśeṣyatvona vivakṣitastam eva svāpadentī sā nānya vācīnā lakṣitām anītam itarāḥ padāni svarthābhīdhāna dvāreṣu tat sa nānāni rūpāṇi lakṣayanti" (Ibid., p. 154).

³ Puṇyārāja on Vā Ky., II. 1.

⁴ "Ākhyāta śābīlo vākyam ity asmin pakṣe kriyā vākyārthah" (Ibid.).

depends upon action. And the words are meant to generalise or particularise the action which is the essence of a sentence. The meaning is intellectually assimilated ; and this assimilation presupposes the necessity of 'ākāṅkṣā', 'yogyatā', and 'āsatti' in the relation of one word to another. These three connect the meanings of the various words, and we apprehend this connection by our memory and intellect. Hence it is that Śālikanātha observes :

“Akāṅkṣā sannidhi prāpta yogyārthāntara sangamāt
svārthān āhuḥ padānīti vyutpattiḥ samśritā yadā
Anvaya vyabhicārābhyām tadā doṣo na kaścana”¹

Thus, according to the Prābhākaras, the potential capacity of the word lies not merely in denoting its own meaning, but in revealing its meaning as referring to or as involving an action.² When the sentence, 'bring the white cow with a stick', is uttered the listener means the act of bringing the object ; and this act of bringing is derived from the verb and related to the object. It is the act which is the essence of the utterance, and the act is always transitive. This idea of an act is inherent in every word. As such the words of a sentence are united with one another in terms of this act.³

But in the sentence under consideration we do not have merely the act of bringing the cow, since we have also the words 'white' and 'stick'. It is not a simple unity of the verb with the object, for we have the unity of 'guṇa', 'kriyā', and 'kāraṇa'.⁴ By the time we come to the last word we apprehend the related system of the words. It may be said that all the words in mutual relation are directed to express only one idea and that is an act ; thus the act of bringing refers to the white cow and involves the person who is to bring it with a stick. But even in this explanation, we relate the word 'white' to the word 'cow', and the word 'white' can in no way refer to an act by itself. Yet it is related and is relatable, which in itself means that it is not the idea of an act alone that can relate the words to one another.⁵ And if the central thought of a sentence is an act, and if this idea of an act determines the syntactical relation, how does the meaning of the sentence differ from the meaning of the

¹ Quoted in Nayanaprasādīnī, p. 145.

² “Kāryasamīkṣā svārthe pada samarthyaṁ, na padārtha māt্রে” (Vivaraṇa, p. 276).

³ “Padānāmeva samsarga pratipādane lāghavam iti” (Vivaraṇa prameya Sangraha, p. 258).

⁴ “Na hi prayoga bhedaḥ kārya samsarga eva givākṛter niyameṇa pratiyate, kim tu guṇa vyakti, kriyā, kāraṇa samsargaś ca” (Vivaraṇa, p. 277).

⁵ “Tathā ca saty avyavahita sambandhopādāna siddhaye anyānvita svārthamātze śabda samarthyaṁ abhyūpeyam, lāghavāt; anyathā anuvāda prasangāt” : (Vivaraṇa Prameya Sangraha, p. 258).

word? They will have to be identical, and consequently the many words in the sentence will be redundant.¹

All the words of the sentence too are not individually related to the verb, and yet the verb or the act is said to bring about the syntactical unity. The verb does not control all the words of the sentence, nor are the other words elements or party of the act. In other words, the various words other than the verb do neither reveal nor denote any action. Moreover what does the verb 'to act' denote? It cannot be any meaning other than its own. As such to speak of an action as the power and meaning of every word is preposterous.²

A word has the 'śakti' which is the cause of the relation of unity in the sentence. It expresses or reveals its own nature as determined by this 'śakti'. It is related to other words. Now consider the word 'cow'; it expresses its own meaning which is inherently related to the other words of the sentence, 'bring the cow'. Does this related group of words express a meaning, or not? If it does not express, the words other than the word 'cow' are meaningless.³ If the other words too have a meaning like the word 'cow', the sentence must express something. If so the word 'cow' cannot express its own meaning until it is related to the verb 'bring', and vice versa. In such a case a sentence is meaningless if the words are not related to one another through their separate meanings. Consequently, a word has to express its relation to other words even before it can express its own meaning. Thus a word will be expressing itself twice at different moments; and this is contrary to experience.⁴

To escape from this difficulty, the Prābhākaras argue that we first remember the meanings of words as we hear a sentence; and this memory is based on the association of a word with a meaning. And when the sentence comes out as a closeknit whole, the remembered meanings are made expressive.⁵ But what happens when we associate the word with a meaning? We do not take the word in isolation, but as related to the rest of the sentence. If at all, we only remember in the first stage; the memory can take cognisance

¹ "Kāryānvīta svārtham pramāṇāntara grhiteṣu śabda samarthyaṃ pratipādyā, paścād vākya pramāṇād api tāvaṃ mātṛa pratipattā, katham anuvāde na bhavet" (*Ibid*).

² "Ataḥ sarvānugat aīka prayojaka lābhāyānvīte sūmārtthyam abhyupeyam Yadi kāryānvīte sūmārtthyam syāt, tadā 'kārya' padasya tan na siddhyet, kāry-āntarābhāvāt (*Ibid*).

³ "Ekasmād eva padāt tat tad arthānvīta svārthūvabodha sandhayeṇa padantavasya vaiyarthya prasangāt" (Otsukhi, p. 145).

⁴ "Padārtha mātṛābhīdāna pūrvako tu tad anvitābhīdāne dvir abhīdhanam apramāṇam, anupādeyamānam cāpadyeta" (*Ibid*).

⁵ "Śrūyamāṇam padam sarvam anāri tānanvītarthakam Nyāya sampādita vyakti paścād vākyaṛtha bodhakam smṛti sannihitair evam arthan anvitam ātmanā Arthemāha padam sarvam iti nānyonya samārayaḥ (Śālikanātha).

only of the related words ; and by a related word we mean a word related to another by virtue of the meaning. Thus we hear the sentence 'bring the cow', and after some time 'see the cow'. If we were to accept the part played by memory, then while we hear the word 'cow' in the second sentence we have to think of it as related to the act of bringing, whence the act of seeing fails to be related to the word 'cow'. Moreover, even when a few words are forgotten one can reconstruct the meaning, specially in a long sentence.¹ Hence the Prābhākara explanation of the ideal content of a sentence does not satisfy the demands of logic.

8. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas accept the 'abhihitānvayavāda', according to which a sentence is a combination of words following a certain order or sequence. Jainini insists on the single idea running through it ;² and so does Śabara.³ A sentence, therefore, is a synthetic judgment made up of words that are united with one another to form a single whole.⁴ This unity harmonises the parts and gives rise to the import,⁵ which is distinct from the meanings of the various words since the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.⁶ The sentence conveys a single, self-complete, and self-subsistent idea.

Each word has its own distinct meaning, and each such meaning is equally significant since it serves some specific purpose in the import of the sentence. The significance of sentence lies in the correlation of the meanings of the various words.⁷ This special import is already implicit in the nature of the words themselves. Santayana too observes that language is a "symbol for intelligence rather than a stimulus to sense". The synthesis of the meanings of the separate words constitutes the import of the sentence; and it is distinct from that of the separate words.

The meaning of the sentence is a single unitary idea, and it does not form part of the 'śakti' of the word. The word does not stop after it signifies its own meaning, for it leads up to the meaning of the sentence. The first function is a necessary intermediary in

¹ Śāstradīpikā, p. 153. "Dṛśyate hi viśmṛta pūrvapadānām api dīrghatameṣu vākyeṣu vākyānvayagatīḥ".

² "Arthaikatvād ekam vākyam, sākāṅkṣam ced vibhāge syāt".

³ "Ekārthaḥ pada san ūho vākyam".

⁴ "Sākāṅkṣānvayavam bheda parānākāṅkṣā śabdakam karma pradhānam guṇavadekārttham vākyam iṣyate" (Vāky. II. 4). Cf. Puṇyārāja on II. 1: "Sanghāta pakṣe, krama pakṣe ca samsarga vākyārthaḥ".

⁵ "Padānām parasparānvaye padārtha vaśād ādhikyam samsargaḥ sa vākyārthaḥ" (Puṇyārāja, on II. 41).

⁶ "Sambandhe sati yattīanyad ādhikyam upajāyate vākyārtham eva tam prāhur anekapade samārajm" (Vāky. II. 42).

⁷ Gadādhara : Vyutpattivāda : "Śabda bodhenaika padārthe 'para padārthasya sambandhaḥ samsarga madyādya bhāṣate".

the realisation or consummation of the second. The meanings of the various words are harmonised with one another and unified in the form of a sentence; and the import of a sentence is the apprehension of meaning of this unified whole.¹ In other words, if the 'samsarga' or the unity of the words is not apprehended, the sentence itself cannot be understood, nor can there be any consequent reaction or response. The apprehension proceeds thus: when a person says to another, 'bring the cow' and he brings the cow, we have to recognise two things. On the one hand there is the act of bringing presented by the word 'bring'; and on the other there is the object 'cow'. The act of bringing is related to the cow which is brought; and from this one can infer that in relation to the object, the verb has come to acquire a specific transitive meaning. Thus every word has the power or capacity to denote its own meaning, and this meaning, apprehended from the word, determines the unity of the sentence.² Hence we arrive at the meanings from the words, and from the meanings we arrive at the 'samsarga' or the unity of the sentence.³ Consequently the meaning of a sentence does not lie outside of itself in action, but in itself only.⁴

If the meanings of the words are not explicitly revealed, the words cannot form a synthetical unit; and as such we have to accept that this power to unify the words into a sentence rests with the meanings of the words and therefore indirectly with the words.⁵ It is said,

"Vinābbidheya smaraṇam anvaya pratipattitāḥ
Tat tat padārtha smṛtayas teṣāṃ anvaya bodhikāḥ"

Unless we take note of the meanings of the expressed words, we cannot apprehend the meaning of the sentence; and when we understand the sentence we do find that the meanings of the words are comprehended and contained in it. This meaning of the sentence is not the same as the meanings of the words that constitute it; for the words are like the fuel, their meanings are like the flames,

¹ "Padebhyaḥ pratipannānām padārthānām samsrṣṭe parasparārthāvabodhanam abhīhitānvayo nāma" (Vivaraṇa, p. 275).

² "Evaṃ sarva padānām padārtha svarūpamūlreṣu sāmārthyā pratipattēḥ samsarga-bodhaḥ kim nibandhana itī vikṣayām ananyathā siddhānvaya vyatirckābhyām śabdāvagata padārtha nibandhana itī kalpayate" (Vivaraṇa, pp. 275-276).

³ "Tataḥ padebhyaḥ padārthāḥ, padārthebhyāḥ samsarga ity abhīhitānvayavādinām matam" (Ibid., p. 276).

⁴ "Evaṃ ca saty etam mānusaśreṣa śabdaśya na kāryānvita svārthe sāmārthyam, kim tu svārtha mātre" (Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṅgraha, p. 257).

⁵ "Padārthānām anabhīhitānām samsarga bodhakatvābhāvād abhīhitānām eva tad eṣavyam Tatthā ca padārthānām samsarga pratyaya janana sāmārthyam, padānām ca padārtheṣu tat sāmārthyādhāna sāmārthyam itī" (Citsukhi, pp. 148-49).

and the final import is like the cooked food.¹ And yet the words nowhere relinquish their meanings. As Kumārila observes,

“Na vimuncanti sāmārthyaṃ vākyārthe 'pi padāninaḥ
Vākyārtha lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti ca sthitiḥ.”

The words do deliver their primary meanings; but when they are united into a sentence a new spirit breathes into them. Thus a straight line by itself has a property of its own, and when it forms one of the sides of a square it does not lose its primary sense. But it is permeated by the meaning of the square and in this meaning of the whole its primary meaning participates. The words, therefore, have their nisus towards the whole.

“Śabdās tātparya viśaya vyatiṣaṅgasya lakṣakāḥ
Tat tātparyābhīdhānatvāt kṣvelam bhukṣveti śabdaḥ tat”²

And this whole with reference to a sentence is called ‘tātparya’ or the final import.

The sentence becomes a unitary whole not because of the words, but because of the meanings of the words. This is a view open to serious objections. If the meanings constitute the unity, we must be able to derive the same cognition from two statements which give the same meaning but which use different synonymous words. Thus the sentences, ‘A thing of beauty is a joy for ever’ and ‘A thing of beauty is a constant joy’, mean the same thing but give rise to two different and distinct impressions. These impressions depend upon the relations subsisting between the words in the two cases. And when we find that the words by themselves can and do enter into a syntactical relation with one another, there is no need to take recourse to “lakṣaṇā” and explain this relation in terms of their meanings³. But in a sentence like “Gaur aśvaḥ puruṣo hasti” we find that words fail to enter into any syntactical relation because of their meanings. That is, the import of a sentence and the unity of the sentence depend as much upon the words as upon their meanings. Hence Maṇḍana observes that the meaning of a sentence is always a specific content conveyed by the words in a syntactical relation.⁴ Each word strives

¹ “Sākṣād yady api kurvanti padārtha pratipādanam varṇāḥ tathāpi naitasmin paryavasyanti niṣphalo Vākyārthamitaye teṣāṃ pravṛttau nāntariyakam pāke jvāleva kṣāṭhānām padārtha pratipādanam” (Kumārila).

² Citsukhi, p. 151.

³ “Nanu padānām evānyonya anvita svārthābhīdhāyakaṭva sambhava, kim iti padārthānām lakṣaṇayā anyonyānvaya pratipatti janakatvaṃ āsthiyate” (Citsukhi, p. 145).

⁴ “Padārthāntara tulyatvād vidhy ākāṅkṣā nibandhanāḥ Na samsargāḥ padārthānām evaśabdeistu pradarśitāḥ Sambandha yoga rūpyeṇa tasmāt sambandha bhāgīnaḥ Viśiṣṭārtha prayuktā hi samabhiyāntir jñāne”.

towards the explication of this meaning in terms itself. As such each word is a necessary and significant component of the sentence in which it exists. And Kumārila, therefore, observes that the meaning of a sentence is always implied by the words ¹.

With reference to the meaning of a word, there is the maxim that the accepted meaning is preferable to the etymological sense, since the former asserts itself sooner than the latter. Hence when we hear the word 'aśvakarṇa' we do not find that the words here are related first and then they yield their meaning, in which case the meaning must be 'the ear of a horse'. But the two words in the compound are related otherwise. The principle involved here is closely parallel to that involved in the relation between one word and another in a sentence. Consider the sentence, 'The king's man is very handsome'. Here we have two sets of related words—king's man and 'very handsome'. Each set contains two words which are mutually related. The word 'king' can relate itself to 'man', but not to 'very handsome'. It is the compound unit 'king's man' as a whole that is related to the other compound unit. And this relation between the related words is necessarily determined by the meanings of words ². In other words, the words are related to one another not by themselves, but they achieve this relation because of their meanings. Hence a sentence is not a mere aggregate of words but a significant totality of meanings. The meaning of a sentence is a composite of several 'padārthas' or meanings of words; and this meaning of the sentence has its basis in the 'padārtha'.³ As Suresvara puts it :

Sabdasyabhāva evaiṣā samsṛtārtbhāva bodhanam ⁴

9. The Nyāya theory of the import of a sentence can be best understood from the way in which the meaning of a compound is derived by the Naiyāyikas. They consider the meaning of a compound to be nothing more and nothing less than the meaning of its component parts. But this meaning is yet different from that of its constituent parts, for they would not like 'ośvakarna' to mean the ear of a horse. This is accounted not with reference to the special

¹ "Vākyaārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti ca sthitiḥ".

² Śāstradīpikā. P. 151; 'Puruṣa śabdo hi puruṣasyaiva arthāntarīkṣyam abhidhāte, tasyaiva svārthatvāt; ato 'nanvitanvayam alam abhidhātum. Eṣam śobhana śabdo'pi svārthasyaiva śobhanatvasya anvayam āha, nānyānvitasya, Ato 'nvitayor anvaya 'vaśyam padārtha nibandhana ity abhy upagantavyam'".

³ "Tasmād aneke padārthānurakto vākyaārthaḥ. Sa ca padārthanūlo, na niranūlo, nacasanketa mūlaḥ" (*Ibid*, P. 160)

⁴ Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad bhāṣya vārtika, I. 4.905.

new power of the unit called the compound, but with reference to 'lakṣaṇā.'¹

In a sentence we cognise first the words, and then their meanings. The cognition of each separate word leaves its impressions behind, these impressions are remembered as we reach the end of the sentence; and then we relate these varied meanings to one another and form a single unit. A sentence therefore is a collection of significant words² whose collective meaning is apprehended by us with the help of our memory. In this we also apprehend the intention of the speaker which intention is "tātparya" or the import of the sentence. Since the primary meaning of a word, according to the Nyāya system, is a meaning imported into the word by the intention of the speaker, the meaning of a sentence too is made to depend on the speaker's intention. With this qualification in the mind, we can state the Nyāys import of a sentence very well in the language of Russell: "A sentence may consist of a single word, or of a wink, but generally it consists of several words. In that case it has a meaning which is a function of the meanings of the separate words and their order".³ This is more or less the same as the 'abhihitānvaya vāda' with the addition of the intention or 'uddeśa'.

Udayana identifies intention with "tātparya"⁴. The word "tātparya" is derived from "tat para" which words mean 'referring to or involving that'. The 'that' here can be a sādhyam, a 'pratipādyam', a 'prayojanam', or an 'uddeśyam'. Rejecting the first three alternatives, Udayana accepts the last one. The word means that with reference to which it is employed, and this is no other than the intention of the speaker. Since the final import of a sentence is the intention of the speaker, 'tātparya' is no objective entity. It is not a characteristic or principle of the sentence governing its parts independently. It is only a feature of the individual mind. Thus the import of the sentence gets itself equated with the personal meaning, and we have seen in the earlier chapters that this is an illogical position. Moreover, if we do not recognise the objectivity of the import the very purpose of language falls to the ground. Pār-

¹ Gangeśa. Tattvacintāmaṇi, p 746. "Babuvrīhau na vākye lakṣaṇā, kim tu pada samudāya śakteu mānābhāvāt", cf. Śabda śakti Prakāśikā, 81: "Ata eva rāya puruṣa ity ādau pūrva pade ṣaṣṭhy artha sambandhe lakṣaṇeti manikṛdaktam api samgacchate".

² Cf. Udayana: Kuṣumāñjali on V. 6: "Tatra pada śaktis tāvad abhidhā, tad balāyātah padārthah. Akāṅkṣādimattve sa cānvaya śaktiḥ padānām padārthānām vā vākyam, tadbalāyātovākyaṛthah".

³ Outline of Philosophy, p 266. cf. Nyāya Manjari, pp 395-396, and Tarkabhāṣā. p. 14.

⁴ Nyāya Kuṣumāñjali, V 6: Uddeśa eva tātparyam vyākhyā viśvadrśāheati . . .
"Yad uddesena yah śabdah pravṛttah sa tat parah" (Ibid)

thasārathi therefore observes that a word, which ceases to function after serving as a means of indicating the intention of the speaker, cannot by any 'pramāna' be shown to possess its denotative power ¹.

10. Every word is capable of denoting something, and this something constitutes its meaning. A combination of words then necessarily has to give rise to a definite meaning in which the denotation of each particular word forms an integral part. Thus we have the meanings delivered by the words separately, and also the meaning of the entire combination known as the sentence which is a single unit. What is the relation between these two? The meanings of the words give rise to the meaning of the sentence, but the latter is distinct from the former since the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The parts breathe the spirit of the whole, for they have their nīśus towards the whole. In such a case do we arrive at the meaning of the word from the import of the sentence? or do we arrive at the import of the sentence from the syntactical relation of the various words? In the general import of the sentence, what is the place we have to assign for the denotation of the word?

The author of the "Vivaraṇa" observes :

"Śabdāo ca tattva jñānam evotpadyate. Tataś ca śabdāt puruṣa doṣāc ca baliuṣu paraspara virurodhiṣu jñāneṣu jāteṣu, śabda śakti tātparyāvadhāraṇam puruṣa doṣapanayanena pratipakasa jñānāntara mātram nivartayati ; ni vṛtte ca pratibandhe śabdād eva tattvajñānam jāyate" ²

The word gives rise to true apprehension. But due to the limitations of the speaker and due to various other defects, the word can yield many a meaning; and these various meanings come in the way of realising the true idea. Hence if we take recourse to the general import of the sentence, then these obstacle will be set at rest, and the true meaning of the word can then be apprehended. As such, the general import of a sentence does not directly bring forth the verbal cognition, for its immediate purpose is to ward off possible misapprehensions. Thus the problem narrows down to two questions : Is the import of the sentence the cause for the apprehension of the meaning? or is it the cause of putting an end to the obstacles in the way of the realisation of the meaning of the word ? ³

¹ Nyāyaratnamātā : "Na hy abhiprāyānumāna kṣipasya śabdasyārtham prati vācakatve pramāṇam asti".

² Pañcaspādikā vivaraṇam, P. 181.

³ "Kim tātparyam artha pramiti hetue? Kim vā pratibandha nirāsa hotur iti? (Ibid).

The first alternative makes the apprehension of the meaning the result of the import of the sentence. This import is said to be the intention of the speaker, in which case we have to find out how we apprehend the meaning of this intention'. Should we, or should we not, know the import of the sentence for understanding the meaning of the word? If we can understand the meaning of the words without knowing the import, then the import of a sentence is unnecessary and need not be known. Nor can we know the import before knowing the meaning of the words.² In either case the import has little to do with the words.³ If the unknown import of the sentence can give rise to the apprehension of the meanings of the words, then the word by itself cannot denote any meaning.⁴

Suppose some persons are seated, a gentleman enters and wants to displace a boy. He goes to the boy and tells him, "You are wanted by your father". The boy gets up and this gentleman takes that seat. Thereupon the boy realises why that sentence was uttered. Now, the *tātparya* or the import of the sentence is not the calling by the father, but the intention of the speaker to seat himself in the place of the boy. The boy gets at this import long after. But he understands the meanings of the words in the sentence, does not know the import, but responds to the sentence and gets up. Here we find that the *tātparya* is not at all responsible for the verbal cognition, even if the father is actually calling the boy since the meaning which the context demands is the intention of the speaker which the boy does not know.⁵

Let us take the other alternative. The import of the sentence is known. Do we at all apprehend the meanings of the words? Do we want to have the single import of the sentence? Or, do we get the import as determined and qualified by the meanings of the words⁶. If the latter, what is this meaning? The import of the sentence can be derived from the word, or from the related system of words. From the words we derive their meanings; and since the words are

¹ *Puruṣābhīpiṇyas tātparyam, tad artha pramiti janakam ity arthah*" (*Tattvadīpanam*, p. 557).

² *Kim ajñātam tātparyam vākyārtha samsarga jñāna hetuh? Tātparya jñānam vā? Nādyat, tātparya vicāra vaiyarthya prasangat. Na dvitīyaḥ, vākyārtha jñānāt prak tad viśayakasya tātparyasya jñātum asākyatvāt*". (*Vivaraṇopanyāsa*, P. 104).

³ *"Sarvatra laukika vākyeṣu tātparyāvagama phalaka vicāra vaiyarthyaḥ pātāt. Anavagatē 'pi tātparye 'nyathāpratīpatty abhāvāt. Dvitiye 'pi na tāvat tātparyam padārtha Vīrasayam; tasya vākyārtha pratīty anupayogāt*" (*Vivaraṇa Prameya Sangraha*, P. 178).

⁴ *"Ajñāta tātparyasya pramiti janakatve tad agocare śabdād buddhir na jāyeta"* (*Tattvadīpanam*, p. 557).

⁵ *Vivaraṇa*, P. 182.

⁶ *"Kim tātparya mātrasya jñānam pramiti hetuh? Uta artha viśeṣitasya?"* (*Tattvadīpanam*, p. 518).

used in a particular order, we believe that there must be some relation between these meanings. From this belief we get at the meaning of the sentence.¹ In other words the import becomes dependent on the words.² But the words are mutually related. Do we apprehend, or do we not, the related system of words at the moment we apprehend the import? If we do not comprehend the meaning of the syntactically related unit called the sentence, but only the final import, then the relations of the words are futile and meaningless. But we cannot even think of a mere unqualified and unrelated subject or essence or content of the sentence.³ Here we have the maxim, "na agrhīta viśeṣarū viśeṣye buddhiḥ". If we do comprehend the syntactical relation, how do we arrive at it? Do we arrive at it imaginatively or by implication because through this alone we can get at the final import? But when the words are clearly and unambiguously cognised there is no need to resort to imagination or implication apprehend in the syntactical relation and its meaning. The syntactical relation is brought about by the words,⁴ and it is the words therefore that can give rise to the meaning and final import of the sentence.

The word 'cow' can and does give rise to the idea of the universal cow or 'cowness'. Likewise let us consider that the final import of a sentence is related to the sentence as a universal to the particular. This import is known earlier, for on this view the verbal cognition is said to arise from the "tātparya-jñāna". As such it is a qualified import that we derive from a sentence.⁵ That is, the words give rise to a related system of words, and while each word has its own meaning, the ideal content of the sentence must make us apprehend this specific syntactical relation. Just as the word 'cow' has one meaning when it is used separately and a new specific meaning in a sentence, similarly the import of a sentence must be specific being determined by the syntactical relation.⁶

¹ "Atha mayāc padebhyaḥ padārtham avagamyānānantarāt tu mūlamiṣṭam samārga 'sti saha prayamānāt' ity utprekṣyā vākya-rthavagatav nokta dosa ki. "Tad ayuktam" (Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṅgraha, p. 178).

² "Adāya viśaya āpṛkṣyāt tātparasya" (Vivaraṇa, p. 182).

³ "Na tāvat padārtheṣu tātparyam, vākya-jñāne 'nupayogāt samārga-cūnavagato, na tātparya viśeṣanātayā 'vagātum śakyaḥ', (Ibid).

⁴ "Tatra pariśeṣāc chabde janyataya samsargabodhaḥ pramāṇam eva syāt" (Ibid).

⁵ "Nanu gavādi padānām go-vādi sāmānyo tātparyam, tataśa sāmānyasya pūrvam eva jñātaya tātparya viśeṣanātva sambhavāt tad viśiṣṭam tātparyam avagamyate" (Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṅgraha, p. 179).

⁶ Śabdāt samārga mātṛe pratīpanne, tadviṣaya tātparyam samsarga viśeṣa bodhakam; gavādi śabdānām sāmānyo śakti pratīpattāv api vākyaḥ viśeṣa pratīpattiḥ vad ity āśanky āha (Tattvadīpanam, p. 559).

But when a word like 'cow' or 'river' is used, even though it may be used separately and independently, still it refers only to the particular object and not to the universal. Even in a sentence this reference is not given up, for a reference to the universal does not make practical sense.¹ And the apprehension of the syntactical relation does not come from outside the sentence, for it depends on the inherent power or potentiality of the words.² This power aids us in understanding the import, and not the reverse. Tātparya comes in only when there is a doubt or error in the apprehended meaning, of the syntactical unit ; in such a case 'tātparya' or import removes the difficulties and obstacles and restores the verbal cognition to its original place of importance. Hence it is said, as against the Nyāya theory :

"Tātparyam tan matir vāpi śabda bodhe na kāraṇam
pratibandha nirāsārtham tātparya jñānam iṣyate".³

Thus 'tātparya' renders the meaning of the sentence distinct, unambiguous and entirely objective. It arises to interpret the unintelligible words in a given sentence.

Tātparya or the ideal content of a sentence or a proposition is significant. The import of a sentence does not lie in the intention of the speaker alone. It is not a personal meaning. One does recite the Vedas without knowing what the texts mean ; and yet the texts do mean something to us.⁴ Children and parrots do imitate the sounds of people, and yet they do not intend any meaning save that of imitating and signifying something of which they are ignorant. The import of a sentence does not depend on the intentions of a speaker, nor does it depend upon the awareness of the conventional nature of language.

On the other hand, the import of a sentence lies in the competency to generate that cognition which is presented by it.⁵ For instance, the sentence, 'the pot is in the house' is competent to generate the cognition of the relation of the pot to the house, not to the

¹ "Nadī tira phala srtiādy artha viśeṣam abhipretyottama Vṛddhaś śabdāṁ prajyunkte. na śāmanīyam, tena phalābhāvād ity arthaḥ" (*Ibid.*).

² "Padārthavāt samsarga, 'pi śaktimātra nibandhane avagamo ra tātparya nibandhana ity anumātum śakyate. Śabdānām ca padārtha praderśana mukhena tātparyopādhy upayogitayā nyathā si'dhivāt, tātparya mātṛāvagamādhinaḥ samsarga bodhe na śabda nibandhanaś ca syāt. Tasmāt padānām eva samsarga pratipādana sāmartyam mukhya, lakṣanapadidvāreṇa pramāṇāntarāvairuddhe samsarge pratipanne doṣantara nimittasamāśy viparyāsa vijnāna nirākaraṇāya tātparyāvagama ity si'dham" (Vivaraṇa, p. 192).

³ Vivaraṇopanyāsa, p. 104.

⁴ "Tat pratīticchayoccaritatvam na tātparyam, arthajñāna śūnyena puruṣenoccaritāt vedāt arthābhāvē prasangāt". (Vedānta Pribhāṣā p. 286).

⁵ "Tat pratīti janana योग्यatvam tātparyam" (*Ibid.*, p. 287).

cloth or any other object. This sentence has the purport of relating the pot to the house.¹ But consider the sentence, 'bring the saindhava', and the word 'saindhava' means the salt and also the house. The meaning here cannot be said to depend upon the intention of the speaker, for it is the content that determines the sense. The intention of the speaker may refer only to salt, but the word is capable of meaning a horse too; in which case we recognise even that which is not intended.² Thus a sentence is competent to generate definite cognition; and this cognition depends upon the intention of the speaker in the sense that the context alone can determine the intention.³ The word, therefore, is potentially powerful and competent to generate the proper cognition of the proper meaning. And from the import of the sentence we derive the knowledge of the words.

11. There are six ways of determining the import of a passage :

"Upakramopasamhārāv abhyāso 'pūrvatā phalam
arthavādopapatti ca lingam tātparya nirṇaya".

These are (i) harmony of the initial and concluding passages, (ii) repetition, (iii) novelty of what is taught, (iv) fruitfulness, (v) eulogy or condemnation in other passages, and (vi) consistency in the light of reasoning. The first principle brings forth the unity and harmony of the initial presuppositions and final conclusions; and any disparity between the two makes the text unintelligible. The second explains obscurities, while the third dominates the passage as the central thought. The last one is closely related to the third one in making the entire passage free from self contradictions. The fifth one secures the unity of the passage, while the fourth follows the third principle. These six principles explain the unity of the passage and secure consistency and unity to the whole.

This question leads us to an examination of the import of a passage as a whole. A passage consists of many sentences. The relation of a word to a sentence must hold in the relation of a sentence to a passage. The sentence as a whole expresses a single idea and each word breathes the spirit of the whole. Here we have at least a syntactical relation which binds together all the words. Can

¹ 'Gehe ghaṭaḥ' iti vākyam geḥ ghaṭa samsarga pratīti-janana yogyam, na tu paṭa samsarga pratīti janana yogyam; iti tad vākyam ghaṭa samsarga param, na tu paṭa samsarga param iti vyajyate" (*Ibid*).

² Cf. Vedānta Paribhāṣā, pp. 287-288.

³ Yadvākyam yat pratīti janana yogyatve sati yad anyā pratītiśchayānuccaritam tad vākyam tat samsarga param ityucyate" (*Ibid.*, p. 288). Cf. "Loke tu prakaraṇādīnā" (*Ibid.*, p. 296),

we discover such a principle in the passage? Supposing that there is such a principle, what is the relation of a sentence to another sentence in the same passage? Let us take two sentences. One is, "vāavyam śvetam ālabheta bhūtikāmaḥ"—'one desirous of prosperity should sacrifice a white animal to vāyu'. The other sentence is, "Vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā"—'vāyu is the God who bestows his favours quickly'. These are related to one another. The second one praises Vāyu and thus incites the worshipper to offer the sacrificial animal to vāyu. In other words, it stands as an adjective with reference to the former. The principle of relation here is the same as that enunciated by Bradley in his theory of the Judgment—viz., the reference of an ideal content to a Reality which is outside it.

The first sentence is a command and has a reference to the future, while the second one is an affirmative sentence referring to an existent fact. How can we relate the existent affirmation to a command referring to the future? And if we were to relate the two, we have to explain how the two sentences are able to convey only a single idea. Sankara tells us that the words in the commendatory sentence reveal first the synthesis of their meanings, and then proceed to glorify the command by becoming integral to it.¹ In this way the second sentence is a means to complete realization of the import of the first one.

Words convey their meanings in two ways. One is through the syntactical relation in a sentence; and this is called 'anvaya jñāna'. The other is through the final import or 'tātparya jñāna'. The former works within the latter and not over and above it. This twofold function applies to sentences. Let us take two sentences—"This Devadatta's cow is to be purchased. It yields plenty of milk". In these two sentences the most important one is that containing the idea of purchasing; and to this sentence the second one offers a qualification. Hence Vācaspati takes the second sentence to be one providing the 'dvāra', and find the import or 'tātparya' in the first one.² But when the 'dvāra' which gives 'anvaya jñāna' of the one conflicts with the tātparya of the other we have to interpret the former through implication with reference to the latter; as in the sentence—"Eat poison. Don't take food in his house".³

¹ "Arthavādaśthāni padāni yathag anvayam vṛtānta viśayam pratipādyā, anantaram kaimarthyā vāśena kāmam vidheḥ stāvakatvam pratipadyante" (On Vedānta Sūtra, I. 3.38).

² "Dvidvidho hi viśayaḥ śabdānām—dvārataś ca, tātparyataś ca. Yathāikasmīn vākye padānām padārtha dvārato vākyānīhaś ca, tātparyato viśayaḥ; evam vākyā dvayaika vākyatayam api. Yathāheyam devadattīyā gauḥ kṛetavy ety ekam vākyam, eṣā bahu kṣīrā ity aparaṃ tad aśya bahukṣyraiṣva pratipūdanam dvāram. Tātparyam tu kṛetavy eti vākyantarārthe". (Bhūmati on I. 3.38)

³ "Yatra yad dvārataś tat pramāṇāntara virodhe 'nyathā niyate" (Ibid.).

Thus we have two sentences to be related. One contains the central idea, of the 'tātparya' or the import. The other acts as a way ('dvāra') to it. Both these contain syntactically related groups of words and both reveal their respective synthesis of meanings brought about by the unity of the meanings of the words. The second sentence qualifies the first one. But in itself it has an independent existence and it does not require an external help to interpret it.¹ And it is only when it is related to some other sentence containing the central idea, it transforms its nature into an adjectival one. Hence in a passage containing one dominant idea, the other sentences that do not embody it stand as adjectives.² This is the adjectival-theory of the propositions. From this basis Kumārila's observation regarding the interrelation of the sentences becomes intelligible: "The cognition of a sentence terminates in the awareness of its own meaning. But when it is combined with other sentences, there again arises a syntactical unity, because there is the need to establish a relation among the meanings of the sentences".³

Thus we apprehend the related system of the meanings of the words at one time; and when the same sentence acquires an adjectival nature we do not comprehend its 'padārtha samsarga'. That is, the 'tātparya' or the final import of a sentence is not the mere synthesis of the various meanings of its words. If so, in the father's command 'Eat poison' we would get at a meaning which the context rejects as improper.⁴ Thus it is the knowledge of the ideal content which renders the various sentences intelligible.

¹ "Dvārato 'pi tad avagatau tātparyāntara kalpanā' yogāt" (*Ibid.*).

² "Nānāṭve 'pi viśeṣaṇānām viśeṣa-yaṁkīṭvāt, tasya ca sakṣeḥrūtaśya pradhāna bhūtasya guṇābhūta viśeṣaṇānurodhanīvarīṇāṁ yogāt" (*Ibid.*).

³ 'Tantra vartika, pp. 329-333:

"Svārtha bodhe samāptānām angāṅgitvālyapekṣayā vākyānām eka vākyatvam punaḥ samhatya vīryate".

⁴ Vedānta Paribhāṣā, p. 93: "Vākya janya jñāna viśayatvo hi na padārtha samsargatvam tantraṁ; anabhimata samsargasyapi vākya janya jñāna viśayatvūpatteḥ. Kim tu tātparya viśayatvam".

INDIAN CLASSICAL MUSIC UNDER THE IMPACT OF MODERN CIVILIZATION *

V. R. TALASIKAR

Art is an embodiment of the creative energy of people and a reflex of their social environments.

Reflecting the devotional life of the people in the Vedic period, the Samvedic hymns, employing no more than three swaras, never failed to create an august atmosphere. Later, the patronage of kings and feudal lords nurtured the tradition of classical music. Learning at the feet of the preceptor went on till the beginning of the Second World War. The growth of natural sciences in the Western World and the industrial revival setting in India after the first World War fostered a mechanistic way of life and a materialistic sense of values. An age of commercial art took birth. The Indian economy leaning more and more towards urbanisation and an indiscriminate acceptance of the social and moral values of the West did not fail to cast their shadow on the Indian classical music. In the whirl of democracy and the zeal for the formation of a classless society, feudal lords and princes who were the main bulwarks of classical music, melted away and music was left to gape at the masses for patronage and survival. The rare charms and the highest aesthetic delights of music that used to be exhibited in the select assemblies of appreciative critics and music connoisseurs, got banished from our music. The idea that the aristocratic organisation of society was a pre-requisite of high culture, came under severe criticism. "The fact that culture requires leisure is, however, hardly a sufficient justification for the maintenance of a leisure class. For every artist which the aristocracy has produced and for every true patron of art, it has supported a thousand wastrels. An intelligent society will know how to subsidise those who possess peculiar gifts in the arts and the sciences and free them from the necessity of engaging in immediately useful toil". (Reinhold Niebuhr: *Moral Man and Immoral Society*). This logic appears to be plausible provided a society can discriminate between a real and a pseudo artiste. Artistic excellence is incompatible with an artiste struggling for his bread. It was a stupendous achievement of Pandit Vishnu Digambar Paluskar

* A paper read in Sangeet Natak Akademi Music Seminar, 1957.

that he made classical music more broad-based and democratic. But he meant that it should not be after cheap popularity.

In our zeal for making everything secular, we are making classical music profane and vulgar. In the words of Will Durant, "The spread of industry and the decay of aristocracy co-operated in the deterioration of the artistic form. When the artiste was superseded by machine, he took his skill with him and when the machine compelled to seek vast markets for its goods, adjusted its products to needs and tastes of vast majorities, design and beauty gave place to standardisation, quantity and vulgarity. Had an aristocracy survived, it is conceivable that Industry and art might have found some way of living in peace. The taste of innumerable average men became the guide of the manufacturer, the dramatist, the scenario writer, the novelist and at last of the painter, the sculptor and the architect; cost and size became the norm of value and a bizarre novelty replaced beauty and workmanship as the goal of art. Artistes, lacking the stimulation of an artistic taste, sought no perfection of conception and execution, but aimed at astonishing effects. Music went down into the slums and factories to find harmonies adapted to the nervous organisation of elevated butchers and emancipated chambermaids. But for automobiles and cosmetics, the 20th century seemed to promise total extinction of art". (*Mansions of Philosophy*).

The melodic character of Indian music cannot stand harmony which implies a combination of discordant notes simultaneously played. The *raga* has a melodic structure. Swami Haridas and the famous Andhra composer Thyagaraja, we are told, attained a state of eternal bliss (*Savikalpa Samadhi*) through the medium of *Swaras*. This was the outcome of their individual excellence. Democratisation of music has, on the other hand, led to a lowering of standards. The attainment of aesthetic delight, *i.e.*, *Sundara*, must always be accompanied by an emotional purification or liberation, *i.e.*, *Shiva*, and both these elements lead to final beatitude or the elevation of the human spirit, *i.e.*, *Satya*. One can imagine that these ideals in classical music cannot be attained by the production of music for commercial purposes or catering to the mob.

Creation of *Rasa* is the goal of *raga* and this calls for a refined and correct tune or *Shruti*. The artiste must utter the *Shruti* correctly and understand the full impact of the text of the song he performs. But a modern artiste seldom pays heed to them. He hankers after spectacular effects by crude methods. He never worries to see if a

note is correctly and effectively used. Even the major notes are uttered in a crude fashion not to speak of the subtle micro-tones.

The modern listeners in the big industrial cities go to a concert more out of fashion than out of any love or understanding of music. It is important for the growth of classical music and its true appreciation that the artistes do not stoop down to find favour with these pseudo-lovers of music.

The use of machines in the sphere of classical music has its own limited importance. The invention of gramophone and sound-recording has no doubt conferred a unique advantage on mankind. It has made possible the preservation of the creations of the old masters. Who would not have benefited from the divine music of Swami Haridas, Tansen or of Rehmat Khan, Bhaskar Bua and Vishnu Digambar, had it been preserved with the aid of machine? But I think, the utility of machines should end. The replacement of the human voice by the metallic ring of the machine has had a nefarious effect on the human ear and soul. Lewis Munford corroborates the same view in his book, *The Arts*. "The perfection of mechanical transmission and the spread of music through radio and phonograph may presage extinction of music as a direct spiritual experience . . . if the process of mechanisation is unfriendly to the human spirit, it will be inimical to music; in the long run, the spirit must either assert itself or commit suicide".

The musicians, actuated by commercial considerations, always striving for profitable markets where they can sell their songs like hot cakes, is another baneful influence of modern civilization. The 'Sugam Sangeet' or the light music which harnesses musical material to love-lyrics for utilitarian ends, is also an outcome of the mechanistic values that have corroded the mystic world of melody. The popular music is being pushed into the market as a source of profit and as a momentary escape from the miseries of a machine civilization. Films have played a potent role in the debasement of classical music. The film music is a hybrid or a mongrel which partakes of the characters neither of the classical music nor of the Western music. Giving no more than a casual, fitful sensation, the flippant and frivolous film songs have caused disturbance in the standards of artistic judgement.

The artistic values will not get adjusted automatically. The time is up for all lovers of classical music to rally all their courage to fight these evils. It is necessary to make every effort to resuscitate classical music which is one of the finest achievements mankind has ever made.

HISTORY OF MANIPUR

GHARIB NIWAZ PAMHEIBA

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The beginning of the 18th Century saw the dawn of a new era in the history of Manipur. When the death of Aurangzeb in 1707 A.D. left India in a state of political chaos, the dark cloud overshadowing the political horizon of Manipur gradually became clear. Though India has nothing to be proud of the new century, it has at least added a bright chapter of the history of Manipur to the history of India. Those who are engaged in reconstructing the history of Manipur find their task easier from this period. They have no longer to grope mostly in the catacomb of myths and legends. Reliable materials in increasing quantity are available from this time. Manipur was waiting for a strong and able guide to bring her latent energy to fruition. It was at this time that Gharib Niwaz Pamheiba with a revolutionary outlook and the zeal of a conqueror, comparable to that of Emperor Harshabardhana, assumed the political leadership of Manipur. In one hand he carried his victorious arms to the imperial city of Ava and in the other he effected a religious revolution within his own country.

His activities paved the way to rapid cultural integration of Manipur with the rest of India. Had the people of Manipur not received the guidance of such an able personality they could not probably have reached their present higher level of culture than other backward communities in the neighbouring state.

According to Perumberton Gharib Niwaz ascended the throne of Manipur in the year 1714 A.D.¹ But Bijoy Punchalle gives the date of his accession as 1709.² It is difficult to be accurate about it. Manipur enjoyed his rule approximately for 35 to 40 years. For, his reign did not extend to the second half of the 18th Century. But who is this mighty Vaishnava ruler and conqueror who styled himself as the refugee of the poor (Gharib Niwaz) and in whose character is found the rare combination of the martial qualities of a Kshatriya and the Vaishnavic humility? Gharib Niwaz Pamheiba is the successor of the King Charairongba.³ All sources point to his being brought up by a Naga Chief in the midst of a Naga Society. After ascending the

throne also he showed his leanings towards Naga custom and costume. He celebrated the coronation ceremony putting on a Naga robe.⁴ The Nagas (who form a community entirely different from the ruling clan) at last found to their great delight a king of their own.

But authorities are not unanimous regarding the parentage of Gharib Niwaz. British writers⁵ have identified him as the son of a Naga. There are many stories regarding the early life of Pamheiba current in the hills and plains of Manipur. According to a very popular anecdote he was really the son of King Charairongba borne by one of the queens, Nungshel Chaibi. A strong custom prevalent up to that time in the royal family of Manipur would not allow any son of the king borne except by the Chief queen to survive.⁶ This was intended to prevent fratricidal war amongst the princes. Nungshel Chaibi, not being the chief queen wanted to save her son from this cruel custom. In due course when the child was born she secretly sent him to the house of a Naga Chief in Laisangkong, a village situated in the south of the Imphal Valley. The king was informed that the queen had given birth to a stone.⁷ Pamheiba's royal birth is also corroborated by another story⁸ giving a different version. When the prince was in his mother's womb, the king one day consulted his astrologer regarding the fate of the child, who it was told, would be a parricide. Hence the king ordered the child to be murdered immediately after birth. The queen on hearing this terrible order secretly shifted the child after birth to the house of the above mentioned Naga Chief, with the help of her father. The king was told of the birth of a stone (instead of a male child). When Pamheiba was four years old the chief queen heard of his existence and sent secretly assassins to kill him. The boy's maternal grand-father escaped with him to the Thangal Village inhabited by the Quiron tribe of the Nagas. In the meantime many years passed away, but king Charairongba had no other son. The father in him was longing for a son. Once he with his retinue visited the Thangal village for collection of taxes and was accorded suitable reception by his subjects. While staying in that village he noticed a very beautiful boy in the company of other boys of the village. He expressed his desire to adopt him. The villagers willingly consented to the wish of the king. Forsaken at the time of birth, Pamheiba was thus restored to the palace again. When the boy grew up into manhood the king proposed to Haobam Selungba, a member of his councils to give his daughter in marriage with Pamheiba. Selungba fell in a dilemma. He was not willing to give his daughter to a person of unknown parentage but at the same time was afraid to refuse the king. At this time Pamheiba's mother somehow came to

know of the situation, and one day disclosed the identity of the prince both to Selungba and the king. The king was much pleased to hear it and Selungba also after that could have no objection to give his daughter to Pamheiba. Another version concludes the same story in a different way. Many years passed since the birth of Pamheiba none of the queens showed any expectation of child birth. "The Raja was unaware up to this time of the existence of Pamheiba, although he had a suspicion of the fact. He made a declaration before all his wives that if any of them had concealed a male child, they should be freely forgiven, and the child made his heir. The mother of Pamheiba promised to make enquiries if the Raja promised that no harm should befall the child. On his doing so she confessed the existence of Pamheiba. The boy was sent for and acknowledged by the Raja and people as the son of Charairongba." * Afterwards when Pamheiba ascended the throne he assumed the title of "Gharib Niwaz".

The word "Gharib Niwaz" has been derived by the writer of Bijoy Punchalle as "Karigumba Nawa" which means the assumption of the throne by a prince who was once lost.¹⁰ This interpretation if accepted, also suggests the royal parentage of Pamheiba. But Khongnangthaba refused to recognise Pamheiba as Kshatriya and proclaimed him of a Naga descent.¹¹ His denunciation of Pamheiba's royal parentage may not be taken as authentic because he was a strong opponent of the changes made by Pamheiba in religious matters. Shantidas Adhikari a Vaishnava missionary and preceptor of the king confirmed that Pamheiba undoubtedly belonged to the royal family of Manipur, in the veins of which is flowing the blood of the third Pandava Arjun, one of the heroes of the Mahabharata.¹² To prove one's parentage, specially after a gap of long two centuries is an intricate task. There are instances in history of powerful kings claiming noble descent. The Rajput princes trace their origin from Lakshmana, the younger brother of Rama. Shivaji at the time of his coronation traced his connection on the father's side from the Ranas of Udepur, a claim which found ready support of the Pundit's enjoying his favour. The only strong point in favour of Pamheiba's royal origin is that he was recognised by the ruling clan as their king. Had he really been a Naga boy his succession, would not have gone unchallenged.

Bijoy Punchalle records the rise of a particular Naga community of the south called the Too-sook during the end of Charairongba's rule. The rebels led by Lalamba proceeded up to Kharanin. All the officers of the king were successively defeated by the Nagas. At this crucial hour the king disregarding the forewarning of the astrologer, himself led his forces against the rebels. An intrigue was already afoot within the royal

family. Selungba, the father-in-law of Pamheiba, always had an apprehension, lest the king at the counsel of other queens and partisans should change his mind regarding the succession of Pamheiba. He got his son-in-law interested in the plot. Too-sook rebellion might not have been engineered by Selungba but it undoubtedly gave him an opportunity for his design. The King completely defeated the Too-sooks and killed Lalamba. After the battle while he was resting on the bank of the Nambul river a thunder fell with terrific sound within close proximity. Tired as he was he fell fainted. Selungba saw his chance and thrust his spear on the person of the king. The king was mortally wounded but did not succumb then and there. When he regained consciousness, his body-guards told him about the act of Selungba. He was quick to understand the motive. But it was too late. Death was fast approaching. He called in Pamheiba by his side, cursed him for his misdeed and then handed over to him the royal insignia. Before he breathed his last Charairongba entrusted upon his son the task of taking revenge upon Taningangwe,¹³ the ruler of Burma of Toungoo dynasty (1714-1733)¹⁴ for his maltreatment to his wife Makhaobhangbe, the younger sister of Pamheiba.¹⁵ T. C. Hodson heard a different story about the death of Charairongba. "He was killed by a poisoned arrow while in fighting a tribe to the south called Too-sook upon which Pamheiba, better known by his Hindoo name of Gharib Niwaz ascended the guddee".¹⁶ Dr. Brown gives the following version of the facts as given to him, "In that year (1714) Pamheiba who appears to have been a Naga boy brought up and adopted by the Raja Churai Romba, shot his adopted father, it is said accidentally, whilst hunting and succeeded him".¹⁷

Pamheiba ascended the throne and assumed the title of Gharib Niwaz. All Naga chiefs were invited at the coronation ceremony. The Ministers and Sirdars of Manipur received the Naga chiefs, made friendship and intimacy with them. The Raja entertained the Naga Chiefs with good feasts and wine.¹⁸ Outside Manipur the title Gharib Niwaz became more popular than the real name. 'Gharib Niwaz' derived from "Karigumba Nawa", meaning lost prince ascending the throne, does not offer a satisfactory cause for its being chosen as a title by the king like Pamheiba. The above meaning only signifies the game of fate. It speaks neither the glory nor suggests any ideal of the owner. On the other hand there is no reason to rule out its source from Persian. In Persian Gharib Niwaz means kind to the poor. In the beginning of the 18th Century, when the major portion of Eastern India was still under Muslim domination percolation of a Persian word Gharib Niwaz into Manipur through the hills and becom-

ing favourite of her powerful king is not at all an impossibility. For even to-day long after Muslim rule, the Muslim titles like Dewan, Munshi, Mazumdar, Bahadur, etc., are found very common among the aristocrats of the neighbouring states both Hindus and Muslims alike. In the history of ancient India it is found that centuries after the disappearance of Archæmenian Empire of Persia assumption of the Persian title " Satrap " used to be considered as a matter of pride by non-Persian rulers of Western India. Just as in spite of being a separate state, Manipur was not free from the influence of Vaishnavic movement in India, similarly the influence of Islamic civilization might not have left her completely untouched. In the year 1667 the eastern boundary of the Mughal empire under the generalship of Mirjumla extended as far as the Darrang District in Assam. Sylhet and part of Cachar District continued to be ruled by Muslim Amirs appointed by the Nawab of Dacca till 1765 A.D. Muslim traders, artisans and labourers began to enter into Manipur long before the time of Gharib Niwaz. In " The Background of Assamese Culture " Mr. R. M. Nath writes " Gopal Singh ascended the throne of Manipur in 1709 A.D. at the age of 20 and assumed the surname Gharib Niwaz, a honorific epithet given to him by the Emperor of Delhi ".¹⁹ But he could not give any clue to the source of this information. Whatever it may be through religion and commerce Manipur undoubtedly maintained connections with the neighbouring Muslim provinces at the time of Gharib Niwaz. Hence there can be little doubt that the word Gharib Niwaz used by Pamheiba belongs to the Persian vocabulary.

The relation between Burma and Manipur used to remain far from friendly most of the time. The Burmese army ravaged Manipur times without number. Our first record of those invasions goes back to 1562 A.D.²⁰ when Bayinnaung, the most powerful ruler of the Toungoo Dynasty, reduced Manipur to a tributary State.²¹ But subsequently she asserted her independence and even made occasional raids on the Burmese territory. There were truces also which were followed by matrimonial alliances. Perhaps one such matrimonial alliance took place during the time of Charairongba. But that it was not a very happy one, has already been noticed. In the year 1725 Gharib Niwaz was able to make the first of his series of raids against the Kingdom of Burma. He attacked and defeated a Burmese force at the mouth of the Haglung river. In the following year the Burmese tried to retaliate. An army of 30,000 men penetrated into the valley, but were finally repulsed. Three entire Divisions were captured by the forces of Manipur.²² Tanninganwe (1714-33), the king of Burma, expressed his desire to make peace. Mahanta Bakridas, a disciple of the

Vaishnava Missionary Shantidas, was sent to the Burmese court as plenipotentiary to the king of Manipur. Tanninganwé, defeated though he was, expressed his desire to have the princess Satyamala, the daughter of Gharib Niwaz as his wife. Gharib Niwaz felt offended but kept up appearances. The Burmese king was informed that Satyamala would be presented to him three days after the spring festival (Basanta Panchami). Quite ignorant of the real design of the king of Manipur Tanninganwe made all preparations for the ensuing marriage ceremony. Instead of the bride's party the army of Manipur suddenly fell upon the royal camp and made a terrible massacre.²³ In the year 1735 Gharib Niwaz, crossed the Ningthee river, attacked and destroyed the town of Myedoo, on the bank of the Moo river and carried numerous captives. During the subsequent two years he defeated two Burmese armies amounting to 7,000 foot, 700 horse and 20 elephants and devastated the whole country from the bank of the Khondoung Khyoung to Deebayean. In the year 1738, he again crossed the Ningthee river, attacked and dispersed the Burmese army of 15,000 foot, 3,000 horse and 30 elephants. In the same year after the rainy season "Gharib Niwaz at the head of 20,000 men marched between the Burmese army, 3 Divisions of which occupied the towns of Mutseng, Deebayen and Myedoo and to use the language of the Burmese historian 'without stopping' attacked and carried the stockaded positions around the ancient capital of Zakaing, of which he obtained possession.* Religious fanaticism appears to have stimulated the Muneepoorees to this last act of successful daring; for the Burmese Chronicles record the name of a Brahmin, who is said to have assured them, that they would be preserved from all evil by drinking and bathing in the water of the Irrawattée river at Sagaing." ²⁴

During these years the Toungoo Dynasty was represented by two weak kings Tanninganwe (1714-33) and Mahadamma Yaza Diputi (1733-1752). These kings rarely left the capital; surrounded by all the jealousies and intrigues of harem life they became practically palace prisoners. Law and order was practically non-existent in the dominions. Adventurers were always ready to throw off their allegiance and make profit out of the situation. At the time of Bayinnanng's reign lower Burma was devastated by the exodus of thousands of mons. The weakness of the Ava kingship was so obvious that there was bound to come a time when the mons would dream of restoring the old kingdom of Pegu.²⁵

* The old door of the Eastern entrance to the Kaunghmudaw Pagoda still bears marks said to have been made by the sword of Gharib Niwaz as he forced his way into slaughter its garrison (Burma—Hall, p. 75).

Gharib Niwaz, the ruler of the trans Chindwing State of Manipur must have been aware of the condition of his neighbour and laid bare the weakness of Ava. In 1739 he added it is said, by the Cacharees invaded Ava with a force of 20,000 men, but failed to capture a stockaded Burnese post at Myedoo. He suffered a heavy loss and was deserted by his allies.²⁶

Bijoy Punchalee records that taking advantage of the commitments of the king of Manipur in Burma a Tripuri king invaded Manipur from the West and advanced as far as Mourang in the year 1739. Safety of the country was foremost in Gharib Niwaz's mind. So it was considered unwise to maintain two fronts. He concluded peace with the Burnese king offering his daughter Satyamala and hurried back to Manipur.²⁷ Tripuri forces were, of course, easily driven out. But he remained inactive on the Eastern Frontier until 1749 A.D.²⁸

After a long gap of ten years in 1749 Gharib Niwaz again crossed the Ningthee river with 2,000 men and 3,000 horses, encamped "near the confluence of the Kyendwen and Irrawattce rivers", waiting for a favourable opportunity to cross the Irrawattce and make an attack on the capital Ava. The Burnese king also mustered all his forces to oppose him. Just at this time a trifling incident caused Gharib Niwaz to change his mind. One night his standard was blown down. Taking it to be a bad omen he preferred to make peace. On his return journey he was harassed by the Koe tribe near the Moo river. On reaching the mouth of the Maglung river he was met by Ajit Shah alias Kakeelalthaba and was rebuked by him for the unsuccessful termination of his expedition. These remonstrances produced so strong a feeling of disaffection among the troops, that Gharib Niwaz was deserted by all but 500 men. With them he went back to Ava, this time soliciting help from the Burnese king against his rebellious son. He resided for a short time at Tseengam and gave another daughter in marriage to Taningauwe. But no help could be given to the rise of the Peguers in the south. He stayed there until Ava was destroyed by the rebel Peguers. Finding no help in Burma he made an attempt to re-enter Manipur. At the mouth of the Maglung river, he was met by the emissaries of Ajit Shah and was cruelly murdered together with his eldest son Sham Shah and all the principal men of the court who followed Gharib Niwaz.²⁹

Bijoy Punchalee gives a slightly different version of the death. Gharib Niwaz had two queens. By the eldest queen he had a son called Shyam Shah. Shyam Shah had two sons—Gour Shah and Jai Singh. By the second wife he had six sons, Ajit Shah, Nun Shah,

Tong Shah, Sarbosachee, Bharat Shah and Shatrughna Shah.³⁰ By this time the old custom of allowing only the sons of the Chief Queen to survive had been abolished.³¹ Once Gharib Niwaz at the request of his younger queen nominated Ajit Shah as his successor superseding the eldest son Shyam Shah. While he had been to Burma for the last time and concluded peace with the Burmese ruler, a rumour spread in Manipur that Gharib Niwaz had changed his mind in favour of Shyam Shah regarding the succession to the throne. On hearing this, Ajit at the instance of his mother sent a force to Burma under an officer Tolentomba. Tolentomba implored the old king to come back to Manipur. He agreed and proceeded along with him. At that time Shyam Shah, Santidas, the Vaishnava preacher and 17 other of his followers were in his party. On the way, they were treacherously murdered at the instance of Tolentomba.

As a king Gharib Niwaz's energy was not completely used up in the expeditions against Burma. The images of Ramji and Hanumanji were installed by him in two separate temples of which that of Hanumanji was made of brick. Of his other philanthropic acts mention may be made of the construction of the Ningthem Pukhri (tank) at Wangkhei Leikai.³² The dimensions of the tank reflect to some extent the greatness of the king. Among the literary activities it is mentioned that Bijoy Panchalee was rewritten by Dwija Sita Ram Sarma, a chronicler in the court of Gharib Niwaz.³³

Almost all the accounts of Manipur refer to the spread of Brahmanical Vaishnavism in wide scale in Manipur under the royal patronage of Gharib Niwaz. Baptized by the Vaishnava missionary, Shantidas Adhikary, he declared Vaishnavism as the State religion and advised his subjects to accept it. In view of the rapid progress of Vaishnavism, the champion of the old faith, Khongnangthaba with his followers tried to stem the tide. The account of this event given by the local historians ends with a tragic conclusion. The king enraged by the opposition, ordered all the scriptures of the old religion to be burnt. Manipur to-day is thus deprived of her valuable religious and historical literatures of old—by religious fanaticism of the king.³⁴

The association of Gharib Niwaz with Brahmin Vaishnava missionaries has been revealed to us by Lieut. Colonel Burney, from the original Burmese sources. Gharib Niwaz's devotion to lord Rama is proved by his perpetuation of the image of Rama. All these informations suggest Gharib Niwaz's acceptance of Vaishnavic faith. But so far no evidence has been found regarding the burning of old scriptures and suppression of the old faith. In this connection it may be pointed out that human civilization has no record of any such religious

order dictated by the monarch and accepted by the masses. Ajatsatru, for example, tried in vain to efface Buddhism from Magadha. Emperor Asoka employed all his resources for the propagation of Buddhism. Hinduism, Jainism, Ajivikas and other religious sects still continued to flourish within his empire. In later periods attempts of the Muslim and Christian rulers failed to convert whole of India into their respective faiths. Though China and Japan accepted Buddhism, the followers of Laotse, Confucius and Shintoism are not few in those countries. All the churches have not been closed down under the anti-religious government of modern Russia. Exception is not found in Manipur also. Ancient gods and customs are also being duly attended to side by side with Vaishnavism. The temples of Thangjing at Moirang and Sena-meih at Imphal show that the old faith is not dead. Maibas and Maibies in every village are still regulating the old customs and performing the old rites. The rapturous feeling noticed in the community dance of annual festivals like Chirouba amply testify that the old faith is not only alive but going strong. Brahmanical Vaishnavism also has failed to vivisection the Manipuri society into water-tight compartments of rigid caste system.

Gharib Niwaz entering into the Ramanandi order of Vaishnavism through Shantidas, must have patronised this new faith to spread among his subjects. Later on when the school of Gauranga Mahaprabhu was introduced Ramanandi school did not vanish altogether.

The temple of Ramji and the custom of putting on a special white turban by the Manipuris on ceremonial occasions indicate even to-day the influence of Ramanandi cult.

Nothing is known about the life of Vaishnava Missionary Mahanta Shantidas Adhikary (Goswami) before his arrival in Manipur. Local accounts refer to his arrival from Sylhet.³³ He might have entered Manipur from Sylhet side, but there is very little probability of his belonging to Sylhet. After the advent of Shri Chaitanya Mahaprabhu in Bengal Ramananda had few followers on this side. Specially Sylhet being the ancestral home of Shri Chaitanya undoubtedly came under the magical influence of that great personality. Lord Rama did not gain popularity in Bengal at any time. Whereas the centre of Ramananda cult was at Banaras and Lord Rama is still sovereign in the heart of the people of Northern India. Hence there are reasonable grounds to hesitate in coming to the conclusion that Shantidas came from Sylhet or any part of Bengal. However the rapid diffusion of Ramananda cult in Manipur speaks of Shantidas Adhikary's high spiritual attainments.

It is difficult to believe the elevation of Vaishnavism to the Status of State religion, purely due to the will of the monarch. In the historical period, politically Manipur was more in touch with Burma than with Cachar, Sylhet, Tripura and Assam. Shortly after the death of Gharib Niwaz, Burmese army entered and conquered Manipur (1758-A.D.). From 1758 A.D. to 1826 A.D. within this period of 68 years Manipur was over run and dominated by the Burmese, times without number. They must have tried to force their religion upon the people they conquered. An image of Buddha found in Manipur was probably imported during this period. In spite of it Manipur did not accept Buddhism. Early association of Gharib Niwaz with the Nagas won for him a deep regard from that community. But his new religion had no influence upon the Nagas. On the other hand the Non-Nagas became out and out Vaishnavas. Hence it is difficult to accept the version that Gharib Niwaz at the instance of Shantidas burnt all the scriptures of old religion to make Vaishnavism acceptable to the Manipuris.

In connection with the spread of Vaishnavism in Manipur at the time of Gharib Niwaz a brief retracement of the history of Vaishnavism will further clarify the proposed contention. Vaishnavism, though it began to come to the lime-light in the modern period since the exposition of qualified monism by Ramanuja in the middle of the 11th century A.D. Still it is not a new idea originated from him. The cult of Bhakti (devotion) is found in Indian religion even in the remote past. Its earliest form is known as "Atkantika Dharma". The Gita serves for its philosophical basis. Vasudeva Krishna turned the attention of his followers from the dry and complete ritualism of the Vedas to the path of love and devotion. But even in the days of the Mahabharata sectarianism crept into this school and we come across different communities like 'Narayani', 'Pancharatra', 'Satta' etc. following the ideal of 'Bhakti'. The Greek ambassador Megasthenes noticed the existence of such religious communities in the 4th century B.C. In course of time Vaishnavism arose out of the Union of the two sects, 'Narayani' and the worshippers of Vishnu. This Vaishnavism could not only survive through the palmy days of Buddhism in India during the periods of Asoka and Kanishka but also succeeded in enlisting foreign converts. Heliodoros, a Greek envoy of Antialkidas, king of Taxila to the court of a Sunga ruler Bhagabhadra professed the Bhagavata religion and set up a Garuda column at Besnagar in honour of Vasudeva—in the second century B. C. In the 5th century A. D. the Gupta rulers used to assume the title of 'Parama Bhagabata'. After the death of Harshabardhana, Aditya Sena, one of the later Gupta

rulers of Magadha established a Vishnu temple at Gaya. In the 9th century A.D. Shankaracharya, the great exponent of Vedantic 'Advaitism', pointed out the philosophical hollowness of Buddhism. According to him the Universe instead of resting upon nothingness (suggested by the Buddhist philosophers), is in fact a superimposition on the Supreme Being, which is beyond all determination and who can be approached only through pure knowledge. In the 12th century Ramanuja attributing qualities to that Supreme Being infused new blood in the old but thin stream of Vaishnavism. Ramanuja's God can be approached through devotion (Bhakti). According to him God is the nearest and dearest friend of men. There is no scope for emotion either in Buddhism or in the Advaitism of Shankara. Human emotion so long did not find any approach to God. Qualified Monism of Ramanuja opened its gate to words God. In the wake of Ramanuja there followed Nimibarka, Madhvacharya and Ramananda. All of them were exponents of Vaishnavism. Ramananda (15th century A.D.) for the first time conceived Rama and Sita combined, as the dual incarnation of Vishnu. He preached his Sita Rama' among all classes of people including muslims. His muslim disciple Kafir preached that there is no difference between Ram and Rahim.

Vallabhacharya (1179 A.D.) was an important preacher of Krishna. According to him Radha was the chief disciple of Krishna and the ideal, before the Vaishnava devotees. But some sections of the Vaishnavas failing to realise the inner meaning, degraded themselves in imitating the apparent relationship between Krishna and Radha. Instead of celibacy and sacrifice they plunged into sensual pleasure in the name of religion. In the 19th century Narayan Swami tried to rectify this perversion.

Contemporary of Vallabhacharya was Chaitanya (1179 A.D.). He also preached his God Krishna to all classes of people. Lord Krishna can be obtained, in his opinion, only through pure devotion and love. Radha resides in the heart saturated with intense love for Krishna. She has no material existence. The father of Chaitanya, his maternal grand-father and some of his chief disciples came from Sylhet. Even before the birth of Chaitanya, Sylhet was an important centre of Vaishnavism. Vaishnavism spread in Assam also, under the spell of Shankar Deva (1449-1569 A.D.).

There was no royal support behind this Vaishnavic movement,—which influenced the Indian masses from the 11th century A.D. to the 16th century A.D. India was at that time ruled by the Muslim Kings who were interested in preaching Islam only. The Vaishnava missionaries everywhere preached their ideal only through love. Charges*

like burning of others' canon or desicrating other's temples have not been heard so far against the Vaishnavas even from their direct enemies. On the otherhand the history of Vaishnavism is shining with instances of bestowing love even to its enemies. It is quite probable that the waves of the Indian Vaishnavic movement began to reach Manipur from at least the 15th century onward.

The ideal of love adorned by the Manipuris in their popular anecdotes 'Nompok Ningthou' and 'Panthoibi', 'Khamba and Thoibi' found support in Vaishnavism. The legend of Arjuna's marriage with Chitrangada, Princess of Manipur, must have served a good background for the introduction of new Vaishnavism. Charairoughba, the father of Pamheiba established a temple of Radha Krishna even before the coming of Shantidas, an earlier king Khagemba established a Vishnu temple at Vishnupur.

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A CRITICAL STUDY OF SVAYAMVARA FORM OF MARRIAGE

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The number of forms of marriage of the Hindus in ancient India offers an interesting subject of study. The present discussion will show that the writers on law of ancient India intentionally or otherwise have omitted the name of Svayamvara marriage, which in our opinion is worthy of being ranked as an independent form of marriage.

Manu, one of the oldest of the lawmakers in India has mentioned eight forms of marriage as Brāhma, Daiva, Ārsa, Prājāpatya, Āsura, Gāndharva, Rākṣasa and Paisāca.¹ No other writer of law in ancient India has named a new form besides the eight already defined by Manu. It is far more interesting that neither of the digest writers on the subject, has initiated any discussion on the point. One scanty reference, however, is available from Mitramiśra who in his Viramitrodaya commentary on Yājñavalkya,² has expressed the opinion that Svayamvara form of marriage is not different from the Gāndharva form. The silence on the part of the writer of the epic Mahābhārata can scarcely be excused for the simple fact that the epic is full of references of Svayamvara form of marriage among the Kṣatriya princes. Mitramiśra's explanation cannot be accepted in view of the fact that in Gāndharva form of marriage both the parties—the groom and the bride have pre-nuptial love-making and the marriage takes place through the initiative of both of them.³ In the Svayamvara marriage on the other hand the girl exercises her power of choice of the groom, who has practically no say in their marriage.

The Svayamvara form of marriage is as old as the Rgveda, where we meet with references of the same. It is stated in the Rgveda that girls selected their partners of life.⁴ That the line of the Rgveda quoted below refers to actual Svayamvara assemblies, as we find in the epic, is clear from the explanation offered by Sāyana on the line mentioned. The story of Vinada and Ghosū as available in the Rgveda may be cited in this connection. Kamadyu, the daughter of king Purumitra was married to Vinada, and it is said that the Āśvinas conveyed her in their chariot to

¹ Brāhma daivastathaivārṣaḥ prājāpatyastathāśuraḥ
Gāndharvo rākṣasaiva paisācascāṣṭamodhamah.
Manu Samhitā. Chap. III. 21.

² Yājñavalkya Samhitā 1/61, on which Mitramiśra says –
'Evañca Svayamvaropi Gāndharva eva'.

³ Ichhayānyonyasamyogah kanyāyāśca varasya ca.
Gāndharvaḥ sa tu vijñeyo maithunyaḥ kāmasesanibhavaḥ.
Manu Samhitā, Chap. III/92.

⁴ Bhadrā vadhūr bhavati yat supesāḥ svayam sā mitramiśraḥ banute janaḥ.
Rv. X. 27 112.

her husband.⁵ Sāyana (on Rv. 1. 116. 1.) has narrated the story in details. According to him, Kamadyu chose the sage Vimada for her husband in a Svayamvara assembly held for the purpose. As Vimada was returning home with the bride, he was attacked on the way by the disappointed persons who had been suitors for the princess. The Aśvinas helped Vimada in the skirmish and taking up the bride in the chariot, conveyed her to her husband's home.⁶

The problem of the origin of this form is interesting. The prevalence of Gāndharva form of marriage which we find equally in the Rgveda and the Mahābhārata, offered the girls full scope for free and independent mixing with their lovers. This necessarily resulted in open exchange of hearts, and there was no fault if girls under the circumstances refused to marry a man other than that of their choice. The case of Rukmiṇī may be of interest in this connection. Her father and brother settled her marriage with King Śiśupāla, who was invited to their house but Rukmiṇī did not like the groom. She herself sent a messenger for Kṛṣṇa and married him.

From the Mahābhārata we learn that even if a girl was carried away forcibly from the Svayamvara assembly and cases like these would occur every now and then, she could not be married except without her consent. Thus Bhīṣma could not get Ambā married with his brother against her will, though she was forcibly carried away from the Svayamvara assembly. Her argument was that she had mentally selected Saubharāja Śālva, who had reciprocated the same, and it was interesting that Bhīṣma had to honour her sentiment by releasing her.⁷ Manu even allowed girls to exercise the amount of choice under certain conditions.⁸ This discretionary privilege of the girls ultimately were utilised by them to such a degree that they did not hesitate to remain unmarried throughout their career if they could not procure a husband of their choice. The Mahābhārata records the story of the daughter of Kunigarga, who remained a virgin throughout her whole life, because she could not give consent to the marriage with a person selected by her father.⁹ The Buddhist story of Sumedhā also may be cited in this connection. We learn that only for her disapproval, Sumedhā's marriage with a king could not take place, though he was selected by her father and approved by her relatives. Similarly we are acquainted with the story of Gopā, who was approached by many wooers after the retirement of Lord Buddha. Marriage could not be solemnised only because she did not like the idea.

When consent on the part of girls with respect to their marriage, began to play a vital part, there arose in society a situation where girls indulged in marriage incidents after marriage—a state of society, which reminds one of the prevailing condition of poliandry. The Mahābhārata records the story of Yayāti's beautiful daughter Mādhavī, who married four times one

⁵ Yuvān rathena Vimadāya Śuindhyvān nyubathuḥ Purumitraṣya yojanam. Rv. X. 39. 7.

⁶ Vide Sāyana's Commentary on Rv. 1. 116. 1.

⁷ Vide Mahābhārata, Ādi Parva, Chap. 102/56-59.

⁸ Kanyāyām dattaśulkāyām mṛiyeta yadi śulkaḥ.

Devatāya pradātavyā yadi kanyānumanyate.

Manu IX/97.

⁹ Mahābhārata, Śalya parva, 58/7-8.

after another and had procured issues from respective husbands. She divorced in each case her previous husband, and it was interesting that none hesitated to marry her, in spite of the fact that she was married and had her issues. When she rejected her last sage-husband, her father and brother became eager to arrange for a Svayamvara marriage for her but she did not agree and retired to the forest.¹⁰ This may help us to arrive at the conclusion that once when the ladies attained the new right of selecting their husbands after being free from the tutelage of their father and guardians, they felt a strong tendency to utilise that newly earned right, and presently we will notice here how the lawmakers gradually had to make laws newer and newer according as the situation rightly demanded.

Of the various forms of Svayamvara form of marriage, the most common and ordinary type can be noticed from the directions of the Smṛti texts. In ancient India father or legal guardian of the girls exercised absolute power so far as her betrothal was concerned. But along with the rights thus allowed, a father was charged with responsibilities of giving her away to a worthy person in time. Failure on the part of father to comply with the directions of Smṛti texts was penalised heavily. Thus in the Rājanārtanda it has been prescribed that in case of father's failure to get his daughter married before her twelfth year, he is to drink the menstrual flow of the daughter in each month.¹¹ Yama and Aṅgirā harp on the same tune.¹² This was binding not only on the father of the girl but on any other legal guardian.¹³ On the one hand the father of such a girl incurred sin, while on the other hand he was bound to lose his control over the girl because he stood as bar to her begetting an issue in proper time.¹⁴ It may be one of the reasons of non-recognition of the type of marriage as one of the forms, as has been suggested by Dr. Ludwick Sternback.¹⁵ The heaviness of penalty should under no circumstances be regarded as laudatory (Arthavāda) as one may suggest, but this is evident in the Mahābhārata, where father of such a girl is seen to submit humbly to the dictations of legal texts. When Sāvitrī approached her father on the issue of her marriage, he retorted in clear terms that on the basis of ancient legal texts she was at liberty to seek her husband for herself.¹⁶ He further added that a father is to be condemned if he cannot give his daughter in marriage in time.¹⁷

This was with reference to the fathers. And what about such girls? It is far more interesting. A girl who was not married before the attainment of puberty has been permitted by Manu to wait for three years after that puberty period and then to select her own groom independently.¹⁸ Support-

¹⁰ Vide Mahābhārata Udyogaparva, Chaps. 115-120.

¹¹ Samprāpte dvādaśe varṣe kanyāṁ yo no prayacchatī
Māsi māsi rayas tasyāḥ pitā pibatiṣṭhitam. Quoted in Udvāhatatvam, p. 107.

¹² Ibid., p. 107.

¹³ Viṣṇu, Chap. XXIV, pp. 38-39.

¹⁴ 'Sa hi svāmyād atikramed pūnāmpratirodhanāt,—Manu Samhitā, Chap. IX/93 p. 93.

¹⁵ Vide Bhāratīya vidyā, Vol. XII, 1951, p. 96

¹⁶ 'Bharturapveṣaṇe tvare'—Bānāparva—Mahābhārata 293/36.

¹⁷ Apradātā pitā vācyaḥ—Ibid. 293/35.

¹⁸ IX/90.

ing statements are available from the Mahābhārata,¹⁹ Gautama Dharmasūtra²⁰ and Vishṇu Smṛitī.²¹ Backed by such strong directions from the ancient lawmakers the girls hesitated not for a moment to make best use of this power. The story of Sāvitrī shows how she travelled by a finely decorated chariot to find out a husband worthy of in all respects and after finding beautiful Satyabān selected him as her groom.²² This is the oldest type of Svayamvara of the Smṛtis.

In this connection, however, some sort of difference of opinion prevailed regarding the time-limit up to which a girl should wait after reaching puberty. Manu,²³ and Baudhāyana²⁴ specified the time to be three years (trīnibarṣānvudikṣeta). Viṣṇu²⁵ and Gautama²⁶ are in favour of prescribing three monthly periods (Rtus) in place of three years. On the problem, the opinion of Dr. Sternbach may be quoted. He says—"The first duty of the young couple was to bear children. Therefore, immediately after the monthly period (Rtugamana) coitus had to take place. This was of great importance for the marriage and therefore the space of time of three monthly periods was completely sufficient, only with great liberality was it possible for the later commentators to extend this period."²⁷

Now this type of freedom on the part of girls could not be looked up with ease by the orthodox writers and Manu's direction in this reference is a bit confusing. He says that a girl indulging in this type of marriage should not be entitled to take with her ornaments given previously by her father, brother or mother. If she takes, she must be charged with theft.²⁸ Manu has been supported by Gautama.²⁹ Yājñavalkya³⁰ has enunciated a list of persons who are to be deemed of as legal guardians of girls. A girl can resort to Svayamvara only when all of them are absent.³¹

Nārada tried to restrict the power of the maidens to a certain extent. According to him such a maiden in the absence of all givers should report the matter to the king and may select the groom herself through the permission of the king. Whatever may be the case, there is no denying the fact that girls were permitted under certain circumstances to select for themselves their husbands.

The next stage of Svayamvara can be marked in the condition of society in which fathers realising the seriousness of the situation arising out of legal licence, arranged the whole show of Svayamvara assembly wherefrom girls selected their husbands for themselves. Svayamvara of Kuntī falls at this stage. Kuntī in the assembly selected Pāṇḍu and he

¹⁹ Anu., p. 44/16.

²⁰ Chap. XVIII.

²¹ Chap. XXIV, 40.

²² Satyabānanurūpo me bharteti manasā vṛtaḥ—Mahābhārata—Bhanuparva, 290/10.

²³ X/90. ²⁴ IV, I, 14. ²⁵ XXIV—40, ²⁶ XVIII—20.

²⁷ Vide his article on Hindu Marriage in Bhāratīya vidya.

²⁸ Manu, Chap. IX, 92.

²⁹ Gau. Dh. Sū, Chap. XVIII.

³⁰ 1/69. Gamyam Avabhāve dātṛnām Kanyā Kuryāt Svayamvaran...Yāj, 1/64.

³¹ Yadā tu naiva kaścit syāt Kanyā rājānam āśrayet.

Arājñayā varam tasya parikṣya varayet svayam.—Quoted in Vṛtramitrodaya commentary on Y. Sam. 1/64.

father approved of the marriage and had it done under his care.³² Indumatī's Svayamvara as described by Kālidāsa, in his *Raghuvamśam*, should be classified under this category. Here in these instances, we notice that father tried to accommodate and respect the will of the girl as far as possible.

The third variety of Svayamvara is interesting. Here we mark a tendency on the part of Kṣatriya fathers to arrange for a Svayamvara for their girls but they wisely left less scope for them regarding selfchoice of the groom. Here fathers arranged for the assemblage of variant princes and placed before them certain conditions, by fulfilment of which a prince could marry the daughters of the king concerned. Here again fathers dominated the whole show and their daughters had nothing to do except choosing as groom the person who could fulfil the condition laid down by their fathers. Draupadī's Svayamvara represents this stage. King Drupada announced that a person who could pierce the mark by stringing the bow in proper way, would be able to marry his daughter Draupadī in the Svayamvara assembly. Arjuna amongst all the princes assembled for the purpose was successful in fulfilling the condition, and Draupadī was given away to him as a natural consequence. In this connection mention may be made of the marriage of Sītā, which is generally stated to be performed according to Svayamvara form of marriage. Actually speaking it was by no means a case of Svayamvara marriage. King Janaka declared his daughter Sītā as Viryaśulka and promised that anyone who could break the bow,³³ received from Śiva would get Sītā. Thus it was said about Rāma by Janaka that Rāma would be able to get Sītā as wife if he was able to perform that valorous act.³⁴ Viśvamitra asked Rāma to see the particulars of the bow, and Rāma easily became able to break the bow. Daśaratha was immediately reported of the heroic deeds of his valorous son, and he came and asked for Sītā as Rāma's wife to Janaka. Janaka fulfilled the promise, and Sītā was given away to Rāma in accordance with the religious directions. Here we notice that Sītā had nothing to do for herself in her marriage, the entire part in this connection being played by Janaka.

But when Dr. P. V. Kane says that 'the Svayamvara of Sītā or Draupadī did not depend upon the will of the bride, but the bride was to be given in marriage to whomsoever showed a certain skill as a warrior', his statement should be taken as a general one. It must be noted here that the word Svayamvara can under no circumstances be associated with the marriage of Sītā. On the one hand no Svayamvara assembly was arranged by Janaka, while on the other hand Sītā had no scope for selecting Rāma as husband. What she did was nothing other than following the directions of her father. Marriage of Draupadī can under no circumstances be equated with that of Sītā. Her marriage was normally arranged in the order of a real Svayamvara, but yet it had some sort of speciality for

³² *Mahābhārata* Adī, 200-18.

³³ *Viryaśulkaḥ me kanyā sthāpīteyamajonjā—Rāmāyaṇa*. Adī. K. 66/15.

³⁴ *Ibid.* Adī. K. 60/26-27.

which it deserves a special study of itself. The story as recorded in the *Mahābhārata* is interesting. After the announcement of king Draupada, several kings tried their best to string the bow for hitting the mark. When almost all kings became ashamed of their failures, Karna went forward to fit the arrow in the bow. In spite of the fact that the king Drupada did not lay any condition regarding the caste and creed of the person trying to show his worth, yet Draupadī, in rather a very surprising position protested that she would not under any circumstances be ready to marry a charioteer's son, if he fulfilled in toto the conditions, laid down by her father.³⁵ It is far more interesting that Karna had to count the insult silently in the presence of the valorous princes, and her father Drupada did not utter a single word regarding this particular behaviour of his daughter. Then Arjuna tried for hitting the mark and when he became successful, Draupadī followed him and placed the garland round his neck.

The story of Draupadī shows clearly how the girls after fully realising their helplessness in the assembly, conducted under the guidance of their father, felt it quite proper to raise a voice of protest against such dealings of their fathers. This further goes to show that fathers under the circumstances were wise enough not to hesitate to honour the sentiment of the girl concerned.

The laying down of condition by fathers took such a position in society of the Kṣatriyas that a king could not think of any other form of marriage except Svayamvara. The Kṣatriya kings invited or uninvited would think it their duty to regard a Svayamvara as a place of showing valours. Not to speak of other kings, even a life-long celibate like Bhīṣma felt it dignified on his part to participate in the Svayamvara of the three girls of the king of Kāśī. When he was reproached by others for such an activity, he boldly retorted that princes admire and resort to Svayamvara.³⁶ The position took a serious turn that for the Kṣatriyas a Svayamvara-sabhā became a regular battle-field where two things did occur. On the one hand a more powerful prince would forcibly take away the girl from such an assembly and on the other hand the selected prince would often had to face the combined attack of all the assembled princes unselected by the bride concerned.

This would create an embarrassing position both for the prince selected as also for the father of the bride concerned. An instance of this first type we find in the story of Bhīṣma already referred to. He simply went to the Svayamvara assembly of the daughter of the king of Kāśī to carry away the girls. His statement reveals that at that time it was almost a settled and accepted convention, on the part of a Kṣatriya prince. Again in the *Mahābhārata*, we hear that Arjuna, when selected by Draupadī was attacked on all sides by Duryodhana and his allies, and fortunately for him, Arjuna could defeat them all.³⁷ It is under this perspective perhaps the

³⁵ *Dṛṣṭvā tu taṁ Draupadī vākyamuccair yagāda nāhaṁ varayāmi sūtaṁ*
Sāmarāhāsaṁ prasamīkṣya sūryaṁ tatvājo karnaḥ sphuritaḥ dhanuṣat.
Mahābhārata Ādi. 181/28.

³⁶ *Svayamvaraṁ tu rājanyāḥ pīṣaṁśantynpāyāntica* (S. I. text), Ādi. p. 109/17

³⁷ *Vide Mahābhārata* Ādi Parva, Chap. 205.

convention grew up in society that a Brāhmaṇa had got no right to be present for being selected in a Svayamvara assembly.³⁸ Thus in the form of a Brāhmin Arjuna had to face criticism from the Kṣatriyas assembled for the purpose. This was quite rational in view of the fact that to participate in the warfare was not in nature of the Brāhmins and thus Kṛṣṇa argued that Svayamvara was meant only for the Kṣatriyas.³⁹

Naturally this condition of society could not remain longer, and it existed in the society as long as the Kṣatriyas were valiant and chivalrous. Moreover, the girls amidst such an assembly felt their helpless position and did not like to be such objects of warfare. We may in the next stage of society imagine the existence of a kind of Svayamvara which may be called so in the strict sense of the term. Damayanti's case may be cited as an illustration. We hear about her case that just after the attainment of youth, her father Bhīma thought it to be the ripe time for performing his duty towards his daughter, in the form of arranging for her Svayamvara.⁴⁰ The princes on hearing of the news, arrived *en masse* and Nala was also encouraged to be present, but there were interruptions on the way by the gods. At last in the assembly Damayanti tactfully managed to select Nala as her husband.⁴¹ The union being a worthy one, was acclaimed by all to their hearts content and fortunately for Damayanti no king stood against Nala. Here we notice that the whole show was arranged by Damayanti's father but in no way he made any interference in respect of selection of the groom by her. That mere selection did not amount to marriage proper is evident once more by the fact that Bhīma had to make necessary arrangement for rites of marriage after the selection was over and when the princes invited were departed.⁴² The description of the Svayamvara of Indumatī as described by Kālidāsa in his Raghuvamśam (Canto VI) is identical in character. His reference to the fact that disappointed kings did not feel any inclination towards causing any disturbances, due to the presence of Sacī⁴³ goes to show that the tradition of fighting in such an assembly did not die out altogether in his time. Julius Jolly has expressed doubt to the extent that it is hardly possible that the bride could follow her inclination in such a festive gathering dominated by her father.⁴⁴ But the description of the Svayamvara of Indumatī as described by Kālidāsa will show that Kṣatriya princesses never hesitated to express the true feeling of their heart. The story of Draupadī will corroborate the conclusion further.

In this connection reference may be made of the story of Svayamvara of Saśikalā, where Svayamvara has been classified as Icchāsvayamvara, Pāpasvayamvara and Sauryaśulka Svayamvara.⁴⁵

³⁸ Na ca vipreṣyadhikāro vidyate varāṇāṃ prati. Svayamvaraḥ Kṣatriyāṇāṃ itīyaṇ prathitā Śrutiḥ Ādi, p. 204/8.

³⁹ Svayamvaraḥ Kṣatriyāṇāṃ vivāhaḥ puruṣarṣabha—Ādi, p. 230/22.

⁴⁰ Vide Vanaparva, 51/8.

⁴¹ Vide Vanaparva, 54/26.

⁴² Vide Vanaparva, 54-44 (S.I. text).

⁴³ Raghuvamśam, VII/8.

⁴⁴ Hindu Law and Custom (tr. by B. K. Ghosh), p. 112, f n.

⁴⁵ Svayamvarastu tribidhaḥ vidvadbhiḥ parikṛtitaḥ.

The story of her Svayamvara marriage is interesting. When her father arranged for the Svayamvara, she informed her mother through her companion that she would select no person other than Sudarśana as her husband.⁴⁶ Though discouraged by her mother, she sent messenger to Sudarśana, who also turned up in the assembly. When again Yodhājit expressed his readiness to kill him, the king of Kerala retorted that in Icchā-svayamvara there is no scope of fighting among the princes. As the girl here independently chooses her groom, a prince other than the selected one is not permitted to carry away the girl forcibly as Bhiṣma did in case of the princess of Kāśī.⁴⁷ The story further records a very important and interesting stage in the development of Svayamvara marriage. Here Śaśikalā on being requested by her father to be present in the Svayamvara assembly, did flatly decline to concede to the request. Her point was that the moment in which a girl enters the assembly, garland in hand with a view to select her husband from amongst the princes present, she becomes a general lady (Sāmānyā) and her status becomes equivalent to that of a harlot. She has further elaborated the proposition by stating that to pass through a host of kings, without being attracted to any one of them, is like the action of a courtesan to accept men without being in love with any one.⁴⁸ She again was not ready to be an object of Panasvayamvara for the same reason that if persons more than one could fulfil the conditions laid down, then an intricate position might arise, as all would claim the girl as wife.⁴⁹ The story of Śaśikalā thus points out to a stage immediately preceding the decaying one, as we find the girls unwilling to be present before the assembly of princes and to be an object of quarrel and fight among them bringing disaster to a happy performance.

As the Svayamvara marriage was primarily a marriage meant for the Kṣatriyas, the system died out perhaps with the loss of valour of the Kṣatriya princes in India as also for the reason that girls gradually felt an inclination towards disapproval of the form of marriage. Last record of this form of marriage is available in the Vikramārkadevacarita (Canto IX) of Bilhana, where we find a description of the historic Svayamvara of Candrakāhā, daughter of Silhara, prince of Karahata (modern Karad) where she chose Ahavamalla or Vikramārka, the Chōlukya king of Kalyāna (latter half of 11th century).

Rājñān vivāhavogyo vai nānye, ān lathitah kula
Icchāsvayamvar: śaiko dvitīyaśca paṇabhidhah
Yathā Rāmēna bhagnān vai tvamabaleśya Sarasanam.
Tṛtīyah Suryakulkañca Smānān pai kīrtitah—Devībhāgavatam Sk. III,
Chap. XVIII, pp. 41-43 (ed. by Haricharan Basu).

⁴⁶ Nānyān baram bārvān tūṃte vai sudarśanam. *Ibid.* Sk. III, Ch. XVIII,
p. 47.

⁴⁷ Nātra yuddhan prakartavyān rājannicchā-svayamvare
Baleṇa hareṇaṁ nāsti nātra śulka svayamvarah
Kanyecchayātra varapān vivādah kīdr'astvīha—Devībhāgavatam, Sk. III/19,
pp. 54-55.

⁴⁸ Svayamvare arāyaṁ dbhṛtvā yada gacchati mandape
Sāmānyā sā tadā jātā kulalevāparā budhūh
Naikabhāvā yathā vacyā bṛthā paśyati kāmukam
Tathāhaṁ mandape gatvā kurve vārastrīyākṛtām—*Ibid.* Sk. III, Chap. XX,
pp. 65-67.

⁴⁹ Kṛte paṇe mahārāja sarveśān vasaṃ hyaham, etc.—*Ibid.*, Sk. III, Chap. XXI,
pp. 51-52.

FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN TWENTIETH CENTURY INDONESIA

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A distinguished author¹ has referred to Indonesians as a people against geography. Indonesia is the land of islands reaching the magnificent total of three thousand. The major islands are only four in number—Bali, Java, Sumatra, Borneo. This peculiar geographical feature is to be specially mentioned because the awakening of national sentiment does not take place simultaneously in all parts of a single country and wayward geography makes it increasingly more difficult in the case of Indonesia. This fact, therefore, also serves to illustrate the quality of statemanship displayed by those heroes of freedom movement who have to work untiringly in order to form public opinion, organise public action and canalise popular energy avoiding any overflow.

National sentiment dawned in Indonesia out of several well-known factors. In the first place, there were not a few social grievances. The Dutch were the rulers and the Indonesians envied the superior position they enjoyed and enforced in comparison to their own serfdom. This bitterness was all the more inflamed as the Dutch made them face an unequal competition with the Chinese in Indonesia. Indonesians were smarting under some restrictions regarding residence and travel from which the Chinese were made free. Moreover, the Dutch Government even passed some laws favouring the Chinese only such as extending financial help to Chinese schools. These grievances centring social inequality were cemented with the modernisation of Japan. Japan thereby lifted herself to a status equal to that of the European nations and also instilled in the downtrodden Indonesians a just craving for equality. In the second place, outside influences must be reckoned. There were two stirring events in Asia in the first decade of the 20th century—the Russo-Japanese war and the Chinese Revolution—both focussing the formation of the national movement and the growth of a resurgent Asia. The former restored the confidence of the dormant East in their ability to tear away the clutches of the West. The latter

¹ *Vida* his book, *South East Asia between two Worlds* Tihar Mania

suggested a way of reformation. The former urged them to assert. The latter impelled them to organise. In the third place, enlightened advocates of colonial upliftment in the country of the colonial power itself did a lot. They argued out the case for concessions to the conquered. Exploitation then in some spheres at least gave way to paternal despotism. From the end of the 18th century to the beginning of the 20th Dutch interests veered round what was essentially commercial and tangibly profitable. But with the opening of the 20th century the Dutch became aware of the civilisational aspects of their Indonesian enterprise. As B. H. M. Vlekke writes in p. 319 of *Nusantara*, "The period between 1900 and 1917 became an era of increasing care by the Government for the native inhabitants of the Indies." All that emphasized the little achieved and the vast to be attained and crystallised public sympathies for concerted action. Lastly, the favourable response that the Indies Chinese received from governmental measures by acting through an organisation stimulated in Indonesians hatred for the Chinese and the Dutchmen just as it also stimulated a hope of success. Indonesians grew zealous for strong common organisation launching a unified struggle for the removal of disabilities.

However, the first glimpses of the coming freedom-movement can only be caught by a few advanced minds. And here we must look at a letter written as early as 1900 by a Javanese woman named Kartini, daughter of an Indonesian aristocrat, to one of her friends.² "With heavy hearts", she wrote, "many Europeans here see how the Javanese, whom they regard as their inferiors, are slowly awakening. But we are going forward, and they cannot hold back the current of time. Many of them (Hollanders) are among our best friends, but there are also others who dislike us, for no other reason than we are bold enough to emulate them in education and culture."

The first association to be formed with a nationalistic leaning is also associated with Kartini's name. Of course, nationalism had to be contented with an humble beginning because the association was primarily cultural. Kartini in 1902 founded a school where western education would be imparted to women who were enabled to reap the fruits of modern female education so long confined to Western countries. But the membership was limited and granted only to the female progenies of Indonesian Officials. In spite of this aristocratic basis the school undoubtedly furthered national ideals. In spite of the Moha-

² *Vide* 'Letters of a Javanese Princess, R. A. Kartini'—Pub. by Duckworth in the year of 1921.

medan religion, the Indonesian women found a common cultural platform which could be easily utilised to form a political association.

The next important step in the direction of a national cultural movement was taken by a Javanese medical man M. W. S. Husodo. He aimed at enlightening his countrymen on western teachings plus Indonesian heritage. Unsuccessful at the beginning, he was mightily backed up by Medical students of aristocratic birth in founding in 1908 the organisation, Budi Utomo, the name standing for genuine effort. The organisation set as its goal the development of "all that grants to the people a dignified life",³ thereby indicating its essential nonpolitical character. The organisation looked to the elders for mature guidance, to the youngmen for a forward drive. Within a year the membership total recorded significant increases. It began to lose members only after the rise of political organisations inside the country and of extremist political tendencies outside. But while the number of members diminished, the programme was expanded as, especially after the first world war, Budi Utomo began to interest itself in matters political.⁴

The first politically based organisation was Sarekat Islam, founded in 1912. Like Budi Utomo, it was in origin a nonpolitical organisation, but later launched on a political career, the call being that of self-government. "By 1919", G. M. Kahin nicely summarises, "its membership had reached almost two and a half million, and its militant nationalist programme was boldly dedicated to complete independence, to be attained by force, if necessary." Similar leadership was not visible earlier and now the masses were deeply enthused. The masses began to wake up as the leaders awakened them to the rich possibilities of self-government attained by self-help.

There were several factors responsible for this rise of leadership, apart from the fundamental reason of general social conditions engendered by centuries of foreign domination. The first was religious. Christian missionary activity was growing more and more aggressive in various countries. There were some Mohamedan countries still free from colonial clutches. All were in danger and all began to tighten up mutual ties in order to forestall the common danger. The situation was one of spontaneous give-and-take especially on the cultural plane—for cultural relations admit of far easier international organisation than, say, political or economic relations—because fear-complex has here a

³ Vide Sitorus, L. M., *History of the Indonesian Nationalist Movement*, 1947, Jakarta.

⁴ In 1854 the Dutch Government issued a regulation prohibiting political organisations, which was a factor in shaping Budi Utomo's initially modest aims.

lesser part to play. So, Modern Islamic Thought, having for its centre Cairo and its teacher the Egyptian M. S. Md. Abduh, began to stir Indonesians. Teachers from Egypt also toured Indonesia and Indonesian students flocked in al-Azhar University in Cairo. Islam was in a process of readaptation to the modern era; superstitions of the Islamic creed were subjected to scrutiny with a view to abandonment; scientific thought and practice were encouraged and brought to bear upon the principles and rituals of Islam. This is not all of the Abdūh Influence. It further expressed itself through the Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912, which supplemented the ethical programme of Islam by a social programme. It advocated reforms in almost every sphere—education, health, marriage. It supplied to the religion a social tone and thereby brought the people nearer to political self-consciousness for they were already near to the mosque. “What this Indonesian really needed was to be able to call himself an Islamite”, wrote Prof. Wertheim, “without having to feel ashamed of his faith in the presence of Westerners; to profess a faith, that is, which harmonized with the modern age and his own aspirations as a man of his time.”⁵ Now, the Sarekat Islam leaders had the foresight to feel the importance of this socio-religious influence as an aid to political development. Thus, as contrasted to Budi Utomo, the Sarekat Islam leaders approached the people through the religion and not through the aristocratic class and derived the prize of a greater following in a quicker time.

The other cause of emergence of able leadership through the Sarekat Islam was economic. The Chinese merchant class was much too tricky for the Indonesians. Besides, the strong organisation that backed them and secured from the Dutch authority discriminatory treatment in favour of the Chinese underlined the necessity of similar activity on their part. Indeed, the origin of Sarekat Islam can be traced back to Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trading Association) upholding co-operative protection against the Chinese and even boycotts. It was founded in 1909 mainly through the initiative of a Javanese merchant, namely, R. M. Tirtoadisurjo.

This new organization brought home the crying need for unity and, therefore, soon became the rallying point of Indies Moslems. Membership rose up to a large figure. Boycotts against the Chinese were instituted with planned regularity sometimes leading to anti-Chinese riots. As a penalty it was banned by the Government. The

⁵ Vide W. F. Wertheim's book, *Effect of Western Civilization on Indonesian Society*.

ban was lifted in a few months. Towards the end of 1912 the leadership of Sarekat Dugang Islam was shifted on to the nonmerchant class and it reappeared as Sarekat Islam under the Chairmanship of O. S. Tjokroaminoto. The first Congress met in January, 1913, where the Chairman diplomatically stressed the nonpolitical character of his association and stood against any disloyalty to the ruling government. In particular, he held out the following programme: (a) promoting commerce among Indonesians; (b) mutual support of members who encounter economic difficulties; (c) promotion of the intellectual development and material interests of the Indonesians; and (d) opposition to wrong religious concepts concerning the Mohammedan religion, and promotion of religious life among Indonesians.*

Clearly, this was meant to hoodwink the government and was necessitated by the government regulation No. 111 banning politics through organizations or meetings. Speeches in party gatherings proved the inadequacy of the announced programme in representing the total aim of the party apparent from the quick growth of its organizations. Thus, in March, 1914, the leader of the Semarang branch of the association announced: "The Sarekat Islam already existed in the hearts of the natives before it was established. This is not only a movement of an economic and moral nature, but means also that the natives seek justice, which they have never yet found".⁷ He also stated that the Indonesians must understand why they were poor and for that they must make a united front.

While the masses hailed the existence and expansion of Sarekat Islam with all enthusiasm, the reaction of the aristocratic classes was different. They watched with anxiety the division of interests between them and the people brought out by the leaders of Sarekat Islam. Anxiety gave birth to a feeling of insecurity that turned into active opposition. As Fromberg commented on this development: Indonesian Civilians could no longer be trusted by the masses as the repository of goodwill and justice. Some of the laws were oppressive and sometimes the native officials executed them without trying to mitigate their rigour. In effect, people began to look down upon the Indonesian Administrative Officers as the custodian of such tyrannical laws.

Naturally, the initial religious professions of the party leaders gave way to open acceptance of a political goal to which religion would be

* *Vide* Blumberg in 'Encyclopaedia Nederlandsch Indie' (2nd Edition, III, 695; quoted from Kahin's 'Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia', p. 68.

⁷ *Vide* Fromberg, 'De Inlandsche, Beweging of Java', p. 519; quoted from Kahin, *ibid.*, p. 68.

employed as a means. And we learn from Fromberg the statement of Tjokroaminoto that Sarekat Islam would not allow its political aim to be frustrated by religion which would be utilised as merely an instrument of unity.

The government could no longer slumber over the growing popularity of such a movement, nor could it go all the way in suppressing Sarekat Islam altogether; for, as Sitorus emphasises, that might have been dangerous by evoking universal hatred and rebellion. Therefore, the Dutch authorities resorted to the novel plan of nonrecognition. They would not acknowledge the unity of the organization so that its strength could be sapped in a roundabout but nonetheless effective manner. To that end the Government passed an act in March, 1914, whereby it accepted the legal status of the different branches of Sarekat Islam, but refused to grant the same for the association as a whole. But this policy undermined the strength not of the party as a whole but of a section of the party. The Central organization of the party was largely composed of the champions of Islam modernised. Hence their authority was weakened as they became isolated from the local branches of the party ruled by leaders given over to Marxist ideas. The government policy thus paved the way for predominance of communistically inclined leaders and a more radical turn of the movement.

Side by side with the growth of Sarekat Islam Indonesian nationalism found a powerful exponent in another party—the Indies Party. It had certain novel features. Firstly, it was the product of a Eurasian-Indonesian combination. Secondly, it frankly challenged the Dutch Government and proclaimed openly the goal of self-government—unlike any of its predecessors. The government too grew hostile. The first leaders of the party, Dr. Mangunkusumo, Dekker and Dewantoro, were exiled, and were succeeded by Sneevliet, Brandsteder, and Dekker. Later on this Sneevliet was greatly responsible for the Communist orientation of Sarekat Islam, the ground being already prepared by the Dutch law.

Sneevliet's grasp of political reality was immense and he realised in no time that the Eurasian leadership of his party would fail to capture the imagination of the native peoples. Besides he was a Socialist while in Netherlands and also while in the Indies. So, Indonesians must be won over to Marxism. Sneevliet, therefore, set himself to the task of infiltrating Sarekat Islam which exercised at that time the greatest influence over the Indonesians. He began to make increasing and effective contacts with communistically inclined leaders of Sarekat Islam. He succeeded in securing a Marxist orientation of Sarekat Islam

with some leaders, namely, Darsono and Semaun as the most redoubtable champions.

There were two principal reasons rendering Sneevliet's task easier. The Russian scene considerably influenced the events in Indonesia. Indonesians became increasingly responsive to ideologies that pledged the emancipation of the toiling humanity. The second factor was the domestic legislation that led to a split in Sarekat Islam as between the Central organisation and the various branches, the latter being admitted as legal entities while law did not recognise the unity of the party as a whole.

As the branches of Sarekat Islam pressed more and more for Communist Orientation of the party the Central organisation had no alternative but to yield and modify its principles in the light of recent resurgent tendencies. The effect was discernible in the programme adopted at the Second Congress in October, 1917. The former aim of self-government now gave way to the new demand of independence coupled with various schemes of social reform. By themselves these aims were not opposed to the tenets of Modern Islam. But, significantly enough, they were accompanied by an open antagonism to condemned capitalism. Of course, this condemnation embarrassed the merchant followers of Sarekat Islam which could not afford this financial risk. That is why Tjokroaminoto publicly sought to explain away the difference between internal and external capitalism hinting that the condemnation was meant for foreign capitalism. The Central organisation of Sarekat Islam had to come to terms with the communistically inclined branches: for, in the first place, it could not venture to lose their support; in the second place, it became aware of the potency of revolutionary tenets that shook Europe in 1917-18 and was a bit inclined towards them. The proceedings at the third party Congress in October, 1918, therefore, underlined the socialistic bias of the organisation and emphasized the manifest revolutionary tone of its ideals.

It is only in the context of such a setting that we can examine the turns of Dutch Policy. The national movement, fortified by the Russian example, bolstered up by Sarekat Islam, strengthened by the inroad of Marxist ideals, brought home to the Dutch authorities the everapparent need for change. To these we might add the demand of socialists in Holland for a liberalisation of the colonial rule. The combined effect was the establishment in 1918 of 'Volksraad' or 'Peoples' Council', although the bill was passed by the Netherlands Parliament in 1916. The Council was to be composed of , at least, 39 members, the Chairman being appointed by the Crown. Only 5 Indonesians were

to be appointed by the Governor-General. Others, mainly Dutch residents in the Indies, were to be elected on a narrow franchise which was also indirect. At first the Council had advisory powers only, although rights of petition, questioning, and of free expression were granted. Amby Vandenrosch emphasised in his writings the fear of old officials at the opening of the assembly as for the first time they had to bear the brunt of public criticism. In point of fact, at the very first session of the Council the government was shocked by the tremendous fury of criticism. Followed as it was by the outbreak of radical movements in Europe, it was but a prelude to the oncoming overwhelming outbursts. Thus, one member on November 18, went so far as to speak for the right of revolution. Also, the news of revolutionary enterprise in the mainland of Netherlands reached the government and almost swept it off its feet—so much so that the Governor-General in person promised the Council quick and extensive reforms in the Governmental structure.

However, these 'November Promises' only partly materialised—that too not until 1925. All the same the Volksraad served as a focus of nationalist agitation. But there came forth a division, so long dormant but being drawn up, in the nationalist front. This division did not centre round the objective, which remained to be independence; it centred round the means thereto; it lay broadly as between the Communists and Non-Communists. In spite of Sneevliet's arrest and exile in 1918, the Communist infiltration of Sarekat Islam went on, although even in the Fourth Party Congress in 1919 the Marxists were not to control the organisation. That explains why Semaun, being disgusted of the Central leadership of Sarekat Islam, along with his followers in the Social Democratic Association transformed themselves into the Communist Party of the Indies, generally known as PKI.

Now, the PKI. sought to link itself with the comintern. At the Second Congress of the comintern Sneevliet represented Indonesia. At the third and fourth Congresses Darsono and Tan Malaka respectively took the seat of the Indonesian representative. But in August, 1923 Semaun was arrested and had to leave the country. The same fate soon overtook other leaders of the party. Although it lowered the organisational strength of the party it heightened popular enthusiasm about it.

Meanwhile Sarekat Islam kept on following an active programme and the Central leaders still got the upper hand. There were small popular uprisings in Celebes and West Java in response to vigorous outbursts against the government indulged by such leaders as Abdul Muis. At this time the Central leadership of Sarekat Islam was also successful in organising the trade-union movement in Indonesia by setting up

the 'Trade Union Central' which sought to unite the trade union movements in Indonesia. Semaun, failing to capture its control, started another, namely, 'Revolutionary Trade Union Central', thereby wresting much of the strength of the former body.

All this betokened a final reapture between the two groups in Sarekat Islam. This was most evident at the sixth party congress in Surabaya in 1921. One section was willing to co-operate with the Dutch while continuing the struggle for self-government. Others, mainly Marxists, condemned such co-operation. And their leaders were vociferous in attacking the central leadership for being oblivious of class conflict and for being religiously minded. H. A. Salim came to the rescue and won the day by a vitriolic counter-attack that the Prophet had expounded Socialism and Materialism centuries ago. This completed a formal split and signalled the secession of the Communist group from Sarekat Islam. The Congress did not break up till it passed a resolution affirming party discipline, that is, negating any attempt to bolster up the PKI.

Logically there ensued a long-drawn-out struggle for control of various branches of Sarekat Islam with dire consequences for the progress of the national struggle. In a way the Communists were winning the early laps of the race, for they brought most of the branches within their fold. But they also had to share significant losses as the peasantry fell apart. Firstly, their sympathy was alienated because of the religious, if not irreligious, attitude of the Marxist. It fell heavily on their sentiment and support. Secondly, the government successfully blocked contacts between the peasants and political leaders.

The Communists, breaking loose from Sarekat Islam, centralised their activities in the Indonesian Communist Party. The formal formation of the Red Centre was complete at a Congress held in December, 1921. Early in 1922 Tan Malaka took up the cause of a section of government servants and tried to convert their strike into an all-embracing strike. The attempt ended in a dismal failure. Tan Malaka had to leave the country. All this time Semaun was in Moscow. On his return he concentrated on controlling the trade union movement in its entirety. Late in 1922 he was successful in his project and formed the 'Union of Indian Labour Unions' which reduced the authority of the 'Trade Union Central' almost to a nullity.

Thus, by 1923 the Communist leaders shadowed their rivals in two ways. Firstly, they captured the initiative with regard to the Indonesian Trade Union movement. They also had under their control a majority of the branches of Sarekat Islam. The basic conflict with regard to tactics still continued—the Marxists were all for strikes and a revolutionary procedure. But the other group of leaders still pinned

their faith on parliamentary action and co-operation with the rulers. As the Marxist group grew in power, parliamentary leaders resorted to a purge and formed a new organisation called Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (P.S.I.I.). The Communist answer to this was the organisation called Sarekat Rajkat Merat (Red People's Association) which combined with the P.K.I. The PSII, however, had Muslim Nationalists as its Vanguard, who began to shift to the goal of Pan-Islamism. The policy yielded a fair dividend. Indonesia being pre-eminently a Muslim country mass-psychology was not late in coming under its banner.

In 1925 the controversy with regard to co-operation with the Dutch authorities again came to a head as in that year Indonesian representation in the People's Council was extended. The powers of the Volksraad were also increased including such important ones as the power to alter government bills, to pass the budget and to question that might lead to debates and even a vote of confidence. As usual, the reactions of the two camps were quite different. While the moderates were jubilant over the victory of parliamentary nationalists, the Communists called it a betrayal of the nationalist cause.

In 1924 the Comintern at its fifth world Congress issued a directive that attached the greatest importance to trade unions as the only basis for successful revolution anywhere. Accordingly the Secretary of the Indonesian Communist Party drew up in December, 1924 a resolution that sought to disband the Sarekat Rajkats and fall back on the trade unions as the building blocks of revolution. But that would have altogether destroyed peasant sympathy which already lay hurt. So, a middle way was found out which led to a policy of gradual dissolution of the Sarekat Rajkats so that the Indonesian Communist party might be rid of any adinterim adversity. However, the crowning point of the programme was the setting up of a Soviet Republic of Indonesia. In spite of the cautious move the singular emphasis on trade unionism could not but jeopardise the interests of the peasantry which on its part lost its interest in tying itself with the Communist organisation. It was all the more telling as the Communist leaders thwarted the move of a united nationalist front initiated by Sarekat Islam.

Another weakness in the Communist front was the internal division. Two sections fought for mastery. One was completely wedded to Comintern's command. The other sought to chalk out an independent line of action as adapted to the changing national situation. Now at a crucial stage of the struggle the former group won. At a meeting in October, 1925 the extremist group controlled the decision of the Party's Executive Committee and a resolution was taken to the

effect that a strike of the railwaymen should be expanded into an all-out revolution culminating in the overthrow of Dutch authorities. The leaders even fixed up a date in June, 1926—but owing to difficulties of internal management it was postponed. When the first blow was struck it was vehemently repulsed by the Dutch authorities. The revolutionary disturbances were summarily quelled by active state measures. Tan Malaka was of course responsible for a counter-movement. But that could not have been the sole cause of the failure of the rebellion. Apathy of workers had much to do with it, for indeed there were successful strikes and even successful fighting against Dutch forces. But they were not plastered by strong mass support and lacked co-ordination. And the Dutch were not ready to lose any ground by remaining on the defensive. In June, 1927, perhaps also fearing another outburst, the Dutch, formerly banning assembly and thereby weakening labour unions, all on a sudden adopted a thoroughly offensive strategy. They searched students, screened others, scrapped documents, arrested thousands and exiled many. During the year 1926 the government had arrested many leaders and that is one of the major reasons why the planned revolution did not materialise. During the year 1927 the government acted so as to block any such attempts in the future. While the government weakened the adversary it also considerably tightened its own clutches. Kahin notes that altogether some 13,000 people were arrested of which 4,500 got prison sentences, 1,308 got internment orders, 832 were exiled to Tanah Merat. The communist strength was sapped.

Reviews and Notices of Books

Comparative Aesthetics, Vol. II (Western Aesthetics) by Dr. K. C. Panday, Published by the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras, Price Rs. 20 only.

The book under review is a lucid presentation of the aesthetic theories of the master minds of the west. Ranging from Gorgias (470 B. C) and Socrates (467—399 B C) to Benedetto Croce (1866—1952) all the aesthetic theories as propounded by the continental and British thinkers have been critically evaluated and pitted against the corresponding Indian views. The theories of art are diverse. They are imitative, hedonistic, pedagogic, kothatic, mystic, intellectualistic, emotive, transcendental and of many other varieties. All these types of aesthetic theory have been discussed threadbare and the author has taken particular care in tracing the influence of the predecessor in his successors. The parallel citation of the Indian views has made the discussion interesting. We note that Plato's imitation theory was very much a like to the theory of Śrīśankuka, 'the first exponent in India of a theory of art on the basis of a system of Philosophy, like Plato'. Plato's theory of illusion in art bears marked resemblance to the views attributed to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa by Viśvanātha. Apart from such comparison of views strewn all over the treatise, the author devotes a whole chapter (Ch. XIV) to a detailed treatment of the points of similarity and difference in the aesthetic thoughts of Indian and Western Aestheticians. The Chapter deals with the Hegelian and Indian classification of arts and states elaborately the two points of view for handling the problem of art, different approaches to the problem of aesthetics and the principles of artistic production such as imitation, reflection, illusion, selective imitation, idealisation, invention, verisimilitude, symbolisation, concretisation and suggestion. The rich scholarship of the author in Indian and Western aesthetics and his penetrating probe into the fundamentals of both have given the volume under notice value and dignity of rare magnitude.

The book is divided into fourteen chapters. The author starts with the background of Plato's aesthetics and ends with the intuitive aesthetics of Croce. Within a span of five hundred pages (*i.e.*, the first thirteen chapters) the author has introduced Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Dürer, Descartes, Bacon, Hobbes, Hume, Berkeley, Addison, Burke, Baumgarten, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Croce and a host of other minor aestheticians. From the Rigoristic hedonism of Plato we pass on to the Pedagogism of Aristotle (Ch. II). Plato's condemnation of arts was not acceptable to many and Plato

himself was well aware of the fact. That is why in his *Laws*, Book II he wanted to strike a golden mean and this clue was taken up by Aristotle in right earnest. Aristotle's compromise formula was presented in his pedagogic theory of art. It was Plotinus who pointed out that aesthetic experience belonged to the transcendental level. In Chapter VI the aesthetic trends in early Christian Era, Middle Ages and Renaissance have been presented and there it has been rightly observed that according to the Renaissance thinkers imitation and imagination are the means of artistic production, that imitation means verisimilitude, that emotion in the principle of harmony in art, that pleasure from art is essentially intellectual and that art is essentially a human invention. This trend of aesthetic thought in the Renaissance era influenced the intellectualistic aesthetics of Descartes, as also the British Aesthetic thinkers. Germany's contribution to Western aesthetics has been elaborately discussed in four chapters, starting from Leibniz and Baumgarten and ending in Hegel and Schopenhauer. The less known aesthetic theory of Leibniz has been presented in minute details. Leibniz recognised different levels of aesthetic experience—sensory, emotive, intellectual and transcendental. He comes very near Abhinavagupta in his formulation of the different levels of aesthetic experience. The universalisation of the individual at the final level of the aesthetic experience, as held by Leibniz corresponds to the *Sādhārāṇabhāva* in Indian aesthetics. The penultimate chapter is devoted to Croce and opens with Croce's criticism of Hegel's philosophy in general and of his theory of fine art in particular. According to Croce 'Aesthetic' is the first theoretic form. The subject-object distinction is absent there. It is free from temporal and spatial limitations. According to Croce aesthetic experience is a purely subjective experience characterised by the freedom from predicative relation. It is pure intuition.

The whole range of aesthetic thought as stated above has been put in the volume under review in a style of good grace and charming simplicity. We welcome this volume and consider it to be an addition to the literature on aesthetics.

S. K. Nandi

Ourselves

UNIVERSITY ELECTIONS

Elections are being held for reconstituting the Senate of the University. The reconstituted Senate will be the Second Senate under the Calcutta University Act, 1951. According to this Act, the term of the Senate, Syndicate, Academic Council and other bodies in the University has been fixed at three years, and consequently the life of these institutions would expire in the course of the present year. It may be pointed out in this connection that the first Senate, Syndicate and Academic Council under the Act of 1951 came into existence in 1954. Elections to the Senate are the most important for the constitution of the body corporate. The Senate is the supreme Governing Body of the University, and the constitution of other bodies cannot be made until the constitution of the Senate is complete. Under the Act of 1951, the Senate is pre-eminently an elective body, and elections to the Senate are made by a number of different constituencies. These constituencies consist mainly of persons engaged or interested in education and academic affairs in West Bengal. This feature of popular election is the most outstanding characteristic which distinguishes the Calcutta University Act of 1951 from the previous Acts, namely the Act of Incorporation, 1857, and the Indian Universities Act, 1904. The Act of 1857 provided for an entirely nominated Senate, the members of which were nominated by the Governor-General in Council. The Indian Universities Act of 1904 recognised the elective principle, no doubt, in the constitution of the University Senate, but the elected members constituted an insignificant minority. The Act of 1951, however, has boldly accepted the elective principle as the basis for the constitution of the Senate and other important bodies in the University.



Notifications

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/10/57

It is notified for general information that the Regulations for the Diploma Course in Museology as shown in Notification No. C.S.R./34/56, dated the 20th November, 1956, will take effect from the examination of 1958.

The decision was made by the Academic Council on 6th March, 1957.

Senate House,
The 21st March, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2918/134 (Affl.)

It is hereby notified for general information that the Govt. Sponsored College for Women, Midnapore has been affiliated in English, Bengali Vernacular, Additional Paper in Alternative Bengali, Civics, Logic, Sanskrit, Alternative Bengali, History, Commercial Geography and Mathematics to the I A. standard, in English, Bengali Vernacular, Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics to the I Sc. standard, in English, Bengali Vernacular, Additional Paper in Alternative Bengali, Economics, Philosophy, Sanskrit Bengali, History and Mathematics to the B A Pass standard from the session 1957-58 with permission to present its students at the I.A., I.Sc. and B A. Examinations of 1959 and not earlier on condition that the staff as proposed is appointed before the commencement of the session 1957-58 and the library is equipped with books of the value suggested.

Senate House,
Calcutta.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2872/97 (Affl.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Itachuna Bijaynarayan Mahavidyalaya, Hoochly, has been affiliated in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics to the B.Sc. Pass standard and in English, Bengali Vernacular, Sanskrit History, Economics and Philosophy to the B A. Pass standard with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 28th June, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2835/133 (Affl.)

It is hereby notified for general information that the Teachers' Training College, Darjeeling has been affiliated in (1) Principles of Education, etc., (2) History of Education, (3) General Methods, etc., (4) Methods of teaching English, Bengali, Hindi, Sanskrit, Mathematics, History, Geography, Hygiene, Physical Sciences, Biological Sciences, Primary and Infant School Subjects, Arts and Crafts, (5) Essay and Composition and in the following additional subjects : (a) Mental and Educational Measurements, (b) Mental Hygiene and Child Guidance, (c) Methods and Organisation in Nursery Schools, etc. to the B.T. standard from the session 1957-58.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2817/48 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Kalna College has been affiliated to the B.Sc. Pass standard, in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examination mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 24th June, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2827/101 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Siliguri College has been affiliated to the B.A. Pass standard, in English, Bengali Vernacular, Sanskrit, History, Philosophy Economics and Mathematics with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e. with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examination mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 24th June, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2865/27 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Vidyasagar College Calcutta, has been affiliated to the B.A. and B.Sc. Honours standards in Botany with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subject at the examination mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House
The 25th June, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2877/115 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Maharajadhiraj Udaychand College for Women, Burdwan has been affiliated to the I.Sc. standard in English, Bengali Vernacular, Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics and Biology with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examination mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 25th June, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2882/86 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Uluberia College, Howrah has been affiliated to the B.A. Pass standard, in English, Bengali Vernacular, History, Economics and Philosophy with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e. with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examination mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House
The 25th June, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No C 2845/20 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Mahara & Maninirchania College, Calcutta has been affiliated in Physics and Chemistry to the B.Sc. Pass standard, and in Mathematics to the B.A. and B.Sc. Pass standards with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e. with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 25th June, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C 2650/66 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Rishi Bankimchandra College, Nalanda has been affiliated in Physics, Chemistry, Botany and Zoology to the B.Sc. Pass standard and in Mathematics to the B.A. and B.Sc. Pass standards with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 25th June, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C 2640/42 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Paikpara Rastogi Surenchandra College, 24-Parganas has been affiliated to the B.A. Pass standard in English, Bengali, Vernacular, History, Economics and Philosophy with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 24th June, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C 2855/66 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Bishnupur Ramananda College, Baikunth has been affiliated to the B.Sc. Pass standard in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta,
The 25th June, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2822/116 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Beth Soomull Jalani Girls' College, Calcutta has been affiliated to the B.A.

Pass standard, in English, Bengali Vernacular, Hindi Vernacular, Addl. Paper in Alternative Hindi, Hindi, History, Economics, Philosophy and Sanskrit with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examination mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta.
The 24th June, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2899/61 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Goenka College of Commerce, Calcutta has been affiliated to the B Com standard in French with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subject at the examination mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta.
The 25th June, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2887/61 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Basirhat College, 24-Parganas has been affiliated to the B A Pass standard in English, Bengali Vernacular History, Economics and Philosophy with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta.
The 25th June, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2904/26 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the St. Paul's Cathedral Mission College, Calcutta has been affiliated to the B.Sc. Honours standard, in Physics and Chemistry with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above named subjects at the examination mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta.
The 25th June, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2860/38 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the St. Joseph's College, Darjeeling, has been affiliated in Chemistry to the B.Sc. Honours standard, and in English and Economics to the B.A. Honours standard with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta,
The 25th June, 1957,

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No CSR /11/57

It is notified for general information that the following changes in Chapter XLI of the Regulations relating to Law Examinations were passed by the Senate on 11th March, 1957 :—

(i) That Regulations 4 and 5 of Chapter XLI be replaced by the following :—

"4. The following shall be the subjects for the Preliminary, Intermediate and Final Examinations, respectively

For the Preliminary Examination

Paper I (i) Jurisprudence	50 marks
(ii) Roman Law	50 marks
Paper II Hindu Law including selected texts as may be prescribed	100 marks
Paper III (i) The Law of Contracts including selected portions of the Contract Act and the Sale of Goods Act	... 60 marks
(ii) The Law of Torts	... 40 marks
Paper IV (i) Constitutional Law (Indian Constitution selected portions)	... 70 marks
(ii) General Principles of English Constitutional Law (Selected topics)	... 30 marks

For the Intermediate Examination

Group A—Compulsory Subjects

Paper I (i) Principles of Equity (with selected Portions of the Indian Trust Act)	50 marks
(ii) Specific Relief Act (Selected portions)	... 20 marks
(iii) Elements of the English Law of Real Property	30 marks
Paper II (i) History of Land Laws in Bengal and the Law relating to Property (Topics as may be prescribed)	... 50 marks
(ii) Land Revenue Laws (Portions as may be prescribed)	30 marks
(iii) The Law relating to Prescription and Easements	20 marks
Paper III (i) The Law of Transfer Inter Vivos	... 80 marks
(ii) Registration (Selected topics)	20 marks

Group B

One of the following subjects

Paper IV (a) Selected topics of Company Law	70 marks
and Law of Partnership	30 marks

Or,

(b) The Law relating to Income Tax (Portion to be prescribed)	... 50 marks
The Law relating to Estate Duty (Selected topics)	30 marks
The Law of Sales Tax (Portions to be prescribed)	20 marks

Or,

(c) Indian Succession Act (Portions to be prescribed)	...	70 marks
Mohammedan Law (Portions to be prescribed)	...	30 marks

Or,

(d) (i) Workmen's Compensation Act	...	30 marks
(ii) Industrial Disputes Act	...	40 marks
(iii) Factories Act and Trade Union Act	...	80 marks

For the Final Examination

Group A

Compulsory Subjects

Paper I (i) General Principles of Civil Procedure	..	40 marks
(ii) General Principles of Limitation (Limitation Act excluding Articles)	...	30 marks
(iii) General Principles of Law of Evidence	...	30 marks
Paper II (i) Public International Law	...	60 marks
(ii) Conflict of Law	...	40 marks
Paper III (i) The Law of Crimes	...	60 marks
(ii) General Principles of Criminal Procedure	...	40 marks

Group B

Any one of the following :-

Paper IV (i) Drafting and Conveyancing	...	30 marks
(ii) Construction of Deeds and Statutes	...	40 marks

Or,

(b) (i) The Law of Bailments, Surety, Agency and Indemnity	...	70 marks
(ii) Negotiable Instruments Act	...	30 marks

Or,

(c) (i) The Law of Arbitration	...	30 marks
(ii) The Law of Insurance	...	40 marks

5. The limits of each subject mentioned in the preceding Regulation shall be indicated by the Academic Council from time to time after considering the recommendations made by the Board of Post-Graduate Studies in Law by reference to Text-Books, and Legislative Acts and Statutes where necessary. The allocation of marks under different sub-heads in each paper may be altered by the Academic Council after considering the views of the Faculty of Law and the Board of Post-Graduate Studies in Law. The Academic Council shall also prescribe in connection with each subject (other than subjects (i) and (ii) in Paper I for the Preliminary Examination) a list of leading cases to be studied in the original judgments as expositions of important legal principles. Every college teaching up to the LL.B. Standard shall make suitable provision for a Law Library so as to enable its students to have access to the reports or other books in which the selected cases may be found".

(ii) That in line 1 of Regulation 16 of Chapter XLI for the words "The third paper" substitute "the Second and the Third Papers".

Senate House,
The 4th April, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

ANDHRA UNIVERSITY

No. 82/9822/56.

Waltair, 9th November, 1956.

Encl : 1 Statement.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYNDICATE

Sub.—Misconduct at University Examinations—September, 1956.

Read—Syndicate Resolution dated 15th October, 1956

ORDER

The Results of the following candidates who have been found guilty of resorting to unfair means at the University Examinations held in September, 1956 are cancelled and they are debarred from appearing for any of the University Examinations for the periods noted against each:

	Name of the Candidate.	Examination	Reg No	Period
1	M Chinnam Nayudu	Matriculation	2205	Debarred for one year and permitted to sit for the University Examinations to be held in September, 1957, or thereafter
2.	H. Hanmeswara Rao	Intermediate	65	Do.
3.	M Venkataratnam	Do	238	Do
4	G V Subbarayudu	Do	1538	Do
5	R Subba Rao	Do	2118	Do
6	V. Satyanarayana	Do	2150	Do
7	P. Narasimha Rao	Do	2162	Do
8	S. Sivaramkara Rao	Do	3551	Do
9	Y Radhakrishna Reddi	Do	4126	Do
10.	P. Sudhakara Reddi	Do	4079	Do.
11.	Syed Akhal Hussain	Do	4354	Do.
12.	Syed Hafeezuddin	Do	4354	Do.
13	S. Muhammed Ismail	Do	1349	Do.
14.	B. Dasaradharama Reddy	Do	5661	Do
15.	G Sivakamayya	Do.	5969	Do.
16.	V. Sitaramamurti	Do	6938	Do
17.	C. V Prabbakara Rao	Do	7697	Do
18.	L. Dhamara Kesava Rao	Do.	7745	Do
19.	P. Viranna	Do	7750	Do
20.	K. Sobhanachalapathi Rao	Do.	7905	Do
21.	A. Kalyana Rao	Do	8023	Do
22.	M. Srinivasa Rao	Do	7485	Do
23	M. Abdul Kalam	B.A.	1540	Do.
24.	Anis Ulrulk, N.	Do	1653	Do
25.	Syamaundersa Saime, A.	B.Sc.	593	Do
26.	S. Abdul Hye	Entrance Test to Group D	176	Do.
27	T. James Paul Raja	Intermediate	5776	Debarred for two years and permitted to sit for the University Examinations to be held in September, 1958 or thereafter
28	Mohammad Dastagir	Do.	7867	Do

(By Order)

V. Simbadri Rao,
In-Charge Registrar.

ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY

Notice No. 37

Misc Sec. No. 1345

The following examinees who used unfairmeans at the Annual Examination of this University held in the month of March, April 1956, have been awarded punishments noted against their names :—

Examination	Roll No.	Enrolment No	Name	Father or Guardian's name and address.	Debarred up to and inclusive of the examinations to be held in.
Inter.	130	K1615	Syed Firoza Mushir Haider	Syed Mushir Haider Zaidi Mubarak Mahal, Nabtaur, Bejnore.	1956
Inter.	501	D7690	Gomti Prasad Bharti	Deep Chand, Musharraf Manzil, Civil Lines, Aligarh	1957
I.Com.	18	D2899	M. Zia Khan Afridi.	M. Zaman Khan, Bashir Building, Upper Coat, Aligarh	1957
B.A. (Pt. I)	213	R1469	Ramesh Chandra Verma.	Pyarey Lal, Vill Abrolia, Po Abrolia, Dist. Aligarh	1956
B.Sc.	685	C5511	Sabbir Ahmad Qureshi	Shamsuddin Mohd. Kh Dora, Aligarh	1957
B.Sc.	727	D4784	Bhagwan Chandra Gupta.	Laxmi Chandia Gupta, Mahavir Ganj, Chuppath, Aligarh.	1957
B.Sc.	787	C4989	Kunar Yoginder Pal Maingi.	Raja Ram, Gular Road, Aligarh.	1958
B.Sc.	812	D4986	Abdul Shemim	Abdul Rahim, Royal Hotel, Regimental Bazar, Mathura Cant.	1957
M.A. (Prev.)	482	C6620	Mohammadi Naqvi	Syed Mohd. Naqvi, Shanti Niketan, Mairis Road, Aligarh.	1957
M.Sc. (Final)	322	D6044	Balwant Raj Jen-ja	Rajn Saran Jon-ja, H. No 425 1/2 Chowk Kali Bari, Ambala Cantt	1957
L.T.B. (Prev.)	217	D2659	Latsayaf Ali Khan	Ch. Lutf Ali Khan, Wet, P.O. Baksar, Dist. Meerut.	1957
L.T.B. (Final)	109	C5460	Wahood Azmeel Zubairi.	Amrat Elahi Zubairi, Doodhgarh Aligarh.	1957

S. MAHMUDHOSAIN
Registrar

ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY

Notice No. 38

The following examinees who used unfairmeans at the Supplementary and Compartmental Examination of this University held in the months of July/August/September 1956, have been awarded punishments noted against their names :—

Examination	Roll No.	Enrolment No.	Name	Father or Guardian's name and address.	Debarred up to and inclusive of the examinations to be held in.
B.A.	125	C-2853	Viqaruzzaman Khan	Badinzzaman Khan Village, Raisupore P.O. Budhanei, Dist. Aligarh	1958
B.Sc.	774	C 8741	Ramesh Vishnu Gupta	Murarlal Gupta, 146, Raghubirpur, Aligarh.	1959
Inter.	184	D-4824	Naimuddin Khan	Chiraghuddin Khan Mohalla Kulkairpur, P.O. Qaimganj, Dist Farrukhabad.	1958

S. MAHMUDHOSAIN
Registrar

AGRA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C F 53, 1956-57

Misc. Sec No. 1349

In continuation of this office Notification No CF. 37. It is hereby notified that the B.A. Pt II Examination of 1956 of the following candidates has been cancelled for their attempt to use unfair means

Exam	R No.	Name	College.
B.A. Pt II	3770	Satya Pal Mittal	Meerut College Meerut
"	651	Kul Bhushan Dutta	Do.
"	3817	Yash Pal Singh	Do.
"	3311	Devaram Singh	Do.

Senate House,
Agra
Oct 10, 1956

L. P. MATHUR, D.Sc.
Registrar

BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION, WEST BENGAL

103 7A Surendra Nath Banerjee Road, Calcutta-11

Misc Sec. No 1372

List of candidates against whom action has been taken for adopting unfair means at the Compartmental School Final Examination of August, 1956.

Roll No.	Name.	Action
North (Comp.) A 21	Debtosh Mitra	Examination cancelled and debarred for the School Final Examination to be held in 1957
North F (Comp.) A 91	Bima's Debri Kanula	Do.
Boer (Comp.) 31	Syed Musa Ali	Do.
Mid (Comp.) 82	Ratanchandra Samanta	Do.

No. C/57/15

Dated the 6th October, 1956.

UNIVERSITY OF RAJPUTANA

Misc. Sec No. 1698

The undermentioned candidate was found using unfair means at the First M.B.B.S. examination of the University, held in October, 1956. Hence his present examination has been cancelled and he has been further debarred from appearing at any examination of the University till October 1957, i.e. he can appear in April, 1958

Roll No.	Enrolment No.	Name of Candidate	College.
11	54/3459	Kanhaiyalal Pankaj	S. M. S Medical College, Jaipur.

K. L. VARMA
Regisr

UNIVERSITY OF RAJPUTANA

Notice

Misc. Sec. No. 2801

It is hereby notified that Mangi Lal, whose particulars are given below, has been debarred from appearing at any examination of the University to be held in 1958, as he adopted fraudulent means to secure admission to class X of an affiliated institution after having failed in class IX.

Name	Father's Name	Date of Birth	Name of Examination.
Mangi Lal	Kesaji	9th Nov., 1938	High School Examination
K. L. VARMA Registrar			

UNIVERSITY OF RAJPUTANA

Notification

Misc. Sec. No. 1887

It is hereby notified that Pratap Singh Bhatnagar, son of Shri Umrao Singh Bhatnagar of Udaipur (Raj.) has been debarred from taking admission in any affiliated college during the academic year 1956-57, on account of his having tried to seek admission to the B Com. (Junior) class of Maharana Bhupal College, Udaipur affiliated to this University in the session 1955-56, without passing the qualifying examination and making a false statement in his application for admission.

K. L. VARMA
Registrar

BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION, WEST BENGAL

105/7A, Surendranath Banerjee Road

Calcutta—14

List of candidates against whom action has been taken for adopting unfair means or for Breach of Discipline and Decorum

(a) The Examination of the following candidates for the year 1956 has been cancelled

Calcutta

(Central, North and South)

Sl. No.	Roll No.	Name	School
1.	Cent PBA-34	Sk. Anwarul Haque	Private Student
2.	Cent FB-137	Dipali Guha	Nari Siksha Mandir
3.	Cent K-155	Swapankumar Barua	Talta's High School
4.	Cent FPBK-6	Ashima Ray	Private Student
5.	Cent PAM-23	Susbilkumar Haldar	"
6.	Cent T-209	Barindranath Basu	Shyamapada Institution
7.	Cent PAT-3	Biswanath Mukhopadhyay	Private Student
8.	Cent ZA-190	Mrinalkanti Deb	Metropolitan Institution (Bowbazar Branch)
9.	Cent PBZA-14	Pranabkumar Biswas	Private Student
10.	Cent FBZA-15	Chunilal Saba	"
11.	North B-115	Subalchandra Sen	Cossipore Institution
12.	North PAB-17	Narayanchandra De	Private Student
13.	North PAK-43	Amiyabhusan Mukhopadhyay	"
14.	North PAV-27	Arunkumar Chaudhuri	"
15.	North PAV-33	Rabindranath Chatterjee	"
16.	North ZID-53	Kartikchandria Chatterjee	Saradacharan Aryan Instn.
17.	North ZD-54	Baneswar Bhattacharya	"
18.	North ZD-187	Hannumanprosad Todi	Shambazar Vidyasagar High School.

Sl. No.	Roll. No.	Name.	School
19.	North PCZD-15	Gurudas Sil	Private Student
20.	North PCZD-16	Somenath Bandyopadhyay	"
21.	South FPCA-19	Minurani Ghosh	"
22.	South PBA-15	Pradipkumar Ghosh	"
23.	South PBC-13	Prabirkumar Gupta	"
24.	South PAH-30	Prabhulakumar Karpha	"
25.	South FPAL-20	Ravi Bandopadhyay	"
26.	South M-116	Bimal Bandopadhyay (II)	Pudupukur Institute
27.	South PCV-25	Nityananda Saha	Private Student
28.	South W-66	Sanitkumar Chatterjee	Barua High School
29.	South PCZB 39	Pradyutkumar Majumder	Private Student
30.	South ZD-69	Arunkumar Basu	South Suburban School
31.	South ZE-166	Prasenakumar Dasgupta	Jadavpur Bastubara Vidya pith
32.	South ZE 202	Sandipkumar Bhatta charyya	"
33.	South PCZE 6	Sunilkumar De	Private Student
Mofussil			
34.	Lariatack X 61	Phanindranath Chatterjee	Barackpore Debiprasad High School.
35.	Ber PPC 11	Namita Mitra	Private Student
36.	Bhag PC 1	Sa pinkumar Sinha	"
37.	Blag PC 85	Samarchandra Ghoshroy	"
38.	Bhag PC-168	Shyamaprasad Sasmal	"
39.	Bishnu 399	Dulalchand a B.	Rol C. M. Tayyeb Instn
40.	Bol 126	Ajoykumar Ghosh	Bolpur High School
41.	Bol 144	Aswinikumar Laha	"
42.	Bol 284	Manatosh Ghosal	Bandhgora Vidyalaya
43.	Bol PC 1	Dhananjoy Bandopadhyay	Private Student
44.	Chander PA 24	Dharanid s Sinha	"
45.	Dub 56	Abdul Moiz Zamarar	Ranazar High School
46.	Hew PCM 27	Dilipkumar Datta	Private Student
47.	Hugh 247	Joydeb Bandopadhyay	Rangati Rangopal Ghosh High School
48.	Imph PA 7	Sonban Angou Singh	Private Student
49.	Imph PA-8	L. Kulabi Singh	"
50.	Imph PA 27	Kaisam Yama Singh	"
51.	Imph PA-28	Laisram Ibai Singh	"
52.	Jal PA-21	Banamali Ray	"
53.	Kalna 410	Radhagobinda Ghosh	Satgach a Sridharpur Abinash Instn.
54.	Kamal PB 2	Narayanachandra Bhatta-charyya	Private Student
55.	Kanch 70	Nimarchandra Das	Kanchiapara Ramprasad High School
56.	Kat 90	Tarasankar Bhatta charyya	Khugram Sri Jagadva Banipath
57.	Kat 552	Mad Mafu/ Ahmed	Sajgram H. M. Tayyeh High School,
58.	Kat PA 94	Jagadishchandra Datta	Private Student
59.	Mid PC-2	Shyamalkumar Nag	"
60.	Sing PC 4	Biswanath Bandopadhyay	"

(b) The Examination of the following candidates for the year 1956 has been cancelled and they have been debarred from appearing at the School Final Examination of the Board in 1957.

Calcutta

Central, North and South

1	Cent H 39	Debehkumar Nandi	Nankeldanga High School
2.	Cent PAH 1	Pravatkumar Chakravarti	Private Student
3	Cent PBH-10	Santoshkumar Gan	"
4	Cent PBH-32	Kartikabandha Nasker	"
5.	Cent PBH-61	Ajitkumar Nasker	"
6	Cent PAT-24	Anantakumar Chatterjee	"

Sl. No.	Roll No.	Name	School
7.	Cent ZA-33	Pijushkanta Ray	Collin's Institute
8.	Cent ZA-34	Santosh Ghosh	"
9.	North C-20	Ashimkumar Rudra	Park Institution
10.	North PAC-26	Basudeb Basu	Private Student
11.	North PAC-32	Khagendranath Chakravarti	"
12.	North PAC-33	Sankuprasad Gupta	"
13.	North D-16	Shyamkant Sengupta	K. K. Hindu Academy
14.	North PCD-29	Nilmani Biswas	Private Student
15.	North PCD-45	Monoranjan Majumdar	"
16.	North PCD-46	Monoranjan Das	"
17.	North PCD-46	Sambhunath Das	"
18.	North PCD-59	Ajoykumar Mukhopadhyay	"
19.	North E-47	Nirmalendu Dattagupta	Kumar Anantosh Instn, (Dum Dum).
20.	North E-80	Prasantakumar Pal	"
21.	North FPCJ-64	Soumitra Bandyopadhyay	Private Student
22.	North PAJ-4	Raghunath Mukhopadhyay	"
23.	North K-284	Subaprasad Ray	Shambazar Vidyasagar High School
24.	North PBK-9	Badal Laha	Private Student
25.	North FL-116	Arati Neogi	Rani Amiya Bala Balika Vidyalaya
26.	North PCS-7	Biswanath Jhunjhunwalla	Private Student
27.	North PCY-25	Arupkumar Basu	"
28.	North PBZA-12	Anil Kumar Basu	"
29.	North PCZA-34	Kedarnanjan Barai	"
30.	North ZD-117	Parimalkumar Basu	Shyambazar Vidyasagar High School.
31.	North ZD-121	Pannalal Bandyopadhyay	"
32.	North ZD-124	Nirodebaran Ghosh	"
33.	South PAB-36	Barnapada Das	Private Student
34.	South C-216	Narreshchandra Chakravarti	Satyabhama Instn. for Boys
35.	South PAD-23	Monoranjan Mandal	Private Student
36.	South E-64	Chittaranjan Halder	Kidderpore Academy
37.	South FPBG-2	Sunanda Bhattacharya	Private Student
38.	South L-9	Dilipkumar Gangopadhyay	Kalidhan Institution
39.	South L-112	Ranjit Gupta	"
40.	South M-161	Gourisankar De	Puddopukur Instn
41.	South M-177	Bimalkumar Ghosh	"
42.	South M-183	Debrarjan Basu	"
43.	South M-184	Debrarjan Das	"
44.	South M-209	Sailendranath Roychoudhuri	"
45.	South M-215	Radikaprassad Das	"
46.	South PBM-71	Chittaranjan Bandyopadhyay	Private Student
47.	South N-138	Milurkumar Mukhopadhyay	Dhakuria Ram Chandra High School
48.	South N-139	Nityaranjan De	"
49.	South PAS-33	Bappa Ghosh	Private Student
50.	South PAZB-18	Kansilal Datta	"
51.	South PAZB-51	Kamalkumar Mukhopadhyay	"
52.	South PCZB-21	Prabirkanti Manna	"
53.	South PCZB-27	Ajitkumar Biswas	"

MOFUSSEL

54.	Agar PA 126	Durgaprasad Ray	Private Student
55.	Aliduar 8	Sambhunath Gangopadhyay	Alipurdwar High School
56.	Aliduar PA 7	Pankajkumar Ray	Private Student
57.	Aliduar PC 15	Hemendrachandra Biswas	"
58.	Agar PA 14	Lakhindar Bandyopadhyay	"

Sl. No.	Roll No.	Name	School
59.	Barrak X 244	Chandrabahadur Chettri	Barrackpore A. B. Model High School
60.	Berui PB 1	Tarapada Das	Private Student
61.	Batr PB 1	Brajendranath Sii	"
62.	Belon PC 1	Bhimadhab Majumdar	"
63.	Ber 239	Srimohan Sarker	Krishnath College School
64.	Ber PA 104	Mohitkumar Joarder	Private Student
65.	Bhag 317	Bhuchanchandra Barman	Mohammampur Deshapran Vidyapith
66.	Bhag PB 48	Radhanath Dhar	Private Student
67.	Bhag PC 94	Kalipada Gori	"
68.	Bhag PC 123	Bharguram Gharai	"
69.	Bhag PC 176	Pulubehari Maity	"
70.	Bishnu 207	Santimay Basu	Bishnupur Town High School
71.	Bol 109	Kehitindrakumar Sarker	Bolpur High School
72.	Bol 121	Shibnath Pal	"
73.	Bol 129	Nirmalkumar Bandyopadhyay	"
74.	Bol 130	Kanailal Bothra	"
75.	Bol 186	Haradhan Raichandhuri	"
76.	Bol 146	Sisirkumar Pal	"
77.	Bol 149	Bimalendu Senchaudhuri	"
78.	Bur PB	Munai Ali Hossain	Private Student
79.	Chander 195	Ashimkumar Majumdar	Carbati High School
80.	Cont PA 51	Jogendranath Jana	Private Student
81.	Coo 276	Anilkumar Datta	Deocharai High School
82.	Diam PC 24	Dhananjay Khan	Private Student
83.	Garh 28	Shyamsunder Ghosh	Birsingha Bhagavati Vidyalaya
84.	Garh PC 11	Satyanarajan Plachanda	Private Student
85.	Hugh 348	Dasaratni Sarker	Chinsurah S. O. Shome Training Academy
86.	Hugh 357	Madhabchandria Pal	"
87.	Imph PA 37	Thongjam Chingkhua Singh	Private Student
88.	Jia PB 3	Bamacharan Das Biswas	"
89.	Kaila 36	Rathindrakumar Pal	Fatikroy High School
90.	Kamal 5	Taranikanta Debnath	Komalpur Govt. High School
91.	Kamal PB 3	Jogendrakumar Singh	Private Student
92.	Kat 88	Tinkari Ray	Khirgram Sri Jogadya Banipith
93.	Kat 180	Ali Asmar	Amgoria Gopalpur B.G.M. Institution
94.	Kat 589	Jalaluddin Ahamed	Sigram H.M.T. High School
95.	Kat 687	Abumurhed Ansary	Salar Edward Zakaria High School
96.	Kat 747	Narayanprasad Thakur	Gangatikuri Atindranath Vidyamandir
97.	Kat PA 11	Sakibar Rahman	Private Student
98.	Kat PA 48	Janu Mallik	"
99.	Kat PA 106	Md. Hasibar Rahman	"
100.	Kat PB 136	Anilkumar Chaudhuri	"
101.	Kat PB 137	Pravakar Ghosh	"
102.	Kat PB 164	Birendrakumar Sarker	"
103.	Kat PB 178	Biswanath Saha	"
104.	Kat PC 3	Radhasyam Ghosh	"
105.	Kat PC 4	Krishnakali Mukhopadhyay	"
106.	Kat PC 5	Harigopal Dalui	"
107.	Kat PC 7	Jnanaranjan Das	"
108.	Kat PC 15	Jaminimohan Chakravarti	"
109.	Kat PC 17	Arunbaran Indu	"
110.	Kat PC 28	Nisakar Chaudhuri	"
111.	Kat PC 28	Bhajangobinda Chattopadhyay	"
112.	Kat PC 29	Sanjitkumar Mukhopadhyay	"
113.	Kat PC 36	Prodyutkumar Bandyopadhyay	"
114.	Kat PC 36	Golem Absar Shike	"
115.	Kat PC 41	Sasthides Sen	"
116.	Kharg FFB 3	Abha Raichaudhuri	"
117.	Kri PB 29	Rebindranath Datta	"

Sl. No.	Roll No.	Name	School
118.	Kura 52	Premkumar Chetty	Kurseong Pushpani Rai Memorial High School
119.	Mahi 134	Saktisekhar Jana	Ashadtala C M High School
120.	Mal PA 11	Dwijendranath Sarkar	Private Student
121.	Mis PB 49	Santiranjan Ghosh	"
122.	Santi PB 1	Sonilkrishna Pal	"
123.	Ser PB 3	Rashbehari Chakrabarti	"
124.	Uttar 79	Balailal Nag	Bally Jora-Aswathatala Vidyalaya
125.	Uttar 164	Kantikumar Bandyopadhyay	Uttarpore High School
126.	Uttar PB 62	Manabeshchandra De	Private Student

(c) The Examination of the following candidates for the year 1957, has been cancelled and they have been debarred from appearing at the School Final Examination of the Board in 1957 and 1958.

Sl. No.	Roll No.	Name.	School.
1.	North PBJ 22	Shomenath Mitra	Private Student
2.	Bang PB 16	Rabindranath Ghosh	"
3.	Dhan 205	Din Mohammad	Gopalpur Popular Academy
4.	Rain PA 87	Imain Hossain	Private Student

(d) The Examination of the following candidates for the year 1958 has been cancelled and they have been debarred from appearing at any School Final Examination of the Board, to be held in future.

Sl. No.	Roll No.	Name.	School.
1.	South PAR 60	V S Suryanarayanan	Private Student
2.	Kanch PC 3	Tapankumar Ray	"

**THE
CALCUTTA REVIEW**

An Illustrated Monthly

THIRD SERIES

Volume CXLIV

**July—September,
1957**

**PUBLISHED BY THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA**

First Series—1844

New Series—1913

Third Series—1921

THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

JULY—SEPTEMBER, 1957

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THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

Vol. 144]

JULY, 1957

[No. 1

MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S EXISTENTIALISM¹

J. N. MOHANTY, M.A , DR. PHIL. (GÖTTINGEN)

Department of Philosophy

I

Martin Heidegger's major works are *The Doctrine of judgment in psychologism* (1914), *Doctrine of categories and meaning in Duns Scotus* (1916), *Sein und Zeit* (1927), *Was ist Metaphysik?* (1929 & '34), *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (1929 & '31), *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929), *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (1943), *Holzwege* (1950), *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit mit einem Brief über den Humanismus* (1947 & '51), *Erläuterungen zu Holderlins Dichtung* (1951), *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (1953), *Was heisst Denken?* (1954).

II

In the works preceding the *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger was moving within the horizon of traditional philosophy.² The *Sein und Zeit*, appearing in 1927, not only revealed Heidegger's new way of thinking, but put forth the claim of having effected a total destruction of

¹ Martin Heidegger started his teaching career first as Edmund Husserl's assistant at Freiburg; then, for some time, he was Professor of Philosophy at Marburg till, in 1929, he succeeded Husserl to the chair of Philosophy at Freiburg. Later he became the Rector of the University of Freiburg and retired prematurely to the seclusion of a Black Forest village where he leads the simple life of a peasant.

² Some anticipation of what is to follow may nevertheless be detected in the earlier works. Thus, for example, in the work on Duns Scotus Heidegger writes: "Das erkenntnistheoretische Subjekt deutet nicht den metaphysisch bedeutsamsten Sinn des Geistes, geschweige denn seinen Vollgehalt. . . Der lebendige Geist ist als solcher wesensmäßig historischer Geist im weitesten Sinne des Wortes. Die wahre Weltanschauung ist weit entfernt von bloßer punktueller Existenz einer vom Leben abgelösten Theorie." (1937-8)

western metaphysics since Plato. In the works that follow the *Sein und Zeit*, we learn that this new beginning is but a recollection of the pre-Socratic philosophers and poets, of Parmenides, Heraclitus and Homer! At the same time, it becomes increasingly clearer that in this new beginning, in this protest against traditional European metaphysics, Heidegger does not stand alone. Without subscribing to the charge that he is an eclectic, we yet begin to see the way he absorbs into his thought influences from sources as diverse as Kant, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Husserl and Scheler.

III

It is not false but inadequate to characterise Heidegger's philosophy as existentialism. We shall emphasise, in course of this paper, the fact that existential analysis forms a part—though a major part—of his philosophy. Even as a part, existential analysis has only a subsidiary purpose to fulfil. It is not an end in itself. Analysis of human existence serves the purpose of bringing to light the hidden meaning of Being. It is true that the *Sein und Zeit* is mostly concerned with existential analysis. The second volume of that work which was promised by Heidegger, it is known now, would never appear; but it seems reasonable to guess that the author intended, in this promised volume to go beyond existential analysis and to lay bare his philosophy of Being. This guess is confirmed by the fact that emphasis shifts from existential analysis to a metaphysics of Being in the later published works. We may, with a fair degree of accuracy and justice, characterise his philosophy as a phenomenological inquiry into the meaning of Being.

Let us recall a few of Edmund Husserl's¹ important ideas: first, he taught that the true method of philosophy should be description of 'phenomena', as they are presented to us. By 'phenomena' are meant only such as are a-priori and essential. Negatively, this methodology excludes speculative and interpretative thinking. Positively, it leads to the so-called regional ontologies of which Nicolai Hartmann's Ethics is an instance.

Secondly, in order to isolate 'phenomena' in their purity, Husserl made use of the method of phenomenological reduction. Applied to the sphere of pure immanent consciousness, this means that all that is transcendent to consciousness is to be 'bracketed'. We are

¹ For a short account of Husserl's philosophy, see the present author's *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology* in *Calcutta Review*, August, 1956.

then left with nothing but the region of pure consciousness with its acts.

Thirdly, taking up the noematic-noetic structure, Husserl shows that to each transcendent object there corresponds, within the region of pure immanent consciousness, a nexus of actual and possible acts. Husserl would then say that all transcendent objects are *constituted* in the region of pure consciousness. The latter, however, is pure subjectivity, absolute Being, the source of all objective formations.

As Husserl reached this idealistic position, his former pupils deserted him. Phenomenology of pure consciousness was for them a self-contradiction. Pure consciousness or absolute subjectivity was, they thought, no phenomenon. The idea of constitution appeared to them as being speculative in character. It is, however, possible to show that such criticisms were based on a misunderstanding of Husserl.

Of all his pupils, Martin Heidegger went the longest way with Husserl. But he too rejected some of the basic ideas of Husserl's philosophy:

First, Heidegger formulates a new concept of 'phenomenon.' Husserl had rejected all questions about the being of phenomena. The relation between ontology and phenomenology remained unclear. Husserl, in fact, never faced the problem squarely. Heidegger now comes to mean by 'phenomena' what 'show themselves' or 'bring themselves to manifestation' in and through the so-called appearances; they are those that lie hidden behind, but also 'announce' themselves through, appearances. It is the task of phenomenology to uncover them. Phenomenology becomes metaphysics, a search for the hidden Being.

Secondly, Husserl's concept of 'transcendental subjectivity' is categorically rejected by Heidegger. This rejection is of great importance for understanding Heidegger's philosophy. Heidegger replaces this absolute subjectivity by the concrete totality of human existence, one of whose basic features is being-in-the-world. Three motives underlying this change may be singled out.

In the first place, Husserl's concept of absolute subjectivity was based on the concept of intentionality, absolute subjectivity being the *source*, transcendent objects being the *products*, of intentional acts. Heidegger interprets 'intentionality' as being nothing else than a general characterisation of the self's relationships to beings within the world. The idea of the 'world,' of being-in-the-world, is thereby

presupposed instead of being explained away. Intentional analysis cannot therefore lead to a "bracketing" of the world. Heidegger thus comes to reject the method of phenomenological reduction. Human existence is inseparable from 'being-in-the-world' and 'being-with-others.'

Further, Husserl's idea of absolute subjectivity was that of an absolutely theoretic consciousness. Heidegger would instead have a more total concept of human subjectivity. Max Scheler had shown that the world is given primarily in an emotional-affective attitude. Dilthey had developed, in greater detail, the concept of the totality of our essence, integrating the cognitive, emotional and volitional aspects and rejecting all sorts of atomic or faculty psychology. Heidegger takes this up, tries to hold up before us this totality of the human subject in its essence, and for this totality, in its essence, uses the term "Sorge" (=care, anxiety, worry etc.). This name, freed from its psychological associations, points, according to Heidegger, to all the essential features of human existence in its totality.

Thirdly, Husserl's constitution-analysis does not apply to the human subject itself. To explain human personality as the product either of self-apperception or of intersubjective intentional acts is false. Human existence, considered as an objective *fact*, could be so explained. But human existence, as subjectively felt in inner experience, sets a limit to the universal programme of constitution-analysis.

IV

A phenomenological inquiry into the nature of Being has to take its start from an analysis of the structure of human existence. To understand why this should be so is to understand the central motive of Heidegger's philosophy. We then also begin to realise the subsidiary role existential analysis plays in his total philosophy.

Let us start with the *distinction between Being and beings*. Being is that which underlies beings and yet makes them beings. The metaphysical question as to the nature of beings *as such* is often misinterpreted as referring to the most general characteristics of all beings (Nic. Hartmann). In fact, it is a question as to the meaning of Being, as distinguished from beings. The word "Sein" appears, to start with, to be an empty word. On the other hand, we do understand this word as opposed to 'non-Being.' We do have some understanding of Being, however vague and indefinite the same may be. And that we possess such an understanding is an essential feature

of our existence. Inquiry into Being must therefore take its start from an analysis of our understanding of Being—of such understanding as constitutes an essential feature of our existence ; hence, the necessity of existential-analysis.

In his later works, Heidegger precipitates this question about Being in the form : Why is there at all Being, and not rather Nothing? This question at once comprehends all beings in their totality and yet goes beyond them. The question concerns the 'ground' of beings as such. What is the ground that there are beings? The question does not mean that we start with the unquestionably given beings and then immediately proceed towards the needed ground, itself another being ! The second part of the question—"not rather nothing"—is not a superfluous annexe, but is needed for a correct understanding of the question. Why are the beings deprived of the possibility of non-being? Whence is it that Being is victorious over Nothing? What is the ground of the *decision* in favour of Being and as against Nothing? And, the victory is not complete ; every being is half being and half nothing. Even our own being, the questioning self, comes within the range of the question. We are thereby asking about the Being of beings as such.

Heidegger's concept of Nothing and its relation to Being remains unclear to the end. It is clear that by Nothing he does not mean negation or rejection. Negation or rejection pertains to this or that being. But Nothing is said to reveal the totality of beings. There are situations in human existence, moments of dread, when all beings slip off our feet ; nothing is found to abide, ourselves including. Such situations bring us face to face with Nothing. They do not produce the Nothing, but reveal it to us. The Nothing was ever there, without itself being another being.

Heidegger's writings contain several different suggestions as to the relation between Being and Nothing :

i. It may be that Being only appears to us as Nothing. 'Nothing' may be the only form in which Being, as distinguished from beings, could reveal itself to us. In that case, Being is not identical with Nothing, nor are they different.

ii. It may be that Being and Nothing are distinct but co-ordinate, that beings are products of both Being and Nothing though certainly with a predominance of the former over the latter.

iii. Or, it may be that Being and Nothing are the same. If this is Heidegger's view, then it must be formulated in such a way

as to avoid the charge of Nihilism. For, Heidegger repeatedly denies that this charge does justice to him. On the other hand, Heidegger means by Nihilism all such philosophies that would not admit any Being as distinguished from beings.⁵ Since the distinction between Being and beings is central to his thought, he is anything but a Nihilist. If he identifies Being with Nothing, the concept of Nothing must here be taken in a totally unusual connotation. We may here mention two motives that most probably are responsible for identifying Being with Nothing :

First, Heidegger is determined not to permit any of our scientific, naturalistic or theological ideas to contaminate the purity of the notion of Being. He is especially on his guard to avoid the identification of Being with God.

Secondly, his peculiar existential analysis leaves open the possibility of transcending the world of beings and of experiencing Being only in situations like death, dread or anxiety. Possibility of a positive experience of Being, as in love, hope and faith, is not admitted. Here his existential analysis may be suspected as having indirect bearing upon his notion of Being.

V

Before proceeding further with Heidegger's concept of Being let us now turn to his existential analysis.

At the outset, we distinguish between various kinds of beings. Things are given, presented as facts. Their mode of being is called 'Vorhandenheit.' Tools are given for use ; their mode of being is called 'Zuhandenheit.' Human being is *radically* different from the being either of things or of tools, in fact, radically different from the modes of beings of all others. Heidegger uses the terminus 'Dasein' for this unique mode of being of man. Existential analysis is 'Dasein-analysis'. For, man alone exists in the strict sense.

In 'Dasein' alone is revealed the truth of Being. This is metaphorical. What Heidegger means thereby is that while all other beings participate in Being, man alone is conscious of such participation. What is more, this consciousness is essential to his existence. Laying bare of the essential constitution of human being is the task of existential analysis.

Anthropology, psychology and biology claim to study man. But the human person escapes them. The human person is no thing,

⁵ 'Einführung in die Metaphysik,' p. 155.

no substance, no object. The ontological problem of the essence of man moves on a different dimension. This problem has to be attacked from the side of Being itself. Heidegger's analysis in its essential movements, could be summarised, in the following way :

(i) "The essence of man lies in its existence".⁶ 'Existence' here does not mean the sort of facthood belonging to things or events. Existence is really "Ek-sistenz", i.e., "ecstatically staying within the truth of Being". This "living in the truth of Being" is no static property, but an ever present possibility: the two extreme modes being the so-called genuine and the not-genuine modes of existence. Even what is called the not-genuine mode of existence does not mean deprivation from the light of Being. Even in his everyday mode of being, even as a member of the crowd, a human being does not become a mere 'thing'; he still *exists*. Man is elsewhere described as the Neighbour of Being.⁷

Though staying however in the light of Being, man is at the same time forgetful of Being. The understanding of Being which belongs to the essential constitution of human being does not amount to an explicit awareness of Being, though if we were totally unaware we would not be what we are, i.e., men. This forgetting of Being is what Heidegger names the "Verfall", the Fall. The Christian theologians see here a secular version of the Biblical Fall. Others may see here a moral judgment on the present state of human existence. Heidegger cautions us against thus misunderstanding him.⁸ The so-called Fall is only a name for the ontological relation of man to Being itself.

(ii) This existing 'Dasein' is no isolated 'subject', withdrawn from the world, passively witnessing the world-phenomena. On the other hand, 'being-within-the-world' belongs to the essential constitution of man. This 'being-in' does not refer to the way in which man, taken as a fact, occupies a spatial position in the world. This is not a spatial concept. Nor is Dasein's relation to the world the same as the so-called subject-object relation. On the other hand, this subject-object relation or this spatial relation is possible because of the original situation of 'being-in-the-world'. 'World' is to be understood here not as any region of beings, but as that *open horizon* within which beings or regions of beings come to manifestation. Similar analysis of this phenomenon has been suggested by Scheler,

⁶ *Sein und Zeit*, p. 42, 117

⁷ *Brief über den Humanismus*, p. 90

⁸ *Sein und Zeit*, p. 180.

Plessner and others. Man lives in this open horizon and not in the closed environment of the animal.'

(iii) Side by side with 'being-in-the-world', 'Dasein' is also, in its essential nature, 'with others'. Husserl's philosophy of an absolute subjectivity leads him to the insurmountable difficulty of solipsism. Husserl has to exhibit the world as well as the other selves as products of intentional acts within this absolute subjectivity. Whatever plausibility this procedure might have in case of the external world, *other selves* resist such constitution-analysis. Heidegger seeks to avoid solipsism by including the two factors 'being-in-the-world' and 'being-with-others' in the essential constitution of 'Dasein'. 'To be alone' is not the original, but only a deficient mode of 'Dasein'.¹⁰

(iv) After having thus rejected the abstractions of a lonely ego and of an epistemological subject, we come to face human existence in its concrete totality. On the one side, man "ecstatically resides in the Truth of Being"; on the other, out of partial forgetfulness of Being, it finds itself—not accidentally, but essentially—"in the world" and 'with others'. Could we characterise this situation by saying that man is 'thrown' into the world and society? The so-called Fall and "Geworfenheit" thus point to the totality of this human situation in relation to Being.

(v) Further, 'Dasein' is essentially finite. This idea is developed by Heidegger in his book on Kant. Kant's doctrine that man has no intellectual intuition or that his understanding is discursive is shown to be a consequence of man's finiteness. What we have seen to be his Fall and "Geworfenheit" also point to the same. And, because man is finite and yet 'understands' Being he is a 'metaphysical' animal. Metaphysics, as Kant rightly saw, belongs to his essential nature. Thus the three features: finiteness, understanding of Being, and "transcendence" hang together. Here, "transcendence" means man's consciousness of the ontological difference between Being and beings.¹¹

(vi) We have seen that existence signifies no fixed property but always a *possibility* of existing in a certain way. The two extreme possibilities are the authentic and inauthentic modes of existing. The inauthentic mode is reflected in the everyday man. Such a man is not this, not that person, no unique 'Dasein', neither is he a

⁹ Max Scheler-Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (München, 1917), p. 36 f.

¹⁰ Sein and Zeit, p. 120.

¹¹ Vom Wesen des Grundes, p. 15.

totality. He is the 'average' man, the public. He is also nobody. Possibility of degenerating into this stage is not accidental to, but belongs to the essential constitution of, 'Dasein'. 'Dasein' becomes dissipated, scattered into the everyday man and has to recover itself back again. Even the average man is not, however, a mere 'thing'; even he does not live in complete darkness but retains, in some degree or other, the understanding of Being. Heidegger's analysis of this deficient mode of 'Dasein' reveals three essential characteristics of the average man: talk, curiosity, and equivocation. All these point to that sensational man who indulges in endless talk and in aimless curiosity and claims to understand everything without understanding anything.

(vii) How then are we to understand the possibility of authentic existence? This must be a state of complete self-recovery. The 'who' of 'Dasein', the self-hood is a way of existing and not a given fact. This authentic self-hood must be an existential modification of the average man. Already in the average man there is the "voice of conscience" that points to the possibility of this self-recovery. The conscience is thereby interpreted as a call to the average man. Who gives the call? The same 'Dasein' but only as one who has experienced the dread of "Geworfenheit". To hear this voice of conscience is only to understand one's own authentic possibility of existing. To hear this call is to *decide*. The average man does not decide. Such decision implies the concept of *situation* which plays a central role in all existential thinking. 'Dasein' comes to its own in the silent decision of one who experiences the dread of "Geworfenheit".

(viii) The situation par excellence that makes this hearing of the conscience, this consciousness of one's authentic possibilities and therefore this self-recovery of 'Dasein' possible is *death*; hence the important role his analysis of death plays in Heidegger's existentialism. For, death is existential in character. Death is always somebody's *own* death. It is no event. It is an unique inner possibility of each 'Dasein'. Existential analysis of death is concerned with this phenomenon in so far as it represents such an unique possibility of 'Dasein'. All questions about what happens after death are thereby left out of discussion. The existential attitude can be made clearer by contrasting it with that of the average man. The average man says: "Man dies". The equivocation is worth noticing: the subject is no body in particular. And, further, death, in this attitude, is mellowed down to an event that happens to 'Dasein', but intimately

belongs to no one. Either there is a fear in the face of this event, or there is supposed to be a passive indifference, for only "man dies". The average man agrees that death is certain, but his consciousness of this certainty remains equivocal. As against this superficial understanding of death, existential understanding reveals the following :—

1. Death is the most peculiar ontological possibility of 'Dasein'.
2. This possibility is non-relational. It belongs to each 'Dasein' as it is, as alone.
3. This peculiar, non-relational possibility cannot be overtaken, it is the farthest possibility.
4. This possibility is certain. This certainty is radically different from that which may accompany any other inner-worldly being.
5. But this possibility remains indefinite, even with respect to its certainty. This indefinite, but certain end arouses a constant menace.
6. Through this dread, the 'Dasein' finds itself before the possible impossibility of its own existence
7. Genuine existence is existing in the presence of death, of death considered not as a natural event but as an existential possibility.

(ix) The existential significance of death shows how a future possibility can be effective in shaping the present. This opens the path for a new understanding of the sense in which 'Dasein' is essentially *temporal*. Ordinarily, we mean by temporality "being within Time". All other beings except Dasein have this kind of temporality. But such temporality is only derivative. The original temporality is that which characterises Dasein. Objective time is derived from subjective time. We have seen that the essence of existence lies in an ever present possibility of existing. This implies anticipation, expectation, "to be ahead of oneself". Hence the importance of future in Heidegger's analysis of time.

(x) For the totality of all these features enumerated, Heidegger uses the term "Sorge". Being in the world and being with others, "Geworfenheit" and finiteness, understanding of Being and yet forgetting the Being, death and temporality, being ahead of oneself and decisions that turn a moment into eternity,—all these are contained for Heidegger within the significance of that strange term "Sorge".

VI

We have seen two aspects of Heidegger's philosophy, his philosophy of Being and his Dasein-analysis. What precisely is the relation between these two aspects?

It is clear that a philosophy of Being is what is aimed at. Dasein-analysis is undertaken as providing the clue to it.

At the same time, one has the suspicion that the Dasein analysis influences his philosophy of Being. We have mentioned one instance of this influence: how the role that dread and anxiety play in the former lead Heidegger, in spite of himself, to a sort of identification of Being with Nothing. At least, no room is left for a positive experience of Being.

In his later works, particularly in the 'Holzwege', Being is exhibited as determining the historical destiny of Dasein. When his other accounts of Being make us suspect that he is pointing to something like the Vedantic Brahman, we find this suspicion shattered when we are told that Being is historical in character, that Being suffers its own destiny. The "fall" of Dasein, the "forgetting" of Being and the possibility of Dasein's recovering its authentic self-hood, through all these we see the destiny of Being itself. One wonders if this is not Hegelian. Indeed, there is an essay on Hegel, interpretative and not critical, in the "Holzwege". One remembers that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, by revolting against the same Hegelian idealism, had initiated the so-called existentialist movement.

VII

The destiny of Being is reflected in the history of man's *understanding* of Being (which is the true, the 'original' history of Dasein). This latter is also the history of thought, in so far as its relation to Being is concerned. Originally, thought had a direct access to Being. As if, Being was speaking through thought (in the pre-Socratics and the poets). There is, in their original nature, little difference between thought and poetry. But the history of western metaphysics has been a history of progressive falling away from that original contact with Being. Through Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy, thinking became concerned with beings and grew *technical*. Originally, truth was the self-revelation of Being itself. With the rise of technical thinking, truth becomes consistency. With the rise of the distinction between subject and object, truth becomes sub-

jective certainty. Man or Dasein becomes a subject. Philosophy becomes the *world-view* of this subject. *Systems* of philosophy come to be constructed. Technical thinking objectifies. Human action comes to be objectified as *culture*. Art is objectified and becomes the subject matter of a technical study called aesthetics. The world becomes, as it were, de-sanctified. In Nietzsche's words, God is dead. This is the tragic destiny of Being. The whole story originates from the forgetfulness of Being, the dissociation of thought from contact with Being, from consequence objectification of truth. The pathos of Dasein's history lies in the tension between being and Being.

In Nietzsche, Heidegger sees the culmination of western metaphysics as well as its last absurdity. And it becomes Heidegger's avowed purpose to effect a total destruction of this metaphysical tradition. If this destruction succeeds, it may be hoped, thought would go back to Being, thought and poetry would come together, and the light of Being would start illuminating human existence. There is no wonder that Heidegger has taken to poetry!

IX

In an article entitled "Thomas oder Hegel" (LOGOS, 1 26), E. Przywara had suggested the alternative between the protestant-Kantian philosophy of ego (which, according to Przywara, amounts to turning creatures into Gods) and the thomistic experience of "creaturehood" of the ego. Should we say that Heidegger's emphasis on the finiteness of human existence and yet its understanding of Being, however vague, (that is to say, its "self-transcendence"), is a secularisation of the catholic theology to which Heidegger devoted his early major work? And, further, what is still interesting, and what is liable to be controversial, is that here Heidegger claims Kant's company! Kant and Goethe, it would be said as against Heidegger, did hold out promise of an infinite advance and of a positive experience of Being.¹²

Further, do his concepts of Being and self-revelation of Being conceal the concepts of God and His historical revelation? And, could we say that what he describes as "Verfall" (Fall) and "Geworfenheit" (being thrown into) conceals the Christian concepts of the original Sin and the Fall?

¹² Heidegger: Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Contrast Paul Hofmann—
sik oder verstehende Sinn-Wissenschaft? (Berlin, 1929), pp. 58-9.

Heidegger denies the justice of such interpretations.¹³ But there is no denying that his thought has helped Christian theologians in much adventurous thinking and reconstruction of their own ideas.¹⁴

X

A few lines of criticism suggest themselves to us immediately and we shall not do more than barely mention them in this paper :

1. Heidegger claims to be making an absolutely fresh beginning, but the historical influences on him can easily be discerned. The major influences, in modern philosophy, are from Kant, Hegel and Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Dilthey and Scheler, not to speak of Husserl. These influences are so central to his thought that he cannot be understood without a reference to these predecessors.

2. Heidegger claims to be giving us a purely ontological-theoretical analysis, whereas his use of the terms like "Fall", "degradation" and "heillos" involve value-judgment.¹⁵ The possibility of alternating between these two attitudes makes a proper understanding of his writings difficult.

3. One of the essential features of Dasein is said to be "being with others". Yet, existential living is said to be lonely. Heidegger does not give us, explicitly at least, any concept of existential society (Mitsein). This has led his thought to be suspected of a rather cold individualism, as contrasted with Karl Jaspers who speaks of an existential 'communication'.

4. His judgments on traditional philosophy are often too rude; and the readers of *Sein und Zeit* know that Heidegger himself pursues a severely technical analysis. In this respect, Karl Jaspers¹⁶ is more consistent when he denies the possibility of a universally binding objective existential analysis and suggests the idea of communication. May be, Jaspers is thereby pointing towards the impossibility of an existential *philosophy* and Heidegger, when he philosophises, is certainly a better philosopher than Karl Jaspers.

¹³ His attitude towards Theology has been clearly stated in his discussions with the Evangelical Academy at Hofgeismar, reported in "ANSTÖSSE", March 1954.

¹⁴ Compare, e.g., Rudolf Bultmann's movement of Entmythologisierung; discussions on Entmythologisierung are to be found in the 3 volumes of "Kerygma und Mythos", edited by Dr. Hans-Werner.

¹⁵ *Sein und Zeit*, p. 175 f. Also Holzwege.

¹⁶ K. Jaspers' denial of an universally binding objective philosophy pervades all his major works. A clear statement of Jaspers' opinion about Heidegger is however, to be found in an essay "Wahrheit und Unheil" (in 'Kerygma und Mythos' vol III). There Jaspers writes, referring to the "Sein und Zeit": "Diese Philosophie scheint mir in Zweideutigkeiten zu stehen. Sie denkt eine Existenzphilosophie . . . , aber sie denkt sie zugleich wissenschaftlich, phänomenologisch, objectivierend." Jaspers considers this to be an error.

VIRGINIA WOOLF AND THE CAPTURE OF THE MOMENT

II

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"What is the meaning of life?" That was all—a simple question; one that tended to close in on one with years. The great revelation had never come. The great revelation perhaps never did come. Instead there were little daily miracles, illuminations, matches struck unexpectedly in the dark."

VIRGINIA WOOLF: TO THE LIGHT HOUSE.

A question that naturally arises is—Why this ceaseless preoccupation with 'Time'? Virginia Woolf never stops experimenting with the devices of memory, flash-back and foreshortening. It might be said that Mrs. Woolf found traditional time-sequence inadequate for the purpose of recreating reality as observed by her. That would, however, not be the complete answer. In fact, Virginia Woolf, found traditional time-sequence inadequate and insufficient in so far as rendering of character is concerned and a full rendering of character for her, meant the display of the inner lives of her creatures. In this she was certainly influenced by other contemporary writers, particularly by James Joyce and Marcel Proust. There can be no doubt that Joyce's fluidity of prose style, his deliberate disregard for traditional time-sequence and his method of associative writing had left a permanent effect on Mrs. Woolf's style and technique. She makes repeated references to Proust, whom she read in the original French. Proust had also left a permanent impress on her style. But it would be wrong to stop at this point. She was influenced by Joyce and Proust primarily because her own endeavours were also taking her along similar lines. Joyce handled interior monologue in a novel manner, he presented consciousness through a mixture of introspection and anticipation in the characters themselves, he emancipated novelistic plot and characterization completely from traditional shackles of time. Proust's contributions were similar but somewhat more artistic. Proust's continual preoccupation with nature and quality of "experience in time", his interpretation of Bergsonian concept of "duration", and above all his supreme capacity, as Clive Bell puts it, "to fill and colour the bubble of present time with a vision of the past",¹ could influence Virginia Woolf only because she herself had already formulated her own technique and stylistic method and was looking for the sure means of attaining them in the best possible way.

¹ Clive Bell: *Proust*. (Hogarth Press) 1928. This little book undoubtedly reflects the great interest taken in Proust by the literary and artistic group to which Virginia Woolf belonged.

The Voyage Out was published in 1915 and *Night and Day* in 1919. In these two novels Virginia Woolf was still fumbling for a way out. But the publication of *Jacob's Room* in 1922 marks a definite step in her career. In this novel, "the studied tenuousness of expression"² is abundantly evident. Besides, chronology ceases to be important, and human experience is no longer presented whole, but is broken down into a series of shifting impressions which are constantly kept in position by the author's controlling eye. The author has not yet vanished from the scene. She is present on the scene of occurrence and she is present both as a commentator and as an interpreter of events, character and even the flux of time. Here is a typical illustration:

"Captain Barefoot liked him best of the boys; but as for saying why.

It seems then that men and women are equally at fault. It seems that a profound, impartial and absolutely just opinion of our fellow-creatures is utterly unknown. Either we are men, or we are young, or growing old. In any case life is but a procession of shadows, and God knows why it is that we embrace them so eagerly, and see them depart with so much anguish, being shadows. And why, if this and much more than this is true, why are we yet surprised in the window corner by a sudden vision that the young man in the chair is of all things in the world the most real, the most solid, the best known to us—why indeed? For the moment after we know nothing about him.

Such is the manner of our seeing. Such the conditions of our love".

(p. 115-16)

In this novel Virginia Woolf consistently follows a particular method. The point of view keeps shifting all the time. She introduces characters whose sole function is to provide the reader with fleeting and fragmentary impressions of the main characters. A character, with Virginia Woolf, is not just a Jamesian "reflector". An individual character is the sum-total of his own impressions as also those that he makes on his fellow creatures. Jacob is the principal character. But his character is created all throughout by many indirect strokes. But the minor characters too have a life of their own—which are revealed unexpectedly by a sudden flash of light. The novel grows round the life of Jacob. The boy Jacob grows up, goes to Cambridge, to his lodgings in London, has his love affairs, visits France and then Greece and then dies in the war. He lives and dies and what is left of him is left in the impressions he created in the minds of others, a room full of his earthly belongings which would probably renew those impressions in his friends and relations. The method is "impressionistic" and yet not merely that either. The author passes quite easily from one character to another. The transitions are conditioned by the needs of the moment in the story. Virginia Woolf seems to suggest all through that these fragments of experience, these fleeting impressions

² David Daiches: *Virginia Woolf*, 1042. (New Directions, Conn, U.S.A.), p. 20.

have a profound inter-relationship of their own, and that it would appear spontaneously throughout the story. When Jacob dies he does not cease to be. The experiences of his short life have all been gathered together and entombed in past time, which in their turn have been transmuted into the memory of those who had known him alive and would remember him dead. The concluding chapter of the novel (Chapter XIV) is illuminating:

"He left everything just as it was", Bonamy marvelled, "Nothing arranged. All his letters strewn about for any one to read. What did he expect? Did he think he would come back?" he mused, standing in the middle of Jacob's room.

Listless is the air in an empty room, just swelling the curtain; the flowers in the jar shift. One fibre in the wicker arm-chair creaks, though no one sits there.

Bonamy crossed to the window. Pickford's van swung down the street. The omnibuses were locked together at Mudie's corner. Engines throbbed, and carters, jamming the brakes down, pulled their horses sharp up. A harsh and unhappy voice cried something unintelligible. And then suddenly all the leaves seemed to raise themselves.

"Jacob! Jacob!" cried Bonamy, standing by the window. The leaves sank down again.

"Such confusion everywhere!" exclaimed Betty Flanders, bursting open the bedroom door.

Bonamy turned away from the window.

"What am I to do with these Mr. Bonamy's?"

She held out a pair of Jacob's old shoes.

(pp. 289-90)

That is how this unusual novel is concluded. *Jacob's Room*, it seems, was purposively written for "impressions", that is, for rendering human experience in flux. Indeed, there is a plot in this novel, but the plot has been pushed to the background; it has not been used as a means for a proper interpretation of reality. In this novel the plot does not impose a pattern on the experiences recounted. Rather, the record of the flux of experience, as made by the author who is an "ever-present eaves-dropper of the stream of conscience",³ has brought into existence the plot as a by-product. But all this changed in her next novel *Mrs. Dalloway*, which has a very well-constructed plot.

Mrs. Dalloway, which was published in 1925, has been called by David Daiches "the first wholly successful novel that Virginia Woolf produced",⁴ and Joan Bennett characterizes it as "one of her four most satisfying novels".⁵ Mr. E. M. Forster writing in the *Criterion*, April 1926, says: "It is perhaps her masterpiece, but difficult, and I am not altogether sure about every detail except when my fountain pen is in my hand".

³ J. Isaacs: *An Assessment of Twentieth Century Lit.*, p. 95.

⁴ David Daiches: *Virginia Woolf*, p. 61.

⁵ Joan Bennett: *Virginia Woolf—Her Art as a Novelist*, p. 97 (1949).

In her diary Virginia Woolf wrote on Tuesday, April 8, 1925, among other things: ".....More and more do I repeat my own version of Montaigne—'It is life that matters' ". Now this is significant for obvious reasons. In *Mrs. Dalloway* Virginia Woolf is deliberately out to prove that 'life', though it is "the oddest affair", has in it "the essence of reality". In *Jacob's Room*, she had tried to give us a glimpse of the fleeting and shifting experiences of life. In *Mrs. Dalloway*, she makes a deliberate attempt to carry the stream of consciousness method to its highest level of achievement and vindicate its possibilities as a technique for the completely artistic way of portraying "life". She achieves this end by a rigorous process of elimination, selection and clarification of the materials used. *Mrs. Dalloway* has a vigorous structure.

In this novel, the entire action is limited, like that in Joyce's *Ulysses*, to a single June day in the life of its chief character—spatially to London, and "spiritually" or rather, emotionally, to the relations Mrs. Dalloway has with certain other people. The action is presented mainly through the minds of these other people without any reference to conventional time, or space. The novel is actually more concerned with the past of the characters and their stakes of consciousness at different spatial and temporal levels than in the things that take place in that one day. Of course, certain things like Mrs. Dalloway's party, her shopping, the death of Septimus, do take place in course of the particular day. Mrs. Dalloway is the focal point. All the action is centered round her. But the method of presentation follows a rather free movement completely independent of time-sequence. Mrs. Dalloway begins her day by going out to shop for her party which is to take place the same evening. The book ends with a description of that party itself. The reader moves through her mind to the days of her early girlhood spent at home where she met Peter Walsh, now serving in India. London makes an entry—"life; London; this moment in June". She meets her next-door neighbour, Purvis, her friend Hugh Whitbread. And her husband and her daughter Elizabeth, Elizabeth's friend Doris Kilman, her own friend Sally Seton and many other people pass through her mind in quick or slow succession. The reader learns a good deal not only about the character of Mrs. Dalloway, but about a varied group of other people who are related to her. They are related to her in a variety of ways. Some cross her path at one time or the other in course of this particular day, or she thinks of them, or they think of her. The relationship is never casual, they are seemingly so. Each character, no matter whether he or she crosses Mrs. Dalloway's path in space, that is, in London, or in time, that is, doing something at the same time or in memory (both in time and space), has some very intimate relation with both Mrs. Dalloway herself and with the central theme of the book. The relationship is symbolical. The central theme of the book has its interpretation and elaboration in the character of Mrs. Dalloway. The haphazard and random cross-section of a part of human life and experiences is actually, at the bottom, a highly organized representation of all those human experiences that constitute "life". Virginia Woolf has already travelled far away from the stage of "impressionism", pure and simple.

The method of developing story, and character as embedded it, by Virginia Woolf needs a careful analysis. *Mrs. Dalloway* has been rightly called: "a musical fugue in construction".^{*} The novel has a definite movement. The movement goes forward and backward rhythmically. It follows an alternating pattern. At first a point is fixed—a point of consciousness in *Mrs. Dalloway*. That becomes the focal point. From that point the movement swings—away in space, backward in time, opening up long vistas of experience and character, and then forward again to the particular day of the novel-time. Then another fixed point—a point in both time and space—a June morning, Bond Street. The movement begins again from this point through different points of consciousness in different persons: Watkiss, Septimus and Lucrezia, Sarah, and Bowley. Then comes the third fixed point—a point in the *Septimus-Lucrezia consciousness*. There is again a backward and forward movement at this point both spatially and temporarily. On a careful analysis of the whole book it would be found that the pattern is built up with extreme care and precision. This results in the creation of a completely satisfying artistic whole. *Jacob's Room* with all its brilliance remains a patchy affair and *Mrs. Dalloway* is a composite whole. Mr. R. L. Chambers is right when he says: "*Mrs. Dalloway* represents a compromise between the need for formal clarity of presentation and the formlessness apparently inherent in the 'stream of consciousness' technique, with its insistence that 'everything is the proper stuff of fiction', that 'no perception comes amiss'. It was perhaps the main achievement of Virginia Woolf's genius to discover that such a compromise was possible; certainly it required an artistic sensibility of a very high order to apply such a compromise in practice....." Like Joyce, Mrs. Woolf in *Mrs. Dalloway*, succeeds in escaping from the limitations of chronological time by an effective use of the interior monologue. In addition, the use of the alternating pattern of time and space and of time-space has enabled her to effect transitions between different situations. The reader is introduced to a character. He gets inside that character and shares with him or her the movement backward and forward of his or her mind. The reverie of that character is brought up to the present time. And then the reader is reminded of some other character, who has his or her own movements in mind. Thus sometimes, the reader stands still in time and moves from one character to another, and at other times, he stands still in space, that is, in the mind of a particular character and moves backward and forward in his consciousness. The author does not sit idle when all this is taking place. With remarks, such as, "she could remember", "she thought, walking on" and even interpretations, such as, "For Heaven only knows why one loves so" and so on, the author constantly reminds the reader of the existence of time, space, different characters and all the movements which constitute human existence—"life".

There are different kinds of reveries which are in a constant state of flux, but the personality of the particular person involved acts as the

* J. Isaacs: *An Assessment of Twentieth Century Lit.*, p. 87.

† R. L. Chambers: *The Novels of Virginia Woolf* (1947), p. 82.

unifying agent and often gives the divergent and even chaotic reveries a definite direction. Virginia Woolf often shifts from one person to another—or rather from the reveries of one person to those of another. Such a shift invariably involves a change in the unifying agent as well. The individual personality no longer remains the unifying agent. The moment of time which joins these different characters or individuals assume that office. That particular moment of time is indicated and repeatedly emphasised by the striking of a clock. Joyce had exactly the same thing in mind when in *Stephen Hero*, Stephen told his friend Cranly that “the clock of the Ballast Office was capable of an epiphany.”⁸ In *Mrs. Dalloway* whenever we hear a clock striking a particular hour we can be certain that the author is going to shift from one character to another, either in space or in time. The clock by striking a particular note at a particular time acts as the unifying factor in disparate characters. “Characters are revealed to each other by existing contemporaneously, by co-existence in time: moments of time are related to each other by co-existence within the retrospecting mind of the individual”⁹ The best illustration is probably to be found in the following:

“Tell me”, he said, seizing her by the shoulders. “Are you happy, Clarissa? Does Richard——”

The door opened.

“Here is my Elizabeth”, said Clarissa, emotionally, histrionically, perhaps.

“How d’y do?” said Elizabeth coming forward.

The sound of Big Ben striking the half-hour struck out between them with extraordinary vigour, as if a young man, strong, indifferent, inconsiderate, were swinging dumb-bells this way and that.

(p. 73).

And also in the following:

“It was precisely twelve o’clock; twelve by Big Ben; whose stroke was wafted over the northern part of London; blent with that of other clocks, mixed in a thin ethereal way with the clouds and wisps of smoke and died up there among the sea gulls—twelve o’clock struck as Clarissa Dalloway laid her green dress on her bed, and the Warren Smiths walked down Harley Street. Twelve was the hour of their appointment. Probably, Rezia thought, that was Sir William Bradshaw’s house with the gray motor car in front of it (The leaden circles dissolved in the air).

(p. 142).

“It is this, he said, as he entered Deen’s Yard. Big Ben was beginning to strike, first the warning, musical; then the hour, irrevocable. Lunch parties waste the entire afternoon, he thought, approaching his door.

⁸ *Supra*. Chapter V.

⁹ David Daiches: *Virginia Woolf*, p. 65. The author discusses this use of the clock at great length in Chapter IV of this book.

The sound of Big Ben flooded Clarissa's drawing-room, where she sat, ever so annoyed, at her writing-table ; worried; annoyed".
(p. 177).

And then we come to Septimus Warren Smith. Mrs. Woolf herself called him Clarissa's "double". He is also her anti-type. He is an ex-soldier, suffering from shell-shock. He is introduced to the reader at regular intervals in the novel with his Italian wife, Lucrezia. The Septimus-Lucrezia episode is built up step by step and with great care through objective narration of the author and the stream of consciousness of Septimus himself. Late in the day Septimus commits suicide to escape the attendants who come to take him away to an asylum. Sir William Bradshaw, a pompous and bungling specialist, who has been the indirect cause of the suicide, comes to Mrs. Dalloway's party and in a callous manner refers to it. A moment of illuminating insight enables Mrs. Dalloway to experience a complete identity with the luckless young-man's suicide as she thinks of life and death in terms of time. Mrs. Dalloway had never known him in person. Yet this identity of these two disparate and unknown characters imparts to the novel its completeness.

It is thus clear that Virginia Woolf's concept of this identity or to put it more exactly, *unity* has determined the technique of characterization in *Mrs. Dalloway*. She does not describe her characters. Nor does she sum them up in a phrase or two. They often lack the tangible immediacy of say, a Conrad character. This effect she creates deliberately. For, like Proust she thinks that if characters are sharply defined the technique of the novel would run counter to its real purpose. Indeed, "life itself" as she calls it,—that is, a vision of life that denies the validity of boundaries must be projected through and expressed in characters.

It is absolutely unnecessary to assess the extent of Joyce's or Proust's influence on Virginia Woolf with special reference to *Mrs. Dalloway*. Virginia Woolf belongs certainly to the group of those novelists who deliberately turned inward. She accepted the stream of consciousness technique. But while doing that she also contributed to the technique something original, and indeed, carried it a step further. For instance, Virginia Woolf never endeavours to recreate the stream of consciousness of her characters directly, as Joyce constantly does in *Ulysses*. It is *reported*. The author is always present in her novels. As a matter of fact, the style of her novels coincides completely with the vision of life she had and that the novels seek to communicate. Underneath the disparate and even conflicting views presented in her novels, there is the "impersonal narrator", a sort of central intelligence. The reader is very seldom allowed to become too aware of its presence. Yet this central intelligence keeps control of the story as it progresses, not only through its power of directing the raw materials, but also through the ability to extend the idea of a common impulse beneath diversity. Thus she reports with such phrases as "she thought", "she walked on, thinking". The narrator often speaks directly but seldom in the first person. This enables

the reader to have an illusion of entering a character's consciousness. At times the narrator gets completely submerged in the particular character whose stream of consciousness is being transcribed. Then, the impersonal pronoun "one" is substituted for the "he" or "she". Here is a typical example of this:

"For having lived in Westminster—how many years now? over twenty,—one feels even in the midst of the traffic, or waking at night, Clarissa was positive, a particular hush, or solemnity; an indescribable pause; a suspense (but that might be her heart, affected, they said, by influenza) before Big Ben strikes. There! Out it boomed. First a warning, musical; then the hour, irrevocable. The leaden circles dissolved in the air. Such fools we are, she thought, crossing Victoria Street. For Heaven only knows why one loves it so, how one sees it somaking it up, building it round one tumbling it,..... (pp. 8-9).

Mrs. Dalloway, then is a presentation of a complete view of life. In this novel Virginia Woolf was able, above every thing else, to regulate her perspective and "to formalize a consistent interpretation of experience."¹⁰ She was not, as some entries in her diary clearly show, entirely satisfied with her performance. But that was an artist's dissatisfaction, not a critic's. There is in this novel "a suggestion throughout that the experiences of individuals combine to form a single indeterminate whole, and that wisdom is the recognition of this. Her characters are shown as reaching their moments of greatest insight when they perceive life as that "luminous halo"....."¹¹ These moments of insight are given to the reader in a highly symbolical and yet organized manner, for instance:

"What business had the Bradshaws to talk of death at her party? A young man had killed himself. And they talked of it at her party—the Bradshaws talked of death. He had killed himself—but how? Always her body went through it first, when she was told, suddenly, of an accident; her dress flamed, her body burnt. He had thrown himself from a window. Up had flashed the ground; through him, blundering, bruising, went the rusty spikes. There he lay with a thud, thud in his brain, and then a suffocation of blackness. So she saw it. But why had he done it? And the Bradshaws talked of it at her party!

She had once thrown a shilling into the Serpentine, never anything more. But he had flung it away. They went on living (she would have to go back; the rooms were still crowded; people kept on coming). They (all day she had been thinking of Bourton, of Peter, of Sally), they would grow old. A thing there was that mattered; a thing, wreathed about with chatter, defaced, obscured in her own life, let drop every day in corruption, lies, chatter. This he had preserved. Death was defiance. Death was an attempt to communicate; people feeling the impossibility of reaching the

¹⁰ James Hailey: *The Glass Roof*. (Univ. of California Pr.), 1954, p. 76.

¹¹ David Daiches: *Virginia Woolf*, p. 78.

centre which, mystically, evaded them; closeness drew apart; rapture faded, one was alone. There was an embrace in death.

But this young man who had killed himself—had he plunged holding his treasure? "If it were now to die, 'twere now to be most happy", she said to herself once, coming down in white.

(pp. 277-78).

and in these lines too:

"It held, foolish as the idea was, something of her own in it, this country sky, this sky above Westminster. She parted the curtains; she looked. Oh, but how surprising!—in the room opposite the old lady stared straight at her! She was going to bed. And the sky. It will be a solemn sky, she had thought, it will be a dusky sky, turning away its cheek in beauty. But there it was ashen pale, raced over by tapering vast clouds. It was new to her. The wind must have risen. She was going to bed, in the room opposite. It was fascinating to watch her, moving about, that old lady, crossing the room, coming to the window. Could she see her? It was fascinating, with people still laughing and shouting in the drawing-room, to watch that old woman, quite quietly, going to bed. She pulled the blind now. The clock began striking. The young man had killed himself; but she did not pity him; with the clock striking the hour, one, two, three, she did not pity him, with all this going on. There! the old lady had put out her light! the whole house was dark now with this going on, she repeated, and the words came to her, Fear no more the heat of the sun. She must go back to them. But what an extraordinary night! She felt somehow very like him—the young man who had killed himself. She felt glad that he had done it; thrown it away. The clock was striking. The leaden circles dissolved in the air. He made her feel the beauty; made her feel the fun. But she must go back. She must assemble. She must find Sally and Peter. And she came in from the little room.

(pp. 279-81)

To the Lighthouse was published in 1927 This is what Virginia Woolf wrote in her diary on Tuesday, November, 23, 1926, when she was actually writing this novel:

"...yet I am now and then haunted by some semi-mystic very profound life of a woman, which shall all be told on one occasion; and time shall be utterly obliterated; future shall somehow blossom out of the past. One incident—say the fall of a flower—might contain it. My theory being that the actual event practically does not exist—nor time either".

She worked hard to give a practical expression to this theory, that "the actual even practically does not exist—nor time either". And *To the Lighthouse* was the result.

To the Lighthouse is the easiest to read. It is certainly easier than *Mrs. Dalloway*. It appears to develop on normal structural lines, although the basic technique employed is that of the stream of consciousness. It is divided into three main parts: *The Window*, *Time Passes*, and *The*

Lighthouse. The first part deals with Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay, their children and their guests on a holiday on an island one mid-September day. The third part is concerned with events one morning ten years later more or less at the same place. The second part, *Time Passes*, gives us an impressionistic portrayal of the change and decay of the house of the Ramsays during the ten years it is not visited by any one. During these ten years Mrs. Ramsay dies, Andrew Ramsay is killed in War and Prue Ramsay dies in childbirth. All this information is given casually while describing the decay of the house itself. In the third part, the Ramsay family, made smaller by death, visits the house with some of the former guests. Lily Briscoe completes the picture she had started ten years ago before, under the direct impact of the vision that illuminates her inner mind. At about the same time Mr. Ramsay with two of the children (now adolescents) reaches "the Lighthouse". Their arrival and Lily Briscoe's final vision occur at the same time and this identity enhances the symbolic significance of the novel.

There is an abruptness in the opening lines of the novel:

"Yes, of course, if it's fine to-morrow", said Mrs. Ramsay.

"But you'll have to be up with the lark", she added.

(p. 11)

Mrs. Ramsay refers to an expected journey to the Lighthouse. It means so much to young James Ramsay, aged six. The young boy's reactions are described thus:

"To her son these words conveyed an extraordinary joy, as if it were settled the expedition were bound to take place, and the wonder to which he had looked forward, for years and years it seemed, was, after a night's darkness and a day's sail, within touch. Since he belonged, even at the age of six, to that great clan which cannot keep this feeling separate from that, but must let future prospects, with their joys and sorrows, cloud what is actually at hand, since to such people even in earliest childhood any turn in the wheel of sensation has the power to crystallise and transfix the moment upon which its gloom or radiance rests, James Ramsay, sitting on the floor cutting out pictures from the illustrated catalogue of the Army and Navy Stores, endowed the picture of a refrigerator as his mother spoke with heavenly bliss. It was fringed with joy. The wheelbarrow, the lawn-mower, the sound of poplar trees, leaves whitening before rain, rooks cawing, brooms knocking, dresses rustling—all these were so coloured and distinguished in his mind that he had already his private code, his secret language, though he appeared the image of stark and uncompromising severity, with his high forehead and his fierce blue eyes, impeccably candid and pure, frowning slightly at the sight of human frailty, so that his mother, watching him guide his scissors neatly round the refrigerator, imagined him all red and ermine on the Bench or directing a stern and momentous enterprise in some crisis of public affairs.

(pp. 11-12).

This is deliberate. Virginia Woolf weaves into these lines the consciousness of James's character, her own comments as an author and reflection of one character's view on another's. Mr. Ramsay appears very cruel to James when he says:

"But", said his father, stopping in front of the drawing-room window, "it won't be fine".

And ten years after they do take a boat and reach the Lighthouse. James is now sixteen.

"Well done!" James had steered them like a born sailor. There! Cam thought, addressing herself silently to James. You've got it at last. For she knew that this was what James had been wanting, and she knew that now he had got it he was so pleased that he would not look at her or at his father or at any one. There he sat with his hand on the tiller sitting bolt upright, looking rather sulky and frowning slightly. He was so pleased that he was not going to let anybody take away a grain of his pleasure. His father had praised him. They must think that he was perfectly indifferent. But you've got it now, Cam thought.

(p. 316).

All this is so natural and simple; and yet so charged with deep symbolical meaning. In this novel, Virginia Woolf tries her best to give her own version of experience and its dependence on time and personality. This is the essence of this novel.

"In what sense can one personality ever 'know' another? What relation do our various memories of a single object bear to the 'real' object? What remains when a personality has been 'spilt on air' and exists only as a group of contradictory impressions in others, who are also moving towards death? In what way does time condition human experience and its value?"¹² Virginia Woolf tries her best to answer these and some other fundamental questions regarding life and human experience.

In fact, Lily Briscoe asks some questions which are, really speaking, Virginia Woolf's questions:

"Was it wisdom? Was it knowledge? Was it, once more, the deceptiveness of beauty, so that all one's perceptions, half-way to truth, were tangled in a golden mess? or did she lock up within her some secret which certainly Lily Briscoe believed people must jave for the world to go on at all? Every one could not be as helter skelter, hand to mouth as she was. But if they knew, could they tell one what they knew? Sitting on the floor with her arms round Mrs. Ramsay's knees, close as she could get, smiling to think that Mrs. Ramsay would never know the reason of that pressure, she imagined how in the chambers of the mind and heart of the woman who was, physically, touching her, were stood, like the treasures in the tombs of kings, tablets bearing sacred inscriptions, which if one could spell them out would teach one everything, but

they would never be offered opening, never made publick. What art was there, known to love or cunning, by which one pressed through into those secret chambers? What device for becoming, like waters poured into one jar, inextricably the same, one with the object one adored? Could the body achieve it, or the mind, subtly mingling in the intricate passages of the brain? Or the heart? Could loving, as people called it, make her and Mrs. Ramsay one? for it was not knowledge but unity she desired, not inscriptions on tablets, nothing that could be written in any language known to men, but intimacy itself, which is knowledge, she had thought, leaning her head on Mrs. Ramsay's knee".

(pp. 82-83).

This is in the first part: *The Window*. Lily Briscoe has not yet attained a vision of life. Her painting is still incomplete. In part three, Lily Briscoe has developed a good deal. She has understood the meaning of Mrs. Ramsay's personality, she had understood, however, incomplete and fragmentary her knowledge may be at the moment, the implication of the indelible stamp that can be left on time by a personality. This is what she says:

... But what a power was in the human soul! she thought. That woman sitting there writing under the rock resolved everything into simplicity; made those angers, irritations fall off like old rags; she brought together this and that and then this, and so made out of that miserable silliness and spite (she and Charles squabbling, sparring, had been silly and spiteful) something—this scene on the beach for example, this moment of friendship and liking—which survived, after all these years, complete, so that she dipped into it to refashion her memory of him, and it stayed in the mind like a work of art.

"Like a work of art", she repeated, looking from her canvas to the drawing-room steps and back again. She must rest for a moment. And, resting, looking from one to the other vaguely, the old question which traversed the sky of the soul perpetually, the vast, the general question which was apt to particularise itself at such moments as these, when she released faculties that had been on the strain, stood over her, paused over her, darkened over her. What is the meaning of life? That was all—a simple question; one that tended to close in on one with years. The great revelation had never come. The great revelation perhaps never did come. Instead there were little daily miracles, illuminations, matches struck unexpectedly in the dark; here was one. This, that, and the other; herself and Charles Tansley and the breaking waves; Mrs. Ramsay bringing them together; Mrs. Ramsay saying "Life stand still here"; Mrs. Ramsay making of the moment something permanent (as in another sphere Lily herself tried to make of the moment something permanent,—this was of the nature of a revelation. In the midst of chaos there was shape; this eternal passing and flowing (she looked at the clouds going and the leaves

shaking) was struck into stability. Life stand still here, Mrs. Ramsay said. "Mrs. Ramsay! Mrs. Ramsay!" she repeated. She owed this revelation to her. (pp. 248-250).

Lily Briscoe does not stop at this particular moment. Gradually she moves nearer to *reality*.

"Little words that broke up the thought and dismembered it said nothing. "About life, about death; about Mrs. Ramsay"—no, she thought, one could say nothing to nobody. The urgency of the moment always missed its mark. Words fluttered sideways and struck inches too low. Then one gave it up; then the idea sunk back again; then one became like most middle-aged people, cautious, furtive, with wrinkles between the eyes and a look of perpetual apprehension. For how could one express in words these emotions of the body? Express that emptiness there? (She was looking at the drawing-room steps; they looked extraordinarily empty). It was one's body's feeling, not one's mind. The physical sensations that went with the bare look of the steps had become suddenly extremely unpleasant. To want and not to have, sent all up her body a hardness, a hollowness, a strain. And then to want and not to have—to want and want—how that wrung the heart, and wrung it again and again! Oh Mrs. Ramsay! She called out silently, to that essence which sat by the boat, that abstract one made of her, that woman in grey, as if to abuse her for having gone, and then having gone, come back again. . . .

"What does it mean? How do you explain it all"? She wanted to say, turning to Mrs. Carmichael again. For the whole world seemed to have dissolved in this early morning hour into a pool of thought, a deep basin of reality, and one could almost fancy that had Mr. Carmichael spoken, a little tear would have rent the surface of the pool. And then? Something would emerge. A hand would be shoved up, a blade would be flashed. . . .

(pp. 274-276).

And then comes the final realisation—the ultimate vision:

"He must have reached it", said Lily Briscoe aloud, feeling suddenly completely tired out. . . .

Quickly, as if she were recalled by something over there she turned to her canvas. There it was—her picture. Yes, with all its green and blues, its lines running up and across, its attempt at something. It would be hung in the attics, she thought; it would be destroyed. But what did that matter? She asked herself, taking up her brush again. She looked at the steps; they were empty; she looked at her canvas; it was blurred. With a sudden intensity, as if she saw it clear for a second, she drew a line there, in the centre. It was done; it was finished. Yes, she thought, laying down her brush in extreme fatigue, I have had my vision.

(pp. 319-320).

Mrs. Ramsay is the central character. She is one of Virginia Woolf's most successful creations. She is both a symbol and an individual. No

body never calls her by the first name. She wears grey clothes during day and black at night. She is indefinite. Yet she is an individual. She is a wife, a mother of eight children, a beautiful woman who finds great pleasure in match-making, a practical nurse and an able hostess. She is a likeable human being and what is more, she is almost a normal person. But she is something even more. She can create moments of unity that remain intact in the memory, affecting one, as Lily Briscoe realised "like a work of art". Mr. Ramsay is altogether a different person. He is an intellectual—precisely factual and pessimistic. But it would be wrong to take him as a figure of fun. It might be said with a certain amount of appropriateness that if *To the Lighthouse* is a story of a contrast between two different kinds of truth, then Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay surely represent two opposing kinds of truth. Mr. Ramsay's truth is precise and factual. Mrs. Ramsay's truth lies in a man's movement towards it. For her, truth is an attainable ideal, which is never fully apprehended. Like a beacon-light it lures man on and on. The struggle for truth, man's constant endeavour to attain it, is the truth. Mr. Ramsay with this scientific, factual mind spatializes knowledge thus:

"... For if thought is like the keyboard of a piano, divided into so many notes, or like the alphabet is ranged in twenty-six letters all in order, then his splendid mind had no sort of difficulty in running over those letters one by one, firmly and accurately, until it had reached, say, the letter Q. He reached Q. Very few people in the whole of England ever reach Q. Here, stopping for one moment by the stone urn which held the geraniums, he saw, but now far away, like the children picking shells, divinely innocent and occupied with little trifles at their feet and somehow entirely defenceless against a doom which he perceived, his wife and son, together, in the window. They needed his protection. But after Q? What comes next? After Q there are a number of letters the last of which is scarcely visible to mortal eyes, but glimmers red in the distance. Z is only reached once by one man in a generation. Still, if he could reach R it would be something. Here at least was Q. He dug his heels in at Q. Q he was sure of Q he could demonstrate. If Q then is Q—R—Here he knocked his pipe out, with two of three resonant taps on the ram's horn which made the handle of the urn, and then proceeds "then R....." He braced himself. He clenched himself.

(pp. 56-57).

But Mrs. Ramsay is so different. She has no faith in logic or analysis. She is intuitive. She is more interested in time than in space. She believes more in qualitative aspects of phenomenon than its quantitative diversity. The whole of *The Window* is a statement and a counter-statement of this truth.

The second part: *Time Passes*, is apparently impressionistic, but it is something more than that. It is vital to the novel as a whole. It cannot just be withdrawn. In this section Virginia Woolf seems to put Mrs. Ramsay's vision to test. She tries to test her vision by

Mrs. Ramsay's facts. Indeed, time passes, life decays. And of course there is death. Virginia Woolf, however, does not stop at this point. The ultimate truth, she seems to suggest, rises superior to "these facts of life" and transcends both time and space. Time passes and yet true "Time" stands captured for ever by our moments of vision.

The third part is of course devoted entirely to this ultimate realisation of truth that transcends time and space. Lily Briscoe composes a picture. Time intrudes. Ten years later Lily attempts once more to give expression to her vision by formalising it. She remembers Mrs. Ramsay and recalls certain sparkling moments of the past. Mr. Ramsay and the two children leave on a boat for the Lighthouse. Lily begins her painting. Mrs. Ramsay's memory occupies her mind, overwhelms her and Lily completely loses her own identity in the memoried personality of Mrs. Ramsay. It seems Lily owes everything to her. Mrs. Ramsay was the mistress of the living moment, illuminated by the intensity of her intuitive experience of life. "Mrs. Ramsay! Mrs. Ramsay!" she cries over and over again. Lily wants Mrs. Ramsay to come back and enable her to complete her picture. Mrs. Ramsay does not return. Only the memory bathed in the intensive rays of retrospection returns:

"Suddenly the window at which she was looking was whitened by some light stuff behind it. At last then somebody had come into the drawing-room; somebody was sitting in the chair. For Heaven's sake, she prayed, let them sit still there and not come floundering out to talk to her. Mercifully, whoever it was stayed still inside; had settled by some stroke of luck so as to throw an odd-shaped triangular shadow over the step. It altered the composition of the picture a little. It was interesting. It might be useful. Her mood was coming back to her. One must keep on looking without for a second relaxing the intensity of emotion, the determination not to be put off, not to be bamboozled. One must hold the scene—so—in a vice and let nothing come in and spoil it. One wanted she thought, to be on a level with ordinary experience, to feel simply that's a chair, that's a table, and yet at the same time. It's a miracle, it's an ecstasy. The problem might be solved after all"

(pp. 309-310).

Lily at last is able to finish her picture. She has her vision. She too ~~makes~~ her final journey to "The Lighthouse".

From the point of view of novelistic technique, as we have seen before, *To the Lighthouse* is the most natural of all Virginia Woolf's novels. It has none of the technical complexities of *Mrs. Dalloway*. It moves on normal constructional lines from scene to scene and from the mind of one person to another. There is very little violence or complication in these shifts from one consciousness to another. These movements are made further easy by allowing every incident to take place in a close-knit homogenous world. *To the Lighthouse* unlike *Mrs. Dalloway* (which is written as one piece without any chapters or sections) has three main sections and these sections are subdivided into smaller parts for the sake

of convenience. In this respect Virginia Woolf accepts the normal novelistic convention. As we have seen before, the division of the novel into three main chapters or sections, each with a definite title has also added to the naturalness of the novel. And then in this novel Virginia Woolf follows the technique of stream of consciousness and brings to bear on this method the full force of her imaginative genius. Yet, she maintains throughout great clarity. She wants to make a statement of *fact* or *vision*. In this novel the statement is invariably made in an explicit manner. The author succeeds on the whole in striking a balance in her method so that she is able to carry on her personal investigation through the stream of consciousness of a set of created characters. In fact, the narrator or the central intelligence in this novel has gained more importance but has become less discernible. Lastly, in the concluding sub-sections of Part Three: *The Lighthouse* (sixth to fourteenth, pp. 262-320) Virginia Woolf has given us illustrations of the art of structural building-up and mutual irradiation and illumination of the highest order of excellence. We have seen something of this in Butler's *The Way of All Flesh*. In the same manner, but in a much more subtle way, Virginia Woolf has given us a structural building-up of the story and a mutual illumination of such diverse characters as Lily Briscoe, Mr. Ramsay, James, Cam, and Macalister's boy who are all alive and in action; and persons like Mrs Ramsay, Charles Tansley, Mr Carmichael, William Bankes and Minta, who are physically absent yet so very active in the minds of others.

Orlando was published in 1928, *The Waves* in 1931 and *The Years* in 1937. *Between the Acts* was the last novel written by Virginia Woolf. It was posthumously published in 1941 after her sad death. Let us examine this particular novel carefully

After the publication of *The Years* in 1937 Virginia Woolf started writing *Three Guineas* (1938) and *Roger Fry: A Biography* (1940). But she was all the time thinking of another new novel—"new" in the sense that she wanted it to be something quite different and unique. *Between the Acts* was the result. The scattering remarks about the genesis of this novel as recorded by her in her diary are both revealing and interesting. This is what she wrote at different stages:

Friday, August 6, 1937.

Will another novel ever swim up? If so, how? The only hint I have towards it is that it's to be dialogue: and poetry: and prose; all quite distinct. No more long closely written books.

Tuesday, October 19, 1937.

It came over me suddenly last night . . . that I saw the form of a new novel. It's to be first the statement of the theme: then the restatement: and so on: repeating the same story: singling out this and then that, until the central idea is stated.

Tuesday, April 26, 1938.

Why not *Poynton Hall* (became *Between the Acts*): a centre: all literature discussed in connection with the real little incongruous living humour: and anything that comes into my head; but "I" rejected: "We" substituted: to whom at end there shall be an

invocation? "We" . . . the composed of many different things . . . we all life, all art, all waifs and strays—a rambling capricious but somehow unified whole—the present state of my mind? An English country: and a scenic old house—and a terrace where nurse maids walk—and people passing—and a perpetual variety and change from intensity to prose, and facts—and notes; and—but eno'!

Her mind was working in this way when the novel was gradually taking shape. She wanted "perpetual variety" and "change from intensity to prose" as also dialogue to be put into a small novel. She was tired of "long closely written books" and as a tireless experiment in technique and form she struck upon this new medium. She was, however, conscious of her own faults and limitations:

Thursday, January 18, 1939.

I was . . . in full flood this morning with *P.H.* I think I have got at more direct method of summarising relations; and then the poems (in metre) ran off the prose lyric vein, which, as I agree with Roger, I overdo. That was, by the way, the best criticism I've had for a long time. that I poetise my inanimate scenes. stress my personality; don't let the meaning emerge from the matiere.

In the meantime German planes were raining death and devastation over England. Her cottages shook as the black bombers passed by. The air-raid sirens disturbed her and real air raids came in quick succession. Men and women were being killed everywhere. The bottom was dropping out of the universe. On *Friday, May 31st, 1940*, she wrote:

Scraps, orts and fragments, as I said in *P.H.*, which is now bubbling. I'm palying with words: and I think I owe some dexterity to finger exercises here—but the scrap. . . .

The war was on with all its ugly inhumanity. And yet

I'm writing *P.H.* which leaves a spare hour. Many air raids. One as I walked. A haystack was handy. But walked on, and so home. All clear. Then sirens again (Friday, August 16, 1940). But she would not stop. She was disturbed and moved profoundly. Still she never gave way. *Between the Acts* was completed:

Saturday, November 23, 1940.

Having this moment finished the Pageant—or Poyntz Hall?—(begun perhaps April, 1938), my thoughts turn well up, to write the first chapter of the next book (nameless). . . .

I am a little triumphant about the book. I think it's an interesting attempt in a new method. I think it's more quintessential than the others. More milk skimmed off. A richer pat, certainly a fresher than that misery—*The Years*. I've enjoyed writing almost every page.

Between the Acts has been called by an eminent critic "the most baffling of all her books".¹³ It is indeed baffling. The symbolism involved or the allegory employed in the method of presentation do not

make it baffling. That is really to be found in the purely technical peculiarities of narrative, characterization and structure. The opening pages of the novel are fine and convincing like everything else she wrote. Like *To The Lighthouse* the reader is plunged headlong into a small world created particularly for certain purposes by the author—"an English country; and a scenic old house—and a terrace where nursemaids walk—and people passing". Within the first six pages the reader is deep at the emotional centre of the novel. The reader gets into the twilight region of Isabella Oliver's half-formed passion for a complete stranger. Such a passion would not probably be of great consequence in the long run. But at the moment—at this moment it has great significance. Isabella has two children and is married to Giles for some time. They know each other but not really enough. Giles is "the father" of Isabella's children. The reader learns more and more of this as the narrative advances. Virginia Woolf follows the stream of consciousness technique and all this appears casually, rapidly and even clearly with the passage of novel-time. There is love and hatred. There are tense moments of great dramatic intensity until at last the final curtain is rung down. Or is it that the curtain goes up?

The old people had gone up to bed. Giles crumples the newspaper and turned out the light. Left alone together for the first time that day, they were silent. Alone, enmity was bared; also love. Before they slept, they must fight; after they had fought, they would embrace. From that embrace another life might be born. But first they must fight, as the dog fights with the vixen, in heart of darkness, in the fields of night.

Isa let her sewing drop. The great hooded chairs had become enormous. And Giles too. And Isa too against the window. The window was all sky without colour. The house had lost its shelter. It was night before roads were made, or houses. It was the night that dwellers in caves had watched from some high place among rocks.

Then the curtain rose. They spoke.

(p. 152).¹⁴

This is of course only a part of this fascinating novel. The action takes place in the country home of the Olivers', Poyntz Hall, on a summer day when a local pageant is produced. The pageant itself occupies about one-sixth of the novel. It consists of a prologue depicting the infancy of England, three acts—the Elizabethan, Augustan and Victorian ages—and an epilogue suggesting contemporary England. The main characters, besides Isabella and her husband Giles, in the novel are. Miss La Trobe, the author of the pageant; Bartholomew Oliver, master of Poyntz Hall and his sister Mrs. Swithin. Mrs. Manresa and William Dodge, Londoners who have stayed on to watch the pageant just by chance. The pageant is a simplified statement which is artistically integrated with consummate

¹⁴ This and other quotations from *Between the Acts* are from the Penguin ed., 1946.

skill with the extremely complex relations between all these characters to produce this unusual novel.

Between the Acts is a masterpiece despite its being baffling. In this novel Virginia Woolf has made great progress and shown greater mastery over characterization and language. Here are the old Mr. Oliver and his sister Lucy Swithin. Their personalities are carefully drawn with a few deft touches and the essence of their mental relationship is distilled. This is how the author sketches Lucy:

It was early morning. The dew was on the grass. The church clock struck eight times. Mrs Swithin drew the curtain in her bedroom—the faded white chintz that so agreeably from the outside tinged the window with its green lining. There with her old hands on the hasp, jerking it open, she stood: old Oliver's married sister; a widow. She always meant to set up a house of her own; perhaps in Kensington, perhaps at Kew, so that she could have the benefit of the gardens. But she stayed on all throughout the summer; and when winter wept its damp upon the panes, and choked the gutters with dead leaves, she said: "Why, Bart, did they build in the hollow, facing north"? Her brother said, "Obviously to escape from nature. Weren't four horses needed to drag the family coach through the mud"? . . .

But it was summer now. She had been waked by the birds. How they sang! attacking the dawn like so many choir boys attacking an iced cake. Forced to listen, she had stretched for her favourite reading—an Outline of History—and had spent the hours between three and five thinking of rhododendron forests in Piccadilly; when the entire continent, not then, she understood, divided by a channel, was all one; populated, she understood, by elephant-bodied, sel-necked, heaving, surging, slowly writhing, and, she supposed, barking monsters; the iguanodon, the mammoth, and the mastodon; from whom presumably, she thought, jerking the window open, we descend.

"How those birds sang"! said Mrs. Swithin, at a venture. The window was open now; the birds certainly were singing. An obliging thrush hopped across the lawn; a coil of pinkish rubber twisted in its beak. Tempted by the sight to continue her imaginative reconstruction of the past, Mrs. Swithin paused; she was given to increasing the bounds of the moments by flights into past or future; or sidelong down corridors and alleys; but she remembered her mother—her mother in that very room rebuking her. "Don't stand gaping, Lucy, or the wind'll change. . . ." How often her mother had rebuked her in that very room—"but in a very different world", as her brother would remind her. So she sat down to morning tea, like any other old lady with a high nose, thin cheeks, a ring on her finger and the usual trappings of rather shabby but gallant old age, which included in her case a cross gleaming gold on her breast.

The portrait of Mr. Oliver is drawn even more simply:

The old man had sprung upon him from his hiding-place behind a tree.

'Say good morning, George; say "Good Morning, Grandpa",' Mabel urged him, giving him a push towards the man. But George stood gazing. Then Mr. Oliver crumpled the paper which he had cocked into a snout and appeared in person. A very tall old man, with gleaming eyes, wrinkled cheeks, and a head with no hair on it. He turned. Old Oliver raised himself, his veins swollen, his cheeks flushed; he was angry. His little game with the paper hadn't worked. The boy was a cry-baby. He nodded and sauntered on. But the breeze blew the great sheet out; and over the edge he surveyed the landscape—flowing fields, heath, and woods. Framed, they became a picture. Had he been a painter, he would have fixed his easel here, where the country, barred by trees, looked like a picture. Then the breeze fell.

'M. Daladier', he read finding his place in the column, 'has been successful in pegging down the franc. . . . '

(pp. 13-14).

The personality of Isabella and Giles and their relationship emerge through their separate and individual streams of consciousness. That is a common enough method with Virginia Woolf. But what is new is the objective description and statement that is so cleverly woven into one another so easily and are dovetailed so perfectly that the result is altogether extremely pleasing. This movement in and out from the mind of a character to objective description and statement imparts to the novel a great fluidity of atmosphere. Here is a beautiful illustration:

'Cindy—Cindy', he growled, as she shut the cupboard door.

Lucy, his sister, was three years younger than he was. The name Cindy, or Sindy, for it could be spelt either way, was short for Lucy. It was by this name that he had called her when they were children; when she had trotted after him as he fished, and had made the meadow flowers into tight little bunches, winding one long grass stalk round and round and round. Once, she remembered, he had made her take the fish off the hook herself. The blood had shocked her—'Oh'! she had cried—for the gills were full of blood. And he had growled: 'Cindy'! The ghost of that morning in the meadow was in her mind as she replaced the hammer where it belonged on one shelf; and the nails where they belonged on another; and shut the cupboard about which, for he still kept his fishing tackle there, he was still so very particular.

'I've been nailing the placard on the Barn', she said, giving him a little pat on the shoulder.

The words were like the first peal of a chime of bells. As the first peals, you hear the second; as the second peals, you hear the third. So when Isa heard Mrs. Swithin say: 'I've been nailing the placard to the Barn', she knew she would say next:

'For the pageant'.

And he would say:

'To-day? By Jupiter! I'd forgotten!'

'If it's fine', Mrs. Swithin continued; 'they'll act on the terrace. . . .'

'And if it's wet', Bartholomew continued, 'in the Barn'.

'And which will it be?' Mrs. Swithin continued. 'Wet or fine'?

Then, for the seventh time in succession, they both looked out of the window.

Every summer, for seven summers now, Isa had heard the same words: about the hammer and the nails; the pageant and the weather. Every year they said, would it be wet or fine; and every year it was—one or the other. The same chime followed the same chime, only this year beneath the chime she heard: 'The girl screamed and hit him about the face with a hammer'.

'The forecast', said Mr. Oliver, turning the pages till he found it, 'says: Variable winds; fair average temperature; rain at times' (pp. 19-20).

It appears that the stream of consciousness method is still capable of adaptation and there is still in it more room for incorporation of materials of an objective nature. Virginia Woolf attains this very thing in *Between the Acts*.

Without doubt *Between the Acts* is the most symbolical of Virginia Woolf's novels. Mr. David Daiches aptly remarks "The characters' thoughts are less 'in character' than 'symbolically appropriate'" and that much of the very best in the novel has "the quality of a symbolist lyric than of dialogue in a work of fiction".¹⁵ That is so. Did not Virginia Woolf herself write: "I have got at a more direct method of summarising relations; and then the poems (in metre) ran off the prose lyric vein. . . ."? But despite all the symbolism involved, Virginia Woolf in this novel, it appears, is primarily concerned with "summarising [human] relations". That being her primary concern she modified the technique in such a manner that it could strike a happy balance between stream of consciousness and objective statement. This device is altogether new and it establishes a new kind of probability for the novel. In the lines quoted below we find the lyrical and narrative devices in juxtaposition:

'Now may I pluck', Isa murmured, picking a rose, 'my single flower.' The white or the pink? And press it so, 'twixt thumb and finger. . . .

She looked among the passing faces for the face of the man in grey. There he was for one second; but surrounded, inaccessible. And now vanished.

She dropped her flower. What single, separate leaf could she press? None. Nor stray by the beds alone. She must go on; and she turned in the direction of the stable.

¹⁵ David Daiches: *Virginia Woolf*, p. 125.

'Where do I wander'? she mused. 'Down what draughty tunnels? Where the eyeless wind blows? And there grows nothing for the eye. No rose. To issue where? In some harvestless dim field where no evening lets fall her mantle; nor sun rises. All's equal there. Unblowing, ungrowing are the roses there. Change is not; nor the mutable and lovable; nor greetings nor partings; nor furtive findings and feelings, where hand seeks hand and eye seeks shelter from the eye'.

She had come into the stable yard where the dogs were chained; where the buckets stood; where the great pear tree spread its ladder of branches against the wall. The tree whose roots went beneath the flags, was weighted with hard green pears. Fingering one of them she murmured: 'How am I burdened with what they grew from the earth; memories; possessions This is the burden that the past laid on me, last little donkey in the long caravanserai crossing the desert. "Kneel down" said the past. "Fill your pannier from our tree. Rise up, donkey. Go your way till your keels blister and your hoofs crack" '.

The pear was hard as stone. She looked down at the cracked flags beneath which the roots spread "That was the burden", she mused, laid on me in the cradle; murmured by waves; breathed by restless elm trees; crooned by singing women; what we must remember; what we would forget'.

She looked up. The gilt hands of the stable clock pointed inflexibly at two minutes to the hour. The clock was about to strike.

'Now comes the lightning', she murmured, 'from the stone blue sky. The thongs are burst that the dead tied. Loosed are our possessions'.

Voices interrupted People passed the stable yard, talking.

(pp. 108-9).

A word about the pageant itself. It is a lyrical tragedy with England as the heroine. The central theme is stated and restated. "There are only emotions: love and hate". But no, there is another. "Peace was the third emotion. Love. Hate. Peace. Three emotions made the ply of human life". The pageant comes to an end rather abruptly:

" . . . the resolute refusal of some pimpled dirty scrub in sandals to sell his soul. There is such a thing—you can't deny it. What? 'You can't descry it? All you can see yourselves is scraps, orts, and fragments? Well then listen to the gramophone offering. . . . "

(p. 151).

And then—

"A hitch occurred here. The records had been mixed. Fox-trot, Sweet lavender, Home Sweet Home, Rule Britannia—sweating profusely, Jimmy, who had charge of the music, threw them aside and fitted the right one—was it Bach, Handel, Beethoven, Mozart, or nobody famous, but merely a traditional tune? Anyhow, thank heaven, it was somebody speaking after the anonymous

bray of the infernal megaphone.

Like quicksilver sliding, filings magnetized, the distracted united. The tune began; the first note meant a second; the second a third. Then down beneath a force was born in opposition; then another. On different levels they diverged. On different levels ourselves went forward; flower gathering some on the surface; others descending to wrestle with the meaning; but all comprehending; all enlisted. The whole population of the mind's immeasurable profundity came flocking; from the unprotected, the unskinned; and dawn rose; and azure; from chaos and cacophony measure; but not the melody of surface sound alone controlled it; but also the warring battle-plumed warriors straining sunder. To part? No Compelled from the ends of the horizon; recalled from the edge of appalling crevasses; they crashed; solved; united And some relaxed their fingers; and others uncrossed their legs

Was that voice ourselves? Scraps, orts, and fragments, are we, also, that? The voice died away.

(pp. 131-2).

The pageant produces different reactions in different members of the audience. They ask questions. They speculate. Some think of the past, some look for a deeper meaning Virginia Woolf interposes herself and suggests: "Did the plot matter? . . . The plot was only there to beget emotion". (p. 67) She meant every word of it. "Don't bother about the plot: the plot is nothing", she repeats. Miss La Trobe considers the pageant as a creative art: "Hadn't she, for twenty-five minutes made them see? A vision imparted was a relief from agony . . . for one moment. . . one moment". (p. 72) Virginia Woolf wants to capture that moment. She does it with words—words that make everything living, full of life. Miss La Trobe walked into a bar:

"And drank. And listened. Words of one syllable sank down into the mind. She drowsed: she nodded. The mud became fertile. Words rose above the intolerably laden dumb oxen plodding through the mind. Words without meaning—wonderful words.

(p. 147).

In this unusual and baffling novel Virginia Woolf captures the moment in a skilfully constructed world of fiction. And she uses words—wonderful words that can fertilise everything, even the mud-like complex existence of man,—with a skill and virtuosity unparalleled in the history of modern fiction.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

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I.

CHAPTER V.

CONFLICT FROM DIFFERENT STANDPOINTS.

It is impossible to harmonise the conflicting tendencies of Spinozistic philosophy. So far we have seen that Spinoza's philosophy is a mixture of two opposites. Spinoza was not true to his speculative thinking. Thus we see that principal Caird has rightly said the following :—"The last word of Spinoza's philosophy seems to be the contradiction of the first."¹ Being unable to reconcile the contradictions of his philosophical thoughts he was driven to abandon his logic and then became a moralist or say, a moral-philosopher. The charge which was brought against him is a very serious one and he could not avoid it due to his theistic and pantheistic conceptions of God. Spinoza began his philosophical or metaphysical discussion as a true metaphysician but concluded his investigation with a religious touch or with a touch of faith. The indeterminate infinite, which is an absolute negation of the finite, becomes the necessary cause of the finite and which again necessarily expresses itself in the finite. Spinoza failed to establish a relationship between absolutely infinite substance and the world of finite objects. In our second chapter, namely, the chapter on "Pantheism and Theism" we have thoroughly discussed his interpretation of infinite and finite and shown that he stumbled at the very outset of his speculation. "At the outset, in one word, we seem to have a pantheistic unity in which nature and man, all the manifold existences of the finite world, are swallowed up; at the close, an infinite self-conscious mind in which all finite thought and being find their reality and explanation."²

It is certainly difficult to reconcile these opposite conflicting attitudes of his philosophy. We can only do it by accepting one aspect of his teaching and neglecting the other side of it. The Spinozistic philosophy is full of inherent weakness and it is quite

¹ Caird, *Spinoza*, p. 303.

² *Ibid*, p. 304.

impossible to make it perfectly consistent. If Spinoza was true to his fundamental standpoint he would not have accepted the theory of conflicting tendencies. His theory of bondage is but a theory of illusion. He held that we, the finite, are actually in bondage. Can we not ask that if God manifests Himself in the form of the universe where does the illusion come from? If everything is God and God is in everything how can there be illusion or bondage at all? This question can only be answered in the following manner: Through the denial of bondage one can get rid of the bondage or actually speaking, there is no bondage. Spinoza failed to account for this on account of his acceptance of imperfect logic. Spinoza's conceptions of transcendental God, infinite modes, modes attributes and freedom gave him a lot of trouble and the critics pounced upon him as an atheist. One who began his life as a rationalist was in the long run driven out of his logical platform and thus in the hands of the modern critics he is treated as a scientific empiricist. Is it not a terrible irony of fate? Certainly it is!

It is easier to find fault with a man than to take notice of his good qualities. We have said enough of Spinoza's short-comings for the purpose of understanding or realising Spinozistic philosophy. Now we shall try to see what are new things in Spinoza and what he gave for the improvement of philosophical understandings. Thus this chapter is mainly concerned with the new message which Spinoza brought with him to speculative thoughts of world philosophy. It was Spinoza who first dared to go beyond the boundaries of the mediæval philosophical world and it was he who gave a rational interpretation of philosophical thought. "It was Spinoza who first dared to cross these boundaries, and by the skilful use of weapons accumulated in the arsenals of philosophy itself, he succeeded in bringing both God and man under the universal rule of nature and thus establishing its unity." ¹ In attempting to describe what is novel in Spinoza, we shall next try to show Spinoza's thoughtful and original contributions to philosophy.

NEW THINGS IN SPINOZA

(1) The conflict between matter and spirit is a common ground for all mediæval philosophers. The clear line of demarcation between spirit and matter is drawn almost by all philosophers from Aristotle

¹ Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, Vol. II, pp. 881-882.

to Descartes, and Spirit is regarded as the prime cause or uncaused cause of the universe. The absolute pure thought is spirit or God. God wills and the world is created. Though there is nothing in God like material substance or objects yet the world of material things comes out from him. Those who do not accept this position fully say that the world does not come out of God directly but from the first intelligence which is the direct issue of God. Even Descartes holds that the world of objects is a created substance. The mediaevals, Aristotle and Descartes have not thought over the problem of creation fully. The created objects must have some relation with the creator or in other words, the effect should inhere at least some of the characteristics of the cause. Neither Aristotle nor Descartes tries to draw a logical conclusion of the problem of creation. But Spinoza goes too far to supply us with an answer and says that the cause manifests itself in the form of the effect. The cause is the potentiality and the effect is the actuality. Thus we see that Spinozistic philosophy maintains God as both thought and extension. If God is the cause of the world, then God must have the same characteristics as the world has or in other words, if the world is the manifested form of God, then the world should have the characteristics of God. In Spinozistic philosophy there is no creator and there is no place of will and design in God. The world necessarily comes out from God and God is equal to Nature.

God has two attributes, extension and thought. God is not merely pure thought to Spinoza. This is his first act of free thought and this conclusion he draws logically.

(2) To the mediaevals the uniformity of nature is only prevailing in the physical universe. There is harmony among the natural objects, and nature herself maintains that harmony. But Spinoza identifies Nature with God, so it becomes necessary for him to extend the uniformity of the laws of nature up to God and to bind God even by natural laws. Therefore, Spinoza maintains that God cannot alter His laws (because to Spinoza God is deprived of His will) and He cannot create more out of His own choice. Everything follows out of necessity, and God no more remains an arbitrary, creator. This is his second daring act. "He (God) became now a constitutional monarch, whose powers were limited by the laws of His own nature, unable to change the nature and behaviour of things which He himself laid down from eternity".¹ The Mediaevals thought that God

¹ Welfson, *Philosophy of Spinoza*, Vol. II, p. 324.

can create the world out of *exnihilo* and He himself can change the laws with which He binds the universe. But Spinoza does not pay attention to the *mediaeval's* doctrine and boldly declares that God cannot create anything out of nothing and He can in no way change the laws which necessarily follow from Him. The same laws bind God as well as the world of objects. Here Spinoza identifies Nature with God; so many critics think Spinoza to be an atheist. But Spinoza was logically driven to accept God equal to Nature. This is his second act of free thought.

(3) To the *mediaevals*, Aristotle and even to Descartes God is regarded as immaterial. To them God is pure thought and He is unalloyed with materialistic conception. Here Spinoza's objection is this: If God is the cause of this material world how can He be an immaterial substance? If God is immaterial then, where does this world of material objects come from? To declare God as the cause of this universe is to accept the materiality of God. Spinoza, therefore, says that God is both material and immaterial. In God there is matter as well as the spirit. Spinozistic philosophy does away with the immateriality of God and declares with boldness God as material and immaterial both. This is his third act of free-thought.

(4) With the denial of the immateriality of God, Spinoza also denies the separability of soul from body. To the *mediaevals* and even to Aristotle the soul is separable from the body. There is no necessary connection between the soul and the body, because to them (the *Mediaevals* and Aristotle) the spirit (soul) is quite distinct from the body (matter). To them matter is perishable and it undergoes destruction. The spirit is imperishable and it never undergoes change. But to Spinoza both spirit and matter enjoy the same privilege and one cannot be without the other. Thus Spinoza dares to declare the inseparability of soul from body. This is his fourth act of free-thought.

(5) Spinoza's fifth original piece of thinking is this: "To him mind is the idea of the body". To the *mediaevals* the mind (soul) has certain functions to perform. These are the following functions: "Nutrition, growth, sensation, imagination, memory, consciousness, will and intellect or understanding". Spinoza has brought all these functions under "human mind" and does not bother about the functions of nutrition and growth which are common to all animals and plants. The mind is the idea of the body regarding sensation, imagination, and memory, etc. But the mind is the idea of itself with regard to intellect. "Confining himself, then, to the functions of

sensation, imagination, memory, consciousness, will and intellect, he defined mind or the human soul, in departure from most of his predecessors, as one's consciousness of one's own body, and then he reduced sensation, imagination, and memory to the mind's consciousness of its body and intellect to the mind's consciousness of itself, and, following out the reasoning of his predecessors, he identified will with intellect'.¹ Spinoza himself admits that one's consciousness of own body is prior to one's consciousness of other bodies. Spinoza then declares, that intellect,* understanding and any other function of thought arise out of mind's consciousness of its self. The ultimate source of human consciousness of mind is also found in God because Spinoza himself says that whatever is found in human mind must be in God's mind *i. e.*, God must contain everything that is found in the finite things. Spinoza's above assertion deprives man also of his free-will. But one thing is true that through the denial of freedom of the will in human action Spinoza does not say that it is the denial of freedom altogether but he says that it only denies the voluntary action of the human being. But here Spinoza through the denial of 'freedom of the will from human actions' has removed 'a brake in the uniformity of the laws of nature'. This is his fifth eventful act of free-thought.

(6) The sixth or last piece of his original thinking is this: To Spinoza there is one and only one substance. To the mediaevals, to Aristotle and even to Descartes there are many substances. Spinoza asserts that there can be one single substance which is self-caused and which is the cause of the universe also. Spinoza's single substance is identical with the mediaeval's God or prime mover. The Mediaevals hold that which is in itself is substance. Spinoza says that which is in itself must be conceived through itself and that which is conceived through itself must be self-caused. That which is self-caused must be one and only one. Therefore, to Spinoza, substance is one.

Spinozistic substance has four characteristics. In the first place substance is looked at like a transcendent whole which contains within itself the individual parts which make up the universe of our experience. In the second place, substance is unlike the finite objects which require causes for their existence but substance is self-caused,

¹ Wolfson, *Philosophy of Spinoza*, p. 336, Vol. II.

* Intellect means nothing but that the mind is conscious of itself. Sensation and imagination, etc. mean nothing but that the mind is conscious of the body.

i.e. it is causeless. In the third place, the relation between substance and the individual objects of the universe is thought of as the relation between cause and effect. In the fourth place, substance is infinite because whole of its nature is unknown to us. Human intellect can only perceive two of its infinite attributes. Spinoza was justified in holding the first three conceptions of God on Substance. But by the acceptance of the fourth, he had fallen into trap from which he was unable to escape. Here we are not going to discuss those self-contradictory points but it would be sufficient to say this much, that Spinoza out of his several conflicting elements made out good things for philosophical investigation. The motive of Spinozistic philosophy is that of criticism. Spinoza wanted to criticise the mediaevals and in his criticism of the mediaeval's philosophy there was a good deal of incorrect interpretations. But whatever that may be, it is certain that Spinoza had a love for free-thought and he served as a guide to others in the field of free-thinking.

Spinoza is praised for the following four cardinal rationalistic conceptions of his philosophy. (1) He looked upon God as material; (2) Spinozistic God worked for no external purpose; (3) to Spinoza the soul was inseparable from the body; and (4) the man is deprived of his freedom of will. These four rationalistic conceptions of Spinozistic philosophy ensured for the author a special place in the domain of philosophical world. Spinoza's radical departure from the three revealed religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism had shown his courage of thoughtful investigation. Thus we can say that Spinoza as a logician failed to win the game for him but as a man he proved himself to be bold and spirited. Spinoza was a moral teacher who had taught everybody to pray for 'intellectual love of God.' Spinoza's assertion of intellectual love brings a massage of new world and new light and at the outbreak of which Spinoza forgets his logic and says that truth (God) is intuitively known but not by logical argument. This and only this assertion saves Spinoza after all from the heavy charge with which he is bent down. Thus we can conclude with this that Spinoza succeeds as a moralist.

THE INFLUENCE OF SPINOZA

So far we have dealt with Spinoza's merits and demerits, and we have criticised Spinoza from different standpoints. But now

we proceed to estimate Spinoza's influence upon other philosophers of the modern period. Spinozistic philosophy is very much read and made use of by the moderns. We can say this much that most of the moderns from Leibniz to Hegel are indebted to Spinoza with regard to their original ideas. Spinoza had many critics to criticise him and many friends to praise him, but it is true and absolutely true that he is liked and loved by all for the 'saintly' character of his life and for the "perniciousness" of his opinions. Spinoza captured the heart of his admirers and also won the respect of his critics. Spinozistic philosophy was read by some, was made use of by others and was learnt at second hand by many. Locke was badly criticised of having "endeavoured to establish Spinoza's atheistical hypothesis". Berkley read him and made use of Spinozistic Ethics and correspondence. "Hume has a discussion, probably resting on information at second hand, of the hedious hypothesis" of that famous atheist."¹ Spinoza's 'Theological—political Treatise' was principally connected with his name at least for first hundred years after his life time but after that his Ethics became popular.

Lessing restored Spinoza to repute. This great critic (Lessing) during the famous conversation with Jacobi in 1780 surprised the world by saying that he had been a Spinozist throughout his mature life and according to him "there is no other Philosophy than that of Spinoza" (printed in full in Willis). Lessing's great play, Nathan der Weise contained a beautiful picture of an ideal Jew which had come to him from the dead philosopher of great mind. Some years after Herder's *Einige Gespräche Über Spinoza's system* attracted the attention of liberal theologians to the Ethics. Schleiermacher, the leader of this school, talked of Spinoza as "the holy and excommunicated Spinoza". The Catholic poet, Novalis spoke of him as "the God intoxicated man". The great German poet Goethe's attention was drawn to Spinoza's Ethics by Jacobi. The poet was converted and told at the first reading of the Ethics that he had found precisely the philosophy for which his suffering soul had yearned. Since then his poetry and prose were pervaded by Spinoza's thoughts. "It was here that he (Goethe) found the lesson *dass wir entsagen sollen*—that we must accept the limitations which nature puts upon us; and it was partly by breathing the calm air of Spinoza that he rose out of the wild romanticism of *Clötz* and *Werther* to the classic poise of his later life (Will Durant : *The Story of Philosophy* " p. 197).

¹ Spinoza by Leon Roth. p. 190.

"It was by combining Spinoza with Kant's epistemology that Fichte, Schelling and Hegel reached their varied pantheisms; it was from *conatus sese preservandi*, the effort to preserve one's self, that Fichte's Ich was born and Schopenhauer's will to live" and Nietzsche's "will to power", and Bergson's *elan vital* "*ibid.* p. 197". Hegel said "To be a philosopher one must first be a Spinozist".

"On the second century of Spinoza's death subscriptions were collected for erection of a statue to him at The Hague. Contributions came from every corner of the educated world; never did a monument rise upon so wide a pedestal of love."¹ At the unveiling in 1882 Ernest Renan concluded his address with words which fitly conclude also our chapter: "Woe to him who in passing should hurl an insult at this gentle and pensive head. He would be punished, as all vulgar souls are punished, by his very vulgarity, and by his incapacity to conceive what is divine. This man, from his granite pedestal, will point out to all men the way of blessedness which he found; and ages hence, the cultivated traveller, passing by this spot, will say in his heart: The truest vision ever had of God came, perhaps, here."²

SPINOZA AND ENGLISH DEISM

Spinoza's influence upon the English deists was also great. Though he was critically abused by them yet they could not avoid Spinozistic influence. Professor L. Roth says, "There is nothing comparable in other countries to this influence of Spinoza on English Deism (and through it on the whole course of the development of modern rationalism)".³ The whole of the deist's position can be found in Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. Just as Spinoza for the development of his philosophy refuted the mediaeval thought by his acceptance of immutable chain of causation and no free-will in the human actions, so the deists having broken down Spinozistic law of causation and having accepted the doctrine of Free-will made bad use of Spinozistic doctrines. Spinoza was also regarded as the systematist of atheism." Atheism was influenced by his doctrine a good deal. Another interesting side of Spinoza's philosophy is this: The "free-thinkers were only too glad to be able to point

¹ Will Durant: *The Story of Philosophy*,—p. 198

² *Ethics*, Everyman ed. Introf. XXII, note.

³ Leon Roth, *Spinoza*, p. 201.

to Spinoza in proof of their theses that moral living was not the monopoly of the theological orthodoxy." (Leon Roth, *Spinoza*, p. 201)

A group of English theological writers—John Toland, Tyndel and Chubb preached the teachings of the Bible. The Eighteenth Century deists believed that God is the one fundamental principle. He created the world by His will out of nothing at some point of time before which He was without His world. But the world is now an independent reality outside of God and the Wills of men enjoy full freedom. The main reason for which the deist interprets the relation between God and the world in the aforesaid way is this: Spinoza in his pantheism denied the independence of the world and the free will of human beings by reducing them (world and human wills) to be the unreal modes of the Absolute Substances which is the only reality devouring up the reality of the world and of man. Thus deists make their God completely transcendental reality and maintain dualism between God and His creation.

Thus we see that Spinoza's thought influenced and inspired almost all the philosophers of the middle ages and shows divine light even now to some persons who aspire for spiritual realisation of God.

CONCLUDING LINES

So far we have seen that Spinoza's philosophy is a struggle between Spinoza the man and Spinoza the logician. Spinoza as a logician fails to do justice to his fundamental standpoint, and there is a ground for his failure. His philosophy does not allow logic to have any access to the world of reality. To Spinoza there cannot be the 'logic of the real'. His real or absolute is transcendental. Therefore, what the absolute in its totality is, logic does not know and cannot dare to say even. Spinoza had great respect for a man, rather than for his logic. His absolute is above all thought. The logical inconsistency of Spinozistic philosophy is due to his belief in immediate experience and in transcendental God. His logical inconsistencies show that the absolute is inseparable and the ideal (or the real) cannot be an object of thought. Though there is logical incompleteness in his work yet there is novelty and originality in his doctrine. His logical inconsistencies have strengthened his philosophical conception of the absolute. Most of the philosophers, being unable to create a logic of the real draw a sceptical conclusion—that there is no real or God. But Spinoza's failure of creating a logic

of the real gives a new strength to his philosophy. His real is not the real of crude or abstract logic but it is a thing given to intuition. According to him, truth or God is for the moral man but not for the logician. He has more reverence for his moral principle than for his logic. Spinoza is a true moralist and Spinoza, the man is more than Spinoza, the logician.

(To be Continued)

NYĀYA MAÑJARI

VOL. II (27)

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THE REFUTATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS OF ANVITA-ABHIDHĀNA

Oh Mīmāṃsakas ! You have held that the word 'cow' in question conveys its meaning qualified by such other meanings as are required, involve no material contradiction in order to be related and are in close proximity. You do not commit this mistake because the word 'cow' is always noticed as engaged in the service of a collection of words. The word 'cow' conveys as much meaning as its force of conveying primary meaning permits it to do. We shall have to make out what is the exact primary meaning of a word, i.e., how much a word denotes and how much it does not do. Though the primary meaning of the word 'cow' is invariably associated with other meanings which are reciprocally required, are mutually related without involving material contradiction, and are in close proximity yet it cannot be left out. What cannot be brushed aside constitutes its meaning. The meaning may be only the mere universal of cowness or the concrete universal. Thus the primary meaning of the word 'cow' maintains its identity in the midst of its relation with other meanings. This meaning cannot be ignored. It is detected by the joint method of agreement and difference.

Moreover, a single word is never used. In order to use a word, a sentence shall be constructed. The services of a collection of words are essentially required for this purpose. Nobody has noticed the skill of a single word in constructing a sentence without having the aid of a collection of words. An individual word, being included in the collection of words, plays its part to convey the meaning of a sentence. Its power of conveying the primary meaning does not help it much. But its power of conveying the intended meaning helps it to communicate the meaning of a sentence. The Mīmāṃsakas, having failed to recognise this distinct power of conveying the intended meaning, admit the truth of the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna. But such an admission is not logically sound. The power of conveying the primary meaning has no special aptitude for expression one and all meanings. If one is not acquainted with distinct laws which govern the communication of the meaning of a word and that of a sentence then he cannot escape the charge of using superfluous words in a sentence. In other words, if a word

contained in a sentence, expresses the meaning of a sentence then other words, used in it, become superfluous. The hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna cannot get rid of such defects. The word 'cow' has been used in a sentence. Its meaning is related to those of other words in it. Now, the word 'cow' should denote the related meaning by its force of conveying the primary meaning. If it does not do it, the knowledge of the related meaning does not arise in our mind. How does the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna stand its ground? The hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna leads to another absurd conclusion. The word 'cow' denotes a meaning which is related to another object. If the second object is not denoted by the word 'cow' then the related meaning cannot be communicated by it. Thus the hypothesis amounts to this that an object which relates to a cow is not apprehended but a cow as related to it is presented to our consciousness. Such a conclusion points to a glaring contradiction in the above hypothesis. Now, if the upholders of the said hypothesis admit that the word 'cow' also denotes the relation of a cow then they should admit that each word denotes all objects. So, we hold that the power of expressing the primary meaning cannot logically communicate all shades of meanings which a word is competent to convey. Therefore, the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna is not tenable.

The upholders of the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna should also explain the problem, *viz.*, "How does the syntactical relation take place in the sentence that there are a hundred elephants on the tip of a finger?" The sense of the objection lies in this. As the meaning of the sentence involves material contradiction, how can a related meaning be denoted by a word? Now, they may contend that in the above case the syntactical relation is merely verbal and there is no actual relation between the meanings of words. Such a contention does not hold good. If the meaning of a sentence involves material contradiction then words are not related to the real meanings to be conveyed by them. In other words, there is no syntactical relation among words. Now, the upholders of the hypothesis may further contend that the function of a word is to reveal its meaning only but a word does not judge whether a meaning is consistent or not. The critics review this contention and hold that there is an element of truth in it that a word does not judge the consistency or otherwise of its meaning. But they should also know that a word does not denote a related meaning. We cannot also frame a general proposition that all words cannot but denote related meanings. We notice instances which contradict the truth

of the above general proposition. The sentences, viz., "There are ten pomegranates" etc are an exception to it. Now, if the upholders of the hypothesis hold that the so-called sentences are no sentences then the critics will also point out that the sentence that there are a hundred elephants on the tip of a finger is no sentence. But the knowledge of the locus, the located, the verb and their relation is merely illusory. Therefore, the hypothesis that words denote related meanings does not stand to reason.

Do words denote such meanings as stand mutually unrelated like iron-pikes? A hypothesis which points a view like this is not also sound since usage does not justify it. If words denote unrelated meanings then it is next to impossible to find out their mutual relation since words, having completed their task, are never noticed to resume their work. In other words, a word does never do its work by fits and starts. When it works it completely exhausts its capacity to bring about the result. Thus, the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya does not get the sanction of our experience. Therefore, the above two hypothesis, i.e., the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna and that of abhihita-anvaya, do not come off well.

Some critics have said to this effect. The above two hypotheses do not hit our fancy. The hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna does not take its stand upon reasoning. Similarly, the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya does not stand to reason.

ANOTHER HYPOTHESIS AND ITS REFUTATION

Some other logicians use quibbles and hold that words denote meanings which are being related and point to the relation of such meanings as are being expressed. This hypothesis is not to our taste.

These two distinct acts are not experienced by us. These two acts have been mentioned thus :—One is the act of expressing the meanings and the other is the act of relating them.

Do these acts occur successively or simultaneously? If they take place successively and if the act of relating precedes then the new hypothesis is nothing but that of anvita-abhidhāna. It is not the hypothesis of anvīyamāna-abhidhāna (the expression of meanings being related). Again, if words convey their meanings at first then it is the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya but not that of abhidhīyamāna-anvaya (the relation of meanings being expressed). In other words, they mean to say that as soon as meanings are expressed, they are cognised as being related and that meanings are related as soon as they are being expressed. These two acts are not simultaneously

experienced. The act of expressing refers to words. The act of relating refers to meanings. When words are employed the act of relating which refers to meanings is not experienced.

The competent judges have arrived at the conclusion after close examination that the act of expressing is absolutely distinct from that of relating since if meanings are not expressed, they cannot be related. The judgment that this is a white cow points to the co-ordination of the two properties of an individual cow. These two properties are the universal of cowness and the colour 'white.' If there are no terms to indicate their co-ordination then how can we grasp their mutual relation?

Thus we see that the propounders of the two hypotheses, *viz.*, the hypothesis of anviyamāna-abhidhāna and that of abhidhiya māna-anvaya simply play upon words. They have coined new words only. They express no new objects which are experienced by us. All defects which cling to the above two hypotheses do not fail to infect it.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF MEANINGS IN RELATION BY MEANS OF TĀTPARYA-SAKTI

Some logicians hold that the hypothesis of anvita abhidhāna represents the rough draft of the real thesis but that of abhihita-anvaya stands for the minute draft of it. Let us illustrate this point. If the word 'a cow' communicates its meaning as being related to abstract universals of attributes and actions but not as being related to specific attributes and actions then the hypothesis is called as anvita-abhidhāna. If the relation of a cow to a specific attribute such as the colour 'white' etc. is communicated by other words and a minute information is thus given then the hypothesis is known as abhihita-anvaya. This new exposition makes no improvement upon the old one.

The defects which have been pointed out in the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna visit the new exposition of the said hypothesis *viz.*, words express their meanings in relation to abstract universals. The same defects as have been shown to vitiate the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya infect its new explanation, *viz.*, the relation of the meaning of a word to a specific attribute etc. is conveyed by other words.

The hypothesis in question points to nothing new. It is in no way distinct from the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya. When the specific meaning of a sentence is stated the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya is adhered to. Thus it is evident that the ancient path is

welcome to convey the meaning of a sentence. How do you explain everything by adopting the routine method that words point to the meaning of a sentence only by their power of expressing primary meanings? But we find that this path is beset with various troubles since all the previous hypotheses are infected with many defects.

The defenders of the hypothesis under discussion say in reply that the path of conveying the meaning of a sentence is immune from all defects since it has been said before that words conjointly express the meaning of a sentence. The meaning of a sentence which all words conjointly communicate is nothing but the meaning of a principal word as related to the meanings of other subordinate words. In other words, the meaning of a sentence is nothing but the organization of the meanings of words in which one plays the important part and others play the secondary ones.

Where is the room for defects?

Now, a question arises in our mind. Do you intend to revive the old hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna? They say in reply "No sir! The hypothesis in question is not that of anvita-abhidhāna". The critics ask, "If this is not the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna, how is it that words conjointly express the meaning of a sentence?" The defenders give the following answer "Though these words conjointly express the meaning of a sentence yet this is not the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna. Words conjointly bring about the related meaning but do not convey the related meaning". The objectors again ask "What do you say? Do words conjointly produce the meaning of a sentence as lumps of earth and other factors in mutual co-operation produce a jar? The defenders answer, "This is not so since words simply indicate the above meaning but do not produce it." The objectors again put this question to them. "Do you not indulge in quibble if you hold that words conjointly work but do not convey the related meaning? The answer to the above question is as follows:—

We mean to say that words indicate the mutually related meaning but do not convey such a related meaning. The power of conveying the primary meaning does not point to the related meaning. But the joint method of agreement and difference reveals the exact meaning of each word." But these words have another power which is called Tātparyya-śakti. The function of this power is to reveal the meanings of words contained in a sentence, as being in relation with one another since this power is the common effect of powers belonging to all words. This new power lasts so long as these words

do not produce an independent judgment which represents a self-contained unity of ideas.

Let this suggestion be fully explained.

Perceptual or indirect non-verbal knowledge reveals its object in different manner. It incompletely or completely reveals its object which is in front of us.

But verbal knowledge is a class in itself. Its working is absolutely different. Words go on functioning unless and until a self-contained judgment is not produced.

For this reason, in this world, a single word is never employed. Because a single word cannot produce as much knowledge as serves the purpose of a listener.

Now, we put a question to you. It is this:—Do words possess some other power beside the power of expressing their primary meanings? Is it conducive to a complete result? (A complete result stands for a self-contained judgment). An answer to this question is in the affirmative. Those who subscribe to the thesis of relation cannot refute the existence of such a power. The relation of meanings is not conveyed by the power of conveying the primary meaning. But a sentence conveys the correlation of meanings.

Now, some logicians suggest that if the related meaning is denoted by a word then the relation of meanings is presented to our consciousness and if this condition is not fulfilled then the relation of meanings is not cognised. This suggestion is not tenable. The meanings of words are bound up together by means of a relation since words denoting these meanings work conjointly since if causes produce jointly their effects then these effects are never seen to remain isolated. A stem and a suffix, attached to it, imply each other and convey their meanings jointly. But a stem does not denote the meanings of a suffix since an injunction, the meaning of a *liñ* suffix, is not denoted by the basic root, *yaj*, and the *liñ* suffix does not denote the meaning of a basic root, *yaj*. A sacrifice is denoted by the basic root 'yaj'. It cannot be denoted by the *liñ* suffix. They do not independently bring about their effects. Similarly, words conjointly produce their own effects but one word does not denote the meaning of another word. Sentences also convey their meanings with reference to their context but point to no independent meanings. This view has been expressed by some other thinkers.

As a stem and its suffix imply each other so a word implies another and a sentence implies another.

This hypothesis is better. According to it words conjointly produce their effects but the meanings conveyed by words, maintain their individuality but do not interpenetrate.

If one denies that words imply one another then words look like so many detached iron-p'kes. But if the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna is adhered to then the use of words other than one in a sentence becomes superfluous.

But if we stick to the hypothesis that words conjointly communicate their meanings then it becomes free from all defects. This path should be followed since it is not beset with thorns.

We agree to the point that words have power to denote their own primary meanings. They have an additional power which is called 'Tātparyya-śakti'. This power continues to work unless and until the meanings of words are presented to our consciousness as being in relation with one another.

Hence, we do not subscribe to the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna. But of course we surely hold that a sentence conveys a unity of meanings in which they are mutually related

We utter words with this object in view that they will conjointly produce their main effect but not that they will merely communicate their own primary meanings. In other words, we utter words with the intention of communicating the meaning of a sentence. The author of Sloka vārttika has said to this effect.

Words which constitute a sentence engage themselves in communicating the meaning of a sentence. In order to do it they have an intervening process as its invariable associate viz. the expression of their primary meanings. Similarly, sticks of wood burn in order to accomplish their main task, viz., the act of cooking.

It is this great creeper of understanding. Knowledge is its main root. The arrangement of words is its bright sprout. The impressions due to the experience of all antecedent letters are its broad leaves. The meanings of words which have been expressed are its full blown blossoms. The excellent meaning of a sentence is its palatable fruit. One should not put it in mouth. It is to be put in heart. When it enters our heart the listeners long for no other objects.

Kumārila has said in his Tantra-Vārttika to this effect. The knowledge which is derived from words by a listener blooms in the shape of the meanings of words and lastly bears fruits in the shape of the meaning of a sentence.

The knowledge which follows from this method is sound. We have said before that the meanings of words, being mutually related, constitute the meaning of a sentence.

AN OBJECTION TO THE ASCERTAINMENT OF THE MEANING OF THE VEDAS

The path to ascertain the meaning of a sentence has been shown before. All worldly transactions are conducted by means of it. The same path will help to determine the meaning of the Vedas since the same words as are used in the classical Sanskrit language have also been used in the Vedic Sanskrit in the same sense.

Some critics raise an objection to this effect. Sentences which are used in the classical Sanskrit language convey such meanings as are grasped by other sources of knowledge. Hence, we are in a position to apply means to words in order to find out their meanings. The objects which are denoted by the Vedic sentences are supersensuous. We who are ordinary people have our mind polluted by impurities such as love, hatred etc. We possess no power of seeing transcendental objects. One who is not endowed with the mystic power of intuiting supersensuous objects is not initiated into the meaning of the Vedas, observing the usage of the experienced persons. Suppose I desire today to learn the meaning of the Vedas and may approach an expert teacher for this purpose. But he also cannot intuit supersensuous objects. So, his knowledge of the Vedas is not up to the mark. As his knowledge is limited so he will have to approach another teacher in order to receive proper instructions. The teacher whom he will approach will also sit at the feet of another teacher like me because of his imperfect knowledge. He will also wait upon another. Thus we see that the entire tradition rests upon the consecutive series of blind teachers. As Pāṇini teaches the meaning of the conventional term 'vṛddhi' in his sūtra "Vṛddhir ādaic", as Pingala explains the technical term 'ma' in his work on Prosody as three consecutive long syllables, as the author of Abhidhāna-mālā, a lexicographer, mentions the synonyms of the word 'hasta' as kara and pāṇi so the Vedas themselves do not teach in the same strain viz "These words which are contained in the Vedas denote such and such meanings. Hence, the true meaning of the Vedas is incomprehensible.

Some other critics also have expressed the same view. If a person who has fondness for worldly objects does not himself understand the meaning of the Vedas then he will not learn it from others.

The Vedas themselves do not explain their own meaning. Hence how is it possible for a man to gather the sense of the Vedas?

Now, if one may argue that a learner is initiated into the meaning of the Vedas with the help of their accessories such as Nigama, Nirukta, and Vyākaraṇa. Such an argument is not sound. The reason is as follows. The authors of these works agree to differ. Words which have been taught admit of various meanings. Words, prepositions which are prefixed to verbs, and indeclinable words have no fixed meaning. Other plausible meanings of the Vedas may also be imagined.

Some critics have suggested the different meanings of one and the same Vedic text. One who is desirous of Heaven should perform the sacrifice of Agnihotra. This is the traditional meaning of the Vedic sentence "Agnihotram jhuyāt svarga-kāmaḥ". Who knows that the same sentence does not point to the sense "One should take the flesh of a dog"? Is there any crucial proof to decide the truth of any one of either meanings?

A rejoinder to the above charges is as follows. Now we understand that all our previous discussions about the Vedas are like the recital of the Rāmāyana before a deaf person. These critics have heard everything with regard to the ways and means of finding out the meaning of the Vedas. But they still search for the means of explaining the Vedas. All problems, raised by the critics, stand refuted since the ways and means of interpreting the Vedas have been revealed. We have said that there is no new Vedic word. The arrangement of these words is only different. But words which have been arranged are not different from those used in the classical Sanskrit language. From the very dawn of creation the tradition of the Vedic scholars has been working. I had learnt the meaning of the Vedas long, long ago in my previous birth. If I today go to learn the meaning of the Vedas, I shall learn the same meaning.

Where are gone Grammar and Mīmāṃsā Śāstra, the means of interpreting the Vedas? These sciences still exist. But you cannot determine the meaning of the Vedas. Oh fool! one word more to add. A man who is under the sway of love and hatred may not set out for the realisation of transcendental objects. But it is not a fact that such a person who is desirous of Heaven will not be able to understand that the Vedic sentence "Agnihotram jhuyāt Svarga-kāmaḥ" points to the meaning "Agni hotra sacrifice is a means to the attainment of heaven." Now, a question may be raised, "How do we receive regular training in the supersensuous matter?"

We have said before what we have got to say with regard to this problem. The tradition of the Vedic scholars throws unflinching light on the meaning of the Vedic texts since it has been flowing from time immemorial. The Vedas, their meanings, their knowledge, their accessories and the performance of the Vedic rites are not events of our modern age. Some thinkers hold that the Vedic tradition knows no beginning. But we, the Naiyāyikas, hold that the said tradition has commenced its work from the very first day of the creation of the world. Is there any occasion to-day for heaping contumely on them? The vicious and wicked critics have disgraced the Vedas with the insolent interpretation of the Vedic sentence, viz , "One should eat the flesh of a dog." The only object which they will accomplish is that they will be ornamental flowers of hell. No novel criticism has been offered by them.

Some other thinkers take an exception to this criticism. They say "Why do you take them to task? Have they offended against the law? Have they made any inconsistent remark? One cannot learn the meaning of the Vedas from an ordinary person. You may now ask "Who is an ordinary man? Is he an uneducated person or an educated grammarian? Of these two types cabmen are innocent of the use of chaste and correct words. They are in the habit of using vulgar words in a loud tone. These words are gāvī etc. How will they be acquainted with the Vedic words?

Though the rustic people employ a few Sanskrit words, e.g., in Kāśmīra they use eṣi, emi etc., in Dīrvābhīṣāra 'gaccha' etc., and in Madra 'karomi', etc., yet their words are very small in number. The usage of such words is very limited since these persons are ignorant of the Vedic Literature.

Now, the defenders of the Vedic tradition may agree in the following line. The science of Sanskrit Grammar is an ancillary system of the Vedas. One distinguishes with its help the correct words from the incorrect ones. His mind is restrained by the following injunction-cum-prohibition that a learned man should use correct words in speaking but should not use incorrect ones. Thus, learned men always attend to their work, using correct words only. It has been thus suggested that learned men may acquire proficiency in the Vedic Literature with little effort.

This suggestion is not sound because it involves circular reasoning. If the validity of the Vedas is established then its ancillary science, Grammar, may be carefully studied. With the help of grammar one will draw a distinction between correct and incorrect

words. Mature consideration given to correct and incorrect words and acquaintance with the usages of the learned scholars help us to acquire mastery over the Vedic words. Where one is initiated into them his acquaintance with the Vedic vocabulary helps him to understand the Vedic work. Thus, the charge against the Vedas that they are unintelligible is answered. Then and then only the Vedas are considered to be the source of true knowledge. In other words the movers of this proposal reason in a circle. The Vedas depend upon the grammar and the grammar depends upon the Vedas.

Now, the defenders of the Vedic tradition may take up a different line of argument. They may contend thus:—If one discards with contempt the traditional view that Grammar is ancillary to the Vedas but reads grammar at his sweet will and learns to distinguish the correct words from the incorrect ones then the above hypothesis is not open to the fallacy of circular reasoning. If this is their contention, let it be thoroughly examined. Should one study grammar as he takes interest in the study of Indian dialects (Prākṛta) in order to acquire proficiency in classical Sanskrit literary works such as dramas, social dramas etc? If the said defender admits the truth of this new suggestion then the science of grammar will be no more treated to be affiliated to the Vedas as their ancillary science like a work on Indian dialects. In that case it should be admitted that the usages of Indian dialects help to understand the meanings of the Vedic words. Thus, they jump out of the frying pan into the fire.

The another point in criticism deserves mention. One may acquire sound knowledge of grammar. He may receive instruction from a truthful person that he should always use correct words in speaking. He may form the habit of performing Vedic rites. He may develop his conscience, strictly obey Vedic injunctions and conscientiously avoid prohibitions. He may be a sound Vedic scholar. He may entertain respect for the Sāstras. Such a person is very seldom noticed by us. The number on such a person is not many. He uses correct words in transacting all his business which relates to a sacrifice. He moves in the society, paying his sole attention to such actions as are necessary to his main duty, i.e., the performance of sacrifices. If he is not observed by his disciples in the time of his moving about in response to the call of duty then how will you utilise this great savant who is skilful in using correct language as a teacher? Hence, the suggestion that one is initiated into the meaning of Vedas, noticing the practice of a sound Vedic scholar does not stand to reason.

THE HYPOTHESIS THAT ONE LEARNS THE VEDAS WITH THE HELP
OF GRAMMAR IS NOT TENABLE

If one thinks that the science of grammar will constitute the means of access to the Vedic lore then he should reflect on it and solve the problem *viz.*, "how is it possible for grammar to open the door?" Pāṇini does not interpret the Vedic texts as elaborately as the author of Vivaraṇa has explained the sū'tras of Pāṇini. Even though we assume that Pāṇini has interpreted the Vedic texts yet short-sighted and tainted by hatred, etc., as we are how will we, the students of Vedic Literature, pin our faith in the truth of his interpretation? A doubt, *viz.*, whether his interpretation is right or wrong may arise in our mind. One may now argue that the science of grammar is a means of access to the Vedic lore because it distinguishes correct words from incorrect ones. If this is his contention then he should admit that the science of grammar bears a new relation to such rites as are enjoined by Vedic injunctions since grammar does not enjoy the status of an independent science like the Vedas and is affiliated to the Vedas as their auxiliary science.

Now, the above speculator may contend that the Vedas are to require grammar because of the injunction "One should use correct words in speaking" and of the prohibition "One should not use incorrect words in speaking". This contention is met thus Let us examine the character of the injunction and the prohibition in question. Do they find place in a certain section of the Vedas? Or, are they known to all though they find no place? Is it a well circulated topic? Or, does it deserve discussion?

(To be continued.)

DYNAMICS OF RATNA

SRI SATADALKUMAR KAR-GUPTA

(PART II)*

To supplement indirectly the supposed to be conjectural belief of the ancients, modern scientists have found sufficient data to conclude that the jewels or gems, possess a great scientific value in-as-much as they could be utilised for human benefit in various ways.

Very recently Prof. S. Y. Sokolov of Russia has invented a flaw detector, which "makes use of the same principle as supersonic hydrophones"; this flaw detector can detect the genuineness of the gem by showing the air bubbles, gas cavities, or so-called "fatigue" cracks and the size of the crystal grains by accurately checking up its normal intensity of Wavelengths which as a matter of fact during such detection makes a corresponding relation with "the wavelength of the supersonic ray" ¹

By means of electrometer and other scientific instruments it has been established that the gems or jewels, attract, retain and repel electricity; this electricity can be excited either by friction pressure or heat; certain gems have been found conductors, and other non-conductors of electricity. As a rule "vitreous" gems, (i.e., transparent or translucent) acquire "Positive" electricity and the "resinous" (i.e., rough surface or opaque) jewels generate "Negative" electricity. Certain gems (e.g., amber, meaning electron in Greece; Topaz etc.) have pyro-electricity which is produced by application of heat. It is not actually the heat but the change of temperature it causes, that generates electricity. This obviously shows that the precious gems possess magnetic waves when subjected to heat. When the pyro-electricity is generated the positive poles of the gems become negative and *vice-versa*.

The German expert, Baron Von Reichenbach under rigid tests did notice² that stones, shells and crystals radiate continuous magnetic forces displaying different degrees of wave-lengths with the corresponding shades, colours, forms and radiance. Prior to such experiments Rabbi Benoni, a profound Alchemist of 14th Century A.D. experienc-

* Part I of this paper appeared in February 1957 issue.

¹ Sound We Can Not Hear by Prof. B. Kudryavtsev, translated into English from original Russian by David Sobolev (Moscow, 1956), p. 107 f.

² Quoted in Manmāla, II, p. 1080.

ed that the gems with their varieties of colours absorbed different degrees of light, with a consequent transmission of unequal degrees of heat.¹ The power of refraction and of polarizing light inherent in jewels and minerals has been standardised by the scientists as "Optical";—Refraction is understood to be characteristic possessed by all transparent substances of altering the direction of a ray of light, dashing against their surfaces. It is of twofold nature, Single and Double.

Single refraction is known as a ray of light which forming a single line falls obliquely on the surface of a transparent substance and bents from its original course by taking a different direction. Whereas in the case of double refraction two lines from the ray of light appear and on turning the surface of the substance, both the images move until they coincide; and on turning, still further, one will seem to pass over the other. In all substances, evidently one line is visible through which no double refraction is to be seen; this line is called the Axis of the crystal or the Axis of double refraction. The knowledge of the double refractive power helps us to a great extent in specifying jewels and minerals, which at first sight seem to be similar to each other when, by cutting and polishing, or in case of our receiving irregular bits, we cannot form any idea of their external form. A bit of red Topaz will, for instance, refract doubly; whereas one bit of spinel Ruby (the crystal being octahedral) will not refract so.²

As a rule, transparent crystals, with bright polished faces have positive electricity; those that have a rough surface, and are not limpid,³ possess negative electricity. Amongst the jewels which become electricity by pressure, to a very high degree, Iceland spar is one of those varieties; Topaz, Amethyst, and the varieties of quartz, generate electricity under pressure less in degrees than the above mentioned qualities.

Besides these electrical properties of jewels, their chemical compositions depend on the regularity of constituent atoms. From astrological point of view as well as from the recent researches of modern scientists it may be concluded that the energy of the atoms have radiation effect to counteract (within certain limitations) aspects of planets on human destiny.⁴ This necessarily calls for Dr. Rutherford and

¹ *Ibid.*

² A note on the nature of refraction in Jewels is given in Table No. III.

³ An explanatory note of these technical terms have been given in pp 4 ff.

⁴ Cf:—Man, His nature and his Destiny by Dr. Kunhan Raja, in *Astrological Magazine*, 1954, p. 249.

Chadwick who proved by experiment that the disintegration or transmutation of the atomic structure could be generated by outside energies under bombardment by particles, neutrons, deuterons, etc. This variation in the atomic structure changes its destiny. In view of Dr. Gore's Destiny in human system lies in the blood groups, in chromosomes and gene which are influenced through hormones by radiations, and whose intensity vary in accordance with the latitude, altitude and longitude. From these propositions, we could anticipate that astrologically when of any animate or inanimate object's destiny, which is the cumulative effect of gravitational waves produced by planets, the electromagnetic radiations rocketed by stars and the cosmic rays discharged incessantly through the intra-terrestrial spaces, is assessed, variation thereto could be operated by putting in outside agencies like the planetary jewels (Graha-ratna), gems and minerals etc. etc. In this connection it is informative to mention that the "Art Magic" edited by E. H. Britten, contains in detail the experiments made by Baron Von Reichenbach on the subject. Von Reichenbach after rigid tests and experiments have been coerced to believe that the magnetic emanations that streamed from jewels react over human destiny.²

Dr. Oscar Brunter of America³ has established that all tangible things are condensations of Ether. This Ether is known to be the reservoir of "Cosmic Fluid" that lie at the root of all creations; whenever this Cosmic Fluid or Ether is condensed it produces effulging power which could be measured. This method of measurement is called "Radiation". It is imperative in this connection to mention that this "Radiation", as a matter of fact is understood to stand in associated relation to the Science of Astrology." Dr. Castiglioni obviously observed in his work "Adventures of the Mind" that modern research in radiations emitted by substances contained in the stars and revealed by the spectrum,—the hypothesis that have been recently advanced concerning the relations between solar spots and extraordinary historical events,—the publications by Swaboda and Fliess on the laws of septennial periods,—all these lead us to think that the intuitive and profoundly human conception, deriving directly from man's immediate sensitivity to the action of the stars may have a vaster and deeper foundation of truth than was realised when this

¹ Destiny & Cosmic Factors, p. 86.

² Quoted in Manimālā, II, p. 1030.

³ Quoted by Dr. Benoytosh Bhattacharyya in The Astrological Magazine, 1951, January, pp 22 ff.

primitive idea of intercosmic solidarity seemed to be forgotten.¹ It is stated that the malefic powers released by the planets are always Negative, whereas the Radiation of the planetary jewels are found to be Positive.

A comparative chart² of the wave lengths of precious gems with their corresponding planetary vibrations, measured by radiation method are given below :—

Planets		Precious Jewels	
1	Sun : 65000	Ruby : 70,000	
2.	Mercury : 85000	Emerald : 70,000	
3.	Venus : 1,50000	Diamond : 80,000	
4.	Mars : 85,000	Coral : 65,000	
5.	Moon : 65,000	Pearl . 70 000	
6.	Jupiter : 1,80 000	Topaz . 50,000	
7.	Saturn . 65 000	Sapphire . 70,000	
8.	Rahu . 35,000	Zircon : 70,000	
9.	Ketu : 35,000	Cat's Eye : 70,000	

In precious and semi-precious jewels, atoms are orderly arranged to form a clear and single tiny crystal; where the gem is composed of myriads of regular crystallites, it is said to be "Crypto-Crystalline". These Crypto-Crystalline gems are transparent or translucent; where the gem is constituted of irregular crystallites it is called "Massive" which is normally "Opaque". To comprehend the meaning of the technical terms used in this paper a note is given below :—

Transparent : When objects are clearly seen through the gem; it is synonymously used for "Vitreous", which means resembling the surface of glass.

Translucent : When only light is transmitted through the gem without being objects are visualised.

Opaque : When no light is transmitted through the gem; It is otherwisely called "Resinous",—which means shining as if rubbed with an oily substance. The opacity is the effect of intermixture of the minerals with foreign substances, or of decomposition, loss of water, etc.

Adamantine : When the gems show diamondlike brilliance.

Limpid : When the gems are colourless.

Polychroism : When a gem exhibit two or more varieties of colours in the same specimen; the change in colour changes its commercial name and value.

¹ Quoted in Notable Horoscopes by Dr. B. V. Raman (Bangalore, 1956) Introduction.

² Cf. —The Astrological Magazine, 1951, January, p. 23

An alphabetical list of the commonly used precious and semi-precious gems¹ whose utility to combat disease, ailment and hostile astral influences have been standardised by experts all over the world, are given below :—

Transparent	Opaque
Amethyst (Yasavamani)	Agate
Beryl	Basalt
Carnelian (Rudhirākṣya)	Chalcedony
Crysoberyl (Karkketan)	Cacholong
Diamond (Vajara ; Hirak)	Coral (Praval or Vidruma)
Emerald (Marakat)	Cat's Eye (Vaidūrya)
Felspar	Diaspore
Garnet (Pulaka)	Egyptian pebble
Hyacinth or Jacinth (Pingala, Vaikrānta)	Fire Stone
Idocrase	Granite
Kyanite	Heliotrope
Lynx-Sapphire	or } (Jyotirasa)
Milk-Opal	Blood Stone }
Natrolite	Jasper (Gandharva Mani)
Opal	Kork-idolite
Pyrope	Lapis-Lazuli (Rājavaritma)
Quartz (Sphaṭika)	Malachite
Ruby (Māṇikya)	or } (Ganja)
Sapphire (Nīlā)	Mocha Stone }
Topaz (Puṣparāga)	Naphrite } (Pilu)
Uranit	or }
Visuvianite	Jade }
Water Sapphire	Pearl (Muktā)
Xanthite	Porphyry
Zircon (Gomedā)	Onyx (Utpala or palanka,
	Sardonyx
	Turquoise ²
	Ultra-Marine
	Verd-antique
	Wood-Opal
	Xylotile
	Zevelite

Most of the above gems are Polychroistic. Crysoberyl is otherwisely called Cymophane; it owes its origin in Chrysopraser. Sapphire to the ancients is Hyacinthus or Jacinth; the Zircon, Hyacinth and Jargoon are from the same stock; Cat's eye is

¹ As far as I could trace the sanskrit equivalents from ancient Indian Sanskrit Texts, they have been inserted within brackets; in this effort a grateful acknowledgement is due to Pandita, Kamakhyacharan Jyotisharnav, Vidyaratna and Jendra Nath Ghosedastidar Jyotihastri; I am thankful to Sri P. B. Chowdhury of M/S M. P. Jewellers & Co, 1, Vivekananda Road, Calcutta for showing me different specimens of the above jewels.

² Modern Hindusthani Jewellers call it as "Feroza"; in astrological texts, this semi-precious stone is suggested as substitute of Emerald (marakat); "Feroza" is of light ash-colour; It is otherwisely called as "Harita",—which means light bluish-green. "Porojam haritāsmṛt ca bhaṣmāṅgaṁ haritāṁ dvidhā"—tā-Saṁskṛtā, p. 76.

from Chrysoberyl; Lapislazuli is a variety of Quartz; from different qualities of quartz¹ we have the following gems :—

1. The Rock-Crystal (Kācaḥ)
2. The Amethyst
3. The False-Topaz
4. The Chrysophrase (Svarṇāgī)
5. The Chalcedony
6. The Carnelian (Rudhirākṣya)
7. The Agate
8. The Jasper
9. The Heliotrope (ṛyotīrasa)
10. False Cat's eye
11. Mocha Stone (Ganja) etc.
12. Aquamarines (Karpūramāṇi ; muktāśukti)

In India jewels are used on a specific prescription made by experts in accordance with the planetary positions in birth nativity (Janinakunḍalī).

Though there are opinions which at a time are found to be divergent and differ in regard to the attributes of these jewels, generally experts have a common basis with regard to their qualitative aspects. In European civilisation the Garnet is considered to possess the same marvellous and medicinal virtues as Ruby. The Spinel and Jacinth owing to similarity of colour, are occasionally made to pass for the true 'Ruby'; the Rubbies are generally believed to be active as antidote to poison or plague in addition to its virtue to drive away morbidness, evil thoughts and sex-craving; it is also said when Rubies are worn under wrongful judgment they react to cause even fatality; clear indication to such misfortune is seen by a change of its red colour to blackness which would not resume its original reddish brightness, until the peril had passed away. We crave leave to cite here one such practical incident about the action of Ruby in moulding destiny, from the authentic narration of Wolfgang Gabelchover, a German metaphysicist as quoted by Tollins.²

"It is worthy of notice that the Ruby presages to the wearer by the frequent change and a proportionate darkening of its colour with regard to the intensity of coming evil—this is a belief "which I have heard repeatedly from people of the highest eminence and have, alas! experienced in my own person. For, on December 5th, 1600, as I was travelling from Stuttgart to Cal-wam in company with my beloved

¹ Vide plates 5 ff. in Woosters "Semi-precious Stones" for an idea of the various colours of this variety with the picture of the genuine stones that are preserved in some famous museums of the world.

² Quoted in Manimāḷā, I, pp. 244-45.

wife Catherine Adelmann, of pious memory, I observed most distinctly during the journey that a very fine Ruby, her gift, which I wore set in a ring upon my finger, had lost once or twice almost all its splendid colour and had put on dullness in place of brilliancy and darkness in place of light: the which blackness and opacity lasted not for one or two days only, but several: so that being beyond measure disgusted thereat, I took the ring off my finger and locked it up in my trunk. Whereupon I repeatedly warned my wife that some grievous mishap was impending over either her or myself, as I foreboded from the change of colour in my Ruby. Nor was I wrong in my anticipation, in as much as within a few days she was taken with a fatal sickness that never left her till her death. And truly after her decease, its former brilliant color again returned spontaneously to my Ruby".¹

Besides the power of moulding the destiny pattern, the jewels are believed to possess prophylactic influence, *e.g.*, the Amethyst prevents intoxication and sharpens the wit; the Sapphire and the Emerald are said to have capability of improving eye sight; the same property known to have been also possessed by the Turquoise; Von Helmont, the reputed experimenter of Jewels believes that, "whoever wears a Turquoise so that it, or its gold setting, touches the skin, may fall from any height and the stone attracts to itself the whole force of the blow, so that it cracks and the person is safe."² Wooster as well informs us that "Numerous stories are told where a turquoise which was being worn at the time of an accident saved its owner from a fractured bone by itself becoming cracked."³ In the translation of the Polyhistor of Solinus, published by Arthur Golding in 1587, we read that Turquoise unlike Ruby possesses the remarkable property of growing paler when its wearer undergoes ailment and then again it regains back its original lustre "when placed on the finger of a healthy person."⁴ Pliny noted that the Romans used Diamond to keep off insanity and anxiety.⁵ Raja Dr. S. M. Tagore thinks that "Bi-coloured Cat's eyes have inauspicious properties in them. One such specimen is in the possession of Raja Rajendra Mallick of Chorebagan, Calcutta. This stone is alleged to have caused the death of his third son who used to wear it".⁶

¹ Similar experiences of Dr. B Bhattacharyya, ex-director, Oriental Institute, Baroda, have been cited in Part I of this paper.

² Quoted in Manimālā I, p. 88; *Cf.* Wooster, p. 10.

³ Semi-precious stone,

⁴ Quoted in Wooster, p. 10.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, II, p. 909.

According to the famous alchemist Rabbi Benoni, the diamond surpasses the virtue of Load Stone as a promoter of spiritual ecstasy. Amongst a variety of similar traditional beliefs, he quoted the Agate that quenches thirst and soothes fever, when it is kept in the mouth; Amber combats throat-trouble and glandular inflammations, the Opal is fatal to love and brings in disharmony between the giver and receiver; the Topaz is sure cure for all haemorrhages etc.¹

It was evident in the Highlands that the Toad-Stone could prevent the burning of houses and the sinking of boats, and if the Commander in the field had one about him, he would either be sure to win the day, or all his men would die on the spot.²

The British navigator Captain Sir Edward Belcher of the then Her Majesty's Ship "Samarang", in his voyage narrative told that "At my last interview with the Sultan of Guning Taboor he conveyed into my hand—suddenly closing it with great mystery—what they term here as the Snake-Stone. This is a polished globe of Quartz about the size of a musket-ball which he described as of infinite value as heir-loom and reported to have been extorted from the head of an enchanted snake."³ Mr. Kunz in his work⁴ has noted down many such practical happening due to mysterious influences of jewels.

Anselm De Boot, Spanish physician to Emperor Rodolph and Maximilian II, described in 1664 A.D. some chronic cases of kidney trouble to have been eradicated with the potent curative properties of Jade,—the method being merely to tie the stone to the arm. He found some of his patients were obliged to wear it perpetually, as they relapsed as soon as it was removed. To him if a green Jasper were engraved with the figure of scorpion and worn while the Sun was entering that House of the Zodiac, it would be a sure prophylactic against the formation of stone in the bladder and haemorrhage.⁵

In C. W. King's book⁶ it has been emphasised, "That the wearing of an amber necklace will keep off the attacks of erysipelas in a person subject to them has been proved by repeated experiment beyond all possibility of doubt."⁷ According to ancient, to dream of a green gem, makes the dreamer subsequently a reputed persona-

¹ Manimālā, II, p. 1/32.

² Philosophical Transactions, Vol VI, p. 21.

³ Quoted in Manimālā by Raja Comm. Sourindra Mohan Tagore (1879), Vol. I, p. 81.

⁴ Cf. The Magic of Jewels and Charms (Philadelphia, 1915).

⁵ Semi-precious-Stone, p. 11; Cf. Boot's work "Gemmarum et Lapidum Historia."

⁶ The natural History, Ancient and Modern of precious stones gems and precious metals (London 1865).

⁷ Quoted in Wooster's semi-precious stone, p. 15.

lity who could meet with truth and fidelity; even in the modern times, the fall of an Emerald from its original setting is regarded to bring in misfortune to its wearer; when George III, was crowned, a large Emerald slipped off from his Coronet; the supernatural agency attributed to such incident was the consequent loss of America during his reign.¹

We conclude below with a summary of the efficacy of jewels, in changing human destiny, from the masterpiece work "Magic" by J. B. Port; this ideal compilation work incorporates valuable researches, anecdotes and opinions of erudites on this subject² :—

Agate—Stimulates heart-function; Plague preventive; and antidote of Venomous poison.

Amethyst—Protects from spells and sorceric influence.

Cat's Eye—Curative of cold and chronic trouble with spleen and colic; Acts as charm age against witch-craft.

Carnelian or Babylonian Sard—Ensures victory, stops nasal bleeding, kindles up self-consciousness and helps to become judicious.

Chrysolite—Improves eye sight and brings in joyous mood.

Coral—Stops bleeding, minimises panicky mind and saves from thunder, hail, and lightning.

Diamond—Pacifies wrath and anger, brings in cool and unctuous judgment.

Emerald—Cures epilepsy and hysteric fits.

Jade—Stimulates Kidney function and prophylactic against nephritis; expels stones from the bladder.

Opal—Soothes heart condition and preventive of malarial and malignant diseases.

Pearl—Cures syncope, flux of blood and neurosis.

Topaz—Soothes anger, drives away nightmare and sadness; barren women can bear child.

Sapphire—Prevents from cold and biliousness; St. Jerome in explaining the 19th Chapter of the prophecy of Isaiah states that Sapphire procures royal favours, softens down the anger of the enemies and obtains for the wearer release from captivity.

Zircon—Acts as sedative; brings in riches, honour and wisdom for the wearer; it is a safeguard against lightning.

¹ *Manirala*, I, p. 416.

² I am indebted to Pandit Narendranath Bagal, Jotibhādatri for helping me to attach importance on this point with his experience and practical data derived from statistical experiments.

Ancient Indian medical authorities like Caraka, Susruta, Vāgbhaṭa, etc., mentioned that diseases are to be treated in three ways, *e.g.*,

- (i) Talismanic (daiva vyapāśraya)
- (ii) Medicinal (yukti vyapāśraya)
- (iii) Psycho-pathological (sattvāvajaya)

Under Talismanic way remedies are sought by worship, oblation, sacrifices, and wearing jewels :

“tatra daivavyapāśrayaḥ mantrauṣadhi-mañimanāṅgala valyupahāra-homa-niyama-prāyaścittopa vāsa-svaśtyayana”*

So far we have discussed on the dynamics of jewels, with occasional citations of quaint aphorisms of the ancients **not as guides or positive scientific indications, but as an age-old belief on the latent powers of magnetic bodies traced in them and confirmed by the traditional knowledge of the observers and experimentors of natural forces**; with the advancement of knowledge and recent researches in various aspects of Nature we have been fortified to see some useful perspection in Keat's exclamation that Truth is beauty.

This metaphysical vision of the poet verily gets a counter support at the hands of present-day scientists ; for there is not a single aspect left in Nature, where we do not “encounter what Einstein calls ‘pre-established harmonies’, and since the discovery and revelation of such harmonies is the concern, in their different regions, of both the artist and the man of science, we see once again that there is no essential distinction between the science and the arts.”¹ Obviously we could anticipate that the metaphysical knowledge of jewels as moulder of destiny which were known to our ancestors and to the wise of ancient times and which lie buried under the ponderous debris of time, ignorance, bigotry and egoistic unbelief, will gradually be brought to its Truth,² and that besides other properties inherent in them the hidden forces of jewels will be made clear as the hidden relation between matter and energy³ have been made clear to the students of modern science and to the world.

We now append below in table form different scientific analysis of commonly known precious and semi-precious gems :

* Caraka Samhitā, sūtra Bhāṣa, Ch. XI.

¹ The Limitations of Science by J. W. N. Sullivan (Mentor series—1053), p. 172.

Cf. The hidden side of Things by C. W. Leadbeater, Vol. I, p. 47.

² Cf. Occult Chemistry & Physics by G. E. Sutcliffe, p. 187.

TABLE I

Chemical and other scientific characteristics of commonly known planetary jewels

Name	Specific Gravity	Hardness	Ingredients	Lustre
Diamond (Hīraṭ)	3.4 to 3.6	Scratches all other precious gems.	Pure Carbon	Adamantine
Sapphire (Nīlā)	3.9 to 4.2	Scratched by diamonds only but scratches all other gems.	Alumina 98.5 Oxide of Iron 1.0 Lime .5	Vitreous
Ruby (Māṇikyā) or Chuni	3.99 to 4.2	Only inferior to Diamond.	Alumina Oxide of Iron Silica 7.0	Do.
Topaz (Puṣpārāg)	3.5 to 3.6	Scratched by Sapphire and scratches quartz easily.	Alumina 58.39 Silica 34.01 Flourine 15.06 Traces of metallic Oxides 1%	Do.
Emerald (Marakat or Pānnā).	2.67 to 2.75	Scratched by Spinel; scratches some specimens of quartz.	Alumina 15.75 Silica 63.50 Glucina 12.50 Oxide of Iron 1.00 Lime 0.25	Do.
Coral (Vidrumsa or Pravāḥ),	2.6 to 2.7	Easily scratched by other gems.	Pure Calcium carbonate Organic matter affected by heat and acids.	Opaque
Pearl (Muktā)	2.5 to 2.7	Vary with quality.	Carbonite of Lime and Organic Matter.	Pearly (Limpid)
Zircon (Gomedā)	4.77 to 4.10	Scratches Quartz slightly.	Silica 33.0 Zirconia 66.8 Peroxide of Iron 0.10	Vitreous but almost adamantine.
Cat's Eye (Vaidūrya)	2.65 to 3.8	Scratches glass and scratched by Diamond Sapphire and Ruby.	Alumina 80% Glucina 20% Peroxide of Iron 0.10 Unaffected by acids.	Translucent.

TABLE II

Physical characteristics of Planetary Jewels:—

Name	Refraction	Dispersive powers.	Electric properties	Fusibility.
Diamond	Single	0.88	Subject to positive frictional electricity; non-conductor.	Infusible volatilized by continued heat.
Sapphire	Double in a small degree.	0.026	Subject to Frictional electricity and retains the same for a long time.	
Ruby	Practically negligible.	with Same Variation.	Like Sapphire	
Topaz	Double in a small degree.	0.035	Acquires electricity by friction and heat treatment.	Infusible
Emerald	Double (Very feeble)	0.023	Acquires electricity by friction.	Slightly fusible before the blow pipe.
Coral			Acquires electricity by friction.	Highly sensitive to heat and volatile.
Pearl				Calcines by moderate heat.
Zircon	Highly double	0.014	Acquires positive electricity by friction.	Infusible before the blow pipe.
Cat's Eye	Double	0.026	Do. and retains it for several hours.	Do.

After an all round brief survey on the metaphysics of jewels one point yet remains to be discussed; this is, how to ascertain the quantity (weight) of jewels (ratnānām parimānah) are required for individual to wear.

We have discussed already that in every individual's nativity first attempt is to be made with regard to the pinpointing of those planets that are indicated to be malefic for the person. When, for instance, Sun is posited badly in the birth nativity, it indicates that the benefic vibrations radiated by the Sun to the world, do not reach to the store of hidden forces of the person, as such the person is ex-

pected to display his role with the already received quantity of planetary forces, excepting the Sun. By wearing a Ruby he is then fortified to make up his deficiency to a limited extent by drawing forth beneficial power from the Sun; of course this takes place in proportion to the capability of his net energy quanta received by him at the moment of his birth. In ascertaining the benefic and malefic aspects of the planets it is to be borne in mind that the benefic planets when are in association with the strongly posited malefics,—they lose their real nature and side with the malefic aspects of the planets.¹ These benefic planets if are found to be in association or aspects of malefics in “Navāṁśa Kuṇḍali” they are as well to be taken as helpless to guard the good of the person.

Generally, the experts in India have left an opinion to prescribe excepting in the case of Diamonds, all the other planetary jewels by “Rati”² (e.g., 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10 Ratis etc); in the case of Diamond the prescription is by “Viśā”³ (e.g., 12, 15, 16, Visa etc.); it is seldom prescribed by “Rati”.

In ascertaining the malefic and benefic aspects of the planet following particulars are to be primarily judged :—

Particular planet's position in the zodiacal sign, e.g.,

(1) Moveable (Cāra Rāśi), Fixed Sign (Sthira Rāśi) or Common Sign (Dviśvabhāva Rāśi).

(2) Whether the particular sign is fiery (agnitattva), earthy (bhutattva), airy (vāyu), watery (jalatattva).

(3) Then the states of existence of such planet (avasthā), is to be taken into consideration, e.g., exaltation (dīpta), own house (svastha), complementary house (mudita), hostile house (dīna), stagnation (sambhāna), combustion (astagatah), retrogression (vakra), acceleration (aticāra and bhīti), etc.

(4) Lastly the particular planet's position in Navāṁśa⁴ sign is to be carefully considered.

The force of planet to produce beneficial results or inflict obstructive elements is to be assessed in relation to the natural sympathies or antipathies of the aspecting and the aspected planets.

When these diverse and complicated problems of a nativity are clearly understood in the light of above-mentioned points the task

¹ Ratna-Samīkṣā, p. 155.

² 1 Rati=1/8th of a carat which in England is equal to 20, 54, 090 mgms.=4 Dhan (paddy).

³ 1 Visa=1/20th of a Rati.

⁴ When a sign in the birth nativity is divided into nine equal parts each part measuring 3 1/8 degree becomes a navāṁśa.

of prescribing the weight or quantity of the specific planetary jewel becomes safe and scientific.

The simplest process to select the weight of the specific planetary gem to be worn, is by counting the serial position of the respective malefic planet from its original position in the birth nativity to its changed place in the particular sign in Navāṁśa chart. If change is observed by four signs, the planetary jewel, excepting Diamonds, is to be worn "Four Ratis"; in the case of diamond it may be minimum "Twelve Viśā".

HINTS ON EDUCATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION IN INDIA

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1. CONDITIONS TO BE FULFILLED.

Post-War Reconstruction in Education must fulfil the following conditions :—

The problem of employment must occupy its legitimate place in the system of education. Teachers and managers of educational institutions must have their eyes wide open on the market value and employability of their products. This means re adjustment of educational curriculum and methods of training to the needs of the hour and suitable adaptation of our educational machinery to changes in the social, economical, industrial and even political conditions of the country after the war. A wide perspective must be taken of the future needs securing long-range reforms and allowing elasticity in the system wherever necessary in the interests of the people and various requirements of the state.

This will entail a revolution in the entire outlook of the children as well as of the parents. Provision will have to be made for facilities in the use of the libraries and reading rooms and all kinds of research work and for travels, facing adventures, risks, and enterprises. All sorts of manual work should be encouraged and the principle of dignity of labour upheld. Body and mind must be developed simultaneously with the spirit.

Moral and spiritual (including religious) needs must not be ignored but explored and upheld. What are the ideals and postulates, the essential and fundamental principles and beliefs, axioms, and dogmas or creeds, on which the life of the individual and of the society is founded? What are the ancient traditions and cultural values which are to be respected and improved upon? Our ideas of right and wrong, of good and evil, of the beautiful and the ugly, propriety and decency or otherwise must be weighed and probed and a searching scrutiny made of our presuppositions and prejudices, if any. The lives and teachings of Prophets must be studied and reflected on

and presented to the new generation, with modern interpretations. Saints and Sages had their experiences and experiments of life, their blessings and curses, their divergent tastes and temperaments, their universalism and liberalism combined with local and temporal colouring and racial or national prejudices, virtues and vices, narrowness and fanaticism, combined with honest and fearless criticism and open-minded and outspoken vindication of rights and denunciation of evils of their times. All these records carefully read and understood will throw a flood of light on the future course of action and path of journey towards the goal.

Rather than undertaking costly improvements and reforms over a whole province or division or even district, for which funds available may be too small and meagre, it is better to think out a scheme of great value and significance, originality and fruitfulness, and then work it out within a narrow limit, say within a town or a group of villages carrying out an experiment, and spending large sums of money for procuring leaders and ideal citizens for a new foundation. Absolute regeneration is what we need, not patchwork reforms but radical reconstruction. The problem of efficient teachers, the problem of funds, the problem of congenial environment, the problem of virgin and fertile soil, the problem of climate and agricultural, industrial and economic development—all point towards small schemes within a narrow range for application of our ideals and execution of our methods.

2. The *Rationale* and the *morale* of the Plans for Post-War Reconstruction, Educational and Cultural.

The World War II was undertaken by the United Nations with the avowed object of ending the War-minded Policy and impulses of the axis powers and their people for all times.

With the cessation of hostilities and termination of the war in all fronts, bringing victory to the allies, the questions may arise—
(a) How far is it possible to put an end to the possibility of War?
(b) How are we to ensure and maintain peaceful conditions for all times? (c) What is the root of all these Wars?

The genesis of the War-like spirit and impulses must be sought in human psychology, in the national traditions of the western races, and the remedy must be sought in a radical transformations of the hearts of these peoples. Can we in India do anything to prevent future war in any part of the world?

These questions bring us to the consideration of the meanings of peace and service in the kingdom of Heaven or Ideal citizens in an ideal state—

1. Acquisitive instinct in man can be controlled and guided by higher ideals. Saving as well as spending is an art, which can be developed with a science and a philosophy of life and living. Selfishness must give place to unselfish spirit of service to the community, selfless devotion to the public good. How to generate this spirit in our youths, how to root out the germs of violence in their minds, how to eradicate self-centred instincts and impulses, greed, covetousness, self-interest grasping and seizing habits, and to plant therein love and goodwill, impulses to obey and serve, this is the task of education and culture. In Schools and Colleges our youths are to be trained in the habit of good turn, spirit of consideration for their neighbours, classmates or school fellows, etc. Habits of thrift, the art of spending to good purposes, the art of saving for future obligations and the spirit of self-help may be developed, not in theory but in corporate activities.

2. The cry of *Swarāj* is in the air, but what is its inner significance? *Swarāj* in Sanskrit means self-rule, self-control, self-government, self-domination, self-determination, or in other words, autonomy of the soul. The Secis of the Upanishads depended on the soul-force for the attainment of *Swarāj* or self-rule. There are verses and expressions in the Gita and other sacred books of India which elaborately lay down rules and methods to be employed by the seekers after self-rule and by students striving for freedom from bondage. The Bible and the Quoran also contain passages that enjoin self-government, self-help, self-sufficiency and self-dependence. The Buddhist 'Nirvāṇa' or extinction of desires or deliverance from the slavery of impulses and passions and thirst of the flesh, cravings and appetites for sexual pleasures is also related to freedom of the spirit or self-rule. Is there any country in the world that may be said to possess *Swarāj* or self-government in this sense? Individuals and nations, whether in America or Britain, in China or Russia are not yet free or self-ruling in the true sense. Freedom or Independence does not consist in mere possession of right to vote or right to tax ourselves through elected representatives. Even the King is not free or self-ruled in the scriptural sense. Democracy does not give us *Swarāj* or self-Government for the people as is generally understood. Even in the sense of Government of the people, by the people, for the people and through the people very few states will come up to the

standard. Democracy might be reduced to mobocracy or hypocrisy, the rule of the masses by the classes or by the crowd. As mob mentality or crowd psychology is usually the deciding factor in the management of affairs of a modern state, it is all the more necessary that we should give proper education, sound education, efficient education to the masses. They are not merely to be literate but educated and cultured. Unless there is wisdom in the multitude there is no hope for national Self Government. Ignorant masses, unintelligent, unformed and uneducated citizens, even if they are politically free, cannot use their votes intelligently and efficiently. Election becomes a myth, a farce and a frivolous affair like a fancy dress football show with such illiterate people in a state.

3. Experiments on Educational reforms and constructive welfare works in connection with Rural Reconstruction have been made in different parts of India and these should be studied, watched and profited by. For instance, the Government of West Bengal or Assam might depute some Officers of the Education Department to Dayalbag "Radhawami" Educational Institutes (near Agra), to Bolpur Sreeniketan and Visva-Bharati—Santiniketan (founded by the great Rabindranath Tagore) in Bengal, to the Training School for Basic Education teachers at Oglia (the National Islamia University, started by Dr. Zakir Hussain) near New Delhi, to the Educational Institutions under the control of the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Maharaja of Mysore, the Gaekwar of Baroda, to the Basic Education Centre at Wardha, under the guidance of Mahatma Gandhi, to the Centres of Religious, Moral and Spiritual Culture at Pandicherry (Arabinda Asram), to the Gurukula Hardwar (under the Arya Samaj), to the Adwaita Asram, Almorah, under the Ram Krishna Mission, to the Theosophical Institutes at Adyar, Madras, and to the Sundarban educational colonies initiated by Sir Daniel Hamilton and inspired by Capt. Petaval (Calcutta University), to the Lady Irwin College (of Domestic Science), organised by the All-India Womens' Conference, to the Morris College of Music (Bhatkhand University) of Lucknow. We may also profit by a study of the constructive schemes of National planning, both for urban and rural re-construction that are being prepared by the All-India Congress Committee under Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's guidance. The Kasturba Gandhi National Memorial Trust is preparing Schemes of Women's and Children's Welfare works in Rural India, with the help of the fund of over one crore of rupees raised by the friends and admirers of Mrs. Gandhi, and this too deserves a close study for application in Government

organisations directed towards the same ends. Even the Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha may have something constructive to offer for Post-War-Reconstruction planning Departments of Government.

OUR DISEASES AND THEIR REMEDIES

Educational Reconstruction in Post-War India must begin from the foundation and go to the root of all evils in our social and national life, in order that our Post-War planning may root out the diseases that weaken and paralyse our body politic. Crying lipseep and powerless slogans from the housetop and shouting unmeaning and useless shibboleths in the streets will not do. We have to diagnose properly the wrongs that our social life suffer from, the ailments resulting from a unhealthy body and unwholesome mind in the individual and in the nation and then to apply the right remedy for these ills. Prevention is better than cure and that is why all the modern states are applying the preventive measures of the Public Health Department of Government to the social environments of their people rather than spending enormous sums on curative measures prescribed by the Medical Department. Now let us see how educational authorities can help in preventing the spread of physical, mental and spiritual diseases in the body social, body politic and body national in India.

NATIONAL FITNESS CAMPAIGN

Diseases are generally due to poverty and ignorance. But where the rich and the well-to-do families also suffer from illness, the cause must be found in the environment, as well as in the ignorance of the members of these families; regarding the laws of health, the nature of the germs of diseases and regarding medicines, diets and other conditions that help in removing the causes of complaints. Where should we start?

(a) Training our School Children in the fundamental rules of health and essential laws of nature affecting their physical, mental, moral and spiritual welfare is the first thing needful.

(b) Training the parents and guardians, especially the illiterate people of rural areas, in the art of observing those rules and obeying those laws and in the virtues of good citizenship so that they may realise the importance and necessity of co-operation and mutual consideration and service, and pull up the powers that further life and

pull down the barriers that hinder its growth in themselves and their children—these should be attended to as a matter of great importance.

(c) Physical fitness campaign must be started on a country-wide Province-wide scale. The whole nation must be on the alert and leaders keenly interested in securing for our school-children health teaching and propaganda through games, play methods, dramatisation, songs and artistic, rhythmic dances, drills, physical movements and regulated exercises, through the practice of breathing (Prānāyāma) disciplining of *Asanas* or sitting postures, concentration of mind, meditation, calm reflection, the observance of the rules of *Yama* and requirements of *Niyama*, self-control, restraint of senses and limbs, withdrawal of the sense-organs and the mind from external objects and stimulations, absorption of thought in the self and the Supreme Spirit. These must be encouraged and enforced through our schools on a nation-wide scale. The physical and the mental cannot be separated in fact, and in practice the moral and the spiritual underlie them both, but nature is subservient to the spirit, and the natural laws are dominated by the Spirit behind, i.e., by the moral power that maketh for righteousness. The old orthodox belief that still prevails in Indian traditions and permeates the customs and manner of the masses in rural areas, has much to commend itself, viz., that wherever there is virtue or right-doing there is triumph or victory, that every moral action of man is subjected to the laws of righteousness by an unerring wisdom and judgement from the supreme seat of moral and Spiritual Authority, in other words, virtues bring their own reward and vices are automatically and inevitably attended by evil consequences as their appropriate penalties. Regularity of life, law-abidingness in regard to health rules, moderation in eating, drinking and sleeping, in resting, working and playing, a life of strict moral discipline, penances and austerities, combined with enjoyment of beauty and love and pleasures that are not contrary to laws and morals—these are the characteristics of a balanced life, an ideal life of selfpoised and mental equilibrium, that rests on the 'golden mean' or 'middle path'. The life of a Yogi is one of union with the Centre of Reality, union with the Supreme Being, who is the Essence, the Roots and the Seed of the Universe, His is a life in tune with the Infinite and the Eternal, Such a life would follow as a corollary from these faiths, beliefs and attendant practices mentioned above. Return to Nature, Back to the life of purity and simplicity, of high thinking and plain living. restoration of the ancient system of *Brahmacharyya* during the student life—abiding in God's laws, God's own self-imposed

limitations on the self by the self, through the self, revival of the science and art of Yoga, as taught in the Upanishads, in the Gītā, in the systems of Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophy, in the Vedānta of Janaka and Yājñavalkya, in the Prāṇas and the Epic. These are the inevitable consequences of a healthy system of physical, mental and moral training, and spiritual and religious culture that should be adopted as a part of the National Fitness Campaign which must be initiated by our national Government.

INTER-COMMUNAL HARMONY

Division Dispute, Differences of Caste and Creed and Community must go, and unity, harmony, identity of interests and community of purpose, concerted oneness of ideas, feelings and actions must be emphasised in their place. Nothing could be more harmful than the spirit of violence and hatred, which fans the flame of disunion and sows the seed of separation and isolation in our national life. The principles of love and service of peace and goodwill, the spirit of fellowship and mutual understanding and appreciation of each other's culture could not be too highly emphasised in these days. If you exploit on the people's ignorance and misunderstandings, passions and prejudices, if you lay stress on suspicion and distrust, mutual ill-will and non-co operation, the same spirit, will spread its poisonous infection everywhere and set in disintegrating forces in our home and family circle, in our sect and community as well. We have, of course won freedom through our own efforts without depending on any extraneous agencies, but that does not mean that we cease to avail our-elves of the friendly help and active sympathy, support and co-operation of foreign races or peoples, belonging to other nationalities and professing other creeds than our own. We must cultivate the feelings of comradeship, of brotherhood, of peaceful and loving fellowship with all who are united with us in ties of common and concerted action for self-government of freedom in the real, spiritual sense. Let us offer them all our right hand of friendship and secure their co operation in fighting our own evils at home and abroad. 'Unite' 'Co-operate' "Combine", "Join hand", "Pull-together", "Concentrate closely", 'meditate calmly', 'Look out widely', 'Look ahead' and 'Look within'—these are really the maxims that ought to inspire us and animate us towards a common goal—the kingdom of Heaven—that far-off divine event or consummation towards which the whole creation is moving. Castes and creeds that divide men against men, women against women, brothers

against sisters or sisters against brothers, brothers against brothers and sisters against sisters, must be pulled down as walls or barriers that shut out the light and air of Heaven.

Every poisonous plant that thrives on the soil of divisions and produces apples of discord and disharmony must be overthrown, root and branch, whether it is established in the name of religious sect or a caste-guild or communal organisation or party-politics. Whatever forces, principles or organisations on the other hand, unite castes with castes, creeds with creeds, communities with communities must be reinforced, strengthened and bolstered up. We must ever be wakeful and be up and doing to secure that the spiritual energy which lies hidden in the hearts and souls of men and women is liberated like atomic bombs and utilised for constructive welfare activities. In these days of recognition of the solidarity of mankind and of the inter-dependence of nations and races on earth, it is futile to ask for the separation of one nation or group of nations from another in the name of independence. We all are members of one another, we are limbs or parts of one organic whole and must stand together if need be, rather than stand out and fall out to our mutual ruin and destruction and death. We are beloved children of one Common Father and loyal and obedient servants of one and the same Divine Master, call Him God or Allah or Iswar or Bhagavān, Brahma or Param-Ātmā (Supreme Soul) or by whatsoever name you please, and it is our sacred and proud privilege to love Him, serve Him, by loving and serving His children. All men and women are our brothers and sisters, and we are all fellow-subjects of the same Monarch or Sovereign—the Mother of Father Divine, the Queen or the King Divine, and ruler of all the worlds and heavens.

(iii) RELIGIOUS TOLERATION AND THE SPIRIT OF UNIVERSALISM AND LIBERALISM

Next to caste and communal divisions comes the evil of religious disputes which generally mar the prospect of Hindu Muslim unity and inter-communal harmony. Religion is the most sacred thread that binds the human soul with the feet of God and it is the golden link that ought to bind soul to soul, unite mind with mind and heart with heart. It is the one agency that ought to secure peace on earth and goodwill among men and spread the Gospel of Love and service and fellowship everywhere. And yet it is in the name of religion that one community is fighting against another community in India and sectarian jealousies and hatred and violence

and fanatic resolutions and catastrophies are engendered in the social life of the Indian people. One religion may differ from another, in its theology, in its morals, in its rituals, but there is no reason why the members professing these two religions should not live in peace and harmony together, with mutual consideration and appreciation for each other's faiths and cultures and traditions, respecting the feelings of neighbours and minorities belonging to other denominations. The remedy lies in mutual understanding and peaceful disposition and goodwill, spirit of charity, toleration, helpfulness and service and co operation, irrespective of caste and creed and colour. To help in creating this atmosphere, the Government and the people have clear duties before them, *viz.* :—

(1) . They should undertake publication of such verses, passages and extracts from the different scriptures, as have a common basis or imply Universal agreement—either in regard to moral maxim principles of conduct, practice of virtuous life, ethical codes, etc., or in regard to the conception of God and the soul and the world and their relation to one another, as well as selections from the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Gita, the Zendvesta, the Tripitaka, the Bible, the Quoran, the Granth Sahib and other sacred Books to show that there is underlying harmony in the spirit of their teachings regarding love and service, peace and goodwill, which are to provide the cementing bond of fellowship among men and women professing diverse religions :

(2) Arrangement should be made for the preparation of text-books on literature, history, Biography, Ethics, etc., which inculcate the spirit of harmony, concord and unity among the followers of different religions, laying before our youths under training the noble examples of holy living, high purpose and soul-force recorded in the deeds thought and words of the Prophets, Saints and Sages of the world in all periods of religious history.

(3) They should bring out editions of scriptures and lives of the Saints and the Prophets of the Hindus for the Christian and Muslim readers and compilations of the Scriptures and lives of the Prophets and Saints of the Muslim and Christians for the benefit of the Hindus, Buddhists and Parsis and so on.

(4) A Parliament of Religions should be invited from time to time in the great cities as well as in progressive and culturally suitable rural areas.

(5) All the sacred places of pilgrimage and shrines of the different religions should be open to visitors from among scholars and

seekers after truth belonging to other faiths, for deriving spiritual benefits, cultivating charitable dispositions, for promoting tolerance and fellowship and a broader outlook, Libraries, Reading Rooms, and Halls for meetings and discussions and readings and expositions of scriptures should be provided in these holy cities or shrines as well as in other progressive urban and rural centres.

(6) Occasional excursions should be organised of Hindus, Muslims and Christians together visiting historical places, exchanging ideas, dining together, sleeping under the same roof and comparing each other's notes on religious experience and cultural outlook following from their religious convictions and spiritual endeavours.

(7) There should be established a Chair of Comparative Theology or Harmony of Religions in every University (*vide* the University scheme below).

(8) A Journal of Religious Unity and Spiritual fellowship should be conducted by a Board representing all faiths, each member thereof editing and censoring or moderating articles contributed by members of his own community or Congregation.

Thus and thus alone can be generated a spirit of universalism and liberalism among our educated youths which will make for religious toleration, so badly needed in India.

IV. CORRELATION OF EDUCATION WITH LIFE

1. Education in Post-War India must prepare our youth for life, and life includes living and require a livelihood. We cannot correlate the school with the home, with the family and society, with the intellectual, moral and religious environments of the pupils under training unless the educational staff can undertake the tuition of the school boys and girls as well as the college students in the task of earning bread, and helping in the production of food, clothes houses and the materials necessary thereto. Our scheme of education will be incomplete without a scheme of rural welfare, comprehending the supply of food-stuffs, clothing stuffs and housing materials, etc. for the population of the rural areas in which majority of our schools must be situated and also for the urban areas and their people in the neighbourhood of the rural schools. Such a comprehensive scheme can be prepared only with the help of experts, not of the Educational Department alone, but of the Departments of Agriculture and Veterinary, of the Forests and Public Works, of Medicine and Public Health, of Industries and Co-operative Societies so that a school is not to be regarded as a sole concern of teachers and educationists in

the narrow sense, but a joint responsibility of all the heads of Departments, co-operating with the D.P.I., Trade and Commerce, Industry and Co-operative Stores, maintenance of health, prevention and cure of diseases, making and manufacturing of food and clothes of houses and furniture as well as transport and communication (including vehicles for conveying food-stuff and other necessities of life through roads and waterways—from the steam engines to electric powers, from war-ships to aeroplanes, dockyards and aerodrome and motor workshops of all kinds)—nothing is of indifference to the educational administrators of Post-War planning. Youths of India must be trained in the art of making, doing, producing or bringing something out of nothing, which implies training of the will, fashioning of impulses and desires into a strong and iron determination and resolution until it becomes a habit or second nature with the young to do and make the right thing in the right place in the right manner. The will-power is a most important aspect of the soul force and yet unfortunately for India this aspect has not been developed to the extent that is desirable. Brains or intellect received prominence in our educational system, and hearts or feelings, emotions and sentiments too were not neglected, but the strengthening of the will through healthy activities, noble resolutions and firm determinations, has rather been ignored. This is a defect that must be removed, if we are to remedy the main diseases of our national life. Character-building depends almost wholly on the development of the will. All the nation-building Departments must co-operate in fostering this side of human nature and three-fourths of the execution of educational Planning will be achieved therewith.

2. To co-ordinate Education with Life as it is lived by our villagers, we must first of all provide for the supply of food to the people of the villages, including the school population. Rice, wheat, lintel and other cereals, potatoes and vegetables must be grown in plenty and at least adequately for meeting the requirements of the population in the areas served by the school population. Bananas, Oranges, Mangoes, papayas, and such other fruits must be produced as far as possible. Betel-nuts and betel-leaves may be supplied where possible, from local resources, if this habit cannot be done away with. Milk must be supplied in pure quality and sufficient quantity at least for the children, for the expectant mothers, and for mothers of new-born children, for the patients and such others needing nutritious diet. Oxen and buffaloes are needed for cultivating

lands, and cows and goats for milk, poultry and livestock farming are thus indispensable adjuncts to the problem of food supply in our villages. Thus Agriculture and Veterinary Departments and their activities come in intimate connection with the problem of education so far as training in the art of living and bread-earning is concerned. It is, therefore, not without reason that "Food is identified with Brahma or Supreme Self and the ultimate Reality by the Hindu sages (*Annamaya Brahma*) and the Christian Bible teaches every man to pray to the Father in Heaven "Give us this day our daily bread" in the words of Jesus, whose spiritual principle of life finds expression in the maxim "Man does not live by bread alone." The whole system of education in India thus needs reshaping in the light of these requirements, as has been rightly discerned by Mr. Gandhi and his associates in formulating the National Basic Education Scheme.

3. We have dealt with the question of connecting Education with the Dread Problem and "Grow More Food" Campaign. Similarly education in schools can be co-ordinated with the production of clothes and materials for clothing, spinning, weaving, knitting, embroidery, needle work, tailoring, cutting, etc. The routine of the school must be so framed as to provide for each boy and girl spending not less than 12 weeks in the year at the rate of 3 hours a day (*i.e.*, 84 days of 3 hours or 42 days of 6 hours) in the cultivation of cotton or jute or supply of wool from the sheep. Spinning and producing yarn for clothes, in weaving a *dhuti* or *sari* or cutting and tailoring, sewing of his own shirt or coat, or her own chemise, frock, etc., rearing silk-worm and producing *endi moga* or silk, etc. There should be compulsory spinning for boys and weaving for girls. Arrangement may be made for the sale of all clothing materials and finished clothes, which will bring a good return for those who spin and weave or do the knitting, cutting, etc. Mending and darning also should receive attention under the same head.

4. Housing Problem and Town Planning might be considered too big a subject for training in the school hours or during the schooling period. But school children should receive training in bamboo work, cane work, wood work, brick work, in making ropes, knot-tying, repairing a wall or a roof or a ceiling. Village youth should get practised in the art of bridge-building, road-making house-construction (the thatched house), etc., and mixing lime and mortar with brick or concrete or stone and cements, they must know how to handle iron sheets and Asbestos for roofing, walling, etc. Model houses are prepared by primary and middle vernacular school pupils under the

guidance of their teachers and there is no reason why the same should not be possible for college students and high school boys on a larger scale. Once the interest is created and the curiosity is roused in our youths, these things will be welcomed by the parents as well as the scholars as parts of extra curricular activity during the student life.

Adult education is not only meant for further education for boys and girls passing the secondary schools but also required for the illiterate who attend night schools and other centres for becoming literate. Libraries and Reading rooms are needed in very large numbers for promoting and extending the facility of adult education. Evening classes should become a rule rather than an exception throughout the countries and especially during the rainy season and winter months, when the peasants farmers and agriculturists are free from the sowing and reaping work. In these evening classes for adults, vocational training should be given in all subjects connected with food, clothing, housing, etc as well as with arts, crafts, commerce and business. By a judicious distribution of lessons in schools and colleges, most of the boys and girls of the educational institutions proceeding beyond the middle school course may be made to specialise in one or more vocational and technical branches of knowledge and thereby qualifying themselves for earning a decent livelihood.

Evening classes under specially qualified teachers could provide training for those youths who were willing to be proficient in the art of cooking, making sweets and pastries, hair-dressing, tailoring, making apparels, outfits, domestic service requirements, carpentry smithery, drawing and painting, bookbinding, making card-board frames, pencil-making, button-making, mat-making, paper-making, slate-making, manufacturing articles from bamboo, cane, straw, jute, etc.

VI. Spiritual Reconstruction through Education. Three R's are supposed to be the foundation of Primary Education, viz: Reading, (W) 'riting and (A) rithmetic, but these are of no use by themselves unless the children of our schools are established in the three H's, viz: Healthiness, Holiness and Wholeness, which are the foundations of the following 3 R's on a moral and spiritual plane, viz: Regularity, Righteousness and Renunciation of self. All children must be trained in the art of living a regular life, a righteous life and an unselfish life of self-renunciation or self dedication. Habits of forming a routine of daily life and pursuing a plan of simple, sincere and holy living, a life of faith, hope and charity, a life of all-around virtues

sided perfection in body, mind and spirit, after the pattern of Divine life as manifested in the character of the Prophets, Saints and Bhaktas of all ages and all races must be considered an essential pre-requisite of training for our school-children. The whole nation can be disciplined in good conduct and trained in character-building only through the moral and spiritual drilling of school children. Hence the necessity of spiritual Reconstruction by way of Red Cross and Temperance work, recognising the value of cleanliness, dignity of labour, purity of heart, generosity of disposition, charity and tolerance, patience and perseverance, forgiveness and forbearance, moral and religious considerations, etc. An all-round National Fitness Campaign must be initiated in the form of Red Cross Campaign, Health and Hygiene Propaganda, Temperance and Prohibition Campaign, Physical Training and Development Campaign, Leisure Hour Hobbies, Recreation Clubs, Arts and Handicrafts Drive, Music and Fine Arts Promotion Societies, Welfare Leagues, Cultural and Spiritual Fellowship, etc. as advocated in the "Training in Leadership and Citizenship for young India" published by the University of Calcutta.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

To develop the latent spiritual faculties and religious susceptibilities of our boys and girls, it is essential that they should be given an opportunity of systematically studying the lives of Prophets and Saints and Sages and Heroes of the Religious World the Scriptures of their own religions as well as of other communities so far as practicable. Intercommunal Harmony is best promoted by the mutual appreciation of each other's religions, based on a study of the lives of Prophets and Saints and Scriptures. The whole year could be conveniently divided into:—

(I) Prophets' Weeks and (II) Scripture Weeks, *e.g.* (I) (a) Abraham Week (b) Moses Week, (c) David Week, (d) Jesus Week, (e) St. Paul's Week. (f) Muhammad Week, (g) Krishna Week, (h) Rama Week, (i) Buddha Week (j) Jina Week (Jainas) (k) Zarathustra Week (l) Nanak Week (m) Chaitanya Week (n) Sankara Deva Week, Etc.

II (a) Vedas Week, (b) Upanishads Week, (c) Gitā Week, (d) Tripitakas Week, (e) Zend Avasta Week, (f) Old Testament Week, (g) New Testament Week, (h) Quoran Week, (i) Grantha Sahib Week, etc. Each week-day may be associated with the day sacred to the memory of the Prophet or the Scripture concerned, *e.g.*, Sunday...

Day of Gāyatri Jap or Sun-Worship and of Christianity (Jesus and the New Testament of the Bible).

Monday :—Day of the Mahabharata (Lunar Dynasty) In memory of The Gitā of Krishna and Arjuna.

Tuesday—The Day of Welfare and Social Service; Worship of Siva and Sakti, Peace and Power; Service and Sacrifice; God as Goodness, doing good to the people and the country, being good to the world and humanity.

Wednesday—The Day of Budhi Odin and the Sages, Seers, Yogis—Buddha, Socrates, Yājñavalkya, etc.

Thursday—The Day of Brihaspati, of Gurus and Priests and Ministers of Religions, Saints and Apostles, Guru Nanak, Chaitanya, Sankar Deva, Dadu, Kabir and others.

Friday—The day of Muhammed and the Quoran; Islamic Culture; Mahatmā Gandhi's Rāmdhun.

Saturday—The Day of the Jews and the Parsees, the Old Testament and Zend-Avesta.

A Faculty of Theology should be the first essential for every University in India. Each religion should be represented by a Department of this faculty. For example the Department of Vedic Religion, would include a Chair of Vedic and Upanishadic Philosophy, Lecturers on the Gita and the Epic Philosophy, on the Puranas and the Smritis and on the six systems of Darśanas, etc. There may be a Chair of Buddhism, a Chair of Jainism, a Chair of Vaishnavism, a Chair of Saiva and Sakta Tantras, a Chair of Sikhism, as well as Chairs of Christianity and Islamic Theology. It would not be difficult to obtain suitable scholars for filling these chairs, and money may be found by appealing to each community to raise funds for the facilities of study and research in their respective religious literature. Religion has been in the past and still is the predominant factor in Indian life, and the people of India would be keen and enthusiastic in coming forward to meet the requirements of religious studies. It is an erroneous presumption on the part of some educated leaders that religion is not wanted for our national regeneration and that religious education, if introduced in our Universities, would create discord and disturb the peace and goodwill prevailing among the various races of men in this country. On the contrary, religion is the most effective means of elevating the common masses as well as the educated youths of India, and religion, if properly understood and loyally followed, can be the

cementing bond for strengthening the natural ties of fellowship in love and service which will make a happy family of the whole humanity and bring about the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, establishing peace and goodwill, among all races. The Faculty of Theology will help in creating an atmosphere of mutual understanding and appreciation of each other's culture and religion, and promote a spirit of service and sacrifice, prepare the way for purity of thought and word and deed and encourage those virtues of toleration and consideration which enable us to respect other people's point of view, to identify ourselves with the interests of all religious denominations, communities and races. Teachers of religious classes in schools and colleges, Priests and Maulavis and Padres, can be trained in these Theological Departments.

The Vaishnava Theological University in Brindaban can set up on ideal for the future Theological Faculties of our Indian Universities and be a recruiting ground for the staff of Theological faculties in these Universities.

National Welfare in Free India (through a Theological University) Political freedom has been attained by us, but have we liberated ourselves from the thralldom of illiteracy, of insanitary condition in villages, of capitalists, priests and aristocrats, of greed and selfishness and spirit of distrust and disunion among the masses and the classes of our people? How to achieve this primary goal of freedom for our women and children at home, for our teachers and pupils in schools, for our peasants and labourers in the fields of agriculture and industry and for our official and non-official leaders and members of legislature, Directors, inspectors and ministerials, clericals and menials of the various Government departments, that is the problem of problems for those who have the National Welfare of Free India at heart and who are engaged in the task of post-work reconstruction and planning and development for a progressive nation.

To begin from the beginning, nothing worth attempting can be gained without a strong moral and spritual foundation. The basis of National welfare and Progress must be sought in the national characteristics of the people, in their historical growth and development, in their cultural outlook, in their customs and habits, in their manners and morals, and in their longstanding traditions. Let us look into the matter a little more closely and find out the sources of our maladies and the unfailing and indispensable remedy for these. We must dive deeper and deeper into the bottom of the ocean and pick up Pearls of inestimable value.

"The child is the father of the man". As is the child so will be the man. But have we a common conception of childhood or manhood? Our children are first Hindus, Mussalmans, Christians, Buddhists and Sikhs, and even among the Hindus, they are either Vaishnavas or Sāktas, Bhāgavatas or Shaivas, Brahmins or Kāyasthas, Vaidyas or Sudras. Then we have the division of Assamese, Bengalis, Marathis Gujaratis, Hindustanis, etc.

So we have to train our youths first of all in the art of loving all beings without distinction of caste and creed and colour and community, in the art of living together in peace and harmony with mutual respect and tolerance, with true reverence for all religions as Divine dispensations. No religion is untrue, no religion is without high moral principles. No religion encourages vice or enjoins untruth and violence and hatred. No scriptures in the world teach men or women to be dishonest, impure, unholy, unclean and untruthful. No prophets or saints ever exhorted their followers to be jealous, malicious or violent in thought, word and deed. Let all children of the human family, wherever they may be born and brought up, whatever may be their religion or community, learn the simple lessons of truth and honesty, moral purity and clean living, the noble lessons of loving even those who hate them, of serving the poor, the hungry, the homeless, the ill-clad, the illiterate and ignorant and of sacrificing their all, their money, their comforts, their time and if need be even their life for the welfare of the community, the country and humanity—who are representatives of Divinity. Thus everyone should recognise (1) that there are certain moral maxims that are common to all religions, which may be codified and followed as a code of honour by children of all races and nations; (2) that all religions should be respected and the God (or Gods and Goddesses), the scriptures (which are either revealed or believed as words of God), and the prophets and saints of all faith should be treated with reverence; (3) that all differences in creeds and dogmas should be sought to be reconciled and where this is not possible, honest conviction of all should be respected and tolerated until the harmony of all faiths and cultures is established on a scientific basis. There is room for propaganda and publicity of these three principles in and through the churches, mosques, temples and shrines, Viharas, monasteries and places of pilgrimage of all religions. Unfortunately religious preachers and missionaries, the priests, Moulavis or Mullahs, Pāndās, Purohitas and Pandits, of the different religious professions do not always observe the supreme code of all religions, viz., love of God and love of neigh-

hours (which means all men and women), respect for truth and peace and non-violence, and the spirit of service and helpfulness which are enjoined by all religions.

Hatred for people not belonging to one's own creed or community, is neither a sign of piety nor of culture and catholicity. A broad outlook, spirit of tolerance, regard for all, consideration of the minorities and such other noble qualities of the soul should be developed in all children as part of their general education in schools, or as an indispensable requirement of their religious training through the churches, mosques and temples. Let us take up the first principle for a detailed study and examination. What are the teachings of the Vedas, the Upanishadas, the Gita, the Bhāgavata Purāna, so far as the Hindu scriptures are concerned, in regard to truth, non-violence, peace, love and universal brotherhood or friendship? What are the maxims or practical codes of moral conduct, as preached in the Buddhist scriptures, Dharmapada, Suttanipata and Māhāparinirvana (to take only these three of their holy books). What do we learn from the Christian (including the Old Testament of the Jews) scriptures on the same virtues and duties? Are there similar injunctions and commandments by the Koran and Islamic religious literature to support the same lessons? Can we show by an impartial study of the religious literature of the Hindus, the Buddhists, the Christians and the Muslims that there is intrinsic beauty of moral teachings contained in the scriptures of all the religions and exemplified, illustrated and practised in the lives of their prophets, saints and sages? The Avatāras of Hindus were God incarnate, who descended on earth to save the virtuous, the pious and the righteous, to destroy or eliminate (by reform or by transformation or by translation into another higher world) the evil-doers, and to establish the Kingdom of Heaven, of virtue and duty, of peace and love and joy unbounded, (Dharmarāja being equivalent to Ram Rajya and Rama is the very embodiment of dharma or righteousness). So it is only natural that the Gita identifies religion with morality and lays stress on duties one owes to the community and to humanity as sacred obligations one owes to God Himself.

The Research Institute of the Vaishnava Theological University is sure to explore the possibilities of finding the basis of unity in the moral teachings of all the Prophets and Scriptures of the World, by promoting researches in the field of comparative religion. The Gita and the Bible, the Quoran and the Zend Avesta, the Upanishads and the Tripitakas, the Bhagavata Purana and the Mystic literature of

the West, if studied impartially and without bias, will surely present us a number of moral maxims and ethical principles which are common to all religions. To tell the truth, to love one's fellowmen, to obey and serve one's elders and superiors, to abstain from stealing and killing, from dishonest dealings and adulteries and all kinds of vicious conduct will be found to be the central moral code of all creeds and communities. National welfare in Free India demands an All-India Theological University which will undertake such research works on Comparative Religion through its scholars and foster the spirit of harmony and toleration among all the faiths and cultures of humanity. The Viswa-Bhāgavati or the Vaishnava Theological University in Brindaban intends to bring about this consummation in Free India and thereby restore the holy spiritual atmosphere of Sree Brindaban, which was veritably a kingdom of Heaven in the days of Sree Krishna and his cowherd companions. May the Lord Bhagavan Sree Hari shower His blessings on all who are serving this new University and helping its growth and development through their co-operation.

MILL ON JUSTICE, LAW, PUNISHMENT AND SOVEREIGNTY

PROF. SUBHANLAL MOOKERJEE, M.A.

John Stuart Mill's theories of Justice, Law, Punishment and Sovereignty all rest on his conception of the Good. In his Utilitarianism, he tries to harmonise the conflicting claims of social utility with those of individual utility and this accounts for his synoptic view of Justice, Law, Punishment and Sovereignty.

To find out the proper definition of Justice, Mill first clears up the ambiguities in the concept of Justice. It is generally assumed that impartiality is an obligation of Justice. But Mill observes that impartiality cannot be regarded as a duty in itself, but as a means to some other duty. It is, he says, "a necessary condition of the fulfilment of the other obligations of justice".¹ He, however, admits that impartiality is a condition of social and distributive justice "towards which all institutions, and the efforts of all various citizens, should be made in the utmost possible degree to converge".² But distributive justice, in his analysis, is "involved in the very meaning of utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle"; for "the equal claim of everybody to happiness in the estimation of the moralist and of the legislator, involves an equal claim to all the means of happiness".³ In this context, Mill accepts the Benthamite dictum, "everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one" as "an explanatory commentary" "under the principle of utility".⁴

It is further assumed that Justice is the principle according to which every one should get what he or she deserves. A person is regarded as deserving Good from those whom he does good and evil from those to whom he does evil. The ambiguity here arises in connection with the religious precept of returning Good even for evil—a precept not taken as a case of the realisation of Justice but as an exception to which the claims of Justice are waived in favour of other considerations.

Justice is often correlated to the recognition of the legal rights of others. But, as Mill points out, this view of Justice is often complicated by the existence of moral rights along with legal rights

¹ Mill's *Utilitarianism*, (Everyman's Edition), p. 57.

² *Ibid.*, p. 58.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

and by the problem whether it is just or unjust in withholding a moral right from a person to which, legally, he has a claim.

When such are the various difficulties in the way of finding out a proper definition of Justice, Mill accepts the most simple and practical interpretation of Justice offered by the etymological meaning of "Justice". Etymologically, he recalls, Justice means "conformity to law",¹ or the "idea of legal constraint".² A comprehensive theory of Justice, therefore, involves a theory of Law, a theory of Punishment and a theory of Rights. Accordingly, Mill defines Justice as follows—"Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life; and the notion which we have found to be of the essence of the idea of justice, that of a right residing in an individual, implies and testifies to this more binding obligation".³ Justice is intimately related to Liberty because it implies some "social utilities" which promote human pleasure or convenience "at once by the more definite nature of its commands, and by the sterner character of its sanctions" than by the mere idea of utilitarianism.⁴ Mill's conception of Justice is social in the sense that it works as the hindrance to those who violate the rights of others, as the preventive force which makes the citizen feel that he must not be an intolerable nuisance. "It is by a person's observance of these (hindrances) that his fitness to exist as one of the fellowship of human beings is tested and decided".⁵ Justice is also the criterion of Progress. For, every previous stage of social improvement "has passed into the rank of a universally stigmatised injustice and tyranny" in the face of a more enlightened stage of social existence.⁶ Justice, we thus see, is the collection of moral requirements which, together, "stand higher in the scale of social utility" than others; it may, however, be overruled in exceptional cases where the social duty is very urgent. For example, "to save a life it may not only be allowable, but a duty, to steal, or take by force, the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate, the only qualified medical practitioner".⁷ Justice, in a word, appears to Mill as a challenge to the conservative view that is usually associated with

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

the term and this challenge is doubtless the other side of his realistic, humanitarian outlook which makes him welcome a thorough reform in the social order so as to make it conformable to Justice.

We now pass on to Mill's theories of Law and Punishment because, he reminds us, "the idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of conduct, and a sentiment which sanctions the rule".¹ The first implies Law; the second, Punishment.

Mill's thorough-going repudiation of Intuitionism makes him assert that Law must be free from "any process of construction *a priori*".² He praises Bentham for, the latter demolished all superstitions in legislation and sought to lay a foundation "for a rational science of law by direct consideration of the facts of human life".³ As an empiricist, again, Mill strongly condemns the theory of Law of Nature. While he admits that originally, this theory did much to remove age-old superstitions, to liberalise the human minds and to establish the fundamental equality of man, it has now exhausted all these powers and is making "men greater bigots".⁴ Mill here seems to mean that the theory of Law of Nature is based on a sort of mystification of Nature as Supernature and, as such, fails to vindicate the utilitarian function of Law as a means to maximise human happiness by the codification of a custom or conduct whose benefits have stood the test of direct experience.

Mill further clarifies his view of Law when he praises Austin who interprets laws in respect of "their organic structure". Such a "scientific point of view" is necessary, Mill insists, to build up a legal system from the study of the similarities and diversities in the different systems of law.⁵ He finds fault with the legal theories of Hooker, Blackstone and Montesquieu who used the word "law" in a metaphorical sense, connoting "physical laws of organic life".⁶ As a utilitarian, he believes that Law fulfils its social purpose best when it allows the fullest satisfaction of the organic needs of the individual without which he is not able to develop his personality. Mill is thus led to a teleological definition of Law—"Law is a system of means for the attainment of ends." The individual "ends" for self-development are integrated in the legal system when they find social approval.

¹ *Ibid*, p. 43.

² Mill's essay entitled *Austin on Jurisprudence* in his *Dissertations and Discussions*, Vol. III, p. 217.

³ *Ibid*, pp. 208-209.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 248.

⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 212-215.

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 226.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 228.

In his "hitherto unpublished speech on the influence of lawyers." Mill attacks the lawyers' narrow, juristic approach to law and stresses the need for going deeply into what the modern Pluralistic theorists on Sovereignty would call "the philosophy of law." He says, "We cannot expect much aid in making good laws from those whose daily bread is derived from the defects of the laws." He thoroughly repudiates their "professional narrowness of mind which is a uniform effect of the exclusive study of one system." He laments that the lawyers often strengthen their offensive front by relying on "a mere inaccuracy of expression, a trifling error in any matter of detail, the employment of one inapposite illustration." "Even when a cause is good," Mill concludes, "a lawyer has not done his duty by it unless he has given it all the gloss and varnish of which it is susceptible, disguised all its weak parts and heightened its strong ones by artificial colouring. Not one half only, but three-fourths at least, of his business is deception." Mill can value a theory of Law which is supported by a broad social philosophy and free from the personal, rather distorted vision of many of its defending jurists.

After elaborating his views on the nature and function of Law, Mill now explains his theory of Punishment. He prefaces his discussion by an analysis of the ambiguities underlying the different theories of Punishment. For example, there are people who say that "it is unjust to punish any one for the sake of example to others." They maintain that Punishment is just only when it aims at the Good of the sufferer himself. There are others who oppose this view and argue that Punishment has a preventive aspect and that the right to Punishment is exercised as a legitimate right of self-defence. Others like Owen deny that there is any justice in Punishment at all, "for the criminal did not make his own character; his education, and the circumstances which surrounded him, have made him a criminal, and for these he is not responsible." Again, there is the retaliatory theory of Punishment—"an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." Mill suspects that there is "in most minds, a secret hankering after it." Further, there are persons who would insist on Punishment proportional to the crime.

Surveying all these different theories of Punishment, Mill admits that each one of them may be "extremely plausible" and as long as the question of Punishment is debated as an issue of Justice simply,

¹ *The Economist*, Vol. V, March, 1925, pp. 1-6

² *Mill's Utilitarianism*, p. 58.

it is difficult to refute these reasoners in that each such reasoner is right in so far as he is not forced to consider other maxims of Justice than the one he chooses. "No one of them," Mill argues, "can carry out his own notion of Justice without trampling upon another equally binding."¹ To solve this difficulty, he insists upon acceptance of his utilitarian theory of Punishment.

Mill says that "the desire to punish a person who has done harm to some individual is a spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments, both in the highest degree natural, and which either are or resemble instincts; the impulse of self-defence, and the feeling of sympathy."² On this point, he says, man differs from animals in two respects—he is capable of sympathising with all human beings and he has a more developed intelligence which widens his sentiments so much that he can build up "a community of interest between himself and the human society."³ The sentiment of Justice through Punishment of the offender is nothing moral; "what is moral, is the exclusive subordination of it to the social sympathies." The need for Punishment arises, in the opinion of Mill, because some people do not "pay regard to the other's happiness."⁴

Mill advocates corporal punishment in some cases. In his letter to a school-boy of fourteen,⁵ replying to the question, "Is flogging good or bad for boys?" he declares that flogging must be reserved only for very grave moral delinquencies and in other cases, some milder form of corporal punishment is preferable to flogging. His condemnation of the frequent, indiscriminate use of flogging as an instrument of punishment finds eloquent expression in the course of his Parliamentary Speech on Habeas Corpus Suspension in Ireland, "When any man in authority—whether he was the captain of a ship or the commander of a regiment, or the master of a school, needed the instrument of flogging to maintain his authority—that man deserved flogging as much as any of those who were flogged by his orders."⁶

Just as he reserves flogging as an extreme form of Punishment, so Mill also supports Death Punishment as an ultimate penalty of very grave antisocial offences threatening the happiness of the com-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

² *Ibid.*, p. 47.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.

⁴ *The Letters of John Stuart Mill*, Edited by Elliot, Vol. I, p. 280.

⁵ *Ibid.* Vol. II, p. 48.

⁶ *Household's Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. CLXXXI, p. 708.

munal life. In one of his brilliant Parliamentary Addresses, he advances some cogent arguments for Capital Punishment so as to rule out all emotional considerations. "When there has been brought home to any one, by conclusive evidence, the greatest crime known to the law; and when the attendant circumstances suggest no palliation of the guilt, no hope that the culprit may even yet not be unworthy to live among mankind, nothing to make it probable that the crime was an exception to his general character rather than a consequence of it, then I confess it appears to me that to deprive the criminal of the life of which he has proved himself to be unworthy—solemnly to blot him out from the fellowship of mankind and from the catalogue of the living—is the most appropriate, as it is certainly the most unpressive, mode in which society can attach to so great a crime the penal consequences which for the security of life it is indispensable to annex to it..... The very fact that death punishment is more shocking than any other to the imagination, necessarily renders the Courts of Justice more scrupulous in requiring the fullest evidence of guilt."¹

While remaining a supporter of the mollified form of the retributive theory of Punishment, Mill, in another context, emphasises that the Punishment is a kind of language to express moral disapproval of very wrong actions so that people may be educated not to do such wrongs. He laments that a great portion of efforts and talents in the world "are employed in merely neutralising one another." So he suggests, "It is the proper end of government to reduce this wretched waste to the smallest possible amount, by taking such measures as shall cause the energies now spent by mankind in injuring one another, or in protecting themselves against injury, to be turned to the legitimate employment of the human faculties, that of compelling the powers of nature to be more and more subservient to physical and moral good".²

Mill's theory of Rights is closely connected with his theory of Punishment. For, he thinks that the question of Punishment arises because some Right which a person is entitled to enjoy, is violated by another person and the latter is to be punished for such violation.³ "To have a right, then", he declares, "is to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of".⁴ Society ought to

¹ *Ibid*, Vol. CXCI, pp. 1047-1055

² Mill's *Principles of Political Economy*, (People's Edition, Longmans), p. 591.

³ Mill's *Utilitarianism*, p. 49.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 50.

defend the Rights purely on the ground of Utility. Protection of Rights is demanded, Mill thinks, not on rational grounds, but because there is "an animal element, the thirst for retaliation".¹ The interest involved is that of security which Mill considers as the most vital of all human interests. It is on utilitarian grounds that Mill also upholds the Liberty and Rights of the citizens. He opposes the theory of Natural Rights because such Rights are based not on the assumption that moral rules and political institutions are means to an end, "the general good", rather they rest on a metaphysical conception of Rights from which moral rules and political institutions are made to emanate.²

As it is the State which is to be the final authority as the guarantor of Rights, the administrator of Justice and the ultimate penalising agency when Rights are violated, Mill's theories of Justice, Law, Punishment and Rights all revolve round his theory of Sovereignty. He supports Austin's theory of Sovereignty, though with much reservations. Austin defines a Right as follows—"Whenever a legal duty is to be performed *towards* or *in respect of* some determinate person, that person is 'invested with a right'". Austin thus links up Rights with Duties in his juristic interpretation of Sovereignty. Herein, according to Mill, lies the inadequacy of Austinian analysis of Sovereignty. Such analysis fails to secure "perfect exhaustiveness" because, "it does not satisfy the conception which is in every one's mind, of the meaning of the word right. Almost every one will feel that there is, somehow, an element left out; an element which is approximately, though perhaps imperfectly, expressed by saying, that the person who has the right, is the person who is meant to be benefited by the imposition of the duty."³ The same emphasis on Rights coming before Duty is found in Mill's remark in another context, when he says—"Duties of perfect obligation are those duties in virtue of which a correlative *right* resides in some person or persons".⁴ We see, therefore, that while Austin, in his theory of Sovereignty, is concerned with no more than the impersonal legal relations, where legal duty comes before a legal right, Mill, on the contrary, is concerned with the benefit or utility that the individuals derive from the State through claims and counter-claims, that is, through Rights and Duties, Right going before Duty.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

² Mill's *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, p. 67.

³ Mill's essay on Austin in his *Dissertations and Discussions*, Vol. III, p. 229.

⁴ Mill's *Utilitarianism*, p. 46.

Further clarifying his theory of Sovereignty, Mill remarks that Comte's criticism of the concept of Sovereignty of the People as an absolute, negative, metaphysical concept is quite just. But he also thinks that Comte has missed the beneficial, positive sides of the concept. Mill admits that the concept of Popular Sovereignty "claims the direct participation of the governed in their own government, not as a natural right, but as a means to important ends, under the conditions and with the limitations which those ends impose".¹ In this limited sense, he observes, the concept of Popular Sovereignty becomes the bedrock of Democracy.

After this objective presentation of Mill's theories of Justice, Law, Punishment and Sovereignty, we now come to a brief critical appraisal of these theories.

On examination, Mill's theory of Justice seems to have much in common with the Platonic theory of Justice. Plato's conception of Justice, according to which every one must do his own work and the rulers should see that he is not interfered with, implies two characteristics of Justice which we also find in Mill's theory. These characteristics are—freedom and equality; freedom, because, without it, one's creative impulse in doing one's own work vanishes; equality, because, it is fitting to treat the individuals as equals for, their resemblances far outweigh their differences.

Mill's view that Justice is the mainspring of the dynamic life of man and society because it is the spirit behind Progress, has been supported by many modern writers. Hobhouse seems to incorporate Mill's views of the relations between Justice and Progress in his sociological theory of Justice by saying that "Justice has to maintain the functions by which the needs of the community are served and to prevent misfunction or obstruction."² "Justice is restrictive", Karl Britton says, "benevolence expansive. The morality that Mill really adopted combined both elements."³

Roscoe Pound, the distinguished American jurist, in his despair to find out a satisfactory standard for Justice harmonising the recalcitrant social wants, advises, in these days of packed up social groupings, to follow only the pragmatic way of satisfying the maximum social wants.⁴ But this *ad hoc* conclusion of Pound is rightly criticised by Barker because, in the absence of a definite standard for Justice,

¹ Mill's *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, p. 79.

² *The Elements of Social Justice*, by Hobhouse, p. 121.

³ Karl Britton's *John Stuart Mill*, (Pelican books), p. 56.

⁴ *Introduction to the Philosophy of Law*, by Roscoe Pound, p. 188.

there will be much difficulty in integrating the individual wills thrown pell-mell.¹ As Barker himself lays down, Justice in Politics is of twofold importance, first, as the relationship "between man and man in an organised system of human relations", and, secondly, the relationship "expressed in a joining or fitting between *value and value* in a general sum and synthesis of values". Such is also Mill's synthetic and humanist theory of Justice. It aims at the neutralisation of human and social conflicts more through a fair distribution of happiness than through a mere increase in its total amount. In this way, it becomes not merely a theory of human relations, but also a theory of value-relations with Happiness as the intrinsic central value.

Mill's theory of Law as a supplement to his theory of Justice, is teleological and empirical. His is a search for the Philosophy of Law and in his search for this philosophical basis, he rejects all *a priori* construction of Law and chooses the empirical basis in which Law appears to him as an "organic structure", as means to ends. His empirical approach to Law is fully evident when he rejects the theory of Law of Nature.

The group of modern writers known as the Pluralists define Law as "the evaluation of interests." The pluralistic theory of Law proclaims that laws are the indices of the weight of the various forces in society—political, economic, cultural. As such, a law must be interpreted in the background of a social philosophy and must express the pull of the various conflicting interests as represented by the groups. Mill's teleological theory of Law as means to ends and his emphasis on the philosophical basis of Law in his hitherto unpublished speech *On the influence of lawyers* seem to be quite in line with the spirit of the modern pluralistic theory of Law.

But his speech on the adverse influence of lawyers has been very severely criticised by Professor Jenks.² Jenks observes that Mill underestimates the role of lawyers. It was the "sturdy lawyers and judges," he says, who "had turned the writ of Habeas Corpus from its original intent as a police engine into a world famous guarantee of personal liberty." Jenks goes so far as to attribute this speech of Mill to "a pre-historic age" because, in 1825, when it is delivered, little is known of the history of Law. Thus Jenks concludes, "To us, who live in an age in which the discoveries of anthropology and experimental psychology have revolutionised our attitude towards the

¹ *Principles of Social and Political Theory*, by Barker, pp. 102 and 171.

² *The Economica*, Vol. V, Marsh, 1925, pp. 7-9.

social sciences, Mill appears as a somewhat thin and pathetic ghost, living in an unreal world of *a priori* convictions, acquired solely by the method of introspection."

We think that Jenks' criticism is very much unfair. As a lover of Liberty, Mill will certainly be the last person to undervalue the service of the lawyers as defenders of civil liberty in England. It is, again, unfair to suggest that this speech of Mill belongs to "a pre-historic age." Mill appeals to human experience while emphasising on the importance of the empirico-utilitarian basis of Law, that is, the Philosophy of Law. So he is not blind by "an unreal world of *a priori* convictions" as Jenks thinks him to be.

To turn now to a critical estimate of Mill's theory of Punishment. While many writers¹ on the theory of Punishment have supported the retaliatory theory, almost all of them seem to have missed the spirit behind Mill's utilitarian defence of Punishment as a force making individuals co-operative instead of competitive. On this point, he seems to have been fully conscious of the limits of *laissez-faire* and completely free and perfect competition among the individuals. Further, when he discloses that the question of Punishment arises because of the violation of a Right of someone by the offender, he seems to anticipate the later theories of Punishment as supported by Green and Bosanquet. The State exists, according to them, for maintaining a system of Rights and for punishing the offender whenever there is a violation of this State-maintained system of Rights.

But it seems that Mill's opinions on Death Penalty are not being favoured these days. For, in February, 1956, the British House of Commons voted for the abolition of hanging as the penalty for murder in England.

The modern approach to the theory of Punishment is that Punishment aims at prevention of the crime and moral reformation of the criminal. None of these aspects is mutually exclusive. If absolute prevention of the crime is wished for, then Capital Punishment seems to be the best. If only reformation of the criminal is desired, then Punishment will be no better than an endless series of experiments with new offenders. It is thus clear that while no one of the aspects of Punishment—preventive and reformative,—seems to be the sole aim of Punishment, an adequate theory of Punishment must embody both these aims.

¹ For example, Professor Westermarck maintains that even to-day, Punishment may be regarded as a relic of the tribal or primitive idea of vengeance carried on into modern civilised communities.

Ultimately, Justice in Punishment depends on the system of Rights. For, every theory of Rights has a corresponding theory of Punishment. So Mill is fully justified in linking up his theory of Rights with his theories of Justice and Punishment. He defends freedom of speech, tolerance and so on in his essay, *On Liberty*, on utilitarian grounds. As an empiricist, he also makes security the main basis of Rights. For, it is a matter of common experience that man wants to be secure in order to be really happy.

Laski seems to be deeply imbued with Mill's utilitarian spirit in discussing the theory of Rights. He says that Rights "are those conditions of social life without which no man can seek, in general, to be himself at his best."¹ About Mill, he says, "the thing for which Mill was concerned was that the citizen should be given the full chance to be himself at his best."² Thus Laski's theory of Rights is identical with Mill's. Again, very explicitly Laski lays down his utilitarian theory of Rights as follows, "We are making the test of rights *utility*; and that it is clear, involves the question of those to whom the rights are to be useful. There is only one possible answer. In any State the demands of each citizen for the fulfilment of his best self must be taken as of equal worth; and the utility of a right is therefore its value to all the members of the State."³

Mill's theory of Sovereignty, though Austinian, is not forgetful of the Philosophy of Law and its social basis. He criticises the Austinian theory of Sovereignty as too narrow because, it neglects the fact that ultimately, political obligation derives its effectiveness from the spontaneous feeling of the masses that they are getting some benefit from the State. In this way, Mill seems to anticipate the criticism of Austin's theory by supporters of the modern pluralistic school. Yet, when, in spite of his criticism of Austin, he finally commends the Austinian theory, he shows his practical sense as a political theorist for, even the Pluralists cannot escape from the conclusion that the State must retain its sovereign power among the groups to resolve their conflicts and to co-ordinate their activities in their wider interests of individual and social welfare.

¹ *A Grammar of Politics*, by Laski, Ch. on Rights, section 1.

² Laski's introductory remarks in his edition of *Mill's Autobiography*, (World's Classics), p. xviii.

³ *A Grammar of Politics*, by Laski, Ch. on Rights, section 1

PEACE : AN ART AND A SCIENCE, UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER

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Peace under the United Nations Charter can be studied in two aspects—Peace as an Art and Peace as a Science. One is the concept: the other is the avenue. One is viewed conceptually, the other is viewed institutionally or organizationally. One is perfection: the other is the process. One is idealized peace: the other is institutionalized peace. One is subjective and rational, the other is objective and actual. Peace as an art under the Charter excels many other works of art in final touches and finish: but peace as a science thereunder lags behind. The former is here understood to mean peace that is perfect, ideal and rational: the latter means the process of peace that is actually possible. A document dealing with Peace as an art only will be unreal: and one dealing with Peace as a Science only will be too real. Art and Science should be made to coexist in any planned approach. In that case idealism and realism checking and correcting each other may ultimately produce a healthy and progressive formula. Art in this context involves an 'ought', lays down a desired norm and postulates a standard towards which things are intended to move. Science on the other hand takes into account the limitations of the age and the environment and in the light of these seeks to prescribe the avenue to the goal. Art is thus the model: Science is the method. Hence Science, in a sense, is the pathway to art. In any reasonable plan for a thing its art and science must be brought together.

The U.N. Charter gives us a Peace Concept, i.e., Peace as an Art and also a Peace organization i.e., Peace as a Science. Institutionally the United Nations is a mechanism for converting the 'ought to be' of world opinion on peace incorporated in its fold as an art into the 'is' of international or interstate conduct. The potentiality of this conversion is limited in the international field on account of institutional inadequacy. Institutions born out of ideas, values and beliefs may, by influencing gradually state conduct, help the process of converting the conceptual 'ought' into the scientific "is". It is this U.N. process of institutionalization of peace which we call Science. Many would call this combination a normative Science. In that case we can say that it is just another name for what we seek to establish. Art is a model of perfection; positive science is a method recognizing limitations. Normative science means a positive science plus a norm. This norm is just a new name for art, as we understand it here. Hence normative science is art and science combined. All physical sciences are positive sciences: all social sciences are normative. In other words physical sciences neither have nor can have any teleology or purpose. Elements will go on working in their own way and no purpose can be injected therein. But in social sciences there ~~must~~

be a purpose behind. It is true that art should not be divorced from, rather should be deduced from the science of social life. It is equally true that the science of social life must not be tied down rigidly to the realities without caring to look beyond. The science of social life has meaning only when it helps the process of elevation into an art. Peace as only an art may give us a perfect pattern, very much desirable, but which may be drowned in the current of Utopian excess. Peace as only a science would give us an account of the stubborn anti-peace facts and forces at work frequently devouring and destroying peace: in other words its emphasis will be on the realities of conflict tending to undo all the attempts at peace. A balance between the two is what is desired. Peace should be there as an art—as an ideal, as a vision. Peace should be there also as a science indicating the precise way of its fulfillment. There were many peace plans in the past. But not being linked up with the science of peace all failed. Hence peace as an art or the art of peace¹ minus its science may be nothing more than a Utopian romance; and peace as a science or the science of peace minus its art fails to inspire and loses itself in the stagnant pools of realism. Realities cannot be defied: but they should not be defied either. Realism of science without the creative idealism of art is barren. Idealism of art again without the tempering effect of realism and precision of science would degenerate into a day dream.

A peace plan then to be effective must be based on a combination of the two. Peace as an art means the portrayal of the concept of peace in the finest colours. It is born out of the undercurrents of peace beneath the surface realities. It is the product of speculation, hope, ambition, faith and also experience. Peace as a science, on the other hand, is the child of the limitations of the age—it is not independent of the factors and the forces of the time that shape and reshape the form and content of peace. Peace as a science, rightly approached and analysed, breeds a spirit of necessary realism and advises us not to tune Peace as an art at too high a pitch. Peace as an art, on the other hand, properly understood, corrects the barrenness of the science of peace and tones it up with inspiring norm. It injects a teleology in an otherwise purposeless analysis and makes it flow along more fruitful and creative channels.

The statesmen at San Francisco were surely under the influence, perhaps consciously, of peace in these two senses. Peace was the breath of the San Francisco Conference as it was a wartime conference and the peoples of the world were frantically after peace. And in their zeal for a permanent peace they give us a concept of peace. We call this concept, Peace as an art under the U.N. Charter. It is, as we shall show, a positive, just, dynamic, indivisible, enforced and comprehensive peace—epithets that do admirably well for any work of excellence and art. But this art had necessarily to be linked up with peace as a science if it was not to be an empty speculation. This science will be seen in the procedure and the mechanism of the U.N. Charter in protecting and promoting peace

¹ By 'Art of Peace' I mean here Peace as an Art; and by 'Science of Peace' I mean Peace as a Science.

and preventing and outlawing war. And this we call science as it lays down the process and takes note of the limitations and the handicaps. Regulation of armaments, Pacific settlement of disputes, renunciation of 'force', collective security and sanctions and the generation of an atmosphere propitious for peace are the principal peace avenues under the U.N. Charter. And the Security Council is the primary organ for the same. But these in spite of all these provisions could not realize peace, the art, because of the inherent limitations. The Charter contains both these—peace as an art and peace as a science. The concept of peace thereunder is something, perfect, attractive and inspiring and approaches the level of an art. The Charter procedure for peace, however, bristles with handicaps and hurdles: it fails to guarantee realization of peace art. it leaves open many possibilities of deadlock and paralysis: it professes to do simply what is possible under the limitations of the age: it creates not unoften juridical and operative vacuum;—hence it is the science of peace. Let us analyse the character of peace as an art and as a science as that would be an interesting subject for study and appreciation.

Peace as an Art: or the Concept of *Peace under the U.N. Charter*
—its Characteristics

The Charter opens with the determination in the preamble of 'the peoples of the United Nations'² to save mankind from the 'scourge of war' and to unite their strength to maintain international peace and security. Art. 1 of the Charter enumerates the purposes of the United Nations, the first of which is 'to maintain international peace and security'. The primary and first purpose of the United Nations is then to maintain international peace. Art. 2 enunciates the principles in accordance with which the organization and its members shall act while "in pursuit of the purposes stated in Art. 1". Art. 2 then is partly for implementation of Art. 1 where the first purpose is peace. There are many other Articles in the charter where the theme is one of peace—its preservation and maintenance. The charter then stands on the principle of elimination of war and preservation of peace. But to protect, preserve and perpetuate peace we must know the meaning of peace under the U.N. Charter. Peace in history has frequently been consumed by the fire of war only to be born anew out of its own ashes. Peace is in peril today once again: and peril for peace means a peril for mankind. Hence the need for peace was never so urgent as today. In such a context the study

² I do not consider it simply an oratorical phrase. It has a real juristic significance though many may be tempted to dismiss the phrase as a piece of rhetoric by pointing out some anomalies born out of this phrase when read together with other parts of the preamble. Terminological exactitude or harmony may not be there in a perfect sense: still the contrasting phraseology in the League Covenant ('The High contracting parties') cannot but remind us of the significance of the new draft. Prof. A. A. Berle in his lecture entitled "The Peace of Peoples" said that "the general theme is that the charter abrogated the idea that states only are subjects of international law. 'We, the peoples' has as much revolutionary force in the charter as it had in the American constitution". Referred to in American Journal of International Law, January, 1955, p. 162.

of the Concept of peace, i.e., peace as an art under the U.N. Charter must be of absorbing interest.

Positive Peace

Peace to the layman means the absence of war. To the experts it means something more. To say that peace is the absence of war is to say what it is not but not to say what it is. The approach is negative and partial and this is only half of the story. We do not say what peace is: we say what peace is not. This negative 'not-war' idea of peace may satisfy the layman but not the experts specially when the attempt at peace is scientific and comprehensive. But peace from an analytical point of view must connote some positive conditions. The stand is quite clear and may be explained with the help of an analogy. Just as beauty means more than the absence of ugliness—just as liberty means more than the absence of restraint—just as equality means more than the absence of inequality—so peace must mean more than the absence of war. Peace means the creation and perpetuation of an atmosphere in which it can flourish and prosper. In other words it is a positive concept. It seeks to eliminate not only war but the causes of war. Negative peace can never be a real peace as it is only a surface solution. It just secures a calm surface in the field of international relations but it reaches neither the interior nor the bottom. It is "a peace which only cloaks terrible inner conflict"³ and it leads to "a security that is utterly insecure". Moreover, the era of negative peace is wasted in the perpetual strain of averting war. There is hardly any scope for constructive work in rebuilding the national or the international life. It is this negative peace concept which justifies the statement that the history of the world is a history of perpetual war in which periods of peace are just armistices in one long, continuous and perhaps unending chain of war. Negative peace means peace on the surface but perhaps war in the interior. But positive peace means the generation of an atmosphere propitious for peace. It is this positive peace principle which suggests the idea of perpetual peace for man in which wars, if any, would just be temporary periods of conflict and struggle. Positive peace means real peace—peace on the surface as also in the interior. It conveys the idea of eradicating war by rooting out its causes. Negative peace prevents war: positive peace annihilates war. Negative peace protects peace: positive peace promotes peace. Negative peace stifles the anti-peace forces: positive peace nourishes the pro-peace forces. The emphasis of the one is on the negation of the evil: that of the other is on the generation of the good. This positive peace has two foundations—one objective and the other subjective. Objectively it signifies the creation of economic and material conditions necessary for peace. Subjectively it must have a psychological basis. We are to develop an aversion to war and an urge for peace. Positive peace means peace not only in the political or military sense but also in economic, cultural, educational and social sense.

³ UNCIO—Documents, Vol. I, p. 252.

It is pleasing to note that the U.N. Charter lays emphasis not only on negative peace but on positive peace as well. The Charter not only imposes a ban on the use of 'force' (the essence of negative peace) but goes much further and embodies an attempt at the creation of conditions, economic, social, cultural, educational and humanitarian which would be propitious for peace (the essence of positive peace). That will be seen from a study of Art. 1, paragraphs 2 and 3 and of the Articles on the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council and the Declaration regarding non-selfgoverning territories. The UNESCO Constitution in the preamble lays down—"As wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace are to be constructed". Nobody can fail to see herein the positive peace formula. Mr. Malik in the third plenary session of the United Nations Conference laid down—"unless then the positive content of peace is determined on a foundation of real justice, there will be no real peace. Accordingly, the United Nations in this Conference must devote some time to the determination of a dynamic and positive conception of civilized existence which will justify the organization they mean to set up".⁴ This concept of positive peace was also emphasized upon by many other members at the San Francisco Conference. In the 6th plenary session Field Marshall Smuts pointed out—"I have already referred to the unforeseen economic and social developments of the post-war world since the last peace."⁵ They must profoundly influence our views as to the future course of events and its possible repercussions on the peace of the world. The framers of the last peace lived, as I have said in a political world and were dominated by a political outlook and point of view. They thought political solutions would suffice. No wonder that their plans were upset by the catastrophic economic developments which disrupted national and world economies in the era between the two wars. . . . It soon became evident that the economic chaos and the social unrest and suffering resulting from it were no less fruitful sources of war than the ordinary forms of aggression so familiar to the political world. . . . In some respects aggression was becoming more psychological than physical, more insidious and dangerous, and much more difficult to cope with along the old political lines. . . . As a consequence, the New Charter, in dealing with and coping with the the prevention of war, will provide means and methods for the control of these new forces which have entered the international field; and the proposed new Economic and Social Council will thus, from this and other points of view, become one of the most important organs of the new world organization. In close co-operation with the other agencies set up in the economic field. . . . this new Council will enable the United Nations to have a far firmer grip of the new forces and conditions and techniques leading to social and economic unrest and subversion than the League of Nations ever had. The social and economic causes of war may thus come to be controlled at the source, so to say".⁶ None will

⁴ UNCIO—Doc. I, p. 252.

⁵ Obviously he was referring to the League Covenant.

⁶ UNCIO—Doc. I, pp. 424-25.

fail to note herein the emphasis on the social and economic factors which do form the content of positive peace. Mr. Alfaro,⁷ the Rapporteur, echoed the same theme at the 9th plenary session of the Conference held on June 25, 1945. It will be seen from a perusal of Mr. Alfaro's statement that if under the League Covenant the emphasis was more on negative and political peace, under the Charter it is definitely on positive and economic peace. In other words the framers of the Charter were more conversant with the proper anatomy of peace and sought to prescribe a structure in that light. That is why the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council are among the principal organs of the United Nations: and that is why again the Economic and Social Council links up the various specialized agencies with the United Nations in its total efforts at peace. There are more than a dozen specialized agencies and almost an equal number of commissions.⁸ All these are non-political in character and cover different aspects of human life in the international field.

To say, of course, that the covenant contained no idea of positive peace is perhaps to misread that document. Article 23 of the same lays down the scope for a positive approach to the problem of peace. Questions of fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women and children in different countries: just treatment of the native inhabitants: control of traffic in women and children, in opium and other dangerous drugs: supervision of the trade in arms and ammunitions: communications and transit: prevention and control of disease—which are covered by Article 23 of the covenant are akin to the concept of positive peace. As Sir Frederick Pollock says in this connection—"The great political importance of Articles 22 and 23, in addition to the positive benefits to be expected from their application, is that they make the nations of the civilized world active partners in a large field of humane undertakings unconnected with any immediate danger of war. In its very birth the League has outgrown and discarded the narrow conception of it as a merely negative system of mutual insurance; and this without any derogation from the independence of the member states. . . . Intimate counsel and free co-operation

⁷ UNCIO—Doc. I, p. 622. He said—"Economic and social co-operation at the international level was hardly mentioned in the covenant of the League of Nations, although within its powers; the League, nevertheless, succeeded in making some valuable contributions in these fields. In the charter of the United Nations, on the other hand, the subject has been thought to be of such importance that two chapters are devoted to it. It should be noted, furthermore, that the organization has set itself the task not only of facilitating the solution of international problems in the economic, social and related fields, but its statement of purposes goes beyond that by enlisting the co-operation of the members of the organization in seeking the achievement of positive goals. These goals include higher standards of living, full employment, conditions of economic and social progress and development, and the universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In promoting effective co-operation for these purposes, the Economic and Social Council may, under the supervision of the General Assembly, be expected to become, in the course of time, one of the principal instruments for the organization of the peace. The San Francisco Conference will go down in history as the first World Congress where it is definitely recognized and established by the sovereign will of fifty nations that the individual, just as the state, is a subject of international law".

⁸ Specialized agencies—ILO, FAO, UNESCO, ICAO, IPRD, IMF, WHO, IRO, ITU, UPU, TTO, WMO, IMCO, UNRRA (now abolished).

Commissions—Economics and Employment; Transport and Communications; Statistical; Fiscal; Population; Social (UNICEF comes under it); Human Rights; Narcotic Drugs; ECE; ECAFE; ECLA; status of women.

are the methods proposed. It would be foolish not to be prepared for occasional disappointment. . . . But if the tempo of sincere endeavour is maintained, and the due measure of patience and tact is not wanting, there is no assignable end to the fruit of good works which these Articles may bring forth".⁹ It would then not be correct to say that the League was based on the principle of negative peace only. Article 23 incorporates the positive peace stand in the League fold. Moreover there was established under the League an Economic Committee to advise the Council on all economic questions. This Committee reviewed the general economic position in the early thirties and showed in its report to the Council how the divergent economic policies followed by different countries led to the dislocation of the international machinery whose efficient and regular working was necessary for the economic life of civilized nations.¹⁰ All these bear clear testimony to the attempts of the League to achieve peace not only on the political plane but also on the other less conspicuous but more important levels. The U.N. Charter, however, completes the process. If in the covenant the emphasis on non-political positive aspect of peace was weak and inadequate, in the Charter it is pronounced and intensified. In the covenant the question of positive peace was perhaps secondary; in the Charter it is primary along with that of negative peace.

Just Peace

But no peace can be genuinely positive if it has not a footing in justice. A positive peace must of necessity be a just peace. If positive peace means the generation of an atmosphere propitious for peace, it must as a corollary connote the idea of justice. We can have a peace with justice or at the cost of justice.¹¹ In the former case we have a positive peace as it is a just peace; in the latter we have a non-positive peace as it is not just. Injustice can never be propitious for peace. We can argue then that a peace that is genuinely positive can seldom be unjust and that a peace that is unjust can never be positive. Positive peace then must have an inseparable ally or companion in justice. It must signify not any but a just and equitable regulation of international relations.

This concept of justice was in the League covenant also but it was very feeble and reference to it was more casual in character than conscious or causal. That justice and peace are related to each other with a necessary tie was not perhaps fully realized by the authors of the covenant. Still they inserted the term 'justice' in the Document in some places. But there was no clear emphasis on it. The reference appears to be largely incidental.

The preamble to the covenant contains the theme of justice in two different forms. There is the idea of prescription of 'just' relations between nations. There is again the scheme of 'maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized

⁹ Pollock --The League of Nations (1930). pp 171-72.

¹⁰ Essential facts about the League of Nations (7th Edn. Revised), 1936, Geneva Information Section, pp. 167 ff.

¹¹ For example Munich settlement.

peoples with one another'. Be it noted that this formula of 'justice' as a basis of international relations lies in the *preamble*. The only article containing the idea of justice is Article 23 (b) and (c). In the former case the Members of the League undertake to secure *just* treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control; in the other they will make provision to secure and maintain *equitable* treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. These are the only provisions of the League covenant which contain reference to justice. Moreover in the *preamble* justice and respect for treaty obligations were put together with the result that there would hardly be a way out if the two happen to be in conflict. If, for example, an old treaty was found unjust in the new context and yet it was not revised, what were the League Members to do? Were they to profess a prior allegiance to justice or to the obligations of a treaty found unjust in the context of changed circumstances? In fact the scheme of tagging on 'justice' as one principle to 'respect for treaty obligations' as another can operate if there be a quick machinery for adjusting treaties to change eliminating thereby the possibility of a conflict between the two. It raises again the other question of revising or even abrogating the treaties obtained under duress. President Wilson in his message to the United States Senate, January 22, 1917, defined the object of the League of Nations to be—"to guarantee peace and *justice* throughout the world". And again on Independence Day, July 4, 1918, he restated the War aims of the Allies to be among others "the establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right, and serve to make peace and *justice* the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit . . ."¹² In its Part XIII which laid down the rules concerning the organization of Labour, the Treaty of Versailles declared that "the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon *social justice*".¹³ The covenant then did contemplate not any kind of peace but a peace with justice as its ally.

But the League could protect neither peace nor justice. It was on its trial during the Sino-Japanese conflict and the Italo-Abyssinian war. Still it survived though with much of its glory lost. The Munich settlement was another nail on the coffin of the dying League. Thereafter the League was lost in the fury of Axis violence only perhaps to be reborn with a new name, a new faith and a new peace.

And if in the covenant the idea of just peace was vague and weak, in the U.N. Charter the deficiency has been corrected with an element of determination and faith. Justice is a very important aspect of peace under the U.N. Charter and the document is very emphatic, clear and pronounced on it in principle at least.

U.N. Peace then is not only a positive peace: it is also a just peace. This just peace concept can be found in different parts of the Charter

¹² League of Nations Pamphlets - "The League of Free Nations" by McCurdy, M.P., p. 6.

¹³ Schiffer—Legal Community of Mankind, p. 244.

The preamble lays down the determination of the peoples of the United Nations "to establish conditions under which *justice* and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained". The emphasis is clearly on the establishment of conditions which can ensure justice. It is drafted largely in line with the pattern found in the preamble to the League covenant. If, however, 'justice' and 'respect for the obligations' of treaties and other laws be in conflict, there may be complications. Then again we come across the term 'justice' in Article 1, paragraph 1. "To maintain international peace and security" is the primary purpose of the United Nations and to that end they are "to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace". It is very significant to note that the phrase 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law' did not occur in the Dumbarton Oaks Draft.¹⁴ The phrase then was a conscious and deliberate insertion at San Francisco. As Hambro and Goodrich observe—"The insertion of these words was intended to provide a safeguard against the settlement of international questions on the basis of political expediency. It was intended to avoid such a sacrifice of the rights of small nations in the interest of a doubtful peace as was made at Munich".¹⁵ Peace at the cost of justice can hardly be a genuine peace: it is at best a doubtful peace; it cannot prevent war. It simply postpones war and makes it more catastrophic when it comes. It is interesting to note in this connection what the President¹⁶ of Commission I (which was to work with Chapter I dealing with preamble, purposes and principles) of the San Francisco Conference said at its first meeting held on June 14, 1945. He declared: "With regard to peace, we felt the need to emphasize that our first object was to be strong to maintain peace, to maintain peace by our common effort and at all costs, at all costs with one exception—not at the cost of justice. There the difficulty lay. Many of our delegations have repeatedly in our debates warned of the dangers of a 'repetition of the so-called 'appeasement policy'. Too often in the last years Governments had hoped to maintain peace by sacrificing the interests of the weaker countries to the greed of the stronger ones, and all this on the altar of peace, with the rather deceiving result that they succeeded only in feeding what Prime Minister Churchill called "the crocodile who grew stronger and stronger every year".¹⁷ The gist of this statement is that true peace must have its roots in justice and a peace at the cost of justice today is killed by the war of injustice tomorrow. Justice then was a very important consideration for the statesmen at San Francisco. In the same meeting the remarks of the Rapporteur in connection with the inser-

¹⁴ The relevant provision in the D.O. Draft was—"to bring about by peaceful means adjustment or settlement of international disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace".

¹⁵ Charter of the United Nations (Commentary and Documents) Revised Edn., 1949, p. 95.

¹⁶ He was the representative of Belgium.

¹⁷ UNCIO—Documents, Vol. 6, pp. 1814: also Doc 1006 (English) I/6, pp. 2-3.

tion of the phrase 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law' in the second part¹⁸ of Article 1, paragraph 1 are revealing to a degree and should be read with interest by all. He said—"Dealing with the first part a motion was made at first to add 'justice' after 'security'. . . . A second motion was made to add after 'security' the very motion that we have before us now, 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law'. Both motions received a bare majority vote in the committee, but they did not attain the two-thirds majority necessary for a decision. It may seem, at first sight, that some members of the committee who took the move to oppose the first two motions were trying to oppose justice itself. On the contrary, all those who took the floor to oppose the two motions were agreed that the concept of justice is a norm of fundamental importance; and all affirmed that peace, real and enduring, cannot be based on anything other than on justice. They held, however, that adding 'justice' after 'peace and security' . . . brings in at that juncture of the text a notion which lacks in clarity and welds it together with the more clear and almost tangible notion of peace and security".¹⁹ It will be seen herefrom that the phrase was inserted after thorough and careful deliberation and that again consciously and deliberately. The debate that ensued was not on 'justice' as such, nor on the propriety of the concept; it was just a quarrel about the proper place where it should have been inserted. And it was finally decided to insert the phrase not in the first but in the second part of the paragraph, it being argued that "the concept of justice and international law can thus find a more appropriate place in context with the last part of the paragraph dealing with disputes and situations." That does not, however, affect in any way the concept of a peace of justice. Menace to peace usually arises out of disputes or situations or their unjust settlement or adjustment. Non-settlement of disputes adds to and aggravates tension as much as unjust settlement: so also does non-adjustment or unjust adjustment of situations. The phrase 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law' may create complications if 'justice' and 'international law' are not identical but stand opposed. Which of the two in case of conflict among themselves will have a prior claim to allegiance? The charter gives no answer. But reason and the spirit of the San Francisco Conference would perhaps warrant the conclusion that in a case of clear conflict between the two, when justice is precisely known and located it must have a claim to a prior allegiance on the part of the organization and justice should not be surrendered to law but law should be adjusted to the requirements of justice when it is correctly and definitely known.²⁰

¹⁸ Art. 1, paragraph 1 of the charter reads thus—"To maintain international peace and *Security*, and to that end: to take effective collective measures. . . . and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international, adjustment or settlement. . . ." There were suggestions for inserting the term 'justice' or even the phrase 'in conformity, etc.' after the term 'Security' in the first part of this Article.

¹⁹ UNCIO—Documents Vol. 6, pp. 21-22; Document 1006, 1/6, pp. 10-11.

²⁰ It is very difficult to know correctly what is 'justice' in international politics and if the parties are given option in the matter there can be no end to wranglings and

Justice again rings out as the dominant note in Article 2, paragraph 3 regarding peaceful settlement of disputes. Here also the story is more or less the same. Article 2, paragraph 3 runs thus: "All Members shall settle their *international* disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security *and justice*, are not endangered". The parallel provision in the Dumbarton Oaks Draft was—"All Members of the organization shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered". (Chapter 2, paragraph 3 of the Dumbarton Oaks Draft). The difference between the two will at once be seen by the readers. The term 'justice' did not occur in the D.O. Draft. It was then an insertion at San Francisco. And further the term 'international' before disputes was added to make the obligation binding only in the case of international disputes and not in the case of internal and domestic disputes. But the most significant alteration relates to the term 'justice'. This was based on the proposal coming from the Bolivian delegate. Hambro and Goodrich observe in this connection—"The purpose of this clearly was to prevent a recurrence of appeasement at the expense of the smaller nations. It is not enough that peace and security should be safeguarded; the principles of justice must also be respected".²¹

Such then is the concept of just peace under the U.N. Charter—of justice as an element of vital value in Peace as an art. References to some more speeches of the different members at the San Francisco Conference may not be out of place here as these will lend emphasis and clarity to the point I seek to establish. Mr. Alfaro, delegate of Panama, in the first meeting of Commission I, held on June 14, 1945, after noting with appreciation the loyalty to justice on the part of a large number of states added—"Because we all want that kind of a peace—a peace founded upon justice and nothing but justice, a peace that will be on no occasion a peace of expediency, a peace of force, a peace of appeasement. It must be a peace of justice"²² In the same meeting the Egyptian delegate, Mr. Mamdouh Bey Riaz, echoing the same theme commented—"If we want to keep peace and security only, we would not differ much from Hitler, who was also trying to do that and who, as a matter of fact, partly succeeded. *But where the difference lies is that we want to maintain peace and security in conformity with the principles of international law and justice*".²³ The emphasis is here clear and categorical on the fact that peace minus justice loses its quality and charm; and the Members of the United Nations are after not a peace of politics but only a peace

controversies. The possibility of an impartial international non-legal machinery may be considered for the purpose.

²¹ Hambro and Goodrich—*op. cit.*, p. 102.

²² Doc. 1006, I/6, p. 16; UNCIO—Doc. Vol. 6, 27.

²³ Doc. 1006, I/6, p. 18; UNCIO—Doc. Vol. 6, p. 24.—He continued—"Before concluding I should like to tell you just a little story of what happened to me a few days ago. When I was talking with a member of the Chinese delegation—and we should not forget that China is one of the four sponsoring powers—he explained to me that the ideogram which is used in Chinese to denote the word peace is really composed of two symbols, one of which means harmony and the other means equity. Therefore in the opinion of Chinese civilization, which is one of the oldest in the world, peace can only be obtained by the co-existence of security in international relations with justice. I ask you to meditate on the wisdom of that Chinese saying".

of justice. To sacrifice justice for peace is to sacrifice the heart for the head: and just as the head minus the heart cannot survive, so also peace minus justice cannot continue for long. Lord Halifax, the delegate of the United Kingdom, in the same meeting pointed out—"All of us, of whatever delegation, are naturally anxious to see justice carried out, and to see the alliance between justice and order on which the future of our work must depend". The speech of Mr. Paysse, the delegate of Uruguay, in that very meeting is largely revealing in character and deserves careful study. Commenting on the debate regarding the place where the phrase 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law' ought to be inserted (in which Uruguay's point of view was opposed by the United States delegate, Commander Stassen) Mr. Paysse remarked—"Any flighty observer could imagine that this is a duel between David and Goliath, in which the small countries, Panama and Uruguay, throw the stone of justice at the great powers, represented in this debate by none other than Lord Halifax and the Honourable Mr. Stassen. That would be quite contrary to the truth, for the formula which we are fighting is sponsored by the United States and Great Britain, to whom all the nations of the world are so much indebted for their work on behalf of the rule of justice; by the U.S.S.R., the definition and characteristic of which is an impatient and strong zeal for real social justice, so deep that to attain it this nation sacrifices some juridical processes which we deem essential; by France which has written for humanity a rich philosophy impregnated with justice; and by the heroic and suffering China, martyred for her defence of principles of international justice in the face of imperialism.....

..... we firmly support a drastic system of effective security measures, but we conceive it only on the basis of justice and in conformity with the rules of international law. Such are the problem and the divergence. The mere police function, which pursues the materiality or formality of the order,....., cannot attract our sympathies nor our hopes in the panorama of the reconstruction of the world. The day when there occurs anew the illusion that by sacrificing the rights of the weak in the face of threats by the strong the peace would be saved, on that day the fuse will have been lighted which sooner or later would set off the explosion of war. Injustice is not a propitious atmosphere for peace".²⁴ The formula of just peace under the Charter cannot perhaps be expressed in better and more emphatic terms; that is why I have taken the liberty of quoting elaborately from Mr. Paysse's speech. It will be seen that just peace under the Charter is not a formula of the feeble;—it has been framed and sponsored by the stronger powers as well. The maxim of just peace was universally acknowledged by all powers, great and small, at the San Francisco Conference.

Such then is the nature of just peace under the Charter. Justice is the ruling theme in the maintenance of peace and security as it is the

²⁴ Doc. 1006, I/6, pp. 20-22;
UNESCO—Doc. Vol. 6, pp. 81-83.

guiding norm in the settlement of disputes and adjustment of situations. Unjust settlement of disputes and inequitable adjustment of situations frequently lead to friction which may develop into war. Just peace formula of the Charter is expected to root out such possibilities.

To be continued.

Reviews and Notices of Books

Devayatan O Bharatiya-Sabhayata—By Sris Chandra Chattopadhyay, published by the Calcutta University, 1957. Introduction pp. 82. Subject matter pp. 146; illustration 159; description of illustration pp. 77; index pp. 11, Price Rs. 20/- .

This is one of the best publications of the year 1957 in Bengali language. It reflects to the credit of the Calcutta University to have undertaken the publication of such an expensive book with 159 illustrations in art paper—nicely designed, accurately blocked, beautifully printed. It reflects no less credit to the author who has devoted long patience, and put in unlimited labour to collect materials for his book. The book is primarily a work of history and culture, the study of which he undertook by choice. He has justified his choice—by the production of this Book on 'the Abode of gods'. In fact, the book is a history of Indian Civilization from the Paleolithic age to the modern age based on the conceptions of Indians about God and gods and the attempt made by them to find abode of their objects of worship. These abodes varied according to their conception of the *object* of worship, *method* of worship, *attitude* of individual worshippers and lastly according to the *aesthetic standard* of the community of worshippers. These abodes were styled as *Mandir*, *Chaitya*, *Stupa*; and the deities inside them were represented by idols, and often by symbols.

These abodes of worship gradually developed into centres of social concourse, stages of theatres, assembly hall for religious discourses, hospitals for the sick, rest houses for travellers, schools for education—in fact these abodes represented the genius of the Indians in their attitude towards life and culture.

Our author in course of his approach to the subject has taken a large canvas and has developed the various aspects of Indian life through ages, from pre-Aryan, Aryan, Dravidian, Greek, Iranian, Scythian, Kushan, Chinese, Mongol, Turkish, (Muslim) even the British; he has even gone to analyse the Indian mind in Greater India, I mean, West, Central and East Asia. From historical point of view the author has shown the waves, curves and lines of development of Indian architecture which grew round the Indian temples. In this connection, incidentally, he has analysed the subtleties of Indian mind in its diverse manifestations.

In the end of the book, the author has tried to play a visionary in the development of temples in future India where he conceives the abodes of worship as centres of unity of Indian culture.

The author deserves suitable recognition from the University, Government of the country and from the public. No modern library will be complete without a copy of the *Devayatan*. It should be translated into the principal languages of the world.

M. L. ROYCHOUHURY

Ourselves

CONDOLENCE UPON THE DEATH OF DR. HEMCHANDRA RAYCHAUDHURI

On the 10th July, the day of the re-opening of the University classes after the summer vacation, University teachers and students of the Departments of Ancient Indian History and Culture, History, Islamic History and Culture, Sanskrit and Pali met in the Asutosh Hall of the University to express their sorrow at the sad death of Dr. Hemchandra Raychaudhuri. Dr. Jitendranath Banerjee, M.A., Ph.D., the present Carmichael Professor of Ancient Indian History and Culture, moved the following resolution which was adopted by all persons standing in solemn silence.

Resolved—This meeting of the students and teachers of the Departments of Ancient Indian History and Culture, History, Islamic History and Culture, Sanskrit and Pali of the University of Calcutta, expresses its deep sense of sorrow and irreparable loss at the sad death of Dr. Hemchandra Raychaudhuri, late Carmichael Professor and Head of the Department of Ancient Indian History and Culture, on the 4th of May, 1957.

This meeting further resolves that a copy of the condolence resolution be sent to the members of the bereaved family.


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VIDYASAGAR LECTURES

Sri Benoy Ghose, M.A., Vidyasagar Lecturer of the University for 1956, is delivering a course of five lectures on various aspects of Vidyasagar's life and character, in the Darbhanga Hall. The first lecture is on the formation of Vidyasagar's personality. The second is on his contributions to Bengali Language and Literature. The third is on the Educational Reforms of Vidyasagar, and the fourth and fifth lectures are on Vidyasagar as a Social Reformer. The advent of Pandit Iswarchandra Vidyasagar is a tall landmark in the Bengal Renaissance of the 19th century. His towering personality earned for himself the respect of all Bengal and a great place in the history of the country. He was a member of the first Senate of this University constituted under the Act of Incorporation, 1857. It is only fit and proper that in the centenary year, the University has made arrangements for a course of lectures on Vidyasagar.



Notifications

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification.

No. C/2951/135 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that the Viharilal College of Home Science has been granted affiliation in English, Bengali, Household Art, Child Care & Training, Social Science, Household Science & Music (f Bengali Songs) to the I.A. and B.A. Pass standards; in English, Bengali, Chemistry, Household Science, Child Care & Training, Social Science & Household Art to the I Sc standard and in Chemistry, Household Science, Child Care & Training, Social Science & Household Art to the B Sc. Pass standard from the session 1957-58, provided the necessary staff is appointed and the practical class rooms are properly equipped before the commencement of the session.

Senate House, Calcutta. }

The 26th June, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,

Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification.

No C/104/78 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Syamsunder College, Burdwan has been affiliated to the B Sc Pass standard, in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House, Calcutta. }

The 16th July, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,

Registrar.

ANDHRA UNIVERSITY

Order

The results of the following candidates who have been found guilty of resorting to unfair means at the University Examinations held in September, 1956 are cancelled and they are debarred from appearing for any of the University Examinations for the periods noted against each of them.

Name of the Candidate	Examination	Reg. No.	Period
1 Mudunuru Appala Raju	Matriculation	1974	Debarred for one year and permitted to sit for the University Examination to be held in September, 1957 or thereafter.
2 Asapu Ramaswami	Do.	2012	Do.
3 V. Chakradhara Rao	Intermediate	7904	Do.
4 S. Koteswara Rao	Matriculation	405	Debarred for two years and permitted to sit for the University Examination to be held in September, 1958 or thereafter.
5 P. V. Chalapathi Rao	Do.	366	Do.
6 P. Trinadha Rao	Do.	2038	Do.
7 V. Sekhara Rao	Intermediate	4737	Do.
8 B. Atchamma	Do.	8707-A	Do.
9 S. Ramachandra Raju	Do.	1154	Do.
10 M. Devendra Rao	Matriculation	1836	Do.

By Order

V. SIMHADRI RAO,
Deputy Registrar.

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

Office of the Registrar, February 18, 1957.

Copy of Resolution :

Considered the report of the Chief Proctor, B. H. U. regarding Shri Awadh Kishore Lal, a student of law for his undesirable activities in the University.

Resolved that Shri Awadh Kishore Lal, a student of Law be expelled from the University with immediate effect and he be not admitted to any of the constituent colleges of the University.

Illegible.

Registrar.

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

Office of the Registrar, February 18, 1957.

Copy of Resolution :

Considered confidential letter, dated the 12th January, 1957 from the Principal, Teachers' Training College, Banaras Hindu University regarding Shri Shyam Singh Varma, a student of B.Ed., for forging signature of Prof. B. L. Atreya.

Resolved that Shri Shyam Singh Varma, a student of B.Ed. be expelled from the University with immediate effect and he be not admitted to any of the constituent colleges of the University in future.

Illegible,

Registrar.

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

Office of the Registrar, January 4, 1957

Copy of Resolution :

Considered letter, dated 25th November, 1956 from the Chief Proctor regarding (i) Shri Omkar Nath Pandey II, Year (Ayurved), (ii) Shri Tej Bahadur Pandey, IV Year (Ayurved), and (iii) Shri Ram Lakhon Singh, IV Year (Ayurved), for their objectionable behaviour in the University.

Resolved that Shri Omkar Nath Pandey, II Year (Ayurved), (ii) Shri Tej Bahadur Pandey, IV Year (Ayurved) and (iii) Shri Ram Lakhon Singh IV Year (Ayurved) be expelled from the University and in future they be not admitted in any of the constituent colleges of the University.

Illegible,

Registrar.

NOTIFICATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BOMBAY

No. Ex/31787 of 1956

It is hereby notified that the undermentioned candidates who are found guilty of having practised unfair means at the University Examinations held in March and April, 1956, are declared to have failed at the respective examinations, and to have forfeited their claims to exemptions, if any, earned by them at the examinations held this year and that they are further debarred from appearing at any University or College Examination before the dates mentioned against their respective names :—

Seat No.	Name	College	Date up to which debarred.
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INTERMEDIATE ARTS EXAMINATION

1917	Turel, Nadir Erachshaw	R. D. and S. H. National College	1st January, 1959
2187	Sainani, Srichand Kishinchand	Jai Hind College	Do.
3898	Nerkar, Vaman Shankar	D. G. Ruparel College	Do
3933	Parande, Ganpat Laxman	Kishinchand Chellaram College	Do
4382	Desai, Jyotindra Jagadishchandra	Khalsa College	Do.
5188	Ramchandani, Arjundas	Kamla Kishinchand College	Chellaram 1st January, 1959

INTERMEDIATE SCIENCE EXAMINATION

17	Asha, Beji Rustomji	Siddharth College of Arts and Science	1st January, 1958
45	Charania, Sultanali Kermali	Kishinchand College	Chellaram Do.
185	Irani, Khodi Aspandiar	Jai Hind College	Do.
906	Puri, Mohan Nath	Khalsa College	Do.
1708	D. Souza, Edward Anthony	Do.	Do.
2187	Joishi Suresh Mahadeo	D. G. Ruparel College	Do.
3044	Shetty, Rango Guthu Shena	Do.	Do.
3701	Patel, Vishnubhai Shankarbhai	Wilson College	Do.
3711	Vasanwala, Husaini Mohomedbhai	Ismail Yusuf College	Do.

B.A. EXAMINATION

139	Vyas, Pranshanker Jagannath	Siddharth College of Arts & Science	1st January, 1959
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B.Sc. EXAMINATION

75	Davalia, Ranjitsinh Tricunddas	Jai Hind College	1st January, 1959
1113	Vakil Arun Madanlal	Siddharth College of Arts & Science	Do.
2459	Raval, Narendra Shanker	Jai Hind College	Do.

B.Com. EXAMINATION

521	Sanchawala, Esabhai Tayebali	Sydenham College	1st January, 1959
725	Jain, Kirtikumar Harischandraji	Do.	Do.

THIRD M.B. B.S. EXAMINATION

250	Suri, Jagdish Raj	Grant Medical College	1st January, 1959
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It is also notified that Shri Julius Moraes candidate No. 1164 at the B.Sc. Examination held in April, 1955, who was sent up by the St. Xavier's College and who was found guilty of having used unfair means at the said examination is declared to have failed at the examination, and to have forfeited his claims to exemptions, if any, earned by him at the examination held in 1955 and that he is further debarred from appearing at any of the University or College Examinations before 1st January, 1959.

By order,

T. V. CHIDAMBARAN,
University Registrar.

Bombay, 5th September, 1955.

UNIVERSITY OF GAUHATI

Orders passed by the Executive Council by Resolutions Nos. 22, 23 and 24, dated 18th November, 1956 with regard to the cases of candidates who used unfair means in the B.Sc., B.A. and 1st B.V.Sc. and A.H. Examinations of 1956.

The Examinations of the following candidates have been cancelled and they have been debarred from appearing at any Examination of this University until 1958.

Sl. No.	Roll & No.	Names of the Candidates	Name of College
1	Roll Jor. 19	Md. Shah Alam (B.Sc.)	J. B. College
2	Roll Shi. 50	Pradipkumar Datta (B.Sc.)	St. Anthony's College
3	Roll Shi. 51	Sourendranarayan Raychaudhuri (B.Sc.)	Do.

4 Roll Gau. 209	Gauri Ram Kalita (B.A.)	Cotton College
5 Roll Gau. 298	Pijuskanti Dasgupta (B.A.)	Do,
6 Roll Now. 17	Binodchandra Tamuly (B.A.)	Nowgong College
7 Roll Now. 69	Md. Nur Hussain (B.A.)	Do,
8 Roll Shi. 18	Himansukumar Bhattacharyya (B.A.)	St. Edmund's College
9 Roll Gau. 12	Kanakchandra Sharma (1st B.V. Sc. and A.H. Examination)	Assam Veterinary College

P. DATTA,
Registrar,
University of Gauhati.

GUJARAT UNIVERSITY

Circular.

It is hereby notified that Shri Hariharprasad Prabburam Trivedi of Dharmendrasinhji College, Rajkot who had appeared at the Intermediate Arts Examination held by the University in October, 1956 under seat No. 1098 and who had been found guilty of having practised unfair means at the said examination, is hereby declared to have failed at the said examination and has forfeited his claim to exemptions, if any, earned by him at the examination held in October, 1956 or in any previous year and that he is further debarred from appearing at any examination of this University up to 31st December, 1959.

The 16th April, 1957.

Illegible,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF GAUHATI

Orders passed by the Executive Council by Resolution No. 20, dated the 30th September, 1956 with regard to the cases of candidates who used unfair means in the Matriculation Examination of 1956.

The Examination of the following candidates have been cancelled and they have been debarred from appearing at any Examination of this University until 1958.

Sl. No	Roll and No.	Names of the Candidates	Names of School
1	Dib. 87	Prema Kanta Hazarika	Govt. H. E. School, Dibrugarh
2	Dib. P. 196	Bhabani Mohan Borgohain	Private Candidate
3	Dib. F. 90	Sandhya Datta	Victoria Girls H. E. School, Dibrugarh
4	Gau. 719	Umesh Ch Mahanta	Puthmar H. E. School
5	Gau 743	M/s Makiboor Rahuau Borah	Bazra H. E. School
6	Haila. 126	Susantakumar Kar	Public H. E. School, Hailakandi
7	Jor. F.P. 83	Tuleswari Chakraborty	Private Candidate
8	Lakhim P 6	Nagendra Nath Hazarika	Do
9	Sib P. 38	Hemadhar Gayan	Do.

P. DATTA,
Registrar,
University of Gauhati.

UNIVERSITY OF GAUHATI

Orders passed by the Executive Council by Resolutions Nos. 8 and 9, dated 30th September, 1956 with regard to the cases of candidates who used unfair means in the I.A. Compartmental Examination of 1955 and I.A., I.Sc. and I.Com. Examinations of 1956.

(i) The Examination of Roll Gau. Comp 54 (I.A.) Khunanthem Kaulai Singh has been cancelled and he has been debarred from appearing at any Examination of this University until 1957.

(ii) Roll Gau. Comp 95 (I.A.) Alfred Wallang is permitted to appear at the I.A. Compartmental Examination to be held in 1956.

(iii) The Examinations of the remaining candidates have been cancelled and they have been debarred from appearing at any Examination of this University until 1958.

Sl. No.	Roll and No.	Names of the Candidates	Name of College
1	Gau. Comp. 54 (I.A.)	Khumanthem Kanhai Singh	D. M. College, Imphal
2	Gau. Comp. 95 (I.A.)	Alfred Wallang	St. Anthony's College, Shillong
3	Dib. 42 (I.A.)	Md. Rafeequr Rahman	Dib. H. S. K. College, Dibrugarh
4	Gau. 154 (I.A.)	Md. Abdul Kader	B Borooah College, Gauhati
5	Gau. 869 (I.A.)	Krishnakanta Choudbury	Nalbari College, Nalbari
6	Karim. 9 (I.A.)	Md. Abdus Saleh	Karimganj College, Karimganj
7	Karim. 32 (I.A.)	Bhabatoah Deb	Do.
8	Now. 186 (I.A.)	Dinesh Ch. Borah	Nowgong College, Nowgong
9	Dib. N. 3 (I.Sc.)	Nitilal Chakravarty	Dib H. S. K. College, Dibrugarh
10	Karim. 11 (I.Sc.)	Nirmalendu Sen	Karimganj College, Karimganj
11	Karim. 13 (I.Sc.)	Romendranarayan Dey	Do.
12	Karim. 59 (I.Sc.)	Karunasindhu Aditya	Do.
13	Sil. 42 (I.Sc.)	Mrigendra Lal Daskanungu	G. C. College, Silchar
14	Sil. 98 (I.Sc.)	Kumar Kanti Sinha	Do.
15	Tez. 1 (I.Sc.)	Lala Lhar Bora	Tairang College, Tezpur
16	Tez. 46 (I.Sc.)	Sunendra Nath Borthakur	Do.
17	Gau. 63 (I.Com.)	Kamalesh Ch. Banerjee	University Classes, Gauhati

Illegible,

Deputy Registrar,
University of Gauhati.

NOTIFICATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF POONA

No. EX/BAH/ 116 of 1955 56

Misc Ser. No. 2471

It is hereby notified that the results of the undermentioned candidates who have been found guilty of having resorted to unfair means at the University Examinations held in October 1956 have been cancelled and that they have further been debarred from appearing at any Examination of this University before 1st August of the year mentioned against their names.

University Seat No.	Candidate's Name	College	Date till which the candidate is debarred
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B.A. (General)

254	Gadgil, Kusum Govind	N. Wadia College Poona I	1st August, 1958
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B.E. (Civil) (New Rules)

3	Bhide, Keshav Kashinath	Walchand College of Engineering, Bangal	1st August, 1960
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Ganeshkhind, Poona-7
February 5, 1957.

Y. D. KHAN
Registrar

PATNA UNIVERSITY

Misc. Ser. No, 1650

The undermentioned candidates are debarred from appearing at any University Examination for the period noted against their names as they were found guilty of using unfair means at the Supplementary Intermediate and Bachelor Examinations in Commerce of 1956.

Sl. No.	Centre	Roll No. Examination on	Registration Number and College	Candidate's Name	Period of punishment.
1.	Tir-Chandra College, Kathmandu, Nepal.	Roll Nep No 1. B.Com.	153-56	Dakshina Ranjan Sen Gupta.	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Suppl. Exam. of 1958.
2.	Tir-Chandra College, Kathmandu, Nepal.	Roll Nep. No. 8. I. Com.	1040-55	Ob. Ananta Jung Parakram Shah.	Do.

Patna University
The 27th November, 1956.

S. Y. HUSSAIN,
Deputy Registrar.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY

No. 20949/56-G.

Chandigarh, December 1, 1956

From

The Registrar,
Panjab University,
Chandigarh,

To

The Principals of all the colleges affiliated to the Panjab University.

Sir/Madam,

I am to inform you that the Principal, Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College, Hoshiarpur, vide his letter No 901, dated 31st October 1956, has rusticated the following students for a period of one year, with effect from 30th October 1956, for the reasons mentioned below :—

S. No	Name of the student	Father's name.	Class.	Reason.
1.	Rajendra Kumar Bah (Registered No. 51 dh-81)	Jagat Ram Bah	IV yr.	Gross misconduct
2	Jagtar Singh (Registered No 55 dh-789)	Darshan Singh,	II yr.	Gross misconduct.

Yours faithfully,
KESAR MALL
Asst Registrar (Co ordnn.)
for Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE

Misc. Ser No. 1600

Office of the University of Mysore,
Administrative Buildings,
Crawford Hall, Mysore,
Dated 16th November 1956.

Notification.

Pursuant to the resolution of the University Council passed at the meeting held on 10th November 1956, the following candidates who were found guilty of malpractice at the University examination of September-October 1956 are penalised as follows —

Examination	Reg No	Name and Address.	Penalty Imposed.
Intermediate in Science.	459	K Venkatnarasimhachar, S/O Sri K. Baliga Iyengar, No 4th Cross, Shankarpur, Bangalore 4	(1) He loses the whole Examination * (2) He is debarred from sitting for the following Examination.
Do.	3085	T Kondappa, S/O Sri Thirumalappa, Land Lord, Yelahanka, Bangalore North Taluk.	(1) Do. (2) Do.
B.Sc	792	M. R. Ramachandra Rao S/O Sri M Raghavendra Rao, Land Lord, 1883 Cross Temple Road, Mallawaram, Bangalore 3	(1) Do. (2) Do.

* Note :—" Whole Examination " refers to the part or parts for which the candidate had appeared at the September 1956 Examination.

By Order,
Registrar

NAGPUR UNIVERSITY

Misc. Ser. No. 1408

Order

The following examinees, having been found guilty of attempting to use unfair means at the supplementary Examinations held in September-October, 1956, are disqualified for admission to any University examination to be held before September, 1958, viz.—

S. No.	Roll No.	Name in full	Examination	College
1.	114	Manohar Raya i Zade	Intermediate in Science	Ex-student
2.	400	Yadav Chandra Gajwe	B A (Pass)	Ex-student

By order of the Executive Council,

Nagpur.
The 15th November 1956

Registrar,
Nagpur University

NAGPUR UNIVERSITY

Order

The following examinees having been found guilty of attempting to use unfair means at the University Examinations held in March-April, 1956, are disqualified for admission to any University examination to be held before the year 1958, viz —

S. No.	Roll No.	Name in full	Examination	College
1.	1948	Tatayappa Malappa Murhe	Intermediate Examination in Arts	Vidarbha Mahavidyalaya, Amravati.
2.	488	Kumari Shanta Malave	Do.	Non-Collegiate Woman candidate
3.	1024	Shankarlal Bansulal Soman	Do	Vidarbha Mahavidyalaya, Amravati
4.	99	Ratnakar Hari Vaidya	Intermediate Examination in Science.	Ex-Student.
5.	429	Mohanlal Sreekrishnadas Nabira	Do.	College of Science, Nagpur
6.	64	Manohar Sing Rajput	Do	Ex Student
7.	876	Namdeo Jagannath Shende	Do.	S. B. City College, Nagpur.
8.	552	Sharad Onkarprasad Yadav	B A (Pass)	Ex-Student
9.	84	Jugal Kishore Madanlal Oza	Intermediate Examination in Commerce	Ex Student
10.	280	Prempal Mehrchand Khurana	B C m	Shri Shivaji College, Amravati.
11.	162	Gurudil Singh Kalai	Final LL B	University College of Law, Nagpur.

By Order of the Executive Council,

Registrar

Nagpur University,

Nagpur :
The 15th November, 1956.

1957]

NOTIFICATIONS

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BIHAR UNIVERSITY

Misc. Ser. No. 1350

From

The Registrar,
Bihar University,
Patna—4.

To

The Principal of all Colleges under the Bihar University.

Patna, the 4th October, 1956.

Circular No. 9.


Sir/Madam,

I have to inform you that Sri Raj Kumar Sinha (Registration No. 968-52), who submitted forged and wrong marksheet of the I.Sc. examination in connection with his admission in the Tirhut College of Engineering, Muzaffarpur, has been debarred from taking admission in any College prior to July, 1957.

Yours faithfully,

Sd. P. BOY CHOWDHARY

Registrar.



THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

Vol. 144]

AUGUST, 1957

[No. 2

MOHENJO DARO CIVILIZATION

III

BASANTA KUMAR CHATTOPADHYAYA

In my articles on Mohenjo Daro published in the *Calcutta Review* of May and December, 1956 I tried to maintain that Mohenjo Daro civilization was Vedic civilization. I was glad to find that Sri T. R. Ramachandran, Joint Director-General of Archaeology delivered a lecture at the Asiatic Society, Calcutta on the 2nd April, 1957 giving his opinion that this civilization was Vedic civilization. He also confirmed my view that RVS VII-100-4 referred to the colonization of Uruk¹ by Vedic Aryans. He also confirmed another view of mine viz that the names Ur, Uru, Uruk, K² and Urkasdim which are found in ancient Mesopotamia are corruptions of the word Uruk¹ which is found in the Vedas. He also quoted RVS 9-84-1, RVS 10-118-8 and RVS 10-118-9 (also quoted by me) as referring to Aryan colonization of Mesopotamia. He interpreted one of the seals as depicting a scene described in Satapatha Brahmana in which Indra appeared in the body of the sacrificial sheep and devoured the offerings, while seven priests were reciting the Vedas (*More excavations at Mohenjo Daro* by Mackay Plate XCIX(A)) He interpreted the statue in PL. XCVIII (Marshall, Vol. III) as that of the Yajamana wearing golden ornaments on the arm and forehead and also wearing the upper cloth in the Yajnopavita fashion. He also said that the seal No. 387 (Plate CXII of Marshall, Vol. III) refers to the well known Vedic verse "Two birds are sitting on the same tree. One of them eats the fruit. The other does not eat but merely looks on."

(Mundakopanisat 3 1-1 and also RVS 1-164-20). In this article I propose to discuss the age of the Mohenjo Daro civilization.

Referring to two of the seals of the Indus pattern discovered in Mesopotamia Sir John Marshall supports the statement of Mr. Gadd and Prof. Langdon that the Indus civilization must go back to an age before 2800 B.C. (Mohenjo Daro and the Indus Civilization, pp. 103-4). As the seals unearthed at Mohenjo Daro emanate from all levels and in point of style are indistinguishable from one another, the two specimens referred to above might equally well have been produced in the Late, Intermediate or Early period of Mohenjo Daro. Marshall assumes that they were produced in the Intermediate period and has given the date of Mohenjo Daro as 3250 B.C. to 2750 B.C.

Besides the seals some other facts are mentioned by Marshall which indicate a date near 3000 B.C. and even earlier. He observes: "Among many other objects and motifs that demonstrate an intimate relation between the Indus, Early Sumerian and Second Pre-diluvian cultures, the following are specially noteworthy:—(1) certain fragments of vases found at Al-Ubaid, which are made of an Indian potstone; (2) the trefoil patterning on the robe of the statuette figured in PL. XCVIII, which is identical with that on certain Sumerian "Bulls of Heaven" of early date; (3) the horned figures on seals 356 and 357, which there is a strong presumption for connecting, if not for identifying with the Sumerian Hero-God Eabani; (4) A toilet-set comprising a piercer, earscoop, and tweezers, found in a deposit of the Late period at Harappa and identical in pattern with one from the First Dynasty cemetery at Ur; (5) the curious etched beads of carnelian figured in PL. CXLVI, 43-5, which are identical in technique with certain beads from pre-Sargonic graves at Kis; (6) a peculiar type of jar cover figured in PL. LXXXII, type X, specimens of which have also been found at Jemdet Nasr; (7) the wavy rings of shell inlay figured in PL. CLVI, 4 and 5; the squat carinated vessel of PL. LXXI, 17; the offering's stands of PL. LXXIX; the barrel-shaped stone weights of PL. CLIV, 5 and 7; the stone toilet boxes of PL. CXXI, 36 and 37 all of which, as Mr. Mackay has pointed out, can be matched by similar objects from Mesopotamia of the fourth or first half of the third millennium B.C. These examples—and their number might easily be multiplied—are enough to show that active intercourse must have been going on between the Indus Valley and Mesopotamia in Pre-Sargonic or early Sargonic times, and thus afford strong confirmation of the

chronological conclusions drawn from the seals." Marshall, Vol. I, pp. 104-5.

The Sumerian culture has been divided into three periods : (1) the Obeid period from 4000 to 3500 B.C., (2) the Uruk period from 3400 to 3100 B.C. and (3) the Jemdet Nasr period from 3100 to 2900 B.C. (Hrozny's *Ancient History of Western Asia, India and Crete*, pp. 22, 27, 34, 43).

The Pre-diluvian period has been identified by Hrozny with the Obeid and the Uruk periods (Hrozny, p. 58). It would thus appear that by "early Sumerian culture" Marshall refers to the Obeid period and by "the second Pre-diluvian culture" he refers to the Uruk period. Hence according to Marshall the items mentioned by him indicate that there was intercourse between Indus Valley and Mesopotamia during the period from 4000 to 3100 B.C. Item (1) viz. fragments of vases found at Al-Ubaid made of Indian potstone obviously refers to the Obeid period viz 4000 to 3500 B.C. The trefoil pattern on the robe of the Indus statue (item 2) which is identified with that on certain "Bulls of heaven" of early Sumerian period should also refer to the same age. The horned figures mentioned in item (3) which are connected with Sumerian hero-God Enbani should also refer to the period prior to 3100 B.C. The toilet set mentioned in item (4) found in a deposit of the late period at Harappa has been identified with one from the first dynasty cemetery at Ur. the date of which has been given as 27th century B.C. by Hrozny (p. 63). The date of the earliest deposits of Harappa may, therefore, be taken as 3000 B.C. The etched beads referred to in item 5 are connected with pre-Sargonic graves at Kiş. The Kiş period intervenes between the Jemdet Nasr period and first dynasty of Ur and should therefore be dated from 2900 B.C. to 2700 B.C. Item 6 is connected with the Jemdet Nasr period (3100 B.C. to 2900 B.C.). The several objects referred to in item (7) indicate, as stated by Marshall, dates in the fourth millenium or the first half of the third millenium B.C. in other words, from 4000 B.C. to 2500 B.C. It will thus be seen that item (1) definitely gives the date of Mohenjo Daro between 4000 and 3500 B.C. It is not clear why in spite of this fact Marshall does not go beyond 3250 B.C. Even the date of 3250 B.C. given by Marshall is brought down by Wheeler to 2500 B.C. In support of this date, Wheeler mentions the fact that only one of the seals is found to be pre-Sargonic (i.e. earlier than 2330 B.C.) (Vide *Indus Civilization*, p. 85). Wheeler's date might possibly be justified if we are to rely only on the seals. But many other objects mentioned by

Marshall throw light on the date of Mohenjo Daro and there is no reason why their testimony should be ignored. As observed before item (1) gives a date earlier than 3400 B.C., items (2) and (3) give dates earlier than 3100 B.C., while items (4), (5), (6) give dates earlier than 2600 B.C. It is not clear why Wheeler does not discuss these items in fixing the date of the Indus civilization.

Pigott brings down the date still lower. He writes "In Sumer there is no absolutely clear evidence of Harappa contact until Akkadian times, that is, from 2300 B.C. to 2000 B.C. or a little later" (p. 208). Thus the seal mentioned by Wheeler (prior to 2350 B.C.) is not accepted by Pigott as a definite evidence. Pigott also, like Wheeler, does not mention the items referred to by Marshall as evidence of contact between Sumer and Indus in the fourth millenium and the first half of third millenium B.C. Hrozny gives the date of the Mohenjo Daro culture as 2400 to 2100 B.C. (p. 159). He also seems to have overlooked or ignored important relevant facts.

There are some other items mentioned by Marshall which, though not as conclusive as items (1) and (2) mentioned above, indicate a possibility, if not probability, of a still earlier date. It has been observed by Marshall on page 105, Vol. I that the comb motif is found in Susa I pottery and also in Mohenjo Daro. Marshall thinks that it is too distinctive and original a device to have originated independently and concludes that it was borrowed by Indus potters from those of Persia. This, however, is very unlikely. For while there is sufficient proof that Indus people visited Elam (Susa) and Sumer, there is no evidence that people from Elam and Sumer visited Indus Valley (Marshall, Vol. II, p. 381, Pigott, p. 208, and Ancient India, No. 4, p. 26). It is therefore more likely that Persia got it from India than that India got it from Persia. The fact that this motif is absent in Susa II pottery makes Marshall doubt whether his theory is correct. How is it, he observes, that "this motif disappeared altogether from use in Western Persia after the first Pre-diluvian culture to reappear again on the Indus a thousand years afterwards?" As Marshall gives 3250 B.C. as the date of Mohenjo Daro, the Susa I period is obviously taken by him as 4250 B.C. He has tried to explain the difficulty referred to by him by saying that this motif travelled from Persia to Baluchistan and thence to Indus, for in Baluchistan it is found with Second Pre diluvian pottery (B.C. 3400 to 3100—Vide Hrozny, p. 34). This explanation also is unsatisfactory. If the comb motif originated in West Persia it is not likely to disappear there altogether. But if it was borrowed from Indus there

was possibility of its disappearance as presumably it was learnt only by a limited number of persons in West Persia. The facts which are found about the comb motif are also found about the step motif. If, as we have tried to show, the probability is that these motifs travelled from the Indus to West Persia where they are found in 4000 B.C. the age of Mohenjo Daro is also 4000 B.C.

Another fact is mentioned by Marshall (p. 105) which tends to show that the Mohenjo Daro civilization is contemporary with Susa I (4000 B.C.). The copper and bronze weapons of Mohenjo Daro and Harappa are of a very primitive type. The blade axes are paralleled by Mackay with early examples of Susa I culture, while a bronze saw with curved cutting edge is similar to the most primitive saws of Egypt. We have already seen that from fragments of vases found at Al-Ubaid it may be concluded that Mohenjo Daro existed between 4000 and 3500 B.C. while the comb motif and step motif tend to push the date beyond 4000 B.C. The primitive types of weapons lend weight to the earlier date. Marshall has observed that the Indus people could manufacture elaborate and highly finished vessels and statuettes of bronze and copper while the weapons made were of primitive type. Obviously these people paid greater attention to the production of non-martial objects than to that of weapons.

As will appear from my article on Mohenjo Daro civilization published in the Calcutta Review of May, 1956 it has been stated in Rg Veda Samhita 7-100-4 that Viṣṇu travelled over the world to find dwelling place for his worshippers and gave them Urukṣiti. In R-V-S, 9-84-1 it has been stated that Vedic sacrifices were performed in Urukṣiti and in RVS 10-118-8 the god of fire is invoked in the houses of Uru to burn the Rākṣasas. As Indus seals have been found in Ur and Kiš, and as these names along with the names Uru, Uruk and Urkašdim are also found in ancient Mesopotamia, it is clear that all these words are corruptions of Uru-Kṣiti where Vedic Aryans established a colony. It is also found that about 3500 B.C. there was an Aryan invasion of Uruk when monumental buildings were built there (Hrozný, p. 35). As I have tried to show in my articles, published in the Calcutta Review, May and December 1956 the Mohenjo Daro civilization should be taken as Vedic civilization. Hence this invasion (or colonizing expedition) of 3500 B.C. was perhaps the one referred to in RVS 7-100-4. The dates of the Indus civilization and of the Vedas thus go back to B.C. 3500. The astronomical calculations made independently by Lokamanya Tilak and Prof. Jacobi fixing the date of the Vedas as not later than 4000 B.C. are thus confirmed.

In this connection it may be observed that Marshall after giving 3250 B.C. as the earliest date states "At the same time it is evident—and I should like to stress this point once again—that the culture represented must have had a long antecedent history on the soil of India taking us back to an age that at present can only be dimly surmised," (p. 106). In the preface to his book (p. viii) he states "the civilization hitherto revealed at these two places is not an incipient civilization but one already age-old and stereotyped on Indian soil with many millenia of human endeavour behind it." The items referred to by Marshall which seem to indicate a date in the neighbourhood of 4000 B.C. can thus be explained satisfactorily. It is not understood why all these factors have been ignored by Wheeler, Pigott and Hrozny and the date of 3250 B.C. given by Marshall has been brought down to 2500 B.C. or 2300 B.C. and it has been stated without any justification, that civilization travelled from Mesopotamia to Indus. The use of cotton for textiles was well-known in India, but was not known in Mesopotamia and the rest of the world till two or three thousand years later. (Marshall, Preface VI). The citizens of Mohenjo Daro had well built baths and lived in commodious brick, built houses, when the citizens in Mesopotamia lived in insignificant dwellings of mud (*Ibid*). Besides the baths and well-built houses the people had wells in almost every house and an elaborate system of drainage from which it is clear that the towns people in Indus Valley enjoyed a degree of comfort and luxury unexampled in other parts of the then civilized world. "Indian domestic architecture was far ahead of other countries" (Marshall, p 106). There is no granary in the preclassical world comparable to the examples from the two Indian cities. (Wheeler, p 24). It seems that many tangible items of civilization travelled from the Indus to Mesopotamia but there is no proof that any such item came from Mesopotamia to India. It cannot, therefore, be that civilization travelled from Mesopotamia to India.

It is well known that in Mohenjo Daro many seals have been found with writings in the Indus script. I have shown above the date of the Mohenjo Daro civilization should be taken as 4000 B.C. It follows that in 4000 B.C. the art of writing had been invented in India.

At present the earliest date of writing in the world is taken to be 3200 B.C. among Phoenicians. If, as shown above, the art of writing was known in Mohenjo Daro in 4000 B.C. it follows that writing was known in Mohenjo Daro earlier than in Phoenicia. Writing was

probably introduced in Phoenicia from India. When so many items of civilization, e.g., building, town planning, cotton goods, went from Indus to Mesopotamia, writing also might have gone from India to Phoenicia. Dr. A. C. Das in his *Rig Vedic India* states that the Phoenicians were probably the descendants of the Panis who are referred to in the Vedas. The Panis were apparently a maritime people who sailed in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea and established colonies in Mesopotamia. It is possible that the art of writing was introduced by them from India to Asia Minor.

INDIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Lake Success and After (1946-1956)

PROF. S B MOOKERJI, M.A.

Head of the Department of History, Khalsa College, Amritsar

“Discord was not lacking in South Africa before the finding of gold and diamonds there, but the discovery of such riches has multiplied the friction and vastly complicated the country's problems. Had the new wealth been controlled and exploited for the improvement of the living standards, education and the betterment of all sections of the people, it might have lessened the discord. And if also there could have been a spiritual perception of basic human justice, and a full use of love and human understanding, South Africa might to-day be leading the world in the glory of a multi-racial Christian Society.”—Rev John Nevin Sayne in *The Modern Review* (Calcutta), January, 1953.

“Our policy is that the Europeans must stand their ground and must remain ‘baas’ (master) in South Africa. If we reject the *Herrenvolk* idea and the principle that the white man cannot remain ‘baas’, if the franchise is to be extended to the non-Europeans, and if the non-Europeans are given representation and the vote and the non-Europeans are developed on the same basis as the Europeans how can the Europeans remain Baasour view is that in every sphere the European must retain the right to rule the country and to keep it a white man's country”—J. G. Strijdom.

“No dilemma is more cruel than that faced to-day by the Union of South Africa. The situation is one of the most tragic, difficult and dangerous in the world, and the problems involved appear to be insoluble. Close to ten million black and brown people are denied the most elementary rights and privileges by a divided white minority. Put in crude terms the dilemma is triangular. (A) the white minority cannot kill off the black majority, even if it should wish to do so. (B) The black majority cannot drive the white minority into the sea. (C) Apartheid, which is the Nationalist formula for solution, cannot be made to work except at the risk of poisoning the entire nation. Result: South Africa is not only a country gripped by crisis, but one tormented by the most paralysing kind of fear”—John Gunther

“There are 180,000,000 black people living in Africa, nearly 9,000,000 in the Union (of South Africa). We dare not overlook their needs. You cannot shift Table Mountain. Somehow or other the black and white people have to find a way of living together on the continent. If not, it will be the story of India all over again. The whites will be the ones to go.”—Field-Marshal Smuts (in 1948).

The Government of India complained to the United Nations Organisation against the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act popularly known as the Ghetto Act passed by the South African Government in May, 1946. The General Assembly took India's complaint into consideration in its session of 1946 (October-December). The Indian case was presented by a delegation, which included Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (Leader), the Hon'ble Justice C. M. Chagla of Bombay High Court, Mr. Krishna Menon and Sir Maharaj Singh. A better and wiser selection of personnel could hardly have been made. The South African Indian Congress also sent a delegation of its own to help the Indian team. The delegation was composed of Messrs. A. I. Kajeo, A. Christopher, P. R. Pather and H. A. Naidoo. The South African Government delegation was led by Prime Minister Smuts himself. Mr. Heaton Nicholls, High Commissioner of South Africa in England, Senator D. G. Shepstone and Mr. Douglas Forsyth, Secretary for External Affairs, were the other members of the delegation.

The Government of India contended that the Union of South Africa had placed on the statute-book "certain discriminatory legislation against its Indian citizens, notably the Asiatic Land Tenure and (Indian) Representation Act of 1946. This segregated Indians both commercially and residentially." It violated, India pointed out, the (United Nations) charter's human rights provisions and the 1927, Cape Town Agreement between India and South Africa, which had defined the Status of South African Indians. (The Agreement had been renewed in 1932)

"A situation had therefore arisen, India maintained, which was likely to impair friendly relations between the two countries. It called on the Assembly to recommend 'that the Union Government revise its general policy as well as administrative measures affecting Asians in South Africa, to bring them into conformity with the principles and purposes of the charter' Further, the Assembly should request South Africa to report to the next session on the measures taken."¹

The Union Government, however, contended that the Cape Town Agreements of 1927 and 1932 were not "instruments giving rise to treaty obligations."²

The 1946 session of the General Assembly opened at Lake Success on October 23, 1946, with the eyes of all mankind "in their kindred desire for spiritual and economic freedom—for peace and pursuit of happiness—focused on its deliberations." The four hundred delegates to the session represented fifty-four different nations of the world, all of them members of the United Nations Organisation. Europe was represented by sixteen nations, North and Central America, by twelve, Asia and South America, each by ten, Africa, by four and Australasia, by two.

President Truman of the U.S.A. observed in course of his inaugural address, "The peoples of the world know that there can be no real peace

¹ Every Man's United Nations (Second Edition), p. 48.

² Vide *The position of Indians in South Africa* by Sirdar D. K. Sen, Chap. III for a refutation of the South African contention.

unless it is peace of justice for all—justice for small nations and for large nations and justice for individuals without distinction as to race, creed or colour—a peace that will advance, not retard, the attainment of four freedoms.

“We shall attain freedom from fear when every act of every nation, in its dealings with every other nation, brings closer to realisation the other freedoms—freedom of speech, freedom of religion and freedom from want. Along this path we can find justice for all, without distinction between the strong and the weak among nations and without discrimination among individuals”.

Noble sentiments eloquently expressed! But South Africa struck a discordant note when the Indian complaint was taken up. It challenged the authority of the United Nations to interfere in its (South Africa's) dispute with the Government of India. It was asserted that the question of the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa was out and out a domestic problem of the Union in the light of Clause 7, Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.³ The Union “took the view that a state was not subject to outside control or interference in its domestic affairs. The legislation referred to, it said, concerned matters within its domestic jurisdiction, and did not fall within the competence of the Assembly. South Africa denied that the Cape Town Agreement was an instrument giving rise to treaty obligations. Nor, it added, had the Union Government violated any fundamental human rights within the terms of the charter. As no internationally recognised formulation of such rights yet existed, and as the charter did not define them, Member States did not have any specific obligations, in this respect, under the charter”.⁴ Field-Marshal Smuts observed that the “Provisions of Article 2, therefore give expression, in the form of a fundamental principle governing the whole charter, to the recognised general rule of international law that, as a necessary corollary of its political independence, every State has the right to live its own life in its own way, so long as it does not infringe the equal right of other States to do the same, and has jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial supremacy. Within the dominions of its domestic affairs a State is as a general rule of international law and also according to the principles laid down in the Charter, not subject to control and interference, and its action may not be called in question, by any other State”.⁵

It should be noted in this connection that under the Charter “it is one of the basic obligations of the United Nations to promote the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms”. The Charter “expressly requires the General Assembly to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purposes of implementing this obligation”. It is thus

³ “Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or which require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of matters under Chapter VII.”

⁴ Every Man's United Nations (Second Edition), p. 48.

⁵ For a detailed analysis and refutation of the contention *vide*. The Position of Indians in South Africa, Chap. V, by Sirdar D. K. Sen.

evident that the question of human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot be within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of any State. Last but not least, the General Assembly has the authority to decide any issue relating to the interpretation of any Article of the Charter.

Mrs. Pandit opened the Indian case. She told the Assembly that India did not aspire after domination over others—"We seek no dominion over others—we claim no privileged position over other peoples, but we do claim equal and honourable treatment to our people wherever they may go, and we cannot accept any discrimination against them."

She declared in the name of the non-European peoples of the world, who looked to the United Nations for the prevention of racial strife and for the implementation of the principles of civilized life embodied in the Charter of the United Nations—"We have brought before the Assembly the treatment of Indians in South Africa. The way this Assembly treats and disposes of this issue is open to the gaze, not of those who are gathered here, but of millions in the world—progressive people in all countries more particularly non-European peoples—who are the overwhelming sections of the human race.

"The issues we have brought before you is by no means a narrow and a local one nor can we accept any contention that a gross and a continuing outrage of this kind against the fundamental principles of the Charter can be claimed by any one, least of all by a member state, to be a matter of no concern to this Assembly.

"Bitter memories of racial doctrines are still fresh in the minds of all of us. Their evil and tragic consequences are part of the problems with which we are called on to deal

"India firmly believes that imperialism, political, economic or social, in whatever part of the world it may be established and perpetuated, is totally inconsistent with the objects and purposes of the United Nations and its Charter."

Mrs. Pandit clarified India's stand in course of an exclusive interview to the Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) correspondent on October 29—"It (the Indian question) is a question of domination of white over black. The coloured man is on the march and will not tolerate the domination by the whites because of the colour of his skin. It is, therefore, a fundamental human issue, and it must go before the bar of world opinion. No one individual, however great, should deal with it.

"India stands for complete equality among the peoples of the world and between the nations of the world, and, as such, India will take up the cause of any nation or people whose fundamental human rights are denied".

Field-Marshal Smuts preferred not to exercise his right of reply in the opening session of the Assembly. He opened his barrage in the steering Committee on November 1. South African propaganda had not remained idle in the meanwhile. Two booklets—Indians in South Africa and South-West Africa, and the Union of South Africa—had been widely distributed among the members of various delegations. They sought to explain facts from the South African point of view and were not altogether

ineffective. Some delegations began to think seriously whether or not the Indian problem came within the domestic jurisdiction of a Sovereign State that the Union of South Africa is. The question was viewed from different angles. Some interpreted India's complaint in terms of the question of national minorities, including Negroes in America. Some felt uneasy over the strained relations and the conflict between India and South Africa. Others again expressed the opinion that the dispute in question should be settled amicably. An amicable settlement was, however, out of the question as South Africa was wholly unrepentant and would by no means withdraw the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian representation Act, 1946 (the Ghetto Act).

Field-Marshal Smuts moved in the Steering Committee that the Government of India's complaint be deleted from the agenda as the question of Indians in South Africa was a domestic matter of South Africa. Mr. Vyshinsky (U.S.S.R.) argued that the Indian question was not an internal question of South Africa and represented in fact a breach of agreements between two governments. The Soviet delegation felt that the problem was definitely within the scope of the United Nations and that the Government of India's complaint should remain on the agenda. To make a long story short, the objection of Field-Marshal Smuts was brushed aside and the Steering Committee resolved to refer the Indian question in South Africa to the Joint Political and Legal Committee of the General Assembly.

Mrs. Pandit pointed out during the debate in the Joint Political and Legal Committee that the Indian question in South Africa was an issue very directly affecting the existence of the United Nations Organisation and the peace of the world as a whole. She said that the Ghetto Act had impaired friendly relations between two members of the United Nations and that it was an infringement of the basic principles of the Charter. Experience shows, she contended, that every concession to the prejudices of South Africa's European community had led to fresh demands for racial discrimination. The issue was, in her opinion, a political, not a legal, one. It was not an issue between two countries only. It was rather a world issue. The dispute, racial in nature, that it was, its repercussions would not remain confined within the geographical limits of India and the Union of South Africa. Mrs. Pandit made it clear that her Government did not deny that the Indians in South Africa were Union Nationals. But the Government of India felt at the same time that they had a moral obligation to these Indians whose ancestors had been sent to a remote land on the clear understanding that they and their descendants would enjoy equality of rights and opportunities with all other citizens of their land of adoption. The Government of India regarded segregation as the denial of an elementary human right—the right of an individual to own and occupy properly within his means and according to his inclinations.

Field-Marshal Smuts contended in his reply that India's complaint raised two issues: one, of the facts of the case, and the other, of the legal position of the United Nations Organisation. He said that he was in a position to prove conclusively that the position of Indians in South

Africa did not call for any action on the part of the United Nations. The Ghetto Act had to be passed to prevent frictions and clashes between Europeans and Indians in South Africa. The South African Indian question, the Field-Marshal continued, would never have assumed the importance that it had done, nor would it have ever, reached the United Nations, but for its exploitation by India as a political weapon. He categorically denied the charge of his country or Government having ever violated any human right and added that the United Nations had no authority to intervene in the internal affairs of its member states. He sounded a note of warning that once such interference took place, many a member-state might find its position in the Organisation intolerable and impossible. He urged further that in the interest of the organisation serious consideration should be given to the advisability of referring Clause 7 of Article 2 of the Charter to the International Court of Justice for authoritative interpretation. The Field-Marshal, however, had no objection to the discussion of India's complaint, if the United Nations' right to intervene in the dispute in question was not admitted.

Ukraine, China, White Russia and Egypt took part in the deliberations that followed. They all held that South Africa had violated the principles underlying the United Nations Charter, that the Ghetto Act discriminated against all peoples of Asia and that the matter under reference was not therefore a purely domestic affair of South Africa and "had become a sort of sore in the body politic of the family of nations". South Africa, however, was supported by Britain, Canada and the United States of America. Poland and France, on the other hand, opposed her.

During the final debate in the Joint Legal and Political Committee on December 2, Mrs. Pandit withdrew the original Indian motion, which read—"That the treatment of Indians in the Union (of South Africa) should be in conformity with the international obligations under the agreements concluded between the two governments and the relevant provisions of the Charter." She voted for an alternative proposal sponsored by France and Mexico, which ran as follows—"The General Assembly, having taken note of the application made by the Government of India regarding the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa, and having considered the matter first, states that, owing to that treatment, friendly relations are likely to be further impaired; second, is of the opinion that the treatment of Indians in the Union should be in conformity with the international obligations under the agreements concluded between the two Governments and the relevant provisions of the Charter; third, therefore requests the two Governments to report at the next session of the General Assembly the measures adopted to this effect." The proposal was passed by 24 votes to 19, with 6 abstentions. The General Assembly accepted the proposal by the necessary two-thirds majority in its meeting on December 8. 32 voted for the proposal. 15 voted against it. 7 abstained. An amendment to the French-Mexican proposal moved by Field-Marshal Smuts to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice for a legal and factual investigation into the question had been thrown out by the General Assembly on December 7. The voting on the amendment had been 21 for and 31 against. Two had abstained from voting.

An analysis of the voting on the French-Mexican proposal in the General Assembly shows that 9 European, 9 Asian, 3 African, 7 North and Central American and 4 South American countries supported the proposal; whereas 1 African, 5 North and Central American, 3 South American and 1 Australasian countries opposed it. 2 European, 1 Asian, 3 South American and 1 Australasian countries remained neutral.

As requested by the General Assembly, the Government of India submitted to the Assembly on September 2, 1947, a report on the developments in Indo-South African relations since December 8, 1946 (*i.e.*, the day the Assembly had given its verdict on India's complaint against South Africa). The Government of India stated in their report that they had approached the Union Government for the implementation of December 8 resolution. Prime Minister Nehru's personal letter to the Union Prime Minister, Field-Marshal Smuts, under date April 24, 1947, had expressed the Government of India's readiness to enter into any discussion initiated by the Union Government assuring him (F.-M. Smuts) of the co-operation of the Government of India. A later communication had further assured that the Government of India were willing to send their High Commissioner back to South Africa, if the General Assembly resolution of December 8, 1946, were accepted as the basis of discussion between the two Governments. The Union had, however, disagreed. No agreement on a common basis of discussion could be reached in consequence.

India's draft resolution in the 1947 session of the General Assembly, which called upon the Governments of India and South Africa to meet at a round table conference on the basis of Assembly's 1946 (December 8) resolution and to invite the Government of Pakistan to participate in the discussions failed to receive a two-thirds majority in the Assembly.

In February, 1948, the Steering Committee of the United Nations rejected a South African suggestion to delete the Indian complaint from the agenda.

India made a fresh representation to the United Nations in 1949 against the continued ill treatment of Indians in South Africa, the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act, 1946, and the amendment thereof by the Malan Government,* which had imposed fresh disabilities on South African citizens of Indian origin. The amendment had altogether prohibited Asians from occupying new land or premises though occupation for the exclusive purpose of business or trade was permissible under the original Act. The amendment had thus imposed territorial segregation for the first time in the sectors of trade and business.

In May, 1949, the Political Committee of the General Assembly rejected by 33 votes to 5 with 12 abstentions a South African proposal that the subject of India's complaint was a matter of essential domestic concern of the Union of South Africa. The General Assembly on the other hand, adopted a French-Mexican proposal that India, Pakistan and South Africa be instructed to meet in a conference to find a solution, "taking into

* In the general election of May, 1948, the United Party of Field-Marshal Smuts was defeated by the National Party headed by Dr. D. F. Malan and the latter replaced the former as the Prime Minister of South Africa.

consideration the principles of the Charter and Declaration of Human Rights" (adopted by the United Nations in December, 1948). South Africa alone voted against the proposal while 47 voted for it. There were ten abstentions.

The Government of India, therefore, enquired of the Government of South Africa on July 4, 1949, if the latter would agree to a round table conference as provided for in the above resolution and, if they agreed, when the conference was to be held and where. The Union Government replied that they were "not averse in general to a discussion of the Indian question in South Africa" subject to certain reservations.⁷

The reservations "coupled with the various amendments to the Asiatic Land Tenure (and Indian Representation) Act imposing further racial segregation" restricted the scope and diminished the usefulness of the discussions considerably. The Government of India nevertheless agreed to the exploratory talks in South Africa suggested by the Union Government. The latter were assured at the same time that the Government of India recognised "that India can no more interfere in the domestic affairs of South Africa than the Union Government can in the affairs of India." The Government of India, however, requested the Union Government "to look upon the problem as concerning both the Governments of India and South Africa." It was pointed out at the same time that the Indian problem in South Africa was one of international significance "because of its racial implications." The Union Government wrote in their reply that their "basically unalterable approach" had already been explained. They suggested that the discussions would have a better chance of success if the economic sanctions against the Union of South Africa were 'Voluntarily withdrawn'.

While these negotiations were going on, the Government of South Africa enacted fresh anti-Indian laws and strictly enforced old ones. The condition of Indians in South Africa, which the Government of India sought to improve, deteriorated in consequence. The Government of India agreed nevertheless to have a joint preliminary discussion on the Indian problem in South Africa.

The preliminary talks took place at Cape Town from February 6 to February 11, 1950. India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa participated in the talks. Mr. Donges, the Union Minister of the Interior, who led the South African delegation, claimed at the outset that the discussions were not in pursuance of the December 8, 1946 resolution of the General Assembly. They were possible, he held, "by the goodwill established during personal contacts between Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. Malan in London." All that South Africa expected from the Conference was, he

⁷ "The South African Government claimed that it had consistently contended that 'the so-called Indian question in South Africa is entirely a domestic matter'. It also desired to be assured that there existed reasonable prospect for a solution satisfactory to South Africa. Otherwise it would construe the proposed discussion as 'interference in the domestic affairs of an independent country.'..... Also, the South African Government recommend 'a sound realistic approach' as opposed to an 'exaggerated emphasis' on the Declaration of Human Rights and 'abstract and often impracticable principles and ideals'. It was also suggested that preparatory talks could be held in South Africa if sufficient common ground was found among the parties"—Apartheid: Strategy of race discrimination, (Government of India Publication), p. 10.

went on, "a solution satisfactory to South Africa herself with the co-operation of an outside Government or Governments". The earlier conferences at Cape Town in 1927 and 1932 had, in his opinion, one and only one objective—the reduction of the Indian population in South Africa.

Pandit Hriday Nath Kunzru, the leader of the Indian delegation, did not, however, accept the contention of Dr. Donges. He said in his reply that his Government had agreed to discuss the Indian problem with South Africa only because the United Nations had called upon the parties concerned—India, Pakistan and South Africa—to settle their differences at a round table conference. The preliminary conference, he observed was not the outcome of negotiations between the Indian and the South African Premiers. Nor were the Cape Town Conferences of 1927 and 1932, he added, "circumscribed by the limited purpose of reducing Indian population in South Africa". India, Pandit Kunzru went on, would insist on a full discussion of the disabilities of Indians in the Union of South Africa. India and Pakistan on the one hand and the Union of South Africa, on the other, suggested two different formulas for the agenda. A common formula incorporating all the items suggested by the parties was agreed upon in the end. A round table conference to "explore all possible ways and means of settling the Indian question in the Union of South Africa" was to be convened.

It may be noted in passing that the South African contention that the proposed round table conference was not the result of the United Nations resolution admits of one and only one interpretation—"the Union Government did not look upon the round table conference as an obligation arising out of the resolution passed by the General Assembly."

Information reached the Government of India in March, 1950, that Dr. Mulan's Government "were tightening up the enforcement of the Asiatic Land Tenure Amendment Act, 1949, and were also vigorously enforcing segregation in other ways by executive measures. It was also reported that the Union Government intended to introduce further legislation which would add to the disabilities of Indians in the Union of South Africa. In an *aide memoire* presented to the Union Government, the Government of India expressed the hope that pending a Round Table Conference, nothing would be done to vitiate the atmosphere and jeopardize the success of the Conference. Towards the end of April (1950), the Union Government published the Group Areas Bill.....In their telegram of 29th April, the Government of India requested the Union Government to postpone the Group Areas Bill and in the meantime expedite the holding of the Round Table Conference. The Union Government did not agree to the request of the Government of India in regard to the Group Areas Bill and as regards the Round Table Conference they stated that they could not attend any such Conference if it was to be held before 15th September, 1950, at the earliest. In effect, therefore, after the Group Areas Bill is passed into Law the only subject that the Round Table Conference could discuss would be the reduction of Indian population in South Africa--which was proposed by the Union Government during the preliminary talks

in February, 1950." The Government of India, therefore, informed the Union Government in June that no useful purpose would be served by the proposed Round Table Conference. The Conference in fact was not worth holding under the circumstances.

The treatment of Indians in South Africa was again discussed by the 1950 session of the General Assembly. The Assembly adopted the following resolution—

".....considering that a policy of 'Racial Segregation' (apartheid) is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination, the General Assembly

(1) recommends that the Governments of India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa proceed, in accordance with resolution 265 (8), with the holding of a Round Table Conference on the basis of their agreed agenda and bearing in mind the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(2) recommends that in the event of the failure of the Governments concerned to hold a Round Table Conference before 1st April, 1951, or to reach agreement in the Round Table Conference within a reasonable time, there shall be established for the purpose of assisting the parties in carrying through appropriate negotiations a commission of three members, one to be nominated by the Government of the Union of South Africa, another to be nominated by the other two or in default of agreement between these two in a reasonable time by the Secretary-General of the United Nations;

(3) calls upon the Governments concerned to refrain from taking any steps which would prejudice the success of their negotiations, in particular, the implementation or enforcement of the provisions of "The Group Areas Act"; pending the conclusion of such negotiations;

(4) decides to include this item in the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly."

South Africa, however, was defiant and refused to listen to counsels of wisdom and moderation.

In December, 1954, India proposed a Conference with South Africa. Prime Minister Nehru, while making the proposal, made no commitments whatever—'certainly not to refrain from public criticism' of the policy of the Union Government. The latter accepted the proposal for a Conference. But they did not promise to 'ease apartheid measures'. Nor did they ease them. The negotiations were subsequently broken off by them on the specious plea that they (the negotiations) were 'deliberately wrecked by the Prime Minister of India: (Cf. while telegrams were passing between the Governments concerned, the Prime Minister of India, in two public speeches, made violent and unsavoury attacks on the Government of the Union of South Africa.)"—Letter of the Union Government).

The Union Government have stubbornly refused to co-operate with the commission appointed by the United Nations to enquire into the racial situation in South Africa. The commission composed of Dr. Herman

Santa Cruz of Chile (Chairman), Mr. Dantes Bellagarde of Haiti and M. Lagier of France.

Important events have taken place in the Union of South Africa in the meanwhile, the 1948 general election being one of them. Field-Marshal Smuts and his United Party were thrown out of office. The Field-Marshal himself was unseated.¹⁰ The National Party of Dr. D. F. Malan defeated the United Party as well as the South African Labour Party led by Mr. John Christie. Dr. Malan became Prime Minister (May, 1948).

The election manifesto of the National Party left no doubts in any body's mind as to the shape of things to come. It stated in unambiguous terms that the Party would pursue a policy of separation of the races—a policy based on the "Christian principles of justice and reasonableness (!)." The Devil to quote scriptures! The Party undertook "to protect the white race properly and effectively against any policy, doctrine or attack which might undermine or threaten its continued existence." The manifesto was unequivocal and emphatic on the Indian question—

"The Party accepts as a basis of its policy the repatriation of as many Indians as possible and proposes a proper investigation into the practicability of such a policy on a large scale in co-operation with India and other countries. In view of the seriousness of the problem, South Africa must be willing to make great financial sacrifices for the achievement of the aim.

"No Indian immigrant will be allowed to enter the country.

So long as there are still Indians in the country a definite policy of separation (apartheid) will be applied as far as possible between the Europeans and Indians in every sphere as well as between Indians and other indigenous non-European groups.

"The Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of 1946, will immediately be revised and:

(a) No representation will be given to Indians in the Legislative bodies of the country.

(b) Indians will be established in separate areas and will not be allowed to reside or own fixed property in the European areas.

(c) Europeans will not be allowed to reside or to trade or to own fixed property in Indian areas.

(d) So far as possible the policy of separation (apartheid) will be applied with regard to the Indians and indigenous races.

(e) Proper compensation will be paid for properties which are expropriated in the European or Indian areas

(f) Facilities for trading outside their own areas and especially in European areas will be drastically curtailed.

(g) Indian traders in Native areas or locations will gradually disappear. This right must be safeguarded for the Natives themselves.

(h) The inter-provincial movement of Indians must be effectively

¹⁰ He failed to get himself elected from Standerton, a constituency held by him for 24 years. He was defeated by a Nationalist rival Mr. W. C. du Plessis by a margin of 1000 votes.

prevented. The protection which the Free State¹¹ enjoys must be maintained.

"The Cape Province must be properly protected against penetration by Indians, especially in regard to ownership of fixed property and trade. Family allowances for Indians must be abolished.

"The Party will take drastic action against Indians who incite the non-European races against the Europeans"

Voted to power, the Nationalists proceeded straightway to implement the policy outlined above. Dr. Malan took the nation into confidence and outlined the policy and programme of his Government in a nation-wide broadcast over the South African Radio. His speech made the following points, among others,—

(a) A distinctive South African nation being already a reality, the Nationalist Government will inaugurate a policy of "South Africa First" and will encourage the consciousness of nationhood and sentiment of national pride.

(b) External interference—even from the United Nations—in the internal affairs of the country will not be tolerated. The Government will not allow any country or power or organisation to become the arbiter of the destiny of South Africa and the South Africans.

(c) To prevent the danger of interference in the domestic matters of the Union, which has become a possibility through the accession of Asian members to the British Commonwealth, the Nationalist Government "would desire separate contacts between individual members rather than through discussion at joint and inclusive conferences"¹²

(d) The Nationalist Government will make an all-out effort to achieve apartheid.

The term 'apartheid', which we have used more than once, needs explanation, pronounced as '*apart-ate*', the word is of Dutch origin and means literally separateness or a state of separation. The exponents of apartheid are of opinion that racial antagonism runs so high in South Africa that if it is not tackled with firmness and promptitude, it will defy all attempts at solution later on. They contend further that there can be peace in the Union only if the Europeans, the Africans and the coloured races live in mutual isolation. Such isolation is to be achieved by apartheid which seeks to divide South Africa into a number of watertight racial compartments. "There are several gradations of meaning within the word, which embodies the fundamental concept of the National Party and most of the Afrikaner community,¹³ namely racial segregation. Colour bar in a restaurant, or a sign on a park-bench, 'For Europeans Only' are examples of simple apartheid. There can be apartheid in schools, industry, recreation and so on. The Nationalist Zealots stand for complete geographical apartheid, which would mean splitting South Africa into two separate entities, a

(¹¹) The Orange Free State.

¹² The struggle for Equality by P. S. Joshi, p. 217

¹³ Speaking broadly, Afrikaner means any South African of non British descent, whose principal language is Afrikaans, a local language derived from Dutch. Most Afrikaners are of Dutch, Flemish, French Huguenot or German stock.

'Bantustan' for the blacks and the rest of the country for the whites. Such would be the culmination of the apartheid ideal".¹⁴

Dr. A. B. Xuma, the well-known African leader of South Africa points out that apartheid is based on fear and is a device for deliberately creating and perpetuating fear. To maintain the *status quo* in South Africa, the Nationalists must hate and "fear is a good mechanism for inducing hate". In Dr. Xuma's own words, "If any contact between the racers was to be allowed, too many white people would discover that *we* are human beings". He holds the Boer-Wars responsible for apartheid and is of the opinion that the 'more inflamed Afrikaners' want to put the Africans 'in their place'; because they 'think that the British pampered(!) them' (the Africans) and they "seek to reverse all the processes of history".

The Malan Government announced that the colonial and the African Sections of the population would be completely separated from each other, that there would be apartheid on railways, that the Native Military Corps would be disbanded and that the Coloured and the Africans would not be allowed to carry weapons. South Africa even objected to the inclusion of Maoris in the New Zealand Rugby team which was to tour the Union in 1949. The Union Parliament passed Dr. Malan's Asiatic Law Amendment Bill in September, 1949. It deprived the Indians of the limited communal franchise granted to them by the Ghetto Act. Dr. A. J. Stals, Minister of Social Welfare, announced at the same time the withdrawal of family allowances for Indians.

The Group Areas Act passed on July 7, 1950, with the majority or a single vote lays down that all land in the Union of South Africa will be divided and controlled by the Government for purposes of ownership and occupation by different racial groups. The entire population of the Union has been divided for this purpose into three principal categories, viz, white, Native and Coloured. The last, which includes Indians, has been further sub-divided. The Act empowers the Government to establish by proclamation Group Areas for the exclusive ownership or occupation or both of any of the above categories. Disqualified persons and companies¹⁵ are debarred from acquiring fresh land in any Group Area not meant for them. If a disqualified company has any property in a Group Area at the commencement of notification, it shall surrender its ownership of such property after ten years. The Minister of the Interior shall 'sell such property compulsorily' after the expiry of the ten-year period. The property in a Group Area held at the commencement of the proclamation by a disqualified individual shall, after his death, have to be sold to a member of the group for which the area is reserved. No disqualified person can occupy land or premises in a Group Area without a permit after one year of notification with the exception of such persons as servants, guests and the like. Areas other than Group Areas and native locations will be 'controlled' in which no transfer of occupation and ownership between members of different racial groups will be permitted except under the

¹⁴ Inside Africa by John Gunther, p. 446. (See also pp. 525-26).

¹⁵ Persons and companies in a Group Area meant for those belonging to a different racial group are regarded as disqualified persons and companies. An Indian individual or company is thus 'disqualified' in White or Native Group Area.

authority of a permit. The Act does not differentiate between occupation for residence and occupation for trade. Trade licences are to be issued or renewed only on proof that an applicant can lawfully occupy the premises in the area where the trade is to be carried on.

The sponsors and the champions of the Group Areas Act contend, that it is equally applicable to all communities without discrimination. But the record of white South Africa—the record is not so *white* after all—so far as its policy to the non-whites is concerned, has justly created a widespread suspicion that on the plea of “progress along parallel lines” the Group Areas Act will condemn the non-European population of the Union of South Africa to live in inferior and neglected areas. Latest developments have made the suspicion a conviction. The Indians have been hit hard—indeed, much harder than the other non-European communities—by the Group Areas Act. All skilled professions have long been closed to them by earlier legislation and they have been forced to fall back almost wholly upon trade and commerce. Indian businessmen have flourishing business—retail and wholesale—in the commercial districts of Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town. It is almost certain that these districts will be declared white Group Areas. Some have already been so declared.¹⁶ Indian business houses have to close down and sell their properties in these districts sooner or later. Their employees will be thrown out of employment. After eviction, the Indians will have to move into Group Areas reserved for them or into ‘Controlled’ areas. Indian Group Areas will be far away from the areas now occupied by them and from those occupied by other races. Indian trade will be confined in consequence to the Indian group. But no community can live by trade among its own members alone. Prospects in ‘Controlled’ areas are hardly

¹⁶ The P. T. I. Correspondent at Johannesburg cabled on 7th November, 1955 “Another determined drive has been launched by the authorities to induce Johannesburg’s Indian community to leave their present homesteads and move to the special Indian township of Lenasia, 22 miles away.

“Lenasia, open only to Indians, has been set up in accordance with regulations under the South African Group Areas Act.

“The new move has come in the form of extensive advertisements in local newspapers offering loans to the extent of 90 per cent. of cost to individual members of the Indian community to build their own houses with immediate transfer of free hold title. The loans, repayable in 30 years, carry 4½% interest.

* * * * *

“The Transvaal Indian Congress has, however, refused to be drawn in by this offer and continues to oppose both the Lenasia housing scheme, where very few plots have been sold, and official efforts to move the Indians, alternatively, to an evacuated army camp at Lenz, 19 miles outside the city.

“The Congress has warned Indians that once they were established in Lenasia they would have no means of earning their livelihood as they would not be able to trade in European areas or carry on any business outside their own areas.

“Moreover, the Congress has pointed out, being debarred by racial legislation from becoming skilled workers, the only alternative for these Indians would be to get jobs as unskilled or semi-skilled workers.

“A High School has already been established at Lenasia, and children who were attending an Indian school in Johannesburg were turned out and told to attend the Lenasia School. But their parents resisted the move by raising funds to start an independent school in the centre of Johannesburg.

* * * * *

“The school was among a number of institutions raided during the recent ‘treason’ raids in South Africa. The teachers’ residences were also subjected to searches.”

better. The Group Areas Act is therefore regarded—not unreasonably—as a shrewd device to get rid of the Indian population of the Union of South Africa. The Nationalist Election Manifesto of 1948 makes the above interpretation unassailable. The Manifesto said, *inter alia*,—"The (National) Party holds the view that the Indians are a foreign and out-landish element which is unassimilable. They can never become part of the country and must, therefore, be treated as an immigrant community. The Party accepts as a basis of its policy the repatriation of as many Indians as possible".

The fate of the Tomlinson Report¹⁷ on Bantu Reserves in South Africa shows how insincere the Nationalist talk of "progress along parallel lines" is. The Report, in the opinion of many, it may be noted in passing, is perhaps the most important document ever published on the subject of apartheid.

Coloured and African leaders too have called the Nationalist bluff and exposed the insincerity of all talks of "Peaceful progress along parallel lines". Mr. J. G. Golding, a moderate coloured leader, describes apartheid as a counsel of despair, as a vicious, bankrupt and dishonest policy. The Coloured Advisory Council declared sometime back that apartheid, far from fostering fruitful harmony and co-operation, would lead to discontent, hatred and disaster. Mr E. M. Gordon, an ex-president of the African People's Organisation, is more outspoken.

"To us in the A.P.O.", says Mr. Gordon, "apartheid could never mean anything else but segregation—segregation in the form of housing schemes with their poky little houses with cement floors and in some cases built in cement tables, inferior health facilities, lack of proper sanitation, one water tap for hundreds of families, darkness, squalor and neglect, discriminatory laws, curfew and disfranchisement".

The Union of South Africa has sought to enforce apartheid in recent years by passing a number of laws. The Group Areas Act, 1950, amended in 1952, formalized the concept of apartheid the prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, 1949, forbids marriages between Europeans and non-Europeans. Any such marriage is invalid in the eye of South Africa law. Officiating at such marriages is an offence punishable with fines. The Immorality Amendment Act, 1950, goes farther and makes illegal any sexual relationship between Europeans and 'any variety of non-whites', i.e.

¹⁷ Shortly after the passing of the Group Areas Act in 1950, Dr. Malan's Government appointed a commission under the chairmanship of Prof. F. R. Tomlinson of Pretoria University. The Commission was to enquire into the "Socio-economic development of the (Native) Reserves" and to suggest how the "over-crowded, over-stocked and much eroded" Reserves could be rehabilitated and developed into a Bantu national home". After a laborious and thorough-going enquiry, the Commission submitted its report in March, 1956. It supported the policy of apartheid and recommended the conversion of the Reserves into a "Bantu national home".

The Government, however, rejected some of the most vital recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission, the most important being the Commission's plea for the development of the Bantu Reserves, which envisaged an expenditure 104 million pounds over a period of ten years. The Commission's recommendation that private European capital should be allowed to assist the creation of new African industries in the Reserves was also rejected. The Government declare that as the rate of development in the different fields of activity could not be determined in advance with any degree of certainty, they did not deem it advisable to fix the amounts needed for the various projects recommended.

Coloured, Indian and Native. "These two Acts", points out Gunther, "embody legislation unparalleled in the world except by the Nuremberg Laws of Nazi Germany"¹⁸ Extra-marital relations were formerly banned only between Europeans and Africans. The scope of the prohibition has been now expanded and to-day it is a serious offence for a European—even for a sailor off his ship calling in Cape Town—to have sexual intercourse with a non-European. Prostitution along colour line is tabooed. There is, however, no legal bar to promiscuity among Indians, Africans and Coloureds. The Immorality Amendment Act, 1950, aims at preserving the purity of European blood by "ramming all channels of contamination". One curious result of the Act is "that an extra-marital relation between two white people, no matter how flagrant, is perfectly legal, whereas a happy marriage between a white and a non-white is a crime".¹⁹

The Suppression of Communism Act, 1950, makes the Minister of Justice the sole authority to determine whether a particular individual is a Communist or not. Any one 'named' a Communist is automatically debarred from holding any position in the Public Service or in any trade union. The Act empowers the Government to take action not only against Communists, but against all who, in the opinion of the Government, encourage hostility between European and non-European races. The Act in fact seeks to suppress all just agitation by Indians and Africans for the redress of grievances. It authorises the Minister of Justice to declare communistic any organisation, journal, publication or person. He may also prohibit any assembly, restrict movements of persons and deport non-nationals under suspicion. The Population Registration Act, 1950, requires everyone over sixteen years of age to carry an identity card issued by the Government. The card describes the holder's person and mentions the ethnic group he or she belongs to. It must be produced for inspection on demand by authorised Police Officers. The Population Registration Act thus provides for the registration of the entire population into racial groups, "with people ticketed, photographed and identified according to race." This, together with the Mixed Marriages Act, aims at ensuring the racial purity of the Europeans. Mr. Shoeman, the Minister of Labour and Public Works, declared immediately after the formation of the Malan Government in June, 1948, that he would see that there were no mixed trade unions anywhere in the Union of South Africa and that Africans were no longer to be trained as artisans. Competition between Europeans and non-Europeans was to be eliminated in this manner. A directive issued a year later by the Prime Minister's Office ordered the replacement of Africans by Europeans in public services. Mr. J. H. Viljoen, Dr. Malan's Minister of Education, Arts and Science, declared later on that the Government would give no financial aid to the South African Association of Arts unless it enforced racial separation *at all times and in all places*. We have yet to know whether the Ukase applies to the visitors only or to the visitors as well as the exhibits. We do not know if a European painter can have an African model and *vice*

¹⁸ *Inside Africa*, p. 473.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

versa. Nor have we any information where portraits of Africans by European artists and those of Europeans by their African counterparts may be exhibited. Can they be exhibited at all?

It may be mentioned in this connection at the cost of a little digression—wholly irrelevant, however—that the Bantu Education Act, 1958, gives the Government complete control of African education. Schools run by various Christian Missions “will have to fall in line with government ‘inspanning’” or they must close down. The Separate Amenities Act, 1953, gives legal sanction to the existing segregation patterns in public transports, public places and so on. The Public Safety Act of the same year has vested the Government with extraordinary powers. They can, under the Act, declare a state of emergency and make laws by proclamation, if necessary. The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1953, fixes the penalties for protesting against the racial laws or for inciting others to do so. It is a crime under this Act “to support.....any campaign for the repeal or the modification of *any* law”. The Industrial Conciliation Act, 1954, gives extensive powers to the Minister of Labour and Public Works “to determine at his own discretion what occupations the members of any race may engage in”.²⁰ In other words, the industrial colour bar may be made absolute by virtue of powers given to the Minister of Labour by this Act. The Industrial Conciliation Act, April, 1956, goes a step farther. It has actually introduced apartheid in the field of trade unionism by prohibiting the registration of any more racially mixed trade unions. It encourages European workers to break away from the existing mixed unions and form exclusively ‘white’ unions. It lays down at the same time that the existing racially mixed trade unions must have separate branches and separate meetings for the different racial groups within them and that the executives of mixed unions shall consist of Europeans only. In case more than 50% of the workers in any undertaking, trade or industry break away and form their own racially exclusive union, the newly formed union will be entitled to legal recognition and to a share of the Parent union’s funds. The Minister of Labour and Public Works may, under the Act, take steps to “safeguard the economic welfare of employees of any race.” He may reserve a work or categories of work for the workers of a certain race or races exclusively. The Act was hailed by the Treasury Benches in the Union Parliament as “introducing a new and specifically South African pattern in trade union movement”.²¹ A Labour Party spokesman retorted that the new pattern was fascist, and fascist undoubtedly it is. The Strijdom Government—Mr. Strijdom succeeded Dr. D. F. Malan in 1954—has succeeded in destroying the traditional rights of South African trade unions.

Two more recent Acts of the Union Government, though they do not affect the Indians, deserve more than a passing notice. They are the Separate Registration of Voters Act, 1951, and the High Court of Parliament Act, 1952. These, along with later Acts in the same field, are the outcome of the Government’s attempt to make the parliament a higher

²⁰ South Africa by Gwendolen Carter, Foreign Policy Association.

²¹ P.T.I. report from Cape Town under date, April 18, 1956.

constitutional authority than the Supreme Court. These Acts sought to remove some 48,000 Coloured Voters in the Cape from the common roll, a step, which would, in effect, disfranchise them.

The voting system in the Cape Province, it should be noted, is one of the two 'entrenched' clauses²² of the South Africa Act, 1909, the equality of the English and the Afrikans languages being the other. Dr. D. F. Malan, the Union Prime Minister (1948-1954), contended that the Statute of West Minister, 1931,²³ had suspended the South Africa Act. He had tried to remove voters of mixed parentage from the common roll by a simple majority. General Hertzog had removed the African Voters from the common roll. He had, however, followed the constitutional procedure, i.e., instead of having the removal approved by a simple majority, he had obtained the consent of a two-thirds majority of both Houses of the Union Parliament at a joint sitting. The Appellate Division of the Union Supreme Court declared Dr. Malan's action *ultra vires* of the constitution. They ruled that a simple majority does not, even in the changed circumstances created by the Statute of Westminster of 1931, override the South Africa Act of 1909. Nothing daunted, the irrepressible Doctor attempted to set up a High Court of Parliament and to invest it with the final authority in constitutional matters. The Judges declared that the step was illegal.

Mr. J. H. Strijdom, who stepped into the shoes of Dr. Malan in November, 1954, finally set the issue at rest by passing the Senate Act in 1955. The Act, however, has not gone unchallenged. It has been challenged thrice in the law courts by the United Party, which constitutes the Opposition in the South African Parliament. The Senate was enlarged. It had 48 members so long. The number was raised to 89. Nearly all the 41 new seats went to the Nationalists. The South African Amendment Act passed with the help of the enlarged Senate in February, 1956, removed the Coloured Voters from common electoral rolls to separate 'Segregation' lists giving them representation in the parliament through European members.

The Supreme Court was also packed. The number of Judges was raised from 6 to 11, "making full quorum necessary in constitution cases, majority opinion to prevail".²⁴ The full story of Mr. Strijdom's machinations to gerrymander his country's constitution by packing the Senate

²² The National Convention composed of representatives from Natal, the Transvaal, the Cape and the Orange Free State, which drew up the South African Union Constitution, were divided on two issues, namely, (1) the equality of the English and the Afrikans languages and (2) the preservation of the liberal franchise laws of the Cape Province, which did not discriminate in politics on grounds of colour. It was finally agreed that both the controversial issues could be *entrenched* in the South Africa Act in such a way that they could be altered only by a two-thirds majority of both Houses of the South African Parliament at a joint sitting. The South Africa Act, passed by the British Parliament in 1909, and brought into effect in 1910, *entrenches* the equality of the English and the Afrikans languages and the existing franchise laws of the Cape Province.

²³ The Statute established complete equality between Britain and the Dominions and reduced the British Empire (so far as the Dominions were concerned) to a "very loose alliance of equal states, bound together only by the formal link of the Crown and without any.....clearly defined mutual obligations..." - A Short History of the British Commonwealth (Seventh Edition), Book XII, Chapter VII, Section I, p. 862 by Ramsay Muir.

²⁴ The Statesman (Delhi and Calcutta), dated the 15th January, 1956.

and the Supreme Court is, as Gunther puts it, 'One of the weirdest in contemporary history'.²⁵

The 1948 Nationalist Election Manifesto stated, *inter alia*, that the admission of Africans to "European institutions together with European students must end". Needless to say, the Nationalists wanted to deny even the meagre educational facilities given so long to the non-Europeans. And they have been denied to all intents and purposes.

Of the nine universities in the Union of South Africa, only two—the University of the Witwatersrand and the University of Cape Town—are 'open'. In other words, these Universities admit students of all races. But in the latter, the Africans are not admitted to the Medical Faculty. A fixed number of non-whites other than Africans are, however, admitted to the Faculty every year. Natal University is "segregated into sections for whites and non-whites". Four of the universities do not admit non-white students. The Rhodes University does not normally admit non-whites. Fort Hare, an associate college of the Rhodes University, does not admit non-whites except in rare cases. The University of South Africa gives tuition by correspondence only.

Between 1948 and 1950, the Nationalist Government of Dr. Malan took steps to restrict the handful of non-white students at the 'open' universities. Such steps included the refusal of entry-permits to the South African Indian students to enter the Transvaal to study at Witwatersrand, stoppage of bursaries to African medical students and the like. The students have since been collecting money in South Africa and throughout the world through the African Medical Scholarships Trust Fund, which renders financial assistance to the African medical students of the Witwatersrand University.

The Government appointed the Holloway Commission in December, 1953, "to investigate and report on the practicability and financial implications of providing separate training facilities for non-Europeans at Universities". The Commission reported in February, 1955, and was of opinion that "apartheid was financially and practically unfeasible". The Government were not prepared to accept the findings of the Holloway Commission and the Minister of Education, Mr. J. H. Viljoen, announced in November, 1955, the appointment of an inter-departmental committee of inquiry "to re-examine the matter—specifically to consider the establishing of segregated tribal colleges for non-white groups—coloured (people of mixed race), Indians and two tribal groups of Africans". This proposal had been rejected by Holloway Commission as it would constitute in the Commission's opinion, a "material retrogression in regard to the University training of non-Europeans".

The Education Minister announced in the Senate in February, 1956, that the Government would soon introduce legislation to enforce apartheid at the 'open' universities. He had said at Pretoria on September 18, 1951, that "the Government agreed that it was desirable that the principle of apartheid should be observed in the Union's Universities, but could

²⁵ Inside Africa, p. 474.

not agree to introduce legislation to enforce it. Such legislation would be a violation of the traditional independence of South African Universities".

The report of the inter-departmental Committee was printing and was not available to the public at the time these lines were written (November 8, 1956). Clear indications were nevertheless available that universities must face legislation early in 1957; because Dr. Verwoerd, the South African Minister for Native Affairs, said in September (1956), "Where there is no segregation, as is the position at certain universities, it must be established or enforced". He had said once before in July (1956) that apartheid would be established at universities "*regardless of cost*". Mr. Viljoen, the Education Minister of Mr. Strijdom, told the Nationalist Party Congress at Pretoria in September (1956) that legislation to enforce apartheid would possibly be introduced in the January (1957) session of the South African Parliament.²⁶

The Government decided in 1949 that non-Europeans in the Union's permanent army should be non-combatants only. A number of first-class compartments in each train on South African Railways are reserved for the exclusive use of European passengers. Apartheid has been introduced at Johannesburg railway station from July 1, 1949, by providing separate entrances for European and non-European passengers. The central entrance is reserved for the former. The latter have to walk longer to reach the trains. The Union Minister of Posts and Telegraphs announced years ago that steps would be taken to separate Europeans and non-Europeans at Cape Town General Post Office and in forty other Post Offices in the Cape Province. In 1952, apartheid was actually in operation in 847 of the Union's 1,250 Post Offices. The number must be much higher to-day. The Transvaal National Party Congress in its session of September, 1950, recommended apartheid in telephone booths. It was "Scandalous", a resolution of the Congress said, to allow "Europeans and Kaffirs" to use the same telephones. Apartheid has been in force in Durban race course from February, 1950, and enclosures have been set apart for the exclusive use of Africans, Europeans and Indians.

Air-hostesses on South African air lines have been warned for not observing the colour bar properly. They have been ordered to do the same without fail. Linen head-rests used by African and Indian passengers must be removed immediately after use and sent for "hygienic processing or dry cleaning" instead of the normal laundering applied to articles used

²⁶ Open Letter from the President, of the Students' Representative Council, University of the Witwatersrand, Students' Representative Council, University of Cape Town and National Union of South African Students, dated October 31, 1956 (published in the "Statesman", Delhi and Calcutta, on November 4, 1956).

A P.T.I. despatch from Cape Town, dated 7th January, 1957, says that the Government will introduce legislation in the Union Parliament during its session which is to open in January (1957) "to enforce apartheid at all South African universities as soon as possible". Non-white students of "mixed" universities will be allowed to complete their courses, but a date will be fixed after which mixed universities will not be allowed to accept any new non-white student". The despatch adds -

"The Government plans to set up separate universities for Africans, Indians and Coloureds. Africans will be segregated into ethnic colleges".

"The Indian university will be located in Natal, while the university for Coloureds is likely to be set up in Western Cape Province" - The "Statesman" (Delhi and Calcutta), dated 9th January, 1957.

by European passengers. Immediately after a plane has landed and non-European passengers have left, a red tag must be put on all articles used by them. Air-hostesses must not issue linen towels for use in wash rooms. Special paper towels are to be used instead because of the risk of both European and non-European passengers using the same linen towels.

Admission of African students from territories outside the Union of South Africa to missionary schools, colleges and universities in the Union has been prohibited. Johannesburg City Council has approved the principle that entry into places of public recreation should be restricted on racial grounds. Johannesburg, it may be noted in passing, has separate transport facilities for Europeans and non-Europeans.

What has been said above does not pretend to be an exhaustive account of the disabilities—social, political and economic—of the non-European population, the Indian included, of the Union of South Africa. It does, nevertheless, give a more or less clear idea of the state of affairs in that part of the world. The Union of South Africa is, in fact, passing through “new barbarism”, which, in the words of ex-president Truman of the United States of America, originates in and flourishes on acts of men, “who conceive of other men as slaves, not as brothers”. It violates and suppresses human rights and freedom in various parts of the world to-day, the President’s own country being not an exception. It is, in other words, an example of “Man’s inhumanity to man”, which “Makes countless thousands mourn”.

The Nationalists condemn the most innocent criticism as subversive, “White themselves engaged in gerrymandering their own Senate, Courts and Constitution”. They have done their best to impede foreign contacts by an oppressive use of the State power over passports; indeed this and the pass laws seem to represent South African ideas of freedom of movement, just as the Bantu Education Act “caricatures freedom of information”. “The sacred trust of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter” to

²⁷ “Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognise the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

(a) to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

(b) to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;

(c) to further international peace and security;

(d) to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and

(e) to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for (information) purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than “trust territories—United Nations Charter, Chapter XI, Art. 73.

promote to the utmost.....the well-being of the inhabitants' of non-self-governing territories, has been implemented by incorporating a League mandate into a racial society, and loudly complaining that Britain has not also handed over Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland to its (the Union's) tender mercies".²⁸

The European rulers of South Africa know and know it well that the steam-roller of racialism and colour bar is welding together the disinherited humanity of the Union into a compact whole. Not content, therefore, with imposing disability after disability, heaping indignity after indignity upon the latter, they have started the game of *divide et impera*, which seeks to alienate the various non-European groups from one another. The Nationalists have tried and have been trying to do everything possible to set Africans against Indians. The harsh and discriminatory policy of the Union Government has made Africans utterly discontented. The African discontent, which has been steadily mounting over a long period, "has given rise to a feeling of hatred which does not necessarily vent itself against the actual perpetrators of evil".²⁹

The anti-Indian race-riots, which broke out at Durban on January 13, 1949, was a logical outcome of the racial policy of the Nationalist Government. The Commission appointed to enquire into the riots reported—

"The cumulative effects of emotion built up over a period of time caused by complaints and conditions, some real and some imaginary, fanned by propaganda culminated in the riots. A background to these riots was a strong feeling of antagonism against Government and control by the Europeans in all spheres of life formed a strong undercurrent".

The Commission held—"Above and beyond all cause the Natives are dissatisfied with conditions under which they live and the repressive measures that hem them in at every turn".

Speaking of the Durban riots of 1949, Field-Marshal Smuts pointed out that "South Africa was tasting her first fruits" of the Nationalist Government's "racially repressive counter-actionary economic policies".

When the riots broke out, Durban witnessed the none too dignified spectacle of European women dancing in joy in public streets. The Africans hauled up before the court for rioting frankly expressed their surprise at their arrest and prosecution. They had been assured, they said, that the rioters would be allowed a free hand and that the police would not intervene. The Enquiry Commission—an all-white affair—had to admit, not very willingly perhaps, that there were Europeans who had actually incited the Africans to deeds of violence against the Indians. It took care, however, to tone down the above finding by adding that such Europeans were exceptions.

It may be noted in passing that the Durban riots took a toll of 53 Indian lives. 547 Indians were injured. The loss of property ran to about a million pounds. Three factories, 710 stores and 1,332 dwellings were damaged and destroyed. 88 Africans were killed and 55, wounded.

²⁸ The "Statesman" (Delhi and Calcutta), dated 10th November, 1955.

²⁹ Apartheid: Strategy of race discrimination (Government of India Publication), p. 19.

by the military and the police. The European casualties—killed and wounded—numbered about 32.³⁰

South Africa has witnessed in recent years a series of inter-racial disturbances.³¹ The recurrence of riots should give food for thought to all genuine friends of the Union of South Africa, to all friends of humanity, in fact. They are a clear indication that the Union suffers from a malaise within its own body politic, that temper has already risen dangerously high. The Union is, in fact, a boiling cauldron to-day. South African politicians must give a careful thought to Mr. W. S. Tsotsi's³² note of warning: the Government as well as the Opposition in South Africa are "heavy with the wine of racial superiority" and unless there is a quick re-orientation of outlook and policy, Nemesis will overtake them engulfing both in a common ruin.

The passive resistance movement led jointly by the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress, which began on June 26, 1952, lends support to the view that the policy of the Union Government has been steadily driving the Black and the Brown into the same camp. The movement, end in a failure as it did, portends much. Based on the Gandhian concept of civil disobedience, the movement was fully non-violent. What it wanted was to register as emphatic a protest as possible against the Group Areas Act, the Bantu Education Act, the pass laws and other legislation against Africans and Indians. African and Indian volunteers took a pledge of non-violence. They invited arrest by breaking the various racial laws. Some would, for example, sit in European waiting rooms at railway stations. Others again, would attempt to get into public libraries. The Government too hit back—they hit hard and hit with promptitude at that. Ten thousand Africans and Indians were arrested. The movement, it must be admitted, was not a full-fledged mass movement. But it was well-led and well-organised the discipline and fortitude of the volunteers surprised the Government. The movement reached its climax in September, 1952. The arrest of late Manilal Gandhi, son of Mahatma Gandhi, and Mr. Patrick Duncan, son of Sir Patrick Duncan, a former Governor-General of South Africa, was one of the very striking episodes of the movement. Along with a group of Africans and Indians and seven Europeans—men and women—they offered themselves for arrest on December 8, 1952, by entering without permits an African location at Germiston near Johannesburg. The group sang *Africa*, the anthem of the African National Congress and patiently awaited arrest. They had not to wait long. All were arrested and produced in court. Manilal was fined £50. He was to serve a prison sentence of 50 days in default. Mr. Duncan was given a heavier sentence. A European and the son of a former Governor-General had he not com-

³⁰ *Vide* the Struggle for Equality by P. S. Joshi, pp. 233-234.

³¹ Some of the more serious are the Noulans disturbances in January, 1950, The Newclare and Sophia Town disturbances in February, 1950, the Germiston disturbances in April, 1950, and the Zulu-Basuto clash in March, 1952. They took a heavy toll of lives. Hundreds were injured. Properties worth thousands of pounds were destroyed.

³² A prominent African leader of South Africa, Mr. Tsotsi was the President of the All-African Convention in 1952.

mitted an unpardonable crime by identifying himself with the dirty Kaffirs and the unwanted 'coolies'? He was therefore to pay a fine of £100 or serve a prison-term of 100 days. Mr. Duncan chose imprisonment "in order to make the full sincerity of his motives manifest".

The joint Indo-African passive resistance campaign died out before the end of the year. For the time being, a similar movement cannot be possibly launched again successfully. Manilal's death on April 4, 1956, has considerably weakened the Indians. On the African side, many leaders have been immobilised. The Criminal Law Amendment Act and various other laws have been passed to check effectively all movements against the Government. Penalties for civil resistance were comparatively light till the end of 1952. The penalties for violating public security or segregation laws have since been enhanced and include long prison-sentences, confiscation of properties and flogging. It must be admitted, however, that to our knowledge none has been flogged so far in South Africa for a purely political offence.

The Indian community is faced to-day with a crisis of no mean magnitude, the solidarity of the community is threatened with division in its own ranks and before long it might present the sorry spectacle of a house divided against itself".³³ "A wealthier section of the Indian community in the areas affected by the Group Areas Act seems to be prepared to accept residential apartheid in return for guarantees for trading rights".³⁴ Mr. Mahomed Jajbhoy, an Indian millionaire, one of the 2,000 Asians given a year's notice in 1955 to leave Page view,³⁵ said in October, 1956, "We are prepared to sacrifice our residential rights, and if we are guaranteed adequate compensation, we are prepared to go to Lenasia³⁶ and make it a beautiful township".

This move by the wealthier Indians to arrive at a compromise with the Nationalist Government is not a new one. Early in 1956, some representatives of the South African Indian Organisation, the membership of which is primarily confined to the wealthier Indians, had a secret interview with Prime Minister Strijdom and placed a similar proposal before him. Mr. Strijdom, a shrewd man that he is, is said to have asked whether the South African Indian Organisation represented the Indian community. The reply was in the negative. The Organisation is now said to be trying to enrol as many members as possible so that it may become a genuinely popular organisation.

The leadership of the South African Indian Organisation will do well to remember that if Mr. Strijdom accept the proposal for only trading rights, he will do so merely with the object of disrupting the United front of Indians against the Group Areas Act. Rich Indians and they alone will benefit from the acceptance of the above proposal. All other Indians

³³ Vide "The Statesman" (Delhi and Calcutta), dated 12th September, 1956.

³⁴ P. T. I. cable from Johannesburg under date 7th October, 1956, published in the "Statesman" (Delhi and Calcutta), dated 8th October, 1956.

³⁵ An Indian area in Johannesburg from 1895, where freehold rights were granted to Indians in 1937.

³⁶ 22 miles away from Johannesburg, Lenasia has been declared an Indian area under the Group Areas Act of 1950.

—and they form the bulk of the community—will be uprooted. The acceptance of the proposal by the Government will moreover turn out to be a trick. Once residential apartheid is accepted, the Government will pursue a policy of cancelling as many trade permits as possible and a wholesale expulsion of Indians from their present homes and places of business will be a *fait accompli* before long.

The South African Indian Congress has justly condemned the move of South African Indian Organisation as suicidal and accused “the wealthier Indians of trying to save their business at the expense of the rights of the rest of the Indian community”.

Racialism and colour bar have been viewed from various angles. Not a few have discussed and debated them. The evils of a policy of racial discrimination are many and varied. The worst perhaps is that it very often drives the victims of discrimination into the folds of lawless, anti-social elements. Little wonder the rising generations of Africans in the Union of South Africa are swelling the ranks of criminals in an ever increasing number. Unless steps are taken for their training and ultimate absorption as useful citizens of the community, such potential citizens would be a burden, if not a menace, to the society which rejected them”.

South Africa is faced to-day with the grave problem of dealing with thousands of non-European citizens, who, denied all opportunities of socio-economic betterment, have been turning in hopelessness and frustration “to the idle and lawless alternatives left to them”. The powers that be seem to be blind to the disastrous consequences of their racial policy. Not a few Europeans demand that lawless non-European youths should be deported from the townships and placed somewhere out of the way. Such a step, like the quack’s prescription, which in reality it is, might work for a time. But it does not go to the roots of the problem. It is but a palliative at best, not a cure.

Racialism is doubly dangerous. Positively, it drives potentially useful citizens to the ranks of criminals. Negatively, it steadily drains away the vitality of the whole community by depriving it of the loyal and devoted services of those who might have enriched it in various ways.

The European settlers in South Africa are rushing headlong to the abyss. They must not forget that all genuine revolutions are directed against the power and privilege of an exclusive group. They should remember in their own interest that “Even the most submissive people cannot stand, in the long run, the rule of others with whom they have no community of counsel or spirit, into whose ranks they cannot be admitted. They can be temporarily kept in check by force and diplomacy, but such a subjection can never be indefinitely maintained even through the most ruthless forms of slavery”.²⁷

Non-Europeans—the Africans, the Coloureds and the Indians—are denied the enjoyment of a full life in South Africa. As P. S. Joshi puts

²⁷ The Stakes of Democracy in South-East Asia by H. J. Van Mook, p. 74.

it, "Under the pretext of civilisation, the Bantu has been robbed of his freedom, the coloured, of his heritage and the Asiatic, of his equality".²⁸

The day may not be far off when the more or less ten million non-Europeans in the Union of South Africa will rise against about two and a half million of its European population and the consequences are not pleasant to contemplate. Rightly did Mahatma Gandhi tell an Indian delegation from South Africa in the late forties—"One day the black races will rise like an avenging Atilla against their white oppressors unless some one presents to them the weapon of Satyagraha".²⁹

All friends of South Africa, of humanity and of world-peace should read, re-read and ponder over what late J H Hofmeyr, one of the most level-headed Afrikaner statesmen that ever lived, said years ago—"We have to re-examine our prejudices and some of our traditional attitudes. We have to get away from the wickedness of exploiting colour prejudice for political purposes".

²⁸ Apartheid in South Africa, p. 50

²⁹ *Vide* Mahatma Gandhi the Last Phase by Pyarelal Vol. I, p. 147.

ON REZA KHAN'S ARREST

NIHARKANA MAJUMDAR, M.A., D.PHIL.

On April 27, 1772, Murshidabad witnessed a sensational event of the century. Muhammad Reza Khan, the Naib Nazim and Naib-Diwan of Bengal and a great favourite of the Company, was suddenly arrested, sent to Calcutta and dismissed from office.

Clive's system of Double Government was bound to fail, as it did. The institution of Supervisors and Controlling Councils of Revenue failed to check the evils of a divided authority. In their letter of August 28, 1771, the Court of Directors expressed their determination to stand forth as Diwan. They recorded censure on Reza Khan's conduct and ordered the Council to divest him of his office of Naib Diwan. The office of Naib Diwan was abolished. The Court's new decision placed the collections and civil justice upon a new foundation by transferring them from the management of the Nawab's officers to the agency of their European servants. Their letter did not, however, envisage any change in the constitution of the Nizamat. It only directed the Calcutta Council to have 'in the Company's interest' 'an ostensible minister' appointed in the Nawab's Court in Reza Khan's place.¹

It was to Warren Hastings, who assumed office of Governor on April 13, 1772, that the task of giving effect to the Company's new policy devolved. In a separate address, the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors gave him orders to immediately arrest Reza Khan with his whole family and adherents and bring him down to Calcutta to stand his trial on certain charges of embezzlement and malversation.²

Coming as a surprise as it did, this measure is not very difficult to explain. Both the Directors and their servants in Bengal took Reza Khan as a mere tool for their ends, whose authority they sought to

¹ General Letter from Court, 28 August, 1771.

² Letter to Hastings from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 28 August, 1771.

(Gleig's *Memoirs of the Life of Warren Hastings*, Vol. I, Pp. 220-24).

Secret Consultations, 28 April, 1772.

The Court's letter of 28 August, 1771, charged Reza Khan with—

- (1) monopoly of grain during the famine of 1769-70,
- (2) misappropriation of the Dacca revenue in the time of Mir Jafar,
- (3) misappropriation of the Diwani revenue and
- (4) misappropriation of the Nawab's stipend.

A fifth charge was subsequently added, namely, treasonable correspondence with the Mughal Emperor and the Marathas.

support on grounds of expediency. Persian by birth, he had no great achievement to his credit. There was no love lost between him and Mir Jafar's family. A serious allegation of being defaulter in respect of the Dacca revenues was pending against him. Yet, immediately after Mir Jafar's death, he was raised with an unbecoming haste to the highest office of the Nizamat. For, his attachment to the Company had been amply proved when it was at war with Mir Kasim. And Nandakumar had to be ousted and the Nizamat kept in absolute dependence on the English Government. Their revenue functions and civil administration as worked out under the pattern of the Dual System and the security of their trade and investment required that Reza Khan should act apparently as the principal, though in practice they saw to it that he always submitted to the will of the Company.

But in one respect, the attitude of the masters in Leadenhall Street differed from that of their servants in Bengal. While their principal servants from Clive and Verelst to Sykes and Becher had nothing but unstinted praise for Reza Khan's integrity, ability and attachment to the Company,³ the Directors were from the very beginning less friendly and more critical.

On the eve of his departure from Bengal, Clive eulogised him in the strongest terms. The marvellous increase in the collections in the year 1766 the Council attributed to Reza Khan's diligence and abilities. They were so pleased with his assiduity that they contemplated to show a distinguishing mark of favour. That they did not do so was only to avoid the Nawab's jealousy.

On the other hand, the Directors were not very happy at the news of his appointment. They felt that the Council had passed too slightly over the charge brought against him of being very deficient in accounting for the revenues of Dacca for the period he was Naib there in the regime of Mir Jafar.⁴ When the salaries of Reza Khan, Rai Durlabh and Shitab Roy were fixed by the Select Committee at Rs. 9 lakhs, Rs. 2 lakhs and Rs. 99,996 respectively and evidently, Reza Khan's case was taken into special consideration, the Court admitted his merits but considered Rs. 9 lakhs to be too large for any officer.⁵ The enormous strain of his onerous duties told upon Reza Khan's health. The Company's servants were not prepared to do without his service and

³ Select Committee Proceedings, 16 January 1767.

Verest's View, Pp. 62-63.

Letter Copy Book of the Resident at the Darbar. Appendix VII.

Secret Consultations, 25 September 1769.

Letters to Court, 31 January, 8 September 1766 and 24 March 1767.

⁴ Letter from Court, 19 February 1766.

⁵ Letter to Court, 24 January 1767.

Letter from Court, 17 March 1769.

in 1768, Fath Ali Khan was, therefore, appointed as his assistant. It was suggested by Sykes that Fath Ali Khan's allowance should be fixed at Rs. 7000. While approving of this appointment, the Court expressed sympathy for his illness and appreciation for his satisfactory work. They even esteemed it "a singular instance of good fortune to have so able a minister to overcome all the difficulties consequential to so new an office", but at the same time they refused to assign to his deputy any additional salary from the revenues and suggested that Reza Khan should yield a part of his big salary to the man who was to assist him in performing the duty he was amply paid for.⁶

When the report that Reza Khan was unduly helping the senior servants of the Company in disposing of large quantities of cotton goods commissioned by them from Bombay reached the Directors, they were somewhat annoyed and demanded an explanation from the Governor.⁷ During all these years, their minds were never free from the suspicion about his integrity, that was caused by the unadjusted balance of the Dacca revenue. They repeatedly reprimanded the Council for their remissness in making a proper investigation into the matter.⁸ By April 1771, they were no longer in a mood to pay him an allowance of nine lakhs.⁹ They were disappointed with the collections from Bengal and came to believe that not only the service of Reza Khan as the Naib Diwan had been most disadvantageous to the Company, but also he had been guilty of the grossest speculation. All the previous assurances of their benign protection were, therefore, thrown to the winds. In fact, they had believed Bengal to be El Dorado and the frustration that followed made them look for a scapegoat.

On the night of the 23rd April, 1772, Hastings received the Secret Committee's letter. As directed by them he kept it a secret in Calcutta and on the next day sent peremptory instructions to Middleton, Chief of the Murshidabad Council, to arrest Reza Khan and Raja Amrit Sing, his Diwan and send them to Calcutta. Middleton received these orders

⁶ Letter to Court, 9 February 1768.

Select Committee Proceedings, 16 February, 17 November 1768.

Letter from Court, 11 November 1768; *Public Dept. India Office Records, Bengal Despatches*, Vol. 4, 229.

⁷ Letter from Court, 11 November 1768.

Letter to Court, supplement, 25 April 1769.

⁸ Letters from Court, 19 February 1766, 10 March, 11 November 1768, 17 March 1769, 10 April 1771.

⁹ Letter from Court, 10 April 1771.

In a confidential letter to Hastings on 16 April 1773, the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors wrote that they had been "long sensible of the utter impropriety of lodging an absolute power" in Reza Khan's hands.

on the 26th and the next morning he deputed Anderson to arrest Reza Khan. He took all precautionary measures against any possible resistance on the part of Reza Khan or any commotion which, at that critical hour, the Nizamat servants or sepoyes or the citizens of Murshidabad might put up. An officer with eight companies of sepoyes was sent with Anderson. Accompanied by a part of his force and some companies of pargana sepoyes, Middleton himself went to the Fort to explain the matter to the Nawab and obviate his consternation at this turn of events. But belying all apprehensions, Reza Khan resigned very calmly to the Company's orders. Along with Amrit Sing, he was sent under a guard to Calcutta.¹⁰

The fact that the whole affair passed off so smoothly without the least tumult or resistance from any quarter, to the pleasant surprise of the English Government, calls for a few words of explanation.

For the past seven years, Reza Khan had exercised more powers than the Nazims themselves. He had enjoyed an annual salary of nine lakhs and had the absolute disposal of the Nawab's stipend. All transactions used to pass under his seal and signature. His agents and creatures filled every office of the Nizamat and Diwani. His authority was much diminished in the collections by the institution of the Supervisors and the Controlling Councils of Revenue, but still vast powers were concentrated in his person with a very imperfect check. His favour was still courted on all sides and his anger dreaded.

But in course of these seven years, he had also created a good many enemies at Murshidabad. "I am aware," wrote Hastings, "of the violent prejudices which were taken up . . . against Mahmed Reza Cawn by all ranks of people both here and at home."¹¹ The immense powers vested in him were far from being welcome to the Nawab Nazims over whom he exercised absolute sway. Since his appointment as Naib Nazim and dismissal of Nanda Kumar, the latter had borne him a grudge.¹² To make matters worse, he came to have another *persona grata* in the rank of his declared enemies. The Court of Murshidabad was so surcharged with jealousy, suspicion and intrigues, and both Reza Khan and Munni Begum were so power-loving, that any conflict of interest was bound to break off their outward intimacy. So it came about over the control of the Nawab's household (*mahalsara*).

¹⁰ Secret Consultations, 28 April 1772.

Letter from Hastings to the Secret Committee of Directors, 1 September 1772.

(Gleig's *Memoirs of the Life of Warren Hastings*, Vol. I, Pp. 246-47.

¹¹ Hastings to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 24 March 1774; *Bengal Letters*, Vol. 12, p. 416.

¹² Reza Khan was not in good terms with Nandakumar even in Mir Jafar's life time. (*Seir Mutaqherin*, Vol. II, p. 557);

Ever since Najm-ud-daulah became heir-apparent to the Nizamat after the death of Miran, Munni Begum rose to pre-eminence among the Begums and controlled the Nawab's household. This distinction she continued to enjoy during the regime of her sons, Najm ud-daulah and Saif-ud-daulah. After Mubarak-ud-daulah's accession, this place of honour was contested by Babbu Begum. She represented to Governor Cartier her straitened circumstances. In obedience to Cartier's orders, Reza Khan and Becher visited her and put her in charge of the Nawab's household. Munni Begum's monthly allowance of Rs. 6,000 was divided equally between her and Babbu Begum; Munni Begum was also deprived of some of her mahals. She took this disgrace and loss very much to heart. She attributed Babbu Begum's revolt against her tutelage and her own degradation to the instigation and contrivance of Reza Khan.¹³

Her letters to the English Government since then were full of bitter complaints against Reza Khan. In one of these she alleged that Reza Khan had so monopolised all power that without a Parwana from him, no body could lay a hand on a barley corn. He dismissed the old servants at pleasure and daily took measures that brought about her degradation. In case her grievances went unredressed, she wrote, "I swear by God and Jesus Christ, I will leave Murshidabad to go to the Committee because living in this disgrace is worse than death."¹⁴ But these expostulations did not avail. In her despair, Munni Begum looked forward to the day when Reza Khan would be out of power to make room for her.

Reza Khan's enemies were never inactive. In October 1767, Brigadier General Smith transmitted to the Select Committee several Persian letters written in Reza Khan's name and under his seal, addressed to the Jat Chief, Javahir Singh and Gopen Ram. The Select Committee believed these mischievous letters to be an impudent forgery, yet Sykes was directed to urge Reza Khan to obtain the most convinc-

¹³ *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Vol. III, Nos. 208, 224, 226, 231, 245, 256, 264-65, 276-77.

Seir Mutaqherin, Vol. III, Pp. 26-27.

The author of *Seir Mutaqherin* who had a personal grievance against Reza Khan, no doubt, charged him with a motive to 'pull down that princess (Munni Begum) whose lofty spirit and extensive influence had given him much umbrage.' Reza Khan's secret hand in this affair cannot, however, be exactly proved from the available records. On the contrary, it is on record that when asked by Cartier, he suggested that it would be better if the two Begums were given equal rank and authority. It was Cartier who decided that the control of the Nawab's household should be vested in Babbu Begum and Reza Khan only obeyed his orders.

¹⁴ *Proceedings of the Controlling Council of Revenue at Murshidabad*, 17 December 1770, Vol. II, Pp. 95-97.

Ibid., 8 January 1771, Vol. III, Pp. 10-11.

ing proofs of his fidelity.¹⁵ His enemies did not stop there. Dark designs were formed against his life.¹⁶

His name came to be associated with all corruption and confusion that marked the Dual System. The famine of 1769-70 further increased his unpopularity. The Nawab and his ministers collectively contributed Rs. 1,83,282-9-11 for a charitable distribution of rice among the famine-stricken people. Of this amount Reza Khan's personal contribution was no less than Rs. 19,507.¹⁷ But he was so little loved by the people that all his good acts went unappreciated.

On the otherhand, the exercise of many public duties during the famine was misconstrued by the people for a private trade in grain.¹⁸ It was a letter from Huzurimul, brother-in-law of Umichand, addressed to Robert Gregory, which particularly induced the Court to bring against Reza Khan the charge of monopoly of grain.¹⁹ Besides their own economic frustration, the non-official information against Reza Khan appears to have impressed the Directors very much. As for Reza Khan, his only source of strength was the patronage of the Company and when that was withheld he had no other way than to yield with humility.

¹⁵ Select Committee Proceedings, 27 October 1767.

Calendar of Persian Correspondence, Vol. II, No. 605.

It may be noted that Brigadier Smith was himself very adverse to Reza Khan. In a minute in October 1769, he vehemently attacked "the lame manner" in which Reza Khan had endeavoured to exculpate himself in an enquiry into the Dacca affair. He also questioned the propriety of continuing an extravagant allowance of nine lakhs to a minister at the beck and call of the Company, and remarked that even presuming that Reza Khan had "the most superlative degree of merit, that has been most superlatively rewarded". (Secret Consultations, 26 October 1769).

¹⁶ After his escape from one such attempt, the Governor directed Sykes to assist Reza Khan in tracking out the origin of the conspiracy. (*Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Vol. II, No. 679).

¹⁷ *Proceedings of the Controlling Council of Revenue at Murshidabad*, Vol. II, p. 118.

(Letter from Bechar, 24 December 1770).

Ibid., Vol. III, p. 8.

Select Committee Proceedings, 1 February 1771.

¹⁸ The belief which prevailed in the country of his being concerned in monopoly of grain had its genesis mainly in the following facts:—

He was in charge of receiving and selling 80000mds. of rice imported on the Company's account from Bakarganj. He was required to procure rice for the Company's troops and the alms-houses of Murshidabad. In order to save the city of Murshidabad from scarcity of rice, Reza Khan took measures to control the exportation of rice from the feeder districts and from time to time, fixed the price and quota of rice sold in the markets of Murshidabad.

Secret letter to Court, 16 August 1773, para. 12.

Secret and Separate Consultations, 3 March 1774, for opinions of Dacres and Vansittart.

¹⁹ Letter to Hastings from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 28 August 1771.

(Gleig's *Memoirs of the Life of Warren Hastings*, Vol. I, Pp. 223-24).

In course of the trial of Reza Khan, Hastings summoned Huzurimul to substantiate his allegation. After much timid hesitation and procrastination, he at least disavowed it. Hastings conjectured that he was misled by the clamours of the people.

(Hastings' letter to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 24 March 1774, *Bengal Letters*, Vol. 12, p. 416).

PEACE : AN ART AND A SCIENCE, UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER

II

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Dynamic Peace

A Just Peace can seldom be a static peace: it must be a dynamic, moving and living norm. A peace formula tied down rigidly to a particular pattern of things and relations for all time to come does not commend itself to us. It will sooner or later be an empty theme with justice flying away from its fold. A treaty containing humiliating terms may be accepted by a state under duress. But to stick to that treaty's peace plan for decades and to condemn all future attempts on the part of that state to shrow off the treaty shackles as illegal would be to serve the cause not of a just peace but perhaps of a political and perverted peace. The norm '*pacta sunt servanda*' is the basis of the international legal order—nobody disputes that. But the doctrine of '*rebus sic stantibus*' had to be enunciated to eliminate the tyranny of outworn and backdated treaties. Treaties are partly the child of facts and partly of the intention of the parties. But facts, circumstances and events not unoften condition and influence the motive, purpose or intention of the parties. If sanctity of treaties is necessary for a stable international system, revision of treaties and even repudiation in cases where there is no scope for release from tyranny of the same is required for a just international order. To get a treaty under duress and then to invoke the norm *pacta sunt servanda* to perpetuate the same would be not to stabilize the international jural system but to sow the seeds of injustice and inequity which will always disturb and dislocate the equilibrium of peace.

Just peace then as a corollary must imply a dynamic and flexible peace, *i.e.*, an arrangement which should contain a provision for revision of treaties that have grown unjust with the march of time or that have outlived their use. Maintenance of *status quo* is imperative in some cases—we must not forget that. But we must not also forget that the *status quo* may be in genuine need of revision. And if in the former case we serve the cause of law and justice by maintaining the *status quo*, in the latter case we not only serve but even strengthen the cause of justice by revising the same. A dynamic and also a just peace recognizes the need as much of maintenance as of revision of the existing state of things.

The U.N. Charter contains no specific provision declaring the dynamic character of its peace formula. But this dynamic element may to some extent be read in Articles 18 and 14 of the Charter. This concept of dynamic peace was implied in Article 19 of the League covenant as well.

The Article was: "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world". Commenting on Article 19 of the covenant Sir Frederick Pollock says—" the covenant is not intended to stamp the new territorial settlement as sacred and unalterable for all time, but, on the contrary, to provide machinery for the progressive regulation of international affairs in accordance with the needs of the future. The absence of such machinery, and the consequent survival of treaties long after they had become out of date, led to many of the quarrels of the past; so that these articles may be said to inaugurate a new international order, which should eliminate, so far as possible, one of the principal causes of war".²⁵ Revision of treaties, then, which is the latent idea in dynamic peace, is, on occasions, a very effective weapon to eliminate the causes of war. To talk of just peace without providing for revision of treaties in necessary and appropriate cases is like making permanent garments for a child without taking into consideration the possibilities of his growth. That is why there was Article 19 in the covenant though the League failed to live up to this ideal. Hence in the concept of dynamic peace the Charter treads no new ground.

In the charter the germ of this dynamic peace concept can be seen in Articles 13 and 14. There is of course a danger in dynamic peace formula as by encouraging too frequent revision of treaties it may damage their sanctity and also the basis of the international jural system. But an immutable law is neither just nor desirable. The essence of a just and living law is its mutability to meet the requirements of the changing life and society. Dynamic peace concept is obviously based on a balance between these two elements—sanctity of treaty law and changeability in necessary and appropriate cases. That is, of course, the key problem for the international jural system. The solution of this problem will mean the salvation of a legal order from its chronic impotence—it would lend the much wanted element of perfection and maturity to the international legal code. Article 19 of the League Covenant was and Articles 13 and 14 of the U.N. Charter are just humble, though not effective, attempts along that line. Article 13 authorizes the General Assembly to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of (a) 'promoting international cooperation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification'; (b) promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, and health fields, etc. Under Article 14 the General Assembly 'may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present charter setting forth the purposes and principles of the United Nations'. This Article, observe Hambro and Goodrich, finds a close parallel in Article 19 of the covenant; yet, as it will be seen, it is not

²⁵ Pollock—The League of Nations (1920). Appendix II, p. 211.

analogous to the same in the matter of treaty revision. The first part of Article 19 of the covenant ('The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable') has no parallel in Article 14 of the charter. Hence the scope of the League Assembly under Article 19 of the covenant in the matter of treaty revision was, I believe, wider in a sense than that of the General Assembly under Article 14 of the U.N. Charter. At the San Francisco Conference suggestions were made to incorporate treaty revision provisions in the charter but all these proved of no avail. Article 14 is the amended and revised version of paragraph 6 of Section B, Chapter V of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.²⁶ The delegate of the United States at the 17th meeting of Committee II/2 declared that he had foregone the question of treaty revision in favour of the broad version of the Dumbarton Oaks stipulation which became Article 14 of the charter for 'it was inconsistent to launch an international organization based on international integrity and at the same time to intinnate any lack of respect for the instruments through which international integrity functions, namely, treaties'.²⁷ 'He submitted that it was wiser not to connect the broad version of paragraph 6 with any specific definition regarding treaty revision. The phrase 'the peaceful adjustment of any situations, regardless of origin', in his view, should not be interpreted to mean that the subject of treaty revision was foreclosed to the Assembly. If treaties give rise to situations which the Assembly deemed likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, it could make recommendations in respect of these situations'. This was the interpretation put on these terms by the American Senator Vandenberg. The question of revision of treaties was discussed in detail at the San Francisco Conference.²⁸ And though no specific provision was inserted, the possibility of revision has not been completely ruled out. In fact under the language of Article 14 there can be revision of treaties.' The reluctance to insert a specific clause was due to the apprehension, though not correct, that a revision clause was incompatible with respect for treaties. In any case there is scope for treaty revision in the charter—a scope even wider in another sense²⁹ than that under Article 19 of the covenant. A just peace must mean then a dynamic peace whose frame in the charter we have just seen.

This dynamic peace concept can be seen in the speeches and statements of some delegates at the San Francisco Conference. The Vice-President of the Bolivian delegation, Senor Andrade, in the second plenary session of the Conference, held on April 27, 1945, said—"The ideal thing is for all men to have equal opportunities for attaining happiness and enjoying the benefits of civilization. The peace for which we long must not have for its purpose the establishment of a social *status quo*, because

²⁶ "The General Assembly should initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international co-operation in political, economic and social fields and of adjusting situations likely to impair the general Welfare". Dumbarton Oaks Draft.

²⁷ Kelsen—Law of the United Nations (1951), p. 212.

²⁸ UNCIO—Documents: Vol. 8, pp. 202, 207, 210-2, 213-5, 216-7, 218-222; Vol. 9, pp. 149-152.

²⁹ Kelsen—The Law of the United Nations (1951), pp. 213-4 for details on this point.

in addition to being anti-human and consequently impossible, such a thing would mean a new form of oppression which will put a fatal end to the principles on which we wish to build peaceful human harmony. It must be a peace dynamic in the desire to find a solution to the social and economic problems of the world".³⁰ Then again Mr. Lescot, the chairman of the delegation of Haiti, in the sixth plenary session of the Conference held on May 1, 1945, observed—"The objection has been raised to the Dumbarton proposals that they do not respect the traditional concept of the sovereignty of states. It does not seem superfluous to us to add here that international law cannot remain static, no more than civil or penal law. It must be capable of adapting itself to the changing conditions of life of the peoples of the world".³¹

Let us then sum up this whole trend of the argument on dynamic peace. The U. N. Charter is after genuine peace. A true peace must be a positive peace. A positive peace connotes a just peace as injustice can never be propitious for peace. And a just peace must mean a dynamic peace—changing, growing and developing with moving facts and events and standing thereby on a living law. If justice had always been something absolute and permanent, then a peace of justice would surely be a static peace. But if justice is a relative phenomenon in the international field and that is what History and Philosophy tell, a peace of justice must inevitably be a dynamic norm. Capitulations in Egypt and China might have been just, if they were ever and at all so, in an age when these countries did not reach the minimum level of civilization. Any claim to retain them now when these countries are the equals of the advanced Western Nations in all respects and that again in the name of justice is to make a caricature of justice in the name of the *status quo*. Justice may be an absolute and abstract principle in the personal ethics of a man but in social and international life it is hardly independent of the environment out of which it is born. Of course what is justice and who³² is to define and decide that in a particular case are very pertinent queries for the critics which do perplex and outwit the votaries of justice as the basis of peace. And the critics may be tempted to go a little further and contend that to talk of just and dynamic peace with justice unknown and undefined is not to organize peace but to thwart and smash the feeble frame of peace under the pressure of a flexible and uncertain ideology. That this difficulty is there, nobody disputes. Still justice, however, uncertain and vague, however, undefined and undefinable, is much better footing for peace to stand upon than any other principle. From the point of view of the operation of the principle of justice, there are tremendous odds flowing from the institutional inadequacy of international law. But as a matter of principle or theory there can be no quarrel with the stand that peace should have justice as its basic norm. And if justice be an inseparable ally of peace and if it be conditioned by change in events then peace must be a moving and living formula, not tied down perpetually to a particular

³⁰ UNCIO—Documents: Vol. I, pp. 186-7; Doc. 55, P/3, pp. 27-8.

³¹ UNCIO—Doc. Vol. I, pp. 442-3; Doc. 55, P/3, pp. 27-8.

³² The possibility of an impartial international non-legal machinery (in the case of political disputes) may be considered for the purpose, as I have pointed out before.

scheme or arrangement of things but changing with the flux of the forces and factors that add to or detract from the content and concept of justice. The U.N. peace, then, to the extent to which it is a just peace is of necessity a dynamic peace, if justice is a relative and living formula.

Indivisible and Enforced Peace

U.N. peace again is not just a casual formula; it is an indivisible and enforced peace. Peace is strong when it is one and the defenders of peace are united in their stand. To make peace indivisible is to offer the surest safeguard for the same. Peace is indivisible when all are at war with the aggressor and on terms of active alliance with the aggressed. Divided and broken peace means that some are at war with the aggressor and others on terms of friendship with the aggressed. To divide peace is to weaken peace and to enfeeble its footing and not unoften again, to kill it. Divided peace is born out of and breeds and ultimately is consumed by the anarchy of states. Indivisible peace connotes a society of states—collective and organized—which is willing, able and strong enough to use cudgels against those who attack its foundations

This indivisibility of peace is linked up with the doctrine of collective security. The doctrine was first enunciated in the League covenant (Articles 11 and 16). The Members accordingly had to shoulder the responsibilities and obligations of the collective world order. But it could not be a perfect norm on account of loopholes therein. The collective security principle was there and the concept of indivisible peace as an ally or corollary of the same obviously followed therefrom. Now the more intense and effective the collective security principle is, the more solidified will be the concept of indivisible peace. But the weaker the former, the more loose the latter.

Collective security principle is then the basis of the concept of indivisible peace. This principle has received a firmer and stronger mould in the U.N. Charter. Hence the indivisible peace plan of the charter, though not absolutely new as it was there in the League covenant in some form, is also of a stronger and solidier type. "What mainly distinguishes the United Nations Charter from the League of Nations Covenant is the attempt to make collective action for the maintenance of peace more effective. The new organization, therefore, essentially is a stronger League".³³

Indivisible peace is then intimately linked up with the principle of collective security. The stronger the latter, the firmer the former. But the principle of collective security connotes the obligations of a collective world order. And that means abolition and abandonment of the right to neutrality. Indivisible peace then negates the principle of neutrality over a wide field.³⁴ The intensification of the collective security principle in the

³³ Schiffer—*The Legal Community of Mankind* (1954), p. 289.

³⁴ For details see my book—"*International Law Redefined*", Chapter on Neutrality under the U.N. Charter.

charter we witness in the centralization of the force monopoly of the world, top priority accorded to the same and the obligatory character of the military sanctions. And abandonment of neutrality for the U.N. Members specially when the Security Council properly functions follows as a corollary and compulsory duty therefrom. Hence peace is possible only when it is indivisible—that is, only when all are for peace and act together to protect it whenever in peril.

Indivisible peace implies both in theory and practice the obligations of all the Members to enforce peace and to punish its enemies. Hence indivisible peace concept must have an ally in the formula of enforced peace. Indivisible peace will in no time be divided, broken and fragmented if there be not a force to enforce the same. In other words there should be a rod to repel the lawbreakers and enemies of peace. This rod was there in the League covenant in Article 16 in the shape of economic and military sanctions. But the rod was a feeble one as the military sanctions were volitional. The machinery has been moulded anew under the U.N. Charter—the rod has been revitalized in Articles 42 and 43 of the new document. It is not yet as strong as the policeman's baton within the state; still it is stronger than the League weapon. This is so specially because all Members of the U.N. "undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, . . ." (Article 43, paragraph 1) The application of military sanctions then under the charter is obligatory at least in theory and principle. The question of agreement relates to the details not to the principle, I believe. The 'undertaking' to make available to the Security Council armed forces, etc., is independent of agreement or agreements; but the operative part of this obligation depends on these agreements. But a principle whose operative part fails is reduced to a barren norm. From this standpoint, it can be argued that the scheme of military sanctions under the charter, though intended to be much stronger than that under the covenant, may fail to operate if the agreements be not reached. Here is an occasion where the science of peace under the charter cannot measure up to the requirements of peace as art thereunder. In any case U.N. Peace as a concept is an indivisible and enforced peace. That is also seen from the statements of different members at the San Francisco Conference. The chairman of the Delegation of Nicaragua at the eighth plenary session (May 2, 1945) observed: "We are united here because we believe that peace is indivisible and we must unite our efforts to obtain it and maintain it. Our contribution to this universal harmony shall never be a small matter; the peace that is indivisible and that is for all nations, must be interowned".³⁵ U.N. Peace is thus to be owned by all and protected by all. Indivisible peace concept of the U.N. Charter extends even beyond the members to the case of the non-members. Article 2, paragraph 6, of the charter enacts—"The organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security".

³⁵ UNCIO—Doc., Vol. I, pp. 556-7.

Commenting on this Hambro and Goodrich observe—"It is clear that the organization thereby actually assumes authority not based on the consent of the states affected".³⁶ Kelsen observes that "the provision of Article 2, paragraph 6, may be interpreted to mean that the charter imposes at least the most important obligations of the Members also upon non-members, and that means that the charter claims to have the character of general international law. It remains to be seen whether this claim will obtain general recognition. If so, the idea of compulsory membership has not been entirely rejected".³⁷ Indivisibility of peace, universality of the organization, compulsory membership or imposition of Members' obligations on non-members, enforceability of peace—all these are allied ideas in the charter. "Our Charter", said a statesman at San Francisco, "will not simply be the written symbol of the big stick or the decalogue of international policeman".³⁸ The chairman of the Delegation of Luxembourg said at the 7th plenary session of the San Francisco Conference held on May 1, 1945—"The protection of peace can only be insured on the basis of collective security. The Geneva League is dead, but its fundamental principle, the spirit of international solidarity, lives again in San Francisco. The best proof of this is that the Dumbarton Oaks plan resembles the covenant like a brother—a more robust brother, a more realistic one who has cast aside the Utopian dreams of his elder and gained wisdom and experience from past errors and misfortunes. . . . The League of Nations was intended to be armed, but it was born without shield or sword—in other words, it was still-born. The international organization born of our discussions will have the necessary armed forces to insure respect for its decisions".³⁹ U.N. Peace then is not only indivisible peace but also intended to be an enforced peace.

Comprehensive Peace

Peace under the U.N. Charter again is a more *comprehensive* peace. It is a peace with ban not on 'War' in the technical sense but on 'Force' [Article 2, paragraph 4] in the non-technical objective sense. Peace permitting no use of 'force' is more comprehensive, effective and abiding than peace prohibiting 'resort to war'. Peace with a ban on 'War' could prevent 'War' but not 'use of force without war'. But peace with a ban on 'Force' can avert both. The charter by banning use of force, threat of force⁴⁰ and coercive solution⁴¹ makes the range and scope of peace under the document wider and broader. The legal quibbles born out of the ban on 'War' in the technical legal sense as in the League covenant and the Kellogg Pact cannot undo the peace plan of the charter because it stands on the ban on 'force'. Accordingly peace becomes genuine, real, non-formal and material. In the League era there could not be peace with 'War' but there could be peace with the use of 'Force' and yet the League

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 108.

³⁷ Kelsen—*The Law of the United Nations* (1951), pp. 75-6.

³⁸ UNCIO—Doc., Vol. VI, p. 79.

³⁹ UNCIO—Doc., Vol. I, pp. 502-3.

⁴⁰ Art. 2, paragraph 4.

⁴¹ Art. 2, paragraph 3.

could take no action. In other words there could be peace in law with war in fact. A document which permits such anomalies is self-doomed; it does not and cannot guarantee peace but simply makes a caricature with the same. It was frequently the case in the interwar period. Its recurrence in the U.N. regime was sincerely abhorred and was intended to be averted. That is why the term 'Force' and not 'War' has been used in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the U.N. Charter. Greater emphasis is hereby placed on the non-technical objective point of view in war. And that means that U.N. peace is much more comprehensive in character and action than League peace. Any peace attempt which does not outlaw 'War' in the material sense is sure to be foiled—that is the lesson of the experiments with the term 'War' in the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact. The U.N. concept of peace with ban on 'Force' and not simply 'War' is born out of experiments in history. But the term 'Force' is flexible. It covers 'Armed Force' but does not include economic or psychological pressure—that is the usual interpretation.⁴² If it be so, it leaves out of account some methods which may act as menace to peace. We hear to-day of economic and ideological aggression, as also of indirect aggression. In the Soviet enumerative draft definition of aggression submitted to the General Assembly and the Special Committee in 1954, there are references to these possible varieties of aggression. 'Force' in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the U.N. Charter not covering these cases may be inadequate, if of course such a definition be ever adopted. Still the U.N. concept of peace being a 'No-Force' peace and not simply a 'No-War' peace stands on a stronger footing.

Peace as a Science under the U.N. Charter

Such then is the concept of Peace under the U.N. Charter. It is a positive, just, dynamic, indivisible, enforced and comprehensive peace. It is, in our view, Peace as an Art. And this Art is sought to be realised through a processual machinery which we call Peace as a Science. And this implies the methods for prevention and suppression of war and the acts of aggression, *i.e.*, Pacific Settlement of disputes and enforcement action against the lawbreaker and the aggressor. To prevent war is to perpetuate peace; it is to nip in the bud the emerging anti-peace forces. Here the technique followed is preventive and stands on the theory of Pacific Settlement of disputes. Wars arise out of international disputes. If all disputes can be peacefully settled, war with its roots can be eradicated. Peace as a science has been so deliberately well planned that there is hardly any scope for the lawful use of force prior to the attempts at Pacific Settlement. Peaceful settlement of disputes is one of the seven principles on which the United Nations organization stands. (Article 2, paragraph 3) The procedural details thereof are found in Chapter VI of the Charter (Articles 33 to 38). All disputes, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security

⁴² See Hambro and Goodrich—Charter of the United Nations (1949), p. 104.

shall first of all be settled by the parties themselves through the methods enumerated in Article 38. [Negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or any other peaceful means of their own choice]. The legal disputes "should as a general rule be referred" to the International Court of Justice [Article 36, paragraph 3]. Other methods are to be applied in the case of non-legal disputes. But there is as yet no universally agreed criterion to determine the character of the disputes. In any case if the methods enumerated in Article 38 (1) fail, the parties have no right to go to war; they are to refer the case to the Security Council [Article 37, paragraph 1]. The Security Council will try to offer a solution. If the Security Council can reach a valid decision based on required unanimity and majority [Article 27], that decision will be legally binding on the parties even if the dispute be a political one. [Article 25, Article 2 (2)]. The party refusing to abide by the lawfully valid decision of the Security Council will be guilty of a breach of its obligations under the charter. And if it goes to war in disregard of the same, it may be branded a lawbreaker and aggressor by the Security Council which may even call upon the Members to apply sanctions [Article 42] against the offending state. Here we see that Peace as a science under the charter largely fulfils the purpose of Peace as an Art if it be assumed that the Security Council being a non-judicial organ will not be guided by the rigid letters of law nor by political expediency but by the more elevated canons and ideals of justice. But if the Security Council suggests a settlement that is manifestly unjust according to one or both of the parties, what will be the position? Are the Members to stick to the obligations of Article 25 and Article 2 (2) or are they at liberty to thwart the settlement by invoking the principle of allegiance to justice?⁴³ Their legal duty is to follow the Security Council's decision, however, unjust it may be. In that case justice perishes only to nourish a precarious peace. These are the possible complications even when the Security Council can properly function. But if the Security Council fails to function properly, the issue remains open and the Members may even go to the length of deciding the issue by the arbitrament of the sword (if it is not taken up promptly by the General Assembly).⁴⁴ This may be the result of the individual veto on the part of the permanent members or collective veto on the part of the non-permanent members. In any case here the Security Council is in a state of paralysis. Peace as a Science fails to live up to its level as an Art on account of procedural handicaps. Moreover, no peace plan will be adequate which cannot provide for the just adjustment of political controversies. In a sense, of course, all disputes are justiciable; but this claim though formally valid may not always be materially sound. The U.N. provides a machinery for political adjudication or adjustment of interests through the Security Council under Article 37. But the failure of the Security Council to reach a formally valid decision (on account of veto or lack of majority)

⁴³ The Five Power Resolution on Kashmir of January, 1957, may be mentioned in this connection.

⁴⁴ But the General Assembly's Resolutions are simply recommendations and have no legally binding force. The Members have a right but no duty to act according to them.

means the failure of the U.N. Science of Peace to achieve the Art thereof. Here emerges a procedurally juridical vacuum to invalidate the whole structure of U.N. Peace. And the failure of the Security Council to reach a *just* solution breeds, if not a juridical, at least a moral or quasi-juridical vacuum. Here Peace as a science succeeds (as the Security Council functions properly from the formal or procedural point of view); but Peace as an Art gets perverted as it becomes an unjust peace and peace at the cost of justice.

There is another possible loophole in this aspect of U.N. Peace as a Science. The obligation of Article 37 applies to 'disputes' not to 'situations', the language of Article 37 being 'should the parties to a *dispute* of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it, etc'. The dispute referred to in Article 33 is one 'the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security'. It is then a compulsory duty for the U.N. Members to refer all 'disputes' whose continuance may endanger international peace and security to the Security Council when the Pacific methods enumerated in Article 33 fail. But this duty does not necessarily apply to 'situations', as distinguished from 'disputes'. A line between the two can be drawn from the drafting of Articles 34 and 35.⁴⁵ A 'situation' may by itself not be a 'dispute' though it may give rise to a dispute. But the continuance not only of a 'dispute' but also of a 'situation' may be a threat to peace. Article 37 imposes obligations upon members in the case of 'disputes' which cannot be extended or applied to the case of 'situations'. But the question of 'situations' was not left uncovered by the charter. Article 34 permits the Security Council to "investigate any dispute, or any *situation* which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute". The language here is permissive—"The Security Council *may* investigate, etc"—and not mandatory. The Security Council may or may not as it will choose. Now if a 'situation' and not a 'dispute' emerges and it threatens world peace, the U.N. Members have no *obligation* to refer it to the Security Council. Of course they have a *right* under Article 35. ["Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34 to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly"]. The Security Council also has no obligation but only a right under Article 34. If then the 'situation' be not referred to the Security Council by any Member under Article 35 and if it be not taken up by the Security Council for investigation (Article 34) or adjustment (Article 36, paragraph 1), a juridical vacuum emerges which may have a chance of undoing the whole peace plan of the Charter. One of the permanent Members may have a special interest in the 'situation' and may want its continuance and may so arrange that it is not taken up by the Security Council. But it may be pointed out here as a counter argument that this possibility of a juridical vacuum tending to undo the peace plan is very limited. Under Article 24 the Members of the United Nations "confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". If the

⁴⁵ Hambro and Goodrich—*op. cit.*, p. 249.

Security Council allows a 'situation' to grow and develop to a point where it bursts into full fledged war without taking it up at all for investigation or adjustment, it may be held guilty by the U.N. Members of failure to fulfil the trust reposed in it as the organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of world peace. But even if the Security Council wants to by-pass a 'situation' allowing it to grow and develop into a threat thus evading its primary responsibility for peace under Article 24, the legal vacuum created thereby may be corrected by the initiative of the General Assembly. Under Article 11, paragraph 3, "the General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security". This eliminates the possibility of evasion of primary responsibility on the part of the Security Council. The Security Council then may be required to investigate (Article 34) a 'situation' to which its attention has been drawn by the General Assembly (Article 11, paragraph 3) and to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment (Article 36). If the right of veto here applies and is used by any permanent member, the Security Council gets paralysed and Peace as a science fails and fumbles. But does the exception to the veto right in the proviso of Article 27, paragraph 3, apply to the case of a 'situation' as distinguished from a 'dispute'? In the concluding part of this paragraph of Article 27 there is an exception to the veto right in the proviso which lays down that in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. It follows that a party to a dispute shall here abstain from voting, even if it be a permanent member. But the phrase is 'party to a dispute' and does not contain the term 'situation'. Hence it can perhaps be argued that the exception to the veto right is limited to 'dispute' and does not apply to 'situation'. And it would follow here—from that a state involved in a 'situation', if it be a permanent member, can veto any decision of the Security Council. It is doubtful if this interpretation will be accepted by all. Though a distinction can be drawn between 'dispute' and 'situation' in a broad general sense under Article 34, 35 and 36, from the standpoint of voting procedure it is better to ignore the line. That is the trend in the practice of the Security Council. As Hambro and Goodrich observe in this connection: "If the distinction between a *dispute* and a *situation* is to be maintained so far as voting procedure is concerned, it then becomes necessary that the Security Council take a decision, if the question is raised, as to whether it is dealing with a dispute or a situation in order that the indicated consequences may follow. Thus far the Security Council has not taken any decision on this question in any matter before it".⁴⁶ The trend then is not to recognize the line in the case of voting procedure. If, however, the line is maintained here also, then literally and strictly the exception to the veto right in the proviso of Article 27, paragraph 3, is confined to 'disputes' and does not apply to 'situations'. That widens the range of the veto field and weakens the basis of the U.N. Science of Peace.

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*—p. 225.

The charter again bans 'force' and thereby outlaws even the compulsive methods along with war. Article 2, paragraph 3, establishes the principle of peaceful solution vs. coercive solution, permitting the one and prohibiting the other. But all these peace attempts and peace avenues may ultimately fail if the Security Council gets paralysed into inaction on account of veto. Veto was a necessity to bring together the more important members in a world organization. The Yalta voting formula reflected the politico-psychological realities of the time. On this stands U.N. Peace as a science. Not to accept the veto was to kill the U.N.O. Veto is a guarantee against the imposition of one Bloc's will on another. It stands on the theory of unanimity among the permanent members, the idea being that they must either work together or would not work at all. But it was felt that veto, if frequently used, would clog the wheels of the United Nations. That is why the Four Sponsoring Powers in their statement on voting procedure laid down "It is not to be assumed, however, that the permanent members, any more than the non-permanent members, would use their 'veto' power wilfully to obstruct the operation of the council"⁴⁷ The U.N. Science of Peace would then be made or marred according as the veto vindicates or vitiates.

Another very important aspect of the U.N. Science of Peace is the machinery of enforcement. Its purpose is to hinder the hindrances to peace and it is designed to suppress acts of aggression. The procedure under Chapter VII of the charter regarding enforcement action is very interesting. Under Article 39 the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken. Again "the Security Council to prevent the aggravation of the situation may call upon the parties to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. These provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned. And the Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures". These are the stipulations of Article 40.⁴⁸ Article 41 permits the Security Council to decide 'what measures not involving the use of armed force' are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. Here we see that the compulsive methods short of war may be used and applied by the U.N. as a collective body against the offending or guilty state. If the compulsive methods be inadequate and fail to achieve the purpose, the Security Council may take action by air, sea or land forces. Here we see that there can be military sanctions against the guilty state. And what is more fundamental still is that "all Members of the United Nations..... undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, etc" [Article 43, paragraph 1].

The entire plan of enforcement action is prepared with caution and restraint and according to a scientific method. The different steps are

⁴⁷ Hambro and Goodrich—*op. cit.*, p. 218

⁴⁸ For full implications of this Article see Hambro and Goodrich—*op. cit.*, pp. 273-6.

to be taken gradually. Provisional measures are purely provisional and do not affect in any way the substantive rights or claims of the parties. They are recommended pending the final decision. Once the Security Council finally decides which party is guilty of aggression or breach of law, it may call upon the Members to apply the compulsive methods. If they prove inadequate, the Security Council may take action by air, sea or land forces. The whole thing has been scientifically planned and contemplated ; and such a peace process rightly deserves the appellation 'Science'.

It will be seen that in the matter of sanctions as in many other matters the Security Council plays the pivotal role. It is by law in the picture from beginning to end. But Security Council can never guarantee its smooth functioning. Veto may at any time create a deadlock. Hence the Security Council can seldom ensure effective action in any field as it cannot be sure of its own successful functioning. Unity of the Great Powers is one of the conditions essentially necessary for a lawful functioning of the Security Council. It is a condition which distinguishes the Security Council from the League Council in a sense. The League Council worked on the principle of unanimity of all ; the Security Council works on the principle of majority in procedural matters along with unanimity of the permanent members in non-procedural or substantive issues. But this legal condition for a prompt and efficient functioning of the Security Council depends on a favourable political climate. "It was taken as axiomatic that the corner stone of World Security is the unity of those nations which formed the core of the grand alliance against the Axis. . . . This axiom is reflected in the so-called principle of unanimity of the Great Powers" The lack of this unity will be and actually is the most fatal sore in the security system of the United Nations. The acceptance of veto in the Charter was necessary as without it the Conference at San Francisco would have failed to produce the United Nations Organization. Peace as a Science in the Charter stands on this attitude of compromise and realism. It was a compromise between perfection and prejudice. Veto was the product of an uncertain political climate breeding fear and suspicion. Talk of abolishing or modifying the veto in law while the political climate of the world remains vitiated is not to solidify the U.N. but to liquidate the same. Abolition of the veto may or will lead to withdrawal of the Soviet Union or Bloc from the United Nations. In that case the United Nations would simply be disunited. Let veto be there as a guarantee in law against imposition of one section's will on another. But if the political climate changes on account of effective emphasis on the aspect of positive peace, we may expect that veto in spite of being there in law will perhaps seldom be used. Hence while thinking of strengthening the science of peace we must note that the malady does not lie with the veto as such ; it lies somewhere else. Abolition of veto with the world political climate remaining the same will not ensure peace but will simply kill the United Nations and will invite war. Retention of veto with a healthier political climate of the world may not create any paralysis in the organization as veto, though retained in law and theory, may be forgotten on account of disuse. Only when veto thus disappears in

practice even though it exists in theory, it should be made to disappear in theory as well. The U.N. Science of Peace, I believe, should be organized along this line, if at all. To eliminate veto in theory and law while it is a necessity in the context of power-politics of the world is not to reform the U.N. but to deform the same by divorcing it from the roots of reality; it is to put the cart before the horse and to mistake the symptom for the disease. Veto is a symptom of a politically diseased world; it was and is the child of the international political realities. To alter the veto right with the political realities remaining unaltered is to divorce law from life. Such a law will sooner or later be a dead letter. Hence only when *positive peace* can really replace *political peace*, there can be a move for abolishing veto. Any attempt prior to that will be a kind of arrogance that may frustrate the United Nations. "International life should be a factory of confidence, not arrogance. Good faith and the spirit of unity among the great powers are the cornerstones of peace"—this warning the states and the statesmen can ignore at their peril.

Peace as a Science under the Charter can never fulfil its role unless there be an agreement among the Blocs on some fundamental values. We are living in a 'shrinking' and 'changing' world—a world that is geographically and economically one, ideologically two and nationally many. That is the basic proposition to start with in any peace plan. Ideological bi-polarization of the world is the most stubborn fact of the day. To prepare for peace according to the old pattern without proper assessment of this fact is like building on sand. There are two methods of solution—one, war, a final showdown leading to the annihilation of one Bloc and survival of the other and creating one world on the ruins of the Third World War; the other adjustment of peace to the requirements of the ideologically divided world. All men in their senses would condemn the first and commend the second method. And the second method means the co-survival and hence peaceful coexistence of the two ideologies. As early as 1953 I suggested⁴⁹ this doctrine of peaceful coexistence as the only effective peace weapon in this divided world. Agreement on basic, fundamental and universal values does not rule out the scope for the existence of the diverse systems of culture and values among the different groups of states. This principle of peaceful coexistence is already there in the preamble to the U.N. Charter. That is to be revitalized and intensified. With the faithful application of the principle of peaceful coexistence tension and cold war will disappear brightening therewith the prospects of peace. Functional friction will cease to act as a hurdle and peace as a science will gradually ripen into peace as an art. So long as this be not achieved there must be the risk of ruin through deadly nuclear weapons. Humanity can survive if only it allows its follies to be corrected by the wisdom and experience of the ages.

⁴⁹ 'The United Nations and World Peace' - in the Bulletin of the Ram Krishna Miskin Institute of Culture, October, 1953.

IMPLICATION OF TAXATION PROPOSALS

In the Context of Second Five Year Plan

HEMRAJ C. ASHER

The Budget proposals embodying a levy of new taxes amounting to Rs. 93 crores presented by the Finance Minister this year seem to have attracted intense and unprecedented controversial discussions. But more than what it seeks to collect by way of taxes, does it involve policy implications which are far greater in importance than the actual addition to the revenue that it will bring about. For such a high increase in tax burden on all sections of the community, people were indeed prepared by the factual disclosures made by the Finance Minister while presenting the interim Budget. The Plan and the Kaldor Report have respectively indicated the magnitude of tax efforts required to fulfil the Plan outlay and the methods to meet those requirements.

As the Finance Minister himself said, "the Plan is to be the main theme and dominant concern of all our thinking" and it is this thinking that has led him to propose a 'comprehensive tax system' that spares not even the common man. Fact lies that resources are required for the implementation of the Plan, to which the government and the people have committed themselves to fulfil. The Finance Minister has adequate powers to drain away resources from people to meet the plan requirements. The criticism levelled against these proposals have been so severe that one cannot decide offhand whether these powers were really recklessly wielded or that they were used with sufficient judgement and insight.

At the end of the current year, the Budget as originally formulated, visualised to lay at the disposal of the Central Government an additional revenue of Rs. 93 crores out of which States' share was to be Rs. 15 crores. The expected net contribution to the Central Government's Exchequer consisted of Rs. 22 crores on account of direct taxes and the remaining Rs. 55.85 crores were to be by way of indirect taxes. Since the presentation of the Budget, concessions have been declared to the extent of Rs. 5.05 crores, bringing down the total yield for the year 1957-58 to Rs. 88 crores. While the reliefs conceded by liberalising the provisions of wealth tax on new companies, providing children's allowances and introducing modifications

in postal and railway charges are in accordance with the public demand, the withdrawal of excise duty on tea and coffee is in view of adverse trade conditions existing in the industry.

DIRECT TAXES

In making proposals for changes in direct taxes on individuals the Finance Minister mainly seems to have been actuated by the desire to model them in a manner which may lead to an increased desire to work and to save, and cause the tax structure to be income elastic. According to him, the high rates of income tax in the upper brackets led to a high scale evasion and put a premium on the propensity to work. This has led him to reduce income tax rates from 91.8% to 84% for the unearned income and 77% for the earned income. On the same ground is based the abolition of the system of granting earned income allowances in favour of higher surcharge on income tax for the unearned income. But these reductions in income tax rates are to be considered along with the new levies of annual wealth tax and expenditure tax (the latter to be effective from next year) which are calculated to reduce income and wealth disparities and tax evasions and curb ostentatious expenditure without adversely affecting the twin incentives to work and to save.

With no historical background to support it, the expenditure tax admits only of theoretical analysis. According to Mr. Kaldor, the appearance of high progressivity is tolerated only because of considerable opportunities for tax evasion. The higher the income, the higher the taxes and greater the advantages in evading tax. Expenditure tax means taxing those anxious to consume. In a poor country, advancing towards economic development, the available scarce resources have to face numerous demands of varied priority. Any measure that attempts to restrict ostentatious consumption by the rich is therefore desirable. In the first instance expenditure tax is to affect only those 6,000 families which have incomes over Rs. 60,000. However, Indian taxpayer is not adapted to this sort of tax and in so far as the tax is a counterpart of income tax, he is bound to calculate the incidence of the two taxes together. Expenditure tax demands maintenance of accurate and voluminous accounts and an efficient administrative system. So as to meet these difficulties and earn a background for the effects of this tax, only one cent of the taxpayers of upper strata are included. The tax also involves cumbersome procedure and a detailed examination of various types of disbursements and receipts to arrive at the determination of

actual assessable expenditure. Assuming that these difficulties will be overcome, an expenditure tax to be effective must have steeply rising rates. It also requires that a large number must be covered to enable one to form accurate decisions which may otherwise be vitiated by abnormal and infrequent variations contained in particular cases. Expenditure tax is one which cannot be applied piecemeal. No doubt the Finance Minister has been forward enough to introduce this novel type of tax, yet it required of him to be a little bolder so as to widen its coverage. It makes one sceptical whether the aim of the Finance Minister to make the tax system income-elastic is furthered by the introduction of the expenditure tax.

The levy of annual wealth tax is a counterpart of the expenditure tax in the sense that the two taxes are self-checking, the concealment or understatement in one to minimise the liability will mean an increased burden in the other. The taxable capacity of an owner of a property is different from that of the owner of an income. The objection lies that the annual wealth tax would decrease desire to invest, particularly in a country like India, where the indigenous capital has been hitherto shy. It is a slow but sure remedy at decreasing the inequalities prevailing in the country. People pay part of their income as income tax and similarly provided the rates of taxation are not high the revenue can benefit itself from the levy of the annual wealth tax without expecting any detrimental effect on investment and risk-bearing. The Finance Minister should not contemplate any rise in the rates of this tax for a substantially long period until it becomes an integral part of the tax system and people are habituated to pay without feeling its pain. An important impact of these direct taxes is to make evasion difficult. The impact of the taxes have been exaggerated, to show that they strike at the very root of investment. The panic sought to be created in the business community is more than warranted. Tax evasion will become difficult under this system of taxes, and an increase in invisible transactions is consequentially feared. It is necessary therefore, that far more comprehensive system of returns and reporting be introduced without delay to counteract such malpractices.

The proposal to lower the taxable limit from Rs. 4,200 to Rs. 3,000 harsh as it may seem, is a legitimate one. Apart from administrative burden that it will entail it will bring four lacs more assesses under the purview of assessment, provide Rs. 5 crores to the revenue, and make the tax system more income elastic. It will also mean that those who will benefit from development plans will

soon be making their contribution from the added income and thereby help the community in ploughing back the extra income earned for further development. The increase in number of assesses will facilitate a more comprehensive reporting system as well.

CORPORATE TAXES

The Finance Minister has made various proposals at taxing corporate earnings involving an overall effect in raising revenue to the tune of Rs. 7.5 crores. Though forming a small portion of the aggregate taxes levied in the present Budget these taxes taken together with the annual wealth tax both on the individual and on the corporations are criticized as to inevitably have adverse effects on production in the private sector. This is also evident in about 8 per cent decrease in prices of the various stocks on the Stock Exchange. The only complacency felt is at liberalisation of the provisions of Sec. 23A. The investment companies also fear increase in costs of production and of expansion programmes on account of levy of excise on cement, steel and motor spirit. The tight import policy is also expected to increase prices of the scarce imported materials. Added to this is the suggestion made by the Finance Minister that part of the excise levy will probably be borne by the producers, and the consumers will be light off in that respect. In view of the increasing role corporations have to play in the development plans the Taxation Enquiry Commission did not suggest any increase in the corporation taxes while suggesting minor changes in development rebates and depreciation allowances. It is pointed out that after these recommendations the corporations have been levied direct taxes alone amounting to about Rs. 30 crores by the three budgets since 1955-56. The steep increase in tax on bonus shares and the taxes on extra dividends above six per cent mean that corporation will hasten to distribute dividends more or less as profits occur, thereby decreasing the amount of corporate savings which are otherwise extremely vital to the expansion and modernisation plants that the corporations are undertaking. However, these measures may mean a steady rate of dividends in the vicinity of six per cent. The projects in the public sector directly and also ultimately through a rise in consumption demand resulting from rising incomes, increase demands for the products of industries in the private sector. For a fairly long time to come, the flow of perennial demand for the products of this sector is ensured in view of the large investment programme envisaged

under the Second Five Year Plan. Rising prices on account of inflationary pressure also provide an inducement to the sustained activity in this sector. The corporations can therefore easily withstand the comparatively small increases in taxation under such buoyant conditions of high demand and rising prices. Hitherto, the companies were able to maintain exceptionally high dividends and at the same time expand their reserves for development at the cost of consumers who had to bear the burden of high prices. The ultimate effect, however, of the new taxation proposals may be to induce companies to distribute moderate and steady quantum of dividends and to attempt to improve productive efficiency and to bring about economy in management expenses. Nonetheless, annual wealth tax on the companies has come under valid criticism as apparently meaning double taxation for the shareholders. Considering the above justification for levying higher taxes, which means that the government will share part of the increase in incomes generated on account of development programme, annual wealth tax will not have undesirable effects. However to ensure new productive activity in essential fields and to continue the inflow of foreign capital, new companies both domestic and foreign, must be exempted from this tax for the initial period before they commence production. A rebate on this tax may also be granted to the existing companies engaged in the production of the essential goods on the basis of their expansion programmes. Instead, the Finance Minister has since declared concessions to the effect that the genuine new companies will be entitled to a tax holiday for the first five years of their incorporation and that shares of companies already taxed and held by other companies will not be included in the wealth of investing companies for the purpose of calculating the tax.

INDIRECT TAXES

A common man who is more affected by indirect taxes than direct taxes has been presented with a comparatively heavy bill of Rs. 53.2 crores for excise duties (now reduced by Rs. 3.45 crores for tea and coffee and kerosene), Rs. 6 crores for custom duties, Rs. 8 crores for taxes on railway fares and Rs. 85 lacs on account of increase in postal and telegram charges. The basis of levy seems to be to raise financial resources for development and compel restraint on consumption of consumption goods and thereby to release a sizeable quantity of goods for export, and make available factors of production for other essential activity. But with high profits current in industries

not the full impact will have to be borne by the consumers. The ultimate effect will be adjusted at some higher price-level than the prevailing one, where demand on the one hand, and profits on the other are suitably curtailed. Whenever demand outstrips supply, particularly in the initial period of development, there are always high profits and it is necessary that these profits be brought back to the government. To the extent excise is paid out of profits, not only the consumer will be better off, but there will be left in the hands of the business community lesser purchasing power to be otherwise spent either on conspicuous consumption or to be misapplied in speculative, unproductive or undesirable investments. The excises will also have deflationary effect to the extent it obviates the need for treasury bills to fill up the budgetary gap. Disregarding the internal effects of these duties on the respective industries themselves, it may broadly be said that the objective of raising revenue through these measures is in fact satisfied. The effect of excises on production goods will be to increase the cost of production both in private sector and in the public sector. The excises on cement, motor spirit and steel ingots—the three important factors indispensable for rapid industrial development which amongst themselves contribute Rs. 19.05 crores, have been levied primarily to curb their rising demand. But it is more likely that these levies would increase the cost of production rather than restrict the demand, the effect of the excises on consumption goods will largely depend upon whether they will impinge upon consumption or upon savings. The actual incidence of excise duty on matches on any individual person will be very insignificant although bringing as it does, a revenue of Rs. 6.2 crores. The levy on sugar, and vegetable oil is expected to cut the present individual demand to enable the supply to meet the increasing demand as also to create a surplus for exports. Roughly speaking, matches will cost more by 1 nP, vegetable oils by 2 nP per lb. and sugar by 5 nP per lb. The tax on railway fares and increase in post and telegram charges are inequitable and must be dropped, in view of the already prevalent high rates. Their levy merely cannot be justified on the ground that the present charges do not meet costs, of the services provided. We may conclude that, with a part of excise duties shared by the business, the net effect of indirect taxes on the budget of an individual will not be very high.

Whether the other two objectives, *viz.*, creating an exportable surplus and releasing resources for better utilisation will be fulfilled

or not, needs a little consideration. It is fairly clear that these objectives may be fulfilled not only by a decrease in consumption of the taxed items, but also of other items if their consumption has to be foregone on account of adjustment in the family budget occasioned by the levy of excise duties. Demand for most goods taxed, while elastic in response to income changes, is relatively inelastic in response to small price changes. Increasing incomes bring in higher demand, but increase in prices may not dissuade people from using part of their savings. The present excise duties will therefore pinch upon savings rather than consumption.

Assuming that the additional demand is adequately met by additional supply, the present levies at the most, will curb inflationary pressures in individual taxed item if its rise in price is due to expanding demand and inadequate supply. But the effect of excises will not be so great as not only to make the hitherto insufficient supply meet the requirements of the consumers, but even result in a balance which can be exported. On the contrary, excises will have inflationary effects if the increased prices cannot cut down the demand.

OTHER PROPOSALS

Apart from the taxes, the notable feature of the Budget is an attempt to provide incentive to save. Although the income tax exemption limit is lowered, the middle class and the upper middle class are granted small tax reliefs by reason of reconstitution of the tax rates, rise in tax free slab for married persons from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 3,000, introduction of children allowance, and by exempting incomes below Rs. 7,500 from the levy of surcharge. Incentives to save are also provided by raising the total amount on which income tax rebate on life insurance premium is granted. Concessions are given by increasing the exemptible amount of the employee's contribution to the Provident Fund and by exemption of employer's contribution under certain conditions. The rate of interest on Post Office Savings deposits is raised from 2% to 2.5%. The new issue of National Plan Savings Certificates is to carry income tax free interest at the rate of 4.25% compound interest, that is, 5.4% simple interest—rate much higher than the prevailing bank rate. Even though, an attractive rate of interest provides a basic inducement to invest in loans and Savings Certificates, by itself it does not mobilise or evoke additional savings. The progress in development of savings institutions and intensifying the programme of collection of savings in the rural areas is much behind the schedule as can be seen from

the fact that the modest target for collection of small savings last year has not been achieved. With increasing prices and by the indirect taxes presently levied, the savings of the people have been adversely affected. The real need is not only an increase in the rate of interest but also organisation of proper agency to tap up the existing savings wherever they may be.

The increase in bank rate from 3.5 to 4%, although as it ought to, has not resulted in a crash at the security market. Partly it is due to the fact that the increase now made is a mere *de jure* recognition of a *de facto* situation. But mainly, it shows the long prevailing stringency in the money market. Reserve Bank's holding of the securities has gone up by Rs. 273 crores than the last year while scheduled banks' lending to the private sector has been more by Rs. 147 crores. This apparently suggests the extent to which both the public and the private sectors are responsible for the high inflationary pressure in the country. It also shows that increase in bank rate by 1/2 per cent will not ease the situation.

The Finance Minister remarked that the efforts were being made to divert away credit from non-essential sectors, so as to facilitate the essential industries to easily obtain the required credit. He also suggested that institutions were being developed to provide facilities to the selective industries. In this respect, the announcement of the establishment of Refinance Corporation is a welcome measure. But the situation demands stronger steps to be taken in this regard. The Finance Minister is well aware that the constant inflationary pressure breeds speculative tendency and thereby create not only a feign financial stringency but also affects the currently available amount of consumable goods. The measures taken by the Reserve Bank from time to time at diverting credit from such undesirable use have not been sufficient. Organisation of a healthy money market is the real necessity. The need may be partly provided by curbing speculative transactions at the Stock Exchange and by creation of new and expansion of the existing financial agencies. At the same time the Reserve Bank must intensify its efforts to prevent the use of credit for speculative purpose and in this respect must maintain a constant vigilance over the banks' lending policy.

The creation of Food Subsidy Fund of Rs. 25 crores and the allocation of Rs. 10 crores for Ambar Charkhas are amongst the other proposals. As the former is to be mainly utilised for the relief in the scarcity areas, which expenses otherwise have to be met from the same resources under different heads, it has not created any

interest amongst the people, who have been suffering from acute shortage in food grains and the consequent high prices. The latter provision is in conformity with the government's declared policy to help fight unemployment through the means of ambar charkhas.

The delicate foreign exchange problem also deserves note. With the imports in 1956-57 exceeding exports by Rs. 350 crores, the present foreign assets of the Reserve Bank has been reduced to about Rs. 500 crores, which sum is hardly more than sufficient to provide for the adverse and unforeseen situations. During the last year, about Rs. 60 crores were also borrowed from the International Monetary Fund for the purpose of financing our imports. The firm determination to fight these foreign exchange difficulties through the scaling down of imports and boosting up exports even at the cost of consumption has helped our rupee to stand more stable.

A budget however, is not to be judged from the total revenues that it brings to the Exchequer. The effect of the budget on the prices according to rough calculations has been estimated in rural areas to be between 1.2 to 2.34% and in urban areas between 3 to 4.38%. The incidence of these taxes on the cost of living is expected to be 0.75 to 1.5% if the consumers will have to bear the full burden of the levies. With varied behaviour of the human being, no definite statement can be made in this respect. These estimates have to be judged from the fact that they are based on an average income. In particular cases, it will depend upon the extent of use of tobacco, Oil, and sugar which an individual makes, and accordingly he will be affected more or less than an average person. Again it does not mean that the rich will be affected less and the poor more or vice versa, for it will depend upon the habit of spending and the items which constitute a family's budget. To this must be added the increase in taxes that the States are obliged to raise, as their part of the efforts in finding resources for the Plan, which in total amount to Rs. 250 crores. In states where the sales tax and other regressive taxes are quite high, the scope for direct taxation being negligible, the poor along with the rich will have to share the burden of taxes very harshly. The common man will face these taxes, both with reduction in consumption and in savings. With every decrease in consumption, real resources will be set free for other productive activity, provided that the additional generation of income into the community, is spent and saved in conformity with the quantities of consumption and production goods manufactured. The situation will not hold out to be such, because of the high

priorities accorded to the industries in Second Five Year Plan. Therefore, as development proceeds, inflationary pressure may also increase.

It is highly necessary that the danger of inflation be guarded against. As the budget reveals, this danger seeks entrance into the economy, through more than one openings. The rise in price of production goods such as cement, steel, motor spirit and the imported goods may lead to an increase in the cost of production and therefore in prices. This will mean higher costs of production not only in the private but also in the public sector. The estimates on development plans have already gone high on account of rise in prices since June, 1955. By now, the costs of production in Second Five Year Plan are higher than those of the First Five year Plan by about 10 to 12%. If the costs of the intended projects are not to rise, a stricter policy of distribution and greater efforts at eliminating mal-allocation of resources will have to be undertaken. Again, the rise in excise on consumption goods will lead to increase in prices. A rise in prices of these goods may soon give effect to the cost-price spiral, if adequate steps are not taken in the initial stages. It shows that giving reliefs to poor and middle class is not so much to give concessions to them. They help to keep low the cost of production. It should be the policy of government to resist any increase in wage claims. Whether the government will succeed in this, in view of the strong trade union movement will depend upon firm government action. Linking wages to productivity seems to be the best medium to save the situation. The test of measuring success will be whether increase in cost of living leads to increase in prices or decrease in consumption. If the latter happens, investment and exports may also increase. The fact that the inflationary pressure existing in the country at the present moment is more than essential to provide incentive to higher production, makes the need for a proper handling of the situation a very delicate issue.

When essential commodities are taxed, people consume the requisite quantity in spite of higher prices, by cutting down their savings. And, it is not unsocial to utilise savings when prices of such goods rise. When the objective is to restrain people from consuming, it is necessary that the conspicuous consumption of the richer and the upper middle class must be taxed. Taxes on these types of articles will show them less attractive than savings, and people will abstain from spending on such articles. The released resources may be either diverted for better utilisation or for promoting

exports and restricting imports. If the aim of the fiscal policy is to check consumption, essential and semi-essentials both ought to be taxed. While the tax on former will enable to check the inflationary rise in prices, the resulting surplus because of diminution in consumption on account of the latter may be exchanged either for imported articles or by diverting the released resources to the other uses. The budget ought to have made further provision for taxing semi-essentials and conspicuous articles. The levy of expenditure tax cannot help in this respect, for it will not affect a large number of people who consume this variety of goods. Measures should be taken to cut drastically the home consumption of conspicuous and ostentatious goods.

The overall impression of the budget is that in spite of the austerity people will undergo to fight the existing situation, it will not release sufficient resources to achieve the ultimate objective of implementing the plan. The failure of the Plan will mean huge waste of partly utilised resources. It has been suggested therefore by many that the size of the Plan may be reduced to represent the tax efforts possible or that the Plan may be spread over more than five years.

SIZE OF THE PLAN

India is an underdeveloped country abounding in masses having low incomes. A small increase in income of the people is bound to be expended on the bare necessities of life. Any increase in their income will forthwith put forth increasing demand for the consumption goods. Similarly, a little increase in the production of food crops is consumed away by the farmers themselves. The increasing population also diminishes the actual increase in individual standard of living. It is difficult in an underdeveloped country to conserve and plough back a substantial part of income that the development generates, for the reutilisation of the same for further production. Economic development may not mean much if it does not bring in expansion of capital and improvement in the technique of production. Initial development therefore has to attain certain minimum momentum so that the cumulative development process is set in to motion. Economic development demands austerity at any one point of time in favour of progress. To postpone such sacrifice to a time when the country might become a little better off through a gradually strengthened economy is to negative the idea of development of an underdeveloped country, particularly in view of the prevailing low

standard of living, increasing population and the peculiar social, economic and political institutional factors which predominate the economy. Again, the complex economy of the modern times needs, that the development to be effectual must be fairly wide so as to include the primary as well as the complimentary industries. In a gradual development, abstinence spread over a number of years, though involving greater sacrifice, in effects, it will not be equal to the economic development brought about fairly rapidly. The economy, in such case, tends to become a weak, steady and rigid economy. However, this does not mean that spectacular progress is preferred to sound and steady development. The emphasis is upon the adequate size of the Plan commensurate with the need of the people so as to be enough to set the acceleration in motion. Otherwise progress becomes impossible. In fact, for instance, many of our development projects are hampered only on account of scarcity of steel. The Second Five Year Plan contemplates to raise investment from 7 to 12% of the national income involving an increase of national income at the rate of 4 to 5% per annum. The Eastern European countries, for example, framed and worked their plans to increase national income by 15 to 17% per annum. This shows that the contemplated increase in national income through increased investment is modest and practicable to implement even in our democratic system. The consequent sacrifice involved is not so great, only if we understand the beneficial implications of the Plan and prepare ourselves for the same. In fact, Japan saved 12 to 17% of its national income so as to free the resources for being utilised for production of industrial goods.

ESTIMATES OF RESOURCES

The Plan which was originally estimated to cost Rs. 4200 crores has now been expanded virtually to cost Rs. 5600 crores. The budget does not raise sufficient revenue for the successful implementation of the Plan. If all other estimates remain unaltered, the uncovered 'gap' will now rise from Rs. 400 crores to Rs. 1000 crores. Contribution of taxes towards the finance for the Plan was determined at Rs. 800 crores, out of which Rs. 450 crores were to be raised by additional taxation. The government has also decided to limit deficit financing to Rs. 800 crores in place of the former estimate of Rs. 1200 crores, in view of the inherent dangers implicit in such a huge creation of money. We may presume that the other sources of finance, viz., external assistance, contribution by the railways and the Provident

Fund, etc. will fulfil their respective quota and that there will be no deficiency under these heads. The expansion of the Plan, the uncovered 'gap' and the diminution of the quantum of deficit financing will bring a burden of Rs. 1400 crores to be distributed between taxation and savings.

As against these requirements the measures undertaken since the beginning of Second Five Year Plan are expected to yield the following increase in revenue over the Plan period.

1. 1955-56 Budget	Rs. 175 crores.
2. Excise on cloth levied in November last and the mid-year Budget 1956.	Rs. 200 crores.
3. 1956-57 Budget.	Rs. 88 crores.
4. Expected yield for the next 3 years on the basis of present Budget proposals.	Rs. 290 crores.
	<hr/> Rs. 753 crores.

To this may be added, say Rs. 100 crores being additional revenue on account of increase in the national income over the Plan period. Thus, as against Rs. 1850 crores required for the Plan, the finance available from the revenues do not exceed, say, Rs. 850 crores. Even if the States in their tax efforts contribute Rs. 300 crores (an unusually high figure for the States) Rs. 700 crores will still be required to be raised either by savings or by taxes. As we will see with high targets fixed for Borrowings and Small Savings, savings will not be able to provide any help in contributing to this deficit. If taxes are immediately levied this may mean raising Rs. 175 crores per year for next four years.

The targets for Borrowings and Small Savings are respectively set at Rs. 700 crores and Rs. 500 crores. The Central Government has raised Rs. 158 crores by way of loans and paid up Rs. 81 crores on account of maturities. In view of extreme financial stringency prevailing in the market and the private sector attracting capital from the investors, the hope for raising substantially high amount by loans does not seem to be bright. The Budget takes credit of Rs. 100 crores for loans and Rs. 80 crores for Small Savings. In addition to the balance of Rs. 623 crores to be obtained by way of loans, the government will also have to borrow further to repay the outstandings which mature during the next four years and which aggregate to Rs. 349 crores. As against this, loans raised by the

State Governments last year should be taken into account. One should be only glad if the Central and the States' Government can secure all these moneys by borrowings from the public. We may hope that with nationalisation of life insurance and increase in rate of interest on savings, government will be able to collect Rs. 500 crores through small savings.

Assuming that the inflationary rise in prices will soon be checked so as not to disturb the Plan requirements, that foreign assistance and contribution by railways and Provident Fund, etc., are available as scheduled, that contemplated deficit financing does not mean excessive risks, that voluntary savings can be tapped up by small savings and loans sufficient to leave the required surplus after imbruing the maturities and provided the railway requirements are adequately met from the Plan allocation and further foreign loans, the Central Government will have to raise Rs. 175 crores per year for the next four years. In other words, the withdrawals at the present level are considerably low

The controversies over the present Budget proposals show how difficult it would be to raise the necessary financial resources. To ensure a steady level of investment and prices, some people have asserted that the Finance Minister should now give assurance that future changes in the tax system will only involve marginal modifications. In light of the above analysis it would be clear how futile it would be for the Finance Minister to give any such assurance. It is also clear that the Central Government and the States' Governments will not be able to wipe out the total deficit of Rs. 1,000 crores by taxes alone. To successfully overcome the difficult situation, savings in the inner parts of the country must be mobilised and a drive at economy commenced to ensure complete utilisation of the resources expended. The success will also depend upon how well the State Governments prove triumphant in their efforts at tax collections. The State Governments should determine to implement the recommendations made by the Taxation Enquiry Commission, which have not yet been attended to. The main sources of revenue of States are inelastic. Except for the increasing collections in sales tax, tax efforts at the States' level has been negligible. The States should now resort to direct agricultural taxation by increasing land revenue which at present forms only one per cent. of the total production. Survey of unsurveyed tracts should be immediately commenced and long standing settlements suitably revised. The increase in land revenue must bring substantial revenue in view of the fact that the rural people

are comparatively better off than urban people in payment of indirect taxes on account of large non-monetised sectors and the exemption of small scale and village industries from the purview of excises. The Local Boards may also be permitted to increase the local taxes. Similarly, efforts must be made to tap up savings in the rural areas or the agriculturist may be encouraged to invest his earnings again in lands rather than use them for consumption goods. At present, rural areas lack in proper agencies to mobilise savings and endeavours must be made to extend saving facilities to these areas. Active efforts on part of government and social institutions are necessary to educate people to realise that instead of what they do not consume and what they may further abstain from consuming, the government and the business community invests; that unless people save government cannot invest; that higher standards of living in the future depend upon present abstention; that progress is vital to a country with increasing population even to maintain the present standard of living. The Plan must be implemented as if it is Peoples' Plan rather than it is Government Plan. Again, particular instances of extravagance and inefficient administration prejudice people against the government. In conformity with the recommendations of the Taxation Enquiry Commission the committee which has been set up to organise a thorough investigation into the waste of resources in different government projects must be entrusted with extensive work so as to secure concrete results therefrom. It is necessary not only to move towards expending for beneficial purposes, but also towards economy and efficiency. Economy and rationalisation in expenditure is vital to an expanding public sector. As for increasing efficiency in administration, recruitment of civil servants on the basis of special cadres must be increasingly resorted to.

But fiscal measures alone will not be sufficient. It is necessary that scarce resources must be properly utilised to ensure sufficient supply of credit for the essential productive activity. Stock exchanges should be cleared of speculative transactions and bank credit be regulated and new financial institutions established to provide the genuine need of the private sector. Further, the resources released on account of decrease in consumption brought about by taxation must be properly diverted to ensure better utilisation.

When programmes of huge expenditure are undertaken, the economy is faced with latent dangers of inflation. If not kept within manageable bounds the functional rise in prices essential to give expansionary impulse may turn down into wild inflation. rise in

prices. Rise in prices of food products probably constitute a single factor that may endanger the fulfilment of the Plan. Cooperative institutions should therefore be developed not only for the purpose of production but also for proper distribution of consumption goods. In a developing economy, proper distribution of consumption goods forms the basis on which the plan seeks to proceed. Such a lacuna becomes detrimental to the success of the plan. As a last resort governmental machinery must be kept ready to institute direct controls if the other alternatives fail. Thus along with the fiscal policy a proper adaptation in monetary, price and tariff policies will also be essential.

Having awakened to the desire for development, the people promise that the Plan will not be hampered merely due to their unwillingness to bear abstinence and hardship. Let the government in its own part assure that all governmental efforts will be made to utilise the scarce resources thus released in a judicious manner, lest they may be wasted away.

A GLIMPSE INTO RAJPUT POLITY.

(EARLY MEDIEVAL PERIOD)

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To the author of the *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan* belongs the credit of having made the earliest investigations not only into the connected, narrative history of the Rajput dynasties, but also into the working of the Rajput social and political institutions. Since then valuable researches have been made with the result that it has been possible to construct the political history of the Rajput states in a continuous link from the early medieval period down to the first quarter of the 19th century, with more or less precision and completeness. But the structure provided by Tod relating to the Rajput political institutions, nearly a century and a quarter ago, has not been elaborated to the extent that was desirable. Eminent historians have written volumes on ancient Indian polity, but the socio-political institutions of Rajputs of the early medieval period have not unfortunately received the attention that they deserve.

The institutions which prevailed in Rajputana since after the advent of the Mughal Empire, lost much of their pristine character as they were invariably influenced by the outlook and institutions of the Mughal imperial court. The view that the character of Rajput monarchy from the 16th century onward, underwent radical change and tended to become despotic has found more or less general acceptance from historians. But the period which intervenes between the rise of the Rajput dynasties and the exit of the Delhi Sultanate, is a period during which Rajput institutions, more or less uncontaminated by extraneous influences, found opportunities for free and proper development. And yet no systematic study into the institutions of this period, is known to have been attempted.

For the early medieval period Tod is of little or no help. The glimpses he offers into Rajput polity relate to the Rajput political organisation of his days with special reference to the circumstances prevailing in Mewar.¹ His information, as such, has no bearing on the early medieval times. Besides Tod was more painstaking than cautious and

¹ Tod—*Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Vol. I. Chapter on 'Sketch of a Feudal System in Rajasthan.'

more often than not, he has allowed his judgment to be vitiated by "his anxiety to discover the elements of Feudalism in Rajput life".²

For the study of the early medieval Rajput polity we are mainly dependent on literary and epigraphic sources. But the available literary sources, such as quasi-historical commemorative compositions, do not supply us with precise data and their tendency is to exalt the position and achievements of the ruling princes, often at the expense of the people, who go unnoticed. Whatever value attaches to them is in the nature of corroborating some information derived through independent sources rather than yielding us new information.

In the circumstances, our reliance has necessarily to be placed on epigraphic records. These records again often furnish us with exaggerated or distorted information and when compared with similar records issued by contemporary or later rulers belonging to several dynasties, are often found to involve themselves in contradictions. In spite, however, of the paucity of materials and of their not wholly satisfactory character it is possible to trace the working of medieval Rajput polity in its outlines.

The general impression prevalent among the students of Indian history is that every Rajput ruler was a tyrant within his state and that he ruled as a despot. Referring to the days that elapsed after the death of Harshavardhan, V. A. Smith says,

"Dynastic wars and revolutions did not bring about any development of political institutions. . . . The states continued to be governed in the old-fashioned ways by despotic Rajas each of whom could do what he pleased."³ But a reference to the available evidence on the Rajput political and social institutions of the early medieval period does not support the statement of V. A. Smith.

A study of the Rajput institutions of the early medieval period is possible only in the context of (1) the character of the Rajput immigrants and (2) the political situation prevalent in India during the age of the settlement of the Rajputs. The Rajputs who came in different waves of migration to India are not known to have developed any organised polity while they lived outside India. After they had lived for sometime in India, they began to run after Indian ideas and institutions as fast as they could. And by the time they emerged as the ruling dynasties, they had become completely Indianised, so that the institutions which came into existence were in the main a continuation of the institutions which had been prevalent in India from much earlier times. There is evidence to show that despotism was not a

² A. C. Banerjee—*Rajput Studies*, p. 99.

³ V. A. Smith—*Oxford History of India*, p. 181.

necessary feature of the ancient Indian polity. The Rajput immigrants had no well-developed polity of their own with which they could think of replacing the institutions which had the sanction of tradition and custom behind them. Hence they accepted them as they were. Secondly, though the Rajput polity was in the main a continuation of the ancient Indian polity, it was not entirely so. This was in a sense inevitable for the death of Harsha had let loose the forces of disintegration at a time which was soon after followed by the advent of Islam, constituting a serious challenge to the integrity of India. It was during this period of confusion that the Rajputs were called upon to play the role of the defenders of Indian culture and polity. They played their part valiantly enough, delayed the progress of the Muslim arms and kept in tact the pattern of Hindu polity, with certain inevitable modifications to suit the exigencies of the time. In the circumstances the early medieval Rajput polity could not obviously be a mere replica of the old system. It was rather the old system chiselled out into a new form. To describe it as feudal, as Tod does, is to put the emphasis on the wrong spot. The Rajput system betrays no doubt certain casual affinities to several features of feudalism, which, on scrutiny, are found to be more apparent than real. A comparison of the Rajput system with the one prevailing in Europe in the middle ages only helps to emphasise the soundness of Hallam's warning that "it is of great importance for us to be on guard against seeming analogies which vanish away when they are closely observed".⁴ Besides the features which Tod took to be feudal, were applicable, if at all, to some of the socio-economic institutions which came to exist in Rajputana only from after the 18th century. The evidence of their existence in earlier centuries is not conclusive.⁵

The distinguishing characteristic of the Rajput system is not then feudal. It would be much more correct to say that the political society of the Rajputs during the early medieval period was based on the ancient Indian system and was governed in accordance with principles laid down in the Smriti commentaries of Medhatithi, Visva-rupa and Nitikavyanrita of Somadeva.⁶

* Hallam—*Middle Ages*, Vol. I, p. 200.

⁴ It must be remembered, again, that Tod's account relates to the circumstances prevailing towards the close of the 18th, and the beginning of the 19th Century. We cannot be sure whether his observations should be regarded as applicable to the political organisation of the Rajputs in the pre-Mughal age or even in the 17th Century". A. C. Banerjee—*Rajput Studies*, p. 99.

⁵ "Upto the end of the 12th Century the character and structure of the Rajput social and political institutions were purely indigenous, having been directly inherited from the ancient political system of India. Their terminology was entirely derived from Sanskrit and their aims and ideals were governed by principles expounded in Hindu Works of Polity." P. Saran—*Studies in Medieval Indian History*, p. 4.

A reference to the Rajput epigraphy shows that the officers of the crown were known by the same designations as in old, viz., *Mantrin*, *Mahasandhivigrahika*, *Mahasenapati*, *Dandapasika*, *Mahapratihara*, *Dandanayaka*, *Baladhikarta*, etc., and the administrative divisions continued to be known by the name of *bhuktis*, *vishayas* and *mandalas*. It was not till the 16th century that these designations were replaced by new appellations unknown to ancient Indian political treatises. But while up to the 12th century the Rajput political system continued to be mainly based on the ancient Indian system, certain changes had begun to manifest themselves, imparting to Rajput polity a character which had been unknown before.

The most prominent feature of Rajput monarchy is its clan-character. The clans into which the Rajputs were divided claimed descent from different stocks and the clan feeling always predominated among them. At no period in their history were they able to merge their clan patriotism into one for the entire community. Under the peculiar political system of the Rajputs one Rajput clan settled in and ruled over one state—the different sub-sections of the clan occupying distinct allotments of land within the clan state. The sub-section first, the clan next and the community last of all—was the pattern on which the Rajput system rested. Thus the Rajput political system tended to accentuate the differences within the community—i.e., between one clan and another, to the great detriment of the feeling of nationality.

Within the clan, however, there was a remarkable identification of outlook and interest. "In every state the ruling class belongs to one particular clan. . . . The humblest members of the clan considered themselves along with the ruler as the sons of the same father, enjoying their patrimony by the same right as the ruler himself. The latter was thus nothing but *primus inter pares*. . . . The state in fact did not belong to the ruler—it belonged to the clan as a whole."

So far as the antiquity of the clan monarchies is concerned, it is possible to trace their existence to the age of the Pratiharas.⁷ Dr. Ghoshal draws our attention to two Pratihara records of A.D. 893 and 899⁸ in which the donated village is described as belonging to a group of 84 villages and concludes "This was exactly the standard size of the clan-chief's estate in medieval Rajputana."

This new type of Rajput polity in its inception, was thus considerably different from the system such as prevailed in the age of the

⁷ S. C. Dutt, "Rajput Polity." *The Guardian*, August 27, 1931.

⁸ *The Age of Imperial Kanauj*, Chap. X—*Political Theory, Administrative Organisation, Law and Legal Institutions* by Dr. U. N. Ghoshal, p. 240

⁹ *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. IX., 4ff.

Mauryas or that of the Guptas. The ancient Indian system was a highly developed bureaucratic system which had to its credit a long process of evolution. Compared to it the Rajput system was a primitive one. It was only at a later stage that the old bureaucratic system made its influence felt over the newer clan system, and in consequence of the fusion of the two, the Rajput system attained its final stature.

In its origin the Rajput system was intended to serve the needs of a transitional phase and is therefore intelligible in the context of the socio-political conditions prevalent then. Broadly speaking, it is possible to trace three main stages in the evolution of medieval Rajput polity (1) Consequent upon the state of disintegration from which India suffered for nearly a century after Harsha's death and the lengthening shadows of foreign invasion, ancient political institutions tended to decline for some time. But with the advent of the Pratihara empire of Kanauj, the pendulum swung back and the ancient institutions were revived. The Pratihara institutions, as observed already, bear a close resemblance with the ancient Hindu polity. (ii) But the ancient system was not destined to remain unchanged for long. The change in the socio-economic cum political conditions consequent upon the decline and disintegration of the Pratihara imperial structure made change in the pattern of government inevitable. From about the middle of the tenth century, Northern India came to be split up into a number of independent territorial units ruled by various Rajput dynasties. By the time these dynasties emerged into the full light of history, the clan-character of the monarchy seemed to have overshadowed its other characteristics. The menace of the Muslim invasion had become more intense than ever and the Rajput rulers sought to strengthen their position by emphasising their identity of interests with the subjects through common ancestry and common profession.

(iii) The third stage in the evolution of Rajput polity was heralded by its contact with the Mughal Raj and it is the influence of the imperial court in Delhi which was responsible for fostering the cause of absolute and over-centralised monarchy in Rajputana. But even when the leader of the clan became transformed into the irresponsible bureaucrat of the 17th and 18th centuries, there was no complete break with the past. Old institutions, like habits, die hard. The old patriarchal character of the monarchy survived through such appellations as 'Bapujee' by which the monarch was addressed and 'Babas' by which his officers, the vassals of the state, were known.¹⁰

¹⁰ Tod—*Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*.

ROLE OF HUMAN FACTOR IN REVOLUTION AND WAR

BANI GHOSH, M.A.

From the dawn of recorded history mankind quests for peace. But the road to peace is strewn with the stormy struggles. Security of life has been challenged continuously from the time immemorial. Peace, progress and prosperity have been ruthlessly charged by the cruel destructive forces in human nature. The grinding poverty and the untold miseries, the pangs of burning hunger, the wants and worries threaten the existence of human life in this world. The unity and fraternity, love and sympathy have been proved ineffective. Evil powers win and the kind virtues are subdued. The goodwill mission becomes a sheer mockery. Man is nothing but the helpless puppet of this tragic show. The wheel of destruction rolls on.

To-day's world is rocking and rolling towards the unknown destination. The bird's-eye view on the international soil focuses on the gloomy days that are ahead. The civilisation stands at present on the cross road of war and peace. The possibility of the third global war in the coming future is threatening through the dark horizon indicating the shaken destiny of human civilisation.

In these tense moments of history in the context of the present international situations it is necessary to survey the basic causes, which operate in the background of the social and political disturbances and crises. Revolution and war are the most violent and engrossing human struggles for power. These two forms of human conflicts have become the most serious and dangerous problems in the modern world. Historians and sociologists attempt to analyse the causes of revolution and war with the different approaches from the past records. But in their reviews, the role of human mind has not been exposed specifically. So it is necessary to explore the human factors involved in revolution and war. The disturbed and tortured mind is the most active and dynamic operator or in other words the leading cause of disruption and violence.

WHAT IS REVOLUTION?

A question may be asked 'what is revolution'? In popular conception a revolution is a sudden reorganisation in the political system.

of a state. But broadly revolution means disorder, chaos and dislocation of the entire existing orders in the political, social, economic, cultural and religious institutions of a country. Precisely, a revolution is an abrupt social and political reformation usually accomplished by forcible overthrow of the existing systems in a country. Overt violence is not an essential feature of revolution. It has been observed universally that upheaval of revolution awaits the arrival of the psychological moment. As no drama can be played unless the stage is properly set, so the revolution cannot step in unless the people is firmly prepared. Actually the emergence of revolution depends on the people's felt need, which arises spontaneously from a tremendous change in outlooks, beliefs and attitudes in a prevalent social system. The age inspires people to claim their voices for novelties.

The strong optimism guides the trend of revolution. The inner spirit of revolution is born out of the agony of the human heart which steers people through the unseen perilous voyage to the glorious victory of life's journey.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS MAKING FOR THE PRE-REVOLUTIONARY SET UP AND THE PRE-WAR CONDITIONS

The pre-revolutionary set up and the pre-war conditions irrespective of time and circumstances depend primarily on the attitudes and feelings of people in making revolution and war.

Revolution and war are the two forms of human conflicts. Co-operation is the basis of society but conflict is the reverse of unity, which uproots or dislocates the social life of mankind. The force of conflict presents the most serious and vital problems in every aspect of human associations—racial, industrial, cultural, religious, etc.

The term 'conflict' has been used in our everyday life. It is an abstract concept of the attitude of opposition or aggressiveness through which it is finally manifested. Conflict indicates the splitting up processes. The significance of the term implies the sense of twoness or duality with the feeling of rivalry; or the awareness of differences with the motive of persecution. That awareness is a tendency, which indicates to move towards an object or principle and at the same time withdrawal or avoidance from the rival or the opposite criteria. The acute conflict is a set of attitudes, which produces tension and is usually released through aggressive actions followed by either verbal or overt violence.

Intensive analysis exposes that the origin of conflict is rooted in the biased attitude and sentiment, ideologies and principles, myths and

legends, irrational beliefs and perverse judgments, etc. Distrust and misunderstandings, jealousy and selfishness are the subsidiary channels through which the main stream of conflict flows on. But more precisely all these evil attitudes originate from the primitive instinct of hatred in human nature; which manifests itself in the spirit of aggression. This instinct is the most powerful and dynamic in action, that guides the destiny of human life in this world. The cause of the outbreak of war is the bitter feeling of hatred within the groups towards each other.

The role of conflict in group life is immensely important. The primary object of conflict is to inspire group consciousness and to maintain the in-group and out-group struggles. This process of conflict has always dual role; which holds the allied group together and at the same time stands against the rival party. These rival forces always run parallel and never coincide and co-exist at one and the same time; so the result ends in the never ending aggression or destruction.

Social exploitation, economic injustice, political suppression, tyrannical rule, ideological antagonism are the adequate conditions which venture and await for the psychological moment for the outburst into direct action.

CAUSES OF REVOLUTION

There are innumerable active factors in making revolution. But the basic cause lies deep in the human nature. Although the psychological factors are not the only causes but these are supposed to be root causes that remain unchanged throughout the ages and centuries.

The major cause of revolution is the repressed instinct or drive which under the proper stimulation bursts out in the form of disorderly breakdown. When the basic desires and the burning necessities are thwarted and forcibly suppressed, the revolting attitude grows up against the existing authority. But the climax of repression becomes heightened when the old system of social-cultural set up fails to compromise with the changing views and demands of the new uprising group. Thus a feeling crops up that the legitimate aspirations and ideals of these people are unlawfully checked. These maladjusted persons with their uncompromising attitudes are the sources of all disturbances and discontents in every sphere of social life. This inhibited force of the repressed impulses and desires attempt to reach the perverted track as an outlet for its satisfaction. The results are the morbid abnormal behaviours of the people. Discontent and unrest, the feeling of insecurity and humiliation, terror and the suppressed

worries are the primary psychological features that create tensions and gradually shape themselves into a stern desperate attitude which finally plunges into revolution.

WHAT IS WAR?

Modern war is the total mobilisation of manpower and the natural resources of a country to encroach on other's free existence. According to some thinkers war is an institution. It is an institution because there are different channels of activities directed to only one objective. In war the entire life of a nation becomes involved. National interest is so much interdependent that sometimes the whole of humanity is entangled and collapses. So war is an institutionalised international conflict. War as an institution stimulates and directs the aggressive habits of man.

ORIGIN OF WAR

The root is the ambitious achievements of a nation for power and possessions. The desires for political supremacy and commercial expansion of the larger states prepare the bases of war. This attitude is termed in political science as imperialism. These desires are the reflections of 'self-preservation' instinct in man and this personal feeling is transformed into a group attitude. The conflict becomes acutely sharp between the states when the political as well as physical securities are threatened and challenged by each other. This is the climax position for the outbreak of war.

WAR IN MAKING

'We love as one, we hate as one'—is the disciplined principle of military idealism. The intensive in-group solidarity is equally dependent on positive and negative attitudes. The patriotic idealism in a nation depends not alone on the attitudes of love and sympathy but also on their opposite components of hatred, jealousy, distrust and avoidance. The people in a state are encouraged and inspired to extend their deepest love and sympathy towards the in-group or homeland, and that spirit is revered as patriotism; whereas at the same time these countrymen are trained to transfer their bitter feelings of hatred to the threatening out-group or enemy country. So the conclusion may be drawn that the war provides the individual with a culturally accepted and expected outlet for his aggressiveness. This culturised aggressiveness is the psychological foundation of war morale or fighting spirit.

War is nothing but the psychological exploitation and drilling of certain distinctive mental forces of people to achieve the pre-planned success of an ambitious nation. These psychological forces in man are cultivated and trained under the strong military discipline. Personal ill feelings are roused and directed to concentrate the force through one particular outlet, which is war. Man is mechanised to act like a horrible deadly weapon. Thus war becomes inevitable.

The studies on the effects of these evil forces on human personality specially in the situation of war in making reveal some deeper causes. Aggression is a common and universal experience of mankind. It has been observed from the fact that personal aggressiveness arises from the frustration complex which individuals experience in their daily contacts with others. The sense of frustration begins from the disparity between human want and its satisfaction in the context of the existing social-culturally interactional systems. Although frustration does not always lead to aggression but everybody shows some form of resistance or negative attitude to the frustrating contacts with relatives, friends, neighbours, teachers or others. So it is evidently true that everybody carries the resource of resistance of some form or other. This resource in human nature is exploited with a pre-planned motive by a particular interested group. People are stimulated to transfer their most intense aggressiveness to the nations that stand against their securities. The force of personal resistance becomes so violent by proper drilling, that it shapes even into the morbid reaction to murder. This process of transformation of the personal evil feelings into the total group feelings is technically termed as psychological exploitation.

HOW TO SOLVE THE DISASTROUS PROBLEM OF HUMAN SLAUGHTER?

It is high time for us to pause and ponder whither we are drifting to-day. The next task of social scientist is ahead the discovery of the evil forces which stand in the way of unity and peace. The analysis of basic psychological factors that lead to misunderstanding, selfishness, jealousy and meanness ultimately misguide the humanity to plunge into ruins. Where religion has become a warery, narrow racism poisons the human culture and civilisation, bloodshed and hatred are the means to reach the goal of success.

Human needs are unlimited and would never be appeased. Satisfaction means stagnancy, discontent is progress. Hatred, jealousy and suspicion are bestowed upon man. Every human being suffers from these natural endowments. But these must be considered as individual problems and should be overcome personally, hence evil forces must

not be stimulated and organised to destroy society. Secondly, the group spirit should be inspired for the constructive services. The human energy should be directed to the multi-purpose achievements of worldly life. The brilliance of life should be unfolded before the distressed and helpless people.

Thirdly, the competitive spirit in people should be always encouraged and guided for the better upliftment. The aggressiveness in human character has been found in its sublimated form in the healthy competitive activities in the different branches of human attainments—academic achievements, athletic contest, commercial competition, party politics, trade unionism, philanthropic mission, etc., are the burning examples. These are the channels in which the diffusion of personal resistance and aggressiveness is possible. Common man desires and hankers after material needs; this individual satisfaction should be provided as far as practicable.

In these critical days, social scientist must be on guard to take the charge of man's destiny and thus to save people from disaster and to ensure lasting peace. If these poisonous forces are reformed and sublimated by broader education and rational outlook, then a great service will be offered to mankind. The resurgent man will realise the ideal of universal fraternity and will proceed to achieve the long cherished goal of cosmopolitanism—"One World".

NYĀYA-MANJARĪ

VOL II (28)

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THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CHASTE AND VULGAR WORDS IS NOT TENABLE

Let this discussion be stopped since it is a very long one. There are no such words as bear the label 'chaste' and similarly the label 'vulgar' is not attached to someother words. Let us now put a premium on discussion regarding the jurisdiction of an injunction and that of a prohibition. Let us take an illustration of Injunction *viz.* one should sacrifice with Brīhis and an example of Prohibition *viz.* "One should not take kalañja. In the above two examples one knows of the characteristic features of Brīhis and Kalañjas from the people at large. Therefore, an injunction concerning Brīhis or a prohibition with regard to kalañjas is not impossible to understand. But as one knows what is Brīhi and what is Kalañja from the common people so he does not know the distinction between chaste and vulgar words from the same source. [Hence, an injunction prescribing the use of chaste words and a prohibition restricting the use of vulgar words remain ever obscure]. Though our ears feel tired with the hearing of words yet they produce simply the undiscerning knowledge of words. But the chastity or otherwise of words is never directly apprehended. As one senses the universal of soundness belonging to all sounds or the qualities of sound *viz.* different accents so he does not perceive with his ears the chastity or otherwise-ness of a word. As we do not perceive the chastity or other wiseness of a word so we can not infer it since an inference is invariably based upon perception which lies at the root of generalisation.

There are two types of words *viz.* (1) words coined by human beings and words used in the Vedic Literature. Of these two types of words, what has been coined by human beings denotes an object which is either perceived or inferred. As the chastity or otherwise-ness of a word is neither perceived nor inferred so chaste or vulgar words do not owe their origin to human agency. Vedic words are now to be discussed. If the chastity of these words is established,

then they may come within the province of injunction and if their nonchastity is proved then they may fall within the jurisdiction of prohibition. In that case we cannot admit the truth of following statement viz. "As the distinction between chaste and nonchaste words is well-established so injunction or prohibition may be imposed upon the proper words." If we admit the truth of the above statement then it will be inevitably open to the fallacy of a vicious circle. If injunction and prohibition are established then the existence of chaste and nonchaste words is proved. Again, if the existence of these words is established then the existence of injunction and prohibition is placed beyond dispute.

What is the exact meaning of the term 'chastity'? Does it mean that a chaste word is such as has denotation? If we say in the affirmative then words such as gāvī etc. are full well denotative. Why are not they to be treated as chaste words? If the communication of meaning decides the chastity of a word then words like gāvī etc more quickly carry their sense than words such as 'go' etc. Hence, the so called chaste words such as 'go' etc. firstly become nonchaste. Some hold that nonchaste words cannot directly convey their sense. They convey their meaning through the medium of their basic chaste words which are inferred. Hence, they indirectly communicate their meaning.

The above suggestion does not hold good. It simply points to another way of communicating the sense of a word. But the way which is contrary to the suggested one is well-known in this world. The rustic people who are innocent of Sanskrit Grammar are well contented with words like gāvī etc. since when they hear these words their meaning is immediately conveyed to them but is not an inference. In other words, a common man having heard a vulgar word does not try to find out its basic chaste word. Recollecting the meaning of the original word and observing the invariable relation of the vulgar word with the chaste one he does not indirectly grasp the meaning of the vulgar word. As trees and fruits which grow on the northern side of the Mount of Gold are not seen before. They are beyond our reach. Similarly, the chaste words of Sanskrit Literature are inaccessible to the common folk. The common man has not grasped the invariable relation of a vulgar word with a chaste one. Hence how will it be possible for him to infer the meaning of a vulgar word from that of a chaste one?

The learned scholars who are helmsmen in the ocean of grammatical literature and are in constant touch with nice expressions

do not indirectly grasp the meanings of vulgar words when they use them. In other words, they do not think in terms of Sanskrit words and gather the sense of other words through the medium of Sanskrit words. Every body has direct experience of the truth of the above statement. The power of communicating a meaning constitutes the chastity of a word. As such power belongs to chaste words such as 'go' etc. so it belongs to nonchaste words *viz.* 'gāvī' etc. So, these nonchaste words may be considered as chaste ones. If the nonchastity of a word stands for the non communication of meaning then it exclusively belongs to the cawing of a crow etc. But nonchastity does not belong to articulate sounds consisting of letters. Hence, the vulgar words are not nonchaste.

Now, an objector may argue that the chastity of a word is not merely the pointing of an object since such a definition is too wide. It also applies to smoke and such other objects which indicate some-other objects. But the power of denotation is that which tends to bring about some specific acts. Such power belongs to words like 'go' etc. but does not belong to words *e.g.* 'gāvī' etc. Hence, words like gāvī etc. are not chaste.

The above criticism has been offered by a person who lacks far sight. A denotative word is that which conveys a primary meaning. We have thoroughly discussed the point that denotation means the communication of a meaning by means of the primary power. This power of denotation is equally shared by words like 'go' etc. and word such as 'gāvī' etc. Therefore, all these words are chaste.

Now, the critics may argue that words which obey the rules of Sanskrit Etymology are chaste and those which do not obey such rules are nonchaste. This argument is logically tenable since the procedure adopted by the science of Etymology is purely conventional. It is an expression of his arbitrary will. So its findings are not absolute. Our subtle intellect fails to invent any new definition of chaste and nonchaste words. Hence, we reaffirm the conclusion that a denotative word is chaste and a nondenotative word is nonchaste. Hence, an injunction concerning chaste words and a prohibition with regard to nonchaste words should be futile. The reason behind the above remark is as follows :—

"One shall speak chaste words" is a well-known maxim. Why shall we issue an injunction to this effect? "One shall not speak non-sense" is also well known. Why does a prohibition come in?

As speaking non-sense is not possible so the prohibition of speaking non-sense is meaningless.

As the injunction, "One should drink water", is absurd so the prohibition "One should not eat fire", is equally absurd. A man naturally seeks to drink water. So any injunction regarding it is superfluous. What is enjoined by the Sastras is beyond the reach of normal activities of a person. As under no circumstances it is possible for one to eat fire so any prohibition with regard to it is unnecessary. The general rule which governs prohibition is this that what is possible is prohibited. Even a camel, being afflicted by the heat of summer, will not try to eat fire in order to quench his thirst. Now, the critics may argue in the following manner. Though words like 'go' etc. and words like 'gāvi' etc. are equally denotative yet an injunction and a prohibition are fruitful since their function is to impose restriction upon the indiscriminate use of words. The use of non-chaste words enjoined by the Sāstras entails merit. The non-use of unchaste words prohibited by the Sāstras helps one to avoid commission of sin. Hence an injunction and a prohibition, recorded in the Sastras, are fruitful. It has been said by Kumārila that though words, chaste and nonchaste, are denotative alike yet a restriction, imposed upon their use, is significant since it regulates merit and demerit.

Such a restriction is an impossible feat to materialise. When a restriction is to be imposed upon the use of words the use of which is to be enjoined should be individually mentioned and words the use of which is to be prohibited should be distinctly stated. The said injunction should be like this that one should utter these words. And the said prohibition should be like this that one should not utter these words. If this suggestion is accepted then the above words are to be mentioned individually and their number is also to be recorded. What will be the net result if they are individually mentioned and their number is counted. This task is impossible even for Brahmā, the personal creator of this world whose span of life extends over a hundred kalpas. It is also beyond the range of imagination even of the god Ananta who has a thousand mouths wide open. It is also too difficult for the Lord of Speech to perform. It is also too heavy a load for the goddess of Learning to carry. As these words are infinite in number so it is absurd to have a record of them.

Now, the objectors may contend that some common properties will be discovered and words will be classed under two different heads. In other words there will be a group of sādhu words and another group of asādhu words. But this grouping is possible if so exclusive common

properties of these two groups are discovered. The critics remark that one may try to find out such common properties but it is not possible for him to find them out.

The universal of soundness which belongs to chaste and nonchaste words is an indivisible entity. Words are not divided into two classes viz. (1) a class of chaste words and (2) a class of vulgar words (words used in spoken languages and dialects). There are no two distinct species under the common genus of soundness. But a hypothesis (which suggests their existence) is unknown to the logical world. Nobody experiences that the species of chastity belongs to all chaste words and the species of vulgarity belongs to all non-chaste words.

As two distinct species are not cognised so it is not at all possible to classify words in two groups. As the basis of classification is not possible so we do not understand this: Why shall the use of words be regulated by an injunction? Though in the Sāstras restrictive injunctions have a necessity yet one has got to explain what is the object of such injunctions. What is the purport of the injunction in question?

Does it mean that one should utter chaste words only but not non-chaste ones? Or, does it mean that he should only speak, uttering chaste words? Both meanings of the said injunction are infected with defects. Some critics have made the following observation. If one is enjoined to speak chaste words only then it is not possible for him to utter non-chaste words. Hence the prohibition that one should not speak nonchaste words is ruled out. Again, if one is enjoined to speak only then he will commit a sin when he will remain silent.

It has been said before that a word which denotes a meaning is chaste and no other definition of chastity is not possible. Hence, it is impossible to accept that what has no power to denote a meaning is to be taken as a word. Therefore, there are no such words as may be called unchaste or non-chaste. The drift of this argument is that the said prohibition is meaningless.

Now, the contenders may argue that the above regulation is significant since it prohibits the use of such words as are wrongly pronounced through inadvertence or inability. Prohibition is directed towards these wrongly pronounced words.

The critics review this new suggestion and point out that if words which are wrongly pronounced through inadvertence or inability do not convey meanings then there is no possibility of applying the said prohibition to them since it follows from the text that significant words

will only be taken into consideration. What is the need of taking unnecessary pains of prohibiting them?

Again, if vulgar words denote meanings as chaste words, correctly pronounced, do then prohibition does not apply to their use as it does not apply to the use of chaste words.

Now, the defenders may contend thus: Nobody can deny that there are words of Indian dialects which are exclusively used in transactions of secular business. In order to exclude their use the said prohibition that one should not speak non-chaste words has been given. Why is not the above restrictive injunction significant? The critics join issue with the advocates and point out that as many examples of conveying one's ideas through the contraction of one's eye-balls, gestures of hands, and such other expressions are noticed so regulations should also be issued prohibiting their practice.

In continuation of their criticism the critics remark that a restrictive injunction has a positive content. It enjoins something positive. Let us take an example, *viz.*, one should lie with his wife during a fixed period after her menstruation. The person enjoined is ordered to do something positive. But a *Parisamkhyā* injunction has a negative import. Let us take an example, *viz.*, "Five species of animals having five fingers with nails are edible." The above injunction implies that one should not take the flesh of animals having such and such characteristic features excepting animals belonging to the well-defined five species. Now, the defenders may contend that the said restrictive injunction has also a negative import, *i.e.*, it intends to prohibit the use of vulgar words. If this is their contention then they simply contradict themselves since they say in the same breath that the said injunction is both positive and negative (*myama* and *parisamkhyā*).

Now, the defenders may contend that the said injunction has only a negative import and is a *parisamkhyā* *vidhi*, such a contention does not hold good since chaste and vulgar words do not simultaneously come within the jurisdiction of this injunction. In case of the above *parisamkhyā* injunction one may take the flesh of all animals having five fingers with nails. There is a possibility of taking flesh since a man is actuated by his natural propensity. Where there is a possibility there negation is significant. Thus, the taking of the flesh of certain animals has been prohibited. As there is no possibility of simultaneously using chaste and vulgar words so the injunction in question does not fall within the *Parisamkhyā* class.

The critics add a new point to their criticism. The defenders hold that the use of a chaste word brings about merit and the use of a vulgar word results in demerit. This hypothesis is not sound. It is unreasonable to assume that both words produce transcendental results, *viz.*, invisible merit and demerit since the tangible result, *viz.*, the communication of a meaning, which stands beyond dispute has been discarded. It has been said that a chaste word, properly used, produces the desired result in Heaven. This statement is not literally true. It falls within Arthavāda. Its object is to praise a chaste word. A word which has been improperly used is a thunder-bolt and kills the institutor of a sacrifice who improperly uses a word. This statement, also, comes under Arthavāda. Its object is to condemn an improper word. It has been clearly proved that these statements are subordinate to a sacrifice. They render assistance to a sacrifice. As they are merely laudatory or condemnatory Arthavādas so chaste and vulgar words have no connection with transcendental results, *i.e.*, merit and demerit. A rule, laid down in the Mimāṃsā sūtra, clearly expresses the following decision that a material substance used in a sacrifice, *viz.*, a special kind of ladle etc., any qualitative change of a sacrificer, and accessory sacrifices are means to an end but produce no transcendental result. The injunction that one should use chaste words in conversation and the prohibition that one should not use nonchaste words in conversation are well-circulated but not based upon the authority of the Sastras. On the basis of this hearsay evidence the science of grammar is considered to be authoritative. But we shall hope against hope if we think that it (the science of grammar) is ancillary to the Vedas on the strength of the said weak evidence. If an injunction and a prohibition are read in a particular section then they exercise their influence only upon it since their service has been meant for the said section. The universal application of the said injunction and the prohibition is not permissible. Thus, considering the problem from every possible aspect we arrive at the conclusion that the injunction and the prohibition, mentioned above, cannot constitute the basis of the authenticity of the science of grammar.

INEFFICACY OF THE STUDY OF GRAMMAR

Some hold that the injunction "One should study the Vedas along with their six ancillary sciences for their own sake" implies the obligatory character of the study of grammar since it is as ancillary as the other branches of Learning, *viz.*, Phonetics, Ritual, Etymology,

Prosody, and Astronomy are. This view does not stand to reason. It is reasonable to hold that the five branches of Learning (Phonetics to Astronomy) are really ancillary to the Vedas since each of them renders unique services to the Vedas and many Vedic injunctions involve necessary references to them. Though grammar tries to attract attention by a show of runs and jumps yet it may be ancillary to the Vedas only because of the possible reason that it is a normative science which regulates the use of chaste words but not because of any other reason. The said function of grammar, viz., the regulation of the use of chaste words is difficult to establish. This point has been brought home before. Therefore, grammar cannot compete with other ancillary sciences of the Vedas in substantiating its claim. In the above injunction concerning the study of the Vedas for their own sake the word 'niṣkāraṇā' has been used. It indicates as much its inutility but not so much its fruitfulness. The Vedas have six accessories. These accessories are not the six branches of learning. They are six ways of establishing the connection of mantras with Vedic rites. They are called Śruti, Liṅga etc. This point will be discussed later on. Therefore, some other passages which are often quoted to prove that grammar is an accessory of the Vedas do not serve the purpose. The passages are as follows: "A Brahmin should not use vulgar expressions since a vulgar expression is barbarism". If a chaste word is properly used, it fulfills the desire of its employer in heaven". "The institutor of Agnihotra sacrifice having used vulgar expressions should observe an expiatory rite in honour of the Goddess of Learning"; and "A speech which is strictly classical is worthy of its name". Now, one may suggest that grammar should be based upon the usages of savants just as the science of medicine is based upon the experimental method of agreement and difference. The drift of this argument is that the science of grammar has a sound footing to stand upon. The critics review the suggestion and put the following questions. Who are these savants. Are they savants who employ classical words such as 'go' etc? Or, are they savants who use vulgar words, e.g., gāvī etc. in speaking and writing? Or, are they savants who use both classical and vulgar words in speaking and writing?

(to be continued)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

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CHAPTER VI

(A synopsis of the preceding chapters)

I

Baruch de Spinoza (the world famous monarch of the mind), the Dutch Jew, was born in Michael and Hannah Deborah de Spinoza on the 24th of November, 1632 at Amsterdam in Holland. The name Baruch is equivalent to the English word blessed. After he had ceased to be a Jew, he took the name of Benedict, the Latin equivalent to Baruch. His father was a Portuguese Jew, a merchant and member of a small Jewish Community, residing at Amsterdam. The family from which Spinoza came was originally Spanish, and Spanish was also Spinoza's mother tongue. The age in which Spinoza was born was a scientific age, and every now and then there came news of some scientific discovery. He was educated in the local Talmudical College and received education from private teachers. He learned Latin from a German teacher and after that he was taught Latin by Vanden Ende, a physician at Amsterdam and through his influence he became an atheist. The character of his father and mother is not clearly known to us. But it can be said that they were strongly religious minded and their strong religious faith found its expression even in Spinoza. They were not blind followers of customs and tradition and therefore, they had to leave their original home. When Spinoza learned Latin, he gave up belief in Divinity and offered himself for the study of Descartes and natural philosophy. He became critical and began to forsake the Jewish doctors, as well as the synagogue. Not only he was an opponent of the synagogue but he also abandoned the religion of his father. After abandoning his original faith, he never accepted conversion to any other established creed. The Jews tried to bribe him in order to keep him a member of the Jewish community. A pension of one thousand florins a year was offered him to conceal his doubts, but he boldly declined to accept it. Therefore, an attempt was made to assassinate him, but fortunately he escaped. He left Amsterdam and spent the remaining days of his life in various places. He passed

more of his time in the country side. He lived quietly making his living by polishing lenses of the newly discovered telescope. Colerus, the biographer of Spinoza says, "before he began his quiet life outside the town, he learned to polish lenses for telescope and other purposes." His wants were few and he showed a rare indifference to money throughout his life.

Spinoza's constitution was weak. He was poor in health and very lean and thin. According to Colerus, "he had been troubled with pthisis for more than twenty years." From every point of view he had to face the conflict in life. Though he had to carry on a constant struggle with his opponents on matters of religion and dogmas and although his health was always poor, he bore all these sufferings and struggled patiently like a hero. On Sunday, the 21st February, 1677 at about three o'clock, he died of heart failure. He was buried on the 25th February in "huirgraft" of the New Church, from where his remains were removed as a result of an agitation. Spinoza's pantheistic system aroused intense and almost universal indignation and thus he was despised as an atheist for centuries together. But ultimately his profound love of truth, his unselfishness and his simple mode of life made him one of the greatest ideal souls of the world. Now he is worshipped and honoured by one and all.

Spinoza, we find in the preface to his posthumous works, "received his early training in literature, and as a youth spent many years in the study of theology; but when he grew up to age of maturity he gave himself up entirely to philosophy. He burned with passion for knowledge; yet as he did not find what he required in either teachers or authors, he determined to attempt a trial of his own powers, in the carrying out of which he received great assistance from the writings of Descartes." It shows that the germs of conflict were in him even in his childhood and they developed into violent forms in his mature age. Spinoza's mind was not free from contradictions and he was not satisfied with traditional dogmas. His philosophy is like an outburst of a seemingly extinct volcano.

The main purpose of this article was to show that there was a continuous conflict of tendencies in Spinoza's philosophy. From the very childhood and up to the last days of his life he had to suffer hardships from life and religion. He had a weak constitution which prevented him from enjoying a healthy life. In matters of religion, he was a revolutionist who became dissatisfied with the current doctrines of theology and church dogmas.

This article has been divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, under the heading of 'Baruch and Benedictus,' we tried to show Spinoza's early conflict which was due to his vast study of Hebrew philosophical works, study of Natural philosophy and the writings of Descartes. If one likes to form a correct opinion of Spinoza, one must try to understand first of all the implicit Spinoza. There was two Spinozas—one was the implicit Spinoza and the other was the explicit Spinoza. The implicit Spinoza was the last of the mediaevals and the explicit Spinoza was the first of the moderns. Baruch, the implicit Spinoza, was taught theology and current dogmas of those days and Benedictus, the explicit Spinoza, revolted against the theological doctrines and traditional customs and abandoned even his father's religion. Thus there was a conflict between the implicit and the explicit Spinoza.

Spinoza himself remarked that if a person liked to understand Euclidean geometry he did not require to know about the life and character of Euclid or the language he used, the public for whose sake he wrote, or the history of his writings; "and what is said here of Euclid," he declared, "holds good of all those who have written about things which are clear in their own nature." Spinoza might have thought that like Euclidean geometry his own writings were clear and simple. Therefore, for the understanding of his writings, there was no necessity to know the author. As his writings were full of conflicting ideas, it was difficult and sometimes impossible to read the clear and simple meaning of it, without previous knowledge of the implicit Spinoza whose works are with us now. He did not write without a motive. He wrote with a view to criticising mediaeval philosophers and he wanted to show through his own statement the weakness of mediaeval philosophy. Thus the conflict between mediaevalism and modernism found its first expression in the writings of Spinoza.

The second chapter of the article dealt with Spinoza's pantheism and theism. It was a very difficult task for us to declare whether Spinoza was a pantheist or a theist. Spinoza wanted to reconcile the different theories of the Mediaevals. But in this act of reconciliation, his philosophy had not discarded any of the truths of the Mediaeval philosophies but had only given them their proper place in his system. Pantheism and theism, nominalism and realism, idealism and empiricism, and so on, found a sanction in Spinozistic philosophy. To the follower of one line of thought, he was "a God-intoxicated man"; to the acute observation of another, he was a theist, in whose philosophy the elements of scientific empiricism

found their place under the guise of theistic interpretation. When he said that 'all determination is negation', he reduced all finite individuals to unreality and illusion. At another time when he said that "Nature" is only another name for God, he gave to the finite individuals an independent reality and treated the infinite as an aggregate of finite things. Thus Spinoza's philosophy gave birth to many a conflicting element which made it impossible for us to call him either a pantheist or a theist, either a naturalist or a supernaturalist, either a nominalist or a realist, either a deist or an atheist, and so on.

The third chapter of the book dealt with Spinoza's ethics and metaphysics. To the Mediaevals, philosophy was a system based on logical construction and abstract notions of reality. For Spinoza philosophy was a system of necessary truth whose aim was to understand completely ourselves and our place in the universe. In other words, philosophy was for him; 'ethics scientifically demonstrated'. The general tendency of Spinoza's philosophy was best expressed in his work, 'On the improvement of the understanding' where he clearly stated his views in the following way: "After experience had taught me that all things which are ordinarily encountered in common life are vain and futile, and when I saw that all things which occasioned me any anxiety or fear had in themselves nothing good or evil except in so far as the mind was moved by them: I at length determined to inquire if there were anything which was a true good, capable of imparting itself, by which alone the mind could be affected to the exclusion of all else; whether, indeed, anything existed by the discovery and acquisition of which I might be put in possession of a joy continuous and supreme to all eternity". His own statement made clear the ethical outlook which he held for the subject matter of his philosophy. "Spinoza's Ethics deals with three distinct matters. It begins with metaphysics; it then goes on to the psychology of the passions and the will; and finally it sets forth an ethic based on the preceding metaphysics and psychology. The metaphysics is a modification of Descartes, the psychology is reminiscent of Hobbes, but the ethics is original, and what is of most value in the book". (Bertrand Russell: History of Western Philosophy, Edition, 1945, p. 593). Spinoza was in the main concerned with virtue more and more rather than with anything else in this universe. He was after the search for true good and he discovered the same for himself as he was passionate in his love of God. He found his philosophy and religion in the heart and mind of men. He had deep spiritual insight and he served as a guide for those who seek en-

lightenment while they are in troubles. Thus Spinoza shines above all as a man of virtue. "Spinoza, although he was not without scientific interests, and even wrote a treatise on the rainbow, was in the main concerned with religion and virtue. He accepted from Descartes and his contemporaries a materialistic and deterministic physics, and sought, within this framework, to find room for reverence and a life devoted to God. His attempt was magnificent, and rouses admiration even in those who do not think it successful." (Bertrand Russell : *Ibid*, p. 593).

The real conflict of Spinoza's philosophy is the conflict between ethics and metaphysics. Spinoza approaches philosophy from the problems of conduct. There are many approaches to the domain of philosophy. Some thinkers approach it from the point of view of physical science, some from the thought of metaphysics and some have come to it from the problems of logic. But a great thinker, like Spinoza, came to the study of philosophy from the standpoint of conduct. His metaphysical discussions are nothing but a prelude to his ethics. As he himself wrote, "he was like a man stricken with a moral disease, who seeks certain death in front of him if a remedy is not found."

Spinoza was a true moralist as is evident from the titles of his writings. He believed in the veracity of God and he did not require any proof of the truthfulness of God. To him his faith is a kind of truth, and God is known only through faith or intuition but not through imagination and logical reasoning. Imagination is the first and scientific reasoning is the second grade of knowledge. Whereas faith or intuition is the ultimate knowledge.

Spinoza was a critical philosopher of his days. But he was not, like others, a philosopher of the abstract type. He had a great horror for abstraction ("Transcendental terms"). (Ethics, II, 40, Sch. I). The true and great characteristic of his philosophy is its "ethical intention; the second is then, what may be called its scientific orientation" (Leon Roth's Spinoza, p. 49).

The fourth chapter of the book was on "Human freedom and absorption in God". In this chapter we treated of the nature of mental freedom or blessedness and thereby we tried to see that the wise man is more powerful than the ignorant. Here the conflict is between the power of the mind or of reason and emotions or passions. If we can possess absolute dominion over them, then we are freed, and absolute freedom means absorption into God.

In the last chapter of the article we tried to find out the solution of the conflicting tendencies of Spinoza's philosophy. Spinoza did not follow the Rabbinic and the theological manner of writing his philosophy. He found out for himself the true and demonstrated method, for his philosophical works. Thus it is clear that though Spinoza gathered materials from the mediaevals, and more particularly from Descartes yet he had sufficient strength to mould them in his own way. The change brought about by Spinoza in the field of philosophy was just like the change brought about by Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo in the field of science.

Before I conclude, I must acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr. S. K. Maity and other authors whose books I have freely made use of in writing out this article. I have gathered most of the materials of this article from Wolfson's. The Philosophy of Spinoza; Joachim's A study of the Ethics of Spinoza; Caird's Spinoza, W. H. White's and A. H. Stirling's Ethics of Benedict De Spinoza; R. H. M. Elwe's and Frank Sewell's Philosophy of Benedict De Spinoza; Martineu's Types of Ethical Theory, Study of Spinoza, and A Study of Religion; Norman Kemp Smith's Studies in Cartesian Philosophy, Leon Roth's Spinoza, Bertrand Russell's The History of Western Philosophy; Falckenberg's History of Modern Philosophy; Thilly's History of Philosophy and Will Durant's The Story of Philosophy etc. I am also indebted to many other philosophers whose names are not mentioned in my article.

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The 27th July, 1957.

LORD LYTTON'S AFGHAN POLICY

(Up to the Treaty of Gandamak, May 26, 1879)

(II)

DILIP GHOSE

The repulse of the Chamberlain Mission at Ali Masjid is a fact too well known to be narrated here. But the chagrin that it caused to the Home Government is worthy of notice. Disraeli admitted that the Russian Mission to Kabul was not a very serious matter, and that the sensation which it produced "would have quietly disappeared, the Russian projects having been intended for a contemplated war" with England, which was then out of the question.⁵⁶ A remonstrance against Russian activities at Kabul was made from London, and Lytton was asked to wait till a reply had been received to it. Moreover, the Viceroy was asked to send the proposed Mission by the Kandahar route, and not to attempt the Khyber Pass.⁵⁷ But he disobeyed both instructions, so that the Marquis of Salisbury complained that the Viceroy was "forcing the hands of the Government", and had been doing so from the very first.⁵⁸ Disraeli went further than this and remarked that by disobeying the orders of the Government Lytton had mutinied.⁵⁹ None in the English Cabinet could find a *casus belli* against the Amir, for want of which the Prime Minister dared not summon a Parliament to sanction a war.⁶⁰ Lord Cranbrook, however, took a strong view, complaining that the *casus belli* was formed by an aggregate of hostile incidents on the part of the Amir, and startled all by suggesting that his own opinion was for war, immediate and complete.⁶¹ Disraeli repented that the Afghan business should have been thus precipitated, as he felt that it was wholly unnecessary.⁶² The majority in the English Cabinet were aggrieved that they had been unduly hustled by Lord Lytton.⁶³

Even so, once the die was cast, they agreed that Lytton's "policy must be supported—and supported, as the Queen urged and Beaconsfield

⁵⁶ Buckle, *Life of Disraeli*, VI, p. 390

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 383.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 386-87.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 397-98.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 388.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

agreed with as much cordiality as if there had been no initial difference of opinion."⁶⁴ The war was thus sanctioned by the Ministry, and in justification of Ministerial action Beaconsfield gave out the cause of the war in his Guildhall speech, just as much as Lytton had in his mind. It was, he declared, to remove all anxiety about India's north-west frontier, which was a haphazard and not a scientific frontier, that the decision for war had been taken.⁶⁵ All who heard him were rather dismayed, and Cranbrook, Salisbury and Cross pulled very long faces over the "rectification" passage.⁶⁶ The time given to the Amir for a reply to the ultimatum was yet not over; but the cat had been let, willynilly, out of the bag.⁶⁷

With the victory of General Roberts' forces Peiwar Kotal on December 2 the first phase of the Second Afghan War was practically over. Within two days after the declaration of hostilities, the affront received by Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission at Ali Masjid had been appropriately avenged; within two weeks after the same date the passes of Khyber and Kurram were completely in British hands. Not long afterwards Jellalabad and Kandahar were occupied without resistance; and before the end of January the greater part of Southern Afghanistan, from the Helmund to Khelat-i-Glitzai, had passed into the hands of the British Government. Even in the midst of the war the British Cabinet had begun to consider the future arrangements in Afghanistan.⁶⁸ The Viceroy was in favour of disintegrating the political fabric of that kingdom, but in this regard he met with decided discouragement from the Home authorities. They considered "that grave difficulties and complications might arise from any action on our part having for its object the removal of Shere Ali in order to lead either to the substitution of a rival or the disintegration of the country."⁶⁹

Certain remarks on the theory of disintegration of Afghanistan may here be observed in passing. For precipitating the Afghan crisis and encouraging the disintegration of the permanent fabric of the Afghan Kingdom Lord Lytton was severely criticised both at the time and afterwards. Martineau,⁷⁰ the biographer of Sir Bartle Frere, observes that if Frere had gone to India as Viceroy in 1876, he would have

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 390.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ For the affront received by Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission an ultimatum was sent to the Amir, and it gave him till November 21 to reply. But the Amir's reply did not reach the Viceroy within that time, and the British forces marched to Afghanistan on 21st November, 1878. Disraeli's Guildhall Speech was delivered in early November, even while a reply to the British ultimatum was being awaited. Buckle, *op. cit.*, pp. 333-30.

⁶⁸ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec. 1879, Cons. 413.

⁶⁹ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec. 1879, Cons. 413.

⁷⁰ *Op. cit.*, II. pp. 159-60.

prevented the war, and saved England from the crisis that perplexed her statesmen for about a year and a half. This caused so much annoyance to Lady Betty Balfour that in defence of her father she pointed out, referring to a passage in a letter—written by Frere to Lord Salisbury for the guidance of Lytton—that, had Sir Bartle Frere been able to carry out these views in 1876, he would have brought about the war of 1878 much earlier, and taken steps leading towards the disintegration of Afghanistan.⁷¹ “If”, runs the relevant passage in Frere’s letter, “the Amir showed obvious signs of disinclination to improve his relations with us, I would take it as clear proof that hostile influence had worked more effectually than we now suppose, that it was useless to attempt to coax or cajole him into a better frame of mind, that we must look for alliances and influences elsewhere than at Cabul, and must seek them in Khelat, at Candahar, Herat and in Persia, and I would lose no time in looking out for them.”⁷²

It may be difficult to resist the conclusion that in the above passage Frere hinted at a policy which tended towards the dismemberment of the Afghan Kingdom, and he, therefore, anticipated Lord Lytton in this matter. Actually, the theory of disintegration of Afghanistan did not originate from Lytton, although when it occurred to the Viceroy, it did so independent of any external authority. As early as 1874, Sir Henry Rawlinson suggested that, failing to secure the Amir to his side he would detach Kandahar and Herat from the authority of Kabul.⁷³ Yet, there is a significant point of difference in the opinions of Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Lytton. Whereas the policy suggested by Frere was contingent, that of Lord Lytton was absolute. In suggesting a new departure from his well-conceived policy of creating a strong and united state in Afghanistan* Sir Bartle referred to an extreme necessity, rendered imperative only by the unflinching denial of the Amir to come to some arrangement with the British Government. Never for a moment did he presume that the alienation of the Amir was a finality in itself, and his policy was designed to operate only when all his efforts to reconcile the Amir to his point of view had failed. But Lytton, on the other hand, believed that for acquiring a strong line of defence on India’s north-west frontier a disintegrated Afghanistan would, in no

⁷¹ *Op cit.*, p. 48.

⁷² Letter, dated 3rd March, 1876, Martineau, *op. cit.*, II. p. 148; also Balfour, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁷³ *England and Russia in Central Asia* (1879); p. 192.

*Both before and after Sir Bartle Frere wrote his note of 3rd March 1876, he had observed that a strong and united state in Afghanistan would be infinitely more valuable than a dependent or conquered Afghanistan. The same view was reiterated by him even in the above letter. *Vide* Martineau, *op. cit.*, II, p. 148; also *vide The Times*, November 14, 1878.

case, be less preferable to an integrated state in that country"⁷⁴; and starting from a fixed premise that the Amir of Afghanistan could not be secured on behalf of the British Government, he resolved to work out his hypothesis without any regard for time and circumstances. Whereas Frere, in Lytton's position, would have allowed matters to develop† and adjusted his policy to events as they grew, Lord Lytton, from set ideas, himself proceeded to shape events, as he desired them to be. In fact, the difference is something like one between obsession and practical brooding. Lord Lytton was obsessed with the idea of the Amir's alienation, and in quest of a scientific frontier to arrest Russian advance towards India, he formulated a policy that contained the germs of future trouble. The Viceroy, however, failed to see them through, and it was not till his policy proved inoperative in practice that it was finally discarded and kept out of all considerations.

In reply to enquiries from the Home Government in regard to his plan for future settlement in Afghanistan, Lytton emphasised the need for annexing Pishin and Sibi to Baluchistan, and retaining Perwar Kotal and the Kurram valley. He urged that the tribes like the Khyberis, Shinwaris and Mohmunds ought to be kept independent of Kabul, and that all foreign agents, except the British, should be excluded from admission into Afghanistan.⁷⁵ On these conditions Lytton was prepared to open negotiations with Yakub Khan, Shere Ali's eldest son, and he instructed Major Cavagnari to sound that prince.⁷⁶ Yakub was considered by the Viceroy to be the only man left in Afghanistan who, in the absence of Shere Ali, was at all likely to be able to hold the central authority without much foreign support.⁷⁷ Another man was also in the view of Lord Lytton as a possible candidate for the Afghan throne—Wali Mahomed Khan, Sher Ali's half brother. This Barakzai chief, for his English sympathies, had long been a favourite of the Viceroy's⁷⁸ and of him Lord Lytton hesitated not a little to give a good account to the authorities in England.⁷⁹

⁷⁴ Lytton to Cranbrook, 10th January, 1879, *Lord Lytton's Private Collection*, Commonwealth Relations Office Record.

† Lytton himself acknowledged the wisdom of this policy. After the breaking-up of the Peshawar Conference, he wrote to the Secy. of State for India emphasising the necessity of awaiting 'the natural development' of events in Kabul; although shortly afterwards he tried to dictate a different policy. *Vide* the Despatch to the Secy. of State, 10th May, 1877, *Parl. Pap* 1878 Afghanistan No 1, para. 40.

⁷⁵ For. Dept. Sec., Supp., January, 1879, Cons. 500, K. W. No. 3 also for Dept. Sec. Supp. Dec 1879, Cons 417.

⁷⁶ Lytton to Layard, 21 Dec., 1878, *Lord Lytton's Private Collection*, Commonwealth Relations Office Record.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Lytton to Cranbrook, 3rd Aug., 1878, *Lord Lytton's Private Collection*, Commonwealth Relations Office Record.

⁷⁹ Lytton to Cranbrook, 10th January, 1879, *Lord Lytton's Private Collection*, C. R. O. Record.

While Cavagnari was instructed to negotiate with Yakub Khan, Lytton proceeded to sum up the Afghan situation as one of great uncertainty in which the primary task was to find out a capable man worthy of governing the Afghan Kingdom. Personally, however, he still retained the belief that "the ultimate solution of the Afghan problem most favourable to our permanent interests will be in the disintegration of the artificial political unity of Afghanistan." The one argument which, among others, weighed most with him in support of his theory was that any strong Asiatic Prince was likely to disavow the utility of British friendship, and might find his best account with Russia in the long run.⁸⁰ Referring to the nature of a permanent settlement in Afghanistan that was most likely to secure British interests in that country, Lytton observed that the objects for which the war was fought were: (a) the punishment of Sher Ali, (b) the permanent improvement of the north-west frontier, and (c) establishment of paramount political influence over all the Afghan territories and tribes between the North-West Frontier and the Oxus. It was to the attainment of these objects that the negotiations ought to be directed, and that without any indefinite prolongation of the uncertainties that then prevailed in Afghanistan.⁸¹

Meanwhile, Yakub Khan had replied to Cavagnari's overtures in terms of general friendship.⁸² This was a fitting reply to Cavagnari's letter, since the British offer of amity contained "no definite basis for the removal of hostility . . . between the two governments."⁸³ Yet, both Cavagnari and Lytton were dissatisfied with Yakub Khan's attitude towards the Indian Government. On the former's authority,⁸⁴ the Viceroy gave a very bad account of the Afghan prince to Her Majesty's Ministers, and urged for their permission to deal with Wali Mahomed Khan. Yakub Khan, wrote Lytton, "has inherited his father's perversity and hatred of the British Raj, and has also acquired by sheer blundering, in the course of a few weeks, all the personal unpopularity with none of the personal power, acquired by his father in the course of many years. He could not maintain himself without our support, and our support could not be given to a more unpopular and incompetent ruler."⁸⁵ He branded Yakub Khan as a very "slippery customer, whom we shall be well rid of if he disappears."⁸⁶

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Lytton to Cranbrook, 30th January, 1879. *Lord Lytton's Private Collection*, C. R. O. Record.

⁸² For. Dept. Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879, Cons. 507.

⁸³ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879 Cons. 437.

⁸⁴ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879, Cons. 507.

⁸⁵ Lytton to Cranbrook, 30th January, 1879, *Lord Lytton's Private Collection*, C. R. O. Record.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

It is not difficult to comprehend what prompted Lytton to account Yakub so badly. He was still wavering between his policy of disintegration of Afghanistan and that of a puppet chief in that country, not of course of the type of a Shah Shuja, but one like Khodadad Khan, the ruler of Khelat.⁸⁷ Afraid, lest Yakub Khan, whom Lord Lytton considered to be the fittest man after Shere Ali to unite the whole of Afghanistan, should turn out to be a strong and independent ruler, who "might find his best account with Russia in the long run," the Viceroy wanted to get rid of him and desired that he might "disappear," just as Lord Lytton had desired the disappearance of Shere Ali Khan.

The Home Government, however, had by then grown impatient of the indefinite prolongation of the Afghan crisis, and suggested to the Viceroy the desirability of closing the war, in the absence of any suitable authority by proclamation, as was done in the Second Burmese War.⁸⁸ But Lytton argued "that we cannot close the Second Afghan war as Lord Dalhousie closed the Second Burmese War; the circumstances of the two cases being in many important particulars very different."⁸⁹ And after adducing his reasons for coming to such a conclusion, he continued to argue: "It is doubtless most desirable to close the Afghan war as quickly as possible. But we cannot close it satisfactorily, or finally, without an Afghan treaty; we cannot get an Afghan treaty without an Afghan Government willing to sign, and fairly able to maintain it . . . Its early establishment mainly depends on our own policy: and we must, I think, be prepared to do whatever may be necessary on our part to promote and maintain the existence of such a Government at Kabul . . ."⁹⁰ Then, referring to Wali Mahomed Khan, he pointed out that this prince "appears to be the only member of the Amir's family now left in the country who has any personal influence or capacity. He obviously aspires to the musnud, and knows that his fortunes must depend upon friendly relations, with us. He has already made frequent overtures to us, promising assistance to our interests and obedience to our wishes, if we will make them known to him . . ."⁹¹ Not that Wali Mahomed was to be made the Amir for his own sake. Lytton's object was to convert Afghanistan into a puppet Kingdom, as was done in the case of Khelat; and with that end in view, he proposed that the Sirdars of Afghanistan should be taken into confidence, and "made a recognised party to the resettlement of British

⁸⁷ *Ibid* ; also see below.

⁸⁸ For. Dept., Sec. Supp. Jan., 1879, Cons 460.

⁸⁹ Lytton to Cranbrook. 30th January, 1879, *Lord Lytton's Private Collection*, C. 15. O. Record.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*.

⁹¹ *Ibid*.

relations with Kabul, either as co signatories to the treaty, or by some clause in it recording their acquiescence in its provisions, and their joint responsibility for its fulfilment."⁹² The Viceroy was aware of the embarrassments to which the Government of India would be exposed if Wali Mahomed failed to establish himself or proved an incapable ruler.⁹³ But he assured the Secretary of State for India that he would endeavour to minimise the latter possibility by associating the leading Sirdars with Wali Mahomed in any settlement with him. Even so, he doubted Wali's power to establish himself in Herat and Kandahar, and though hopeful of a satisfactory settlement in Afghanistan, he knew that an arrangement with Wali Mahomed might even lead to the ultimate disintegration of that country. Lord Lytton also did not discount the possibility of a rising by Yakub Khan to trouble the Wali-Lytton combine, and, in that case, he foresaw, an advance to Kabul by British troops would be necessary, and the final settlement in Afghanistan still remote.⁹⁴

The consent of the Secretary of State for negotiations with Wali Mahomed Khan was given on the 20th February, 1879.⁹⁵ Meanwhile, Lytton had instructed General Roberts, who was then at Kuram,⁹⁶ and Major St. John at Kandahar⁹⁷ to report about the possibilities of Wali Mahomed and his influence among the people. But both Roberts and St. John reported that Wali Mahomed had neither any following, nor much of influence, so that he could never hope to establish himself except with exclusive British support.⁹⁸

Just when Lord Lytton was casting about for a satisfactory settlement of the Afghan question, a proposal was made to the Viceroy from London for considering the desirability of some territorial cession to Persia with a view to improving British relations with that country. The proposal was made as an integral part of Lord Lytton's policy of disintegrating Afghanistan, and it had its origin in a suggestion by Lord Tenterden in early January, 1879, when it was proposed that a rectification of the Perso-Afghan frontier in favour of the Shah might be made one of the conditions of peace with Afghanistan.⁹⁹ The object was to improve diplomatic relations with Persia which had been strained by Goldsmid's Seistan award.¹⁰⁰ Persia was also never happy over the

⁹² *Ibid*

⁹³ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879, Cons. 434.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879, Cons. 435.

⁹⁶ For. Dept. Sec. Supp., March, 1879, Cons. 160.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, Cons. 161.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, Cons. 166 and 169.

⁹⁹ For. Dept. Sec. Supp., July, 1888, Cons. 52.

¹⁰⁰ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec. 1879, Cons. 514.

Treaty of 1857 by which Herat was given to Afghanistan,¹⁰¹ and she had always attributed to this cause alone the want of Persia's cordiality towards Her Majesty's Government. In England it was apprehended that Russia might take advantage of her embarrassments in Afghanistan and her strained diplomatic relations with Persia in order to secure greater political influence in the court of the Shah.¹⁰²

Lord Lytton, therefore, invited suggestions from Ronald Thompson, the British Ambassador in Tehran, on the question of territorial cession to Persia.¹⁰³ The latter suggested that the cession of Scistan with a resolute attitude on the part of the British Government to press for her interests in Persia, whenever they would be threatened, would place British relation with that country on a satisfactory footing.¹⁰⁴ He, however, discouraged the retrocession of Herat, since, instead of excluding Russian influence from Persia, its cession would prove to be a source of additional danger.¹⁰⁵ The Persians, he contended, were so untrustworthy that their presence at Herat would open the door to Russian intrigue, and as such, "we must absolutely dominate Herat" to secure "ourselves" against Russia.¹⁰⁶ When the Viceroy referred the question to the members of his Council, Alexander Arbuthnot recorded a note of dissent, suggesting that any proposal to cede Afghan territory to Persia would be entirely incompatible with the proclamation, which had been issued to the Afghans at the commencement of the late war.¹⁰⁷

As England was thus considering the question of cession of Afghan territories to Persia, the Foreign Minister of the Shah approached Ronald Thompson with the suggestion that the opportunity had now occurred to hand over Herat to Persia and thus to do away with the diplomatic estrangement between the two countries. In return the Persian Minister promised to conclude an alliance with England, to take no political step whatever without her advice and sanction, to make her influence and political position paramount in Persia, and to allow no Russian or other foreign agents or travellers, except the English, to reside at, or visit, Herat.¹⁰⁸ Sometime in the month of March, a similar approach was made by Persia when a rumour got about that Russia was preparing an expedition upon Merv. The Persian Minister in London professed his anxiety at the projected invasion and

¹⁰¹ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879, Cons. 532.

¹⁰² For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879, Cons. 524.

¹⁰³ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879, Cons. 513.

¹⁰⁴ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879, Cons. 514.

¹⁰⁵ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879, Cons. 525.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Feb. 1871, Cons. 285-89 K. W.

¹⁰⁸ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879, Cons. 532.

proposed to Salisbury a basis of agreement to thwart the Russian advance towards Persia and Afghanistan. It was suggested that if England should forego the treaty obligations of 1857, Persia would prevent Russia from occupying Merv and would unite her foreign policy with that of England. Thereupon, the Viceroy was called upon to inform Her Majesty's Government how far any such policy with respect to Persia was compatible with their policy in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁹ The negotiations with Yakub Khan having meanwhile made some considerable progress Lytton cabled that the retrocession of Herat would now ruin the prospect of settlement with the Afghan prince by which he hoped to obtain a better hold upon Herat than through Persia.¹¹⁰

The arguments which Lord Lytton gave against the proposed retrocession of Herat were brilliantly discussed by him in a despatch to the Secretary of State on 1st of May, 1879.¹¹¹ They are important, at least for one reason, since they clearly defeat the purpose of the policy of disintegration of Afghanistan, of which Lord Lytton was so resolute a champion. Apart from alienating the ruler of Kabul, Lytton pointed out, the question that required serious consideration was whether "the Persian alliance would secure for India any gain which would counter-balance the loss of the clear and substantial benefit of a friendly understanding with Kabul." He proceeded: The Government of India are not called upon to submit any opinion upon the question whether Persia sincerely intends, and has the power, to fulfil her part of the bargain which she has offered; but they may remark that if she does fulfil it effectually she will as effectually give grave offence to Russia. Our principal, almost our sole object in contracting alliances with the Asiatic Powers beyond India's Western frontier, is to check the advance of Russia toward that frontier. Whether this object would be promoted by the Persian alliance, upon the conditions and under the circumstances described by the Persian Minister, is a point which will receive, we feel assured, the most careful consideration from Her Majesty's Government. It will be perceived that a policy which might alienate the Kabul Government and give offence to Russia simultaneously, is not unlikely to provide both these powers with a common ground of dissatisfaction, and with a common motive for an understanding adverse to Great Britain. The Amir might be easily induced to believe that he could only hope to recover his lost province, and to secure Herat, his strongest and most valuable frontier fortress, from imminent attack by arranging some reconciliation with Russia, nor can we expect that Russia would

¹⁰⁹ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879, Cons. 450.

¹¹⁰ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879, Cons. 451.

¹¹¹ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., July, 1881, Cons. 52.

be slow to realize such an opportunity for holding out expectations to the Afghans, and for introducing a community of aims and interests. The calculations suggested by such a situation would probably point toward some eventual combination whereby Russia might be enabled to occupy Merv while the Afghans reinstated themselves in Seistan. Against such a combination Persia would have little or no power of resistance unless she were very thoroughly and unreservedly supported."

Though inclined to secure the accession of Wali Mahomed to the Afghan throne, Lord Lytton, on the advice of Scindia,¹¹² kept open the door for negotiations with Yakub Khan. Scindia urged the Viceroy to give Yakub "a fair opportunity", and argued that unless this was done, the native opinion in India would be greatly shocked. Lytton was persuaded to consider that Cavagnari's overture to Yakub Khan contained "no explicit statement of . . . terms, and, therefore, Yakub cannot be said to have explicitly rejected them."¹¹³ But the Governor-General was spared the embarrassment of reopening the negotiations with Yakub Khan. In February, he received a spontaneous communication from the Afghan prince which contained distinct overtures for a reconciliation with the British Government.¹¹⁴ Major Cavagnari was thereupon authorised by Lord Lytton to respond to Yakub Khan's overture by a plain statement of the preliminary conditions, on which the Viceroy was prepared to entertain negotiations for peace.¹¹⁵ First, the Amir of Kabul must renounce all claim to authority over the Khyber and Michni Passes, and over the independent tribes, directly connected with them. Secondly, the districts of Kuram, Pishin and Sib. would remain under the protection and control of the British Government. In the next place, the foreign relation of the Kabul Government must be henceforth conducted in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government; and European British Officers, accredited to the Kabul Government, must be permitted to reside at such places in Afghanistan as hereafter determined upon.

Yakub Khan agreed to place his foreign relations under British control; he also accepted in principle the conditions respecting European British agencies in Afghanistan. To the territorial conditions, however, he evinced considerable repugnance, and for the withdrawal of them he made to the Government of India a strong appeal.¹¹⁶ Cavagnari was thereupon instructed to address another letter to Yakub Khan, advising

¹¹² Lytton to Cranbrook, 30th January, 1879, *Lord Lytton's Private Collection*, C. R. O. Record.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879, Cons. 548.

¹¹⁵ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., March, 1879, Cons. 144.

¹¹⁶ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., March, 1879, Cons. 151.

him to reconsider the territorial condition, and enquiring if the Amir was disposed to invite to Kabul a British Officer for personal conference with a view to the early removal of all the possible impediments to a re-establishment of friendly relations between the two Governments.¹¹⁷ To this Yakub Khan replied, reiterating his sincere desire for British friendship, but declaring once again his inability to accept the territorial condition. He, however, readily acceded to the request for receiving a British Envoy at Kabul.¹¹⁸

This opportunity Lord Lytton resolved to accept. Major Cavagnari was instructed to send a native agent, Bakhtiyar Khan, to the Amir for the purpose of making the necessary arrangements for the proposed conference, and was invested with full powers to treat with the Ruler of Kabul on behalf of the Government of India.¹¹⁹ But, meanwhile, the suspended activity of the British forces in Afghanistan had led to a recrudescence of vexatious and harassing attacks from the surrounding tribes. These attacks gave rise to two actions, in which severe loss was inflicted on the Shinwari tribe by Brigadier-General Tytler at Deh Sarrak, and on the Khugianis by Brigadier-General Gough at Futtehabad. Simultaneously, General Sir Samuel Browne was authorised to advance as far as Gandamak which was occupied shortly afterwards.

Within a few days after the occupation of Gandamak, a letter from the Amir announced his intention of proceeding to that place for the purpose of their entering into personal conference with Major Cavagnari.¹²⁰ This decision was taken perhaps due to the recrudescence of troubles around Kabul, and on the suggestion of Cavagnari's messenger, Bakhtiyar Khan. This was considered by the Viceroy to be a more satisfactory arrangement, and Major Cavagnari was accordingly instructed to arrange with General Sir Samuel Browne for the honourable reception of Yakub Khan at Gandamak.¹²¹

The Afghan prince arrived at the British Camp at Gandamak on 8th May, 1879.¹²² Throughout the discussion he was reluctant to make any territorial concession, and earnestly pleaded that the Government of India should not take any territory from him.¹²³ After a lot of higgling Cavagnari granted him a concession on the territorial question: Kurram, Pishin and Sibi were not to be formally detached

¹¹⁷ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., April, 1879, Cons. 326; also Parl. Pap., 1879, Afghanistan No 7 (c 2401), pp. 14-15.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*; also Parl. Pap. *Ibid.* p. 15.

¹¹⁹ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., April, 1879, Cons. 326.

¹²⁰ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879, Cons. 473.

¹²¹ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., July, 1879, Cons. 185.

¹²² For. Dept., Sec. Supp., Dec., 1879, Cons. 424.

¹²³ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., May, 1879, Cons. 198, 206, 209, 213.

from his Kingdom, though they were to be administered by the British Government under an assignment.¹²¹ Virtually, Yakub Khan had to agree to all that had been originally asked of him, and whether brow-beaten or reasoned into submission, Yakub Khan ceased to struggle any longer.¹²²

The treaty of peace signed at Gandamak on the 26th May, 1879, and ratified by the Viceroy on the 30th of the same month,¹²³ contained articles by which the Amir further bound himself to grant an amnesty to his people, to give trade facilities to the British subjects, and to permit the construction of a telegraph line from Kurram to Kabul. Kandahar and Jellalabad were, of course, restored to him, but the British Government retained all control over the Khyber and Michni Passes, and of all relations with the independent tribes connected with these highways. Instead, the Government of India promised the Amir a subsidy of six lakhs of rupees a year, and a conditional guarantee against foreign aggression.

With the restoration of peace the policy of disintegration of Afghanistan was abandoned as a matter of course. Perusing the peace treaty with studied moderation, Lytton expressed great satisfaction at having being able to avoid the "serious embarrassment" to which the British Government would have been exposed in case the disintegration of the Afghan Kingdom were undertaken. He congratulated the Amir for readily agreeing to place his foreign relations under British control and admit British Residents in his country. The disinclination to accept these conditions, he averred, would have been incompatible with the objects for which the war was undertaken. The exclusion of Russian influence from Kabul and the rectification of the north-western frontier required that some strong material guarantees should be obtained, which would secure, independent of the personal caprices of the Afghan ruler, British interests and influence in Afghanistan. The territorial concessions, Lytton pointed out, guaranteed that security which rendered it impossible for any future Amir to exclude British influence from Kabul.¹²⁴ "The valley of the Kuram, rising eastward from the Punjab border between Kohat and Thal" commanded, "on the one side, Kabul and Ghazni, on the other, easy access to India." "Our southern frontiers", Lytton further observed, "had been greatly strengthened by our arrangements with Khelat, which gave us a strong

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, Cons. 209.

¹²² Hanna, *Second Afghan War*, II (1904), p. 341.

¹²³ Parl. Pap., 1879 Afghanistan No. 6 (c. 2362), pp. 3-5.

¹²⁴ For. Dpt., Sec. Supp., July, 1879, Cons. 185. Quoted also in part in Balfour, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-30.

position above the Bolan Pass. From Western Afghanistan, however, all the approaches to this position debouch in the fertile district of Pishin, which, bounded by the Kojak-Amran range, constituted the great natural granary to Quetta. Holding Pishin, and commanding the issues of the Kojak Pass, we could descend at will upon the plains of Kandahar, or advance to meet an enemy in the open field; whilst no enemy could debouch upon our plains by the Bolan without first besieging and taking Quetta (no easy task), and then forcing a long and difficult pass, of which we hold the issues."¹²⁸

Dwelling upon the retrocession of Kandahar and Jellalabad, Lytton claimed that "the local experience recently acquired by our expedition into Western Afghanistan has fully confirmed our previous impression that the strategic value of Kandahar exists only in connection with a system of frontier defence much more extensive than any we now require, or have even contemplated. It is reported to be a position of no material strength; it can be easily turned; and the surrounding country could not support a large military force. Kandahar is now easily accessible from our advanced position in Pishin, and can, at any time, be occupied without difficulty; but the permanent occupation of it (involving the maintenance of long lines of communication) would have considerably increased our military expenditure, without strengthening our military position. It is, however, mainly on political grounds that the retention of Kandahar was excluded from the conditions of the Treaty of Gandamak. Such a condition would have been extremely painful to the Amir, and detrimental to the strength and credit of his government. Without Kandahar it would be difficult for the central authority at Kabul to maintain any effective hold upon Herat; and the foreign occupation of so important a city, in the interior of his dominions would have been inconsistent with those relations of friendship and mutual confidence which the Treaty was designed to establish between the British Government and the Amir of Afghanistan... Similar objections applied to the retention of Jellalabad. As a military position that town offers no advantages not better secured by a garrison on the Tundi Kotal ridge. It can, at any moment, be seized by a rapid advance from the Khyber, and to hold it as a permanent frontier garrison would require the prolongation, as far as Gandamak, of a troublesome line of military communications."¹²⁹

In short, Lord Lytton believed that the Treaty of Gandamak provided for and facilitated "the attainment of results incalculably

¹²⁸ For. Dept., Sec. Supp., July, 1890, Cons. 165.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

beneficial to the two countries concerned."¹³⁰ In England the same satisfaction marked the sentiment of many, who rejoiced "at the generosity of the terms accorded by the treaty to the Ameer," and felt that the result of it was "honourable and creditable to England, and the advantages secured real and important"¹³¹ To the Government at Home the treaty brought increased confidence in its stability;¹³² to the great mass of the people it was a relief from the worries of an uncertain war. Dissatisfied with the treaty, however, were many malcontents, who were chiefly to be found in the advanced section of the Forward School, and among all those who still wanted to retain the frontier at the foothills of the Indus.

(concluded)

¹³⁰ *Ibid*

¹³¹ *The Times*, June 2, 1879.

¹³² *Vide* Disraeli's letter to Lytton, dated 14th Aug., 1879, Buckle, *op cit*, VI, p. 475. This letter is also quoted in part in Balfour's *Lord Lytton's Indian Administration*, p. 331; also see Hanna, *op cit*, II, p. 314.

Reviews and Notices of Books

Counter Attack From The East, The philosophy of Radhakrishnan—
By C. E. M. Joad, Hind Kitabs, Ltd Bombay, 1951. Price Rs. 4-12 0.

This is the first Indian edition of Dr. Joad's book on Radhakrishnan, first published in London by George Allen Unwin, Ltd in 1933. Radhakrishnan is now Vice-President of the Indian Union. And I think it is not wide of the mark to say that Plato's dream that "philosophers should bear kingly rule" has been partially realized in Radhakrishnan inasmuch as he is a philosopher and is in a way at the helm of the Indian State. It is good that Dr. Joad, tremendously preoccupied as he was, found time to write a commentary on the teaching of Radhakrishnan.

The book has seven chapters in which the illustrious author deals with such topics as Radhakrishnan the liaison officer, counter attack, intuition, the universe as a spiritual unity, way of life, immortality, and religion in the modern world.

The author begins by a comparison and contrast between the East and the West. He shows after the manner of Radhakrishnan that "the West has the energy and vitality of a civilization still comparatively young, yet does not know into what channels to direct them" and that the East has the tradition of wisdom and knowledge, "but is without the vitality to make the tradition live" in modern conditions.

In Chapter I, the author makes an appraisal of Radhakrishnan's personality. "Much has been written of Radhakrishnan the thinker", says he, "but of Radhakrishnan the talker and listener not enough." Dr. Joad goes on to say that Radhakrishnan is a brilliant speaker and that he has mastered the art of public speaking. His eloquent performances put "most English speakers to shame." One however is not prepared for wit and humour from Radhakrishnan. Much of it none the less is in him. Being vastly read in Western philosophy and literature and steeped in Eastern lore, he is eminently fitted to be, as Dr. Joad calls him, the liaison officer between the East and the West.

Then Dr. Joad sympathetically treats of Radhakrishnan's views on religion, mysticism, philosophy, reason, intuition and the rest, and tries to bring out his contribution to World-Synthesis. Dr. Joad however makes a critical approach to Radhakrishnan's position, and his criticism, which often appears pertinent, serves to clarify the ideas of the Indian philosopher. I may cite, for example, the difficulties the author points to about Radhakrishnan's views on creation, multiplicity, evil and error. As the author puts it:

"Why should the Absolute create?.....Now, creation implies change; it implies that one brings into being something that does not already exist because, presumably, what does already exist is not completely satisfying. But a perfect being cannot feel need or desire and yet remain perfect.

"This world, it is obvious, is not perfect; it contains evil and pain. Either, then, we must say that God deliberately willed to produce something less good than Himself, or persuade ourselves that these things, evil and pain, are in some sense illusory.

"Here, then, we seem to have two conflicting demands: the demand of the speculative reason and abstract mysticism for an all-embracing spiritual Absolute, impersonal, passionless and aloof, and the demand of the mass of religious experience for a personal God, interested, rejoicing and suffering. That the demands are at first sight incompatible is sufficiently clear". And so on.

As we see, the points Dr. Joad raises constitute the perennial problems of philosophy. Philosophers have been grappling with them ever since. But they have not yet found any final solutions to them. Radhakrishnan indeed has his answers to Dr. Joad's questions. But it seems that he is not wholly satisfied with them. He is, however, quick to assert that Radhakrishnan has his own view of the world, which, he is confident, would go a long way to synthesize the East and the West.

The book is written in lucid simple language, and the lucidity of the author's style does match the lucidity and fluency of Radhakrishnan's writings. The book is a brilliant piece of work. It makes highly interesting reading and would prove illuminating to the students of philosophy and general readers alike.

ADHAR CHANDRA DAS

Ourselves

VICE-CHANCELLOR'S TOUR ABROAD

Our Vice-Chancellor, Professor N. K. Sidhanta went to Utrecht in Holland in the last week of July, to attend a meeting of the Assembly of the World University Service. Professor Sidhanta is the Chairman of the National Committee of the World University Service in India. In the fitness of things, he represented the University Communities in this Country in the World organization. The World University Service is an international organization which came into existence for the first time after the termination of the first World War. Since then this institution, with its headquarters at Geneva, has been trying to focus world opinion on the importance and necessity of the development of healthy corporate life among the students in the University Communities in different parts of the world. Activities of the World University Service have assumed different forms in different countries according to the varying educational, social and economic needs of the Student Communities. Cultural values also are not overlooked. The World University Service arranges Seminars and discussion meetings in different University centres from time to time. There will be a Seminar this year towards the end of the month of September at Hyderabad. The subject chosen for discussion is:

“The Role of the University in a Welfare State”. Delegates from different Universities in India will participate in the Seminar meeting.

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SIR ABDULLA SUHRAWARDY LECTURES

Professor Syed Hasan Askari, Sir Abdulla Suhrawardy Lecturer of this University for 1956, delivered in this month in the Darbhanga Hall, a series of lectures on “Sufism in Medieval Bihar.”

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UNIVERSITY ELECTIONS

University elections are being held. The second Senate under the Calcutta University Act of 1951 has already been formed. Arrangements are now being made for reconstituting the other University Bodies, namely, the Academic Council, the Faculties, Boards of Studies and the Syndicate. It is understood that before the end of the year, by the month of December, all the new authorities will be fully reconstituted and they will begin to function.

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Notifications

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/113/125 123 (AM.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the undermentioned colleges have been affiliated to the B.Sc. Pass standard, in the subjects stated against each with effect from the session 1957-58, i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above named subjects at the examination from 1959 and not earlier.

Name of College.	Subject.
(a) Brahmananda Kesabchandra College, Bon Hooghly	Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics.
(b) Dinabandhu Andrews College, Baishnabghata.	Do.
(c) Sarojini Naidu College for Women, Dum Dum	Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics and Botany
Senate House, Calcutta, The 20th July, 1957.	D CHAKRAVARTI, Registrar.

ANDHRA UNIVERSITY

No. S 1/6928/56.

Waltair, 11th April, 1957

Encl: 1 (95 pages)

Proceedings of the Syndicate

Sub:—Gudala Satyanarayana, candidate with Registered No 1720—Matriculation Examination—March--April 1956 Misconduct at University Examination—Punishment awarded—Proceedings issued.

Read:—Syndicate Resolution dated 9th December, 1956.

(2) Letter dated 7th January, 1957 from Gudala Satyanarayana

(3) Syndicate Resolution dated 26th March, 1957.

Order

Gudala Satyanarayana, candidate with Registered Number 1720 of the Matriculation Examination held in March-April 1956 who appeared for the Examination at C S R Sarma College, Ongole Centre has been found guilty of the offence of substituting another person in his place for writing scripts under Part I of the Examination.

His result at the examination has been cancelled and he is debarred from appearing for any of the University Examination in future until and unless the Syndicate gives special permission.

By Order

V. SIMHADRI RAO,
Deputy Registrar.

ANDHRA UNIVERSITY

No. 82/8188/57.

Waltair, 18th May, 1957.

Order

The results of the following candidates who have been found guilty of resorting to unfair means at the University Examinations held in March-April 1957 are cancelled and they are debarred from appearing for any of the University Examinations for the periods noted against each:

Name of the Candidate.	Examination.	Reg. No.	Period.
1. J. P. Anantayya Setti	Intermediate	1007	Debarred for one year and permitted to sit for the University Examinations to be held in March-April 1958 or thereafter.
2. B. C. Sondra Rao	Do.	129	Do.
3. M. Suryanarayana Raju	Do.	270	Do.
4. Y. Bhagavannarasyanamurti	Do.	290	Do.
5. D. Ramamohana Rao	Do.	1701	Do.
6. P. Ramakrishna Rao	Do.	2081	Do.
7. K. Ramakrishna Rao	Do.	2294	Do.
8. N. Hari Babu	Do.	2343	Do.
9. Y. Radhakrishnamurti	Do.	2724	Do.
10. N. Srinivasa Rao	Do.	2765	Do.
11. B. Prabhakara Rao	Do.	3185	Do.
12. M. Radhakrishna Prasad	Do.	3201	Do.
13. J. Rayana Rao	Do.	5215	Do.
14. N. Ranga Rao	Do.	8151	Do.
15. K. Venkatacharyulu	Do.	8317	Do.
16. G. Venkateswara Rao	Do.	4273	Do.
17. A. Virasakhara Rao	Do.	5014	Do.
18. S. Parthudu	Do.	5251	Do.
19. M. Subba Rao	Do.	6277	Do.
20. M. Seshachari	Do.	8326	Do.
21. V. Koteswara Rao	Do.	9140	Do.
22. M. Srimannarayanaachari	Do.	6966	Do.
23. D. A. Nityananda Rao	Do.	7136	Do.
24. T. Pamanathan Rao	Do.	7421	Do.
25. S. Venkateswara Rao	Do.	7584	Do.
26. P. Friramu'lu	Do.	7957	Do.
27. K. Ramachandra Naidu	Do.	1003	Do.
28. M. Venkata Rao	Do.	11043	Do.
29. C. Thirunai	Do.	11034	Do.
30. N. Ina Rao	Do.	10992	Do.
31. T. Chidanandam	Do.	11468	Do.
32. G. S. S. Hanugopal	Do.	9969	Do.
33. A. Ramamohana Rao	Do.	10074	Do.
34. N. Govardhanadhara Das	Do.	11685	Do.
35. K. Hari Prasad	Do.	12078	Do.
36. K. Koteswara Sarma	Do.	12087	Do.
37. N. Lakshmana Sastri	Do.	12093	Do.
38. K. V. Rama Rao	Do.	12214	Do.
39. B. Ratna Rao	Do.	12217	Do.
40. K. Kanakareu	Do.	12352	Do.
41. K. James Clive	Do.	12582	Do.
42. M. V. Rami Reddi	Do.	12687	Do.
43. V. Suryanarayana Rao	Do.	12725	Do.
44. K. B. V. Ramakrishna	Do.	12791	Do.
45. C. Brahmanandam	Do.	12811	Do.
46. G. Jagannadharao	Do.	12928	Do.
47. D. Nartanda Sastri	Do.	13027	Do.
48. P. Srinivasa Rao	Do.	13836	Do.
49. K. Narayanaswami	Do.	13895	Do.
50. B. A. Satyanarayana	Do.	14011	Do.
51. C. Virsharudu	Do.	14080	Do.
52. Sriniseti Prabhakar.	Matriculation	995	Debarred for 1½ years and permitted to sit for the University Examinations to be held in September, 1958.
53. Putti Sobhanadri Rao	Do.	380	Do.
54. Kondayypalem Gopalekrishna	Do.	1144	Do.
55. Inampudi Venkateswararao	Do.	1410	Do.
56. Gogineni Subba Rao	Do.	1629	Do.
57. Vummaneni Ankamma Chowdary	Do.	1598	Do.
58. Rachakonda Venkata Sitaramanjaneyulu	Do.	2283	Do.
59. Pattaswami Venkatasubbarao	Do.	2294	Do.
60. Chana Sambasiva Rao	Do.	2419	Do.
61. Arummalu Tirupatireddu	Do.	2568	Do.

Name of the Candidate.	Examination.	Reg. No.	Period.
62. Konern Ramkrishna Prasad	Do.	2648	Do.
63. Narind Kanaka Rao	Do.	2787	Do.
64. Avasara Surya Prasad Rao	Do.	2917	Do.
65. Pedada Venkata Satyam	B.A.	3815	Do.
66. Mariganti Appalacheri	Do.	2413	Do.
67. Ramanadh Vittal Bhat, K.	B.Com	898	Do.
68. A. S. R. Joga Rao	F.L.	296	Do.
69. T. Ramachandria Rao	Intermediate	6332	Debarred for 2 years and permitted to sit for the University Examinations to be held in March-April 1957.

By Order
V. SIMHADRI RAO,
In-Charge Registrar.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH

No. 2571-2750/57-G.
Sir/Madam,

15th February, 1957.

I am to inform you that the Principal, Dyal Singh College, Karnal, vide his letter No. 8936, dated 29th January, 1957, has rusticated the following students, for a period of one year, w.e.f. 29th January 1957, for the reasons mentioned below :

S. No	Name of the student (with Regd Nos.)	Father's Name.	Class.	Reasons.
1.	Hardip Singh Virk (52-y-238)	Rachpal Singh Virk	IV Year	For man-handling one of the senior members of the staff.
2	Amrik Singh (53-y-2)	Narain Singh	Do.	Do.
3.	Gurdial Singh Virk (53-y-29)	Kartar Singh Virk	Do.	Do.
4.	Kanwar Jit Singh Virk (53-y-364)	Gurcharan Singh	Do.	Do.

KESAR MALL,
Assistant Registrar (co-ordination),
for Registrar.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY (CHANDIGARH)

Notification

It is hereby notified that :—

I(a) Hardarshan Kaur daughter of S. Karam Singh, Kucha Kamboja inside Sultan Wind Gate, Amritsar, Roll No 122, Budhiman Examination, November, 1956, has been disqualified for four years i.e. 1956, 1957, 1958 and 1959, for impersonation, under Regulation 18(a) at page 80 of the Calendar, Volume I, 1954

(b) Mohinder Kaur daughter of S. Biant Singh, Post-Master, Kot Bhagat Singh, Sultan Wind Road, Amritsar, Registered No. 55-ez 5674, who impersonated Hardarshan Kaur, has been declared as not a fit and proper person for any future examination of this University, under Regulation 18(d) (ii) at page 80 of the Calendar, Vol. I, 1954.

II A Diploma Course in Library Science will be started at the University Library.

III(e) With effect from the examination to be held in 1957, M.A. Part I Examination will be held on August 1.

(b) M.A. Part II Examination of 1957 shall be held in September, 1957 but M.A. Part II Examination of 1958 and subsequent years shall be held on the 1st of August.

IV B.A. Honours examination in Urdu has been instituted at this University with effect from the examination of 1958.

Chandigarh (Capital)
Dated the 5th March. 1957.

J. R. AGNIHOTRI,
Registrar.

1957]

NOTIFICATIONS

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PANJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH

Sir/Madam,

I am to inform you that the Principal, S. G. G. S. Khalsa College, Mahilpur (Hoshiarpur), vide his letter No. 1281, dated 30th January 1957, has rusticated the following student, with effect from 30th January, 1957, for the reasons mentioned below (Reg. 4 and 5, Pb. University Cal 1954 Vol. III, page 17).

S. No.	Name and the registered No. of the student.	Father's name	Class	Reasons for rustication
1	Lachhman Dass Mehmi (54-gur-48)	Harnam Dass	3rd-year	Gross misconduct

Yours faithfully,

KESAR MALL,

Asstt. Registrar (co-ordn.)
for Registrar,

6th March, 1957.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH

Sir/Madam,

I am to inform you that the Principal, Government Post-Graduate Basic training College, Chandigarh, vide his letter, No. 183, dated 21st January, 1957, has expelled the following student, with effect from 21st January, 1957, for the reasons mentioned below :—

S. No.	Name and the registered No. of the student.	Father's name	Class	Reasons for expulsion
1	Kumari Lajwanti Rewal (52-ez-8468).	Harishchandra Rawal	B.Ed. (basic)	For making a grossly false statement, about her relationship with the person with whom she was staying at Chandigarh, in her application form.

Yours faithfully,

KESAR MALL

Asst. Registrar (co-ordn.)
for Registrar.

13th February, 1957

PANJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH

Sir/Madam,

I am to inform you that the Principal, Ahir College, Rewari, vide his letter No 1027, dated 1st February, 1957, has expelled the following students, for a period of two years, with effect from 2nd February, 1957, for the reasons mentioned below :—

S. No.	Name of the student	Father's name	Class	Reasons
1	52 ar 20 Shri Chand	Shri Chuni Lal	III year	Gross misconduct

Yours faithfully,

KESAR MALL,

Asst. Registrar (co-ordn.)
for Registrar.

15th February, 1957

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

Office of the Registrar

Copy of Resolution :

Considered letter No. 3671/56-57 dated 8/10th December, 1956 from the Principal, College of Mining & Metallurgy regarding Shri Khush Hal Singh, 1st Year (Min. & Met.) for forging signature of the Principal and the office seal.

Resolved that Shri Khush Hal Singh, 1st Year (Min. & Met.) be expelled from the University and in future he be not admitted to any of the constituent colleges of the University.

Illegible,
Registrar.

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

Office of the Registrar.

Copy of Resolution :

Considered the letter dated the 4th March, 1957 from the Principal, Ayurvedic College, B.H.U. regarding Sri Rama Kant Pande, II Year (Ayurveda) who was found copying from certain slip of papers.

RESOLVED that Sri Rama Kant Pande, II Year (Ayurveda) be rusticated for two years with immediate effect for copying from certain slip of papers in the examination and his result of the 1957 examination be cancelled and be not permitted to appear at any University examination before 1959.

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

Office of the Registrar

This is to inform you that the following students who appeared in the Admission Examination/ Ayurvedic Examination (First Professional) of 1957 of the Banaras Hindu University have been rusticated for two years for using unfair means at the examinations and that their 1957 Examination have been cancelled and they would not be permitted to appear at any of the University Examination before 1959, vide Resolution No 344 of the Standing Committee of the Academic Council passed at its meeting held on the 15th April, 1957.

Yours faithfully,
Illegible,
Registrar.

S. No.	Roll No	Name and Address.
1.	2915	Kamla Prasad Misra, S/o Shri Braham Nath Misra, D 14/28, Tehri Neem, Banaras
2	642	Anand Prakash C/o Shri S K Sharma, Marvahi Gali, Sadet Ganj, Lucknow.
3.	832	Bindeshwari Prasad, S/o Shri Bishnu Lal, Moh : Naisarak, Jamunajika-nath, Patna.
4.	3715	S. Pichai Rao, S/o Shri N. . Muttu, 99, Rayapatha High Road, Mylapore, Madras-4
5.	1428	Deo Narayan Bajpai, S/o Shri Shanktha Pd. Bajpai H. M. Tikrapara (Shon-kapara) P.O. & R.S. Bilaspur, M.P.
6.	390	Smt. Shanti Shukla, D/o Pt Raja Ram Shukla 104 A/ 300 A. P. Road, Kanpur
7.	1379	Dharam Kishore Dubey, S/o Pt. Ram Kumar Dubey, Bashirat Ganj, Lucknow.
8.	4037	Saiva Bhagwan Pareek, S/o Shri Sujan Chandji Pareek Gita Press, Gorakhpur.
9.	553	Km. Urmila Tripathi, D/o Shri Lalji Tripathi, New A/7 Quarters, B.H.U., Banaras-5
10.	3153	Prakash Narayan Saigal, S/o Shri Bankey Behari Lal Saigal, Nilkunt 33/57 Chowk, Banaras.
11.	1374	Dwarika Nath Dubedi, S/o Pt. Balram Dubey, Cola Mahalla, Arrah (Shahabad) Bihar.

AYURVEDA (FIRST PROFESSIONAL), 1957.

12. 1 Ayudhya Prasad Rai, S/o Shri Achaibar Rai, Vill. & P.O. Khaira, Banuwar, (Deoria).

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

Office of the Registrar.

II/11/20/& 11

May 4, 1957.

Copy of Resolution :

Considered the cases of malpractices at the Admission and Ayurvedic Examinations of 1957.

RESOLVED that the cases be dealt with as shown below :

AYURVEDIC EXAMINATION (FIRST PROFESSIONAL)

Roll No	Name	Nature of Guilt	Punishment.
71	Shiv Sajan Prasad	The candidate was found copying from a leaf.	Expelled; the 1957 Exam. be cancelled and be not allowed admission to any of the Constituent colleges of the University in future.

AGRA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. 86, 1957.

It is hereby notified that the results of the following candidates have been cancelled for 1957 Examination and they have been further debarred from appearing at any examination of the University in 1958, as they used or attempted to use unfair means at the University examination of 1957 :—

M.A. (PREVIOUS)

Roll No	Enrol. No.	Name	College or Centre	Subject
870	A5316064	Uma Shanker Awasthi Es.	St. DAV. Col., Kanpur	English.
889	A5118009	Daya Shanker Shastri	VSSD. Col., Kanpur	Sanskrit.
3355	A5312030	Krishna Nandan Kulshreshtha	St. Johns Col., Agra	Economics
4963	A196751	Shri Nandan Sahai	DAV. Col., Kanpur	History.

M.A. (FINAL)

1215	A525614	Fate Singh Rawat	DAV. Col., Dehradun	Hindi
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LL.B. (PREVIOUS)

387	A516176	Chiranjil Lal Bansal	Govt. College, Ajmer
1980	A526780	Kausbal Kishore Singh	DAV. Col., Kanpur
2087	A519219	Prabha Kant Misra	Do.
2107	A519029	Shri Prakash Agrawal	Do.
2602	A581127	Ajit Singh Bansal	Meerut College, Meerut.
2699	A531710	Onkar Singh Sirohi	Do.
2889	A536922	Mahendra Pal Singh	KGK. Col., Meeradabad

B.T.

326	A52468	Kbilar Singh Verma	Bareilly Col., Bareilly.
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B.A. PART I.

96	A5617819	Hari Shanker Rajput	Agra College, Agra
137	A5617850	Krishan Kant Gautam	Do.
182	A5617883	(Km) Nirmala Singhal	Do.
597	A5626	Indra Chand (Student)	St. John's Col., Agra College Centre
883	A5517860	Gopal Prasad Lavania	Senate House, Agra Centre.
1873	A5617865	Kamel Singh Verma	DS. Col., Aligarh
4013	A5610661	Subhas Chandra Katiyar	Bareilly College, Bareilly
4769	A567885	Ram Prakash Varshney	S. M. College, Chandausi
		Nirbhay	
6593	A5518158	Vijai Bahadurlal Srivastava	M.P. Deg. Col., Gorakhpur Centre
8800	A5620356	(Km) Chandra Wati Pal	Holkar Col., Indore Centre
9624	A5515871	Om Prakash Sharma	B.D. College, Jhansi Centre
9782	A5616236	Hem Chandra Gupta	Christ Church Col., Kanpur
10046	A5611455	Baij Nath Sachan	DAV. College, Kanpur
10152	A564554	Devī P'd. Dwivedi	Do.
10400	A5611767	Krishana Kumar Srivastava	Do.
10985	A5612312	Subhan Khan	Do.
11552	A5621542	Raj Narain Tewari	Do.
12619	562552	Jagdish Prasad	NREC College, Khurja
12868	A5511020	Sheo Dan Singh Dagur	Do. " Centre
		(DAV Col., Bulandshahr)	
12909	A5519768	Prem Chand Sharma Ex. St.	Do.
13494	A561288	Narendra Singh	KR. College, Mathura
14111	A559731	Prem Chand Jain	Meerut College, Meerut
14999	A559736	Prem Singh Ex. St.	Do.
14537	A5616514	Sharan Vir Rathbi	NAS College, Meerut
16801	A563004	Arjun Deo	JV. Jain Deg. Col., Saharanpur

Roll No.	Enrol No.	Name	College or Centre
17327	A565371	Mānvendra Singh	AK College, Shikohabad

B.A. PART II

12	A5411891	Hukam Chand Jain (W. M.)	DAV. College, Ajmer
43	A5511714	Hari Kishan Chhaberia	Agra College, Agra
149	A547900	Ram Singh Yadav	Do.
270	A5513754	Mithan Lal (St. B. R. Col.)	Do. Centre
482	A5311977	Som Pal Gupta	Do.
489	A5311996	Badri P'd. Pathak. Ex. St.	Do. Centre
1154	A5616546	Suresh Chandra Gupta	Govt. College, Ajmer
1685	A543176	Om Prakash Saxena	DS. College, Aligarh
1654	A5520409	Chandra Ketu Singh	Do. Centre
2879	A558098	Dina Nath Gcel	Bareilly College, Bareilly
3638	A552176	Ram Bharosay Lal	S.M. College, Chandausi
5158	A5411054	Mangal Prasad Srivastava	MP. Col., Gorakhpur Centre
6651	A5616980	Amar Nath Srivastava	TD. College, Jaunpur
7102	A5575058	Satish Chandra Kenchan	B.D. Col., Jhansi
7784	A554085	Murlidhar S. Bhatia	DAV. College, Kanpur
7822	A555082	Onkar Lal Dixit	Do.
8466	A529244	Krishna Kant Sharma	Do. Centre
8795	A5520259	(Km) Jayanti Rani Nandi	Do. Centre
		Burman	
1 0350	A559611	Krishna Raj Singh	Meerut Col. Meerut
10397	A54351	Munishwar Dayal Tyagi	Do.
10553	A559947	Soren Singh Maheriya	Do.
10595	A559915	Vikram Singh	Do.
12144	A544310	Ramesh Chandra Pant	DSBG. Col. Nainital

B.Sc. PART I

671	A5523508	K. Mathews	Govt. College, Ajmer
1444	A507899	Mohan Sarān Chaturvedi	S.M. College, Chandausi
1943	A566152	Mohan Lal Vijay	M.M.H. Col., Ghaziabad
2391	A5615888	Krishna Nand	KN. Govt. Col., Gyanpur
3100	A5612640	Mahesh Kumar Raizada	DAV College, Kanpur
3149	A5612672	Onkar Prasad Sakseena	Do.
3362	A5612816	Surendra Kumar Johri	Do.
3532	A556003	Syed Jafar Husain	Do.
62	A562757	Bhavendra Pal Singh	NREC College, Khurja
4396	A552780	Hari Shanker (Ex. St. GHD. Col.)	R.K.K. Col., Moradabad Centre
4712	A5614127	Mohan Lal Sab	DSB. Govt. Col., Nainital

B.Sc. PART II

271	A541603	Shyam Babu (St. BR. Col.)	St. Johns Col., Agra Centre
1871	A555660	Darshan Lal Sachdeva	DAV. Col., Kanpur
1902	A519140	Hari Shanker Tewari	Do.
1971	A543212	Narendra Nath Srivastava	Do.
1935	A555879	Pyare Lal Misra	Do.
1996	A555895	Radha Charan Lal	Do.
2011	A555902	Rajni Kant Pandey	Do.
2081	A540932	Surendra Singh	Do.
2106	A549386	Virendra Sarup Saksena	Do.
2647	A. 12257	Bhupendra Singh Verma Ex. St.	Meerut Coll ge, Meeru
2666	A474753	Madan Mohan Kaushik (Ex. St.)	Do.

B.COM. PART I

317	A562439	Deoki Nandan	Barahseni Col Aligarh
330	A562453	Jagdish Prasad Mital	Do.
330	A562473	Radhey Shyam Sharma	Do.
2547	A5514393	Shyam Sunder Bhatia	DAV College, Kanpur
2677	A5618396	Suresh Chandra Agrawal	Do.
2774	A561731	Gopal Das Tandon	VSSD College, Kanpur
3183	A569355	Jai Prakash Gupta	Meerut College, Meerut

B.COM. PART II

318	A557338	Girish Babu Varshney (Ex St.)	Barahseni Col., Aligarh
377	A524979	Chandra Prakash Varshney (Ex. St.)	Do.
709	A5415657	Anand Prakash Aroia	DAV College, DehraDun
2139	A521711	Jagdish Chandra Consul (Ex. St.)	NREC College, Khurja

AGRA UNIVERSITY

The Examination result of 1957 of the following candidates has been cancelled on account of using or attempting to use unfair means —

LL.B (PREVIOUS)

Roll No	Enrol No	Name	College or Centre
1920	A549134	Brahma Datt Dwivedi	DAV College, Kanpur

B.A PART I

1616	A557254	Ghan Shyam Singh Verma	Barahseni Col , Aligarh
1725	A557321	Puran Lal (Ex. St.)	Do.
4450	A5613414	Munni Baksh	Hajimda College, Bhopal
8887	A5621125	Balmukand Singh	T.D. College, Jaunpur
10106	A5611510	Raj Swarup Awasthi	DAV College, Kanpur
10390	A551852	Kishna Gopal Nigam	Do.
1240	A56619	Om Chandra Shah	VSSD College, Kanpur
12618	A5510-55	Hem Singh	NREC. College, Khurja
13571	A56137	Rosan Lal Verma	KR. College, Mathura
14424	A559943	Shafiq Ahmad Khan (Ext St.)	Meerut College, Meerut

B.A. PART II

9612	A5519488	Banwari Lal Kaushik	NREC. College, Khurja Centre
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B.Sc. PART I

3796	A568967	Ishwar Chandra Tyagi	Meerut College, Meerut
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B.COM. PART II

1115	A552690	Lakhan Lal Sharma	Victoria College, Gwalior Centre
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Senate House, Agra

L. P. MATHUR, D.Sc.,

June 20/22, 1957.

Registrar.

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

Office of the Registrar

Ref. No. II/14/5. Dated June 5, 1957

Corrigendum

Please read Roll No. 365 of B.Sc (Pure) Krishan Lal Arora, D5/52, Tripura Bhairavi, Dasaswamedh, Varanasi in place of Roll No 336 of B.Sc (Pure) Jag Jivan Das Vansal, K28/22, Dudh Vinayak, Banaras in the list of rustication issued to you vide this office letter No. II/14/1/5/1141 to 1160, dated May 28, 1957/4-6-1957.

Illegible,
Registrar.

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

Office of the Registrar

Ref No. II/14/1 June 15, 1957.

Corrigendum

Please treat rustication of Shri Lakshmi Narain Jaiswal, Roll No 503 of B.A. Examination, 1957 as cancelled as shown in the list of rustication issued vide this office letter No. II/14/1/5 dated May 29, 1957.

Illegible,
Registrar.

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

Office of the Registrar

No. 11/14/6

17th June, 1957.

Copy of Resolution :

Considered the cases of malpractices at the various examinations of the University of 1957.

Resolved—That the cases of malpractices at the various examinations of the University be dealt as shown below:—

Roll No.	Name.	Examination	Subject	Paper	Punishment.
19	Man Mohan Krishna Trivedi	B.Sc (Ind Chem.)	Chem (Org)	II	Rusticated for two years, the 1957 Exam. be cancelled and not to be permitted to appear at any of the University examination before 1959.

Illegible,
Registrar.

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

Office of the Registrar

II/14/1/5/1656 to 1686

28th May, 1957

This is to inform you that the following candidates appeared in the examinations noted below against their names have been rusticated for two years for using unfair means at their examinations and that their 1957 Examinations have been cancelled and they would not be permitted to appear at any of the University Examination before 1959, vide Resolution No. 875 of the Standing Committee of the Academic Council passed at its meeting held on the 16th April, 1957.

No.	Roll No.	Name and Address.	Examination.
1.	51	Kedar Nath Dubey, S/o Shriwa Nath Dubey, Vill. Kharsuty, P.O. Obre (Gaya). Dt.	I.A.
2.	312	Ram Shankar Pathak, S/o Kedar Nath Pathak, 3/11 A.B.C., Banaras.	Do.
3.	150	Shiva Murat Gupta, S/o Lalji Gupta, Barigon Newada, Jaunpur.	I.Com.
4.	142	Tarkeshwar Nath Upadhyay, S/o Madhuban Upadhyayji, Vill. and P.O. Sukhpura, Dist. Ballia.	B.Sc. (Pure)

5.	652	Kedar Nath Srivastava, S/o Kailash Nath Srivastava C 7/152 Sain Pura (Chetganj) Banaras.	B.A.
6.	1041	Brij Pal Das Shah, S/o Ran Das Shah, K 87/87 Gwaldas Sahu Lane, Varanasi.	Do.
7.	1355	Prem Chandra Lal, S/o Shyam Narain Lal, Vill. and P.O. Umaraha, Banaras.	Do.
8.	1331	Ram Swaroop Prasad, S/o Kunj Behari Prasad, Vill Chitra, P O Soubarsa, Dist. Muzaffarpur (Bihar)	Do.
9.	1779	Ram Dhari Pandey, S/o Suraj Prasad Pandey, Vill. Belwan, P O. Pahara, Dist. Mirzapur.	Do.
10.	376	Jag Jiwan Bas Vansal, S/o Narottam Das K. 23/22, Dooth Vinayak, Banaras.	B Sc (Pure)
11.	414	Pratap Singh, S/o Amar Singh Mehrotra, K.E. Hospital, Varanasi.	Do.
12.	43	Shyam Bihari Misra, S/o Srichida Nanda Misra, Vill. Bakuchi, P.O. Satram, Dist. Deoria.	B.Sc. (Ag) Pt. I.
13.	503	Lakshmi Narain Jaiswal, S/o Satya Narain Prasad Jaiswal, Gola Pan ley, P O. Ahraura, Mirzapur.	B.A.

Illegible,
Registrar.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY (CHANDIGARH)

It is notified that—

The following persons have been disqualified from appearing in any future examination of this University for the reasons noted against each, under Regulation (ix) (b) at page 84 of the Panjab University Calendar, Volume I, 1951 :—

(i) Sri Amar Nath Janhar, S/o Shri Harinam Dass Jauhar, an employee in Indian Naval Headquarters, who tried to obtain a duplicate copy of the Matriculation Certificate on the basis of a false statement of having passed the said examination from Panjab University, Lahore, in 1923

(ii) Sri Bhagat Ram Sharma, S/o Pt Narangu Ram, Sanskrit Teacher, Janta, A S. Middle School, P.O. Polian Prohitan (Dist. Hoshiarpur), who tried to obtain a duplicate copy of the Shastri certificate on the basis of a false statement of having passed the said Examination from the Panjab University, Lahore, in 1912.

(iii) Sri Gurdial Singh, S/o Sri Amar Singh, who obtained a duplicate copy of Matriculation Certificate on the basis of a false statement of having passed the said examination from the Panjab University, Lahore, in 1946.

Chandigarh (Capital).
Dated the 28th May, 1957.


J. R. AGNIHOTRI,
Registrar.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY CHANDIGARH

I am to inform you that the Principal, Government College, Chandigarh vide his letter No. 619, dated 1st April, 1957, has rusticated the following student, with effect from 1st April, 1957, for the reasons mentioned below (Reg. 4 and 5, Pb. University Cal, 1954, Vol. III, page 17)

No.	Name and the Regd. No. of the Student.	Father's Name.	Class.	Reasons for Rustication.
1.	Sham Sunder Sharma (56-c-205)	Shakji Prashad Sharma	1st year	Gross Misconduct

K. L. MUKERJI,
Assistant Registrar (Cdn.)
for Registrar.



THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

. Vol. 144] SEPTEMBER, 1957 [No. 3

BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY

DR. ATULCHANDRA ROY, M.A., PH.D. (LOND.)
Calcutta University

British colonial policy has remained fundamentally unaltered since the time the colonies were created whether in Africa or Asia. It was rigid and imperialist in character as it is to-day although a section of the British people too, the Labourites had all along been, until sometimes back, advocating a liberal policy towards the colonies. The majority of the British Labour Movement at the time of the South African War (1899-1902) characterised it as an imperialist war against a small people with the object of destroying the independence of that people and obtaining possession of its national resources—gold mines and diamond mines—for a powerful group of monopoly capitalists. Is there any difference between the monopolists' drive for gold and diamonds in South Africa at the beginning of the century and their drive for tin and rubber in Malaya at the present time? Certainly not, the motive being the same. Sometimes back (May 1952) the then Labour Government, issuing a pamphlet "Problems of Foreign Policy," recognised the fact that "underneath the ferment in Asia a historic revolution is in progress. Conscious of their rights and dignity as nations they (the Asian peoples) are demanding freedom of control by European peoples" (P. 3). The Labourites admitted when in Power that the aims of the colonial revolutions were (1) to destroy native feudalism, (2) to emancipate the country from the control of the foreign groups, owners of plantations, tin mines, railways and harbours and (3) to gain control over their own industries and raw materials. But as a matter of fact, the Labourites have done very little in translating

their liberal ideas into action. Although they boast of the measure of self-government which they gave to India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, it will not be disputed to say that the then British Government had not the strength to hold them in the old way, and hence they had to make concessions to India and the countries around it. But wherever they have sufficient strength, the British Government are involved in fighting the colonial liberation movement as in Malaya, Kenya and British Guiana. In a recently published pamphlet (Feb. 1955), "Facing the facts in the colonies", the Labourites have exposed themselves. In fact, they have outright ignored the realities of colonial rule previously recognised by the party. Their policy approximates to Tory policy. Of course, a few years back, they exposed their approximation unambiguously to the Tory Policy when in the House of Commons, Mr. Attlee in reply to a question by Mr. Churchill on 23rd August, 1945, regarding the colonies, said, that he (Mr. Attlee) fully recollected the British Government's statements that Britain did not contemplate any modification in the sovereignty of His Majesty's territories both in Asia and Africa. "Apparently", observed Dr. Radhakrishnan, "the Labour Government intends to carry on the imperial policy of its predecessors" ('Is this Peace'?—P. 8). About the attitude of the British Government to their colonies, Dr. Radhakrishnan said, "The present owners (meaning the Tories) did not wish to set the dependent territories on the path of independence" (*Ibid*-P. 14). In a word, it can be said that the British Government, no matter whether Labour or Tory, are bent on perpetuating their colonial rule in spite of their frank admittance of the fact that a "historic revolution is in progress in the colonies", and why?

Interests in Colonies

Four different types of colonies have been enumerated in the pamphlet "Facing facts in the colonies", viz., (1) "colonial territories where trusteeship for the benefit of the colonial peoples themselves is the predominating factor", (2) "in others, economic interests lie at the roots of colonial rule", (3) "Yet again there remains the emotional tie with the crown and the Flag," and (4) "the fourth category which is rapidly becoming of paramount importance within the British empire is the drive of white settler-communities to establish their own imperial rule by gaining both political and economic control of the territories where they have settled."

This analysis is just an attempt to confuse the real issue. There can be no denying the truth that one colony differs from another, but

the essential fact about them is that the ruling authority of the colony derives economic advantages, and whatever may be the form of government in any particular colony, the real government deciding the policy in the last analysis, is the government in London.

The economic interest are enormous. In the first place, the white firms engaged in colonial trade, derive super-profits, and in the second place, these firms provide a stumbling block to the development of the indigenous economy. The foreign firms have completely monopolised tea, and rubber plantations and mining industries. They have the advantage of cheap labour, no trade unionism or weak trade unionism, enabling them to earn much higher profits than usual. Hence it is understandable, these firms are not at all interested in the all round developments of the colony.

Besides these firms, there are trading companies. These companies are the link between the peasantry and the capitalist world market, selling the goods manufactured in the parent cities. Formerly, these companies used to buy and sell on their own account the produce of the peasantry. But now they are buying agents at a fixed allowance of those products for the Marketing Boards. Through these agents British goods reach the colonial markets. It cannot be gainsaid that the very existence of these trading companies is a hindrance to the large-scale growth of the indigenous mercantile community.

Despite the profits derived by particular firms, the British capitalist system, as a whole, derives enormous gains from the colonies. Britain sees in increased colonial exploitation and increased sale of colonial products to the U.S.A., in return for dollars, a way out of its economic difficulties. As a matter of fact, the colonies are compelled to buy British goods in preference to goods of other countries however cheaper and advantageous they might be.

What British Govt. want?

The British Government, whether Labour or Tory, want to continue and extend their colonial rule in every possible way. They do not propose to transfer the mines and the plantations, the main economic resources of the colonies, to the colonial peoples. They do not desire to replace the white trading organisations with trading organisations operated on a small scale by the colonial peoples themselves. On the contrary, they really mean to increase the investments of their nationals in order to extend the existing system in the colonies. The Labour pamphlet quoted above, has laid down that it is not possible to develop the colonies "without outside assistance." It

argues that private investors in the metropolis have to be encouraged to lay out their capital on a grand scale in the colonies, of course, subject to certain conditions. "It must be remembered", the pamphlet argues, "that if you need private foreign capital, the terms on which you allow it to operate must be such that private investors feel that they will themselves benefit. This may mean the export of greater profit payments than you really wish to permit." This argument cannot be gainsaid. The private investor won't go into the colonies unless he is assured of a big and safe return, although the Labourites apprehend that their advocacy for more private investment in the colonies might be unpopular in the Labour Movement. As a precautionary measure, the Labour pamphlet says that care should be taken to ensure that private enterprise "does not become so powerful that it could secure a stronghold on the economy and virtual control of the government." How absurd to pretend that such enterprises would not go in for super-profits but would remain satisfied with a modest rate of interest. The Labourites let the cat out of the bag by putting the question before the Labour Movement thus, "In view of the fact that the capitalist system is likely in our opinion to last for a long time and in view of the fact that the capitalists will not invest in the colonies unless they get a good return for their money, had'n't we better drop our previous (Socialist) opposition to imperialist exploitation." So it seems that the British Socialists are bent on keeping alive and extending further the imperialist apparatus of exploitation in the colonies.

So far as the colonial trade unions are concerned, the British Labourites, following the policy of the Tories, suggest something which would definitely injure the last hope left to the colonial peoples. They take it for granted that there is a danger of a too rapid growth of trade unionism, and that the colonial trade unions are often inspired by political groups. Hence at present, they are considering the possibilities of introducing working class adult education into the colonies, that is, the Labourites are advocating for non-political trade unions. They admit that British trade unionism "grew out of bitter and tragic struggles of the working class movement" and "one is forced to ask if genuine trade unionism can be created otherwise"? (Ibid). Of course it cannot. Even in the richest capitalist land—the U.S.A.—trade unionism grew in that way. British trade union history proves that only under compulsion that the employers recognised the unions. But so far as the colonial trade unions are concerned, in the opinion of the British Government, it is wrong to (1) obtain recognition by strikes, and (2) obtain recognition by a ballot vote of the workers. That was the argument of the present Conservative Government for destroying

the constitution of British Guiana. Hence both the Labourites and the Conservatives favour setting up of tame-trade unions in the colonies.

Self-government for the colonies?

The Labourites are raising hosts of objections to giving any of the existing colonies independence in the foreseeable future and on this issue they are in line with the Tory policy, as Sir William Ridsdale says, "of the many views they (i.e., the Labourites and Tories) had in common, one concerned the importance of keeping foreign policy out of and above party politics." Self government, however, had been granted to India and the countries around it, but still Britain continues to hold those colonies which she is able to hold. Malaya is as fit for self-government as Burma or Ceylon, but she has not yet been given that privilege. The fact that the British Government do not contemplate to giving self-government could be well illustrated by the following facts.

In British Guiana, the People's Progressive Party gained a majority at a general election on a programme of self-government. A few months later they are thrown out of office although it was admitted that the newly constituted government had the peoples' support, just what happened in East Bengal in 1955. A Commission, appointed by the British Government, reported that it would be useless to hold another new general election because the People's Progressive Party would win again. The British Labour Party argued in a round about way that the constitution should not have been suspended but that "the Governor should have vetoed the legislation of the People's Progressive Party", which certainly amounts to the same thing. The Government justified their action by observing that "It is clear, their (P. P. P.) objective was to turn British Guiana into a totalitarian state subordinate to Moscow and a dangerous platform for extending communist influence in the Western Hemisphere" (Colonial Office statement, Oct. 9, 1953). How could a country of 437,000 People separated from any other communist state by thousands miles of ocean—set up "a totalitarian state subordinate to Moscow"? Troops were sent in and the leaders arrested "with a view to preventing them acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety and order" (*Ibid*). The observation of Mr. J. M. Cambell, the Chairman of a Canadian firm that "British Guiana remains the source of our existence and the foundations of our structure", surely betrays the Government's often repeated declaration of granting self-government to the colonies.

In the case of Kenya, the Government claimed that an armed

rising was in being and hence they resorted to repression and mass arrests. The Labour party supporting the fight against 'Mau Mau' argued that "real progress is impossible until psychological and political conditions are such that co-operation on equal terms is possible Opposition has been expressed in some circles to Britain sending troops to the colony. Would it be a more Socialist Policy to withdraw our troops and leave the people there to settle the issue by force or would this be more likely to lead to either a black or a white tyranny? If so, have we a responsibility to try to avoid this?" (Facing Facts, etc.) The statement contains no proposals to meet the present situation in Kenya, nor any suggestions for negotiations on the future of Kenya. (My article, "In the background of Kenya", *vide*, Hindusthan Standard—9th December, 1954, contains some important informations.)

Again on Malaya both the Labourites and the Tories hold the same view, that is, an armed rising is in being prejudicial to public safety and order. The Labour Pamphlet says, "In 1948 there was a communist rising in Malaya, which having failed in its object of establishing 'liberated areas' resorted to acts of terrorism." Hence they argue, "The events in Malaya raise in a dramatic form the question of whether Britain should concede self-government immediately on the threat of force, or whether it should suppress violent moves in the interests of democracy." Self-government was conceded to India precisely for this reason. In Southern Ireland, Canada and Australia, self-government was granted "on the threat of force." Up till the movement that seems to be the only way by which colonies have ever obtained self-government. Here are peoples rebelling against White domination. Surely this is part of the "historic revolution in progress." Yet British troops are engaged in suppressing it. The truth is as Brig. Head (Tory. M.P.) opines, "Malaya, a key strategic area, is also of great economic value, since the export of rubber is one of our main dollar earners," ('Pattern of Peace'—P. 25). Hence excuses are not wanting for justifying the armed suppression of the Malaya Peoples as in the case of other colonial Peoples and denying them self-government. Particularly, the British Socialists support the Government sending troops in the colonies on the ground that if they got self-government, there is no guarantee that they would establish 'democracy', although they asserted sometimes back (in their pamphlet, 'our first duty—Peace') "that we have now to defend our gains, to go further towards Socialism and in particular, towards greater equality of wealth and opportunity which is the essence of Socialism." At last after years of troubles, the British Government have conceded to the demand of the independence which Malaya will achieve on 31st August of this year.

The Future

British has been affected by crisis after crisis in the post war period and the military costs of war in the colonies are adding enormously to Britain's difficulties. Time is important and a new approach to the colonies is desirable. The attempt of Britain to hold back the colonial liberation movement is imposing an enormous drain on the economy. The policy of emancipating the colonial peoples and on that basis entering into a politico-economic association with them on the basis of equality is only real way forward. Britain needs the food and raw materials of the colonies, while on the other hand, the colonies need industrial and technical assistance which only Britain can offer. Hence the possibility of an honourable association with the colonial Peoples, is there which Britain should attempt for before long. This attempt would remove much of her present difficulties and surely endure her fame as the champion of democracy.

THE SOCIAL THEME IN THE NOVELS OF GEORGE MEREDITH AND THOMAS HARDY

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“ And there was a Horse in the King's stables; and the name of the Horse was Genius ”—wrote Walter de la Mare. Both Meredith and Hardy rode this Horse; but whereas the former drove him into the realm of comedy rejecting immortality and piping—

Into the breast that gives the rose
Shall I with shuddering fall,

the latter rode into the realm of tragedy crying—

Oh Thou, who Man of Baser Earth didst make,
And ev'n with Paradise devise the snake,
For all the sin wherewith the Face of Man
Is blackened—Man's forgiveness give—and take!

Poetic comedy is Meredith's (1828-1909) powerful weapon in his assaults against pride and vanity and all their brood. He sings and as he sings, he dissects. He is not of course among the great psychologists who thread their way anonymously and patiently in and out of the dark corridors of the mind and who subtly and perfectly individualise each character. His analysis re-creates rather than divides his object by a series of visions which he limns in impassioned prose. He is essentially one with the poets who identify the character with the passion, who 'symbolise and make abstract'. This poetic identification of the character with emotion is, in part, due to a close observation of the most delicate shades of the comedy of human relations. “ Man ”, says Meredith, “ is the laughing animal; and at the end of the infinite search, the philosopher finds himself clinging to laughter as the best of human fruit, purely human and sane and comforting.” While Aristotle attributed a cathartic effect to tragedy, Meredith held that it was the function of comedy to “ touch and kindle the mind through laughter.”

Meredith developed his theory of comedy in his Essay on Comedy, in the prelude to the *Egoist* and in his ode to the comic spirit. Comedy, according to him, is a great social force, a means of purging man of unsocial vices and of inculcating a sense of humour. Without

a sense of humour even a god is no god. A grain of humour would have saved Sir Willoughby Patterne or Sir Austin Feverel. Meredith suggests that "a good wind of laughter ultimately would have relieved Sir Austin of much of blight of self-deception and oddness and extravagance; and given him a healthier view of our atmosphere of life; but he had it not."

Meredith is too cheerful a humourist to be a satirist. The latter is a moral agent, a 'social scavenger working on a storage of bile'. He is often a misanthrope who goes about the world with a fleck of foam upon his lips. Meredith, however, observes that no misanthrope can ever aspire to be a humourist. He adds—"You may estimate your capacity for comic perception by being able to detect the ridicule of them you have without loving them less and more by being able to see yourself somewhat ridiculous to dear eyes and accepting the correction of their image of you. To love comedy, you must know the real world and know men and women well enough not to expect too much of them."

Meredith's preoccupation with social comedy makes him a keen observer of men and manners and prepares us for the large role which women play in his novels. After a study of a novel of Meredith, one rises with the exhilarating conviction that men and women are not cats and monkeys, but beings capable of growing more graceful than the angels and mightier than the leviathan. Among such beings women are the elect of Meredith. Indeed there is no society without women and Meredith affirms—"Where a veil is over women's faces, you cannot have society." It was the mission of Meredith to tear such veils where he found them. He knew that the comedy of life is enacted by both man and woman, yet he realised how the comedy is made lively and dynamic by woman who is the unconscious and often unostentatious initiator of all action, man being only her second fiddle. The types of women in Meredithian fantasy, lured in unforgettable portraits, are kaleidoscopic; but his womanly ideal, far removed from prurience, is always free from febrile aberrations and is, to quote Edward Wagenknecht, "certainly one of the finest tributes ever paid the sex in the frame of art."

In life, Meredith was a feminist and held that—"women of the independent mind are needed for any sensible degree of progress. They will so educate their daughters that these will not be instructed at the start to think themselves naturally inferior to men because less muscular and need not have recourse to particular arts, feline chiefly, to make their way in the world."

An appropriate title for the complete works of Meredith can be 'Women against Men.' Though inferior in physical prowess, women

are superior to men in humour, intellectual eminence and penetrating insight. They are less inclined to tilt at wind-mills or ride Hippogriff than are men. Their feet are planted firmly in the green earth; yet they are more likely to transcend their selves than men. In Meredithian fiction, they are the deputies of the Comic Spirit and by them man is tested, judged, rusticated or rewarded. They throw into bold relief the high aspirations and low life of the hypocritical man. Like Chaucer's Sir Thopas, Sir Willoughby Patterne (the principal character of the novel, *The Egoist*, 1879) rides forth in quest of the elf-queen for his overweening vanity accepts no other woman for his spouse. But his egoism eclipses his idealism. We first see him as an ardently admired philanderer condescendingly accepting the adoration of Laetitia Dale, sweeping off an heiress and losing her to gain a greater prize in the debonair Clara Middleton. Eventually Clara realises that life would be intolerable with an incorrigible egoist. The egoist is at last forced to let go his hold on Clara, and he does so on condition that she should marry his unassuming kinsman, Whitford Vernon. The reader, of course, cannot help a derisive smile at the petty self-absorption with its insistent note of responsibility for the care and protection of the caged bird that is no longer in the cage. At last the twice-jilted Sir Willoughby is compelled to eat his humble pie and beg the hand of the twice-jilted and once-despised Laetitia. Pride has its fall and ultimately the mortified Sir Willoughby secures a Laetitia whose eyes are opened and who sees him as he really is. Thus in the egoist's prosecution, Clara and Laetitia are the prosecuting counsel and Jury while the other women of the novel, are admirable witnesses. Sir Willoughby shivers in his shoes at the very idea of being found out by Mrs. Mountstuart, Lady Busshe or Lady Culmer who know him more precisely than he knows himself.

It is rather strange that Meredith's proclivity for moral idealism, his amazing fertility of wit and his wealth of critical observation have gone to exalt the womanly ideal at the expense of man's innate nobility. In some of his novels, he has held up to ridicule the faithlessness which Meredith imagines to be native to sophisticated man. Lucy, Dahlia, Vittoria, Clara, Renee, Diana, Aminta are worthy to stand beside their Shakespearian sisters. These graceful characters are bedevilled with such depraved figures as Richard Feverel, Edward Blancove, Sir Willoughby Patterne and Lord Ormont. What abominable foils: What striking contrasts! Richard's breach of faith almost breaks the heart of the helpless Lucy. Dahlia Fleming is betrayed by Edward; Laetitia jilted by Sir Willoughby, Aminta is abandoned by Lord Ormont. These stories merely illustrate the over-

riding hypothesis of Meredith that woman is the touch-stone of man's integrity. In all the novels of Meredith, the presiding deities in the social cavalcade are women. In *Evan Harrington*, it is Lady Jocelyn and Rose who dominate the story and fill it with rich fragrance. Sir Franks, Lady Jocelyn's husband cannot be said to have groaned under the tyranny of the petticoat government; but in comparison with his indomitable wife, he is a soft milk-sop and his constant code of honour is deference to the superiority of his wife's judgment. Rose, in a similar way, governs the heart of Evan. On one occasion, she eggs him on to hazard a break-neck leap. Even the women of minor importance have their own distinction. Harriet is admired and adored by her husband as a fine duck and Louisa—the inimitable Lousia—Harriet's sister, is the bantam hen who outheroes Herod.

The last four novels of Meredith are illuminating variations on the common theme—'woman in the toils of a hypocritical and tyrannous man-made society.' *Diana of the Crossways* (1885) deals with a scandal about Sheridan's beautiful grand-daughter, Mrs. Caroline Norton, whose husband unsuccessfully sought to divorce her on a charge of misconduct with Lord Melbourne, the renowned Victorian Prime Minister. Mrs. Norton was falsely accused of selling a government secret to the *London Times* after working it out from her admirer, Lord Melbourne. This novel, the finest of Meredith's novels on the theme of female emancipation, is memorable for the freshness and charm of its heroine. In her freedom, intelligence and elfish buoyancy, she resembles Shakespeare's *Rosalind*. In the second of the last novels, *One of Our Conquerors* (1891), we see the heroine in the undignified role of a common law wife. The third novel, *Lord Ormont and his Aminta* (1894) is built upon the career of Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough. It deals with the problem of the sanctity of the marriage-tie in a critical situation and offers a wealth of psychological and ethical reflections. In *The Amazing Marriage* (1895), the last of Meredith's complete novels, Fleetwood spurns in haste the peerless pearl of a woman's pure love only to repent at leisure for his folly.

In his delineation of woman, Meredith was a typical Victorian. His creations are not happily vitiated by the gross passions and temptations which blight the worlds of Balzac or Flaubert. The peculiar vices of his world are only snobbery and egoism. It never occurred to him to imitate the French Naturalists and 'fiddle harmonics on the strings of sensualism.' He was little interested in sex although much preoccupied with dramatization of love—love which transcends the vibrant tensions of physical relationships. Flooded in love, the Meredithian world runs molten gold and here "spirit brands the flesh

and capricious power that strikes the weak and the strong indiscriminately, furiously and inevitably. Accident or Chance is at the centre of Hardy's creation. Hardy has shifted the burden of evil from man's shoulders to the universe. In the process, he has loaded the dice against man; concentrated all evil against him, thus making his existence precarious. His heroes are quite naturally passive and perplexingly effeminate. They are quite convincing in their helplessness and instability before the malice of cosmic powers although they gain colour when passion or misfortune suddenly overtakes them. Their abiding virtue is uncomplaining endurance, an exemplary fortitude which seem to elevate them over the storm and stress of fate. Consider Gabriel Oak, Diggory Venn and Giles Winterbourne—all of them are typical Dorset shepherds, rustic stoics—true children of the soil with the morals, ideals and superstitions of Wessex running through their blood. They are unaggressive, shy, detached spectators of life. They are sexless like the other Victorian heroes.

The endurance of Hardy's heroes has mellowed into the rich humour of his quaint peasantry, who form a sort of chorus for the novel. Hardy's rustics are too "humble to fear a fall." They do not promote the tragedy, but afford comic relief and their humour is like bright sunshine on a dark, deep sea. They are inimitable and nothing is more fascinating than the sunny scenes in Warren's Malthouse or in the Buck's Head Tavern—scenes which are beyond the scope and range of Meredith.

Hardy's lively gallery of charming women is wider in range and more vivid than that of Meredith. In the portrayal of feminine characters, Hardy deals with some extreme psychic oddities although he floundered in registering familiar and real neuroses. The only exceptional triumph is Sue Bridehead who remains one of the most impressive portraits of a neurotic and sexually maladjusted woman. Beyond Sue, Hardy never attempted a detailed picture of the epicene woman, for "Diana was the goddess whom Bathsheba adored" and even Grace Melbury had "more of Artemis than of Aphrodite in her constitution."

The stubborn idealism of the Meredithian heroine falls to the lot of Hardy's hero while the essential woman in Hardy's vision seems to be the weaker and the fleshier than (not to speak even of the angelic woman) the erring man of Meredith's fiction. According to Santayana, woman has a Sibylline intuition and the right to be irrationally *apropos*. Some of the notable feminine characters of Hardy possess these traits in abundance—Sibylline intuition and floods of irrational impulses which break through all the dykes of reason and carve their wayward channels ultimately converging in tragedy. "I am content to build happiness

on any accidental basis that may be near at hand," Elfrida tells Stephen Smith, " You are for making a world to suit your happiness." " You are Just like all women." Clym informs Eustacia, " they are ever content to build their lives on any incidental position that offers itself; whilst men would fain make a globe to suit them." The illuminating comments of Albert Guerard on Hardy's women characters are worth quoting here : " Women incorrigibly bent on enjoying life," he says, " are unmoral and by the same token charming. They are as unmoral and charming as any other irrational unregenerate objects. They are scarcely to be ' understood ' and must therefore be pardoned."

To sum up the social theme in the hands of Meredith was irradiated by the comic spirit, " a fine celestial sunlight in the mind, answering to the theological grace of God in the heart "; in Hardy, by the conflict with destiny, of human beings who put forth all their strength to deal with " the downright blows, the freakish ingenuity, the gradually increasing malignity of Fate, reserving none to spend upon the delicacies of human comedy."

NYĀYA-MANJARĪ

Vol. II (29)

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INEFFICACY OF THE STUDY OF GRAMMAR

If the defenders answer the first alternative in the affirmative then they involve an unanswerable vicious circle since the science of grammar is based upon the usages of savants and savants are those who are proficient in the science of grammar. It is a fact that those who are not well up in Sanskrit Grammar are not adept in using chaste classical Sanskrit words (words which are grammatically correct). If they answer the second alternative in the affirmative then coachmen and such other persons who use vulgar words such as 'gāvi' etc. should become savants and the science of grammar is nothing but a record of refinements upon those vulgar expressions. Such a conclusion appears to be absolutely irrelevant. If they answer the third alternative in the affirmative then the promiscuous use of the chaste and the vulgar words, e.g., 'go', 'gāvi' etc. should go on uninterruptedly. In that case the study of grammar will be superfluous. But it is reasonable to hold that the medical science owes its origin to the reliable teachers who have composed it with the help of the experimental method of agreement and difference. Even if the science of grammar is judged from this point of view, it serves no useful purpose. Moreover, it has no utility since the author of aphorisms of grammar has made no mention of it. As Jaimini, the author of Mīmāṃsā aphorisms, has clearly stated the usefulness of Mīmāṃsā Sūtras in his first Sūtra, "Athāto Dharma jijñāsā", as Gautama has expressed the utility of his Nyāya-sūtras in his first Sūtra "Pramāṇādi-jñānat niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ" and as Kaṇāda has vindicated the efficacy of the study of his Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras in his initial sūtra "Sādharmyādi-jñānāt niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ" so Pāṇini, the author of grammatical aphorisms has given no indication of the usefulness of the study of grammar. Now, the defenders may contend that Pāṇini has made no mention of its utility because it may be easily guessed. We, the critics, say, "What do you say"? We fail to discover it up to this time even after a thorough search for it. The point in question is the subject of dispute among all parties.

There are four different ends of human life, *viz.*, (1) Celestial happiness, (2) Wealth, (3) Sensuous Pleasure and (4) Final emancipation from bondage. Now, the defenders may look forward to any one of these ends as the goal of grammatical study. Of these four ends Dharma (means to celestial happiness) does not constitute the goal of grammatical study since Dharma consists in being a sacrifice, gift, and libation etc. Or, Dharma is Apūrva, *i.e.*, the transcendental result of the various Vedic rites. It is revealed only by the Vedas. Those who are well-acquainted with Dharma hold that the Vedas are the only source of the knowledge of Dharma. Or, we take no exception to the view if one holds that Smṛti of Manu which is based upon the Vedas, good conduct of the pious men and tradition is also authority on Dharma. But grammar-in-itself is not competent to impart instructions on Dharma. It is not reasonable to think that Dharma is the end of grammar because it is ancillary to the Vedas. Dharma is the goal of that science which gives directions to the performance of duties since such a goal is bound up with the necessary directions of duties. Dharma is not the goal of the study of grammar since it gives no such directions. Therefore, the hypothesis that Dharma is the goal of grammar has been refuted.

It is well-known that wealth is the goal of vocational subjects and Political Science. But wealth is not attained through the study of grammar since many scholars of grammar are generally noticed to be very poor. Therefore, wealth is not the goal of grammar. Sensuous pleasure is the object of the Sexual science, composed by Vātsyāyana. Grammar has got the least connection with this science. Such pleasure is beyond its reach. Mokṣa or Final Liberation is attained through the realisation of one's own self and the cessation of five kinds of kleśas (five sources of bondage—an initial error, mis-identification, love, hatred and fear of death). This is the verdict of the spiritual experts. It is not very reasonable to hold that the proper knowledge of cerebral *śa* and *ṇa* is a means to Final Liberation. Thus we arrive at the conclusion that none of the four ends is attained through the study of grammar.

Now, the defenders of the utility of the study of grammar may contend that no distinct end of the study of grammar has been mentioned since it is affiliated ancillary to the Vedic lore, an embodiment of all instructions conducive to all these four ends. They also add that ends which are attainable through the study of the Vedas are also attainable through the study of grammar. This contention has been already refuted.

The basic assumption that grammar is accessory to the Vedas on the strength of its instructions on chaste words has been refuted. It renders no other service to the Vedic study. Such a grammar has no utility. Moreover, a branch of learning which is not helpful to the Vedic study cannot be its ancillary.

The Vedas do not obey the injunctions issued by their subordinate science since the Mīmāṃsakas hold that they are the sole authority on the matter of injunctions. The purport of this point is that one should not logically hold that the science of grammar is an ancillary of the Vedas on the basis of non-vedic injunctions.

The celebrated bhāṣya-kāra of Pāṇini has mentioned a few utilities of the study of grammar, viz. the preservation of the Vedas etc. As these purposes are served also by other methods so we should not absolutely depend upon grammar for the attainment of the said objects. The continuous circle of students preserve the purity of the Vedas. If one student slightly deviates from the proper pronunciation of an accent or a letter then the other students give the following warning to him. They say "Do not mar the Vedas. This is the correct pronunciation of the Vedic sentence. Pronounce it thus." They instruct him. Thus the Vedas are preserved. The second utility is ūha i.e., the necessary modification of a Vedic word etc. according to requirement. This modification takes place with regard to mantras, tunes and preparatory acts for purifying substances. The modification of tunes is learnt either from the Mīmāṃsā-sūtras or from the usages of the sacrificial experts. The modification of words in a mantra is also learnt from the same source. Any modification with regard to a preparatory act for purifying something is beyond the scope of grammar. What shall grammar do in this matter? The Vedas themselves do not constitute the object of the study of grammar. This suggestion has been already examined and criticised. Moreover, the Vedas reveal ends of human life but they are not ends in themselves. It has been said that the study of grammar provides one with an easy access to literature. Does it do so? What do you say? One cannot master it even if he has been reading it from his childhood and continues his study for many years. If it is an easy way we do not know what will be a difficult one. Grammar can solve no doubt about the meaning of a Vedic sentence. It is Mīmāṃsā Sāstra which solves a good number of doubts eclipsing the meaning of each Vedic sentence. The science of grammar is never noticed to do this function. The mention of five-fold utilities of the study of grammar viz. the preservation of the purity of the Vedas, necessary,

modifications of the Vedas, the easier method of learning language and the removal of doubts has not been rightly made.

The said commentator has made mention of other minor utilities of the study of grammar. Let us illustrate one of them. The demons who were innocent of grammar wrongly pronounced "Helaya Helaya etc." and were crushed. The correct pronounciation of this mantra should be "He arayah, he arayah" etc. These utilities have only minor significance. These are too insignificant to record. Moreover, these are indirect utilities. Kumārila in his Tantra-Vārttika has said to this effect:—

The grammarians hope against hope if they try to establish minor utilities of the grammatical study when its major utilities are not established. They behave just like a drowning man who catches at a straw, leaving aside big trees.

THE UNTENABILITY OF THE HYPOTHESIS THAT GRAMMAR MAKES AN IMPROVEMENT UPON WORDS.

Now, the defenders may contend thus:—There is no need of making an investigation for other utilities of the study of grammar. The only object of grammar is to make an improvement upon words. The critics say in reply to this contention that they should explain their point, viz. the samskāra of a word. What is this samskāra? What result do we derive from it? As sprinkling purifies Br̥his, as looking at ghee purifies it, as the establishing of sacred fires consecrates fire so grammar does not make an improvement upon words. The Naiyāyikas hold that letters are very short-lived. They pass away as soon as they are uttered. What is the samskāra that a sound has? As acceleration is the samskāra of the flying arrow, as impression is the samskāra of the soul as the branch of a tree has elasticity as its samskāra so what is the samskāra of a sound? Again, if we subscribe to the hypothesis that letters are eternal then we are also compelled to admit that their manifestation is transient. In that case what is this samskāra that affects them? Does a samskāra work upon a letter, or upon a word, or upon a sentence? No solution can be given to any of these three alternatives. The grammarians hold that a sentence is a partless whole. Hence, a samskāra which is directed towards a letter or a word has no ground to stand upon. Now, the grammarians may contend that the stems and suffixes will be elicited from sentences and the remaining words will be brought under samskāra. Such a contention does not hold good. Such

words are non-existent. Hence, no samskāra can be worked upon them.

Some have criticised the above attempt thus :—Do not intelligent persons who intend to introduce samskāra into words after having distinguished them from a sentence by means of imagination, wreath a garland of sky-flowers, having given up flowers which emit fragrance and become ornaments of different directions :

Nobody comes across a Vedic injunction (either universal or sectional) which enjoins to formulate grammatical laws for the better analysis of words or for the synthesis of parts of words. There is no injunction on the authority of which we shall take up the better study of words. A sacrificer is enjoined to put a horn, brought to scratch the body of an antelope, into a sacrificial hole. This act exerts a sacred influence upon the rite which has been observed. A similar act in some cases precedes a rite which will be performed.

One should sprinkle Brihis. Sprinkling in accordance with this injunction will make the future Darsa and Purnamāsa rites more perfect. In these ways it is not possible for us to make an improvement upon words. There is an injunction viz. one should study the Vedas. It concerns only with a young boy of the twice-born class. It introduces some qualitative changes to him as he is taken to a Vedic teacher for the learning of the Vedas. Upanayan ceremony is a symbol of the beginning of the Vedic study. Or, the said injunction exerts an influence upon the Vedas thus acquired. Let us stop this discussion since it is a very long one. The drift of our discussion is this that the study of grammar is not competent enough to bring in such an improvement. It is also doubtful to hold that grammar makes an improvement upon words by formulating laws which govern inflexions, such formal changes of words as do not affect a stem and its inflexion, the elision of letters, formal changes which affect a stem and its inflexion and such other things. Let us stop this discussion. Grammar cannot work a change which is a very hard task either in organs of speech, or in the internal air which is instrumental to the being of sound or in the organ of hearing which is instrumental to its perception, or in the soul of a speaker, or in the internal organ, or in the intellect. For this reason it is certain that grammar cannot create such situation as helps the use of verbal expressions. Some may contend that the services of grammar cannot be dispensed with since it explains a few difficult compound words such as sthūla-prṣati etc. Such a contention is not tenable since kalpa-sūtra, a work on rituals, and such other treatises will render the same service.

Some body has said in defence of grammar that grammar is the only means of the clear understanding of words. Kumārila, the author of Tantra-Vārttika, smiles at his claims and remarks that without the organ of hearing words are not otherwise distinctly perceived.

Moreover, though grammar has chastened words yet many ancient writers of acknowledged authority have used many irregular words which violate the rules of grammar. Pāṇini, the author of grammatical sūtras, has used irregular words in his sūtras "Jani-karttuḥ" prakṛtiḥ and tat-prayojaka hetuṣca". The compound words "Jani-karttuḥ" and "Tat-prayojakaḥ" are illustrations of Tat-puruṣa compound. The sixth case-ending has been dropped. But the rule "Trjakā-bhyām kartari" opposes the formation of Tat puruṣa compound in these two cases. Again, the term 'jani' denotes a root. But in the above sūtra the word denotes a different meaning. Kātyāyana, the author of Vārttika on Pāṇini's sūtras, has indulged in irregular usages. Let us illustrate them. In his sūtra "Dambher halgrahaṇasya jāti vacakatvāt" the compound word 'jāti-vācakatvāt' is irregular since Ṣaṣṭhī-tat-puruṣa is not permissible. Let us take another example. In the sūtra "Ānyabhāvyam tu kāla-śabda-vyavāyāt" the word 'ānyabhāvyam' is irregular. The nominal suffix 'śyañ' has been attached to the compound word 'anya bhavaḥ'. The provision for the said suffix has been made in the sūtra "Guṇa-vacana-Brahmaṇā dibhyaḥ". The word 'anyabhava' is not an abstract noun since it has been said that an abstract noun ceases to be so if it enters into a compound. In other words no compound word should be treated as an abstract noun. The said suffix is also attached to such words as fall within the group of words having the word 'Brahmaṇa' at their head. The said word is not included in the list. The author of bhāṣya on Pāṇini's sūtras, has not dropped the case-ending, intending to use a compound word of the Tat-puruṣa class, containing another compound word of the Dvandva-type in the analogy of the word 'aviravika'. He has violated the rule of Pāṇini, viz. "Supo dhātu-pratipadikayoh". He has also violated the rule of Pāṇini "Anyathaivam katham itham susiddhā prayogaścet" since his sentence "Anyathā kṛtvā codyam anyathā kṛtvā pariharaḥ" illustrates his irregularity. He should have attached the suffix "Namul" but not "Ktvāc" to the root 'kr' preceded by the word 'anyathā'. The above three sages are the propounders of the system of Grammar. It is a matter of grave regret that these great personages have deviated from the path of duty i.e. the use of correct expressions. Whom shall we chastise?

In Manu's treatise and such other works a large number of words which are irregularly formed is counted. He writes "Jñātāram anti-metyuktvā". The euphonic combination resulting in 'antimeti' is not permissible. Āśvalāyana has also used "Aksiṇī ājyati." The resulting form 'ājyati' is grammatically incorrect. The author of Grhya-sūtra has used "Mūrdhani abhiḡhrāṇam." The suffix 'śānac' has been attached to the root 'ghrā.' It should not have been attached to the root in question. Vālmiki has written "Tubhyam ca Rāghavasya." The word 'Rāghavasya' is incorrect. Vedavyāsa has made a mistake when he writes "Janme janme yadabhyastam." The word 'janma' is not chaste. It should be janman. Hence he should have written "Janmani janmani etc." Kumārila in his Tantra-vārttika says that in the works on History and Purāṇa there is no end of unchaste words.

DEFINITION OF A CHASTE WORD IS PUZZLING

There is no need of censuring the ancient personages. Our concluding remark in a nut-shell is this that grammar renders service neither to classical language nor to Vedic language. Let us point out the initial failure of grammar not to speak of other such failures. Patañjali commences his work with the title "Atha śabdānuśāsanaḥ" (Instruction in words). He raises a question, viz. "which words are to be discussed?" He solves the problem by proposing to give instruction in classical and Vedic words. But he fails to enumerate the number of classical and Vedic words. We are going to discuss the matter in question. Shall we treat each word individually and give our instruction? Or, shall we take up many words at a time and bring them under a general rule? It is an impossible feat to treat each word individually. The ancient teachers have expressed their opinion regarding the subject-matter under discussion. They say "Bṛhaspati (the lord of speech) himself has been instructing Indra in words, one by one, for a thousand divine years but has been unable to complete his task since the number of words is inexhaustible. It is not also possible to determine all chaste words by means of general rules. The reason has been given before. In a nut-shell it is this that no common property which constitutes a mark of distinction from all vulgar words belongs to all chaste words like the species of cowness. How is an instruction in words to be imparted? He raises the problem and solves it thus: a word is to be analysed into two parts, viz. (1) its basic element and (2) inflexion attached to it and a general rule, determined by a qualification, is to be formu-

lated. Let us take an example to illustrate the above procedure. The sūtra "karmanyan" is a qualified general rule. The verbal suffix 'an' is attached to a verb. This is the general rule. It is qualified by the word 'karmani' karma is such as denotes an objective case and is penultimate. Thus, the meaning of the qualified general rule is this that 'an' suffix is attached to a verb provided it is qualified by a penultimate objective case. The defenders of the utility of grammar hold that words such as kumbhakāra, nagarakāra etc., are easily explained by means of the qualified general rule and many other words such as goda, kambalada etc., are also explained by general rules without any difficulty. We have already elaborately criticised the supposition that a word consists of two imaginary parts viz. (1) a basic element and (2) a suffix and expressed our opinion about it. Now, we shall examine the new hypothesis viz., the supposition of a qualified general rule. Such a rule is not without its defects since the determination of the two elements of a word is not exact.

Let us clearly state the ground of our objection. The general rule is that a suffix is attached to a verb. In order to make it intelligible they should define a verb. Now, the grammarians may say by way of repartee that a verb has been defined in the sūtra 'Bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ' and its characteristic feature has been indicated. Some words have been read as synonyms in an order of succession and several such groups have been included in the list of verbs. These words have been defined as verbs. The inflexion 'tiñ' and several suffixes are attached to them. The critics make the following remark:—"Very well, you have said this. But your definition does not point to the true characteristic feature of a verb. If you ask "why?" then the reason of our critical note is as follows. Let us take an example, say 'gaṇḍate.' The noun 'gaṇḍa' should be treated as a verb. Thus, the definition of a verb suffers from the defect of being too wide since according to your rule inflexion 'tiñ' is attached to a verb. There is a verb 'ghaṭa' which denotes activity. There is also a noun 'ghaṭa.' There is a verb 'ama' which means to be sick. When its non-essential termination 'a' becomes detached the essential form of the verb is 'am'. The second case-ending in the singular number is also 'am'. There is a verb 'bhū' and a noun 'bhū' also exists. There is a verb 'yati' denoting 'to act well'. It has an accidental termination 'i'. When it drops off the verb assumes the real form 'yat'. There is also a pronoun 'yat' which is well-known, being included in the list of pronouns. As there is no

difference between the verbs and the words mentioned above so why should not inflexions 'tim' etc. be attached to ghaṭe, bhū and yat (which are not verbs)? Now, the grammarians may contend that a verb is such as denotes activity. If this is their contention then the verbs 'to be' (bhū) and 'to stand' (sthā) cease to be verbs. They should not be included in the list of verbs."

"Now, the grammarians may revise their definition of a verb and hold that there are two definitions of a verb. These definitions are as follows:—(1) That which is included in the list of verbs is a verb and (2) "That which denotes activity is a verb." Thus, 'bhū' and 'sthā' will be treated as verbs since they find a place in the list of verbs. The critics put a question to them whether these two definitions will apply severally or jointly. If they say that they will apply severally then the verbs 'bhū' and 'sthā' will not be treated as verbs since the second definition of a verb does not apply to them. If the definitions of a verb do not apply to all verbs then the characteristic feature of a verb remains indeterminate. In that case how will it be possible to attach inflexion 'tim' and suffixes to a verb? They are attached only to verbs. As verbs cannot be defined where will they be attached to? If the grammarians hold that the above two definitions of a verb are to be applied jointly then they make no improvement upon the situation *i.e.* the defect mentioned remains unremedied.

Some 'tim' inflexions are time-adjective but are not denotative of tenses. If they do not denote the different times of actions then it is impossible to frame rules which speak of the connection of the various tenses with different inflexions. The sūtras *e.g.* "Varitamāne laṭ", "Bhaviṣyati lṛt", "Bhūte lam" etc. try to do something impracticable since mentioning times they try to establish the relation of various inflections with them (times). Now, the grammarians may hold that these inflections will denote tenses *i.e.* times. If they change front, they contradict their own Bhāṣya-kāra who is an authority on grammar. He has said that the verb in question denotes the past tense. If the findings of the Bhāṣya-kāra are accepted then the said rules are absurd since the meaning of a verb cannot regulate itself. The inflexions such as lin etc. point to such things as are incomprehensible. Hence, they are prescribed to denote order etc. Such meanings of inflexions can be determined neither by themselves nor by their adjuncts.

Similarly rules which govern cases are also defective. An ablative case expresses a noun or its equivalent which remains motion-

less when an act of separation takes place. Devadatta has fallen from a tree. A tree is said to be the ablative case. A tree is motionless. But it has not the slightest relation to the act of falling. Hence it does not fulfil the condition of being a case. A case is that which is related to a verb. A tree does not relate itself with the verb in question. A traveller has fallen behind a caravan. A person has fallen from a moving chariot. A caravan and a chariot are not motionless like a tree since an action is noticed in them. It is a truism that they have their own action. Any verb does not determine a case in a sentence. But a case is determined only with reference to a verb which finds a place in a sentence. In the above illustrations the two verbs *viz.* to fall behind and to fall from, have been used. As a tree has no relation with the said verb so a caravan and a chariot are in no way connected with these two verbs. Each of them may be related to a particular verb and be a case. But this connection with a particular verb does not mean that a case maintains its *statu quo ante* in relation to all verbs without an exception. If this be so then the definition of a case will be too wide. Thus we see that the definition of the ablative case has a serious flaw.

(To be continued)

A NEW VIEW OF CULTURE

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I—CHARACTERISTICS

Culture is as old as man, as deep as his heart, as complex as his mind, and as diverse as his struggle for existence. It has evolved with his own evolution, the fundamental of its growth being the play of human nature under the stress of time and place. The old view of culture is based upon idealism which regards the world as the embodiment of an 'absolute idea', a 'universal spirit', 'consciousness'.

The new view is based upon materialism "which holds that matter, nature, being, is an objective reality, existing outside, and independent of, our consciousness".¹ In other words, "the material world is primary; and consciousness (thought) is secondary—derivative, reflection of the objective reality". It is not consciousness of men that determines their being, says Marx, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.² Engels confirms the view by saying that "Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life".³ The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness is at first directly inter-woven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men; the language of real life, conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at the stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour.⁴ Hence, argues Stalin,⁵ the source of formation of spiritual life of society, the origin of social ideas, social theories, political views and political institutions themselves should be sought for in the conditions of the material life of society in social being, of which these ideas, theories, views, etc., are the reflections. "Morality, religion metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain their independence."⁶ Society, according to Marx, is the real foundation on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.⁷

¹ *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, 19f.

² *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy Selected Works*, Vol. I, 356f, 391f.

³ Marx and Engels. *The German Ideology*, 13-16 (31).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, 19f, 25f D.H.M.).

⁶ (8)

⁷ (2)

But though political, judicial, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic development is based on economic development, yet all these activities react upon one another and also upon the economic base. Economic necessity and interaction on its basis, influence the course of progress. Though economic relations are decisive in their influence, political and ideological factors cannot be ignored in their operations.⁸ They have their significance and they play their important role in history. Some of these hamper the development, others facilitate the progress, of society.

2. Secondly, culture is not only primarily material but also evolutionary and dynamic. All nature, according to Engels, is in a constant state of coming into being and going out of being, in a constant flux, in a ceaseless state of movement and change.⁹ This process of development is an onward and upward movement from an old quantitative state to a new qualitative state, as a development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher, not as a harmonious unfolding of phenomena but a disclosure of the contradictions inherent in things and phenomena. In other words, development takes the form of struggle of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these internal contradictions.¹⁰ In the space of three thousand years, five different social systems have prevailed in the world: primitive communal or tribal, slave, feudal, capitalist and socialist. With the change of the economic foundation, says Marx, the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.¹¹ Productive forces change and develop and are the most mobile and revolutionary element in production. The changes in the mode of production inevitably call for the changes in the whole social system, social ideas, political views and political institutions.¹² New social ideas and theories arise precisely because they are necessary to society. It is found impossible to carry out the urgent tasks of development of the material life of society without the tremendous organising, mobilising and transforming values of new ideas, new theories, new political views.¹³ They so react upon social being and upon the material life of society as to create conditions necessary for further development. Theory, says Marx, becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses.¹⁴

⁸ (8)

⁹ G.I., 482.

¹⁰ D.H.M., 9 11, 33, 45

¹¹ (2)

¹² D.H.M., 38, 43.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 29.

¹⁴ G.I., 406.

3. Thirdly, the new view of culture characterises it as essentially proletarian. The history of social development, says Stalin, is above all the history of the development of production, of the modes of production, of the development of the productive forces, and of the producers of material values that are necessary for the existence of society. In other words, the labouring masses are the chief force in the process of production. The historical science must, therefore, concludes Stalin, devote itself not to the actions of kings, generals, conquerors, and subjugators but to the history of the labouring masses, of the peoples.¹⁵

The hand is not only the organ of labour, it is also, says Engels, the product of labour. Only by labour, by adaptation to every new operation, by inheritance of physical improvements and their ever-renewed employment, has the human hand attained the high degree of perfection that has enabled it to conjure into being the pictures of Raphael, the statues of Thorwaldson, the music of Paganini.¹⁶

According to Gorky, whom Lenin regarded "undoubtedly an authority in the matter of proletarian art",¹⁷ labour offers the shortest and straightest road towards freedom and culture.¹⁸ The social and cultural development of man is normal only if the hands teach the head, then the now wiser head teaches the hands and then the even cleverer hands again, and even more thoroughly, stimulate the further development of the brain.¹⁹ Freedom, culture and knowledge, in short, are the products of labour. Truth, as an instrument of knowledge, as a stairway leading men forward and upwards, is created by human labour.²⁰ It is in this light that Gorky regards only people willing and able to work as true heroes.²¹ "The new Russian man, the builder of a new state" is an "irrefutable proof of the great wealth of creative forces and gifts that lie in the working masses".²² By the labour of their own hands, with their feet firmly planted on the earth, these honest skilful workers have built up new Russia by virtue of their faith in their own reason and will and in the spontaneous forces of nature which must be conquered in order that they may become the servants of man's reason and will and lighten his life and labour. They believe that "only man exists—everything else is his thinking and his doing".²³

¹⁵ D.H.M., 89f.

¹⁶ *Dialectics of Nature*, 281.

¹⁷ L.A.L., 68.

¹⁸ M.G., 154.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 185.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 144.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 154.

²² *Ibid.*, 155.

²³ *Ibid.*

4. Fourthly, the new culture is aptly described as socialist culture. The only ones capable of understanding the honest words of right-minded people are proletarians, the handiworkers of culture, the working intellectuals and the labouring peasants, who want to be, and deserve to be, masters of culture.²⁴ U.S.S.R., says Gorky, is creating a new culture, on the strength of the mighty creative power of the proletarian humanism, the humanism of Marx and Lenin.²⁵ The working people, he believes, possess inexhaustible reserves of intellectual energy latent in them which await to be released in reconstructing the new culture.²⁶ The proletarian, in the new Russia, instead of being a drudge, is proving that when armed with knowledge he is quite capable of being a consummate master of culture and maker of culture.²⁷ There the will and reason of the entire mass of the workers and peasants are stimulated and educated by work that is necessary to the state, and also beneficial to every working individual, and there the entire labour energy is enlisted in the multiform work of creating new conditions of life, that is, new socialist culture.²⁸ The new proletarian is conscious of the fact that it is precisely their labour that has created all the treasures of culture. By utilising these treasures, they must create a new universally human socialist culture.²⁹ The revolution has loosened all the forces chained down before and has driven them to the surface from the depths. The awakening of new forces and their work on creating a new art and culture, said Lenin, is a good thing, a very good thing. Their tempestuous course of development is understandable and useful. We must catch up with all that has been neglected for ages and we want to.³⁰ The tremendous energy, to which Gorky has referred, has been released and is being partly directed in the channels of art and literature. We must never forget, said Gorky in 1934, that throughout the territory of the U.S.S.R. among the masses of the working people a great renaissance is rapidly taking place. They are progressing towards the free creation of a new history and of a socialist culture.³¹

II—ATTITUDE TOWARDS ART

According to Lenin, art is not a luxury meant for the few and patronised by the few. "It is unseemly", he said once, "to main-

²⁴ A.P., 408.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 892f.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 407.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 890.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 889.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 868.

³⁰ L.A.L., 42.

³¹ M.C.T.T., 120.

tain such a luxurious theatre (as the Bolshoi Theatre) at great cost when we haven't enough money to maintain the most ordinary schools in the villages." ³² Must we provide fine cakes for a small minority while the masses of workers and peasants still lack black bread? ³³ What is important, is not our opinion on art. What is important is not what art has to give several hundred, even several thousand of the total population of millions. Art belongs to the people. It must let its roots go down deep into the very thick of the masses. ³⁴

In other words, art must come home to the business and bosoms of the people. "It must unite the feeling, thought and will of these masses, uplift them. It must awaken the artists among them and develop them."

The function of art, then, according to Lenin is threefold: to appeal to the masses, to uplift them and to inspire them.

Asserting the claim of the people on art, he says, "They 'made' the revolution and defended its cause . . . making untold sacrifices. Truly our workers and peasants deserve something more than spectacles. *They have earned the right to really great art.* That is why we first of all call for the widest popular education and upbringing. That prepares the ground for culture, on the condition, of course, that the question of bread is solved. On this basis a really great new communist art must arise which will find a form consistent with its content." ³⁵

The duty of the State is, first to provide bread for the people; second, to educate them and then to cater for their artistic needs financially. In the mean time it is the duty of the intellectuals to come to the help of the State in attempting the problems of the popular art. Our 'intellectuals', Lenin reminds them, have noble problems of the utmost importance to solve in this respect. If they understand and solve these problems, the intelligentsia will only do their duty towards the proletarian revolution which opened wide the doors for them also. ³⁶ From a mass of people, wrote Gorky in 1934, whose intellectual level was that of the seventeenth century, progressive men and women of the twentieth century are rapidly emerging in great numbers and this magnificent process holds hundreds of themes and subjects for plays, novels, poems and stories. Never has there been an age in which art had at its disposal such a variety of material as our country now offers. Never before have writers had such extensive opportunities of free and

³² L.A.L., 56.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 43.

³⁵ Raising the economic standard of the masses was the first priority. It was no use talking of cultural advancement to hungry people.—Nehru in his address to 40th Session of the Indian Science Congress, January 2, 1953.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 43.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 43.

³³ *Ibid.*, 43.

immediate contact with reading public as we now have in our country.³⁷ We, the writers of the Soviet Union, adds Gorky, have gained the right to say that a new man has appeared in the world, a man without "callouses on the brain", and with a great desire to reveal himself and his gifts and abilities. The intellectual energy which was there potentially, but was not active in practice, is now magnificently effective.³⁸

7. Next to the masses, art should concern itself with genuine heroes of culture, forerunners of socialism, its theoreticians and fighters as well as leading lights in philosophy, science and art.³⁹ Art, said Lenin, must be pushed "as a means of propaganda",⁴⁰ and be intelligible to the masses.⁴¹

Lastly, literature, must become an integral part of an organised, planned, united social democratic party work, a part of the proletarian cause, as a whole, 'part and parcel' of a single whole.⁴² Lenin had no patience with 'literary supermen', 'literary careerism', individual 'lordly anarchism', 'anarchist individualism', 'absolute individual intellectual creation'.⁴³ Literature, he said, must become party literature.⁴⁴

8. Discussing the nature of art, Gorky admits that Art is within the powers of the individual, but asserts that only the community is capable of true creation. It was the Greek people who created Zeus, Phidias merely carved him in marble.⁴⁵ In the beginnings of literature, he points out, an individual acted as an instrument of the community in carrying out the functions entrusted to him; but, later having developed skill and initiative in the new uses of the material supplied by collective experience, the individual grew conscious of himself as a new creative force independent of community.⁴⁶ This freedom of art prompted individuals to withdraw into the 'privacy of their own soul', developing their individualism into egocentrism. Divorced from reality and obsessed with anarchy of thought, the individualists became "superfluous" people, pessimistic in their attitude towards life.⁴⁷ Whatever cunning a picture he may develop of himself, says Gorky, man still remains a social unit and not a cosmic phenomenon like a

³⁷ M.G.L.L., 147.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 146.

³⁹ L.A.L., 50f.

⁴⁰ L.A.L., 54.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 45.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 45f.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁴⁵ M.G.L.L., 117.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 115.

⁴⁷ M.G.L.L., 186f.

planet.⁴⁸ In order, therefore, that our literature may understand its responsibilities towards our country and may learn worthily to fulfil its great tasks, we need to make a careful and serious study of the contemporary world.⁴⁹

Absolute freedom, writes Lenin, is nothing but hypocrisy. In a society based on power of money in a society where masses of workers are paupers, and handfuls of richmen are idle, there can be no real and true "freedom".⁵⁰ But freedom of literature must have 'to provide for the widest freedom for individual initiative, of personal inclinations, free swing for thought and imagination, of form and content'⁵¹ There should be no mechanical levelling, by standardisation, no leadership of the few over the many".⁵² Such a literature, adds Lenin, would be free from greed, or carreering. It will serve not a bored 'upper ten thousand' suffering from over-stoutness but millions and tens of millions of workers who are the flower of the country, its strength, its future.⁵³

III—CATHOLICITY OF CULTURE

9. Next to widest freedom for individual initiative, Lenin emphasises catholicity of culture. "One cannot satisfy one's hunger on crushed capitalism. All the culture left by capitalism must be taken and socialism built with it. All science, technology, all knowledge and art must be taken. Without this, we shall not be able to build the life of communist society."⁵⁴ The student of literature who would consider it possible to ignore entirely the beginnings of esthetic feelings in animals, or the development of sensitiveness and creativeness in the child or the rich treasures that are still undiscovered in the field of collective creation of languages, would be a very narrow research worker, and it would be ludicrous for him to set himself up as an example of pure Marxian research.⁵⁵ Writing to Gorky, once, Lenin said, ". . . I am of the opinion that an artist can get for himself much that is useful to him in any philosophy. Finally, I completely and absolutely agree that in the matter of creative work you should be free to delve in all books, and that drawing this sort of opinion both from your literary experience and from philosophy, even idealistic philosophy, you may reach conclusions which will be of tremendous benefit to the workers'

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 137.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 141.

⁵⁰ *L.A.L.*, 46f.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 46, 81, *Lenin's Works*, Vol VIII, 987

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *L.A.L.*, 20.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 45.

party.”⁵⁶ In other words whatever *knowledge enriches art and literature and ennobles life* should be seized and harnessed.

10. Referring to old riches of art, Lenin asks, “why must we turn away from the truly beautiful, reject it as a starting point for further development only because it is ‘old’?” Rather, the beautiful should be preserved, taken as an example, something to begin with even if it is ‘old’. We are good revolutionists, adds he, and we must stand ‘at the heights of modern culture’.⁵⁷ He, therefore, enjoins upon the Russian communist youth to bear in mind that “Proletarian Culture must be a logical development of those funds of knowledge which humanity has worked out under the yokes of capitalist society”.⁵⁸

IV. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CULTURE

11. Every national culture, says Lenin, contains *elements* even if not developed, of democratic and socialist culture, for in *every* nation there are toiling and exploited masses, whose conditions of life inevitably give rise to the ideology of democracy and socialism. But *every* nation also has a bourgeois culture—and not only in the shape of ‘elements’ but in the shape of the *dominant* culture. Therefore, ‘national culture’ in general is the culture of the landlords, the clergy and the bourgeoisie.⁵⁹ The national culture is a fact and a fundamental fact of the present day.⁶⁰ The significance of the slogan of national culture is determined by the objective alignment of all classes in the given country and in all countries in the world.⁶¹ There is, evidently the world-historical tendency of capitalism to break down national barriers, to obliterate national distinctions, towards the assimilation of nations,⁶² grinding up national distinctions in large international dimensions.⁶³ But the ideological foundation and content of cultural-national autonomy is to fix nationalism within a certain ‘justly’ limited sphere, to constitute ‘nationalism’, strongly and durably, to fence off all the nations from each other by means of a special state institution.⁶⁴

But Marxism, says Lenin, is irreconcilable with nationalism, even the ‘justest’, ‘purest’, most refined and civilized, for, the principle of bourgeoisie nationalism inheres in its tradition and is difficult to root out.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁵⁹ C.R.N.Q., 17, 81.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 20.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 27.

A FEW CHINESE TRAVELLERS VISITING INDIA DURING THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD¹

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The cultural tie between China and India, as is well known, dates back from the very early centuries and the records left by celebrated Chinese traveller-historians like Fa-hsien, Yuan-chwang, I-tsing and others are undoubtedly regarded as the outstanding sources of our knowledge of the Sino-Indian cultural relations in the early period of history. But much less is known with regard to India's relation with China during the medieval period of our history. Leaving aside the above-mentioned celebrities of China, several other individuals from China paid visits to India on their holy pilgrimage from time to time during the period from the 8th to the 13th-14th centuries of the Christian Era and their activities, though not so pronounced as those of the earlier Chinese travellers, are none the less appreciable for the establishment of Sino-Indian relation during this period. These later pilgrim-travellers also contributed in their own way to the cultural unification of India with China and an attempt is here made to notice a few of those celebrated Chinese pilgrim-historians, if they might be so called, who visited this holy land during the time.

Professor Liang-Chi-Chao² has noticed, in his book "The Study of Chinese History", as many as one hundred and eighty-seven of such traveller-pilgrims who had visited or attempted to visit India on different occasions during the period from the 6th to the 8th centuries. Many of them could not reach India and died on their way to holy pilgrimage to Jambudvīpa. During the 10th and the 12th-13th centuries, there was a regular influx of traveller-pilgrims from China visiting India. Between A.D. 964 and 976, it is said, some three hundred Chinese scholars came to India.³ During the reign of the Chinese emperor T'ai-Tsu of the Sung dynasty, 300 monks left China to visit the holy places of India.⁴

¹ Read at the 17th Session of Indian History Congress at Ahmedabad, 1954.

² Chia-Luen Lo: Chinese sources for Indian History (Indian Historical Records Commission, 1948).

³ Mukherji: Indian Literature in China and the Far East, pp. 319ff

⁴ The life history of these 300 monks are recorded in *Fo tsu t'ung-chi*, a history of Chinese Buddhism (Nanjio, Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, No 1661, also, Appendix III, 68). This book was compiled by Chu-pwan, a T'ien-tai priest of the 13th century, and also recorded in "The Annals of the Sung dynasty" *Sung-shu*, compiled by T'o-t'o, a Mongol. See also, Notes on Chinese Literature, pp. 209-10 and *Mélanges de géographie asiatique*, pp. 169-78

Tao-Yuen, a monk from China, came to India during the Han period and after having spent six years in India, returned to China in 965 A.D. He brought with him to China several Palm-leaf manuscripts of the Buddhist texts and presented them to the Sung emperor T'ai-Tsu who eagerly enquired of him about his journey in India and the monk explained to the emperor everything of his journey and of his stay in India in detail. Another monk, during the same period, came here on pilgrimage from China. His name was Ki-Ye. He also wrote an account of his journey in India.¹ Emperor T'ai-Tsu being encouraged by these two monks Tao-Yuen and Ki-Ye passed a royal mandate to despatch some more Chinese scholar-monks as emissaries to India and also to procure Indian philosophical texts. About 157 scholars from China responded to the emperor's call and agreed to come to India in spite of the hazardous journey. They visited India during the end of the 10th century and collected many Buddhist Manuscripts. This cultural mission was led by a scholar named Hing-Chin and the emperor T'ai-Tsu furnished the mission with a letter of royal authority, asking the respective states through which it would pass, to offer all sorts of privileges and provide guides for the members of the mission so that they might not feel any difficulty during their journey.

Another Chinese pilgrim monk named Kuang-Yuen visited India during the period of A.D. 976 to 997. He was a native of Ch'eng-Tou. After returning from India Kuang-Yuen produced the second Sung emperor T'ai-Tsung a letter from the Indian king Mc-si-nang who is generally identified with Mahāsena. This letter speaks highly of the Sino-Indian alliance during this period. King Mahāsena sent through Kuan-Yuen several presents including a 'relic of Sākya' for the Chinese emperor T'ai-Tsung of the Sung dynasty. Following the foot-steps of Kuan-Yuen, another pilgrim-scholar from China named Fa-Yu came to India in search of knowledge and to attain merit by visiting holy places in India. He returned to China in A.D. 982 with a number of Palm-leaf manuscripts from India and presented them to the emperor. Another Chinese monk named T'se-houn visited during that period the holy Buddhist places of Bodhgayā and Nālandā along with a Turkish(?) monk named Mi-tan-lo.

Thus there was very frequent intercourse between China and India during the 10th-11th centuries; and specially the Buddhist Chaityas

¹ See, Schlegel : *Memories du comite sinico-japonais*, XXI, 1893, pp. 85-84 (Itinerary to the Western Counties of Wang nich.; also, Huber : *Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême Orient*, 1902, pp. 255-59; E. Chavannes, *Ibid.*, 1904, pp. 75-81 (L'itéraire de Ki-Ye).

of Bodhgayā, as the records¹ show, were continually visited by a good number of pilgrim-scholars and travellers from China. There were also pious donors coming from China and donating sums for the worship of the images, building chaityas, repairing the religious establishments, etc. and some of them also returned to China after having completed their studies of Indian philosophy and religion. During the most flourishing period of Indian sovereignty under the Pala kings in the 11th century, Buddhist devouts from China came to India in batches. They performed certain special works of merit by erecting stone-stūpas which testify to the present day the Sino-Indian cultural achievements of those days. There are some five inscriptions discovered by Mr. Beglar of the Archaeological Survey of India around the Bodhgayā temple during the year 1878-79. These inscriptions are written in Chinese and are perhaps the only Chinese inscriptions so far discovered in India. The inscription of Chi-I reveals that he was a priest of the great Han dynasty. He visited India twice and came to the Magadha country to pay respect to and worship the Diamond-Seat (Vajrāsana) of Buddha and other Buddhist relics of India. During his second visit to this country, he was accompanied by a number of other monks of whom Hwei-tsei, Tsi-I and Kwang-fung are mentioned. The second Chinese inscription from Bodhgayā belonging to the same group, mentions the name of the Priest Yun-Shu. He came from the Western River (Yellow river) country of China during the Sung period in A.D. 1021. He caused to build a stone-stūpa in honour of the ten thousand Buddhas some 30 paces to the north of the Bodhi-terrace and had set up a votive record and composed hymn of praise in Chinese. This inscription also mentions another Chinese priest named Chiang Hsia-pias who had come to India earlier than Yun-Shu and on three occasions had spent the season of fast. Yun-Shu became associated with Chiang Hsia-pias during his first visit to Bodhgayā. During his second visit to India Yun-Shu was accompanied by two other monks from China named I ching and I-lin. They belonged to the 'Monastery of Established Doctrine in the High Street of the Eastern Capital'²; and they also had set up a separate inscription at Bodhgayā which dates in the 6th year of the reign of an emperor of the Great Sung dynasty, roughly corresponding to A.D. 1030. These two Chinese priests presented, as the inscription records, a gold-embroidered holy robe to spread

¹ See, Cunningham's *Mahābodhi*, pp. 68ff.; M. Chavannes: monograph on *Mahābodhi* originally appeared in the *Revue de l'histoire des Religions*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, 1896, under the title *Les Inscriptions Chinoises de Bodhgayā*.

² Cunningham: *Mahābodhi*, pp. 71-72; Barua, Gajā and Bodhgayā, p. 190f.

over the Diamond-seat (vajrāsana) of Buddha and had also erected a shrine (stūpa). Yu-pin was another Chinese priest belonging to the same group and he also had acted in the same manner as was done by his other fellow companions coming from the Eastern Capital. The third Chinese inscription from Bodhgayā records the activities of a Buddhist priest named Hui-wen who belonged to the Great Sung period. His inscription dates the 2nd year of Ming Tao (A.D. 1033 Circa). He visited India with a charter from their Imperial Majesties the Emperor and the Empress of the Great Sung dynasty and was commanded by them to proceed to the kingdom of Magadha to erect a memorial mound (stūpa) beside the Diamond-seat and the Bodhi-terrace in memory of His Departed Imperial Majesty T'ai Tsung.

All these little known travellers and pilgrims of China being attracted by the glory of India, visited this country during the medieval period of our history and had made considerable contribution towards the Sino-Indian amity and establishment of international relations between India and China for centuries. They used to come to India by land route which was very much hazardous ; they had defied the frown of natural calamities and waded their ways into this holy land of India to fulfil their mission. But as time went on and with the development of maritime activities of the people, they took recourse to the sea routes for India and came to India with the purpose of establishing trade and commercial relations with this country ; and naturally there appeared an ebb in the Sino-Indian cultural and intellectual flow since people having other interests than religious fervour and possessing lesser intellect began to come to this country.

FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN TWENTIETH CENTURY INDONESIA

II

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The Indonesian nationalist movement was now at crossroads and soon took a new turn. The Communist failure was to serve at least one important purpose. It helped to clarify issues. It underlined the main issue that was the centre of nationalists' internal feud—this was the question of co operation with the rulers. In this stage of the Indonesian freedom movement social, political, cultural, religious, all factors combined to develop the national self-consciousness of the masses. In fact, as Prof. C. C. Berg¹ refers to this period : the precise aims of an institution are "less of a stimulus to participation than the opportunity to express feelings of solidarity and grievance and instinctive opposition to foreign influence in many respects, renders it impossible to keep political, social, religious, Pan-Islamic apologetic and cultural action absolutely distinct "

However, the significant turn in Indonesian nationalism was evident from the nonpolitical associations to which the peoples and leaders began paying greater attention and through which they chose to eliminate the curses of foreign rule and elevate the masses. This decision was necessitated by the melodramatic struggle between the Communists and Sarekat Islam and afterwards the vengeful government measures against any attempted communist revolution. Thus, a large section of the non-communist bloc of Sarekat Islam entered the Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyah was an organisation as old as 1912, its founder being K. H. A. Dahlan. Dahlan was a staunch advocate of Islam modernised. The first target was education. Later the programme expanded to cover many aspects of social welfare such as medical aid, popularisation of the Koran and, therefore, its publication in several indigenous languages, founding of schools, libraries, etc. But although there was professedly no political aim of the organization and its collective activity centred round Modernist

¹ *Vide* 'Whittier Islam' ed. by H. A. R. Gibb; p. 284, article by Berg on 'Indonesia.'

Islamic ideas, there could have been no bar to the fruition of individual political bias and action. So, G. H. Bousquet points out in 'A French view of the Netherlands Indies' (p. 5), "It would be very wrong, however, to suppose.....its members entertain no political bias." In fact, modernist Islamic ideas had political corollaries and Muhammadiyah must have contributed to the political growth of the Indonesians. As Kahin¹ so aptly writes: "It was a still, but deep, tributary of the stream of political nationalism and quietly but sustainedly nourished and strengthened that stream."

The Taman Siswa movement, first launched in 1921 by the Javanese educational leader Dewantoro displayed an almost similar activity. He aimed at harmonising the Western and Indonesian methods in building up an educational system devised to equip the young Indonesians with practical sense and spiritual self sufficiency. As Vlekke observes:² "It was his dream to educate the people to be men and women of independent judgment and understanding for the harmony that must exist in human society if peace is to rule." Many persons, trained in these schools, later turned out to be nationalist leaders. That proves the political efficacy of this pronouncedly nonpolitical organisation.

Of great importance was the somewhat complete unification of the hitherto scattered youth movements. There were various youth groups working in different parts of Indonesia. Now in Bandung was founded 'Pemuda Indonesia' which sought to combine the activities and bring together the leaders and policies of such groups as 'Young Sumatra,' 'Young Ambon,' 'Young Java,' 'Young Celebes.' Also, many branches of the Scouts' organisation affiliated themselves to 'Pemuda Indonesia.'

The women too did not lag behind. Some of their organizations, *e.g.*, especially Putri Merdeka (Independent Women) was established as early as 1912. Now the Women's groups came together as one organisation—the decision being taken in December, 1928, at a Congress in Djogjakarta. Formerly devoted only to the cause of education, these organisations now developed a political bias and moulded their activities accordingly. An avenue was open to women who could increasingly engage in political play and contribute their mite to the growth of self-government. Thus, Dorothy Woodman rightly concludes:³ "the nationalist idea was written into every type

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

² *Vide* his book—'The Story of the Dutch East Indies'—p. 187.

³ *Vide* the book 'The Republic of Indonesia,' p. 159.

of organization, trade union, cultural, religions, youth and women. Nationalism was now the unifying factor. As a political concept, it owed much to Western thought, but it was more than a political concept. It was the self consciousness of people under colonial rule, inevitable, inescapable, sweeping across boundaries of class, of religion, rousing illiterate peasant and intellectual, unsettling industrial worker and aristocrat, bridging regional differences, and ultimately welding the most diverse peoples into a common struggle. Differences of ultimate objective are over-shadowed until the nationalist struggle is won. But there is a wide variety of difference as to the tactics which are adopted. They are all fundamentally concerned with the degree of resistance to the colonial power''.

In the period between the failure of Communist rebellion and the Japanese interlude the 'Perhimpunan Indonesia' (Indonesian Union) was the greatest force shaping the national movement. In 1922 this organization, a political one, was started by Indonesian students in Holland. That many of the post—1927 leaders of the Indonesian national movement were the active members of this organization is a commentary on its gigantic influence. As early as 1923 the organization stood for unqualified independence to be achieved by the co-operation of all classes and sections in Indonesia excepting the Dutch authorities. It demanded unfailing unity in the fight for freedom while rigid in its insistence on non-co-operation with the Dutch. Many members had avowedly Marxist leanings—but they were far from being dogmatic. They solicited the support of every foe of colonialism regardless of their Communist orientation. The most significant fact about these Marxists was that most of them did not come up to be members of the Communist Party. The leaders like Abdul Majid did not come over to Indonesia before 1946—while they hid their orientation till 1948. But they had gained control in Holland in 1932, for that was the year when Md. Hatta left for Indonesia. Besides, at about 1937, they were responsible for a great change in PI (Perhimpunan Indonesia) policy. The PI was won over to the policy of co-operation with the Dutch. That was the work of the Marxists and according to the dictates of the Comintern. The demand for freedom even was curtailed—it was not complete independence as before—this move being reflected in the change of title of the mouthpiece of this organisation from 'Indonesia Merdeka' (Free Indonesia) to 'Indonesia'.

We must not fail to note the change in Dutch policy after the 1926-27 putsch. Firm in its dealings with the participants and

sympathisers, the Dutch policy wore an increasingly paternalistic colour in its approach to the problem of self-government for the colonies. Education and social service were the first to receive greater attention. Indonesians were invited to participate in the administration of the country. They were offered larger membership in the Volksraad. Moderates hailed all these concessions as the fruits of the golden rule of co-operation. But a trouble arose over the resulting alliance between the middle-income group and the Dutch authorities. Therefore, nationalists were driven to consider non-co-operation as one of the steering wheels of the movement.

While Hatta and others were busy in Holland organising the Indonesian movement for self-government, it was Soekarno who managed the home front. With his gift of the gab he was easily the fascinating hero of the nation in the making. All of them took their lessons from the failure of the revolutionary methods. All of them were uncompromising in their attitude to the liquidation of Dutch power in the Indies, however severe the strain might be. They did not flinch till they secured independence, all the time submitting to imprisonment or exile. It was the Japanese who released them. But that never meant, as some Dutch Commentaries would emphasize, the manufacturing of Indonesian Liberation in Japan.

By the third decade of the present century the dissenters of colonialism had begun to enjoy a world forum through the instrumentality of the League Against Imperialism. This League met in a conference in Brussels in February, 1927. Here for the first time Indonesia's cry for self-government had a world hearing. Hatta, Subradjo, Semaun and Pamuntjak represented Indonesia in this international gathering. At a place near Paris in September, 1927, Dr. Hatta also addressed the assembly of the 'Women's International League for Peace and Freedom'. He was eloquent in emphasising the necessity for self-government and the ability of his fellow countrymen to shoulder its responsibilities. He challenged the right of the Dutch people to enlighten another people much larger in number. As for political experience and wisdom, he pointed to the fact of occupation of 80% posts of the Civil Service by Indonesians. Hatta's speech moved the Congress which passed a resolution demanding Indonesia's independence not only as a matter of vital concern for that country but also for mankind.

It is interesting to note that Semaun and Tan Malaka came forward to join hands with the PI. And Md. Hatta was ready for a

united front. So a convention to that effect was signed in the month of December, 1926. This convention, however, assured the leadership of PI in guiding the nationalist movement and accorded a subordinate or secondary position to the Communist organisations. But this fact did not continue for more than a year. In December, 1927, Semaun thought it better to go back on the pledge as that violated the independence of his party. This severance of the bond served to make way for another severance. The communistically inclined members of PI, disillusioned of an ephemeral union with the Communists, now broke the bond, even with the 'League Against Imperialism'. Of course, they could not view with equanimity the increasing dominance of this organisation by the Comintern. The separation came in 1929.

The influence of PI on Indonesian nationalism mounted as the members began to return home. They brought out publications and established study-centres and succeeded in bringing within their fold even the Indonesian students in Mecca and Cairo. L. M. Sitorus has pointed out,¹ that PI members in Holland had a mind to set up a political party in Indonesia in 1926. But the decision had to wait as the PKI was still strong enough to hold the field.

Although the formation of the party was delayed, it was effected in the month of June, 1927, when Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party) or PNI originated in Bandung with Soekarno as the Chairman. Soekarno had the rare acumen to effect a symbiosis of the Eastern and the Western, himself having a measure of both Western and Muslim education. He had also the unique capacity to convey all these to the illiterate in an intelligible but nonetheless forceful fashion. That the party should aim at full political and economic liberation was natural. But the emphasis on non-co-operation with the Dutch was significant. Soekarno spoke of united resistance to the Dutch, divested of any religious bias. Any division along religious lines would mar unity. After all, independence was as much a necessity to the Moslems as to the Non-Moslems of Indonesia. Moreover, Soekarno disclaimed any attention to foreign help and, therefore, disclaimed any move calculated to outrage unity at home.

The PNI concentrated on moulding the labour unions and building up a system of national education. For the latter task they found an useful ally in the Taman Siswa Movement which already provided a framework. Oratorical brilliance and sincere implementation of the programme brought the party the reward of mass increase

¹ Vide 'History of Indonesian National Movement', pp. 10-11.

in membership. We must not, however, forget the contributions of the government to the growth of PNI. The communist revolution was followed by the Governor-Generalship of De Graeff. He was liberal and tolerant. He did not try to crush the flourishing organization that would one day seek to remove the very chair he occupied. The role of the PNI becomes all the more impressive as we note its attempt to achieve unity amongst the various nationalist organisations in Indonesia.¹ It effected a flexible co-ordination through the Union of Political Associations of the Indonesian People shortly known as the PPPKI. The whole freedom movement now, coming under the dominant influence of PNI, assumed an attitude of non-co-operation.

But the Government could not sit complacently over the alarming growth of the PNI. The PNI's criticism of and attacks against the capitalists in general and the government in particular thoroughly embittered the feelings of the Dutch in Indonesia. Their agitation moved the government which began to plan stern measures so that Soekarno along with several other leaders were arrested in December, 1929. They suffered months of detention, trial and then graduated terms of imprisonment. The accusations, as usual, were the violation of public order and undermining the public authority. But the worst came at a little later date. The PNI was outlawed. This had a twofold effect. The organisational strength of the PNI was sapped, many of its members joining newly formed organisations, although a portion of the membership still clung to the older policies and programmes. Then, the newly formed organisations encouraged moderation in the formulation and implementation of their aims.

In the month of September, 1930, Md. Tabrani formed the Indonesian People's Party (Partai Rakyat Indonesia) although the membership never rose to significant proportions. It talked of parliamentary procedure in achieving the aim of independence and it was ready to co operate with the Dutch

Sartono, an important leader of the PNI, could draw the attention and support of a majority of his old associates and formed a new organization 'Partai Indonesia' (generally known as Partindo) after the lapse of more than a year. Although its means were not extremist, it abridged neither the goal of complete self-government nor the slogan of non-co-operation.

In 1932 Hatta and Sjahrir, two leaders of extraordinary calibre, returned from Holland. Those members of the old PNI who resented

¹ *Vide Kahin, ibid, p. 91.*

Sartono's move now welcomed the leadership of Hatta and Sjahrir in the 'Independent Group' (Golongan Merdeka) which in essence retained the policy of PNI. Sjahrir reached his country later than Hatta and after his return the name of the party was changed to Indonesian National Education Club (Club Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia).

There was a deepseated reason why such outstanding nationalists as Hatta chose Golongan Merdeka inspite of the vast numerical superiority of Partindo. Indonesian nationalism was yet to attain maturity. That required laborious training of the masses which at that time could be undertaken only by a few topranking leaders. If they were put, as the Dutch could do easily, behind the bars, the soil would have been dug out of the bottom of the nationalist movement. And to lead a party such as Partindo would mean working in the floodlight of publicity and might bring about speedy detention. Instead, men like Sjahrir sought to remain in the background and steadily to educate the public while at the same time encouraging the growth of auxiliary leadership upon which the movement could fall back in the case of an arrest of the frontmost leaders. However, the Dutch after a time came to realise the forthcoming results of this party's policy. Hatta and Sjahrir were arrested in February, 1934 and were not released till the Japanese attack in 1942. They were exiled to New Guinea without trial. This Dutch aggressiveness was soon repeated. Yet the organisation did not die and it confirmed the sincere workmanship of leaders and the solidarity of the bands of disciples as they followed their captains and filled the prisons.¹

Fortunately for the movement, Soekarno had been released on the last day of the year 1931. He assiduously attempted to combine the Partindo and the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia into a unity. Failing in that task he chose Partindo and was instrumental in increasing the quantitative and qualitative strength of the organisation. The Government could not overlook the overt danger and promptly arrested him in the August of 1933 and exiled him to Flores island and thence to Benculin. He too was not free till the Japanese invasion in 1942.

De Graeff was no longer the Governor-General. The Government policy under De Jonge was changed to one of repression. All the important leaders were arrested and exiled. The secret police

¹ The informations in this paragraph are the outcome of personal communications between Hatta, Sjahrir and G.M. Kahin of Cornell University, U.S.A., during 1948-49; *Ibid.* p. 98.

played a great game so that secret political manoeuvrings were all the more difficult. The parties sometimes vainly retaliated by ignoring the Volksraad and sending in no members. Yet the harsh attitude of the Government awakened many to the sense of co-operation as a practical political poise. This was responsible for a split in the Sarekat Islam camp. It was at first very obstinate in its policy of non-co-operation and of attaching primacy to religious and not to economic and social problems. In 1934, however, H. A. Salim sternly opposed the decision of Sukiman and Tjokrosujoso to establish a religious organisation for attracting masses *via* the local leaders of religion. Besides, Salim and his followers were far from being dogmatic on the question of co-operation, while the other group was not.

Repeatedly the people saw the failure of the non-co-operative attitude against the powerful rulers and more and more they realised the efficacy of moderate means designed to extract concessions from the rulers without wounding their vanity or exciting their violence. It stood to reason to recognise the superior physical strength of the enemy and to stand on reality. That explains the formation of Greater Indonesian Party (Parindra) in 1935 led by Sutomo, Sukardjo and others. It was alive to the situation at hand and would adopt non-co-operation or co-operation conveniently. In the Volksraad it came out as the most powerful organisation. But its activity and influence lay more in the social than in the political arena. It promoted agrarian banking and co-operation, instituted a drive against such social vices as illiteracy.

But if the revolutionists could not gain their end and were crushed, the moderates too were not to experience a smooth sailing. The year 1936 proved to be disastrous for the evolutionists. The Volksraad passed a resolution celebrated as the Sutardjo proposal embodying a 10-year plan advancing self-government among Indonesians limited by the precepts of the Netherlands' Constitution. It was summarily rejected. The high hopes of the victory for parliamentary means were nipped in the bud. The rulers would not bow down to the dictators of the decade in South East Asia. However, "the rejection of this very moderate proposal", as Kahin puts it,¹ "was a sobering dash of cold water in the face of those Indonesians who had believed that a policy of co-operation with the Dutch would be a sure, though perhaps slow, road toward self-government."

¹ *Vide 'Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia', p. 98.*

This disillusionment was the primary reason for the formation in April, 1937 of a new political organisation Indonesian People's Movement (Gerindo), although there were other factors such as an increasing awareness of the strength of totalitarianism on the offensive all over the world. This party showed a mixture of firmness and moderation. Its leaders, Gani, Sartono, Sjarifuddin, became all radicals as regards their attitude to the motives of the Government. But at the same time they dreaded fascism and on that account developed a co-operative tendency to help the Dutch in their fight against the fascist coalition. They joined the Volksraad and backed the Government on acceptable affairs; but they were insistent in their pressure for obtaining self-government. Thus, Gerindo became international in its outlook without even being successful nationally. It was led by men of foresight who placed the world-issue of fascism *vs.* democracy above the domestic issue. Although Dutch inclinations for democracy were not unqualified, we must not misunderstand the leader's hatred of fascism.

In 1939, war and the fear of Fascism shook the whole world but served as a unifying factor in Indonesia where the political parties formed together the Federation of Indonesian Political Organisations or G.A.P.I. (Gabungan Politik Indonesia). The manifesto of GAPI called for a parliamentary system of Government in Indonesia which must enjoy the right of self-determination and democracy, social, political and economic, secured by popular elections. Of course, the manifesto did not fail to point out the necessity of a united anti-fascist action of the parties in Indonesia and Netherlands. In December, 1939, the GAPI organised a Peoples' Congress which approved of and refined this programme, adopting a national language, flag and anthem. Its resolution was embodied, with certain modifications, in the famous Wimoho resolution passed by the Volksraad in February, 1940. The resolution, although demanding self-government, did not repudiate the Netherlands Constitution, nor did it abolish the post of the Governor-General. In general, it asked for revision and not complete alteration of the status quo. This was at a time when the Nazis held their sway over Holland. The Netherlands government did not reply till a few months after the Nazi occupation was over. And the reply left the matter where it stood; it strikingly revealed the disinclination of the Dutch authorities to embark on or even consider seriously any plan of Indonesian political reconstruction—especially war left much to be reconstructed in Holland proper.

An even more striking refusal came in the shape of the reply to a question in the Volksraad regarding the aims of the Atlantic Charter and the achievements of the Netherlands government which was a party to it. The Charter glaringly upheld the universal right of self-determination in clearest terms. But the Dutch government betrayed a lamentable lack of principles in its attitude towards Indonesia by ignoring the Charter. The reply of the government to this charge was simply astonishing. It took for granted the honest execution by the Dutch government of the benevolent principles of the Charter and found no reason why on the basis of the Charter Netherlands-Indonesian relations were sought to be revised. As Karl Pelzer in his article on "Post War Plans for Indonesia"¹ puts the reply: "As the principles of the Charter were already adopted long ago by the Netherlands Government , adherence to the Charter does not represent a special reason for new consideration regarding the aims of its policy....."

In 1940, September, the Volksraad appointed a Committee chairmanned by Mr. Visman. It was entrusted with the task of ascertaining the state of political organisations in Indonesia and reporting on it. The Report of the 7-man Visman Committee was published in 1941—it covered the period between the two world wars. Essentially, the report noted the progress of the nationalist movement and the urge for equality with the Europeans amidst the non-Europeans. However, an element of surprise lay in store for the nationalists as the Queen of Holland would not be delayed by the publication of the report and issued her pledge to the Indonesian people from London on July 30, 1941. She vaguely promised happiness and prosperity for the Dutch Empire as a whole and to amend to that end the administrative measures only in the event of stable freedom from the Nazi clutches.

Vague and small as the promise was, it left the Indonesians as much disillusioned as they were and could be. "We have been too late with everything", wrote T.H. Veenstra in "Diogenes in der Tropen".² A similar sentiment was ventilated by Kioef in "The Indonesian Revolution in Retrospect"³ when he said that "no number of asphalt roads, tiled roofs, hygienic services, or adat law codes could alleviate" the grievances such as the rejection of Sutardjo and Wimoho

¹ Far Eastern Survey, June 11, 1943.

² Quoted from 'The Republic of Indonesia' by Dorothy Woodman, p. 167.

³ World Politics, April, 1951.

petitions. Fear of Fascism and war had contributed to Dutch-Indonesian solidarity which from now on began to evaporate. Intellectuals who had gone as far as subordinating the national to the international were largely disaffected, with the exception of a negligible minority. As Sjahrir comments in 'Out of Exile':¹ "As the war developed in those first years, the people derived a vicarious satisfaction from the misfortunes of their rulers..... For the average Indonesian, the war was not really a world conflict between two great world forces. It was simply a struggle in which the Dutch colonial rulers finally would be punished by Providence for the evil, the arrogance, and the oppression they had brought to Indonesia. Among the masses, anti-Dutch feeling grew stronger and stronger".

But while Indonesian antipathy for the Dutch deepened it served to promote Indonesian national integration. This was reflected at the Peoples' Congress in September, 1941. Out of it arose the *Majlis Rajkat Indonesia* (Indonesian Peoples' Assembly). It was considered to be a representative body for the nationalist movement as a whole and comprised the GAPI, Federation of Muslim Organizations, the Federation of Government employees, and also Women's Organization, Youth Organisations and Trade Union Movement. Thus for the first time nationalists had a clearcut forum because they could shed the differences in doctrines and dogmas, means and ends. Of course, differences could not be eliminated; only they were relegated to the background by a wave of enthusiasm that could emerge as a unified national outlook and finally even with an organization. The object was the formation of an elected legislative body to which the Government of the land must be made responsible. Nationalists forged ahead with a substantial programme when they were cut short by the Japanese advances and ultimate victory over the Dutch overlords who could only put up a meek show.

A statement put forward by W. K. Hancock needs re examination in connection with the struggle of the colonial peoples for self-government. We agree with him that self-government means not only a status but also a full belly—the 'status' referring to a position of equality as between the ruling race and the ruled. But we disagree when he argues² that politicians in these unfree countries, and he makes a pointed reference to 'Indian politicians', should devote themselves more to the objectives of higher agricultural and industrial

¹ Tr. by Charles Woolf—1949 pub., New York.

² Vide *'Empire in the Changing World'*, p. 47; chapter on 'Colonial Self-government'.

productivity attended by the growth of essential social services rather than to the problem of earning a status of equality with the Europeans. The argument is distinctly guilty of putting the cart before the horse. A country must gain self-government before it can effectively forge ahead with plans of all-round development. Of course a square meal daily is much more important than casting a vote once a year or once in every five years. But it is the latter which impels the rulers to recognise the necessity of securing the former.

(To be Continued)

THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT—SOME OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS

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Disarmament as a problem has its fundamentals and details. The details relate to the amount of military, naval, aerial and nuclear weapons which the states may be allowed to retain as a maximum. Or the details again may prescribe a complete ban on them and also the process for the same. The fundamentals, however, raise the questions—why should there be disarmament? what is the nature of its link with security? Does disarmament ensure peace? Is it a question of law or is it essentially a problem of power-politics? Is it a physical problem or is it also psychological? What was the approach to the question in the Hague Conferences and under the League Covenant? Are there any lessons therefrom and what is the approach thereto under the U.N. charter? These and allied questions constitute the fundamentals of the issue. And this article will be devoted to a discussion of some of these.

Disarmament is decidedly a panacea for many of the ills of modern international life. To disarm is to deplant fear and distrust and to replant faith, goodwill and understanding in the soil of international politics. To disarm is to dislodge the dread of war and to reinstate the promise of peace. To disarm again is to eliminate the strain on national budgets and to create possibilities of plenty and prosperity all round. To disarm is to tear off tension and to tone up the mansion of peace. To disarm is finally to rearm the U.N. with chances of fulfilment of its mission—it is to reaffirm faith in the U.N. as the guardian of world peace. States have renounced their sovereign right of war and use of force under the charter (Article 2, paragraph 4). Disarmament surely adds more positive meaning to that norm. War in self-defence is still permitted (Article 51) and there can also be U.N. War in the sense of international enforcement action (Article 42). Armaments may be required for these. Yet disarmament as a principle is not basically affected by the requirement of armaments for these two purposes. Disarmament does not necessarily mean complete negation of armaments: it means the reduction and cutting down of armaments. Moreover, with disarmament, effective and general, there will hardly be any occasion for war in self-defence or for U.N. police action. With disarmament disappears offensive or aggressive war. And if there be no war of offence, there is neither need for any U.N. War nor for any war of defence. Disarmament corrects collective insanity seen in the mad race of armaments and creates security for all. Modern wars with nuclear weapons mean a challenge to humanity and civilization. Disarmament, if effective, will mean the triumph of the rational in man over the animal in him.

Disarmament is definitely one of the many necessary avenues to peace. It must then figure as an item in any planned approach to peace. But disarmament as an exclusive peace weapon cannot be commended very much in principle as the idea behind it is to stop war not by growing an aversion to war (which is by far the best method) but by eliminating and limiting the arms with which to wage and carry on war. It is to some extent akin to the attempt at controlling riots in a state by imposing a ban on the carrying of firearms or other lethal weapons.

So long as war remains a sovereign right of nations, there can be no effective disarmament. But when we plan for peace, we ban war and disarmament may then be taken up as an ally of peace. Prior to the League Covenant, war was usually a corollary of the sovereign right of nations. To prohibit armaments while permitting war is like banning instruments of killing while allowing murder in law. Or to put the metaphor in general terms it is to permit a thing in law but to prohibit the ways of its operation. Apparently it seems insane or anomalous. But sufficient sense can be seen in it on careful analysis. When war cannot be banned in law or in fact, there may be some point in attempting to eliminate it or softening its rigours by taking away or limiting the armaments. War being a corollary of sovereignty could not be banned in the past. Yet there were talks of disarmament though in every case they failed. But disarmament to be real and effective must be preceded by a ban on war. (This is not to say that renunciation of war would automatically and by itself lead to disarmament) Hence any talk of disarmament with war existing as a right under law would simply be ignored as trash. That is seen from the fate of 'Disarmament' in the Hague Conferences. But with war outlawed in law a peace plan emerges and therewith appears usually as an ally the idea of disarmament.

The League Covenant is the first international document seeking to ban and prevent 'war'. Though a patchwork of incompatibles (American idealism, British liberalism and French realism) it sought to achieve all that was possible in the atmosphere of the age. It represents the first organized attempt of a war-torn and war-weary world to prepare a peace plan on a global scale. Ban on wars of aggression, collective security and sanctions, prevention of war and pacific settlement of disputes—are the main planks of the League system. Along with these there is the principle of disarmament in Articles 8 and 9 of that document. Disarmament or reduction of armaments was a companion to the other organizational peace potentials of the League of Nations.

But attempts at limitation of armaments began earlier. Disarmament was intended to be one of the principal items of the First Hague Conference of 1899. For the first time in an international conference of this kind the question of limitation of armaments was taken up. It will be recalled that the Russian Circular Note¹ proposing the First Peace Conference opened with a reference to this question: "The maintenance of general peace and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments which

¹ The Note will be seen in the Reports to the Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907. Edited by Scott, pp. 1-2 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)—Handed to the diplomatic representatives. August 12/24, 1898.

weigh upon all nations present themselves, in the existing condition of the whole world, as the ideal towards which the endeavours of all governments should be directed". In another part of the Note there is emphasis on the belief that the international discussion may be an effective means of ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace, and above all 'of limiting the progressive development of existing armaments'. In the Second Russian Circular Note² proposing the programme of the First Conference there was clear and specific emphasis on limitation of armaments in section (a) and items (1) to (4). In this proposal the Russian Government had two objects in view: the first, humanitarian, sought to lessen the possibility of war and to remove its evils and calamities as far as possible; the second, founded upon economic considerations, aimed to diminish as far as possible the enormous weight of pecuniary charges.....for the support of armies in time of peace. Hence the matter was taken up for discussion at the Conference of 1899 and was referred to its first Commission. The Scheme of limitation did not and could not succeed. "After taking into consideration the report of the First Committee, the Conference is of opinion that the restriction of military charges which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind" and the Governments..... "may examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea and of war budgets". The Conference then failed to produce anything positive or definite on the issue: the resolution adopted was just a pious wish. It failed largely because of technical reasons'. Yet we must not belittle the significance of the same. "We should not overlook the fact that the question of armaments was elaborately and carefully discussed for the first time in an international Conference called for this express purpose. In this way the subject was given an importance and dignity which it previously had not enjoyed, and it is not too much to say that the mere presentation and discussion of the subject place its opponents upon the defensive." And one can appreciate the achievements of the First Hague Conference in the matter when one sees that some states were reluctant to join the Second Hague Conference if the question of limitation of armaments became an item in the programme or if the subject were brought forward. But there were states again which insisted on its inclusion in the programme or which wanted to retain their sovereign right to present the matter to the Conference for discussion. In the Second Hague Conference of 1907, limitation of armaments did not figure in the official programme, and it was not referred to any Committee of the Conference. Yet the Second Hague Conference of 1907, unanimously adopted the following resolution: "The Second Peace Conference confirms the resolution adopted by the Conference of 1899, in regard to the limitation of military expenditure; and inasmuch as military expenditure has considerably increased in almost every country since that time, the Conference declares that it is eminently desirable that the Governments should resume the serious examination

² *The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and 1907*, by Scott, Vol. I, pp. 45-46.

³ Speech of Colonel Gross Von Schwarzhoff, German Delegate in Scott—*The Hague Peace Conference*, Vol. I, pp. 657-8.

of this question''.⁴ Many may be tempted to see in this a farcical burial of the question of disarmament. But that will be misreading the momentum the question breeds. If disarmament is linked up with peace and if man is ceaselessly in quest of peace, disarmament will remain a problem for man so long as peace is not earned. And the efforts are resumed after the birth of the League of Nations. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, sought to prevent war by pacific means and to ban war conditionally in a particular aspect of interstate relations (for the recovery of contract debts only in Convention II, adopted in the Conference of 1907). Along with these there were attempts, though abortive, at agreement on the limitation of armaments. In the League Covenant we see that the peace avenues are sounder and more numerous. And disarmament is one of them.

Attempts at disarmament failed in the Hague Conferences as the proper link between it and security was lost sight of. As aptly said by M. Bourgeois at the Second Peace Conference (1907)—“Disarmament is a consequence and not a preparation. In order that disarmament may be possible, it is necessary that each should feel that his right is assured. *It is the security of law which ought first to be organized. Behind this rampart nations will disarm easily because they will no longer have the fear which obliges them to arm themselves to-day*”.⁵ This is the fundamental of the disarmament problem and it is as true today in 1955, as it was in 1907. Disarmament may in principle breed security but in practice must follow it. The scheme failed in the Hague Conference as security was not ensured. States would not disarm if not rearmed with a sense of security. The League Covenant introduced the collective security principle on a global scale and the question of limitation of armaments was hence taken up more vigorously.

Articles 8 and 9 of the Covenant contain the relevant provisions. In Article 8 the League Members recognize that “the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments” not to any level but to the point consistent with national safety and the obligations of international enforcement action. They agree that “the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections”, and the League Council was to advise how the evil effects thereof could be prevented. They, moreover, “undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programs and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes”. These provisions in spirit and principle were no mean achievements considering that they were first in the field. The Covenant even went further and in Article 9, provided for the constitution of a permanent Commission for executing the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally. These provisions, however, contain no mandate. The Council is simply to formulate plans for the reduction of armaments under Article 8: the Governments are

⁴ Final Act of the Peace Conference of 1907 in Scott (Ed.) - *Reports to the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907*, p. 216

⁵ Scott—*The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907*, Vol. I, pp. 671 2 (italics mine.)

free to accept or reject. But if they accept they agree not to exceed the limits without the council's concurrence. These provisions, though appearing timid and halting to many, surely mark a positive step ahead of the point where the issue was left in the Hague Conferences. The problem of disarmament then takes a definite shape in the Covenant, however inadequate and imperfect it may be. This is so perhaps because the question of security was correctly understood and sought to be settled. Disarmament can seldom be a sane or rational proposition with the 'balance of power' principle at work in international relations. This principle resting on proportions of power connotes or postulates a race in armaments. If power flows from armaments and the principle is 'balance of power', then virtually it means a competition in the possession of armaments. Hence the talk of disarmament or limitation of armaments in the 'balance of power' era is, if not insane, at least ridiculous. This 'balance of power' principle was replaced in the League Covenant by the doctrine of Collective Security. And plan for disarmament comes as a consequence thereof. History then corroborates the view that security should precede disarmament. That is further evidenced from the post-League efforts at peace, disarmament and security.

The security system of the League though planned ambitiously failed miserably as the members betrayed the organization. And the damage to the security system would surely mean a handicap for the process of disarmament if the latter is linked up with the former as consequence with cause. Hence with the increasing skepticism about the efficacy of the League additional attempts, though abortive, were made for revitalizing the League's dwindling security system. These will be seen in the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923 and the Geneva Protocol of 1924. Rappard remarks regarding the Geneva Protocol that it is an attempt to "promote disarmament by creating security, to create security by outlawing war". Here also we see that security precedes disarmament. The Locarno Pact of 1925, restores security on a regional basis by ensuring peace in the storm centre of Europe, the Rhineland Zone. It had a salutary effect no doubt; yet it could not give a guarantee for global security. That was done in the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, wherein for the first time in an international document of this type 'war' was renounced "as an instrument of national policy". This renunciation of 'war' as a matter of principle in a general treaty surely serves the cause of security. And we see that the failing League Security System having been revitalized by the Kellogg Pact as a supplement, disarmament plans and schemes were taken up with all seriousness. The lesson then is clear. To disarm the states we must rearm them with an effective sense of security. Thus disarmament depends on security. But security again depends on disarmament. And the circle goes round and round in an unending chain.

In spite of the Kellogg Pact of 1928, it took several years for the first International Conference on the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments to meet and handle the problem. It met in 1932, with 62 powers including Russia and the United States attending the same. The French plan for the formation of an international armed force was ultimately shelved.

Thereafter a proposal to abolish 'the most aggressive weapons' was referred to a committee of experts. The Committee members, it was said, "lost themselves in the metaphysics of aggressiveness". There were debates, discussions and conferences. But the central point emerging thereout was the same old circle—disarmament is not possible without security and security is not possible without disarmament. The only result of the Conference was the recognition of Germany's claim to equality with the other Great Powers in respect of armaments. The failure of the League Security System in the Italo-Abyssinian War brought home to the Powers the urgent need for rearmament. Rearmament was felt to be necessary as much for defence as for fulfilling the international obligations. With this we see the end of Act One of the European drama "in which idealism held the stage amid the idyllic setting of an unarmed peace. It rose again upon the tense atmosphere of Act Two, in which an armed peace was to be the prelude to the conflagration of Act Three".⁶

The conflagration of the Third Act with armed peace as its prelude came in 1939, and passed away in 1945, leaving behind a tragic tale of woes and sufferings. A new World Organization was born with new hope and promises. And the new document for the new organization, like its predecessor the League Covenant, takes up also the question of limitation of armaments. But the approach here is somewhat different.

The U.N. charter does not contain many articles on disarmament. The only relevant portions are paragraph 1 of Article 11 and Article 26. Under paragraph 1 of Article 11 "the General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing *disarmament* and the *regulation of armaments* and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both". Article 26 enacts: "In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the *regulation of armaments*". These two Articles reveal a difference in the functions of the General Assembly and the Security Council regarding the issue. Under Article 11 the General Assembly "may consider the principles" regarding disarmament and regulation of armaments and "may make recommendations" in respect of the same to the Members or to the Security Council or to both. The General Assembly 'may' only 'consider' and recommend: the Security Council does not come into the picture. Article 26, on the other hand, authorizes and makes the Security Council 'responsible' for formulating plans for the 'regulation' of armaments. The General Assembly then can consider and recommend the principles but has no right to formulate plans. Another point of difference between the two Articles is that Article 11 contains reference to both disarmament and regulation of armaments: Article 26 speaks only of regulation of armaments.

⁶ Lipson—*Europe 1914-1939*, p. 335.

These provisions of the U.N. charter may in brief be read in contrast and comparison with those of the League Covenant. Under Article 8 of the League Covenant the League Council was to 'formulate' plans for the reduction of armaments: but the League Assembly was not excluded therefrom. The General Assembly under the charter has no authority in the matter of formulating the plans. Moreover, there is a difference in the two documents in the emphasis placed on the issue. The Covenant's emphasis was on reduction of armament, whereas that of the charter is on regulation of armaments (in Article 26, though in Article 11, paragraph 1, there is reference to disarmament). Article 8 of the Covenant obligates the League Council to formulate plans for 'reduction' of armaments; Article 26 of the charter makes the security Council responsible for formulating plans for the 'regulation' of armaments. The difference in emphasis cannot escape notice. As Hambro and Goodrich observe: "The League aimed to develop a system whereby 'Security, Arbitration, and Disarmament' would work hand in hand and on an equal basis. The charter emphasizes 'Security, Pacific settlement and Welfare' with disarmament in a subordinate position" ⁷

In spite of the subordinate position of the issue in the charter we see that the question of disarmament or regulation of armaments was taken up immediately after the birth of the United Nations. The Atomic Energy Commission⁸ was set up in June 1946 (the first meeting being held on June 14, 1946). It had its terms of reference. In February, 1947, the Security Council established the Commission⁹ for Conventional Armaments (the first meeting being held on March 24, 1947). Since then systematic efforts are being made for regulating both the atomic and Conventional Weapons. By the General Assembly Resolution of 11 January, 1952, the Atomic Energy Commission was dissolved and a Disarmament Commission was established under the Security Council. Further as recommended by this resolution, the Security Council took action on 30 January, 1952, to dissolve the Commission for Conventional Armaments¹⁰. Both these Commissions were superseded by one single Commission. The Soviet Union's proposal that the new Commission should be called "Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission" was abandoned and it was termed "Disarmament Commission only" ¹¹. It had the same membership as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments (i.e. the eleven members of the Security Council and Canada).

This Disarmament Commission held its first meeting on 4 February, 1952, in Paris. Two Committees of the Commission were established,

⁷ The charter of the United Nations (Commentary and Documents) p. 165. There are other interesting points of difference between the two documents on this issue. For details see Hambro and Goodrich, pp. 209-211. They observe further "It is obvious that the League System was much more ambitious and detailed than that of the United Nations". But a different interpretation is possible to show that the obligations for the members of the U.N. to disarm are stricter and more rigid than those for the League Members (for details on this point see Kelsen - *The Law of the United Nations*, p. 105).

⁸ For details leading up to its establishment and other aspects see the *U.N. Year Book* 1946-47, pp. 444-451.

⁹ For details see the *U.N. Year Book*, 1946-47, pp. 451 ff.

¹⁰ *U.N. Year Book*, 1952, p. 46.

¹¹ Keesings' *Contemporary Archives*, 1950-52, pp. 12037A 12034.

Committee 1 to consider the regulation of all armaments and armed forces and Committee 2 to consider the disclosure and verification of all armaments, including atomic armaments and all armed forces. The U.S.S.R. proposals in Committee 1 stood for an immediate ban on the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control of atomic energy, both to come into operation simultaneously and immediate reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces by the permanent members of the Security Council. But the representatives of Canada, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States considered these unacceptable as they were of opinion that the immediate prohibition of atomic weapons coupled with the proportional reduction of armaments and armed forces "would seriously upset the equilibrium of armed strength since the atomic weapon was a counterbalance to the preponderance of the U.S.S.R. in mass armies and Conventional Weapons. The U.S.S.R. position, they said, thus ran counter to the concept of balanced reduction which the disarmament commission had been instructed to work out and to propose".¹² The Commission failed to reconcile the opposing viewpoints and adjourned on August 29, 1952, *sine die*. The General Assembly, however, in its seventh session (February-April, 1953) adopted a 14-Nation resolution requesting the U.N. Disarmament Commission to continue its work and instructing it to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council not later than September 1, 1953. There was again deadlock in the U.N. Disarmament Commission during 1953. The U.N. General Assembly recommended in November of that year that a Sub-Committee of the Powers principally concerned should be set up to seek a solution to the disarmament question by private discussions. The Sub-Committee consisting of Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Canada was established by the Disarmament Commission on April 19, 1954, and met in London in May and June, 1954. An agreed report on the Disarmament Sub-Committee's Work (May 13—June 22, 1954) published on June 24, 1954, once again showed that the basic differences between the Soviet and Western stands still persisted—the U.S.S.R. insisted on the unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons which was to be followed by the setting up of international control machinery: the Western Powers argued that some effective means of international control should precede the ban on these weapons.

The two Power Blocs could not then agree on the question of priority of the items in the disarmament plan. They could not agree in 1952, 1953 and 1954: they cannot agree even now. That will be seen from an analysis of all the schemes beginning from the Baruch plan to the latest Eisenhower's 'open skies' plan and the Bulganin offer. It is impossible to summarise or analyse here all the plans separately.¹³ Limited space does not permit

¹² *U.N. Year Book*, 1952, p. 314.

¹³ For the different Plans for Disarmament the relevant United Nations Documents may be consulted. Keesing's *Contemporary Archives* also may be helpful—1950-52, pp. 11835-6 for the Tripartite plan of November, 1951; for the rejection of these proposals and Soviet Counter proposals, *ibid.*, pp. 11865-11866; for Cohen (U.S.A.) Plan and Moch (France) Plan of 1952—Keesing's *Contemporary Archives* 1952, pp. 12591-2; (For the Anglo-French Proposals of June, 1954, Soviet Proposals of May 1955; the Soviet, American, British and French proposals at the Geneva

that. But an analysis of the different schemes reveals the difference in emphasis or approach. The Soviet emphasis has been on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and agreement on nuclear disarmament measures before negotiating for controls. The emphasis of the Western Powers has been on controls and several pilot projects for inspection and exchange of information. The Soviet proposal of May 10, 1955, which was a kind of compromise proposal laid emphasis on the completion of reduction of conventional armaments and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction within two calendar years 1956 and 1957. Nuclear weapons were to be employed only when the Security Council decided that they were necessary to repel a specific aggression: nuclear tests were to cease at once and there was to be a kind of ground inspection through a control organ working by stages. The Western Powers argued that the Soviet proposals on the subject of controls were not sufficiently precise and were not adequate: ground inspection was to be supplemented by aerial inspection: there should be greater emphasis on reduction and restriction of conventional armaments.

The story thus goes on. There are occasional concessional gestures on a limited scale making possible compromise discussions. These are there even now. The latest Russian proposal of 17 November, 1956, called for a "summit disarmament conference" of the Big Four plus India with limited acceptance of President Eisenhower's 'open skies' inspection plan and a non-aggression pact between the North Atlantic Treaty Powers and the Communist Warsaw Pact Powers. The Soviet Government proposed aerial photography up to 500 miles on either side of the East-West border in Europe. This would be the region where the main forces of NATO and Warsaw Treaty are located. This amounts to a partial acceptance by the U.S.S.R. of the American proposal submitted to the U.N. Disarmament Sub-Committee in its meetings at London from March 19 to May 4, 1956. In that proposal there was a stipulation that the United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and Canada should carry out "a small demonstration test of control and inspection in a limited non-sensitive area of the United States and the U.S.S.R. of 20,000 to 30,000 square miles including at least one port, one airfield and one railway terminal" and further that "a control and inspection plan should be put into operation combining President Eisenhower's 'open skies' proposals and Marshall Bulganin's ground control, proposals". The Soviet proposal before that Sub-Committee (March 9 to May 4, 1956) laid primary emphasis on conventional weapons and made no detailed suggestions for the control and prohibition of nuclear weapons. A Moscow broadcast declared that the U.S.S.R. still aimed at the complete prohibition of such weapons, but was prepared to drop this point for the time being "in order to meet Western objections" on the question of control, and the Soviet proposals gave first place to Marshall Bulganin's ground control plan, but said that the United States 'open skies' plan could be considered at a later stage. This pledge

is redeemed by the Soviet Union in its proposal of November 17, 1956. It accepts the 'open skies' plan within limits. But this Soviet proposal lays emphasis on the ban on nuclear weapons. One item of the six-point Soviet proposal of November 17, 1956 is—"to ban hydrogen and atom bombs, their production and use and to destroy all stocks with an immediate ban on tests". Another item therein lays emphasis on the reduction of armed forces (to between 1 and 1½ million within two years for the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China and to 650,000 for Great Britain and France).

In reply to these Soviet proposals the United States is drawing up a disarmament plan in consultation with her allies. That is reported by Reuter from Washington on December, 10, 1956. This plan is to be submitted to the U.N. General Assembly next year. It seeks to outlaw "push-button warfare" by banning the use of long-range guided missiles. But President *Eisenhower* has rejected the idea of a total ban on nuclear tests in the present world situation: The same old divergence starts again, one seeking to ban nuclear weapons, the other wanting to retain the right to carry on tests. Despite the lack of agreement in the Disarmament Sub-Committee meeting (March 19—May 4, 1956) Mr. Stassen (U S A) said on May 5, 1956 "that the latest discussions had narrowed the gap between the Western and Soviet viewpoints 'from nine miles to five' He believed that this gap would be closed eventually".¹⁴ In spite of this statement we see that the gap persists. Hence the disarmament deadlock appears and reappears but seldom disappears.

The Atomic Energy Commission had its first meeting on June 14, 1946. The first meeting of the Commission for Conventional armaments was held on March 24, 1947. The two Commissions were superseded by one single Commission, the 'Disarmament Commission' which met first on 4 February, 1952. Disarmament efforts then may be traced back in the U.N. era to June 1946 when the Atomic Energy Commission held its first meeting. But there has not yet been any concrete and positive achievement. There is simply the tiring tale of committees and commissions, of charges and counter-charges, of arguments and counter-arguments and of excuses and explanations. The whole thing is nauseating and vexing. Hence the question arises--where is the malady? A divided world with defective security and standing on tension will not and cannot disarm. The U.N. Security System has gaps in the 'veto' power which may paralyse the organization. Tension again born out of disbeliefs breeds further suspicion and causes high levels of armaments: armaments again add to the tension. The spiral thus goes steadily upward. Disarmament schemes can succeed if and when security is established and distrust dies. With ill-faith and suspicion eating into the vitals of the weak and imperfect collective security system, disarmament talks are likely to turn into empty norms. Disarmament can be a success only in a climate of confidence with effective security. So long as that confidence cannot be restored, disarmament discussions may not unoften be a cloak for renewed armaments. Confidence can be created by security only. Hence security must precede disarmament. On what does security depend?—on organizational perfection, e.g.,

¹⁴ Keesing's *Contemporary Archives*, 1956, p. 14635.

compulsory pacific settlement of all disputes, ban on the use of 'force' in international relations and prompt and immediate sanctions against the law-breaker. But do these suffice? Perhaps, not. There can be tension and ill-faith even with organizational perfection, which by damaging the latter may ultimately destroy peace. We have not any fool-proof and perfect security system under the charter. Its inadequacy is due to 'veto' which again was born of distrust. Institutional and functional imperfection of the United Nations Security System is then the child of mutual distrust and tension. Hence we see that disarmament is ultimately not so much a physical as a psychological problem. The logic runs thus: we cannot have disarmament without security: we cannot have security without institutional perfection: we cannot have at present institutional perfection in the international field without a burial of ill-faith, distrust and tension. Hence peace, disarmament and war are all linked up with the psychology of the people. That is recognized by UNESCO in the preamble to its constitution where it is laid down "As wars arise in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace are to be constructed". It lays emphasis on the concept of 'positive' peace, as distinguished from negative peace. It means that security depends not only on objective factors but also on subjective factors. A security system slack in subjective integration and standing only on the objective factors is and must be weak and feeble. The U.N. Security System had inadequacies both objective and subjective. And the gaps in the subjective level (i.e., ideological differences between the two Power Blocs making it impossible for them to come closer) are reflected in the objective and functional region. Hence the U.N. Security System fails to guarantee security. Mutual trust and confidence between the East and the West must be restored. Perhaps 'Panchashil' may be of help in the matter. A joint declaration by the United States and the U.S.S.R. (and they must mean what they declare) pledging support to and faith in Panchashil might strengthen the basic foundations of the U.N. With the subjective basis of security restored, disarmament plans might have better chances of securing all-round agreement. But the atomic age changes our concept of security. Technological advance makes the traditional security concept meaningless. There is no security against atomic weapons. The only security is to ban their production. But how can it be supervised and enforced? The question of faith, security and trust comes in here as well. Hence disarmament is ultimately a matter of mind. Panchashil by revitalizing and supplementing the charter and by creating the climate of peace may genuinely prepare the field for disarmament. If disarmament is a psychological problem in any sense, then Panchashil by correcting and eliminating tension does surely help the process of disarmament. Bilateral adoption of Panchashil by different groups of states creating indirectly a general and universal international law may be one suggested line of action in a world of tension and distrust. In addition to this there must also be a faithful portrayal of the horrors of war and a comparative analysis of the huge waste of money and materials on armaments. The dangerous effects of the nuclear weapons must be made known to all, particularly to the common men. These common men are the rulers in democracies (is it only in

theory?): they should be the makers of foreign policies as well. They have an aversion to war as they are the first casualties in an armed conflict. They must be acquainted with the horrors of war and nuclear weapons. In this way the pressure of public opinion in different countries should be brought to bear upon the question of disarmament. Aversion to war and armaments and the urge for peace in the common man should also be the techniques for achieving success in the line

Disarmament is not only an ideal: it is also a necessity. To neglect disarmament is to neglect the need of life. The climate of peace is the best climate for disarmament to begin and to continue. Psychological disarmament is to precede and then to postulate physical disarmament. This should be the lesson for the statesmen and the diplomats who want to avoid deadlocks and to achieve success in the field.

WAS SHAKESPEARE A SNOB ?

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It is incredible that Ben Jonson wrote his immortal line, "He was not of an age, but for all time," without an intuitive awareness of the flux of values in the evolution of democracy. Much of Shakespeare transcends age. Yet the little that is contemporaneous needs a word of explanation, not so much to help interpretation as to prevent misconception. Such is the charge of snobbery against "sweetest Shakespeare, Fancy's child". It had its main-spring in his choice of themes and the main protagonists of his plays. They are invariably aristocratic, when not regal. The so-called high-lights, the patricians of Roman, Italian and English societies figure prominently on the Shakespearean stage with their 'glistening apparel' outshone by the splendour of royalties, but never outvoted by 'tattered robes'. Only once did he come down to the bourgeois society in 'The Merry Wives of Windsor' written at the queen's command to show off Falstaff in love. It was written under duress with the bourgeois knight as the main gallant. Even if Shakespeare's sense of realism might have failed him, Falstaff's would not! He made love with his coevals in social status. But as to the nondescript multitude, God help them! Yet Shakespeare was sensible of the 'groundlings' of the Globe—"Capable of nothing better than inexplicable dumb shows and noise" and even threw down sops to the underdogs in the form of merry topical jokes and crude vulgarities to collect their 4 d's!

Shakespeare's parentage, his station in society, his education—the little we know of them—were antidotal to snobbishness. But these did not prevent Ben Jonson from being so! He was known to the King, Lord Chancellor Bacon, Sir Walter Raleigh, gathered around him a coterie at the famous Mermaid Tavern. Ben though one of the learned, as Shakespeare was not, had no university education like so many of his predecessors and contemporaries, and was the son of a brick-layer, if not a brick layer himself branded on thumb.' Shakespeare was little known as an author in his life time, though the common people delighted in his plays and some of his contemporary writers spoke familiarly of his Falstaff and Hamlet. Those of Shakespeare's contemporaries who praised him did so for his sweetness and other lesser qualities which were apparent to them. Bacon, Lord

Brooke and subsequently Lord Clarendon were silent. In fact a creative age like the Elizabethan cannot be justly critical. He too kept himself hidden in his works like God in His creations. No reformer, no propagandist, he 'let the mind to be a thoroughfare for all thoughts' having, as Keats said, 'the Negative capability' to an enormous extent. Never self-assertive either in life or in his art, his contemporaries refer to him in the common epithet of "Gentlest," "sweet," "beloved."

John Weever writing in 1595 referred to him in the following lines :

Honie-ton'ged Shakespeare, when I saw thine issue
I swore Apollo got thee and none other

Edmund Spenser's stanza on Aetion refers to him, as no other heroic poet had a surname of heroic sound. Johnson and Fuller have similar allusions to the bard's warlike name :

And there, though last not least in Aetion
A gentler shepherd may no where be found

None denied him a genial humanity except Greene who, envious of his new rival, made use of a line in '3 Henry VI' to vent his spite on the 'upstart crow'—

"Tygers hart wrapt in a players hyde"

But this is the chagrin of a scholar-dramatist who was dying in poverty.

Henry Chettle, a master painter of Shakespeare's time writing in December, 1592 admitted that he had seen Greene's 'Groatworth of Wit' through the press and referred to Shakespeare—

"I am as sorry as if the originall fault had been my fault, because me selfe have seene his demeanor no less civill than he exelent in the qualitie he professes."

The Elizabethan society was a compact hierarchy with all the links well-defined, having correspondence on the one hand, to the cosmology of Ptolemy and on the other, to the heavenly hierarchy of angels. The doctrine of the validity of social classes was unquestioned. It was an uncritical dogma in politics as in religion rather than rationalism which made for security and political stability. The ancient idea of equality of men meant no more than that all men were equal before Death and Chance. The idea of democracy had not entered the mental horizon of Shakespeare. His 'King John' makes no mention of the Magna Charta. There is seldom any renaissance writer treating of the subject of equality who did not cry down the Gracchi brothers as traitors. The plebians were asked to accept without murmur the position which providence had assigned to them. Any attempt to rise above the social

position was subversive and dangerous not only to the political stability but even more so, to the aspirant himself. We have a clear notion of it in the famous speech on order by Ulysses in 'Troilus and Cressida'—

“ So every step
 Exemplified by the first pace that is sick
 Of his superior, grows to an envious fever
 Of pale and bloodless emulation.”

Malvolio is an unfortunate victim of cruel snobbery and his ambition to rise above his station by marrying his mistress Olivia is thoroughly exposed as presumptuous and foolish. Bertram's refusal to marry the poor physician's daughter in 'All's Well' seems an intolerable snobbishness to us, but it did not strike Shakespeare's contemporaries as quite so beastly. It was deep down in their blood and the king's persuasive speech to him makes the point clear—

‘ 'Tis only the title thou disdainest in her the which
 I can build up. Strange is it that our bloods
 Of colour, weight and heat, pour'd all together
 Would quite confound distinction, yet stand off
 In differences so mighty.’

In the first scene of 'The Merchant of Venice' Salarino's image of the merchant-vessels tossing on the ocean presents a picture of the commercial society and its social ranking—

“ There where your argosies with portly sail
 Like signiors and rich burghers of the flood,
 Or, as it were, the pageants of the sea,—
 Do overpeer the petty traffickers—
 That curtsey to them, do them reverence.”

The Italianate books on education and courtesy never fail to say that virtue was then the only basis of nobility. Its integrity as a class was the foundation of society. In a society so aggressively class-conscious there is little kindness shown to the underdogs. “the mutable, rank-scented meiny”. Shakespeare had little reason to sentimentalise poverty like Galsworthy. The lewd, merry, stinking, bawdy commoners are used by him either to provide the low atmosphere of plays like 'Measure for Measure', 'All's Well', 'Pericles' etc., or to symbolize a return to the norm from the emotional high-pitch, just as the rattling of wheels on the streets, the ringing of bells, the street-cries might do. The Porter in Macbeth, the old man bringing asps for Cleopatra, the gravedigger in Hamlet, Dogberry and Verges in 'Much Ado' serve this

purpose. Their roles are more or less tactical and vicarious. When they obtrude too much they are sent about their business often with a snub, like little children whose pranks have been too long tolerated. Even the bully Bottom is not spared. He has to pay the penalty for his presumptuous love for the fairy queen by wearing an ass's head and Stephano and Trinculo for the tyrannic ambition by wallowing in a miry pool.

Commiseration for poverty that we mark here and there is the product of humility, rather philosophical and stereotyped. It is significant that the three right royal English Kings—Lear, Richard II and Henry V, each, 'every inch a king'—the first two in ceremonial dignity and the third both in form and substance, are the mouthpieces. When Henry V meeting a common soldier incognito says "I think the king is but a man as I am" it heightens his dignity. Lear and Richard II are spiteful of dignity when the former has been stripped of it and the latter is psychologically preparing himself for what is inevitably coming.

Snobbery was there in the air, in man's blood, in the social fabric, and Shakespeare as a true child of his time could not but reflect it in his plays. We need hardly establish it by counting the proportion of kings, lords, and men of title in Shakespeare's *dramatis personae*. Not only he alone but all his contemporary dramatists had preference for the men in 'robes and furrowed gowns'. In the choice of his themes Shakespeare may plead a greater irresponsibility in the matter. His extreme 'busyness' as a playwright, even more so, his scrupulous adherence to the convention of veracity and authority to evade the platonic charge that poets are liars, led him to turn to ready-made materials. In the English and Roman historical plays his sources were, broadly speaking, Holinshed, Hall, Froissart, Plutarch, etc. These writers were inevitably aristocratic. In fact, democratisation of history was one of the latest laurels of democracy. Artistic explanation apart, Shakespeare's loyalty to kingship was a necessity demanded by contemporary history. There is not the least reason to suppose that Shakespeare had any profound respect for men in public life. The evidence is just to the contrary :—

'Get thee glass eyes
And like a scurvy polotician seem
To see things thou dost not.' (King Lear)

He was only discharging his patriotic obligation here like Philip Sidney, Spenser, Daniel and so many others after the defeat of the Armada.

In the other plays he roamed more freely among romances, tales and novels, mostly Italian. Boccaccio, Ariosto, Cinthio, Bandello and a string of other Italian names may be rattled off while indicating Shakespeare's range of Italian debt. These men were invariably highbrows who though born in bourgeois families had their intimate association with the high society. Boccaccio's lady-love Fiammetta was the natural daughter of King Robert; Bandello was a tutor to the famous Lucrezia Gonzaga and later in life became a bishop. Ariosto had a prince for his patron. Some of these stories reached Shakespeare through Belleforest and Paynter. The latter was in her Majesty's service. Naturally the stories are mostly of aristocratic society. Work as he did on ready-made materials he took the Italian counts and countesses as he had found them, altered the plots to suit the dramatic purpose, made the characters life-like, purged them of obscenity and compressed them. On the whole the alchemy of his dramatic art transmuted the base metals of his sources, but within their set framework. Sometimes again he had an old play or poem to work upon as in the cases of 'King John', 'King Lear', 'Romeo and Juliet', etc. In fact, the plots by themselves were never so important with him as the characters. Coleridge's famous criticism of Shakespeare's plots is very illuminating—"the interest in the plot is always on account of the characters, not *vice versa*, as in almost all other writers; the plot is a mere canvas and no more." The repetition of stage stratagems and devices does not prove Shakespeare's sterility of invention or even the limited scope of his source materials, but the little importance he paid to the plot. What other explanation can there be when he repeats himself as in the technique of the false report of death to vindicate chastity and innocence, as in "The Winter's Tale" and "Much Ado"; of the riddle in "The Merchant of Venice" and 'Pericles'; the vulgar device of the substitution of bed-fellow as in "Measure for Measure" and "All's Well", of the twins in "Comedy of Errors" and "Twelfth Night"; women in boy's guise in so many of his plays?

The artistic reason given by Aristotle is so popular that it needs no more than a passing reference. The tragic hero should be a man taken from high life so that his fall from eminence may strike a sense of helplessness in us and touch our imagination strongly. Bradley's quotation from "King Lear" is very apt:—

A sight most pitiable in the meanest wretch
Past speaking of in a king.

But this explains only the mighty tragedies where the characters are the children of a moral world and a metaphysical society rather than of

a particular secular society. Here Shakespeare is out on an adventure in the 'Strange Seas of thought alone' and we who are his fellow-navigators must forget all about the chart and compass. What stirs the imagination more than the strangeness and halo that surround a high life and hedge it from the profaner eye?

Beauty, grace and grandeur were there in the high life and as much humanity as in the low. The artist's delicate perception for the beautiful and colourful attracted him to high life. Such sophistication is natural to artist, more so, in a society where the sovereign was like the central sun, and the lords like the satellites were but reflected splendours.

" Renown and grace is dead
The wine of life is drawn and the mere lees
Is left this vault to brag of."

None the less what goes by the name of artistic sympathy Shakespeare never lacked, or he could not have created a Bottom, a Dogberry and a host of other immortals of the underworld. The underworld again supplied him with the generous specimens of compassionate, and even selfless humanity whose acts of kindness are written in letters of gold all throughout the Shakespearean world. Adam, Pisanio, the servant of Posthumous, the messenger who warned Lady Macduff against the approach of murderers, the groom who supplied the imprisoned Richard II with music are only a few of the little angels who tread the earth unnoticed by others. On the other hand, the devils in human shape are all fallen angels of illustrious ancestry. Iago, Aaron, Iachimo, Parolles, Richard III, Cornwall, Goneril, Regan, and the list will swell to a legion. So Shakespeare cannot be said to have been enamoured of the superior human quality of the aristocracy. Evidences are just to the contrary. Only as a dramatic artist who shunned innovation he clung to the old classical tradition of the Greek dramatists. Even more so, as an Elizabethan he could not come to terms with the underdogs just for their own sakes. And for the peasant's death-bed becoming the fifth act of a tragedy men had to wait for a more propitious time.

The charge of snobbery against Shakespeare is thus not only irrelevant, but thoroughly unjustified. If he were a snob, so were the Greek masters in the world's cradle of democracy, and all traditionalists down to the modern age! Almost all the artists are more or less tower-dwellers with a background of 'stucco suburbs' and an expensive education. The so-called masses of mankind had rarely a fair deal from them until recently in the Marxist era! Not until the tower of security

had been shaken by the tremor of world revolutions did they turn their eyes below with any degree of emotional sympathy. Even then intellectual aristocracy is possibly the toughest in respect of obduracy. The only difference is this that in place of the aggressive individualism of the past there is now the cohesiveness of a coterie and so much the stronger for that! Against the devastations of war the preservative of culture, so far suggested, is the artists' international according to E. M. Foster, or the Christian society of T. S. Eliot—a terminological variant of the old Brahminical society of India! What Shakespeare would have done had he been writing in this age is a matter for wild surmise! But the little that we know of his habits as a writer entitles us at least to the complacent conjecture that he might possibly have veered round to the proletariat and talked socialism! But we are far less certain if he would have in the same breath propagated himself as a mighty modern phenomenon as did Shaw, with the same Olympic indifference to the petty mortals' scruples and shame!

HISTORY OF MANIPUR

II

JYOTIRMAY ROY, M.A.

AJIT SHAH, BHARAT SHAH, GOUR SHAH AND JAI SINGH

Gharib Niwaz had seven sons. Of them Shyam Shah was born of the Chief queen, the rest Ajit Shah or Ugat Shah alias Kakilal Thaba, Num Shah, Tong Shah, Sarbosache, Bharat Shah and Strughna Shah were born by the second queen.¹ The account of the tragic end of Gharib Niwaz and Shyam Shah has already been given in the previous chapter. Ajit Shah had no difficulty to march straight to the throne. But in the fifth year of his reign his complicity in the murder of his father and brother came to light. Bharat Shah already formed a party and was waiting for an opportunity. When the people came to know about the dark deeds of his brother, he asked him to quit the country since "he abhors the thought of dipping his hands in his brother's blood." Ajit Shah was reluctantly compelled to agree. Bharat Shah's action received the approval of the people and he was unanimously to take up the management of the state.² (3) After two years of reign he died." "After a year and a half of his death the several Rajahs under the government of Meckley (31 in number) assembled to select his successors". "Shyam Shah the unfortunate eldest son of Gharib Niwaz had two sons, Gaur Shah and Chintung Komba aliases Jai Singh, Bhagya-chandra, Karta. The eldest Gaur Shah was unanimously chosen to the vacant throne and immediately proclaimed Rajah of Meckley about the year 1758.⁴ Colonel McCulloch says that "Gouroo Shyam was a cripple and it is related that considering himself from his infirmity unfit to be the sole ruler he associated with himself his brother Jai Singh or Chingtung Komba and that they ruled alternately, this arrangement lasted until Gouroo Shyam's death about 1764, when the sole authority fell to Chingtung-Komba who held it up to 1798".⁵ Bijoy Banchalle also records this arrangement of joint rule.

JAI SINGH (ALIANSES BHAGYA CHANDRA, CHINTUNG KOMBA, KARIA,)

1764 TO 1798 A.D.

Jai Singh the grand son of Gharib Niwaz stands second to his illustrious grandfather in order of merit in the history of Manipur.

He was brave, intelligent and intensely religious. A considerable section of Rajkumars and Rajkumaris of Manipur claim their descent from Jai Singh. There are many stories about the heroism and popularity of Karta current in Manipur. All of them may not be accepted as historical facts, but materials for history will be found in them. It is said that during the reign of Gour Shah, Jai Singh one day in absence of the king ascended the 'Kangla'. According to the prevailing custom no person other than the reigning king had that right. When Gour Shah came to know of it he banished Jai Singh from the palace. Thus driven out from the palace he took shelter in the house of his maternal uncle Khelei-Nungwa Telheiba, the Chief of Moirang. The king then in order to get rid of Jai Singh forever, won over Telheiba to his side. Jai Singh scented it in time and left the palace at once in the guise of a Naga. At first he reached Thigomei (modern Kohima) through Maram. From there he entered Tekhao (Assam). Since the capital of Assam was situated at that time on the bank of the river Dikhu, the Manipuries used to call that kingdom as Tekhao. The enemies of Jai Singh followed him there. But Swargadeo (title of the ruler of Assam) having been pleased to see his wonderful tactics of taming wild elephant, promised to give him shelter. Henceforth he came to be known as Jai Singh. After some time he entered Manipur in the guise of a Kuki and reached first Moirang and then Bishnupur. He realised that in spite of his long absence his memory was still cherished by his countrymen. But he could not keep himself concealed in his Kuki garb for long. Shortly he was recognised and a large number of people began to rally round his banner. But before any outbreak of war the ailing Gour Shah died. Jai Singh ascended the 'Kangla' without any difficulty and was recognised as the ruler of Manipur.*

Manipur already weakened by the death of Gharib Niwaz, became weaker due to the disunity among his successors. Burma, her powerful neighbour, did not fail to exploit her weakness. From 1755 A.D. upto the treaty of Yandabo in 1826 A.D. the history of Manipur is replete with the story of successive Burmese invasions and of how she resisted them and eventually triumphed over them. Within the short period intervening Gharib Niwaz's death and the accession of Jai Singh Manipur was twice invaded by the Burmese.

In 1752 A.D. the Mons laid the final axe on the withered trunk of the ruling Tungoo dynasty. But they were not destined to rule over Burma. Alaungpaya alias Alompra of Moksobomyo (the tower of the hunter chief) suddenly sprang into prominence as the Burmese

national leader against the Mons. He drove out the Mons and established a new dynasty in Burma.' He soon consolidated his power in upper and lower Burma. The presumption of the sovereignty over Manipur by the rulers of Burma was always challenged. Alaungpaya secure about his hold over Burma, embarked on the project of expansion of the empire by conquering Manipur and Siam. Manipur, if she owed any allegiance to the ruler of Burma, undoubtedly had thrown off her yoke during the Civil War in Burma. Alaungpaya decided to re establish it.⁸ In the year 1755, he sent a punitive expedition under the command of a distant relation "to chastise the Cassayers (Manipuries) "which wrought such havoc that it is referred to in Manipuri records as the "Kooltha Kuhlba" or primary destruction. The success of the Burmese force was mainly due to the superiority in fire-arms." Manipur was reduced to submission, "the prince or Rajah, who resided at Munnepoora, the capital of Cassy, sued for peace, which was concluded on terms advantageous to the Burmans and as is the custom, a young man and young woman of the kindred of rajah, were delivered as hostages for the due observance of the compact".¹⁰

In July 1757 accounts reached Alaungpaya that "Symptoms of disaffection had again been manifested by the Cassayers on the west bank of the Keen-Duen." He was then at Rangoon.¹¹ This time he personally undertook the conquest of Manipur and proceeded up the Chindwin river in 1758, with a fleet of boats. The western bank of the river was inhabited by the 'Kathe Shans' tributary to Manipur. The whole tract was laid waste. Afterwards he disembarked and crossing the Ungoching by the Khumbat route marched through Kubo and entered the Manipur valley by the Imole pass at Palel. Bharat Shah the then king of Manipur tried to resist him without any success. He entered the capital and stayed there for 13 days.¹² During this short period "thousands of people were deported for settlement in the Sagaing and Amarapoora district. Among them were boatmen, silk workers and silversmiths. From this time onwards the astrologers at the Burmese court were Manipuri Brahmins, while Manipuries formed a cavalry regiment in the Burmese army known as Cassay Horse."¹³ The news of the revolt of the Peguers made Alaungpaya haste towards Ava. Though the Burmese army withdrew from Manipur proper yet her dependencies on the Burmese side were lost for ever. Kubo valley which was a part of Manipur was also annexed by Burma.¹⁴

Ajit Shah after his banishment was residing in Cachar. During two successive invasions in Manipur by the Burmese army the weakness of the government of Manipur became revealed to him and he felt that he had still some chance to recapture the throne. From the communications of Mr. Verelat, it appears that in the course of the year 1762, Ajit Shah represented his case to the British government through the Raja of Tripura and declared that he had been unjustly deposed from the throne and expelled from the country. His reinstatement to the throne of Manipur would be possible only through British help. He was successful in creating a feeling of sympathy for his misfortunes.¹³

It has already been mentioned that Jai Singh was the joint ruler of Manipur along with his elder brother Gour Shah, from 1756 to 1764. Some misunderstanding between the two brothers might have led to Jai Singh's temporary banishment. British records show that while Ajit Shah was negotiating with the British Government for the restoration of his authority, Jai Singh was at the helm of affairs in Manipur. When he came to know of his uncle's move he deputed his "Vakil Haridas Gossain" with a letter to Mr. Verelat at Chittagong stating why Ajit Shah had been dethroned. About the truth of this statement the Rajah of Tripura appeared perfectly satisfied and the British authorities not only withdrew from any further communication with Ajit Shah but also appeared to support Jai Singh against his machinations and the aggression from Burma.¹⁴

The rapid growth of the Burmese power was viewed with grave concern by the British government in India. Moreover during the seven years' war (1756-'63), Anglo-French conflict spread all over the globe. In 1759 Alaungpaya at the instigation of the French destroyed the English settlement in Nagra's, an island in the mouth of Irrawaddy.¹⁵ It was at such time Haridas Gossain came from Jai Singh, the ruler of Manipur, to Mr. Verelat, at Chittagong to secure British help for his master, to regain the lost territories of Manipur from Burma. He proposed 9 articles as the basis of an alliance to be negotiated between them on behalf of their respective masters. After some discussion the terms of the alliance were finally settled on 14th September, 1762 A D. This is the first formal agreement between the government of Manipur and the British government of India. According to the terms of the treaty it was promised to Jai Singh, that a contingent of British troops of the strength of 6 companies of sepoy, would be sent to his aid in his effort to recover those territories wrested from Manipur by Burma. In return

government of Manipur agreed to grant for ever to the English a rent-free land of 8 thousand cubits, at a suitable place in Manipur for the installation of a factory and a fort and also provide every facility for the prosecution of trade with China. The government of Manipur in its eagerness to get British help not only agreed to pay the expenses of the British troops but also promised to fully compensate the loss suffered by the British in the island of Negrais. A clause of offensive and defensive alliance was included in the treaty.¹⁷ A The terms of the treaty were duly approved by the Board, of which Mr. Vanisitar the governor of Bengal was the President.¹⁸

According to the terms of the treaty in January, 1763 a detachment left Chittagong under Mr. Verelst and reached Khaspur the then capital of Kachar near Badarpur in April. But it suffered so much from rain and disease amidst pestilential swamps that its progress to Manipur was arrested. Finding Khaspur unhealthy the contingent fell back to Jainagar on the left bank of the Barak river. "Circumstances of a political nature (war with Mirkasim) rendering the recall of the force necessary, a letter was despatched to Mr. Verelst, who returned with it to Chittagong".¹⁹

After the conclusion of the treaty in September, 1762, Haridas Gossain left Chittagong for Manipur to initiate the terms to Jai Singh. Since then till the return of the British troops from Khaspur to Chittagong, no communication was received from Jai Singh by the British government. It was at this time Jai Singh was expelled from his position of joint ruler by his elder brother Gour Shah. In the following year (October 1763) three accredited agents of Gour Shah arrived at Chittagong and reconfirmed the terms of the treaty of 1762, on his behalf. They further communicated that the Burmese having destroyed a great part of Manipur it was not possible to meet the expenses incurred by the British government for the troops, sent up to Khaspur, to be employed at the service of the Manipur government. As a token of sincerity "500 meklees gold rupees, to be valued at twelve silver rupees each" was offered. It was also assured that the amount already spent on his account and the charges for future military assistance would be duly paid in kind. After this—treaty all communications between the British and Manipur appear to have ceased.²⁰

Jai Singh formally ascended the throne in the year 1764 A D. But he was not destined to rule continuously up to the end of his life. From 1764 to 1793 he lost and regained his power at least three

times. At the time of his accession Hsinbyushin (1763-76) was the ruler of Burma, He in order to reassert the authority of Burma over Manipur "marched in person against the Manipura cassayers".²¹ When all resistance failed Jai Singh fled to Cachar. His uncle Khelei Nungws, the Chief of Moirang played the role of fifth column.²² Hsinbyushin stayed in Manipur for nearly a month. Before he returned to Burma he put Wangkheimayum Eringba, a scion of the royal family, in charge of the administration of Manipur.²³

Swargadeo Rajeswar Singh was the ruler of Assam from 1751 A.D. to 1769 A.D. "Tungkhungia Buranji" an original account of the history of Assam, records that Jai Singh, the King of Manipur having been driven out of his country by the Burmese, took shelter in the kingdom of Kachar and asked permission through Kirtichandra Barbarua to meet the Swargadeo. Permission was granted. He reached Rangpur and was introduced to Swargadeo with the following recommendation—"The Chief of Manipur has a daughter named Kuranganayani. The Manipuri Raja was descended of old from Babrubahan. He is a kshatriya, and there is no doubt about it. I hope your majesty will marry the princess".²⁴ Swargadeo agreed and the Manipuri Raja's family were brought from Kachar and stationed at Gauriagar. Marriage was performed with due ceremony. "The princess excavated a tank, and made an establishment at the village Manaimji in the Sarucharai forest lower down the Dihoi where the magalus or Manipuries forming part of the marriage settlement were allowed to live".²⁵ Princess Kuranganayani by dint of her merit shortly occupied the position of the Chief queen. After the death of Rajeswar Singh, when the Moimaria LEADER Raha Moran usurped..... the throne from Lakshmi Singh, it was that Manipuri princess who murdered the usurper by a stratagem.²⁶ After this marriage Jai Singh requested Swargadeo Rajeswar Singh to help him to secure his throne from the Burmese. In return of his help he promised "If I be placed in my old territory after driving away the Māntarāns. I will be a vassal of yours and pay annual tributes".²⁷ Kirti Chandra Barbarua and other members of the court also pleaded for Jai Singh. Rajeswar Singh agreed to help him and an army was sent in 1765 A.D. through the jungles over the charaideu hills. But it failed to reach Manipur and eventually had to return. This is known in the history of Assam as 'Latakata Ran'.²⁸ In the year 1767 A.D. another army was sent along with Jai Singh. It marched through Raha, entered Cachar and encamped at the side of the Merap river. There Jai Singh gathered some

followers and entered into Manipur through the hills. The Nagas lent their support to him and as he proceeded, almost all the people of the country welcomed him as their king. The puppet ruler Eringba (Bairang—according to Ahom Buranji) submitted after feeble resistance at Langathen.²⁸

In absence of Jai Singh Manipur was ruled by Eringba, vassal of Burma. Kheleinungwa, traitor occupied an important position. To strengthen his position further, he gave his daughter to the Burmese king. Eringba also to please the Burmese master gave up the sacred thread and the 'mala'. People were not at all pleased with him. To add to their miseries a terrible flood devastated the valley. Hence when Jai Singh came, they could so easily throw off their allegiance to the puppet ruler. Eringba was however pardoned.²⁹

History of Burma records next invasion of Manipur by the Burmese forces in 1770 A.D. The Raja was again driven out and a large number of Manipuris were deported.³¹ Fortunately Jai Singh kept his relation with the king of Assam by making occasional presents.³² No sooner the Burmese withdrew he re-entered Manipur with the help of Assam. Under his efficient rule prosperity gradually returned to the country.

But this again lured the Burmese to renew their incursions. The last great Burmese offensive on Manipur was made in 1782 Jai Singh was driven out. They placed one Kheleinba of Moirang in his place. But Jai Singh finally succeeded in coming to an understanding with the Burmese ruler Bodawpaya, and was allowed to remain in quiet possession of his devastated country.³³ As a result of successive Burmese invasions Manipur became extremely impoverished and depopulated. Francis Hamilton met a priest of Raja Jai Singh at Comilla in 1798. He told him that the Burmese "invaded Manipur about the year 1768, and for eight years remained there, committing every kind of devastation. The country previously had contained a very great number of horses and other cattle, not above one in a hundred of which was left behind. He thinks that the Burmens carried away or destroyed 300,000 persons of different ages and sexes; and indeed it was alleged, when I was at Ava, that 100,000 captives remained near the city".³⁴

Jai Singh maintained his friendly overtures with Assam even after the death of Rajeswar Singh. He gave a "daughter of the elder brother of Kuranganayani" to Swargadeo Lakshmi Singha.³⁵ When the moâmaria rebellion took a formidable turn in Assam in

1766 Swargadeo Gaurinath Singh sent an appeal for help to the kings of the neighbouring states. "Manipur Raja was mindful of the services rendered to him a few years previously by Gaurinath's uncle, Rajeswar and marched with five hundred horse and four thousand foot to Nowgong, where he was met by Gaurinath.

He then proceeded up-country to assist Burha Gohain. When he approached the Moāmaria lines, the latter at once gave battle and, after a short engagement, put his troops to flight. Many were killed during the fight and more in the pursuit that followed,..... He lost no time in hastening back to Manipur. He left a thousand of his men with the Burha Gohain".³⁶ When Major Wood was in Assam in 1794, he saw a contingent of troops from Manipur came to the assistance of Gaurinath, whom the British forces then restored.³⁷

So far as the records show, the relationship between Assam and Manipur is always found to be very cordial. A coin circulated by Swargadeo Pramatha Singh in 1746 A D has been found in Manipur. It indicates commercial relationship existing at that time between the two kingdoms. It may be mentioned that Manipur was invaded by her neighbours in different times but Assam never carried its sword to Manipur. The Swargadeos have had many alliances with the Raja of Manipur, and frequent intermarriages with that family. "Since the usurped authority of the Burha Gohain all intercourse with Manipur has been prohibited, as its Raja favoured Gaurinath. The roads were now choked, and even commerce has ceased".³⁸

Once, while in Cachar Jai Singh made a visit to 'Dacca Dakshin' the ancestral home of Mahapravru Sri Chaitanya in Sylhet. There he came in contact with Ramnarayan Shiromani, a descendant of Upendra Misra, grand-father of Sri Chaitanya Mahapravru. Ram Narayan had his education at Nabadwip. He was a great devotee of Lord Chaitanya. Jai Singh was very much impressed by his exposition of the ideal of Sri Chaitanya and persuaded him to go to Manipur. At Manipur Ramnarayan preached the ideal of Gauriya Vaishnabism which gained much popularity among the Manipuries within a short period. When he returned to Sylhet Jai Singh, as a token of his devotion to lord Gauranga, sent with him a large bell made of brass weighing 5 Mds. to be used in the "Sri Mandir" of "Darca-Dakshin". Unfortunately it was destroyed, after about 90 years when that 'Sri Mandir' accidentally caught fire.³⁹ There were other Brahmins and Vaishnava missionaries also who came from Bengal and settled in Manipur at different times during the reign

of Jai Singh. Among them mention may be made of Paramananda Thakur, Ganganarayan Chakravarty, Krishnanarayan Chakravarty, Kunjabihari, Nidhiram Acharya Thakur, Ram Gopal Bairagi, Adhikary Kamdeb Brajabasi, Krishna Das Thakur and others. It was from that time that Gauriya Vaishnavism came to be recognised as state religion in place of Ramanandi Cult. Jai Singh built the temple of Govindaji in his palace. Following his example his minister Ananta Shah built the temple of Vijay Govinda in his house at Mantri Mayum Leikai. Hungaibam Chuda Sarma and the son of Kishori Singh built the temples of Madanmohon and Gopinath respectively. When the construction of the temple of Govindaji was completed Jai Singh assumed the title of "Bhagya Chandra". His daughters would look after the 'pujas of Govindaji'. Among the 'Maharaj-kumaris' Sijalairoibi through her devotion to Govindaji had high spiritual attainments. Her dance and song reflected her intense devotion. It was 'Sija Lairoibi' the 'Radha of Manipur' who gave concrete shape to an extremely devotional form of dance, conceived by her father Jai Singh. This is the history of the origin of the famous 'Rasa'-dance of manipur. The Princess did not marry. She used to dance before Govindaji playing the part of "Raseswari". She also composed some devotional songs in Bengali to sing for the pleasure of her beloved Lord Govindaji.⁴⁰

Raja Jai Singh spared no pains to bring about spiritual and material regeneration of his country. His activities earned for him that universal esteem which is still cherished by every Manipuri. Along with his innovation in religion and dance mention may be made of the improvement of agriculture effected during his reign. Manipur up to that time stuck to the old method of "Jhum" cultivation. It is said that Kaireng Khulappa, a certain prince of Rangamati, introduced the present transplantation method of paddy cultivation. There were also some changes in dress mainly influenced by the Bengali style.⁴¹ Along with Gauriya Vaishnavism Bengali alphabet and language also began to gain popularity in Manipur from that time.

In the year 1798 a Brahmin under criminal charge of severe nature was murdered by an official. Jai Singh, the God-fearing ruler was extremely mortified when he heard of this killing of Brahmin within his domain. In order to absolve himself from the sin, which he believed to have fallen upon him, Jai Singh decided to go to Nabadwip and spend the remaining years of his life entirely in religious pursuits. Accordingly he abdicated the throne in favour of his son Labanya

Chandra alias Rabino Chandra and proceeded towards Nabadwip. In the way he built a temple at Bishnupur.⁴³ Francis Hamilton heard at Comilla from the priest of Jai Singh, who accompanied him, that the Raja due to some ill-feeling prevailing at that time, between the Rajas of Manipur and Kachar, instead of going by the direct route through Khaspur, cut a new road through the forest to the south and made his way to Sylhet with 700 men. "The Chief travelled on horse back—He was very poor, and his train was supported at the expense of Tripura Raja". From Sylhet he went to Agartala on a visit to the Raja of Tripura. "The Chief of Manipur was then an old man and had with him three sons and an equal number of daughters, one of whom had married Radan Manik," Raja of Tripura." From Agartala he went to Nabadwip. But there was at that time no permanent residence for the rulers of Manipur in Nabadwip. Accordingly, he sent his wakil Rashbehari Das with a letter to Lord Mornington, the then Governor-General of India, expressing his "desire for a piece of land on the river for building a house which may serve him as a bathing resort".⁴⁴ After staying for some time at Nabadwip he proceeded by boat to visit Brindaban, but on the way he met his death in 1799 at Bhagabangola in the district of Murshidabad.⁴⁵ Sija Lairoibi accompanied her father up to Nabadwip where she spent her days singing and meditating on Lord Krishna.⁴⁶

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WILLIAM SHENSTONE AND SPENSER

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"Sir, we are a nest of singing birds," said Johnson, speaking of Pembroke College. One of that college's "singing birds" was William Shenstone whose dainty poem *Written at an Inn at Henley* touched a sympathetic chord in Johnson's heart. In 1732 Shenstone went up to Oxford and remained there for four years but strangely enough left the University without academic honours, although he 'employed himself in the usual studies of mathematics, logic, natural and moral philosophy, with considerable assiduity and success.'¹ In 1745 his paternal estate The Leasowes, which he had inherited from his father at the latter's death in 1724, fell to his own care and he retired to 'solitude & the country,' devoting his time and spending his not-too-large income, 'to point his prospects, to diversify his surface, to entangle his walks, and to wind his waters.'² Robert Dodsley thus described the achievement at The Leasowes: 'Far from violating its natural beauties, Mr. Shenstone's only study was to give them their full effect. And although the form in which things now appear be indeed the consequence of much thought and labour, yet the hand of art is no way visible either in the shape of the ground, the disposition of trees, or (which are here so numerous and striking) the romantic fall of his cascades.'³ Gardening, which from 1745 onwards was the most absorbing of his occupations, would always cherish his name. In his own day, the Leasowes, that artificial version of the Arcadia of the eighteenth century, became 'the envy of the great and the admiration of the skilful; a place to be visited by travellers and copied by designers.'

There, at his *fermeé orndé*, Shenstone essayed to live a romantic-idyllic life. London was not really his milieu, though he enjoyed his occasional trips to the metropolis and whenever he was there, drank deep of its cultural life. His real place was perhaps in his extensive garden. He might be seen any day pottering there, with his 'long hair and heavy visage,' or half-sleeping beneath the shades of his old oaks, a pocket copy of Terence spread out before him on

¹ *The Poetical Works of William Shenstone* (ed. G. Gilfillan, Edinburgh, 1854), VIII.

² Johnson: *Lives of the Poets*. Quoted Chaucer's *Cyclopaedia of English Literature*, 1937, II, 358.

³ Quoted *The Letters of William Shenstone*, p. xi. ed. M. Williams, Oxford.

the ground, or setting up 'bustos' at vantage-points and scrawling verses on seats, dedicated to the memory of his friends and relations.

There are no doubt charm in such an Arcadian life, but there was also the rub of lonesomeness. Shenstone complained at The Leasowes that he was 'forced to die in a rage, like a poisoned rat in a hole,'¹ and said 'the man in curst who writes verses and lives in the country. If his *celestial* parts inspires him to converse with Juno, his *terrestrial* one necessitates him to stoop to his landlady;' ² When vertigo and melancholy came together, he 'fatigued Mrs. Arnold's assiduity, to the injury of her health; by occasioning her to sit in [his] room a'nights, light my candle, put it out again, make me perspiratory wheys and slops—' ³ and when only melancholy possessed him, there was also this pious, Christian woman nearby, trying to humour him with her story of the 'poor, pretty *creters*.' ⁴

There was another more effective remedy to counteract the recurrent periods of his depression—correspondence. From the 'ornamented rusticity' of the Leasowes, he wrote incessantly and interestingly "cargoes of franks" to the publisher Dodsley, to Bishop Percy, to Richard Graves, to Richard Jago and to William Somerville, while to Lady Luxborough, half-sister of Lord Bolingbroke, he confided his emotional state, exchanged gardeners and books, discussed literary plans.

There is perhaps an air of ineffectuality hovering around Shenstone. He was most probably a trifle too modest, too gentlemanly, too elegant for the life he chose for himself. One of his recent biographers describes him as "Nature's wall-flower" ⁵ and the phrase, to a great extent, fits him neatly. "The hospitable, the generous, the immortal Shenstone," ⁶ fighting shy of pulsating, varied metropolitan life, pining at the unequal gifts of fortune, chafing at 'the middlin' sort of people' surrounding him, is perhaps a strange compound of sentiment and reason and has, all through his life, tossed almost helplessly in their alternate waves.

This story of divided loyalties can perhaps be traced in his literary life. In some respects he is a typical figure of his period. In his desire for perfection of form in prose and verse he was of the School

¹ Swift's letter to Bolingbroke, March 21, 1729. Shenstone uses this phrase in his letter to Jago. See *Letters*, ed. cited, p. 34.

² *ib.* p. 28.

³ *ib.* p. 67.

⁴ *ib.* p. 29. Is there a suggestion of Mrs. Arnold in the character of the Schoolmistress, who, like her, was also kind to a 'brood of chickens'?

⁵ A. R. Humphreys, *William Shenstone. An Eighteenth Century Portrait*, Cambridge, 1937, p. 13.

⁶ See Joseph Hesly's *Letters on the Beauties of The Leasowes* (1777).

of Pope. His early success¹ was in the heroic couplet; while the conventional jargon of the time--'swain and grove' and the rest--pervades his *Song of the Valentine's Day*. Above all in his sentimentalism he belonged to the company of Goldsmith, Philips and others. Saintsbury tells us that he was the example *par excellence* of the sentimentalism of the eighteenth century—it is in him and not in Sterne that this strain finds its most genuine and unadulterated expression.²

On the other hand Shenstone showed certain unmistakable romantic tendencies. "He is a forerunner of a later generation in his experiments with metres, in the romantic tone of his poems particularly in his Elegies and in his letters, and he sounds the note of revolt as a landscape gardener. His criticism, in his letters and in his Essays, is far ahead of that of the Augustans. He was imbued with antiquarian spirit, showed an interest in Gothicism, was a keen collector of medals and reliques, and supported the project for *The Reliques*³ and wrote some ballads."⁴ This peculiar 'double-facedness' of Shenstone noticeable in his *Schoolmistress*. The first version of the poem published in 1737, is the Shadow of another Shadow—it is frankly a burlesque—that too, in the vein of Pope's juvenile *Atley*. In sentiment, in language, in diction, Shenstone here echoes the conventional attitude of his age towards Spenser. How could it have been otherwise, it is difficult to see, for Shenstone's introduction to the 'modest bard of learn'd Eliza's reign'⁵ occurred via Pope. Writing to his friend in June, 1742, he makes this point abundantly clear—"I am glad you are reading Spenser:⁶ though his plan is detes-

¹ *The Judgment of Hercules*.

² A *Short History of English Literature* by George Saintsbury (1900), p. 573. Saintsbury does not develop his point and the common reader is startled by this statement. It seems to the present writer that Saintsbury is making a comparison between two writers whose sentimentalism are rather different. Shenstone's sentimentalism is gentler than Sterne's and that is why perhaps no comparison can be instituted.

³ He takes such an active interest in Percy's ancient folio manuscript that it is tempting to suggest that if he had lived for another year, his name would have been associated in some way with *The Reliques*.

⁴ Marjorie Williams—*Shenstone and His Friends* (English Association Pamphlet No. 84, London, 1933) p. 9.

⁵ *The Schoolmistress* (1748), St. 19.

⁶ The following comment of Shenstone with regard to Spenser is of profound interest:—"The plan of Spenser's Fairy-Queen appears to me very imperfect. His imagination, though very extensive, yet somewhat less so, perhaps, than is generally allowed; if one considers the facility of realizing and equipping forth the virtues and vices. His metre has some advantages, though in many respects exceptionable. His good-nature is visible through every part of his poem. His conjunction of the Pagan and Christian scheme (as he introduces the deities of both acting simultaneously) wholly inexcusable. Much art and judgment are discovered in parts, and but little in the whole. One may entertain some doubt whether the perusal of his monstrous descriptions be not as prejudicial to true taste, as it is advantageous to the extent of imagination. Spenser to be sure, expands the last; but then he expands it beyond its due limits. After all, there are many favorite passages in his Fairy Queen, which will be instances of a great and cultivated genius mis-

table and his *invention* less wonderful than most people imagine, who do not much consider the obviousness of allegory ; yet, I think, a person of your disposition must take great delight in his *simplicity*, his good-nature, etc. When I bought him first, I read a page or two of the *Fairy Queen*, and cared not to proceed. After that Pope's *Alley* made me consider him ludicrously, And in that light, I think one can read him with pleasure." ¹ In almost every way the remark quoted above is typical of the early Augustans, possessing uncommon common-sense. Spenser's plan has troubled many a critic, his allegory was lost sight of and his invention severely criticised—but though Spenser was found lacking in some respects, yet his poems had for these worthy gentlemen not a little interest. They liked some of his descriptions and relished his 'simplicity.' This 'simplicity' which they discovered in the works of Spenser was a concurrent motive for the use of everyday material. Pope used the Spenserian stanza to describe a filthy and coarse subject. Shenstone borrowed his cue from Pope. Like Pope he chose to describe a "low" scene in elevated language. But by happy accident, for which his sensibility was perhaps responsible, his scene was "low" in quite a different way. His desire to picture the humble village school he went to in his childhood made the poem somewhat like an essay in recollection and ensured a tone of indulgent and affectionate amusement, side by side with the ludicrous. Only in one stanza ² he reminded one of the coarseness and vulgarity of Pope's imitation—and his *Schoolmistress* belonged to that third kind of burlesque (the classification in his) which consists in "thoughts ridiculously dressed in language (and stanza) much above their dignity." ³

In style Shenstone is apt to give one the impression that he has imitated both Spenser and Pope. His sentences are more distorted by inversions and oddities than Pope's are :—

"And in be seemly order sitten there ;
All but the Wight of Bum y-galled. he
Abhors both Bench and Stool, and Fourm and Chair,
(This Hand in Mouth y-fix'd, that rends his Hair)." ⁴

applied. (*The Works, in Verse and Prose, of William Shenstone*). In Two Volumes—Third edn. (MDCCLXVIII Vol. II, p. 165) In the same volume on p. 12 he singles out the simplicity of Spenser.

¹ *Letters*, ed. cited, p. 55.

² Stanza 9 (1787).

³ See, *Works in Prose and Verse*, op. cit., p. 182.

⁴ Stanza 7 (1787). Op. *The Alley*

"Hard by a sty, beneath a roof of thatch,
Dwelt Obloquy who in her early days
Baskets of fish at Billingsgate did watch," etc. (St. 4).

Shenstone used far more archaic words and scattered archaic spelling profusely. He also used the y-prefix freely, even with present participles and adjectives (as in *y-gazing*, and *y rare*). But like Pope, he ignored Spenser's alliteration. On the whole, however, the stateliness of the stanza contrasted with the quaint simplicity of the subject, and the whimsical gravity of the style produced just that sense of bizarre, which is present in all the best parody. With the obvious burlesque tone, there hangs about this 1737 version of *The Schoolmistress* a suspicion of sweet drollery. Perhaps "Learning's little Tenement" and its "dame" were too near Shenstone's heart to be used in a wholly vulgar burlesque.¹

The second version of *The Schoolmistress*² was published in 1742. In the meanwhile, Shenstone had been able to read more Spenser than he did before—"Some time ago, I read Spenser's *Fairy Queen*; and when I had finished, thought it a proper time to make some additions and corrections in my trifling imitation of him. . . . His subject is certainly bad, and his action inexpressibly confused; but there are some particulars in him that charm one. Those which afford the greatest scope for a ludicrous imitation are his simplicity and obsolete phrases, and yet these are what give one a very singular pleasure in the perusal. The burlesque which they occasion is of quite a different kind to that of Philip's *Shilling*, Cotton's *Travestie*, Hudibras, or Swift's *Works*, but I need not tell you this. I inclose a copy, for your amusement and opinion." ³

Writing again just before the publication of the second version, Shenstone says:—"I have added eight or ten stanzas within this fortnight" and goes on to discuss the nature of burlesque:—"I have been at some pains to secure myself from A. Philips's misfortune, of mere *childishness*, 'little charm of placid mien, etc.' I have added a ludicrous index, purely to shew (fools) that I am in jest: and my motto, 'O qua sol habitabiles illustrat oras, maxime principum,' is calculated for the same purpose. You cannot conceive how large the number is of those that mistake burlesque for the very foolishness it exposes (which observation I made once at the *Rehearsal*, at *Tom Thumb*, at *Chrotonhotonthologos* all which are pieces of elegant

¹ The following reference to the school-mistress of his boyhood 'is full of a peculiar tenderness: "I expect a cargo of franks; and then for the beautiful picture of Lady Gainsborough, and the deformed portrait of my old school-dame Sarah Lloyd whose house is to be seen as thou travellest towards the native home of thy faithful servant. But she sleeps with her fathers; and is buried with her fathers..." *Letters*, ed. cited, p. 46.

² The second version tells that the poem was written at College—and never says that it had been published previously. "Written at College"—is suggestive, it is another device by which Shenstone sought to intensify the ludicrousness of his poem. This phrase was dropped in the later versions.

³ *Letters*, ed. cited, pp. 36-37.

Humour) I have some mind to pursue this caution further ; and advertise it, 'The Schoolmistress, etc.' A very *childish* performance every body knows (*novorum more*). But if a person seriously calls this, or rather, burlesque, a childish or low species of poetry, he says wrong. For the most regular and formal poetry may be called trifling, folly and weakness, in comparison of what is written with a more manly spirit in ridicule of it." ¹ A little earlier, writing to his friend in defence of his revisions, he said "The true burlesque of Spenser (whose characteristic is simplicity) seems to consist in a *simple* representation of such things as one laughs to see or observe one's self, rather than any monstrous contrast betwixt the thoughts and words. I cannot help thinking that my added stanzas have more of his manner than you saw before." ² As is evident from the above, Shenstone set some store by his revisions, as they have "more of Spenser's manner"—as a result of these revisions, the second version ³ of *The Schoolmistress* is a more carefully-planned mock-heroic poem than the original. But in get-up, the six-penny pamphlet, the form in which *The Schoolmistress* was published in 1742, the burlesque was however more clearly brought out than before. The 'splendid red letter,' ludicrous 'index,' the Latin mottoes appearing on the half title and the title, the classical excerpts in the shape of footnotes—all contributed to intensifying the impression of laughter.⁴ And perhaps it might be suggested that the bungling of the engraver Mynde, who represented the 'setting sun like a falling monster' ⁵ between the thatched house and the birch tree unknowingly seeks to confirm this impression.

The Advertisement is important too. In it Shenstone gives the suspicion that he is presenting his poem cap in hand, so to speak, with every imaginable apology. It reads as follows: "What Particulars in Spenser were imagin'd most proper for the Author's Imitation on this Occasion are his Language, his Simplicity, his manner of Description, and a peculiar Tenderness of Sentiment, visible throughout his Works." The last phrase "a peculiar Tenderness of Sentiment" is highly significant. To Shenstone, Spenser's simplicity or naiveté which was as charming as it was laughable, is now allied to another trait which delighted him. And perhaps this aspect of Spenser's genius led him to expand the descriptions and episodes and

¹ *Letters*, ed. cited, p. 48.

² *Ibid.*, p. 40.

³ This was advertised in the *London Magazine* and *Gentleman's Magazine* of May 1742.

⁴ Perhaps the sub-title—Written at College, 1736—which is absent in other versions tends to confirm this.

⁵ *Curiosities of Literature*, A New Edition by Isaac Disraeli (London, 1854, p. 356).

to invest the new version with a pronounced vein of sentiment. The old schoolmistress is described with real affection. The boy who is birched is given a little sister who melts in pity at his plight. There are sympathetic references to "Learning's Imps . . . who cheerless o'er her darkling Region stray." The hen also makes her appearance and the swelling beauty of the Alexandrine is made to suggest her plump and fleshy body. And the revision of the Alexandrine line of stanza 26 is a key to the poet's altered mood. In the first version after describing the "Cath'rine Pear" in the buckster's stall, Shenstone exclaims :

" O ! may no wight e'er pennyless come there,
Lest led by thee astray, he shameful theft prepare."

In the second the last line was changed to read "Lest smit with ardent Love he pine with hopeless care!"

With regard to style the second version shows distinct improvement. In the first version antiquated forms of words were all too plentiful but in the second, they were filed off in many places. He laboured to improve lines that were at first rough with inversions and archaisms. Perhaps all these changes and modifications tended to push back the humour of the poem and Shenstone, nervously fearing that readers might overlook it and accuse him of the lack of "Simplicity" which he had set out to burlesque, added the 'ludicrous index' and the other paraphernalia of the get-up of the second version to convince the public that, after all, he was joking!

Shenstone's imaginative flights to Spenser's fairy land continued unabated, even after the publication of the second version. In June, 1742 he writes to Graves "I am now from trifling and laughing at him *i.e.* Spenser) really in love with him. I think even the metre pretty (though I shall never use it in earnest); and that the last Alexandrine has an extreme majesty. Does not this line strike you :

' Brave thoughts and noble deeds did *evermore* inspire.'¹ Again on a later date—"I have read Spenser once again : and I have added full as much more to my *School-mistress*, in regard to *number of lines*; something in point of matter (or *manner* rather) which does not displease me."² A year later, replying to his friend's criticism of the additional stanzas, he says "I thank you for your perusal of that trivial poem. If I were going to print it, I should give way to your remarks implicitly and would not dare to do otherwise. But as

¹ *Letters*, ed. cited, p. 55.

² *Ib.* p. 97.

long as I keep it in manuscript, you will pardon my silly prejudices, if I chuse to read and shew it with the addition of most of my new stanzas. I own, I have a fondness for several, imagining them to be *more* in Spenser's way, yet more independent on the antique phrase, than any part of the poem: and, on that account, I cannot yet prevail on myself to banish *them* entirely; but were I to print, I should (with some reluctance) give way to your sentiments (which I know are just), namely that they render the work too diffuse and flimzy and seem rather excrescences than essential parts of it.'¹ Writing to Lady Luxborough, he again harps on the same theme:—"My *Schoolmistress*, I suppose is much more in Spenser's way than any one wou'd chuse to write in that writes quite gravely; in which Case the Dialect and Stanza of Spenser is hardly preferable to modern Heroic. I look upon my Poem as somewhat more grave than Pope's *Alley* and good deal less than Mr Thomson's *Castle* etc. At least I meant it so, or rather I meant to screen the ridicule which might fall on so low a subject (tho' perhaps a picturesque one) by *pretending to simp'r* all the time I was writing."²

Shenstone took not a little time to agree to give effect to the criticism of Graves with regard to the additional stanzas of *The Schoolmistress*. Writing in June, 1748, he says, with a touch of regret: "I thank you for your little strictures on *The Schoolmistress*. I have sacrificed my Partiality to your unbiased judgment; *multa gemens*, have I sacrificed it. The truth is, I am not quite convinced (tho' I have acted as if I were) that one should give up any Part, that appears droll in itself, and makes the Poem, on the whole, more agreeable, for the sake of rendering it a more perfect imitation of Spenser."³

Early in 1748 Shenstone was called upon to make this sacrifice. Dodsley's *Collection of Poems by Several Hands*, issued in January of that year, reproduced, without any sanction from Shenstone in its 1742 version, *The Schoolmistress*. The *Collection* was immensely popular and the ardent lovers of poetry of that bygone age showed their appreciation of the miscellany by buying up almost every copy. A new edition was required and Shenstone, suppressing his annoyance,⁴ set about to make the alterations. The second edition

¹ *Letters*, ed. cited p. 105.

² *Ib.*, p. 145.

³ *Letters*, ed. cited, p. 150.

⁴ That Shenstone was annoyed at this is evident from his letters:—"As to Dodsley's *Collection*, I found it is approved on all Hands tho' I should have been much better pleased with him, if he had given me previous notice, e'er he published my *Schoolmistress*; that I might have spruc'd her up a little before she appeared in so much company." (*Ib.*, p. 130).

of Dodsley's *Collection* contains therefore, the third version of *The Schoolmistress*.

In its third version, *The Schoolmistress* contains 35 stanzas, while in the second it had 28. Two stanzas of the earlier version (1742) were suppressed—hence the total number of new stanzas in the third version comes to nine. Two of these new stanzas describe the devout nature of the Schoolmistress, three contain the description of her flower garden, one elaborates the birching scene, another projects into the future of the pupils, two describe the frolicsome children.

The three different versions of the poem have been the theme of a literary battle royal. On the one hand, we have the opinion of C. De Haas who says that in the dozen years that elapsed between the first publication of *The Schoolmistress* and its final stage, Shenstone's attitude to Spenser had entirely changed. From considering him ludicrously only, he comes to loving him and imitating his simplicity and peculiar tenderness of sentiment.¹ Closely allied with his opinion is that of Morton who thinks that Shenstone's case furnishes an instance of half-conscious struggle between an actual taste for what we now call Romantic things and the deference due to such autocratic oracles of authority as Pope.² On the other hand we have the thoughtful comment of R.P. Bond who suggests that Shenstone's attitude towards burlesquing Spenser has been distorted and holds the view that over a period of more than ten years Shenstone was polishing a poem that remained to the end a burlesque.³

The question that any students of Spenserian imitations will have to answer is whether the third version of *The Schoolmistress* is as much a burlesque poem as the original. The answer will be a definite no. In 1737 the poem was simply a burlesque but in the subsequent versions other accretions settled upon it, dulling to a great extent its burlesque lustre. In the first version the poem contained only twelve stanzas, of which one was frankly vulgar. In 1742 this stanza was suppressed and stanzas (1-8 and 10-12) of the original version were used with little alterations here and there as stanzas 2, 5, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20 and stanzas 25, 26, 27 of the version of

Again, "I am afraid, by your account, that Dodsley had published my name to '*The Schoolmistress*,' I was a good deal displeased at his publishing that poem without my knowledge." (*Ib.*, p. 133).

¹ *Nature and Country in English Poetry of the First Half of the Eighteenth Century* by C. De Haas (Amsterdam, 1928), p. 198.

² Morton, *op.cit.*, p. 379.

³ R.P. Bond, *op.cit.*, p. 181.

1742.¹ In 1748 version we find the stanzas 1-10 of 1742 version retained, of course with alterations, stanzas 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 are additions, stanza 16 is stanza 11 of the earlier (1742) version, stanzas 17, 18, 19 are almost the same as stanzas 12 and 13 of the version of 1742; stanza 19 is an addition; stanzas 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 are substantially the stanzas 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 of 1742. Stanzas 22 and 24 (one dealing with the death of the Schoolmistress and the other with that of an "embryo-fox hunter") of 1742 are left out in 1748. Stanza 23 (1742) is expanded into stanza 28 (1748). Stanza 25 (1742) is modified with stanza 32 (1748) while stanzas 26, 27, 28 are stanzas 33, 34 and 35 (1748).

The *Schoolmistress* was repeatedly altered by Shenstone and it is interesting to study the evolution of the poem. As time went on, Shenstone discarded many of the archaic words and most of the antique spelling. The development of one quatrain will illustrate the modification of the burlesque tone, the heightening of the pictorial quality and the increasing ease in the movement of the verse. In the earliest version the poem begins :

"In Evrich Mart that stands on British Ground,
In Evrich Village less y-known to Fame,
Dwells there in cot uncouth, a far-renown'd,
A matron old, whom we Schoolmistress name;"

In the 1742 version these were changed as follows:—

"In ev'ry Mart that stands on Britain's Isle,
In ev'ry Village less revealed to Fame,
Dwells there, in cottage known about a Mile,
A Matron old, whom we School-Mistress name,"

The third version reads:—

"In every village mark'd with little spue,
Embower'd in trees, and hardly known to fame,
There dwells in lowly shed and mean attire,
A matron old, whom we school-mistress name." ²

This modification of the burlesque effect is also evident in the third version by Shenstone's cancelling the ludicrous index (it should be noted that he set great store by it), suppressing both the mottoes as

¹ William Shenstone : *The Schoolmistress* 1742 (Oxford Facsimile edn, p. VII) (1924).

² With this exception, that the Virgilian *audite voces* etc : Originally a note to St. 5 (1742), now became the motto of the whole poem. William Shenstone. *The Schoolmistress, a Poem*, 1742 (Facsimile edn. Oxford, 1924, p. VIII).

also the Latin quotations, formerly appended to the text. Miss Prettyman¹ has adduced another evidence in support of the contention that the third version reveals Shenstone's increasing tact in the handling of burlesque. A comparison of stanza 21 of the third version

"No longer can she now her shrieks command,
And hardly she forbears, through awful fear,
To rushen forth, and with presumptions hand,
To stay harsh justice in its mid career.
On these she calls, on thee, her parent dear!
(Ah! too remote to ward the Shameful blow!)
She sees no kind domestic visage near,
And soon a flood of tears begins to flow,
And gives a loose at last to unavailing we

and its original (stanza 14 of 1712):—

"Oh ruthless Scene! when from a Nook obscure
His little Sister does his Perils see:
All playful as she sate, she grows demure,
She finds, with his, her wonted Spirits flee;
She meditates a Prayer to set him free:
Nor gentle Pardon cou'd the Dame deny
(If gentle Pardon cou'd with Dames agree)
To her sad Grief, which swells in either Eye,
And wings her so, that all for Pity she cou'd die."

shows that in the 1712 version the behaviour of the sister is gauche, while in the third version, she is natural and lifelike. Again in describing the children kept in from play, the version of 1742 reads "They grieven sore in Durance vile y-pent," while the later version has "in piteous durance pent." It is this delicate balance between mock-heroic convention and a "simple representation of such things as one laughs to see" which gives the final version a peculiar charm; and Shenstone's unobtrusive but telling revision of words and phrases towards this end may be seen throughout the poem.²

As has been suggested before the new stanzas which Shenstone incorporated with the third version of *The Schoolmistress* are of profound interest. They tell us much about the mental make up of the poet and significantly point the way which he might have fol-

¹ *Shenstone's Reading of Spenser* by Virginia F. Prettyman. In *The Age of Johnson. Essays Presented to Chauncy Brewster Tinker*. Yale University Press, 1949, pp. 227-37.

² *Shenstone's Reading of Spenser*, op. cit., p. 233. It is perhaps worth while to draw attention to Shenstone's phrase for the third version of *The Schoolmistress*—he called it "improved version."

lowed. It is with deep regret that one has to record Graves's interference in the scheme of the poem. Perhaps Shenstone would have done well to ignore the suggestions of a friend whose knowledge of Spenser was perhaps not complete—but as there can be no access to the stanzas which he thought fit to discard, we must search the ones that he chose to add for any clue to his attitude to Spenser. One thing about these is that they have a quality quite distinctive, they are predominantly pictorial and that they fit into the original pattern of the poem. "Two of these stanzas which describe the devout nature of the Schoolmistress, show Shenstone to be so perfectly in control of the idiom and tone of his poem that he could fuse thereby elements as disparate as his visual memories of old Sarah Lloyd and his current uneasiness about the political situation." ¹ Stanza 14, shows the dame in her garden, singing Sternhold's version of Psalm CXXVII. Stanza 15 gives further evidence of her staunchly Protestant faith:—

"For she was just, and friend to virtuous lore,
And pass'd much time in truly virtuous deed ;
And, in those elfins' ears, would oft deplore,
The times when Truth by Popish rage did bleed,
And tortious death was true Devotion's meed ;
And Simple Faith in iron chains did mourn,
That nould on wooden image place her creed ; "

The old dame's attitude, outlined here, is perhaps a reflection of the poet's. But surely more interesting than these are three stanzas about the dame's herb garden. It seems probable that Shenstone's catalogue of herbs was suggested by a similar passage in Spenser's *Muipotmos: or The Fate of the Butterflie* : "

"The wholesome Saulge, and Lavender still gray,
Ranke smelling Rue, and Cummin good for eyes,
The Roses rainging in the pride of May,
Sharpe Isope, good for greene wounds remedies,
Faire marigoldes, and Bees alluring Thime,
Sweet Marjoram and Daysies decking prime.
Coole Violets and Orpine growing still,
Embathed Balme, and chearfull Galingale,

Prettyman, op. cit., p. 238.

Stanzas 24, 25. This and the other traces of similarity with *Muipotmos* have been noticed by Miss Prettyman.

Fresh Costmarie and breathfull Camomill,
 Dull Poppie, and drink-quickning Setuale,
 Veyne-healing Verven, and hed-purging Dill,
 Sound Savorie, and Bazill hartie-hale,
 Fat Colworts, and comforting Perseline,
 Colde Lettuce, and refreshing Rosmarine."

Shenstone's list is :—

"The tufted basil, pun-provoking thyme,
 Fresh baum, and marygold of chearful hue,
 The lowly gill, that never dares to climb,
 * * * * *

And pungent radish, biting infant's tongue ;
 And plantain ribb'd, that heals the reaper's wound ;
 And marjoram sweet, in shepherd's posies found ;
 And lavender, whose pikes of azure bloom,
 * * * * *

And here trim rosematine, that whilom crown'd
 The daintiest ground of the proudest peer ;
 Ere, driven from its envied site, it found
 A sacred shelter for its branches here : "

The similarity between the passages is deeper than the mere listing of herbs, however. The description of useful properties, the choice of epithet and even the movement of the verse in Shenstone's poem reflect a Spenserian quality.

Stanza 19 of *The Schoolmistress* has another echo of *Muopotmos*. In beginning a description of the urchin about to be caned Shenstone writes :

"Ah ! luckless he, and born beneath the beam
 Of evil star ! it iiks me whilst I write !
 As erst the bard by Mulla's silver stream,
 Oft as he told of deadly dolorous plight,"

The reference to Spenser is highly suggestive and perhaps prepares the reader for the echo from *Muopotmos* where Spenser begins "I sing of deadly dolorous debate." Another interesting point of resemblance between these two poems is to be found in stanza 21 where the poet exclaims—

"But, ah ! what pen his piteous plight may trace?
 Or what device his loud laments explain?
 The form uncouth of his disguised face?
 The pallid hue that dyes his looks amain? "

The poet's grief for the unfortunate boy is amusingly like that of Spenser for ill-fated Clarion :—

“Who now shall give unto my heavie eyes
A well of tears, that all may overflow?
Or where shall I finde lamentable cryes,
And mournfull tunes enough my grieffe to show?”

And yet another echo may be found in stanza 19. The latter part of it might be a comic reversal of the arming of young Clarion whose retainers spread over his back the “hairie hide of some wilde beast” whom he had slain. There is another trace of evidence in the first stanza of *The Schoolmistress*. The 1742 version has “Lend me thy Trumpet, Goddess,” and the third version reads, like an echo from *Muiopotmos*: “Lend me thy *clarion*, goddess!”

It is, of course, extremely difficult to maintain that Shenstone read *Muiopotmos* as there is no evidence to prove it but it seems fairly reasonable to hold the view that Shenstone read Spenser (in 1749 in a letter to Lady Luxborough he says that he has been looking over Spenser for finding a stanza or two of old English verse which would serve as a motto to his Gothick building) ¹ off and on and that probably he was not unacquainted with Spenser's shorter poems. That he read Spenser profitably is abundantly borne out by *The Schoolmistress* which is, if it is nothing else, a glowing array of pictures. The portrait of the kindly schoolmistress, caring alike for children as for chickens, is an unforgettable one. It displays a wealth of understanding and feeling and is framed with tender, sincere, sentiment :—

“ Her cap, far whiter than the driven snow,
Emblem right meet of decency does yield;
Her apron, dyed in grain, as blue, I trow,
As in the harebell that adorns the field;”

or,

“ A russet stole was o'er her shoulders thrown,
A russet kirtle fenced the nipping air;
'Twas simple russet, but it was her own;
'Twas her own country bred the flock so fair;
'Twas her own labour did the fleece prepare;”

When most of his contemporaries were turning out verses depicting society life, or artificial, stilted pastorals, this gardener-cum-litterateur in a mood of genial sportiveness embalmed for all time to come a portrait of an ordinary person, and with it is associated inseparably

Letters, ed. cited, p. 213.

the backwood.¹ *The Schoolmistress* has weathered the literary storm of more than two centuries. Possibly it has vitality enough to stand the test of the future. Gray in a letter to Walpole called the poem "excellent in its kind and masterly." Walpole who sneered at Shenstone by calling him a "water-gruel bard", admitted to Mason that Shenstone never wrote anything good but his *Schoolmistress*. Goldsmith, who had no love lost for Spenserian imitations remarked "This poem is one of those happinesses in which a poet exceeds himself as there is nothing in all Shenstone which in any way approaches it in merit, and though I dislike the imitation of our old English Poets in general, yet, on this minute subject, the antiquity, of the style produces a very ludicrous solemnity." Johnson thought it pleasing. Hazlitt praised it by calling it a "perfect piece of writing."

In history of English literature, *The Schoolmistress* has a double significance. Its importance as a weather vane with regard to the changing wind of taste of Shenstone for Spenser has been discussed. Another significance of the poem lies in the fact that it paved the way for *The Deserted Village*, and Burns.² It contains a vivid description of one corner of English rural life and carries the stream of literature from the town to the country amongst the humble folk. It is a precursor of Goldsmith's poem and also of George Morland's genre paintings. Before Shenstone in his century Ramsay's *Gentle Shepherd* took the Muse to the little common things and events of lowly life; but he unconsciously gave this new development a fillip with his example. It is instructive to note in this connexion that two of Shenstone's stanzas were probably remembered by two later poets. Goldsmith's village schoolmaster

"Of whom still the wonder grew
That one small head could carry all he knew,"³

¹ Iolo A. Williams in *Seven XVIII Century Bibliographies* (1924) praises *The Schoolmistress* for containing a vivid description of one corner of rural English life (p. 48).

² "The influence of *The Schoolmistress* is seen and felt plainly in *The Cotter's Saturday Night* which has the same form, the like rubrics of homely detail, and the same warmly sympathetic feeling that springs from having been a part of the life portrayed. The tone is not playful; the spirit is earnest; yet, on the whole, Burns has here done for lowly rural home life what Shenstone did earlier for lowly rural school life.

Alice L. Hazeltine: *A Study of William Shenstone and his Critics* (Menasha, 1918) p. 45.

³ In *The Deserted Village* Goldsmith praised *The Schoolmistress* - "It is one of those happinesses in which a poet excels himself as there is nothing in all Shenstone which in any way approaches it in merit and though I dislike the imitations of our old English poets in general, yet, on this minute subject the antiquity of the style produces a very ludicrous solemnity." (*Works*, ed. Gibbs, V. 155) cp. "And as they looked, they found their horror grew." *The Schoolmistress*. And still they gazed, and still the wonder grew" *The Deserted Village*. "The noises intermix'd, which then resound, Do learnings little tenement betray". *The Schoolmistress*. "There in his noisy mansion, skilled to rule". *The Deserted Village*.

reminds one almost irresistibly of Shenstone's ancient dame and her pupils who,

"Think no doubt she been the greatest wight on the ground."

Again in stanza 28, Shenstone's lines :—

"A little bench of heedless bishops here
And there a Chancellor in embryo,
Or bard sublime, if bard may e'er be so,
As Milton, Shakespeare, names that ne'er shall die!"

might have given Gray a hint for his well-known passage in his immortal *Elegy*.

In fine, 'the graceful, misty-eyed tenderness' of *The Schoolmistress* (1748) lent a beautiful touch to Shenstone's puttering, spinsterish soul and managed to veer the poem away from the stilted, periphrastic manner of his own day, a style which he himself used occasionally and led him to adopt a sentiment, and tender simplicity which, if we discount the archaisms and some of the exaggerated simpering, suggests Wordsworth of the *Lyrical Ballads* and *Michael*!

Another abiding interest of *The Schoolmistress* lies in the tenderness and gracefulness with which Shenstone describes childhood. The picture of the delinquent boy, sulking after his birching is one of the best pieces of child poetry that the Eighteenth century produced—

"See to their seats they hie with merry glee,
And in beseemly order sitten there;
All but the wight of bumay-galled, he
Abhorreth bench and stool, and fourm and chair,
(This hand in mouth y-fix'd, that rends his hair;)
And eke with snubs profound, and heaving breast,
Convulsions intermitting! does declare
His grievous wrong, his dame's unjust behest,
And scorns her offer'd love, and shuns to be caress'd."

Shenstone did not perhaps touch anything of permanent importance but he gave to small personal objects more than their due place in his mind. He valued them too highly for their own sakes, or made them bear too melancholy a weight of private connotation. 'Many things that he did touch he left perfect.' "

¹ *Essays in Criticism and Research*. G. Tillotson (Cambridge, 1942, p. 109).

THE MESSAGE OF THE ISHOPANISHAD IN MODERN LIFE

DR. MATILAL DAS, M.A., B.L., PH.D.

To-day India stands at the cross-roads. Free India must know her true self. She must look upon her ancient faith with fresh eyes and readjust her culture in the light of the complex problems of modern life. India's civilisation was never static. It has been a dynamic growth and it has shaped itself anew with the changed circumstances in each new century. We must go to the treasure house of our culture for inspiration and guidance and on their basic principles, we must build anew our life and philosophy to suit the requirements of a new age.

The Isha Upanishad otherwise known as the Bajasaniya-Sanhita Upanishad is a Vedic Upanishad which forms part and parcel of the white Yajurveda. Jajnavalkya, the great Seer is the author of the whole Yajurveda and Isha Upanishad thus contains the philosophy of that great thinker in a concise but forceful manner. It consists of merely 18 couplets and within that brief compass it unfolds the mystery of the mystic life, the guiding impulse of the creative life and by reconciling the diverse extremes paves the way for a rich spiritual life.

Unless this book can lead us onward in life, it is no use in glorifying it. It may be held in great esteem and reverence by the people, but that is no reason by itself for its appeal, unless it can give us an insight into reality and alter our life and experience with a new colour.

The first and foremost message of this Vedic Upanishad is one of joy in life and its activities. One should wish to live 100 years verily by doing works. The Vedic seers were not apostles of negativism and asceticism. They felt the exceeding joy that life needs and wanted to enjoy the same to its fullest contents. Vasistha, in a hymn to Indra, asked for that Yoga which would enable the Rishi to milch the cow Earth of its limitless treasure. The Isha Upanishad carries forward the Vedic philosophy of life and preaches the cult of sweetness and light.

The joy that is in the Sun light, the thrill that moves the leaf, the splendour of the clouds, the sweet smell of the mother earth, all these and other varied things of life should bring limitless wealth of delight to the Seeker of truth. This world is no illusion. Here on this earth, in the mud and dust of daily life, we are to find out the honey that flows from the wind, the sweetness that moves the streams, the light that fires, the Sun and the Moon, the splendour that is in love and friendship.

Free India needs to-day this gospel of joy and work. India cannot advance by talking mere platitudes. We must do hard work. Honest and unflagging in every walk of life, conscientious devotion in every department is now necessary to the progress of India. The song of despair, the burden of worry, that came to India during her bondage must now give place to the gala feast of delight and activity.

Religion in India has ever been a thing of the heart and not of the head. The Seekers need not bother themselves with metaphysical subtleties but with spiritual good. They want inner illumination and not intellectual victories. This, one can do by work—consecrated and dedicated work.

This is the second message of the book. Have a life of consecration, dedicate yourself to the cause of God. The vision and consciousness of God should make our life sweet and sacred and we should have enjoyment of this world of delight with realisation of the unity of the Lord and freed from all cravings after the things of the world.

The seer of the Isha Upanishad insists on renunciation, but it is no ascetic escapism, it is no world—negating process. What it requires is participation in the free delight that is in this universe but with an understanding of our oneness with God. When we have this attitude of life, we have no desire and no grief. Realising our unity with all beings, we share the joys of the creation in his universal self-expression.

This leads us to have that ever undenyng love which embraces the whole world in its fold and takes away all conflicts in our social relations. The modern world is no longer the isolated world of the past. The barriers that stood between man and man in different lands and climates are giving way to our technical triumphs and the great and vast world must stand or fall on cooperation and co-ordinate efforts. The brotherhood of true nations can be built only on a sound philosophy of love and harmony.

The Isha Upanishad promotes natural understanding and harmony between man and man by inculcating the noble idea that we must see our own self in all existences. This outlook on life colours not only our ethical life but also enlivens our cosmopolitanism and if developed properly, it would enable us to form that world common-wealth in which each nation will find freedom and security, in which each branch of mankind will be able to achieve its highest ends in the larger life of mankind.

These verses on universal unity and love also promote righteous living. Hinduism enjoins strict code of practice. Our beliefs may vary, our thoughts may be different, but we must all lead the life of the spirit. This we can do by accepting the law of right, by following the path of truth and realising the light of spirit in our daily life. Here comes the question of reconciliation between uncompromising extremes.

Desires are the basic forces of life and stimulate men to diverse activities. The Seer of the Isha Upanishad asks men to be true to the kindred points of heaven and home and link up the realm of desire with the prospective of the eternal. The very first verse lays down the idea of one spirit inhabiting the world of movement and on this fundamental unity prescribes the divine life in one of enjoyment. But renunciation of all desires is the condition precedent to this enjoyment. Our greed moves us to have possession. The lord inhabits each object so we should not regard anything in the universe as a necessary object of possession.

We must feel in our heart of hearts the joy and bliss which the seer of Upanishads rightly termed as "Ananda". We are one in the all beings of the world and we have participation therefore in their enjoyments. If this thought-force guides us, if this feeling moves us, we live free in this world. As already said, this life of joy is no life of inaction. One who has this joy becomes the most active worker and accepts the term of physical life as part of the perfection to which he aspires. In order to have this perfection and delight we must not seek delight in the object of desires but must look behind to the Brahman which expresses itself in that object of desire.

In order to emphasise this view, the poet of the Upanishad devotes a few verses in elucidation of our conception of the One, the Universal and Supreme, the Eternal and the Infinite. We must realise that we are being of his being, force of his force. Perfect freedom, perfect joy and perfect peace come with the vision of all existences in the Self, and of the Self in all existences. In proportion as our vision grows and as we perceive the movement of the universe as the Lila of Sachchidananda, all our repulsions, fears and perversions of feelings disappear and we dive deeper and deeper into the sea of sweetness and light.

For the acceptance of life, we must transcend the limitations of the world. We must spiritualise our life and by that divine life we must have the consciousness and joy of the Sachchidananda here in this life. The bondage is apparent. It is a play. As soon as we realise the secrets of the game, it is over and we partake ourselves of the freedom and bliss that is eternal and universal.

The Isha Upanishad ends with a sublime prayer to Agni, as the embodiment of Paramatma and prays for material and spiritual felicities. The seeker wants to be led to infinite truth, goodness and beauty by self-abrogation and self-surrender.

This surrender to Godhead is the key note of this sublime book. One should accept worldly relationship as manifestations of the eternal and thereby attain peace and harmony. It rightly says:—In darkness are they who worship the world alone, but in far greater darkness are they who worship the infinite alone. He who accepts both saves himself

from death by the knowledge of the Avidya and attains immortality of the knowledge of the Vidya.

For the truly spiritual life there should be thus a reconciliation between the finite and infinite and this we can have by a perfect self-surrender. We must be in tune with the infinite by consecrating our soul to God. Worldly prosperity alone cannot give us the solace we seek. We must have a new birth in the heart of the eternal.

The surest and safest way to the fulfilment of the spirit comes by delegation of ourselves to the Lord. One who wants to rise above the narrowness of our darkness of human nature into the great expanse of truth and light give up this egoistic will and activity and accept spiritual initiation and illumination from above in a mood of complete self-surrender. Then alone by the surrender of the heart and whole nature into the hands of the All-blissful he has the divine peace, transcendent knowledge and the supreme Ananda.

Reviews and Notices of Books

New India's Rivers—By Henry C. Hart, Orient Longmans, pp. 201

Rivers and books on rivers are nothing new to us in India. We have seen so many of either that we in India almost take them for granted. For the last decade or thereabout, India has been literally flooded with technical and popular literature on rivers, particularly river projects. Engineers have presented them from their own points of view whereas administrators have harped on the achievements of projects that are still in the drawing office. Hence, any new publication on rivers is accepted by our readers with some amount of hesitation. Yet one more—they would ask. But Professor Hart's book is a departure from those preceding him. He has not made it a 'travelogue', nor 'a technical book on hydrology', as he hastens to point out in his preface but an assessment of the social import of the developments that are taking place centering on river valleys. A study like this cannot but be subjective and he make no secret of it.

Considering the 'human dimensions' involved in such adventures a have been undertaken in harnessing the rivers, big and small, he asks himself 'can legislators representing citizens for the first time select sound plans, and hold to them staunchly through ten years of minor and major crises', or 'can an engineer build a dam twice as high and twice as fast as he, or any of his men, has seen one built?' And then he leads his enquiries finally to the vital point, 'can men make out the future rising in the midst of the present, can a revolution, in short, be built?'

Professor Hart begins with describing how the Indians from the ancient days have lived in perfect adjustment with the rivers. They have conditioned their mode of living in accordance with the technical know how of the people as evolved from time to time. He cites the Ganga and the Bhagirathi on whose banks the Aryans have been living from the days of the Vedas. Next he goes over to the Cauvery and describes how the stream was harnessed on multipurpose techniques long before the idea was accepted by the engineers in the United States to be a practicable one. Then he traces the different stages in the development of river engineering starting with the British period and then gives us a lucid account of how Indian engineers in league with foreign experts are tackling their jobs with inventive genius. As a sociologist he has not missed the significant elements that are being introduced into the character of the people from the highest to the lowest who are sharing in the task.

Professor Hart in his chapter 15 concludes by amplifying his contention that 'if India's present generation will take stock of the economic

rebirth, which has already occurred, they will have reason to accept the challenge of the future full of confidence.' This is no doubt very much reassuring for those poor nations of the underdeveloped world who have to catch up with the accelerated pace of the industrial giants. To have increased the standard of level in India from the sub human conditions of living would be considered enough achievement in course of two or three decades. But for a sociologist another question remains—Is India avoiding or escaping the inevitable regimentation of life consequent upon the developments that have been undertaken? Can India contribute in a field where such has not come forth so long from the industrial west. Professor Hart is silent about this.

K. BAGCHI

The Isle of Lanka, Ceylon—By J. Vijayatunga, Orient Longmans Ltd.

There is a good number of books written on the history, culture and geography of Ceylon. Ceylon is on the highway of commerce between the east and the west and is easily accessible to travellers and to tourists. But this one is somewhat different from the learned accounts available in print. It is by a Sinhalese himself who values things that are old in Sinhalese culture and who has an attachment for his own country. The author is a journalist of repute and has travelled widely in Europe and America. He has utilised his journalistic talents in presenting an interesting account of his country and his people. The reader may well enjoy the narratives without necessarily agreeing with all the views expressed by the author.

K. BAGCHI

The Way to Ilala, (David Livingstone's Pilgrimage)—By Frank Debenham, Longmans, Green and Co.

This is an account of Livingstone's travels in Africa, nay his exploration in the continent which was still dark for the non-Africans. Livingstone has left profuse notes and sketches and his despatches provide valuable materials which have been drawn upon by the author in producing an account which leaves hardly any scope for improvement in an undertaking of this kind. Livingstone's journeys have not been quite simple, even to pursue on the map. Frank Debenham has had to live the days over again in his imagination and make additional sketches where originals were lacking so that the reader could follow the account without much difficulty. This is only possible for a biographer who undertakes his task with devotion and meticulous care. Frank Debenham is a geographer of the very highest calibre and a reputed cartographer at that. He has made a nice work of it and one may echo with Arther Benson who has provided the foreword, 'my honour to have reviewed this book.'

K. BAGCHI

Malaya, Indonesia, Borneo, and the Philippines (A Geographical Economic and Political description of Malaya the East Indies and the Philippines)—By Charles Robequain (translated from French by E. D. Laborde), Longmans.

The equatorial and the tropical spices of the East Indies group of Islands to which Malay, Indonesia, Borneo and the Philippines belong (Malay is actually a peninsula) attracted the attention of the early European traders. Later colonies were founded in these islands for exploitation of the natural resources. The east Indies have a history of development peculiar to the region. The colonists were quick to realise that the lithological characters, the climatic advantages, the comparative ease in transport facilities and the abundant but cheap labour that were available in these islands would enable them to use this region as the storehouse of agricultural raw materials needed for the industrial west. Holland, for example, had the occupation of Java. The tiny homeland could not command a large area for producing food and variety of products for its own people. In Java, on the other hand, they noticed a highly efficient system of agriculture which is one of the most intensive in the world. They found that the volcanic rock when acted upon by the copious downpour which never fails, provides a very fertile soil, even without recourse to artificial manuring. With their own ingenuity, the Dutch introduced commercial farming for such products as rubber, sugarcane and tapioca, but also allowed the local people to pursue their own systems of cultivation with which to raise rice, sugarcane, tea, etc.

The result has been a mixed system of agriculture in which one supplements the other. This experiment which has proved to be one of the most successful is only one of the various others adopted in these islands. Unlike the case in other colonies, the Dutch also began settling down in the island of Java and making it their own home. The result has been the introduction of sanitary measures which have made the island remarkably free from tropical diseases. Java provides an excellent example of the spirit of co-existence evinced by the local Hindu, and Buddhist communities, the Arab Muslims, the Dutch Christians and the immigrant Chinese, all living in perfect amity.

Charles Robequain has shown remarkable spirit of understanding and sympathy with which he has brought out the facts about Java and the other islands mentioned earlier. A word of praise should also go to E. D. Laborde for retaining the original flavour in his translation.

K. BAGCHI

Ourselves

UNIVERSITY LECTURES

We listened to a number of lectures, delivered by distinguished speakers, in the Darbhanga Hall of the University during the month of August. Miss Mary Seaton, the well-known Film critic, who came to this country at the invitation of the Government of India, delivered a talk on "Film and Film technique". Sri Nirmalkumar Basu, Principal Khudiram Basu Lecturer of the University for 1955, delivered lectures on "The Changing Villages of India". Sri Abdus Subhan Khan, candidate for the Zainul Abedin Gold Medal of the University for 1955, gave a short speech in Persian on "Fydee as a poet".

LILA LECTURES

Srimati Aparna Devi, Lila Lecturer of the University for 1957, delivered a course of three lectures on "Vaishnab Padabali" on the 29th August, 30th August and 2nd September, in the Darbhanga Hall of the University. The first lecture was a short history of Vaishnab Padabali. The second lecture delineated the characteristic beauty of the Vaishnab Padabali and Twelve Tattwas. The third lecture was on the relationship between Vaishnab Padabali and Kirtan. This lecture sought to show how kirtan became so popular in Bengal and how it reached and touched the mass mind. Kirtan undoubtedly was a great liberalising and humanising force in the religious life of the people of Bengal. It made no distinction, so far as religious appeal was concerned, between the high and the low, the rich and the poor, the educated and the uneducated. From this point of view, kirtan represented perhaps the first attempt, in this part of India, to carry an important message to the very door of the common people. The lectures were highly popular and they attracted large audiences everyday.



Notifications

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No C/209/79 (Am)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Netaji Mahavidyalaya, Arambagh has been affiliated to the B.A. Pass standard, in English Bengali Vernacular, History, Economics and Sanskrit with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta.
The 12th August, 1957.

D. (HARBAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/186/186 (Am.)

It is hereby notified for general information that the Bengal Textile Institute, Serampore, Hughli has been affiliated to the B.Sc. (Tech.) standard, in Textile Technology with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subject at the examination mentioned, from 1960 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta
The 25th July, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

The following orders have been passed with regard to the R. A. cases arising out of the Intermediate Examinations, 1956 and Compartmental I.Sc. Examination, September, 1956 :—

I. A. CASES

(1) The Examination for 1956 of the following candidates is cancelled and they are debarred from appearing at any University Examinations in 1957 and 1958 :—

1. Ramesh Chandra Gupta, Cal. 459, Regn. No. 4665 of 1954-55, St. Xavier's College.
2. Nandadulal Pal, Cal. 1825, Regn. No. 3974 of 1953-54, Vidyasagar College.
3. Sankarkumar Chandhuri, Cal. 6764, Regn. No. 26053 of 1954-55, Maharaja M. C. College.

I. A. CASES

(2) The Examination for 1956 of the following candidates is cancelled and they are debarred from appearing at any University Examination in 1957 :—

1. Dipakkumar Gupta, Cal. 23, Regn. No. 7810 of 1952-53, Bangabasi College.
2. Sibaji Sen, Cal. 63, Regn. No. 16751 of 1954-55, Bangabasi College.
3. Bikasranjan Sarkar, Cal. 191, Regn. No. 10429 of 1954-55, Bangabasi College.
4. Md. Abdul Munem, Cal. 317, Regn. No. 11488 of 1953-54, Central Calcutta College.
5. Subodhkumar Chatteraj, Cal. 1331, Regn. No. 7504 of 1954-55, Vidyasagar College.
6. Bishnuprasad Sharma, Cal. 1263, Regn. No. 1667 of 1955-56, Vidyasagar College.

7. Paritoshkumar Das, Cal 1704, Regn. No. 22769 of 1954-55, City College.
8. Satyabrata Datta, Cal, 1731, Regn. No. 24509 of 1954-55, City College.
9. Santoshkumar Ghoshal, Cal 1998, Regn. No. 16181 of 1952-53, Chharuchandra College.
10. Nikhilchandra Ghosh, Cal. 2240, Regn. No. 1185 of 1955-56, Asutosh College.
11. Samirkumar Ray, Cal. 2477, Regn. No. 882 of 1955-56, Asutosh College.
12. Kalicharan Singh, Cal 3591, Regn. No. 27058 of 1954-55, City College.
13. Ranendranath Mukhopadhyay, Cal 3697, Regn. No. 20282 of 1954-55, City College.
14. Md. Qasim, Cal. 4179, Regn. No. 19253 of 1954-55, City College.
15. Mohd. Ismail, Cal. 4182, Regn. No. 19238 of 1954-55, City College.
16. Pradipchandra Bhar, Cal. 5278, Regn. No. 24055 of 1954-55, City College.
17. Radhagopal Basak, Cal. 5873, Regn. No. 22589 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
18. Pradipkumar Barua, Cal. 5875, Regn. No. 22586 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
19. Amalendu Basu, Cal. 5876, Regn. No. 20190 of 1955-56, Surendranath College.
20. Sarojkumar Basu, Cal. 5898, Regn. No. 22632 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
21. Sasankasekhar Basu, Cal. 5899, Regn. No. 22633 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
22. Ardhendukumar Sengupta, Cal 6201, Regn. No. 23230 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
23. Alok Sengupta, Cal. 6202, Regn. No. 23232 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
24. Santiranjana Saha, Cal 6710, Regn. No. 26196 of 1954-55, Maharaja M. C. College.
25. Debendranath Gangopadhyay, Cal. 6722, Regn. No. 26036 of 1954-55, Maharaja M. C. College.
- Amalendu Das, Cal. 6759, Regn. No. 12000 of 1953-54, Maharaja M. C. College.
27. Gaurangprasad Mandal, Cal. 6775, Regn. No. 26131 of 1954-55, Maharaja M. C. College.
28. Arunkumar Pal, Cal. 6777, Regn. No. 26164 of 1954-55, Maharaja M. C. College.
29. Gaugopal Dasgupta, Cal. 6976, Regn. No. 22808 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
30. Susilkumar Das, Cal. 6986, Regn. No. 22801 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
31. Sunilkumar De, Cal 7019, Regn. No. 22836 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
32. Nikhilchandra De, Cal. 7021, Regn. No. 22829 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
33. Anupam Guha, Cal. 7219, Regn. No. 25541 of 1954-55, Bangabasi College.
34. Prantoshkumar Basu, Cal 7588, Regn. No. Bangabasi College.
35. Subalchandra Mandal, Cal. N. 249, Regn. No. 10761 of 1945-46, Non Collegiate Student.
36. Prabhatkumar Mukhopadhyay, Cal. N. 569, Regn. No. 3047 of 1949-50, Non-Collegiate Student.
37. Kalipada Chattopadhyay, Cal N 657, Regn. No. 22037 of 1955-56, Non-Collegiate Student.
38. Rabindranath Pal, Cal. N. 658, Regn. No. 9733 of 1955-56, Non Collegiate Student.
39. Sukhendu Gangopadhyay, Cal. N. 731, Regn. No. 1449 of 1952-53 Non-Collegiate Student.
40. Sankarpad Chattopadhyay, Cal N. 732, Regn. No. 12260 of 1953-54, Non-Collegiate Student.
41. Bidhubhushan Bhattacharya, Agar 10, Regn. No. Agartala Maharaja Bir Bikram College.
42. Mrinalkanti Ghosh, Agar. 104, Regn. No. 22299 of 1955-56, Agartala Maharaja Bir Bikram College.
43. Harihar De, Bank 9, Regn. No. 15509 of 1953-54, Bankura Christian College.
44. Biplob As, Barrack. 13, Regn. No. 14546 of 1954-55, Barrackpore Rastraguru Surendranath College.
45. Md. Akbar Ali Baidya, Basir. 101, Regn. No. 22527 of 1955-56, Basirhat College.
46. Sachidulal Chaudhuri, Basir. 151, Regn. No. 22415 of 1955-56, Basirhat College.
47. Kalyankumar Pal, Basir. 152, Regn. No. 22549 of 1955-56, Basirhat College.
48. A. K. M. Ebadat Hossain, Basir. 170, Regn. No. 4062 of 1955-56, Basirhat College.
49. Tringunananda Mandal, Basir. 171, Regn. No. Basirhat College.
50. Gopeschandra Mandal, Basir. 172, Regn. No. 22484 of 1955-56 Basirhat College.
51. Anilkumar Mandal, Basir. 173, Regn. No. 22478 of 1955-56, Basirhat College.
- Ansar Ali, Basir. 193, Regn. No. 22525 of 1955-56, Basirhat College.
- Sk. Mominul Haque, Basir. N. 12, Regn. No. 15535 of 1955-56, Non-Collegiate Student.
54. Sarojkumar Chakravarti, Bishnu 44, Regn. No. 23552 of 1954-55 Bishnupur Ramnanda College.
55. Brajadulal Das, Bol. N. 13, Regn. No. 8300 of 1953-54, Non Collegiate Student.
56. Baridbaran Ray, Bur. 164, Regn. No. 25064 of 1954-55 Burdwan Raj College.
57. Asiskanti Guptabhaya, Jal. 106, Regn. No. 10347 of 1954-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
58. Jibanchandra Chakrabarti, Jal. 106, Regn. No. 10261 of 1954-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
59. Asitkumar Datta, Jal. 107, Regn. No. 10302 of 1954-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.

60. Samirkumar Deb, Jal. 103, Regn. No. 10317 of 1951-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
61. Syamales Chakrabarti Jal. 117, Regn. No. 10372 of 1951-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
62. Ajitkumar Nandi, Jal. 123, Regn. No. 10338 of 1951-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
63. Anadibhushan Chakrabarti, Jal. 123, Regn. No. 10355 of 1951-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
64. Nirendraprasad Basu, Jal. 132, Regn. No. 10232 of 1951-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
65. Radhagobinda Saha, Jal. 133, Regn. No. 10120 of 1954-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
66. Bidhubhushan Datta, Jal. 134, Regn. No. 10305 of 1954-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
67. Sachindrakumar Biswas, Jal. 133, Regn. No. 25855 of 1951-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
68. Jyotibhushan Guhamajumdar, Jal. 152, Regn. No. 24031 of 1955-56, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
69. Chittaranjan Karmakar, Jal. 155, Regn. No. 24023 of 1954-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
70. Subaschandra Kundu, Jal. 161, Regn. No. 15125 of 1953-54, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
71. Chunilal Agarwala, Jal. 173, Regn. No. 14182 of 1954-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
72. Jyotirmay Raychaudhuri, Jangi. 32, Regn. No. 7386 of 1955-56, Jangipur College.
73. Chandrasekhar Kalidasa, Jangi. 53, Regn. No. 7341 of 1955-56, Jangipur College.
74. Hariyananda Das, Jangi. 55, Regn. No. 7312 of 1955-56, Jangipur College.
75. Manaskumar Pati, Jhar. 23, Regn. No. 12890 of 1951-55, Jhargram Itai College.
76. Susantakumar Bhattacharyya, Kaila. 7, Regn. No. 14194 of 1954-55, Kailashar Ramkrishna Mahavidyalaya.
77. Nanigopal Dasgupta, Kaila. 8, Regn. No. 14513 of 1951-55, Kailashar Ramkrishna Mahavidyalaya.
78. Amiyakumar Sen, Kat. 23, Regn. No. 3885 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
79. Sisir Kumar Sinha, Kat. 21, Regn. No. 3588 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
80. Sadhangopal Das, Kat. 25, Regn. No. 3805 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
81. Asiskumar Sinha, Kat. 26, Regn. No. 23556 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
82. Paramananda Das, Kat. 33, Regn. No. 3839 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
83. Balaram Samaddar, Kat. 34, Regn. No. 3893 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
84. Anantakumar Ghoshal, Kat. 35, Regn. No. 3428 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
85. Mihir Kanti Senarma, Kat. 37, Regn. No. 3594 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
86. Baidyanath Mandal, Kat. 39, Regn. No. 3851 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
87. Nirmalkumar Datta, Kat. 42, Regn. No. 3912 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
88. Biswanath Bandyopadhyay, Kat. 43, Regn. No. 3762 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
89. Kamakhya Charan Ghosh, Kat. 92, Regn. No. 6581 of 1953-54, Katwa College.
90. Anandamohan Datta, Kat. 93, Regn. No. 9041 of 1954-55, Katwa College.
91. Aswinikumar Mallik, Kat. 100, Regn. No. 6543 of 1953-54, Katwa College.
92. Bijaychand Saha, Kat. 101, Regn. No. 9086 of 1951-55, Katwa College.
93. Gholam Morshed, Kat. 102, Regn. No. 23554 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
94. Debnath Chattopadhyay, Kat. 103, Regn. No. 3708 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
95. Mrityunjay Sinha, Kat. 104, Regn. No. 23559 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
96. Batakrishna Datta, Kat. N. 1, Regn. No. 9632 of 1955-56, Non-Collegiate Student.
97. Bijaymohan Chakrabarti, Kat. N. 18, Regn. No. 9791 of 1955-56, Non-Collegiate Student.
98. Saukarprasad Adhikari, Kharag. 59, Regn. No. 26806 of 1955-56, Kharagpur College.
99. Bhabaniprasad Bhattacharyya, Kharag. 61, Regn. No. 26783 of 1955-56, Kharagpur College.
100. Rajnarayan Pal, Kharag. 102, Regn. No. 960 of 1951-55, Kharagpur College.
101. Syamapada Das, Kri. 48, Regn. No. 12032 of 1951-55, Krishnagar College.
102. Dilipkumar Chakrabarti, Kri. 49, Regn. No. 11993 of 1954-55, Krishnagar College.
103. Amarendra Chandra Biswas, Kri. 57, Regn. No. 11966 of 1951-55, Krishnagar College.
104. Bhupendranath Bit, Kri. 93, Regn. No. 11991 of 1951-55, Krishnagar College.
105. Rathindranath Dube, Kri. 95, Regn. No. 6950 of 1953-54, Krishnagar College.
106. Mrinalkanti Patra, Mid. 105, Regn. No. 26498 of 1954-55, Midnapore College.
107. Mahendrachandra Bandyopadhyay, Naba. 9, Regn. No. 5140 of 1955-56, Nabadwip Vidyasagar College.
108. Niranjan Kumar Biswas, Nai. 120, Regn. No. 12230 of 1955-56, Naibati Rishi Bankimchandra College.
109. Subimal Biswas, Nai. 123, Regn. No. 12288 of 1955-56, Naibati Rishi Bankimchandra College.
110. Anadinath Ghosh, Sil. 23, Regn. No. 17084 of 1951-55, Siliguri College.
111. Manmathakumar Ray, Sil. 37, Regn. No. 17110 of 1951-55, Siliguri College.
112. Kabita Nag, Tam. F. 10, Regn. No. 2177 of 1954-55, Tamralipta Mahavidyalaya.

113. Sudhansukumar Maitra, Uttar 15, Regn. No. 982 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Peary Mohan College.
114. Sibsanakar Ghosh, Uttar. 77, Regn. No. 18292 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Peary Mohan College.

(3) The Examination for 1956 of the following candidates is cancelled :—

1. Rabindranath Ghosh, Cal. 649, Regn. No. 4181 of 1954-55, St. Paul's College.
2. Ramapada Biswas, Cal. 1220 Regn. No. 22526 of 1955-56, Vidyasagar College.
3. Tamalkanti Bagchi, Cal. 1241, Regn. No. 7330 of 1954-55, Vidyasagar College.
4. Jitendra Pratap Singh, Cal. 1262, Regn. No. 22715 of 1955-56 Vidyasagar College.
5. Pradyotkumar Das, Cal. 1457, Regn. No. 9172 of 1955-56, Asutosh College.
6. Pankajkumar Bhattacharyya, Cal. 1730, Regn. No. 21444 of 1954-55, City College.
7. Haranchandra Ray, Cal. 2829, Regn. No. 23547 of 1955-56, Vidyasagar College.
8. Haladhar Ghosh, Cal. 3677, Regn. No. 19426 of 1953-54, City College.
9. Kesabchandra Das, Cal. 3678, Regn. No. 20149 of 1954-55, City College.
10. Amalendu Pal, Cal. 5014, Regn. No. 6392 of 1954-55, Seth Anandaram Jaipuria College.
11. Subirnath Bhattacharyya, Cal. 5277, Regn. No. 7218 of 1955-56, City College.
12. Sri Ajitkumar Basu, Cal. 5372, Regn. No. 16080 of 1953-54, Surendranath College.
13. Binaybhushan Bhattacharyya, Cal. 6719, Regn. No. 22837 of 1955-56, Maharaja M. C. College.
14. Sasibhushan Mukhopadhyay, Cal. 6800, Regn. No. 26151 of 1954-55, Maharaja M. C. College.
15. Md. Abul Khalid, Cal. 7219, Regn. No. 28621 of 1955-56, Bangabasi College.
16. Radhabinod Pal, Agartala 88 Regn. No. 698 of 1955-56, Agartala Maharaja Bir Bikram College.
17. Dwijeshchandra Bhattacharyya, Balur 23 Regn. No. 1276 of 1955-56, Balurghat College.
18. Gurupada Palit, Basir 19, Regn. No. Basirhat College.
19. Khiroiprasad Mandal, Basir 20, Regn. No. 22486 of 1955-56, Basirhat College.
20. Md. Afsar Ali, Basir, 99, Regn. No. 4969 of 1951-55 Basirhat College.
21. Md. Abdul Karim, Basir. 147, Regn. No. 17542 of 1951-55, Basirhat College.
22. Surendranath Ghosh Basir. 149, Regn. No. 16034 of 1951-55, Basirhat College.
23. Santoshkumar Karan, Basir. 156, Regn. No. 22469 of 1955-56, Basirhat College.
24. Piyushkanta Ghosh, Basir. 191, Regn. No. 22445 of 1955-56 Basirhat College.
25. Bhabeschandra Mridha, Basir. 192, Regn. No. 16026 of 1953-54, Basirhat College.
26. Kamala Basu, Basir. F. 24, Regn. No. 22385 of 1955-56, Basirhat College.
27. Maya Majumdar Gupta, Basir. F. 25, Regn. No. 2602 of 1952-53, Basirhat College.
28. Sunilkumar Basu, Basir. N. 13 Regn. No. 9566 of 1955-56, Non-Collegiate Student.
29. Kansilal Das, Basir N. 14 Regn. No. Non-Collegiate Student.
30. Satyendranath Raychandhuri, Basir N. 15, Regn. No. 3208 of 1953-54, Non-Collegiate Student.
31. Bhubanachandra Sarkar Basir N. 22, Non-Collegiate Student.
32. Surendranath Sarkar, Basir. N. 23, Regn. No. 3216 of 1951-52, Non-Collegiate Student.
33. Gunabhar Pal, Gurih N. 2, Regn. No. 8343 of 1949-50, Non-Collegiate Student.
34. Debiprasad Kar, Jal. 151, Regn. No. 21023 of 1955-56, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
35. Aditendramohan Sinha, Kat. 19, Regn. No. 20073 of 1953-54, Katwa College.
36. Jagadishchandra Biswas, Kat. 20, Regn. No. 3787 of 1955-56 Katwa College.
37. Paramananda Thakur, Kat. 21, Regn. No. 21029 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
38. Madhusudan De, Kat. 22, Regn. No. 3914 of 1955-56 Katwa College.
39. Rabindranath Pal, Kat. 29 Regn. No. 3871 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
40. Sunilkumar Munigram, Kat. 30, Regn. No. 3967 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
41. Dilipkumar Sinha, Kat. 32, Regn. No. 3990 of 1955-56 Katwa College.
42. Saileswar Pal, Kat. 36, Regn. No. 3872 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
43. Anindyakumar De, Kat. 38 Regn. No. 3816 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
44. Durgacharan Mallik, Kat. 40, Regn. No. 3849 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
45. Niranjan Mitra, Kat. 91, Regn. No. 9069 of 1954-55, Katwa College.
46. Phanindranath Kar, Kharag. 40, Regn. No. 20994 of 1955-56, Kharagpur College.
47. Kbagendranath Satpathi, Mid. 29, Regn. No. 22092 of 1954-55, Midnapore College.
48. Jyotirindranath Biswas, Rai. 13, Regn. No. 7800 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
49. Anulyaranjan Sarkar, Rai. N. 1, Regn. No. 17057 of 1951-52, Non-Collegiate Student.
50. Jitendranath Gupta, Uttar. 2, Regn. No. 958 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Pearymohan College.
51. Santikumar Majumder, Uttar. 3, Regn. No. 987 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Pearymohan College.

52. Chandidas Ray, Uttar. 4, Regn. No. 1075 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Pearymohan College.
53. Mirtyunjay Pramanik, Uttar. 8, Regn. No. 1771 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Pearymohan College.
54. Pitambar Bhattacharyya, Uttar. 9, Regn. No. 811 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Pearymohan College.
55. Santiram Maiti, Uttar. 10, Regn. No. 9811 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Pearymohan College.
56. Gopimohan Chakrabarti, Uttar. 14, Regn. No. 829 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Pearymohan College.
57. Asutosh Chattopadhyay, Uttar. 16, Regn. No. 848 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Pearymohan College.
58. Amalkumar Mukhopadhyay, Uttar. 17, Regn. No. 1003 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Pearymohan College.
59. Syamsunder Chandra, Uttar. 18, Regn. No. 842 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Pearymohan College.
60. Ranjittkumar Bandyopadhyay, Uttar. 22, Regn. No. 778 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Pearymohan College.
61. Mihirkumar Mukhopadhyay, Uttar. 23, Regn. No. 1023 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Pearymohan College.
62. Sukdebprasad Mukhopadhyay, Uttar. 27, Regn. No. 1045 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Pearymohan College.
63. Nepalchandra Barman, Uttar. 28, Regn. No. 784 of 1955-56, Uttarpara Raja Pearymohan College.

I. A. Cases

The following candidates are exonerated from the charge of breach of discipline :—

1. Anilranjan Das, Cal. 2113, Regn. No. 6139 of 1955-56, Charuchandra College.
2. Hridaykrishna Basu, Cal. 2874, Regn. No. 9218 of 1948-49, Vidyasagar College.
3. Bharat Prasad, Cal. 3592, Regn. No. 27005 of 1954-55, City College.
4. Sudhirkumar Mukhopadhyay, Rai. 1, Regn. No. 7843 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
5. Siteschaddra Saha, Rai. 2, Regn. No. 7852 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
6. Ranajittkumar Debray, Rai. 3, Regn. No. 12785 of 1954-55, Raiganj College.
7. Kamales Sarkar, Rai. 4, Regn. No. 12183 of 1952-53, Raiganj College.
8. Dilipkanti Sen, Rai. 5, Regn. No. 26057 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
9. Bhupatibhushan Basu, Rai. 6, Regn. No. 7793 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
10. Nirmalkumar Bagchi, Rai. 7, Regn. No. 22041 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
11. Mridulkumar Mitra, Rai. 8, Regn. No. 7842 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
12. Susilchandra Sengupta, Rai. 9, Regn. No. 7859 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
13. Sunilkumar Saha, Rai. 10, Regn. No. 23068 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
14. Satyaranjan Das, Rai. 11, Regn. No. 7814 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
15. Nirodranjan Ghosh, Rai. 12, Regn. No. 7823 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
16. Jibeschandra Das, Rai. 14, Regn. No. 7809 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
17. Amalendubikas Guhaniyogi, Rai. 15, Regn. No. 26047 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
18. Nripendramohan Saha, Rai. 16, Regn. No. 26051 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
19. Radhakrishna Agarwala, Rai. 17, Regn. No. 7865 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
20. Tarapada Raychaudhuri, Rai. 18, Regn. No. 13607 of 1951-52, Raiganj College.
21. Sujitkumar Dasgupta, Rai. 19, Regn. No. 23083 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
22. Ebaruddin Ahmed, Rai. 20, Regn. No. 7824 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
23. Amalkrishna Talapatra, Rai. 21, Regn. No. 7861 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
24. Khagendranath Talukdar, Rai. 22, Regn. No. 16052 of 1951-55, Raiganj College.
25. Chittaranjan Ghosh, Rai. 23, Regn. No. 7806 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
26. Hasiruddin Ahmed, Rai. 24, Regn. No. 7835 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
27. Goursankar Basu, Rai. 25, Regn. No. 7794 of 1956-56, Raiganj College.
28. Jitendranath Das, Rai. 26, Regn. No. 7810 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
29. Saurindrakumar Ghosh, Rai. 27, Regn. No. 7831 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
30. Smritikumar Chaudhuri, Rai. 28, Regn. No. 22032 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
31. Asitkumar Bhadra, Rai. 29, Regn. No. 7797 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
32. Sunilkumar Dhar, Rai. 30, Regn. No. 7822 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
33. Satyendranath Ray, Rai. 31, Regn. No. 7850 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
34. Kamalkumar Adhya, Rai. 32, Regn. No. 7864 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
35. Syamalkumar Chakrabarti, Rai. 33, Regn. No. 2044 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
36. Nirmalyaprasad Misra, Rai. 34, Regn. No. 7841 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
37. Bidhubhushan Niyogi, Rai. 35, Regn. No. 7846 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
38. Md. Azizur Rahman, Rai. 36, Regn. No. 6934 of 1953-54, Raiganj College.
39. Arunkumar Chakrabarti, Rai. 37, Regn. No. 7802 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
40. Salilbaran Ray, Rai. 38, Regn. No. 26050 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
41. Subrata De Rai, Rai. 39, Regn. No. 721 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.

42. Asimkumar Ray Rai 40 Regn No 748 of 1955-56, Raiganj College.
43. Arunima Ghosh, Rai F 1 Regn No 2385 of 1955-56 Raiganj College
44. Swapna De, Rai F 2 Regn No 12781 of 1954-55, Raiganj College
45. Usha Das Rai F 3, Regn No 7815 of 1955-56 Raiganj College.
46. Archana Bhaumik Rai F 4 Regn No 12780 of 1951-55 Raiganj College
47. Jyotsna Guha Rai F 5, Regn No 7853 of 1955-56, Raiganj College
48. Balarani Ray, Rai F 6, Regn No 7819 of 1955-56 Raiganj College
49. Chhaya Bhattacharya Rai F 7 Regn No 7799 of 1955-56 Raiganj College
50. Jharna Chakrabarti Rai F 8, Regn No 7803 of 1955-56, Raiganj College
51. Maya Nath Rai F 9 Regn No 1330 of 1955-56, Raiganj College
52. Karala Datta Rai F 10 Regn No 7817 of 1955-56 Raiganj College
53. Arati Datta, Rai F 11, Regn No 12776 of 1954-55 Raiganj College
54. Sadhana Sarkar, Rai F 12, Regn No 1500 of 1955-56 Raiganj College
55. Susobhana Sinha Rai F 13 Regn No 61 of 1955-56 Raiganj College
56. Mukti Ghosh Rai F 14 Regn No 7827 of 1955-56, Raiganj College
57. Mamita Basu, Rai F 15 Regn No 779 of 1955-56, Raiganj College
58. Sant Mandal, Rai F 16 Regn No 1339 of 1955-56, Balurghat College
59. Saraswati Chakrabarti, Rai F 17 Regn No 9373 of 1955-56, Non Collegiate Student.
60. Satyapada Ray, Rai N 3 Regn No 16724 of 1951-52 Non Collegiate Student
61. Atubandhu Lahiri Rai N 6 Regn No 26058 of 1955-56 Non Collegiate Student.
62. Harendra Chandra Majumdar Rai N 8 Regn No 8162 of 1951-55, Non-Collegiate Student (Raiganj College)
63. Tamizuddin Ahamed Rai N 10, Regn No 12738 of 1954-55 Non Collegiate Student (Raiganj College)
64. Ranjankumar Mitra Rai N 11 Regn No 5719 of 1953-54, Non Collegiate Student.
65. Raminan Sen Rai N 13, Regn No 1130 of 1952-53 Non Collegiate Student
66. Asit Ghosh Rai N 15, Regn No 12315 of 1951-52 Non Collegiate Student
67. Haridas Biswas, Rai N 18 Regn No 26175 of 1955-56, Non Collegiate Student

I SC CASES

(i) The Examination for 1956 of the following candidates is cancelled and they are debarred from appearing at any University Examination in 1957 and 1958 —

1. Sri Ranendranath Ghosh, Cal 513 Vidyasath Jyotish Ray College
2. Sri Suraj De Singh, Cal 8268 Regn No 6116 of 1952-53 Vidyasagar College
3. Sri Narayan Das Damani, Cal N 123 Regn No 2779 of 1955-56 Non Collegiate Student (Vidyasagar College)
4. Sri Asokranjan Guharay, Kat 1 Regn No 8157 of 1953-54 Katwa College
5. Sri Prithwisatendra Chakrabarti, Kat 2 Regn No 9127 of 1951-55 Katwa College
6. Sri Atulchandra Biswas Kat 3 Regn No 15583 of 1951-52 Katwa College
7. Sri Sankarprasad Ray, Kat 4 Regn No 7262 of 1953-54 Katwa College.
8. Sri Bijaykumar Das, Kat 5 Regn No 13198 of 1953-54 Katwa College
9. Sri Anantakumar Ghosh Kat 6 Regn No 9048 of 1954-55 Katwa College
10. Sri Sukhamay Majumdar, Kat 7 Regn No 3814 of 1955-56 Katwa College
11. Sri Ghanasyam Bandhyopadhyay Kat 8 Regn No 3765 of 1955-56 Katwa College
12. Sri Dipkumar Das Kat 9 Regn No 32 of 1955-56 Katwa College
13. Sri Udayotkumar Chattopadhyay, Kat 10 Regn No 3787 of 1955-56, Katwa College
14. Ramendranarayan Dhar, Kat. 25 Regn No 3818 of 1955-56, Katwa College
15. Pranabkumar Chattopadhyay, Kat 30, Regn No 2857 of 1955-56, Katwa College

(ii) The Examination for 1956 of the following candidates is cancelled and they are debarred from appearing at any University Examination in 1957 —

1. Sri Nikhilendrakumar Basu Cal 6 Regn No 15511 of 1954-55, Bangabasi College
2. Sri Sanatan Datta, Cal 79 Regn No 1616 of 1954-55, Bangabasi College.
3. Sri Samiranjan Dattachaudhuri, Cal 362 Regn No 24086 of 1955-56, Bangabasi College
4. Sri Krishnapada Datta Cal 569, Regn No 17129 of 1953-54, Bangabasi College
5. Sri Bishupada Biswas Cal 1186 Regn No 15579 of 1954-55, Bangabasi College.
6. Sri Samers Chakrabarti, Cal 1193, Regn No 12928 of 1953-54, Bangabasi College
7. Sri Nirmalendu Ghoshdastidar, Cal 1229, Regn No 16211 of 1954-55, Bangabasi College.
8. Sri Anishkumar Medak, Cal 1241, Regn No 16476 of 1954-55, Bangabasi College
9. Sri Ram Layak Singh, Cal 1274, Regn No 12740 of 1953-54, Bangabasi College.
10. Sri Bimalendubikas Datta, Cal 2854, Regn No 2662 of 1954-55, Asutosh College

11. Sri Ranjit Kumar Mukhopadhyay, II, Cal. 2863, Regn. No. 20616 of 1953-54, Asutosh College.
12. Sri Anankumar Das, Cal. 3126, Regn. No. 22711 of 1955-56, Vidyasagar College.
13. Sri Narendramohan Chakrabarti, Cal. 3239, Regn. No. 2218 of 1952-53, Vidyasagar College.
14. Sri Binayakranjan Ray, Cal. 3310, Regn. No. 8602 of 1954-55, Vidyasagar College.
15. Sri Sekharkanti Sarkar, Cal. 3749, Regn. No. 8077 of 1954-55, Vidyasagar College.
16. Sri Anil Basu, Cal. 4210, Regn. No. 10634 of 1953-54, Charuchandra College.
17. Amalkumar Ray, Cal. 4238, Regn. No. 21301 of 1954-55, Vidyasagar College.
18. Sri Pabitrakumar Basu, Cal. 4315, Regn. No. 17076 of 1952-53, City College.
19. Sri Sailendranath Chattopadhyay, Cal. 4911, Regn. No. 15836 of 1952-53, Charuchandra College.
20. Sri Santirajan Ghosh, Cal. 5669, Regn. No. 20965 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
21. Sri Tapaskumar Ghosh, Cal. 5670, Regn. No. 16026 of 1955-56, Surendranath College.
22. Sri Sita Ram Goswami, Cal. 5686, Regn. No. 16027 of 1955-56, Surendranath College.
23. Sri Maniklal Gangopadhyay, II, Cal. 6672, Regn. No. 20902 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
24. Sri Ranendranath Basu, Cal. 6847, Regn. No. 8450 of 1952-53, Surendranath College.
25. Sri Debnarayan Bhattacharyya, Cal. 7080, Regn. No. 8673 of 1955-56, Maharaja M. C. College.
26. Sri Dula'krishna Pal, Cal. 7163, Regn. No. 21223 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
27. Sri Amalendu Dasgupta, Cal. 7259, Regn. No. 223 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
28. Sri Ramendra Chakrabarti, Cal. 7263, Regn. No. 20658 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
29. Sri Amareschandra Chattopadhyay, Cal. 7412, Regn. No. 18168 of 1954-55, City College.
30. Sri Parameschandra Dattamajumdar, Cal. N. 15, Regn. No. 1640 of 1950-51, Non-collegiate student, Vidyasagar College.
31. Sri Bimalkanti Ghosh, Cal. N. 129, Regn. No. 10613 of 1951-52, Non-collegiate student, Vidyasagar College.
32. Sri Rathindranath Mukhopadhyay, Cal. N. 145, Regn. No. 6641 of 1954-55, Non-collegiate student, Charuchandra College.
33. Sri Anilkumar Bhushan, Agar. 11, Maharaja Bir Bikram College.
34. Sri Hari Das Datta, Agar. 22, Regn. No. 27466 of 1954-55, Maharaja Bir Bikram College.
35. Sri Debendranath Chattopadhyay, Asan. 86, Regn. No. 5421 of 1955-56, Asansol College.
36. Sri Prabhakar Upadhyay, Asan. 104, Regn. No. 4566 of 1951-52, Asansol College.
37. Sri Jitendranath Mukhopadhyay, Asan. 172, Regn. No. 12731 of 1951-55, Asansol College.
38. Sri Jibananda Chakrabarti, Asan. 194, Regn. No. 2424 of 1954-55, Asansol College.
39. Sri Santoshkumar Ray, Asan. N. 11, Regn. No. 11836 of 1954-55, Non-collegiate student Asansol College.
40. Sri Prabhakumar Mukhopadhyay, Burb. 231, Regn. No. 3161 of 1953-54, Hetampur K. C. College.
41. Banbikas Koley, Bur. 21, Regn. No. 25156 of 1954-55, Burdwan Raj College.
42. Sri Amersankar Khanna, Bur. 24, Regn. No. 25155 of 1954-55, Burdwan Raj College.
43. Sri Mihirkumar Pathak, Bur. 59, Regn. No. 25193 of 1954-55, Burdwan Raj College.
44. Sri Kumaris Chaudhri, Bur. 65, Regn. No. 25129 of 1954-55, Burdwan Raj College.
45. Sri Debiprasad Hans, Chander, 73, Regn. No. 25821 of 1954-55, Chandernagore College.
46. Sri Sukhendubikas Maiti, Cont. 41, Regn. No. 11736 of 1954-55, Contai P. K. College.
47. Sri Nareschandra Gangopadhyay, How. 198, Regn. No. 10688 of 1954-55, Howrah Narasinha Dutt College.
48. Sri Samar Singh, Jal. 4, Regn. No. 10457, of 1954-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
49. Sri Pijushkanti Rahut, Jal. 7, Regn. No. 10418 of 1954-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
50. Sri Tapankumar Sen, Jal. 139, Regn. No. 15494 of 1953-54, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
51. Sri Binaybhushan Kar, Jhar. 16, Regn. No. 12866 of 1954-55, Jhargram Raj College.

- Sri Sachindranath Sarkar, Katwa 16, Regn. No. 8896 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
53. Sri Kalisankar Chaudhuri, Kat. 17, Regn. No. 2355 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
54. Sri Narendranayan De, Kat. 19, Regn. No. 13970 of 1953-54, Katwa College.
55. Sri Nanigopal Sinharay, Kat. 20, Regn. No. 9095 of 1954-55, Katwa College.
56. Sri Ajay Dhar, Kat. 23, Regn. No. 8617 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
57. Sri Mahadebchandra Ghosh, Kat. 29, Regn. No. 3826 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
58. Sri Alok Kumar Kaibraj, Kat. 48, Regn. No. 3841 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
59. Sri Naderchandra Das, Kat. 48, Regn. No. 3800 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
60. Sri Kanakjyoti Mukhopadhyay, Kat. 50, Regn. No. 3857 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
61. Muhammad Nural Huda, Kat. 53, Regn. No. 1189 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
62. Sri Niranjan Baksi, Kat. 57, Regn. No. 3760 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
63. Amjed Ali Khan, Kat. 62, Regn. No. 3758 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
64. Sri Prakashchandra Das, Kharag. 8, Regn. No. 921 of 1954-55, Kharagpur College.
65. Sri Ajit Kumar Ray, Mid. 111, Regn. No. 23974 of 1954-55, Midnapore College.
66. Sri Kalachand Nath, Naba. 16, Regn. No. 5258 of 1955-56, Nabadwip Vidyasagar College.
67. Sri Ramendraprasad Sarkar, Naba. 19, Regn. No. 5328 of 1955-56, Nabadwip Vidyasagar College.
68. Sri Dilip Kumar Bhattacharyya, Naba. 46, Regn. No. 5155 of 1955-56, Nabadwip Vidyasagar College.
69. Sri Sailendranath Bhaumik, Nai. 83, Regn. No. 19185 of 1953-54, Naihati Rishi Bankimchandra College.
70. Uma Debi Nai F. 10, Regn. No. 19256 of 1953-54, Naihati Rishi Bankimchandra College.
71. Sri Arunkumar Das, Rana. 43, Regn. No. 5769 of 1955-56, Ranaghat College.
72. Sri Jyotirmay Ghatak, Rana. 50, Regn. No. 5775 of 1955-56, Ranaghat College.
73. Ardhendusekhar Mukhopadhyay, Santi. 16, Regn. No. 18400 of 1952-53, Santipur College.
74. Sisirkumar De, Ser. 96, Regn. No. 3501 of 1954-55, Serampore College.
75. Satyapada Bhaumik, Sili. 4, Regn. No. 27343 of 1954-55, Siliguri College.
76. Kalidas Silsarma, Sili. 6, Regn. No. 1669 of 1954-55, Siliguri College.
77. Rathindranath Biswas, Sili. 10, Regn. No. 25684 of 1954-55, Siliguri College.
78. Prabalkumar Maitra, Sili. 40, Regn. No. 27934 of 1955-56, Siliguri College.
79. Subodhkumar Hui, Syam. 7, Regn. No. 26615 of 1954-55, Syamsundar College.
80. Ajit Kumar Das, Syam. 33, Regn. No. 7074 of 1954-55, Syamsundar College.
81. Amalkumar Bhaumik, Tam. 63, Regn. No. 17144 of 1954-55, Tamruk Tamralipta Mahavidyalaya.

(iii) The Examination for 1956 of the following candidates is cancelled :—

1. Debipada Bhattacharyya, Cal. 150, Regn. No. 15714 of 1954-55, Bangabasi College.
2. Syamaprasad Ghosh, Cal. 182, Regn. No. 13192 of 1953-54, Bangabasi College.
3. Mathuraprasad Tewari, Cal. 857, Regn. No. 7250 of 1952-53, Bangabasi College.
4. Paritoshkumar Ghosh, Cal. 1126, Regn. No. 21089 of 1955-56, Bangabasi College.
5. Abhijit Bandyopadhyay, Cal. 1179, Regn. No. 15402 of 1954-55, Bangabasi College.
6. Sri Tusharkanti Das, Cal. 1206, Regn. No. 15903 of 1954-55, Bangabasi College.
7. Anindyakumar De, Cal. 1219, Regn. No. 7729 of 1952-53, Bangabasi College.
8. Manojkumar Maitra, Cal. 1235, Regn. No. 16296 of 1954-55, Bangabasi College.
9. Sujit Kumar Raychaudhuri, Cal. 3902, Regn. No. 8041 of 1954-55, Vidyasagar College.
10. Sri Anilkumar Ray, Cal. 3315, Regn. No. 11169 of 1953-54, Vidyasagar College.
11. Ajay Kumar Raychaudhuri, Cal. 3893, Regn. No. 8034 of 1954-55, Vidyasagar College.
12. Snehansuranjan Pal, Cal. 3453, Regn. No. 8864 of 1954-55, Vidyasagar College.
13. Ramchandra Sonthalia, Cal. 3871, Regn. No. 22718 of 1955-56, Vidyasagar College.
14. Brijamchandra Sil, Cal. 3921, Regn. No. 803 of 1954-55, Vidyasagar College.
15. Arunkanti Datta, Cal. 3936, Regn. No. 7629 of 1954-55, Vidyasagar College.
16. Jogendra Prasad Khetry, Cal. 4168, Regn. No. 1017 of 1953-54, Vidyasagar College.
17. Kamalkumar Ray, Cal. 4289, Regn. No. 24302 of 1954-55, Vidyasagar College.
18. Bharatiprasad Das, Cal. 5047, Regn. No. 13164 of 1954-55, Charuchandra College.
19. Samirkumar Mukhopadhyay, Cal. 5425 of 1954-55, Regn. No. 21171 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
20. Amiyakumar Bandyopadhyay, Cal. 6175, Regn. No. 20423 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
21. Nimdbari Singh, Cal. 7267, Regn. No. 2344 of 1954-55, Surendranath College.
22. Sisirkumar Basu, Cal. N. 122, Regn. No. 4581 of 1951-52, Non-collegiate student, Vidyasagar College.
23. Mrinalkanti Ray, I, Cal. N. 282, Regn. No. 8090 of 1952-53, Non-collegiate student, Surendranath College.
24. Hiranmay Das, Agar. 141, Regn. No. 22290 of 1955-56, Maharaja Bir Bikram College.

25. Syamaprasad Pathak, Ber 252, Regn. No. 26778 of 1955-56, Berhampore K. N. College.
26. Amalkanti Das, Birb. 33, Regn. No. 12392 of 1955-56, Suri Vidyasagar College.
27. Sunilkanti Bishnu, Bol. 16, Regn. No. 484 of 1955-56, Bolpur College.
28. Tusharkanti Ray, Bur. 249, Regn. No. 15215 of 1953-54, Burdwan Raj College.
29. Nandakumar Chettri, Dar. 39, Regn. No. 923 of 1953-54, Darjeeling Govt. College.
30. Setyanarayan Dasgandit, Kat. 24, Regn. No. 3918 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
31. Brajadulal Chattopadhyay, Kat. 54, Regn. No. 7847 of 1953-54, Katwa College.
32. Amarnath Mukhopadhyay, Kat. 61, Regn. No. 3353 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
33. Dilipkumar Dakshi, Kri. 44, Regn. No. 12032 of 1954-55, Krishnagar College.
34. Bimalenduprasad Sinharay, Naba. 10, Regn. No. 5276 of 1955-56, Nabadwip Vidyasagar College.
35. Lakshminikanta Das, Naba. 11, Regn. No. 5182 of 1955-56, Nabadwip Vidyasagar College.
36. Krishnachandra Kanasanik, Naba. 15, Regn. No. 5217 of 1955-56, Nabadwip Vidyasagar College.
37. Syamalendu Majumdar, Naba. 45, Regn. No. 5238 of 1955-56, Nabadwip Vidyasagar College.
38. Mihirkumar Chattopadhyay, Santi. 26, Regn. No. 14451 of 1955-56, Santipur College.
39. Harisadhan Karmaka, Syam. 21, Regn. No. 11706 of 1954-55, Syamsundar College.

(iv) The following candidates are exonerated from the charge of breach of discipline : —

1. Arshedali Mallick, Kat. 11, Regn. No. 3751 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
2. Debnarayan Bhattacharyya, Kat. 12, Regn. No. 3777 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
3. Madhabchandra Das, Kat. 13, Regn. No. 3791 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
4. Nripendrakumar Basu, Kat. 14, Regn. No. 3772 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
5. Satyendrakumar Gupta, Kat. 15, Regn. No. 3833 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
6. Gaurkisor Chandra, Kat. 19, Regn. No. 9028 of 1954-55, Katwa College.
7. Jyotishwar Chattopadhyay, Kat. 21, Regn. No. 9033 of 1954-55, Katwa College.
8. Tarunkumar Baksi, Kat. 22, Regn. No. 3761 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
9. Madhusudan Datta, Kat. 26, Regn. No. 3808 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
10. Kamalarangan Palray, Kat. 27, Regn. No. 3876 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
11. Barindranath Datta, Kat. 45, Regn. No. 3809 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
12. Mahadeb Chandra, Kat. 49, Regn. No. 3796 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
13. Anilkumar Chaudhuri, Kat. 51, Regn. No. 3792 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
14. Susilchandra Talukdar, Kat. 52, Regn. No. 9097 of 1954-55, Katwa College.
15. Jnanankur Sen, Kat. 55, Regn. No. 3607 of 1953-54, Katwa College.
16. Sailenkumar Baradwopadhyay, Kat. 59, Regn. No. 3766 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
17. Dasarathi Ghatak, Kat. 60, Regn. No. 3836 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
18. Madhusudan Datta, Kat. 63, Regn. No. 28259 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
19. Masihar Rahman, Kat. 64, Regn. No. 3869 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
20. Juthi Mukhopadhyay, Kat. F. 1, Regn. No. 3864 of 1955-56, Katwa College.

The enrolment of the following candidates for the I.A. Examination, 1956 is cancelled :—

1. Narindar Singh, Cal. 7672, City College.
2. Ghansham Lal Chugh, Cal. 7673, City College.

The Examination for 1956 of the following candidate is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any Examination of this University in 1957.

I.Sc. Compartmental, September, 1956

Prasantakumar Kundu, Roll Cal. Comp. No. 632, Burdwan Raj College.

The Examination for 1956 of Bansagopal Mukhopadhyay, Kat. 46 (I.Sc., '56) Katwa College, is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any University Examination in 1957.

The candidates pertaining to your college may kindly be informed of the orders in respect of them expeditiously.

Yours faithfully,
N. C. ROY
Controller of Examinations

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

No Rta./R A /B.A , B.Sc./57

The following orders have been passed with regard to the B.A. and B.Sc. examinations arising out of the B.A. and B.Sc. Examinations, 1957:—

B.A. CASES

I. The following candidates are exonerated from the charge of breach of discipline:—

1. Mohammed Imaajuddin, Ber 15, Regn. No 2298 of 1954-55, Krishnath College.
2. Chittaranjan Ray, Kri 60, Regn No 16318 of 1952-53, Vidyasagar College, Calcutta.
3. Gayatri Sarkar, Mal F 8, Regn No 8026 of 1951-52, Malda College.
4. Sm Sabita Sarkar, Mal F 9, Regn No. 9549 of 1953-54, Malda College

II. The Examination for 1957 of the following candidates is cancelled —

1. Sankarprasad Datta, Cal 2203, Regn N 17123 of 1952-53, Asutosh College.
2. Kamalkanti Gupta, Cal 2255, Regn No 12651 of 1953-54, Bangabasi College.
3. Saktipada Chakrabarti, Cal 2169, Regn No. 6743 of 1954-55, Maharaja M. C. College
4. Jibankrishna Chakrabarti, Cal 2169, Regn No 14661 of 1951-55, Maharaja M. C. College
5. Pritindranath Ghosh, Cal Ext 737, Regn No 12741 of 1950-51
6. Narayandas Konar, Bur 85, Regn No 14837 of 1952-53, Burdwan Raj College.
7. Chittaranjan Sarkar, Bur. Ext 21, Regn No 5176 of 1946-47

III. The Examination for 1957 of the following candidates is cancelled and they are debarred from appearing at any examination of this University in 1958 —

1. Subrata Sarkar, Cal Ext 734, Regn No 13226 of 1951-52
2. Sitendu Bhattacharyya, Ber 32, Regn No 2108 of 1954-55, Krishnath College.
3. Kalyankumar Lahiri, Kri 3, Regn No 16791 of 1953-54, Krishnagar College.

B.Sc. CASES

I. The Examination for 1957 of the following candidates is cancelled —

1. Chandranath Basu, Cal 1194, Regn No 7122 of 1953-54, Bangabasi College
2. Samirranjan Das, Cal 1263, Regn No 6451 of 1952-53, Bangabasi College
3. Arunkumar Bagchi, Cal 1839, Regn. No 19653 of 1952-53, Scottish Church College
4. Gautam De, Bur 141, Regn No 9075 of 1953-54, Krishnath College
5. Amiyakumar Ghosh, Bur 109, Regn No 15639 of 1951-52, Burdwan Raj College
6. Tarapada Chakrabarti, Bur 118, Regn No 240 of 1952-53, Burdwan Raj College.
7. Sunnikrishna Kundu, Gob 41, Regn No 6173 of 1949-50, Dootardanga Hindu College
8. Narayanachandra Pal, Kri 62, Regn No 5311 of 1951-55, Santipur College
9. Mandares Mitra, Roll Burb No 59, Regn. No. 15070 of 1954-55, Smt Vidyasagar College.

II. The Examination for 1957 of the following candidates is cancelled and they are debarred from appearing at any examination of this University in 1958 —

1. Debeskumar Ghosh, Cal 1288, Regn No 12356 of 1951-52, Bangabasi College
2. Mahesh Swarup Saxena, Cal 1973, Regn No 8181 of 1952-53, St Paul's Cathedral College.
3. Rajbhuvan Mitra, Cal. 1988, Regn No. 10748 of 1951-52, St. Paul's Cathedral College.
4. Amarendra Prasad, Cal. 2425, Regn No 10075 of 1953-54, Asutosh College.
5. Pradyotkumar Mukherjee, Ber. 80, Regn. No 2127 of 1952-53, Krishnath College.
6. Sadhankumar Ray, Ber 91, Regn No 13774 of 1951-55, Krishnath College.
7. Sanilkumar Das, Bur, 121, Regn. No. 1315 of 1953-54, Burdwan Raj College

III. The Examination for 1957 of the following candidate is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any examination of this University in 1958 and 1959 :—

1. Chowdhury, Tajal Islam, Bur. 115, Regn. No. 16755 of 1951-52, Burdwan Raj College.

The candidate/s who appeared from your College may kindly be informed of the decision/s in respect of him/them expeditiously,

Your's faithfully,
N. C. ROY,
Controller of Examinations.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

No. Rts/RA/Int./57/

The following orders have been passed with regard to the R.A. cases arising out of the I A. and I.Sc. Examinations, 1957 :—

I.A. CASES

(I) The following candidates are exonerated from the charge of breach of discipline :—

1. Usha Sawhney, Cal. F. 414, Regn. No. 4511 of 1955-56 City College.
2. Shanta Arora Cal. F. 415, Regn. No. 702 of 1954-55 City College.
3. Chandramohan Sabui, Chander 4, Regn. No. 6829 of 1955-56, Chandernagore College.
4. Buddhadeb Set. Chander. 6, Regn. No. 6816 of 1955-56, [Chandernagore College.

(II) The Examination for 1957 of the following candidates is cancelled :—

1. Gopalchandra Saha, Cal. 412, Regn. No. 176 of 1956-57, City College.
2. Chittaranjan Ghosh, Cal. 449, Regn. No. 10930 of 1955-56, City College.
3. Asitbaran Baral, Cal. 692, Regn. No. 16906 of 1955-56, City College.
4. Juranchandra Majumdar, Cal. 867, Regn. No. 23813 of 1954-55, City College.
5. Pravabendranath Bhaduri, Cal. 1097, Regn. No. 20468 of 1955-56, Vidyasagar College.
6. Sekharnath Raychandhuri, Cal. 2187, Regn. No. 25661 of 1954-55, Vidyasagar College.
7. Somendranarayan Majumdar, Cal. 4792, Regn. No. 2976 of 1955-56, City College.
8. Kesabchandra Das, Cal. Ext. 974, Regn. No. 20149 of 1954-55.
9. Sobhendranath Bandyopadhyay, Cal. Ext. 1287, Regn. No. 16885 of 1955-56.
10. Banamali Mandal, Cal. Ext. 2110, Regn. No. 6182 of 1948-49.
11. Ritendranath Bandyopadhyay, Barrack. No. 8, Regn. No. 15458 of 1954-55 Rastra-guru Surendranath College.
12. Samirkumar Ray Belur. 1 Regn. No. 5115 of 1955-56 Ramkrishna Mission Vidyamandira.
13. Rajat Obakrabarti. Belur. b, Regn. No. 5054 of 1955-56 Ramkrishna Mission Vidyamandira.
14. Sunilkumar Sinharay, Belur. 15 Regn. No. 5131 of 1955-56 Ramkrishna Mission Vidyamandira.
15. Saumendrenath Majumdar, Birb. 62 Regn. No. 29835 of 1955-56 Suri Vidyasagar College.
16. Manoranjan Mukhopadhyay, Bur. Ext. 40 Regn. No. 2176 of 1946-47.
17. Debasis Bagchi Kri. 86 Regn. No. 2839 of 1955-56 Krishnagar College.
18. Jaladhar Sahu, Mahi. 2 Regn. No. 16170 of 1955-56 Mahisadal Raj College.
19. Saktiranjana Bhattacharyya, Mahi. Ext. 15 Regn. No. 9529 of 1954-55.
20. Taritkumar Bandyopadhyay, Naba 118 Regn. No. 5144 of 1955-56 Nabadwip Vidyasagar College
21. Dilipkumar Sinharay, Nai. 367 Regn. No. 12725 of 1955-56 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
22. Chittaranjan Halder Nai. 368 Regn. No. 12516 of 1955-56 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
23. Nanigopal Ankur, Nai. Ext. 65 Regn. No. 10548 of 1956-57.
24. Sibchandra Mandal, Ram N. 3 Regn. No. 11151 of 1950-51.
25. Nandalal Ghosh, Uttar. 132 Regn. No. 18295 of 1955-56 Raja Pearynath College.

III. The Examination for 1957 of the following candidates is cancelled and they are debarred from appearing at any University Examination in 1958 :—

1. Nikhilkumar Raychaudhuri, Cal. 615 Regn. No. 1112 of 1955-56 City College.
2. Saritkanti Ray, Cal. 1409 Bangabasi College
3. Dilipkumar Bandyopadhyay, Cal. 1543 Regn. No. 1575 of 1954-55 Seth Anandaram Jaipuria College.
4. Bimalchandra Mandal, Cal. 2038 Regn. No. 19543 of 1955-56 Vidyasagar College.
5. Haridas Saharay, Cal. 2036 Regn. No. 18758 of 1955-56 Vidyasagar College.
6. Babindranath Kanjilal, Cal. 2302 Regn. No. 7922 of 1955-56 Charuchandra College.
7. Nanigopal Datta Cal. 2583 Regn. No. 1907 of 1956-57 Asutosh College
8. Adityakumar Ghosh, Cal. 2608 Regn. No. 1981 of 1956-57 Asutosh College.
9. Jagadishchandra Ray, Cal. 3359 Regn. No. 16510 of 1953-54 Surendranath College.
10. Surojkanti Bandyopadhyay, Cal. 5170 Regn. No. 24420 of 1954-55 City College.
11. Susilkumar Mukhopadhyay, Cal. 5230 Regn. No. 20294 of 1954-55 City College.
12. Upendranath Sen, Cal. 5870 Regn. No. 21961 of 1955-56 City College.
13. Kedar Sharma, Cal. 6060 Regn. No. 16086 of 1955-56 City College.
14. Usha Agarwal Cal. F. 257 Regn. No. 17305 of 1955-56 Seth Soorajmull Jalan Girls' College.
15. Santiranjana Bhattacharyya Cal. N. 59 Regn. No. 4892 of 1953-54 Non-Collegiate Student.
16. Hiranmay Bandyopadhyay Asan. 33 Regn. No. 2368 of 1956-57 Asansol College.
17. Birendrakishore Talukdar Belur. Ext. No. 46 Regn. No. 13509 of 1956-57 Non-Collegiate Student.
18. Santoshkumar Pramanik Bang. No. 105 Regn. No. 22996 of 1955-56 Dinabandhu Mahavidyalaya
19. Anilkumar Ghosh Basir. No. 85 Regn. No. 22488 of 1955-56 Basirhat College
20. Biwajit Chattopadhyay Belur 3 Regn. No. 5056 of 1955-56 Ramkrishna Mission Vidyamandira.
21. Sujitkumar Pakrasi Belur. 6 Regn. No. 5110 of 1955-56 Ramkrishna Mission Vidyamandira.
22. Kanakendu Majumdar, Roll No Belur. 19 Regn. No. 5093 of 1955-56 Ramkrishna Mission Vidyamandira.
23. Dilipkumar Chaki, Ber. 55 Krishnath College
24. Md Luqat Ali, Ber. 76 Regn. No. 15572 of 1956-57 Krishnath College.
25. Tarapala Swarnakar. Ber. N. 6 Regn. No. 15615 of 1956-57 Krishnath College
26. Mohan Chatterpadhyay, Birb. 43 Regn. No. 28798 of 1955-56 Sri Vidyasagar College
27. Rajat Chakrabarti, Birb. 57 Regn. No. 28785 of 1955-56 Sri Vidyasagar College.
28. Gurupada Sen, Birb. Ext. 23.
29. Paritosh Baral, Bur. 92 Regn. No. 15721 of 1955-56 Burdwan Raj College.
30. Subalchandra Ray, Bur. 176 Regn. No. 15301 of 1955-56 Burdwan Raj College.
31. Rammohan Hati, Bur. 171 Regn. No. 25016 of 1954-55 Burdwan Raj College.
32. Sivasanker Ray, Bur. Ext. 71 Regn. No. 10159 of 1933-40.
33. Sk Motiher Rahaman, Bur. Ext. 74 Regn. No. 5263 of 1950-51.
34. Srikantakumar Sahu, Cont. 30 Regn. No. 11805 of 1954-55 Contai P. K. College.
35. Sunilbhusan Dattaraj, Gob. 44 Regn. No. 3314 of 1956-57 Hindu College.
36. Dilipkumar Sarkar, Jal. 7 Regn. No. 21393 of 1954-55 A. C. College, Jalpaiguri
37. Dibendu Sarkar, Jal. 23 Regn. No. 26454 of 1955-56 A. C. College, Jalpaiguri.
38. Harijasa Sen, Jal. 47 Regn. No. 26457 of 1955-56 A. C. College, Jalpaiguri.
39. Sibaprasad Biswas, Jal. 62 Regn. No. 26293 of 1955-56 A. C. College, Jalpaiguri.
40. Kamalkumar Sarkar, Jal. 87 Regn. No. 26455 of 1955-56 A. C. College, Jalpaiguri
41. Sankumar Saha, Jal. 143 Regn. No. 12500 of 1954-55 A. C. College, Jalpaiguri,
42. Jayral Abidin Kalna 5 Regn. No. 14843 of 1956-57 Kalna College.
43. Sukanthkumar Ray, Kat. 52 Regn. No. 15078 of 1956-57 Katwa College.
44. Debkanti Das, Mahi. 54 Regn. No. 11566 of 1955-56 Mahisadal Raj College.
45. Bhupendranath Sahu, Mahi. Ext. 57 Regn. No. 9723 of 1954-55.
46. Anarendranath Mandal, Mal. 28 Regn. No. 17990 of 1955-56 Malda College.
47. Md. Abdus Salam, Mal. 37 Regn. No. 17917 of 1954-55. Malda College.
48. Md. Samsul Islam, Mal. 42 Regn. No. 18008 of 1955-56 Malda College
49. Sureshchandra Kundu, Mal. Ext. 12 Regn. No. 17900 of 1954-55
50. Bijaykumar Set, Mal. Ext. 13.
51. Pasupati Samanta, Mid. N. 2 Regn. No. 18206 of 1950-51.
52. Sibaprasad Nath, Naba. 114 Regn. No. 5259 of 1955-56 Nabadwip Vidyasagar College.
53. Bibhutibhusan Biswas, Nai. 31 Regn. No. 12289 of 1955-56 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
54. Anankumar Chakrabarti, Nai. 45 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
55. Chittaranjan Baksi, Nai. 79 Regn. No. 474 of 1956-57 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
56. Ramkrishna Das, Nai. 92 Regn. No. 13956 of 1956-57 Rishi Bankimchandra College.

57. Sureschandra De, Nai. 102 Regn. No. 628 of 1956-57 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
58. Susantakumar Pal, Nai. 146 Regn. No. 748 of 1956-57 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
59. Gopalchandra Saha, Nai. 240 Regn. No. 23182 of 1956-57 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
60. Ajitkumar Ghosh, Nai. 301 Regn. No. 23112 of 1956-57 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
61. Aseshranjan Ray, Nai. 312 Regn. No. 23180 of 1956-57 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
62. Dilipnarayan Sur, Nai. Ext. 86 Regn. No. 11914 of 1956-57.
63. Jagadischandra Ray, Nai. Ext. 94 Regn. No. 13686 of 1956-57.
64. Surendrakumar Biswas, Santi. N. 2 Regn. No. 9878 of 1955-56.
65. Bimalkumar Saha, Santi. N. 3 Regn. No. 8225 of 1955-56 Santipur College.
66. Radhasyam Pal, Ser. 55 Regn. No. 8546 of 1954-55 Serampore College.
67. Nepalchandra Barman, Uttar. 5 Regn. No. 784 of 1955-56 Raja Peary Mohan College.

(IV) The Examination for 1957 of the following candidate is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any University Examination in 1958 and 1959 :—

Arupkumar Pal, Nai. 331 Regn. No. 735 of 1956-57 Rishi Bankimchandra College.

I.Sc. CASES

(I) The following candidates are exonerated from the charge of breach of discipline :—

1. Hiranmay Sengupta, Cal. 2467 Regn. No. 2699 of 1955-56 Central Calcutta College.
2. Dipakkumar Sengupta, Cal. 2468 Regn. No. 2752 of 1955-56 Central Calcutta College.
3. Prakasananda Mukhopadhyay Cal. 2484 Regn. No. 2723 of 1955-56 Central Calcutta College.
4. Dilipkumar Mukhopadhyay, Cal. 2486 Regn. No. 2718 of 1955-56 Central Calcutta College.
5. Debdas Mukhopadhyay Cal. 2488 Regn. No. 2722 of 1955-56 Central Calcutta College.
6. Parijat Sengupta Cal. 2489 Regn. No. 2754 of 1955-56 Central Calcutta College.
7. Ranendranarayan Sen Cal. 2490 Regn. No. 2750 of 1956-57 Central Calcutta College.
8. Anilkumar Mukhopadhyay Kalna. 46 Regn. No. 15514 of 1955-56 Kalna College.

(II) The Examination for 1957 of the following candidates is cancelled :—

1. Biswajit Chakrabarti Cal. 1266 Regn. No. 15628 of 1954-55 Bangabasi College.
2. Kalisankar Das Cal. 2328 Regn. No. 23934 of 1955-56 City College.
3. Gopalchandra Das Cal. 3086 Regn. No. 15859 of 1954-55 Bangabasi College.
4. Krishnadas Ghoshal Cal. 3094 Regn. No. 16163 of 1954-55 Bangabasi College.
5. Rabikamal Pal Cal. 3592 Regn. No. 15625 of 1955-56 Vidyasagar College.
6. Manishkumar Nag Cal. 4032 Regn. No. 17096 of 1956-57 R. G. Kai. Medical College.
7. Basupati Mukhopadhyay Cal. 4280 Regn. No. 20594 of 1953-54 Charuchandra College.
8. Bhupalchandra Acharyya Cal. 4782 Regn. No. 18551 of 1955-56 Surendranath College.
9. Ramnarayan Murarka Cal. 5419 Regn. No. 21184 of 1954-55 Surendranath College.
10. Nepalchandra Das Cal. 5721 Regn. No. 17076 of 1953-54 Surendranath College.
11. Arunkumar Basu Cal. 6131 Regn. No. 2612 of 1956-57 Anantosh College.
12. Harisankar Saha Cal. 7377 Regn. No. 4024 of 1953-54 Vijaygarh Jyotish Ray College.
13. Manoranjan Basu Cal. 7436 Regn. No. 4518 of 1955-56 Vijaygarh Jyotish Ray College.
14. Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyay Cal. N. 151 Regn. No. 5631 of 1954-55 City College.
15. Sunilkumar Datta Balur. 39 Balurghat College.
16. Bijaykumar Karmakar Bank. 145 Regn. No. 27555 of 1951-55 Bankura Sammilani College.
17. Somendrachandra Sanyal Ber. 207 Regn. No. 8238 of 1955-56 Krishnath College.
18. Jaykumar Biswas Ber. 211 Regn. No. 7993 of 1955-56 Krishnath College.
19. Santikumar Mukhopadhyay Birb. 54 Regn. No. 17799 of 1955-56 Sui Vidyasagar College.
20. Sannyasicharan Mandal Bur. 249 Regn. No. 25171 of 1954-55 Burdwan Raj College.
21. Priyatosh Talukdar Co. 94 Regn. No. 13143 of 1955-56 Victoria College.

- Debkumar Bandyopadhyay Gob. 102 Regn. No. 5v70 of 1953-54 Hindu College.
 Srinivasan A. S. Mudaliar Kharg. 94 Regn. No. 17089 of 1956-57 Khargpur College.
 24. Amulyakumar Biswas Kri. 7 Regn. No. 14988 of 1955-56 Krishnagar College.
 25. Uddhabchandra Pradhan Mid. 129 Regn. No. 4557 of 1956-57 Midnapore College.
 26. Nisithkumar Saha Nai. 66 Regn. No. 18971 of 1956-57 Rishi Balkimchandra College.
 27. Jatindranath Dhar Nai. N. 1 Regn. No. 5328 of 1917-48.
 28. Achyutananda Ghosh Rana. 68 Regn. No. 5772 of 1955-56 Ranaghat College.
 29. Bibhutibhushan Ghosh Santi. 52 Regn. No. 27317 of 1955-56 Santipur College.
 30. Nisithkumar Ray Syam. 13 Regn. No. 15645 of 1955-56 Syamsunder College.
 31. Satyanarjan Khatua Tam. 45 Regn. No. 17165 of 1954-55 Tamralipta Mahavidyalaya.

The Examination for 1957 of the following candidates is cancelled and they are debarred from appearing at any University Examination in 1958 :—

1. Tapaschandra Sengupta Cal. 5 Regn. No. 16776 of 1954-55 Bangabasi College.
2. Praphullakumar Gupta Cal. 38 Regn. No. 16201 of 1954-55 Bangabasi College.
3. Sudhirchandra Karmakar Cal. 606 Regn. No. 16790 of 1956-57 Bangabasi College.
4. Jyotishchandra Saha Cal. 1848 Regn. No. 24118 of 1955-56 Bangabasi College.
5. Jayantakumar Basu Cal. 2353 City College.
6. Prabhatkumar As Cal. 3265 Regn. No. 13150 of 1955-56 Vidyasagar College.
7. Buddhadab Adhya Cal. 3364 Regn. No. 17181 of 1954-55 Vidyasagar College.
8. Ramaprasad Raychaudhuri Cal. 4168 Regn. No. 6272 of 1955-56 Charuchandra College.
9. Surendrakumar Chakrabarti Cal. 4193 Regn. No. 7885 of 1955-56 Charuchandra College.
10. Sadhankrishna Gangopadhyay Cal. 5044 Regn. No. 18998 of 1955-56 Surendranath College.
11. Debkumar Mukhopadhyay, II Cal. 5293 Regn. No. 19201 of 1955-56 Surendranath College.
12. Surendrachandra Khan Cal. 5395 Regn. No. 19120 of 1955-56 Surendranath College.
13. Indubbhushan Mandal Cal. 5410 Regn. No. 21095 of 1954-55 Surendranath College.
14. Pulin Nandi Cal. 5192 Regn. No. 19304 of 1955-56 Surendranath College.
15. Saradindukumar Pramanik Cal. 5611 Regn. No. 19347 of 1955-56 Surendranath College.
16. Abdul Hannan Siddiqui Cal. 5702 Regn. No. 21478 of 1954-55 Surendranath College.
17. Satischandra Das Cal. 5921 Maharaja M. C. College.
18. Bisweswar Ray Cal. 5934 Regn. No. 26188 of 1954-55 Maharaja M. C. College.
19. Mriganaksekhar Maiti Cal. 5994 Regn. No. 21271 of 1953-54 Vidyasagar College.
20. Asokkumar Balo Cal. 6030 Dum Dum Matihil College.
21. Subrata Ghosh Cal. 7394 Regn. No. 4561 of 1955-56 Vidyasagar Jyotish Ray College.
22. Kartikchandra Saha Cal. 7437 Regn. No. 6714 of 1956-57 City College.
23. Samarechandra Datta Cal. 7695 Regn. No. 7649 of 1954-55 Vidyasagar College.
24. Md. Khouda Boksh Sardar Cal. 7731 Regn. No. 7262 of 1955-56 Vidyasagar College.
25. Sudarsanchandra Kayal Cal. 7813 Regn. No. 9342 of 1951-52 Vidyasagar College.
26. Srikantha Bhattacharyya Cal. N. 283 Regn. No. 20569 of 1954-55 Surendranath College.
27. Ganesh Chandra Jha Cal. N. 379 Regn. No. 12578 of 1950-51.
28. Tulsidas Misra Cal. N. 376 Regn. No. 23678 of 1955-56.
29. Sudhansumohan Das Asan. 10 Regn. No. 1458 of 1953-54 Asansol College.
30. Amalkumar Sengupta Asan. 81 Regn. No. 1715 of 1956-57 Asansol College.
31. Monojmohan Das Asan. 184 Regn. No. 21738 of 1954-55 Asansol College.
32. Syamapada Ghosh Asan. 160 Asansol College.
33. Narayan Ghoshal Ber. 37 Regn. No. 15519 of 1956-57 Krishnath College.
34. Sunilkumar Chaudhuri Ber. 135 Regn. No. 6037 of 1955-56 Krishnath College.
35. Nirmalchandra Mukhopadhyay Birb. 56 Regn. No. 4784 of 1956-57 Suri Vidyasagar College.
36. Sunirmal Sengupta Bishnu. 30 Ramchandrapur College.
37. Sunilkumar Chakrabarti Bur. 208 Regn. No. 25121 of 1954-55 Burdwan Raj College.
38. Sukeshchandra Sen Bur. 277 Regn. No. 25219 of 1954-55 Burdwan Raj College.
39. Samarendra Sinharay Bur. 282 Regn. No. 25223 of 1954-55 Burdwan Raj College.
40. Sunilkumar Sarkar Bur. 296 Regn. No. 25216 of 1954-55 Burdwan Raj College.
41. Muhammad Badrul Alam Bur. 237 Regn. No. 7121 of 1954-55 Burdwan Raj College.
42. Maheswar Sain Bur. 320 Regn. No. 15827 of 1953-54 Burdwan Raj College.
43. Kalyankumar Samaddar Co. 91, Regn. No. 13189 of 1955-56 Victoria College.
44. Nirmalkumar De Jal. 12 Regn. No. 17083 of 1954-55 Ananda Chandra College.
45. Kalyankumar Sikdar Jal. 69 Regn. No. 10458 of 1954-55 Ananda Chandra College.
46. Narendranath Chattopadhyay Kharg. 53 Regn. No. 12899 of 1954-55 Khargpur College.

47. Phanibhusan Saha Mal. 79 Regn. No. 17041 of 1954-55 Malda College.
 48. Asikumar Maiti Mid. 4 Regn. No. 1811 of 1956-57 Midnapore College.
 49. Jagannath Prasad Bhakat Mid. 41 Regn. No. 21127 of 1953-54 Midnapore College.
 50. Sachindranath Basu Mid. 64 Regn. No. 1246 of 1956-57 Midnapore College.
 51. Arandamohan Basu Mid. 79 Regn. No. 1237 of 1956-57 Midnapore College.
 52. Bipinbihari Maji Mid. 121 Regn. No. 23946 of 1954-55 Midnapore College.
 53. Nirmal Chakrabarti Nai. 17 Regn. No. 546 of 1956-57 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
 54. Subodhohandra Gaen Nai. 43 Regn. No. 12612 of 1955-56 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
 55. Balaram Mukhopadhyay Nai. 49 Regn. No. 13967 of 1953-57 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
 56. Chittaranjan Sarkhel Nai. 96 Regn. No. 12730 of 1955-56 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
 57. Karunamay Ray Nai. 132 Regn. No. 759 of 1956-57 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
 58. Kumudbihari Sarker Nai. 148 Regn. No. 12985 of 1956-57 Rishi Bankimchandra College.
 59. Parbatishankar Chattopadhyay Ram. 23 Rampurhat College.
 60. Kamalpada Biswas Rana. 61 Regn. No. 5760 of 1955-56 Ranaghat College.
 61. Nityapada Biswas Rana 79 Regn. No. 23215 of 1956-57 Ranaghat College.
 62. Subritkumar Das Santi. 68 Regn. No. 27304 of 1955-56 of Santipore College.
 63. Sasankasekhar Debray Santi. 71 Regn. No. 27813 of 1955-56 Santipore College.
 64. Lakshminandana Santra Ser. 70 Regn. No. 9136 of 1955-56 Serampore College.
 65. Santoshkumar Niyogi Sib. 33 Regn. No. 6257 of 1953-54 Siliguri College.
 66. Bamandas Chattopadhyay Syam. 8 Regn. No. 15601 of 1955-56 Syamsundar College.
 67. Subashchandra Soni Uttar. 20 Regn. No. 804 of 1955-56 Raja Peary Mohan College.
 68. Aytikumar De Uttar. 54 Regn. No. 18275 of 1955-56 Raja Peary Mohan College.
 69. Biswanath Chattopadhyay Uttar. 130 Regn. No. 11356 of 1955-56 Raja Peary Mohan College.

(IV) The Examination for 1957 of the following candidates is cancelled and they are debarred from appearing at any University Examination in 1958 and 1959 :-

1. Javanta Dasgupta Cal. 7476 Regn. No. 13057 of 1953-54 Bangabasi College.
2. Jagannath Mishra Cal. 7827 Regn. No. 8924 of 1953-54 Vidya-nagar College.
3. Nirmalchandra Bandyopadhyay Cal. N. 357 Regn. No. 13456 of 1954-55 Maharaja M. C. College.
4. Nandadulal Dan Ram. 24 Regn. No. 7031 of 1955-56 Rampurhat College.
5. Prabhakar Misra Cal. 3527 Vidya-nagar College.

The candidates who appeared from your College may kindly be informed of the decisions in respect of them expeditiously.

N. C. ROY

Controller of Examinations.

OFFICE OF THE BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION, ORISSA

Notification No. C-307

Dated Cuttack, the 26th May 1957

In accordance with Regulation 14 of Chapter X of the Regulations of the Board the following candidates who took recourse to unfair means at the Annual High School Certificate Examination of 1957 are penalised as noted against each.

Roll No.	Name.	Institution.	Penalties imposed.
4754	Sri Janardan Padhi, Son of Sri Ganesath Padhi, Anandapur, P.O. Anandapur, Dist. Keonjhar.	B. N. High School, Anandapur.	Results for 1957 Annual High School Certificate Examination is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any examination of the Board prior to the Annual High School Certificate Examination of 1959.

5186 Sri Buresh Chandra Mohanty, M.K.O. High
Son of Sri Gobinda Chandra School, Baripala.
Mohanty, Vill. Pratappur, P.O.
Badasahi, Dist. Mayurbhanj.

Result for 1957 Annual
High School Certi-
ficate Examination is
cancelled and he is
debarred from appearing
at any examination of
the Board prior to the
Supplementary High
School Certificate Exami-
nation of 1958.

S. SAHU,
Secretary.

UTKAL UNIVERSITY

Notification No. EC./808

Dated Cuttack, the 27th May, 1957

In accordance with Standing Order No. 28 of the Syndicate the following candidates who took recourse to unfair means at the Intermediate Examination in Agriculture held in the month of April, 1957, are penalised as noted against each.

Intermediate in Agriculture

Roll No.	Name.	Institution.	Penalties Imposed.
14	Sri Shibaram Misra, S/o Sri Udayanath Misra, P.O. Sonopur Raj, Dt. Bolangir.	Utkal Krushi Mahavidyalaya, Bhubaneswar.	Result for 1957 Annual Examina- tion is cancelled and he is debar- red from appearing at any of the Examinations prior to the Supple- mentary Examination of 1958.
28	Sri Sachindranath Mohanty, S/o Sri Sadhu Charan Mohanty, At & P.O. Bangripasi, Dist. Mayurbhanj.	Utkal Krushi Mahavidyalaya, Bhubaneswar.	Result for 1957 Annual Examina- tion is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any of the examinations prior to the Annual Examination of 1958.
34	Sri Purusottam Rout, S/o Late Udayanath Rout, C/o Sri Muguni Rout, Canal Division, P.O. Maneswar, Via Sanatan Pali, Dt. Sambalpur.	Utkal Krushi Mahavidyalaya, Bhubaneswar.	Result for 1957 Annual Examina- tion is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any of the examinations prior to the Annual Examination of 1958.

University Office, Cuttack,
The 27th May, 1957.

Illegible,
Assistant Registrar.

UTKAL UNIVERSITY

Notification No. EC./259

Dated Cuttack, the 17th May, 1957

In accordance with Standing Order No. 28 of the Syndicate the following candidates who took recourse to unfair means at the Annual Intermediate and Degree Examinations of 1957 are penalised as noted against each.

Intermediate in Arts

Roll No.	Name.	Institution.	Penalties Imposed.
782	Sri Jaminikanta Patnaik, S/o Sri Prabhu Charan Patnaik, Vill. Bagalpur, Dt. Cuttack.	Christ, College. Cuttack.	Result for 1957 Annual Examina- tion is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any of the examinations prior to the Supplementary examina- tion of 1958.

Intermediate in Science

- | | | | |
|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1486 | Sri Rathindranath Bose, S/o
Sri Rajagovind Bose, Janana
Hospital Road, Berhampur,
Dt. Ganjam. | Khallikote
College,
Berhampur. | Result for 1957 Annual Examination is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any of the examinations prior to the Supplementary examination of 1958. |
| 1678 | Sri Nityananda Satpathy, S/o
Sri Bidyadhar Satpathy,
Garai Shasan, P.O. Rahama,
Cuttack. | Ravenshaw
College,
Cuttack. | Result for 1957 Annual Examination is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any of the examinations prior to the Annual Examination of 1958. |
| 1744 | Sri Ranadhir Kumar Basu-
Mallik, S/o Sri Ramendranath
Mallik, P.O. Jajpur Dt
Cuttack. | Stewart Science
College
Cuttack | Result for 1957 Annual Examination is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any of the examinations prior to the Annual Examination of 1958. |
| 1912 | Sri Jogeswar Behers, S/o Sri
Madhab Chandra Behers, C/o
Sri Raghurath Padhi, At P.O.
Balangir, Dt. Balangir. | S.K.C.G.
College
Parlakimedi. | Result for 1957 Annual Examination is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any of the examinations prior to the Supplementary examination of 1958. |
| 2097 | Sri Pankaja Kumar Babu, C/o
Mr. Banamali Babu, Jharna-
para, Dt. Sambalpur. | G.M. College,
Sambalpur. | Result for 1957 Annual Examination is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any of the examinations prior to the Supplementary examination of 1958. |

BACHELOR OF ARTS

- | | | | |
|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 60 | Sri Harihar Das, S/o Sri
Hrusikesh Das, Vill. Bara-
garia, P.O. R.K. Pure, Dt
Balasore. | Bhadrak College
Bhadrak. | Result for 1957 Annual Examination is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any of the examinations prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1958. |
| 410 | Sri Trinath Prasad Misro, S/o
Sri Meenaketan Misro, Grade
I Oriya Pandit, B.H. School,
P.O. Palasa, Dist. Sukakulam. | S.K.C.G.
College,
Parlakimedi. | Result for 1957 Annual Examination is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any of the examinations prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1958. |

Illegible,
Assistant Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE

No. Ex. 3-180/57-58

Notification

Ref : This Office Notification dated 31st May, 1957

Pursuant to the resolution of the University Syndicate passed at the meeting held on 25th May, 1957 following candidates for the University Examinations of March-April 1957 who were found guilty of malpractice are penalised as follows :—

Examination	Reg. No.	Name and Address	Penalty imposed
B.Sc. Agriculture I Examination.	51	H. G. Narasappa, c/o Sri H. Gangappa, Lendlord, Hulikette, Magadi Taluk, Chakrabhavi Post.	(1) Loses the whole examination for which he has appeared for March-April 1957 examination. (2) Warned.

Mysore University,

Dated the 26th July, 1957.

By order,

D. JAVARE GOWDA.

Controller of Examinations.

UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE

No. Ex. 3-180/57-58

Notification

Pursuant to the resolution of the University Syndicate passed at the meeting held on 25th May, 1957 the following candidates for the University Examinations of March-April 1957 who were found guilty of malpractice are penalised as follows :—

Examination	Reg. No.	Name and Address	Penalty imposed
Intermediate Examination, in Commerce	8333	H. D. Ranga Swamy, C/o. Sri H. D. Gundappa, Shyanubough Street, Arasikere.	Loses the whole examination for which he has appeared for March-April 1957 Examination. He is debarred from sitting for the following Examination.
Bachelor of Arts	3680	S. Yoganarasimha Murthy, 790, B. R. Gardens, Mysore.	Ditto.

Intermediate Examination in Science

6692

Do.

Suvratheendrachar, C/o Sri S. Venkataraghavendrachar, Land Lord, Nanjangud.

Loses the whole examination for which he has appeared for March-April 1957 Examination. He is debarred from sitting for the following Examination.

Do.

Syed Abdul Rasheed, C/o Sri Syed Abdullah P.W.D. Contractor No P. 83, Parvathuram, Behind A.P.S. Bangalore-4.

Ditto.

Do.

K. B. Natarajan, C/o Sri K. S. Ramasiah, Overseer, Nuggahally Chennarayapatna Taluk, Hassan District

Ditto.

Do.

A. G. Chandrasekhar, C/o Sri A. G. Benakappa, Benakanahalli, Honnali Taluk, Shimoga District.

Ditto.

Do.

K. R. Lakshminarayana Das, C/o Sri K. R. Narasimhalu, Kilarpet, Kolar.

Ditto.

Do.

N. M. Nataraj, C/o N. G. Marimadappa, School Master, Marasinganahally, Ganeshahally post, Srirangapatna Taluk, Mandya District

Ditto.

Intermediate Examination in Commerce.

6015

M. C. Ranganna, C/o B. K. Rangachar, Retd. District Board Head Clerk, Durgigudi, Shimoga

Ditto

9031

Rafeeq Ahmed, S/O Sri K. M. Abdul Gaffar General Merchants, Door No 33, New Extension, Kalsampalyam, Bangalore-2.

Warned

By order,

D. JAVARE GOWDA
Controller of Examinations.

CENTRAL BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION, AJMER

Notification

The following candidates, whose particulars are given against each, having attempted to use unfair means at the Special Supplementary High School Examination of the Board for July-August, 1956, have been debarred from appearing at the High School Examination of the Board noted against each :—

Sl. No.	Roll No.	Name of candidate	Name of father	Private candidates (name of the place of residence).	High School Examination from which debarred.
1	43	Champa Lal Maheshwari	Badri Lal	Ajmer (Private)	Disqualified from the Special Supplementary High School Examination of July-August, 1956.
2	425	Yogendra Kumar Verma	Krishana Verma	Do.	Ditto.
3	446	Hari Ram	Nathu Lal Bijawat	Do.	Ditto.
4	477	Madan Lal Soni	Mangi Lal Soni	Beawar (Private)	Ditto.
5	601	Kuber Persad Sharma	Jamna Persad Sharma	Bhopal (Private)	Disqualified from the Special Supplementary High School Examination of July-August, 1956 and debarred from the High School Examination of 1957.

G. D. WIDHANI

Dated, Ajmer the 11th October, 1956.

Secretary.

Central Board of Secondary Education, Ajmer.

BIHAR UNIVERSITY

Circular No. 10

To Directors of Public Instruction of all States, Principals of all Colleges under the Bihar University, Inspectors and District Inspectors of Schools in Bihar, Deputy Directors of Education Bihar, Registrars of all Indian Universities, Secretaries, Secondary School Examination Board of all States, Secretary, Union Public Service Commission, Delhi and Secretary, Public Service Commission, Bihar, Bailey Road, Patna.

The undermentioned candidates are debarred from appearing at any University examination prior to the examination not-d against their names, as they were found guilty of using unfair means at the Supplementary Intermediate and Bachelor examinations in Arts, Science and Commerce 1956, and at the Law, Agriculture and M.A. examinations of 1956.

Sl. No.	Name of Centre and College	Name of Examinations and Roll Nos. of the candidate.	Registration No.	Name of candidate	Punishment
1	Arrah, H. D. Jain College	I A. Arr. 30	3646-55	Nalini Bhushan Singh	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1958.
2	Do.	B.Com. Arr. 36	152-52	Sudhakar Tripathi	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1958.
3	Bhagalpur, T. N. J. College	B. A. Bhag. 65	4847-45	Chandra Deva Mahto	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1958.
4	Bhagalpur, Marwari College	B.Com. Bhag. 29	2864-52	Rai Sahab Prasad Sinha	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1958.
5	Chapra, D. A. V. College, Siwan	I.A. Chap. 184	180-55	Pyahari Saran Singh	Ditto.
6	Chapra, Rajendra College	B.A. Chap. 69	939-51	Subrata Gupta	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1957.
7	Gaya, College	I.Sc. Gay. 13	7698-55	Dwarika Prasad	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1958.
8	Do.	I.Sc. Gay. 33	7670-55	Shyam Kinore Singh	Ditto.
9	Do.	I.Sc. Gay. 63	4840-54	Pallekkumar Sen	Ditto.
10	Muzaffarpur, M. D. D. College	I.A. Muz. 285	13322-55	Jahnavi Sinha	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1957.

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Sl. No.	Name of Candidate	College	Examination	Year	Result	Remarks
11	Motilal, M. S. College	B.A. Mot. 26	1558-50	Rajendra Nath Mishra	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1958.	
	Monghyr, B. T. & D. J. College	I.A. Mong 153	2853-55	Badri Narayan Roy	Ditto.	
	Biharsharif, Nalanda College	I.A. Nal. 159	30466-55	Badri Narayan Roy	Ditto.	
	Biharsharif, A. N. S. College, Barb.	I.A. Nal. 173	15793 55	Kamathwar Narayan Singh	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1958.	
15	Biharsharif, Nalanda College	B.A. Nal. 7	3231-52	Janardan Prasad	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1959.	
16	Patna, B. S. College	I.A. Pat. 64	11544-55	Manoranjan Prasad Sinha	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1959.	
17	Patna, Commerce College	I.Com. Pat. 45	15596-55	Biphan Ram	Ditto.	
18	Do.	I.Com. Pat. 116	15786-55	Purushottam Narayan Agrawal	Ditto.	
19	Ranchi, Ranchi College	I.A. Ran. 17	14087-55	Krishna Gopal Choudhury	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1958.	
20	Ranchi Chotanagpur, Law College	Law Part I, 2	11497-51	Ashitkumar Biswas	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Law Examination to be held in January, 1958.	
21	Ranchi, Agricultural College	Agri. (Junior) 45	18923-55	Yogeshwar Prasad Sharma	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1957.	
22	Do.	Agri. (Junior) 67	19023-55	Srinath Tandon	Ditto.	
23	Rhagalpur, Agricultural College, Sabour.	Agri. (Junior) 34	1460 52	Jogendra Kumar Jha	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the M.A. Examination of 1958.	
24	Muzaffarpur, L. S. College	M.A. Muz. 113	5849-48	Prem Prakash Sinha		

A. NARAYAN,

Controller of Examinations,
Bihar University,
Patna-4.

THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

'An Illustrated Monthly

THIRD SERIES
Volume CXLIV

October—December,
1957

PUBLISHED BY THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

First Series—1844

New Series—1913

Third Series—1921

THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

OCTOBER—DECEMBER, 1957

Vol. 144: Nos. 1—3

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
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THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

Vol. 145]

OCTOBER, 1957

[No. 1

THE ROLE OF IDEAS IN HISTORY

A Reconstruction and Analysis of Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy of History.

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1. THEORY OF IDEAS AND IDEALS

One of the persistent themes in political and Social Philosophy is the role of ideas in human history. The idealists tend to exalt moral and spiritual ideas. Plato and Kant and Robert Owen dreamt of the transformation of human cognition. If only man was imbued with the 'true' ideas, salvation would dawn upon the earth. On the other hand, hard and cold realists, Machiavellians and Hobbesians have sang the glories of the cult of the 'stronger'. In two of his books on political and social philosophy—*The Ideal of Human Unity* and *The Human Cycle*, Sri Aurobindo has attempted to deal with this very important problem of the place of ideas in human history and society.

Being a supramental idealist and a believer in Real-Ideas¹ Aurobindo accepts the great role of ideas and ideals in human history. Ideals are only ethical and utopian ideas; otherwise from the ontological standpoint they are similar. All ideas are forces and they have a faculty of formative and self-realising nature. This capacity

¹ *The Life Divine* (American Ed.), p. 257.

can sometimes be reduced to nothing when they have to deal with inconscient matter, but still they can be potential. The comprehensive unitary Real-Idea gets proliferated by self-variation and self-projection into a multiplicity of ideas and since the former is the supramental consciousness-force each one of these ideas assumes the character of independent Idea-Forces. Since the Supermind is the vast all-comprehending and all-containing consciousness the ideals, the wills or the forces do not collide with each other because the supramental power harmonises them.¹ At times there may be a dialectical antagonistic tussle between the different ideas but that is only a part of the supreme mechanism of the spirit itself for purposes of cosmic advance and progression. "From an ascending point of view may say that the Real is behind all that exists; it expresses itself intermediately in an Ideal which is a harmonised truth of itself; the Ideal throws out a phenomenal reality of variable consciousness which, inevitably drawn towards its essential Reality, tries at last to recover it entirely whether by a violent leap or normally through the Ideal which puts it forth. It is this that explains the imperfect reality of human existence as seen by the Mind, the instinctive aspiration in the mental being towards a perfectibility ever beyond itself towards the concealed harmony of the Ideal, and the supreme surge of the Spirit beyond the ideal to the transcendental."² But only when the vital aspects of life have been divinised and transfigured can there be an unadulterated realisation of the great ideals which although expressed through human mind are divine in their source.³ But the delay in the realisation of the great ideals does not mean that they are to be neglected as the empty day-dreams of an utopian idealist because "the utopian thinker is the individual mind forerunning in its turn of thought the trend which the social mind must eventually take." Because ideals are the forecasts of the basic trends of cosmic progression, hence in the ultimate analysis the individuals are only the agents in whose mind they have got crystallized and finalised rather than generated. Hence the immense role of great ideals behind human growth and progression is a consequence of their cosmic origin. The realist and the conservative too often dismiss the idealist but history shows that even Napoleon, whom Hegel calls "the *Weltgeist* on horse-back", was a colossal dreamer building

¹ Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine* Vol. I, pp. 154-57.

² *The Life Divine* (American Ed.), p. 110.

³ Cf. "... for that pre-existence in the divine knowledge is what our human mentality names and seeks as the Ideals."

plans and dreaming about Alexandrian expansionist adventures.¹ All great changes express their advent through some ideals expressed either by one individual or through a number of individuals, and society with the increase of its self-consciousness is driven towards their realisation. But sometimes there may be confusion and distortion because of the difficulty with which the mass can be made to follow great ideals and hence the cruel fates of Socrates, Jesus, Savanarola and Bruno.

Thoroughly interconnected with the concept of ideals is the concept of idea.² Different theories have been prevalent about its genesis. Empiricism refers ideas to the experience of the subjective percipient. *A priorism*, as in Kant, emphasises the role of certain spatio-temporal intuitions and the categories of understanding. A theologian attributes ideas to the action of God and in some of its forms this theory led to the occasionalism of thinkers like Malebranche. The school of *Wissenssoziologie* founded and formulated by Durkheim, Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim would emphasise the social genesis of ideas. According to Durkheim the categories of understanding and knowledge are collective representation imposed upon the individuals by the society. Aurobindo attributes a metaphysical origin to ideas because they originate, according to him, in the Real Idea and are harmonised thereby. Unlike the empiricists, the a-priorist and the sociologist, he has no detailed epistemology. His conception of Ideals and ideas is derived intuitionally from his basic metaphysical assumption and in order to agree with his views one has to be mystic of his brand.

2. THE SOCIOLOGY OF IDEAS: IDEALS AND PROGRESS

In his social and political philosophy the role of ideas is very significant. "It is the idea which expresses itself in matter and takes to itself bodies. This is true also in the life of humanity; it is true in politics, in the progress and life of a nation. It is the idea which shapes material institutions. It is the idea which builds up and destroys administrations and governments."³ Hence even when it may not have any tangible physical power the

¹ *Ideals and Progress* p. 12.

² *Ideals and Progress*, p. 2: "The Idea is not a reflection of the external fact which it so much exceeds; rather the fact is only a partial reflection of the Idea which has created it. Certainly, ideals are not the ultimate Reality, for that is too high and vast for any ideal to envisage; they are aspects of it thrown out in the world-consciousness as a basis for the workings of the world-power."

³ Sri Aurobindo, *Speeches*, pp. 111-12.

idea has a great force attached to it. Since an idea is impalpable it has greater power' and the results it brings about become all the more staggering. The idea finds out the necessary means and instruments and conquers all impediments and does not rest content until it has expressed and established itself in concrete forms.² But when the idea is false or only a half-truth or temporary truth, for example, the ideas of absolutism, aristocracy and theocracy, then it would not be permanently established in the course of history. In every idea one can find "a mastering will for self-fulfilment". Hence at times Aurobindo speaks of "*ideas forces*". Reason provides "the great ideas that are forces (*ideas forces*), ideas which in their own strength impose themselves upon our life and compel it into their moulds."³ The ideas descend from a supramental plane where consciousness and force, will and the dynamic potency to concretise the will are not separated; hence only the human forms of the ideas are subjective but in their essence they have both a foundational aspect of being and a dynamic aspect of becoming. Since the human intellect and reason proceed and work upon division, limitation and exclusiveness hence we find contrary and antithetical ideas whose integration assumes a difficult appearance. Hence we have the task of reconciling authority and liberty, socialism and individualistic democracy, beauty and truth, self-abnegation and self-fulfilment. But they cannot be fully reconciled unless there is the descent of some higher integralising force and consciousness.

The theory of ideas as forces as referred to by Aurobindo has a remarkable similarity to the theory of the French sociologist Alfred Fouillee. Aurobindo even uses the French phrase *idées-forces* which possibly he has borrowed from the French sociologist. Although according to Aurobindo the Vedic concept of *Tapas* and the Upanishadic concept of *Ikshana* have provided to him the fundamental idea that consciousness and force are ultimately the same and every will has an aspect of force, still the way of the theoretical conceptualization and exposition of his *ideas forces* has a remarkable similarity to the theories of the French writer. Fouillee (1838-1912) set forth his ideas first in *La Science sociale contemporaine* (1880) and expounded them in later books like *L'Evolutionisme des idées-forces* (1906), *La Morale des idées-forces* (1908), and *La Psychologie des idées-forces* (1910).⁴ According to Fouillee ideas once generated

¹ Sri Aurobindo, *Speeches*, pp. 111-12.

² *The Ideal of Human Unity*, p. 228, p. 314.

³ *The Human Cycle*, pp. 140-41.

⁴ Augustin Guyau : *La Philosophie et la sociologie d'Alfred Fouillee* (1912, summarized in H. B. Barnes (ed.). *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, p. 462.

become forces and tend to express themselves in action. In his definition of ideas he also includes desires. Aurobindo also included will as a dynamic factor in his concept of supramental consciousness. Fouillee states that ideas have power only to the extent of their 'objective possibility' and the amount of truth they contain. An idea becomes true not because of its force but it has power only to the extent that is true. Ideas are not passive reflections of the social and material reality but are dynamic goads to action "Everywhere the 'idea' appears as a power which contains in itself the conditions for a change of consciousness and, thanks to a correlation of psychical processes with cerebral movements the conditions for a change of cerebral processes themselves Ideas compose the collective force stored up in an individual, they have their own intellectual heredity which reacts on biological heredity and often, through education may direct and sometimes even dominate it."¹ Fouillee thought that with his concept of *idées-forces* he had reconciled the traditions of metaphysical idealism especially of the German school and the sociological outlook of modern positivist science. In the case of Aurobindo we find that he is a metaphysician of the Vedantic type who is trying to integrate the older Upanishadic idealism with the conclusions of modern Science. The concept of the self-concretising force of will is much older in Indian thought than the researches of the Darwinians and Bergson. In the metaphysics of dependent origination,—*Pratityasamutpada*—we find Buddha stating that the desire to take birth—*Bhava*—creates the necessary situations and circumstances. Nonetheless it remains true that both in the Vedic-Upanishadic concepts of *Tapas* and *Ikshana* and the Buddhist concept of *Bhava*, the problem was discussed either on a cosmic or a psychological level. Aurobindo is discussing it also on the level of politics, history and sociology and in this type of work, modern Western social sciences could possibly have given him some inspiration.

The power behind an idea might be derived, according to Fouillee from its truthful consonance to objective social possibility or according to Aurobindo from its ultimate genesis in the Truth-Conscious Real-Idea, but both of them remained emphatic supporters of the theory that behind social processes and movements one can decipher the role of ideas. Aurobindo stresses that a great idea striving for social effectuation is a considerable power and regardless of its apparent failure sometimes, it has to be taken into account when judging the

¹ Quoted in Barnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 481-82.

total situation from a long-range historical perspective. The fundamental importance of ideas in history and society has also been stressed by LeBon who says: "The only important changes whence the renewal of civilisation results, affect ideas, conceptions and beliefs. The memorable events of history are the visible effects of the invisible changes of human thought." ¹ About the process of effectuation of ideas, according to Aurobindo, diverse technics can be used. At times ideas "leap out as armed forces and break their way through the hedge of unideal powers." ² The French Revolution trying to undo the work of centuries in a few months was one such catastrophic outburst when the great ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity wanted enshrinement in European history almost through the death-dance of Kali. At times ideas conquer by martyrdom. The heroic sufferings of the Christian and Sikh teachers provide memorable examples. Sometimes ideas "make interests their subordinate helpers, a fuel to their own blaze". ³ This relationship between ideas and interests has also been discussed by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, who apart from the question of ethical validity of ideas stresses the chances of the realisability of ideas to be commensurate with the extent to which they express the real or supposed interests of powerful social groups, associations and parties. Being a realist in historical interpretation, Tönnies emphasises the predominant role of social power and the subsidiary nature of ideas. But being an idealist Aurobindo stresses the primary self-effectuating propulsive character of ideas which can at times use powerful social and political interests for their own purpose. But the self-effectuating dynamics can be grasped only from the ultimate standpoint of the origin and end of ideas. In terms of the present-day constitution of humanity guided by emotional, egoistic and vital factors ideas "have to work not only by a half-covert pressure but by accommodation to powerful forces or must even bribe and cajole them or work through and behind them". ⁴ Such compromises are bound to occur so long as there is not a moral and spiritual transformation of mankind. Hence it is that even the rational ideal of internationalism has to work with accommodation through the concrete powers of such movements as nationalism, imperialism and state sovereignty.

¹ Gustav LeBon, *The Crowd* (London, 1913) pp. 13-14, quoted in H. E. Barnes (ed) *Introduction to the History of Sociology*, p. 498.

² *The Human Cycle*, p. 148.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

8. CRITIQUE & CONCLUSION

From a long-range historical standpoint we find a great truth in what Aurobindo is saying with regard to the role of great ideas in history. Even in primitive societies we find that life is governed with reference to certain ideas which might be infra-rational and non-conceptual in their origin and formulation. Tylor, Frazer and Spencer have pointed out the great importance of myths, in ancient society, which (myths) are a mass of ideas, judgments and representations.¹ The immensely dynamic role of ideas behind such religious movements as Buddhism, Christianity and Islam and such revolutionary outbursts like the French and Russian Revolutions cannot be negated. Even the German Nazis and the Italian Fascists made a calculated and deliberate effort to inculcate the Teutonic and Roman Myths into the minds of their citizens before the latter could give up their lives in battle. It is true that we are selecting from history those movements that support the theory of the creative role of ideas and the critic would point out that the gigantic records of exterminations of peoples and nations, of catastrophic holocausts and destructions only symbolised dramatically but not exhausted by the record of two world wars, are profound epitaphs on the ten commandments, Buddha's sermon at Sarnath and Christ's sermon on the Mount and (Hiecritic) would draw the conclusion that in history not the *Geist* but the *Macht* is powerful. Once again the solution of this political and historical question depends on the solution of the fundamental metaphysical problem: which is ultimate, matter or spirit? If matter is ultimate and social consciousness is only an epiphenomenon of social reality then the only way to get a better society is to change the social structure and only those ideas have the chance of doing this work which express the demands of the objective socio-economic forces. If spirit is ultimate and ideas have an ultimate divine origin, they would work with the vehemence of supraphysical forces and would get themselves concretely realised regardless of the impediments of recalcitrant forces. Aurobindo accepts the latter view. In his drama *Perseus the Deliverer*, he refers to the battle between divine knowledge symbolised by Athene and blind power symbolised by Poseidon. The Subject in this drama represents an incident in the passage of the human mind "from a semi-primitive temperament surviving in a fairly advanced civilisation to a brighter intellectualism and humanism",² ultimately attaining the fullness of its psychic and

¹ E. Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*, p. 28.

² Sri Aurobindo, *Collected Poems and Plays*, Vol. I, p. 174.

spiritual destiny. Hence according to Aurobindo the rule of blind forces, social interests, political segmental myths and constellations like pan-Germanism, pan-Islamism or pan-Americanism or vitalistic aggressive chauvinism is a phenomenon of unregenerate humanity and with the advent of a spiritualised society ideals as divine realities pointing to the destiny of perfection would reign supreme.

But so long as that final spiritual destiny of man and society has not consummated history is going to be a kaleidoscope of the alternate victories of ideas or forces. Sometimes Aurobindo forgets his metaphysics of the self-effectuating force of ideas derived from their genesis in the conscious-force and begins to explain politics in terms of vital and material forces. Therefore we get a change and divergence in his metaphysical standpoint and political philosophy. "Forces take the first place in actual effectuation, moral principles, reason, justice only so far as forces can be compelled or persuaded to admit them or, as more often happens, use them as subservient aids or inspiring battle cries, a camouflage for their own interests."¹ This is one of the great problems of a spiritual philosophy of history: how to reconcile divine determinism and force? Sometimes it is possible to interpret the reign of force and terror in history as only the manifestations of the divine in a different aspect. Sometimes it is possible to consider it (force) as originating in the unreformed nature of man or sometimes it can be considered as a necessary mechanism in the spiritual dialectic of a cosmic manifestation. Aurobindo accepts this last solution. But if he had been content with explaining forces as only concretised, formalised, externalised ideas, as he could legitimately do on the basis of his metaphysics, the duality and contradiction which we find in his metaphysics and political philosophy would have been avoided. If ideas have a self-effectuating force then either they have to be attributed the potency of self-force or it has to be asserted that in a battle between noble ideas and blind social and political forces ideas will win at least ultimately and eventually. But sometimes Aurobindo makes such a statement: "Ideal conditions cannot be expected, for they demand a psychological clarity, a diffused reasonableness and scientific intelligence and, above all, a moral elevation and rectitude to which neither the mass of mankind nor its leaders and rulers have yet made any approach. In their absence, not reason and justice and mutual kindness, but the trend of forces and their practical and legal adjust-

¹ *The Ideal of Human Unity*, pp. 147-48.

ment must determine the working out of . . . problems." Here it appears that ideas are supposed to have lost their original self-dynamism and in spite of the original supramental metaphysics we are discussing the problem on a purely realistic sociological level. The only way Aurobindo can escape this contradiction between the self-actualising potency of ideas and their socio political ineffectiveness is to accept that even the impediments of forces and the obstructions they put to the realisations of ideas are also a part of the spiritual dialectic and it is the design of the Real-Idea that its multiple ideas should fight with the various accumulated forces and political power and win eventual triumph. Aurobindo's optimism, however, in the eventual victory of the moral and spiritual ideas is unshakable.

A comprehensive philosophy of history has to accept the creative role of ideas but the ideas in order to be effective social agents have also take hold of the minds of people. The Hegelian-Aurobindonian concept of the self-actualising potency of ideas is difficult of acceptance. Some of the greatest of moral and spiritual idealists and prophets have proved ineffectual in history. The objective structure of the social reality has also to be thoroughly scrutinized and taken into consideration. We have to be not fanatic champions of ethereal ideas but should evolve a thought pattern which accepts the efficacy of ideas to be commensurate with their capacity to mould the historical structure. This implies the acceptance of the concept of organic interdependence between ideas and social reality.

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM VIEWED THROUGH AN INDIAN EYE

BIMAL KRISHNA MOTILAL, M.A.

Change is the law of nature. This world of ours is subject to constant change. Night follows day, and day night ; seasons succeed each other, living cells are born, grow old and die. No sensible being and practically no philosophy can deny that change is inevitable and always present in all objects and processes at all times. Attempts have been made to study the exact character of this change, to understand and to explain it, by great thinkers of ages. In doing so philosophers have divided themselves into two main groups—the idealists and the materialists. The former tries to trace back all changes to some idea or intention—if not human, then divine. Changes in matter, according to them, are caused by something which is not itself entirely material.

Here the materialists raise serious voice of protest. They trace back all changes to material causes. What happens in the material world must be explained, so they assert, from principles residing in the material world itself.

In earlier days, materialists preach that the ever-changing world consists of unchanging material particles (atoms). Hence all changes are caused by the movement and inter-action of unchanging atoms. The working of the Universe is explained on the model of the working of a machine. This theory has accordingly been called mechanistic materialism.

Modern materialist rejects this theory on account of the serious limitations which it suffers from. In ultimate analysis it opens door to idealism. Hence modern materialist establishes what is known as dialectical materialism. About this Engels wrote in his *Ludwig Feuerbach*: "The world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which things apparently stable, no less than their mind images in our head, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away." Thus emerges dialectical materialism. It considers that matter always moves and changes. Motion is the mode of existence of matter—the one is inseparable from the other. Matter without motion is unthinkable just as motion without matter.

Hence no external force is necessary to set matter into motion. We are to look for the inner impulses of development, the self-motion, inherent in all processes. And this inherent attribute of matter, motion, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe—'from mere change right to thinking'.

Marxist dialectical method teaches us in the first place to consider things, not in isolation, but in their inter-connection with other things, in relation to actual circumstances of each case. Secondly, things must be considered from the standpoint of their movement and change, their development, their coming into being and going out of being. Stalin in his *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, pointed out that in nature and history there is always "renewal and development, where something is always arising and developing, and something always disintegrating and dying away". This is development. It is something other than simple process of change or mere smooth growth. Here something new and hence better emerges out of old.

To be more clear the process of development passes from "quantitative changes to open, fundamental qualitative changes, resulting in a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state". Hegel was the first to point out that the process of development is characterised by abrupt breaks in continuity, by sudden leap from one step to another. Following up his ideas, Marx and Engels established their own conception of the dialectical materialism, and explained and examined development thereby.

Now why these sudden leaps or breaks in continuity in the process of development? The materialist answers in the following way. Within every process there is a unity of two opposed tendencies. Such unity inevitably and necessarily leads to the struggle of two opposites. This unity and struggle of opposites form what is called real contradiction inherent in all processes. Contradiction is the driving force of change. The working out of such contradictions accounts for the leaps and breaks in continuity—for the transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes, or in short, for the development. Lenin notes "In its proper meaning dialectics is the study of contradiction within the very essence of things. ..Development is the struggle of opposites"—(Philosophical Note Books).

Last but not the least, modern dialecticians assert that the working out of contradictions results in a directed or forward movement. Engels says, "In spite of all seeming accidents and all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end".

According to Hegel all necessary processes were of undirected kind and a direction could only come in the processes when 'spirit' or 'consciousness' was at work in them. But the Marxist retorts that a movement can have a direction without any consciousness being present to direct it. Spirit or consciousness itself is a product of nature. If some processes have direction and others have not, it is the particular character of the processes themselves that is responsible for this and nothing more.

Thus dialectics preaches that the new must struggle with and negate the old. Negation is neither a mere destructive blow nor a loss. It is the condition for positive advance on the contrary. And the negation of negation—an important dialectical law of development—brings the old stage to a higher level with rapidity. So much about the modern dialectical materialism.

Let us now examine this theory. How far does it satisfy us? The drift of arguments points to the following conclusions :

- (1) Every event contains within itself a pair of opposing forces;
- (2) These two opposing forces are in constant war with each other;
- (3) This inner conflict is responsible for its progress and development;
- (4) Law which governs matter applies without any exception to every sphere of existence ;
- (5) Development—directed or forward movement occurs without any consciousness behind.

The first conclusion mentioned above is not an induction. It is more or less taken as a sense-datum. If one does not accept it, he is open to the charge of mal-observation. Or, it may be said that the said conclusion is a presumption. If its truth is denied, then development will remain unexplained for ever but if development is explained otherwise this presumption loses its force. The other two conclusions are mere corollaries which rest upon the first one.

If the materialist holds that through inductive process the first conclusion is arrived at they cannot offer a satisfactory explanation why a pair of opposite forces resides in an object. They simply discover it. The ultimate truth of an induction hinges upon that of a perception. The function of perception is simply to discover facts but not to explain the grounds of them. In case of presumption also the basic principle remains unexplained. It is simply presupposed in order to explain a few facts relating to matter and history, which are not otherwise explained. Hence a critical thinker has the liberty to assert that materialists failed to trace out the genesis

of a pair of opposite tendencies residing in all phenomena. The fourth conclusion minces facts like a procrustean bed. The law that apparently applies to several events of the material world can hardly be applicable to all events—whether physical or mental or both. Thus an Indian mind looks backward to the indigenous system for better and more satisfactory solution of the dynamic universe.

Moreover, dialecticians do not recognise a distinction between the two types of changes, *viz.*, Homogeneous and Heterogeneous. The flame of a lamp has been burning uniformly for a period of time. It appears to be one and the same object though it constantly changes. This change is not noticed though it actually takes place. It passes under the name of Homogeneous change. If only two opposite forces explain the development of every event, then Homogeneous change is not adequately attended to. The modern materialists may contend that in an object a pair of opposite forces works in a manner, so as to produce Homogeneous change. If it be so, the two forces should equally oppose each other. In that case the object in question stands still and no movement ensues. Thus the materialist faces a paradox. In other words, they fail to explain Homogeneous change. In order to solve all possible difficulties which beset the doctrine of universal change, one should postulate, over and above a pair of opposite forces, a third force, which actually represents the process or operation. Now the first two forces cannot account for the movement of objects only by themselves. A principle of activity or energy is to be stipulated in order to explain hard cases where two opposing forces are set at rest by their opposition. In the Sāṃkhya System of Indian Philosophy, we see that three principles which govern every realm of universe have been accepted. These three principles are the ultimate constituents of the ever-changing world. They are known as *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. The Sāṃkhya nicely explains two types of changes—Homogeneous and Heterogeneous. When a force does not get the upper hand of its rival force, struggle does not manifest. The principle of energy makes both of them move on the same form. Thus Homogeneous type of change is explained.

If a Heterogeneous change takes place, the opposing forces do neither negate themselves nor annihilate one of them. But they struggle to hasten the manifestation of an object which has remained concealed so long in its cause.

The last conclusion—the negation of any conscious principle underlying the material development should also be exploded. The materialist asserts that the universe progresses. But the concept of

progress has the necessary implication of a conscious plan or purpose. From an outward examination of several facts they assert that in these cases of development no conscious principle is traceable. Then the illicit jump is taken and a generalisation is reached. But it may be stated with equal force that since there are innumerable cases where conscious principles perceptibly influence developmental progress, the vast universe must have one all-pervading conscious principle which accounts for all types of change, development, and progress. Even the most remarkable discoveries made in modern science, (viz., theory of relativity, etc.) gradually tend to admit of an universal consciousness.

The material world has been finally found to be composed of atoms. When these atoms are analysed into their ingredients, we reach to some wave-structure which are immaterial in nature. J. W. N. Sullivan remarks in this way, "They are, it appears, completely immaterial waves. They are as immaterial waves as the waves of depression, loyalty, suicide and so on that sweep over a country"—(*Limitation of Science*, p. 68). Schrodinger, Principal of Derby Institute of Science, has made it more clear in his lecture, "Scientist now knows that Protons and Neutrons have a continuous wave structure. They surge and undulate as you can see by looking at wrist-watch's illuminous dial. Their forms and general behaviour are sharply determined by the laws of waves. Many processes take place, as if these temporary waves were substantial permanent beings. Matter, therefore, as of now, may consist not of particle but of waves." Thus in the light of Dr. Einstein's Theory of Relativity also matter cannot be eternal, self-sufficient and all-pervasive by itself. Bertrand Russell notes, "matter for common sense, is something which persists in time and moves in space. But for modern Relativity Physics, this view is no longer tenable. A piece of matter has become not a persisting thing with varying states, but a series of inter-related events. The old solidity is gone and with it the characteristic that, to the materialists, made matter more real than fleeting thoughts" (Introduction, *History of Materialism*, by Lange). A universal conscious principle has thus to be postulated to explain all facts of this world. Hence we conclude with the significant remarks of Scientists Plank and Eddington.

"I regard matter as derivative of consciousness. Consciousness I regard as fundamental" (*Observer*, 25th January 1931—Plank).

"The stuff of the World is mind-stuff" (*The Nature of the Physical World*).

A PLEA FOR CALIBAN

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Caliban is universally recognised as one of the masterpieces of Shakespeare's creation. But there has been considerable divergence of opinion as regards the interpretation of this character. Some would deny him humanity and they seek support to their contention in the observation of Prospero :

'A freckled whelp hag-born—not honour'd with
A human shape.'

Act. 1. Sc. 2.

Nay, Dr. Daniel Wilson in 'Caliban: The missing link' broaches a fanciful theory, namely that 'he is a novel anthropoid of a high type—such as on the hypothesis of evolution must have existed immediately between the ape and man—in whom some spark of rational intelligence has been enkindled, under the tutorship of one who has already mastered the secrets of nature.' This is ingenuity carried too far. After all, Caliban is a man, though low in the scale of civilisation. Miranda's observation, when first her eyes meet Ferdinand : 'This is the third man that e'er I saw', is enough to settle all doubts and in the light of this observation, Prospero's remark quoted above may be taken to refer to his misshapen appearance unlike the appearance of any normal man.

Caliban is a man ; but what sort of man? In his Preface to 'A new Variorum edition' of 'The Tempest' H. H. Furness writes : 'It has become one of the commonplaces of criticisms of the Play to say that Caliban is the contrast to Ariel and that as the tricky spirit is the type of the air and of unfettered fancy, so is the abhorred slave typical of the earth and of all brutish appetites ; the detested hag-seed is then dismissed blistered all o'er with expressions of abhorrence and with denunciations of his vileness, which any print of goodness will not take.'¹ Then he poses a question : 'Is there, then, nothing to be said in favour of Caliban? Is there really and truly no print of goodness in him?'

¹ Furness cites one solitary voice raised in Caliban's favour. That is Coleridge who writes : 'Caliban is in some respects a noble being.'

Caliban was the sole inhabitant and, therefore, the sole owner of the island where his mother Sycorax was banished till Prospero came and dispossessed him. He may be taken as the type of the unsophisticated natives without any gloss of civilisation such as the white men found in far-off islands which they colonised. Prospero, then, is the white man at his best. And their relation is symbolical of the relation between the coloured natives and their white conquerors.

What was this relation? Let Caliban speak, for with all his depravity, we need not doubt his words: he speaks before Prospero and Prospero does not contradict. When first the white man came, he 'stroked' the savage and made much of him; he gave him sweet things to eat and taught him language. The savage reciprocated. He loved the white man and showed him 'all the qualities o' the isle'. So days passed, till at last the white man discovered that there was a gulf between the two which was unbridgeable. In the language of Prospero there was that in Caliban 'which good nature could not abide to be with', and so a 'hard rock' was assigned to him where to dwell.

But what was this loathesome element in Caliban 'which good nature could not abide to be with'? A general accusation may mean anything or it may mean nothing. But no—there is one specific charge against Caliban and it is a grave charge: he attempted to violate the honour of Miranda. If for this offence the enraged father had driven him away from the island or if he had kept Miranda away from his impious sight and for himself, he had shunned his presence, any such step would have been perfectly understandable. But however much he might dislike the villain, Prospero did nothing of the kind. Caliban's movements were restricted, yet all the same he was retained in service, even though his daughter might not like 'to look on' him. And the reason is plain; Prospero frankly confesses:

But, as 'tis,

We cannot miss him: he does make our fire,
Fetch in our wood, and serves in offices
That profit us.

Act 1. Sc. 2

This, to speak bluntly, is compromise with evil for expediency. And it profits neither party: the white man suffers from a sense of superior virtue which is not helpful to healthy development of mind, the savage smarts under a sense of injustice which makes him revengeful. Prospero is a magician, not the vulgar magician who has

commerce with the Devil, but a magician, who, by virtue of superior knowledge, has command over the forces of nature. What is more, he is a philosopher who has control over self even under the gravest provocation. Yet in his attitude towards Caliban he is out and out a dictator. It may be argued that whether he wills it or not, Prospero must strike an attitude, for Caliban is sure to take advantage of the slightest show of courtesy and leniency and nothing can move him except frowns and threats and tortures of the flesh which he understands. This, in fact, is the conventional apology of the white men for their traditional attitude towards the coloured people. But how to explain Prospero's discourteous call to Ariel: 'Come away, servant, come!' (Act I. Sc. 2). This is all the more significant in that he immediately changes tone (perhaps because he feels that he has been unjustifiably impolite) and addresses his favourite spirit as 'My Ariel'. Ariel certainly is no mean and contemptible creature, as Caliban might be. True, he frets under bondage and threats of punishment are sometimes necessary to make him work. Yet this does not justify such want of courtesy as the call betrays, specially when Ariel is obeying his instructions so faithfully. The truth is that with all his greatness—he is almost a superman—Prospero is perhaps too conscious of his superiority. This is all the more lamentable in that he had resigned all earthly power: his dukedom with all that it means to his brother for knowledge and the blessings of a life of retirement. As for Caliban, the sense of injustice together with the consciousness of his own helplessness makes him stoop to treachery, even though treachery seems alien to his nature. Caliban is frankly outspoken in his denunciation of Prospero, though he knows too well what it would cost him. If this be considered as an act of desperation, at least his attitude towards the spirits shows a fair mind. The spirits torment him night and day: yet in speaking of them he says that they would not torment him 'unless he bid 'em.' (Act II. Sc. 2). Such a one is not temperamentally deceitful and the conclusion seems irresistible that it is the systematic ill treatment he receives at the hand of the master that makes him the traitor that he turns out to be.

Caliban is of the earth, earthy. But the fact remains that he gets little justice from Prospero and, for that matter, from the readers whose judgment is blinded by the glamour of Prospero's personality. Take a trivial instance: 'I must eat my dinner', grumbles Caliban (Act I. Sc. 2), evidently irritated at being called so peremptorily and critics at once seize upon it as an indication of his gluttony. Gluttony

is bad enough, and it is not unlikely that those who lack spiritual food would become gluttonous. Yet who would not grumble if called by the master when taking meals? Man certainly does not live on bread alone; yet who is there who can do without bread?

No, Caliban never gets a square deal. Commenting on his resentment at being dispossessed of what he thought was his by right of inheritance, Percival writes, "With the same justice or injustice did the savages of the New World charge the European conquistadores from Spain and the colonizers or 'planters' from England, with expropriating them of their lands; the answer of both to the charge is the same: 'We civilized you in return, and this is no robbery, but a fair exchange'; and this, and more, might, well have been Prospero's answer to Caliban."¹ Poor Caliban can expect little justice from critics who are so unabashed in their advocacy of colonialism.

Yet, after all, the fact that he was dispossessed of the island did not weigh much with Caliban. In fact, for all we know he must have surrendered his rights willingly and would doubtless have felt happy even under thralldom, if only he had been kindly treated. The truth is Caliban has no conception of liberty and this, it may be incidentally pointed out, was the plague-spot in the character of the average native. If the savage inhabitants of far-off lands succumbed before the impact of the superior civilisation of the white men, they did so because they did not know how to value freedom and in consequence suffered from a sense of inferiority complex. Caliban frets under the tyranny of Prospero and when opportunity seems to offer itself, from a sense of frustration he readily transfers his allegiance to Stephano. This is understandable. But the mere prospect of being freed from the old shackles makes him forget that even if old shackles fall off, of his own choice he has forged new chains of slavery. Caliban is jubilant like anything and wild with joy he sings:

No more dams I'll make for fish ;
Nor fetch in firing
At requiring ;
Nor scrape trencher, nor wash dish :
'Ban, 'Ban, Cacaliban
Has a new master—Get a new man.

The poor fool concludes :

Freedom, hey-day! hey-day, freedom ! freedom, hey day, freedom !

[Act II, Sc. 2]

This is morbid. With the savage who lacks the urge for freedom, change of master is freedom enough. Caliban's objection is simply nauseating when, at the very first encounter with Stephano, he gleefully observes, 'I'll kiss thy foot' (Act II, Sc. 2) and in a later scene (Act III, Sc. 2) goes even a step further: 'Let me lick thy shoe.' Prospero never mentions this depravity in his slave and it is but natural that he does not, for the white man is apt to make capital out of it in his traffic with the savage people.

Let us now turn to the most abominable trait in Caliban about which Prospero has been vocal. Caliban is grossly sensual and is not ashamed to profess that he is. This is sickening. Yet certain things need be considered before any final assessment is made. Sex-urge, after all, is normal in a normal man. It is education, environment and social convention that teaches the civilised man in society to control this universal appetite. But Caliban has neither education nor environment, nor is he restrained by social convention. It may be argued: Is not Miranda a child of nature as much unrestrained by social convention? Yes, she is; but there is a lacuna. Leaving aside the question of heredity which, though a very important factor, is outside the scope of our present discussion; Miranda has both education and healthy environment. She has her books, she has her father as her companion and guide. But did not Caliban have Prospero as his tutor and guide? Yes, but Prospero was his master too and a relentless task-master to boot. If to Miranda Prospero is a loving father full of remorse that he had neglected his duties towards her while yet he was the Duke of Milan, to Caliban he is a relentless task-master feeling complacent that when the savage did not know his 'own meaning' but would 'gabble like a thing most brutish', he endowed his 'purposes with words that made them known.' Caliban is of vile nature (here heredity played its part) and for his unabashed sensuality he was, we may presume, racked with 'old cramps' till he roared, besides being tormented in all imaginable and unimaginable ways by spirits who were set upon him. But did it occur to Prospero that he was more like a patient to be delicately handled than a criminal to be brutally punished? The philosopher-father must have judiciously thrown hints about the mysteries of sex to his adolescent daughter (or his reply to the query of Miranda: 'Sir, are you not my father?' in Act. I, Sc. 2 would lose much of its significance) and he must have invested the subject with religious awe. But did he attempt anything like that with Caliban? The truth is that he punished the offender but the offender could not realise that

what he thought to commit was an offence against God and man. No wonder that his passion for vengeance gathered an added momentum at being frustrated.

Yet, after all, with all his depravity Caliban is not a lost soul. For he has feeling for beauty, he is responsive to music. A soul that is altogether lost could not have the vision of etherial beauty such as the following impassioned, yet controlled outburst of poetry suggests:

The isle is full of noises,
 Sounds and sweet airs, that give us delight and hurt not.
 Sometimes a thousand twangling instruments.
 Will hum about my ears, and sometimes voices,
 That, if I then had wak'd after long sleep,
 Will make me sleep again: and then, in dreaming,
 The clouds methought would open, and show riches
 Ready to drop upon me; that, when I wak'd,
 I cried to dream again.

[Act III, Sc. 2.

A child looks at the beauty of the flower blooming on the leafy twig, it yearns for the flower, plucks it, drinks its fragrance and then, as it laughs, crushes its petals and throws it away and cries for yet another. If this child were taught that beauty and fragrance is best enjoyed when the flower is 'on the tree' and that once it is plucked with ungentle hands, it withers away, the child would know and abjure the cruel sport. When I think of the influence of music on this wretched creature who gets sympathy from nowhere, when I think how after his misadventure, as soon as he realises his folly and perhaps for the first time in life hears of pardon from the lips of his master,¹ he has the goodness to declare that he would be 'wise hereafter and seek for grace' (mind, the greater villains, Antonio and Sebastian with all their gloss of civilisation do nothing of the kind)—yes; when I think of this aspect of the character of Caliban, I am tempted to look upon him as a child of nature, whose instinct for want of a better guide led him astray and whatever Prospero might say about 'pains humanely taken', I am afraid there was something fundamentally wrong in his way of approach.

¹ I think I shall be doing Prospero no wrong if I suspect that he who punished Caliban for the slightest neglect of duty now pardons a really heinous offence not because he has suddenly developed a softness for the poor slave but because his heart at this moment is too full of bliss at the new turn of events to think of punishing the erring fool.

INFANTILE ANXIETY, THE PRECURSOR OF NEUROSES

PROF. P. N. CHOUBEY

The Science of Clinics has by its logic of development devoted incomparably more attention to the somatic aspects than to the psychic aspects of human ailments, though it has long been established that many of the organic diseases have their origins in, or, are dependent on, or, are linked up with psychic factors, especially emotional factors having roots since early childhood. Now-a-days, psychosomatic approach in psychiatry is of great help to patients suffering from chronic diseases like respiratory disturbances, especially bronchial asthma ; cardiovascular disturbances, including essential hypertension, vesodepressor syncope and migraine ; gastro-intestinal disturbances, especially peptic ulcers, colitis and stomach neurosis etc. Even some chronic cases of skin disease and rheumatoid arthritis are reported to be cured by proper administration of psychotherapy.¹ Freud tries to justify the fact that both conscious and unconscious psychic processes are somatic. As he aptly puts it : "It thus seems natural to lay the stress in psychology upon these somatic processes, to see in them the true essence of what is mental." This conception of Freud explains satisfactorily the etiology of somatic neuroses, conversion hysteria, somatic paranoia and other organic diseases which can be cured by an intensive course of psychotherapy. Therefore, one sided tackling of the problems of diseases isolated from their mental contents has not only marooned the science of psychotherapy, but also affected the fuller development of the treatment of physical disorders. And whoever realises that man is more than his body must admit the great value of psycho-somatic approach in modern psychiatry.

We live in, what is described as, an Age of Anxiety. Adolescence is particularly a period of emotional strains and, as a recent investigation into the mental health of Oxford Undergraduates has revealed, the incidence of anxiety neurosis among students is far higher than among other people of similar age.

Before discussing how infantile anxiety leads to neuroses in later life, it is better to make a clear distinction between fear and anxiety. What we call anxiety varies from mild disquiet and constraint to

¹ Freud, S. *An Outline of Psycho-analysis*, 1949, Chapter IV, page 17.

extreme apprehension. It is distinguished from fear partly on the grounds of lesser intensity and partly because its cause or object is less clearly defined. Anxiety is not a positive fear of something ; it is an apprehension lest something disquieting or harmful should occur.

Doubt is the root of anxiety. Clinical experience shows that a great deal of anxiety arises not from objective, but from subjective, causes. In anxiety states, the patient is beset with all manner of fears, which he can justify inadequately, if at all. Even the normal person may, from time to time, experience anxiety out of all proportion to the objective worries which beset him. "There is nothing on earth or in the heavens, nor in the mind of man, which may not be the object of anxiety." It is one of the most common distractions of daily life, from which few people are fortunate enough to escape.

It has been revealed by psycho-analysis that anxiety is mainly due to the repressed anti-social desires and the intra-psychic conflict which is technically called the damming-up of the libido, or a defensive reaction of the ego against the claims of the unrecognized libido, which it projects on to the outside world. So, according to psychoanalysts, morbid anxiety is a danger signal. The danger, however, is not external but internal. The fear of castration is the most common cause of repression, since it is for fear of consequence that a child is compelled to repress its hate, its jealousy or its sex pleasure, so that these impulses being repressed are transformed into morbid character traits of psychoneuroses. The primary anxiety, or the first experiences out of which later anxiety develops, is a manifestation of unmastered sexual tension. It is an automatic occurrence that takes place whenever the organism is flooded with excitement. In short, anxiety results from the inhibited sex impulse and is projected on to an external situation, which is avoided thereafter by ego's mechanisms of defence. By introjection and identification a child develops within him a moral self or super ego which prohibits the natural activities of the id on the one hand and deprives the ego of its independence on the other. In this way the bedrock of morbid anxiety and guilt is laid in early childhood and adolescence.

The early symptoms of neuroses generally appear in the form of behaviour disorders which include the phobias of early childhood. Fear and anxiety are some of the primary features of infancy, childhood, and adolescence. Every normal child becomes frightened if he is kept alone in the dark, meets a stranger, hears a loud sound or sees, for instance, a big black growling dog approaching. And if these unpleasant situations are repeated in the life of the

child, then his childhood phobias are fixed and ingrained. Indeed, they grow stronger with years and gradually associated with instinctual demands, start causing anxiety. Sometimes it so happens that a mere sight of a lump of cotton or wool may frighten the child, or a small piece of milk cream in the mouth with milk may evoke nausea and vomiting. Of course, these symptoms require thorough investigation and psycho-analytical interpretations.

At the early stage of the development of personality of a small child the ego has to face many difficulties, and consequently it is subjected to the pressure of early anxiety situations. Freud holds that anxiety in small children is usually caused by 'the absence of loved or longed-for person'. And according to Melanie Klein, anxiety as fear of persecution is predominantly experienced in small infants even in the first few months of life. So children, of their own accord, try to master anxiety through spontaneous play activities. Play activities help children in projecting their internal instinctual fear and anxiety into the outer world. Hence, play has a therapeutic value and it restores child's physical and mental health. And a healthy parent-child-relationship helps the gradual normal unfolding of human personality from the very beginning of life.

The structure of human personality depends upon the functions of the mental apparatuses, viz., the ego, the id and the super ego. The final stabilization of human personality can be achieved only when a perfect harmonization of the ego, the id and the super ego, is established on the basis of the formation of an Ego-Ideal. But the rational balance between the ego and the super ego is seldom experienced; and few persons are fortunate enough to escape the intra-psychic conflict. As Anna Freud² says, "Super-ego is the mischief maker which prevents the ego's coming to a friendly understanding with the instinct. It sets up an ideal standard, according to which sexuality is prohibited and aggression pronounced to be anti-social. It demands a degree of sexual renunciation and restriction of aggression which is incompatible with psychic health. The ego is completely deprived of its independence and reduced to the status of an instrument for the execution of the super ego's wishes; the result is that it becomes hostile to instinct and incapable of enjoyment." Our clinical experience shows that sometimes severe mental and physical strains cause deepest anxiety situation, and in this way many unfortunate people succumb to neurosis; the reason

² Freud, Anna—*The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*, 1948, Chapter V, page 59.

is that the difference between the normal and the neurotic is only of quantity and not of quality. I conclude this short paper with a few case histories from my personal experience, which are perhaps typical :—

Case No. 1. Mr. X, a medical man, aged 30, got married, but he divorced his wife. He was suffering from morbid anxiety and dread accompanied by a sense of congestion in the head and constant apprehension of impending danger and death. He often felt his pulse and complained of its irregularity. He suffered from unusual night sweating, general tremor, irritability, gastro-intestinal disturbances and impotence. He was under psychological treatment for nearly two years, and now he is fully cured and leading a normal life. It was a case of anxiety neurosis.

In course of psychotherapy it was found that he was suffering from repressed passive homosexuality arising out of his infantile maladjustment and frustration. There was an incidence of incest at the age of fourteen. He was a very nervous and anxious type of boy.

Patient's family history showed that he had a boisterous and eccentric father who tortured him and quarrelled with other members of his family, especially his mother. His mother committed suicide when he was a boy of ten. In short, Mr. X's upbringing was sadly neglected and his family life was most unhappy.

Case No. 2. Mr. Y, a social worker, aged 32, unmarried, came with the following symptoms : He was willing to marry but the force of the counter wish was so strong in him that he could not marry. He was in the habit of following women in the street though he knew it to be illegal and immoral. He had the desire of rubbing his penis on other's body, especially on the body of the leader-type personality. While travelling in a tram car or a public bus he used to count how many female passengers were there in it and in the opportune moment to touch their body. He was under treatment nearly for two years and a half. He had achieved much improvement. It was a case of obsession-compulsion psychoneurosis.

Patient's childhood history showed that one of his widowed aunts used to rub his little penis regularly at the time of massaging oil before bath. At times the patient felt that he was the son not of his father but of his youngest maternal uncle. The patient was the only child of his parents. In his early infancy his father married a second wife and since then he and his mother were living in his maternal uncle's house. From early childhood Mr. Y was very

nervous, and emotional. At the age of fourteen he developed homosexuality which persisted up to his twentieth year.

Case No. 3. A boy of 8, was very shy, nervous and delinquent. He had a long-standing thumb-sucking habit and nocturnal neurosis. He was suffering from nightmare and anxiety dreams. The child's family history showed that his father was a perfect gentleman, but his mother was a hysteric lady, who used to pick a quarrel with anybody, especially her husband.

The child was under psychological treatment. The parents were advised to re-establish a healthy parent-child relationship; and the boy was asked to draw whatever he liked and to play with other children of his age. In the beginning the boy was a bit hesitant, but gradually he adjusted himself. Now, his behaviour is completely changed and he is studying in Class VIII.

APPENDIX

A Broad classification of Mental Disorders :—

A. Psycho-neuroses or Neuroses

(1) Hysteria :

- (a) Conversion Hysteria
- (b) Anxiety Hysteria
- (c) Other unclassified

Forms of emotional reaction :

- (i) Gastrointestinal reaction,
- (ii) Cardiovascular reaction,
- (iii) Genitourinary reactions, *e.g.*,
menstrual difficulty, urinary irregularities, frigidity in women
and impotence in men.
- (iv) Psychogenic allergic reaction etc.
- (2) Obsessive—compulsive Psycho-neuroses.
- (3) Anxiety Neuroses
- (4) Neurasthenia
- (5) Hypochondria

B. Psychoses (Functional)

(1) Schizophrenia (Dementia Praecox)

- (a) Simple type
- (b) Hebephrenic type
- (c) Katatonic type
- (d) Paranoid type

- (2) Paranoia (Paranoid States)
- (3) Manic Depressive Psychoses.

C. Sexual Perversions

- (1) Homosexuality
- (2) Exhibitionism—observationism
- (3) Sadism—Masochism
- (4) Fetishism
- (5) Narcissism
- (6) Pygmalianism
- (7) Bestiality

D. Amentia or Mental Deficiency:—

(Congenital & Acquired)

- (1) Morosis (Feeble-mindedness)
I.Q. 61-90,
- (2) Imbecility — I.Q. 31-60.
- (3) Idiocy — I.Q. 10-30.

E. Psychoses other than Functional

- (1) Epileptic Psychoses
- (2) Toxic Psychoses
- (3) Traumatic Psychoses
- (4) General Paralysis (G.P.I.)
- (5) Psychoses due to disturbance of circulation
- (6) Psychoses due to metabolic disturbance
- (7) Psychoses due to the growth of tumor in the brain
- (8) Psychoses due to unknown causes, e.g., Huntington's chorea and Paralysis agitans.
- (9) Senile Dementia.

RESEARCH ON PERSONALITY AND PROBLEMS OF ASSESSMENT

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THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As the techniques adopted in this investigation consisted of inventories on the one hand and situation tests on the other it will be proper to construct a theoretical frame-work (a) so as to explain all the considerations underlying the construction of the inventories and situation test and (b) to put forward the arguments in favour of accepting Teacher's ratings and responses of the criterion-group as the criteria for validation of tests on persistence and interest respectively.

The questionnaire method of personality study involves a series of questions combined into a single measuring scale. But where is the justification for believing that the responses to a few questions will faithfully reflect one's feelings, dispositions, abilities or traits? In general, alternative choices in the form of 'yes', 'no' and (?) are supplied and the subject's response is taken at its face value and treated as an index of his actual characteristics under similar circumstances. When an individual acts in the same manner on different occasions, it means that the groups of stimuli is presented on these occasions have the same personal significance for him. This fundamental fact forms the basis of Allport's assumption of 'Generalised Tendencies' within the organism, which he described in short as 'traits'. Cattell's view of traits is also similar, as according to him, trait is nothing but a collection of reactions or responses bound by some kind of unity which permits the responses to be gathered under one term and treat in the same fashion for most purposes.

So, in the present investigation it can be assumed that personality originates and develops through the interactions of four main sectors: the cognitive sector, the affective sector, the conative sector and the physical sector.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ASSESSMENT OF PERSISTENCE

The construction of this questionnaire was stimulated by the consideration that such a test on persistence is rare in this country and as such would be of value if it proved reliable and valid. As this was intended for application and validation in West Bengal this was constructed in Bengali with a view to avoiding the influence of verbal factor. The questionnaire contains eighteen items which have been constructed with an eye to a particular connotation of the term. As the term persistence may have different meanings to different people it is perhaps wise to describe here, how and in what sense this term has been used in this investigation.

As persistence has been tentatively defined here as 'a trait by virtue of which an individual continues in steadfast pursuit of an aim, inspite of difficulties or obstacles', the following considerations were taken into account before framing the test items.

A person who is not steadfast quickly gets bored with a job, neither can he be expected to finish a task if difficulty arises. On the other hand, a man who is persistent pays little attention to how long it takes him to finish a job or to what is going around him; he is a person who never rests or feels satisfied until he has got over the difficulty and finished the work started. This view of persistence is quite in keeping with that given by MacArthur in his Ph.D. Thesis.¹ There has been another attempt to phrase questions in an indirect manner so that the child would not realise that he was revealing himself.² The situations chosen were within the experience of the particular age group and the number of such situations was limited in number. As Vernon says, "It is a mistake to make the test too long because the testees get bored and respond in a stereotyped manner, failing to consider each item on its merits". Both the questionnaires were made deliberately short and handy for making them effective from the standpoints of administration and scoring as well.

ADMINISTRATION

Before actually applying the questionnaires the writer considered it advisable to create favourable situations for the successful administration of the tests. The purpose of the investigation had to be kept concealed and a plausible explanation was offered when one was called for.

It was deemed essential to diminish as far as possible any feeling of strangeness or excitement on the testees and to reduce the unnatural and artificial conditions of the testing situation and as such the necessity for developing a cordial relation with the testees before the actual application of the tests was kept in view.

Scoring

The following scoring principle was adopted for discriminating the more persistent from the less persistent. In the case of questionnaire I, the subject would receive plus one every time he underlined the response denoting the presence of the trait measured and this was sometimes 'yes' and sometimes 'no'. But in all cases a 'doubtful' (?) response will score zero.

The method of scoring in questionnaire II is a bit different. Subjects are to write down the name of one of the persons (imaginary) described in each part of the story and thus scoring will depend upon which person they associate most readily with themselves.

Construction of the Inventory for the Assessment of Interest

Inspite of the fact that inventories suffer from a number of limitations it was considered that the questionnaires may serve some purpose for

drawing out relevant information about the likes and dislikes in a particular field. All the questions were intended to place the individuals in such situations that their responses might be of value and significance to the investigator

The construction of this questionnaire was guided by the theories underlying Kuder preference Record. The final questionnaire took the pattern of the above card and thus 60 items were placed in different combinations each group containing three different items representing different fields of interest. Instead of getting a list of scattered items responded the idea of grouping them in order to increase the range of scores and provide scope for checking and better discrimination stimulated the investigator to frame the questionnaire according to the above mentioned Preference Card. There are 60 items designed to measure six different types of interest and arranged in 20 different groups. Most of the items demanded information about the subjects' actual participation in different fields of activities or the feeling about what would be done and how could he react in certain situations.

In short, the preference card was an inventory attempting to draw information about the subjects' preferences, likes and interest (dominant) by placing the individuals in such abstract situations as would indicate the subject's interest in every sense of the term. The consideration behind the construction of the inventory was quite in keeping with Strong's view of interest.

Administration and scoring

In spite of the written directions at the top of the inventory it was considered advisable to make instructions clear before actually administering the test. Uniformity in procedure for administering the tests was another important conditions.

Scoring

The subject would receive 1, 2 and 3 for his responses indicating least, average and highest preference to each of questions forming a group. The range of scores will therefore vary from 10 to 30 as there are 20 items for the assessment of each type of interest. In other words, the testee is told to rank his order of preference to the three answers to such questions forming each group. The scoring principle is in keeping with that followed in the Allport and Vernon's Study of Values.

Construction of situational tests

Though the Preference card or inventory formed the main techniques for the assessment of interest, still certain situational tests of *ad hoc* type were evolved for comparison and analysis. As mentioned before, interest has been taken to be "as complex as amalgam of subjective feelings and objective behaviour tendencies".¹

The investigator, therefore, was conscious of the various dimensions of interest and tried to test an individual's relative standing on six main types of interest through his actual participation in certain standardised activities or situations and analysis of the relative influences of different objects on the individual's mind.

The first situational test was constructed with the hope that this will give the investigator greater opportunities to observe the subject's responses to actual life like situations on the basis of his participation in the activities presented in the test. The items comprising the test have been so selected that they may give indication of the subjects expressed interest in relevant fields. The items either demand some information or his preliminary knowledge in relevant fields of interest and mostly cover the different aspects of each field. For example the items designed to assess one's interest in Art comprised activities demanding his motivation in drawing some sketches, sense of colour composition, sense of perspectives and proportion. Similarly, the items designed to assess one technical interest comprised situations demanding subject's information and familiarity about certain common parts of ordinary things mostly used in every day life but evoking mechanical or technical interest.

There are five items for assessing each type of interest arranged in different combinations so as to increase the efficiency of the test in discriminating. Three items have been put in each group and the subject is to choose one out of the three. Thus for assessing six types of interest there are thirty items set in 20 possible groups and each group of three items will be presented one after another.

Scoring

For each successful participation in every activity the subject will score 1 and thus the range of score will be from 0 to 10 in each field of interest. Thus the relative standing on six main types of interest may be deduced from the total pattern of responses. In this connection it is worth while to mention that in the twenty groups, each type of interest has been represented 10 times and as such if in all the groups anyone successfully participates in activities representing the same type of interest then he will score the maximum i.e., 10 and his standing on that type of interest will be the highest.

Construction of Situation Test No. 3

The construction of this test was stimulated by the consideration that one's interest may find expression through his preference of certain news items to others. There are thirty news items pertaining to different fields of interest presented in different combinations in 20 groups and the subject is to choose one of the three items forming each group, for perusal and underlining. The administration and the scoring principle are similar to that followed in the former case (i.e., Situation Test No. 2).

Construction of Situation Test No. 4

This comprised a new technique based on the assumption that the objects in which one is more interested are retained more than the other which do not evoke so much interest. On the basis of this the test was constructed and a number of cards containing sketches of equal number of objects in different fields of interest comprised the test. The total number of such card was originally five and each card contained six items, one from each field.

Administration and Scoring

Each card would be presented for a few seconds, say 2 seconds before the subjects who will be asked to write the names of the objects they have retained after each presentation. For each item retained and described a score of 1+ in respective field will be given. For example, if one out of a total of 15 items retained and reproduced 10 belong to Technical field the individual's standing on the same will be obviously dominant. Thus the number of items in a particular field of interest forming the majority will indicate the dominant interest of the individual.

Construction of the Information Test

This test was devised with a view to serving as one of the subsidiary checks on the assumption that anyone keeps a wider range of information in a particular field in which he is more interested than in the one in which he has lesser interest. This attempt is quite in keeping with that of E. A. Peel who has devised a test which accentuates a more certain knowledge of things in which the testee has the greater interest than things in which he has a lesser interest.

The test contained 36 items of which six pertained to each type of interest.

Administration and Scoring

This is a group test to be applied with a clear instruction that all the items should be attempted. Each correct answer will fetch a score of 1 and thus the range of scores for each type of interest is 0 to 6.

Construction of the Questionnaire for the Assessment of persistence

The construction of this questionnaire was stimulated by the scantiness of such instruments in this country. It was also hoped that such a test would be of value in the field of education and guidance, if it proved reliable and valid. It must be admitted that Cattell's 16 P. F. Test and Bernreuter's Personality Inventory contributed to its construction.

As the term persistence may have different meanings to different people, it is perhaps wise to describe here, how and in what sense this term has been used in this investigation. As persistence has been ~~used~~

tively defined here as a trait by virtue of which an individual continues in steadfast pursuit of an aim, in spite of difficulties or obstacles, the following considerations were taken into account before constructing a questionnaire for its assessment.

In this connection it may be mentioned that the questionnaire is an adaptation of the questionnaire constructed and validated by the author in England. The recent one has been constructed in Bengali in order to avoid language difficulty and it contains 18 items for assessing persistence only.

Administration and Scoring

Oral instructions are to be given in addition to the written directions on the top of the questionnaire. The necessity for complete honesty when answering deserves special emphasis.

The subject would receive 1 each time he will underline the response denoting the presence of the trait measured; this was sometimes 'yes' and sometimes 'no'.

Construction of Questionnaire No 2 for the assessment of persistence.

The idea of constructing another disguised questionnaire appeared to be more psychological as Symond¹ observes, "It is probable that disguised questionnaires are more valid than those which are straight forward in their approach". It seemed desirable therefore, to phrase questions in an indirect manner so that the child did not realise that he was revealing himself. The situations chosen were within the experience of the 14—17 years old boys and girls and might form a story. The story included six situations. In both the questionnaires for the assessment of persistence, it will be seen that the number of items is not large and this was deliberate.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE SITUATION TEST

(For the assessment of persistence)

It was anticipated that shortage of time and other circumstances would not allow the investigator to apply existing situation tests of persistence. The situation test was, therefore, constructed so that its findings might be compared with those of the questionnaire 1. The investigator decided to present three situation tests to the children at the same time with the clear instruction that they were at full liberty to spend all the time available on any one of them instead of attempting all the three. Alternatively, they asked to record the order of preference and the time they began and gave up in each case. It was not considered desirable to try to elicit a high degree of original motivation for the tests. At his first meeting with the children, the experimenter told them that he would ask them to do certain games for ascertaining their speed of action. They

were also told that they would be given the opportunity to try any of them as long as they liked within the time-limit. Thus the purpose of the situation test was kept concealed, as it was intended to observe them under normal motivational conditions. The battery of tests presented a variety of three tests in the form of games:—

(1) Dotting and Pricking, (2) Crossing Vowels and (3) Writing natural numbers, and separating the odd numbers from the even by distinctive marks. The aim of the situation test was to estimate persistence, i.e., how long one could stick to a job, however, difficult and boring it might be. McArthur's definition of persistence that "persistence is a virtue by which an individual continues in steadfast pursuit of an aim, in spite of difficulties or obstacles" was kept in view.

It is true that the quality of persistence mainly required in the field of education is mixed with intelligence, but at the same time it appears to be true that people need persistence in certain jobs which at the moment are dull. This is particularly so with the beginners in any language or in Arithmetic where repetition seems to be the only way of learning and practice offers the key to advance. The tests presented in this investigation were not completely unintelligent activities as each of them demanded understanding of the principle according to which each game was to be done.

The writer made the following assumptions before constructing his test:

(i) That persistence is not necessarily related to high intelligence and that there is a special trait called persistence that is independent of intelligence.

(ii) That less persistent persons change their occupations in a given time more often than the more persistent persons. Thus the scoring of this situation test was guided by this consideration and individual scores were calculated by dividing the total time spent (in this case almost the same as the maximum time allowed, few giving up entirely before time) by the number of changes. If an individual stuck to one job for the whole period he naturally scored more than one who changed two or three times.

The Construction of the Criteria

In a domain such as personality, the selection of a criterion against which to measure the test results forms one of the crucial steps in an experimental investigation like the present one. But it appears to be impossible to obtain a fully reliable standard by which to judge the result furnished by the tests or questionnaires. There are no dependable criteria upon which objective validation of the measure used might be based.

There are ratings on the one hand and other types of tests on the other. But is it possible to have absolute assessments of personality aspects like persistence and interest. According to Burt "even a personality is an abstraction, a child is not an isolated unit.....what the psychologist has to study are the interactions between a 'personality' and an 'environment'—the behaviour of a dynamic mind in a dynamic field

of which it forms a part''. The same attitude is revealed by Murray-et-al in their proposal for a theory of personality. They said, "Since at every moment, an organism is within an environment which largely determines its behaviour, and since the environment changes.....the conduct of an individual cannot be formulated without a characterisation of each confronting situation, physical and social''. True it is that no judgment can possibly be regarded as final, but in the absence of a reliable criterion the best possible one should be selected. The question as to what is the best possible criterion is very controversial. Therefore, the writer has considered it advisable to obtain estimates of the degree to which the subject possesses the traits in question, from persons who have had an opportunity of observing him for some time under a variety of conditions. This is of course, a deliberate step to evade unnecessary debates and the writer feels justified in doing so. Ratings are according to Vernon, 'most inadequate as the sole criteria of a person's traits, or as the sole source of data for the scientific study of personality'—The writer is quite conscious of the limitations of ratings. The writer has, therefore, reasons to look out for other suitable criterion particularly for validation of interest tests.

Criterion for Validation of tests or inventories on interests

As ratings are not the only criteria for selection of tests which intend to measure something involving motivation, it will be wise to select some other criterion group for comparing the test results and thereby validating the instruments. For this purpose different groups in different institutions, viz., Technical, Commercial, Art, Agricultural, Science and Academic showing better success in successive examinations have been selected. If it is observed that the items in the different tests designed to detect particular interest are favourably responded to and a significant correlation be found out between the responses of respective groups and corresponding ratings of Judges some evidence of external validity may be obtained. Thus the criterion group has been selected for a more objective validation in the case of interest assessment.

The intention of the writer was therefore to obtain of Judges' opinion and (2) responses of the successful groups in different branches or wings for serving as criteria for validation of tests on persistence and interest.

The Pilot Study

It seemed desirable to conduct a pilot study before starting the main experiment.

The Pilot study was expected: (a) to give the experimenter a definite idea of the various stages of the experiment beforehand so that the experience gained from the Pilot study might be of help in case modification and improvement of the test materials or revision of the testing programme proved necessary, (b) to give the experimenter practice in administering the tests, particularly in such respects as standardisation

of emphasis in oral directions. It would also provide information as to (1) the lengths of time needed for the questionnaires, (2) the reactions of the subjects to the tests, (3) the suitability of the tests to the age, abilities and interests of the boys, (4) the adequacy of the directions.

Population

The Population selected for the Pilot study consisted of boys and girls from six different types of institutions, *viz.*, technical, commercial, art, agricultural, etc., the age of the population ranging from 14 to 17 years

Technique

Techniques adopted in this study comprised two questionnaires and two situational tests each for the assessment of persistence and interest, teacher's ratings on a five point scale and interview.

The purpose of the pilot study was mainly to make necessary revision of the test in the light of the experience gathered and therefore, the main techniques were applied on a handy number of boys and girls for internal validation of the items comprising the tests.

Administration

The tests were applied in different institution with the help of the members of the staff. The question took about 50 minutes to complete. After a gap of 10 minutes the situation tests were presented one by one. In each case verbal instruction were given and an attempt was made to keep the test situations almost uniform. As regards the teacher's ratings, three teachers were personally requested by the experimenter to rate the boys and girls on a five-point scale and to submit an agreed estimate of each boy and girl after conferring on individual ratings. Necessary instruction were provided to each rater on a printed sheet and they were asked to base their opinion about each subject on objective study and analysis.

Directions for Teacher's Ratings on Persistence

- (I) Please read the whole scale before rating any item
- (II) In rating each item disregard your ratings for that child on any other item
- (III) Firstly, please try to rate the entire group of children on persistence, keeping in mind that persistence is a general quality of continually trying to accomplish a task in spite of difficulties or clinging to a purpose in the face of oppositions.
- (IV) Try to base your ratings on observations taken over a period of three weeks from now, in the class-room, during games or outside school activities. Any observations supporting your ratings might be recorded on a separate sheet.
- (V) The following scale should, however, be taken into consideration before starting the work.
- (VI) Please allow a minimum gap of two days in between the two ratings. It is a five point scale in which you are requested to

indicate your assessments. In this connection it is worth noting that there may be a general tendency to place your remarks in the middle of the scale and none towards the higher end. This can be avoided by observing the following scheme :

E	D	C	B	A
5%	25%	40%	25%	5%

Description of the Scale

- E. Very low or poor, i.e., loses interest or gives up an activity as soon as he meets with the slightest difficulty, never takes any job with a view to sticking to it.
- D. Low, i.e., gives up an activity soon after coming up against one or two stumbling blocks, or easily changes to another after feeling slightly bored
- C. Average, i.e., will strive to overcome difficulties, if the labour involved is not too overwhelming or will go on doing one job if he is not too bored.
- B. High, i.e., will strive to reach the goal even though the time involved may be fairly considerable.
- A. Very high, i.e., will not give up until the goal is reached or totally exhausted, no matter how much time and energy is involved.

Keeping in mind the procedure outlined in the assessment of persistence, and avoiding at all costs the consideration of any other quality, attainment or behaviour, please assess as accurately as possible the persistence of each child

Similarly for the rating of the interest by the teachers, the different types of interest as classified in the present investigation were described as follows :

(A) Academic interest means he likes to read and write, literally jobs, writing essays, editing, studying history, solving problems of Mathematics, surveying a place or a society and works of similar types are included in this area.

(B) Scientific interest means that one likes to discover new facts, to observe and analyse things for a systematic study.

(C) Technical interest means that one likes to work with machines and tools to handle small parts of mechanical things like watch, torch-lights camera, belts etc., to try for devising something out of the spare parts, etc.

(D) Commercial interest means one shows preference for keeping accounts, making small bargains, observing price index and showing definite inclination towards business or such projects.

(E) Artistic interest means one likes to do creative work including painting, decorating, making attractive designs, writing poems, participating in dramatic performances, etc. Agricultural interest means one likes to do productive work with the soil including growing vegetables, gardening, etc. This comprises one's tendency to some experimental work on fertilization, manuring and cultivation.

A GLIMPSE INTO THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION

SUBHASH CHANDRA SARKER

Introduction The Chinese people's struggle for national independence and unity achieved its victory in 1949. The significance of this victory is gauged when it is recalled that by this single stroke the imperialist system was deprived of about 40 per cent of the colonial hinterland it still had in the days of the Second World War¹

After the victory in the revolutionary war against the corrupt and decaying Kuomintang the first concern of the leaders of the revolution was the economic rehabilitation of the country which had been ravaged by civil and international wars for about a quarter of a century since the death of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen in 1925. It became at once quite obvious that economic rehabilitation could hardly be undertaken without having a constitutional framework. The constitution introduced by the Kuomintang was wholly unworkable and it was therefore necessary to adopt the fundamental laws of the land within the shortest possible time. In such circumstances the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, to which every political party of any importance in China other than the Chiang Kai-shek clique sent its representatives, met in Peking in September, 1949, and adopted the *Common Programme* as the Provisional Constitution of the People's Republic of China. The common programme envisaged the convention of an All-China People's Congress which was to exercise the Supreme State power. Pending the convocation of that Congress elected by universal adult franchise, the *Common Programme* laid down, "the Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference shall exercise the functions and powers of the All-Chinese People's Congress".² With the completion of the rehabilitation of the national economy by 1952, conditions were ripe for holding national elections and the electoral laws were promulgated on March 1, 1953, according to which elections were duly held during 1953-54. Simultaneously the question of planning the future development of the national economy and the adoption of a regular constitution also came to the fore.

Accordingly the Central People's Government appointed a Committee of thirty-three members headed by Chairman Mao Tse-tung in January, 1953 for preparing a draft constitution for consideration by the National People's Congress which would soon come into being following the conclusion of the national elections. In March of the following year (1954) the Drafting Committee accepted as its first draft³ the one submitted to it by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China⁴ [of which again the Chairman was Mao Tse-tung]. Discussions of that draft were organised on a wide scale in Peking and other cities in which about 8600 people reportedly participated. The draft, changed in the light of those

discussions, was published by the Central Government on June 14, 1954 as the first "Draft Constitution of Chinese People's Republic" for "people all over the country to discuss".⁵ According to official statements about fifteen crores of people took part in the discussions following the publication of the draft and about 1,180,420 amendments suggested.⁶

The draft constitution was further modified in the light of those discussions and suggestions and then adopted by the Central Government on September 9, 1954. 5(a) It was then placed before the first session of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on September 15, 1954 along with a report of the Drafting Committee read by Liu Shao-Chi. After five days' discussions the National People's Congress adopted the constitution of China on September 20, 1954 by the unanimous vote of the eleven hundred and ninety-seven deputies present.⁷ It took 20 months from the date of the appointment of the Drafting Committee for the constitution to emerge in its final shape.

The Constitution of the People's Republic of China—world's largest republic—is a relatively small document consisting of 106 articles and a Preamble* (thus fulfilling one of the conditions of an ideal constitution). It is largely based on the Common Programme adopted by the first plenary session of the Chinese People's Political consultative Council (CPPCC) in September, 1949 and draws heavily upon the "experience of the advanced socialist states, headed by the Soviet Union". Liu Shao-chi describes it as a "step forward on the basis of the Common Programme". However in some important respects it widely differs from the Common Programme. Among the new features not contained in the Common Programme are, in addition to the changes in the Governmental structure the provision for elected Government bodies, the right of recall of deputies, and lastly, a provision for the amendment of the constitution.

The constitution is meant for a period of transition and, on the admission of no less an authority than Liu Shao-chi himself, contains many provisions of the nature of a programme which are not ordinarily included in constitutional documents.

CHARACTER OF THE STATE

The constitution, as the Preamble says, consolidates the gains of the Chinese people's revolution and the political and economic victories won since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. However, it also "reflects the basic needs of the state in the period of transition, as well as the general desire of the people as a whole to build a socialist society".

OBJECTS OF THE CONSTITUTION

The object of the constitution is to facilitate the socialist transformation of the country and to ensure "the gradual abolition of the system of exploitation of man by man and the building of a socialist society". Such transformation has to be taken in a planned manner, says Article 15. After the abolition of feudalism through the operation of a properly phased

land reform programme during 1950-52 there remain four basic types of ownership in China! State (socialist) property; co-operative property; individual ownership and capitalist ownership. The constitution in various articles lays down that all these forms of ownership are to be transformed into socialist ownership. But such transformation has to be made in a peaceful and gradual manner. Violence is to be avoided in every way. Says Liu Shao-Chi, one of the outstanding leaders of New China. "We must use peaceful means of transformation not only in the case of agriculture and handicrafts, but also in the case of Capitalist industry and Commerce.

The record of the State in fulfilling the aims of socialist transformation as set down in the constitution has been impressive indeed. Vast changes have occurred in the economic and social life of China since the time the constitution was adopted in September, 1954. Great strides have been made towards bringing the individual peasant and handicraftsmen into collective and to nationalize the industries yet left in private hands. At the end of June, 1956, 91.7 per cent (eleven crores) of China's twelve crore peasant households had joined agricultural producers' co-operatives of various grades ranging from elementary to fully socialist ones. As a matter of fact seven and a half crores of peasant households were officially classified as forming advanced type of agricultural co-operatives by that time. About 90 per cent of all who followed the calling of individual handicrafts were also members of industrial producers' co-operatives, producers' groups or supply and marketing co-operatives.

The progress toward socialization of industry is equally impressive. After coming to power the new Government confiscated all the enterprises held by Big Business and nationalized all the banks—thus laying the basis for a State sector in the national economy. The State sector was gradually expended since 1949 so that at the end of 1955 the state sector accounted for 51.3 per cent of the total industrial output value against 26.3 per cent. in 1949 and 41.5 in 1952 (all values computed in terms of fixed prices of 1952). Foreign trade and foreign exchange are also under state control and the state has introduced "a nationwide, uniform and powerful network of state trade and trade through the supply and marketing co-operatives" so that socialist trade (i.e., State trade) predominate in the country's internal market also.

The Chinese economy is being developed according to a definite plan as envisaged in the constitution. Chronologically speaking, however, the plan came before the constitution in as much as the First Five Year Plan of China had been put into operation in the beginning of 1953, whereas the constitution was promulgated in 1954. The First Five Year Plan was, however, published only in 1955 after it had got the approval of the supreme legislative body of the state, the National People's Congress. The Plan envisaged a 90.3 per cent. increase in the total value of industrial production and 28.3 per cent. increase in the total value of agricultural production on during the five-year period 1953-57. It is stated that it would take three five-year plans, roughly a little over fifteen years from 1953 to complete the socialist transformation of the country.

The First Five-Year Plan period is coming to an end. The Plan is stated to have worked quite successfully. In the Second Five-Year Plan, Liu Shao-Chi told the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, efforts would be made to grapple with the following basic tasks (1) to continue industrial construction with special emphasis on heavy industries, (2) to promote collectivization; (3) to promote increased production of industry and agriculture and to develop transport and commerce; (4) to encourage technical skill and scientific research; and (5) "to strengthen the national defences and raise the level of material and cultural well-being of the people on the basis of the growth of industrial and agricultural production".¹⁵

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty in the People's Republic of China, which is a "people's democratic state" based on the alliance of peasants and workers, lies with the people who exercise their power through the people's Congresses elected by them on universal but unequal and (except at the lowest level) indirect suffrage. All people irrespective of nationality or religion are equal before law and possess equal rights, there is no discrimination on any racial, national or religious grounds. Minority nationalities have been granted national autonomy and they enjoy certain special status as regards land reform and socialist conversion of industry.

THE PARLIAMENT

The country's only legislative body is the unicameral National People's Congress, elected by indirect vote every four years. The First National People's Congress was elected in 1953-54 and consists of over 1,200 members. The First Congress met in September, 1954, and adopted the present constitution and other subsidiary laws. The Congress has the final say in all matters in the People's Republic of China. It elects the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice, the Attorney General (President of the Supreme People's Procuratorate), the members of the National Defence Council; and has powers to remove any or all of them. The Congress ordinarily meets once in a year. Up to date the Congress has met in three sessions. In its Second session it adopted the First Five-Year Plan of China. The minority nationalities are guaranteed 150 seats in the Congress. All decisions of the Congress are made by a simple majority vote of all the deputies (and not merely of those present and voting), except that a constitutional amendment to be effective require a two-thirds majority.

Because of the rather unwieldy membership the sessions of the Congress have to be infrequent. Therefore, the Congress elects a Standing Committee to act on its behalf in the intervening period between the two sessions. The Standing Committee is headed by a Chairman and several (at present 18) Vice-Chairmen, a Secretary-General and several other members. In one sense this is the most powerful organ of the State in China because in the absence of the Congress, the Standing Committee is

the final authority on almost all matters. The Standing Committee conducts the election of the deputies to the Congress; convenes the sessions of the Congress; adopts decrees and interprets laws; supervises the work of the Supreme People's Court, the State Council (Council of Ministers), and of the Provincial and Local Government, and of authorities subject to central control. It appoints and removes the Vice-Presidents and Judges and other members of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme Court; appoints and recalls Ambassadors to Foreign States; ratifies and abrogates treaties with other countries; orders general or partial mobilization and enforcement of Martial Law; exercises the right of pardon. When the National People's Congress is not in session, as is often the case, the Standing Committee appoints and dismisses any or all of the members of the State Council except the Premier who can only be removed by the Congress; the Committee can also proclaim a state of war "in the event of armed attack on the country or in fulfilment of international treaty obligation concerning common defence against aggression"—Chief among such treaties being the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, and the Warsaw Treaty of May 14, 1955.

The Standing Committee generally meets twice a month but can meet oftener if needed. The meetings are convened by the Chairman of the Committee. The Standing Committee is responsible to the Congress and regularly reports to it.

During the first nine months between September, 1954, when the constitution was adopted and July, 1955, when the National People's Congress met in its Second Session the Standing Committee made 40 decisions on domestic and International affairs and passed the draft of the Military Service Law later approved by the Congress. The Standing Committee collected data and sent working parties to Sinkiang and Yunnan Provinces to help in the study of the Regulations for the autonomous regions. It decided 330 cases of appointment and removal of Government Personnel. The Committee received 3,407 letters from the Public and 342 letters from the Members of Parliament. It investigated the more important acquisitions made by the people concerning Government working personnel.

This powerful Standing Committee is headed by the noted Communist Intellectual, Liu Shao-Chi who is shortly to visit India leading a Chinese Parliamentary Delegation on the invitation of the Government of India. The functions of the Committee are broadly comparable with those of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. with this difference that in China the head of the State is the Chairman of the Republic and not the Chairman of the Standing Committee, while in the U.S.S.R. there is no head of State apart from the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

Besides the Standing Committee the Congress may appoint other committees also as and when required. The Constitution mentions four such committees: (1) Nationalities Committee; (2) Bills Committee; (3) Budget Committee and (4) The Credentials Committee.

CHAIRMAN AND THE VICE-CHAIRMAN

The head of the State is Chairman, who, though he is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, possesses far less formal powers than either the President of India or of the U.S.A. A person, for election as Chairman, must be a Chinese citizen of at least thirty-five years of age. The functions of the Chairman are purely formal except that at his own discretion he can convene an advisory Supreme State Conference to consider important matters of State policy and to give advisory opinion. Such a Supreme State Conference was first convened during the beginning of 1956 to consider an eleven-year plan for improving agricultural production. The present occupant of this position is Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of modern China.

A Vice-Chairman, elected by the National People's Congress in the same manner as the Chairman, assists the latter and acts for him in the absence or prolonged illness of the Chairman. The present Vice-Chairman is the famous General Chu Teh.

Both the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman hold office for four years or until the election of a new Chairman and Vice-Chairman. Both of them are removable by a majority vote in the National People's Congress and no special method of impeachment is required as is the case under the Indian and U S. constitutions.

(GOVERNMENT

The executive functions of Government in the People's Republic of China are carried out by the State Council headed by a Premier (now Mr. Chou En-Lai) and composed of several Vice-Premiers, Ministers, Heads of Commissions and a Secretary-General. The State Council is accountable to the National People's Congress or, when the Congress is not in session, to the Standing Committee of the Congress. The State Council has executive and supervisory jurisdiction over all the governmental and elective bodies below the National People's Congress and can annul or modify the decision of any local government. The Premier and Vice-Premiers together constitute what would be called a Cabinet in the non-Communist parliamentary democracies.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

China is a unitary state and is therefore highly centralized. Indeed centralization has been raised to the height of a principle as it has been stated in Article 2 of the Constitution that all organs of state power practise "democratic centralism". Democratic centralism formally means that while all organs of state must be elected (thus admitting democracy), once such election has been effected all lower bodies should give unquestioned obedience to the directives of higher bodies.

Until June, 1954, China (except Taiwan), was administratively divided into twenty-eight provinces and fourteen centrally administered municipalities. The provinces were grouped in Six Greater Areas, namely, North,

North-East, North-West, East, Central-South and South-West China. Each of the Greater Area had its administrative Committee which directed and supervised the work of the local, provincial and municipal Governments within its jurisdiction on behalf of the Central Governments. Besides, there were the Government of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and the Local Government of Tibet under the direct jurisdiction of the Central Government. There was a major administrative reorganization in June, 1954, in which the Greater Area Administrative Committees were abolished, bringing the provinces under increased central supervision. The number of provinces was reduced from twenty-eight to twenty-five and that of the centrally administered municipalities was reduced to three. In addition there remained the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and Tibet. Before the reorganization in June, 1954 there were 2,548 counties and more than 2,80,000 *hsiang* (unit of administration for a group of villages). Their number was somewhat reduced to 2,116 and 2,20,460 respectively after the reorganization.

The organ of Government in the provinces, centrally administered municipalities, counties, municipalities, municipal districts (centrally administered municipalities and other large municipalities are divided into districts), *hsiang* and towns are the people's congresses of the respective levels. Deputies to these people's congresses are elected by the people's Congress of the next lower level. The local people's Congresses are elected for four years, they "ensure the observance and execution of laws and decrees in their respective administrative areas, draw up plans for local economic and cultural development, examine and approve local budgetsmaintain public order. The local Congresses elect the local Governments which are responsible to the former. All local Congresses and local Governments are subject to the supervision of the Congress or Government of the next higher level. At the top of all stands the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress which has powers to revise or annul inappropriate decisions by the Governmental authorities of any level (Clauses 6 & 7 of Article 31 of the Constitution). The Standing Committee in its return is responsible to the National People's Congress.

MINORITY NATIONALITIES IN CHINA

The Constitution describes China as a multinational State. In the framework of a unitary State the minority nationalities, who constitute about ten per cent of the country's population, have been given considerable autonomy and latitude. The form of Government in the national minority areas does not substantially differ from that obtaining in other parts of the country, but the minority areas have been granted considerable latitude in governing their own affairs. The areas inhabited by the minority nationalities were accorded special treatment during land reform and the socialist transformation of industry and agriculture. Those measures were introduced only gradually. However apparently even in the minority areas socialist transformation has been fairly rapid as would be indicated by latest statistics according to which "socialist transformation has been basically completed "in areas where 28 million of China's

85 million people belonging to minority nationalities live''. Democratic reforms still remain to be carried out in areas that are inhabited by only 3 million people of minority nationality origin.

The Constitution has been in operation only a little over two years. It has naturally not been possible to adjust the mutual relationships between the Central and the Local Governments. Moreover, the need for centralization, which was pressing at the initial stages of victory and national consolidation, becomes less significant with the growing stabilization of the country and Government. Currently the Central Government, in conjunction with the local authorities, is reportedly making a study of the problem of relationship between the centre and the Local Governments and is drawing up a concrete plan to be put into practice step by step.

JUDICIARY

In China there is no separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the State and all power is concentrated in the National People's Congress. All the courts are elected for four years by, and are responsible to, the people's Congresses of the corresponding level—the courts at higher levels having supervisory jurisdiction over courts of lower levels. The accountability of courts to the legislature is one of the unique features of the Chinese Constitution. The judges are independent and administer justice according to law. But judicial work is considerably hampered by the absence of legal codes. In every court judges are assisted by two assessors. Recently efforts have been made for codification of laws. There is a tendency to dispense with death penalty in as many cases as possible and the Communist Party recently put forward the proposal that all cases involving death penalty should be decided upon or sanctioned by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court being subordinate to the Parliament apparently has no power to declare unconstitutional any law passed by the Congress.

The observance of the laws and decrees by the citizens and by the various organs of State are watched by the People's Procuratorate. The Supreme People's Procuratorate has the overall jurisdiction. The Supreme People's Procuratorate is responsible to the National People's Congress but the other procuratorates are not responsible to the Congresses of the respective levels but to the next higher procuratorate. The life of the Supreme procuratorate is four years.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

The Constitution contains a chapter on the fundamental rights of the citizens. All citizens of China are equal before law irrespective of race, nationality, religion, sex, colour or property status. Every citizen who is eighteen years of age has the right to vote and to be elected, the usual exceptions being those who are insane or are deprived of by law of electoral rights. Women enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life. Citizens have the right to freedom of speech, assembly, association and freedom of religious belief.

Citizens have the right to work and leisure and material assistance in old age, illness or disability.

Foreigners "persecuted for supporting a just cause, for taking part in the peace movement or for engaging in scientific activity" have the right to asylum in China.

It is the duty of every Chinese citizen to abide by the Constitution and the law, to keep public order and respect social ethics, to uphold discipline at work, to pay taxes according to law, and to respect and protect public property which is sacred and inviolable. Defence of the homeland is another sacred duty of every Chinese.

The State is a "people's democratic dictatorship" i.e., that it allows democracy to the people but is dictatorial against the reactionaries. The people are: workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and the national capitalists. Only they can enjoy the rights conferred by the constitution. Others, while they may remain "citizens" of China, cannot exercise such rights.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The Preamble to the constitution says: "In the course of the great struggle to establish the People's Republic of China, the people of our country forged a broad people's democratic united front, composed of all democratic classes, democratic parties and groups, and popular organizations and led by the Communist Party of China. This people's democratic united front will continue to play its part in mobilizing and rallying the whole people in common struggle to fulfil the fundamental task of the state during the transition and to oppose enemies within and without". This is the only reference to the Communist Party in the Constitution. The Communist Party is described as the leader of the people's democratic united front composed of various other parties. As a matter of fact besides the Communist Party, there are several other parties in China which were mostly organized during the period of the war of Resistance against Japan. Chief among those parties are the Revolutionary Party of the Kuomintang, China Democratic League, China Democratic National Construction Association, Chinese People's National Salvation Association. These parties have not much real power. Nevertheless their existence is tolerated and a recent Communist pronouncement indicated that they would be allowed a share in the country's administration in future also. These parties are based on the national capitalist class and the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the intellectual of those classes. Even after socialist transformation of the country when national capitalists would also turn into workers, survival of bourgeois ideology are sure to linger in their minds. So, says Liu Shao-Chi, "there will be need for the democratic parties over a long period, to keep in touch with them, represent them and help them to remould themselves".¹⁵

The Communist Party is the leader of the United Front and of the State as well; because, "the cause of socialism in our country [China] cannot do without the dictatorship of the proletariat" which, again, is realized only "through the leadership of the party of the proletariat—the

Communist Party". The Communist Party's present membership runs to over a crore—10,780,000 to be precise of whom 14 per cent. is of working class origin, 69 per cent. peasants and 12 per cent. intellectuals. All important posts at all levels of the state structure are occupied by the Communists and all state policies are initiated and formulated by them.

AMENDMENT

The Constitution can be amended by a two-thirds majority vote of all the members of the National People's Congress. No amendment has, however, been made so far.

AN ASSESSMENT

The present Chinese State and Government, as we have seen, are led by men with Communistic convictions. Yet Communism in practice in China differs widely from its counterpart in the U.S.S.R. or other European countries. This is a cardinal point to note in any assessment of the new Government in China. Many of the peculiarities of Communism—violence, oppression and party purges—are remarkably absent in China. Except for a brief period following the victory of the revolution the country has been free from violence. Even while carrying out such gigantic and revolutionary programmes as land reform and socialist transformation of industry, agriculture and handicrafts the emphasis has been unmistakably upon persuasion, gradualness and non-violence. The latest authoritative pronouncement made before the eighth national Congress of the Communist Party of China says: "In carrying out reforms, peaceful means must be persisted in, and no violent struggle should be resorted to". Again "... we have to be patient and wait for them [the peasants to see the wisdom of joining co-operation]; coercion or commands in any form will not be allowed".¹⁸ Moreover, a campaign is afoot against bureaucratization of the state apparatus and towards decentralization. All in all the new Chinese state represents a sincere and honest effort by a batch of patriotic and capable leaders to regenerate the great Chinese Civilisation in the modern world. In many respects the Chinese leaders have to follow an untrodden path but the experience so far well speaks of their assessments and achievements.

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2. Art. 18 of the *Common Programme*.

3. The text of the March, 1954 draft of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was never published—See the article " Constitutionalism in Communist China " by H. Arthur Steiner in the *American Political Science Review*, March, 1955—P. 3. Between March 23 and June 11, 1954 when the drafting committee recommended for the publication of the draft constitution for the first time, the committee met seven times; see the *News Bulletin* of the Chinese Embassy in India, June 23, 1954, New Delhi.

4. *The Common Programme* had also been drafted by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

5. *News Bulletin*, ibid 23. 8. 1954.

5(a) Liu Shao-Chi—*Report on the Draft Constitution of China*, Peking 1954—P. 8.

5(b) Textual comparisons of the June and September drafts show that changes occurred in more than thirty articles of which the great majority were minor verbal changes. In his report on the draft constitution Liu Shao Chi explained thirteen amendments—see Liu Shao-Chi—*Report on the Draft Constitution*, cited, p.p. 50-61.

6. *Statesman*, Calcutta, 18. 9. 54. Before publishing the draft constitution the Drafting Committee had considered 5,900 amendments—see the *News Bulletin*, cited, 23. 6. 1954.

7. *The Modern Review*, Calcutta, December, 1954—p. 489, see also the article by Sun Chan. Ko in the fortnightly, *People's China*, October 16, 1954, pp. 35-39. Of the deputies eighty-nine took part in the debate on the constitution—see the article by V. Ovchinnikov in the weekly *New Times*, Moscow, October 2, 1954—p. 13.

7*. The inclusion of a Preamble is a departure from the Soviet model

7(a) See for example K. C. Wheare—*Modern Constitutions*, p. 48, Oxford, 1951.

8. Liu Shao-Chi *Report on the Constitution* p. 19. In spite of such acknowledgement of debt to the Soviet constitutional experts the Chinese authorities have not hesitated to depart from the Soviet model whenever they considered such departure expedient. Stalin openly deprecated the inclusion in a constitution of provisions of the nature of a programme or wish—see Stalin's Report delivered before the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of the All Russian Congress of Soviets in December, 1936. In contrast as will be noted presently, the Chinese constitution contains many provisions of the nature of a programme. See also Liu Shao-Chi—*Report on the Constitution*, cited—pp. 57-58.

The Chinese Constitution bears a great resemblance to the Constitutions of Eastern European Peoples Democracies—here also with marked differences. For an account of Constitutionalism in post-war Eastern Europe see "The Peoples Democracies of Eastern Europe" by C. F. Black in *European Political Systems* edited by Taylor Cole, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1953; see also Hugh Seton-Watson—*The East European Revolution*, London 1950.

8(a) *Report on the Constitution*, p. 19.

9. *Ibid*—p. 57.

10. *Ibid*—p. 58.

11. It is however difficult to generalise the Constitutional practices of the different countries of the world. If a constitution can invoke the Sovereignty of God in its opening article (vide the Constitution of the Union of South Africa) the inclusion of a few articles denoting a programme (as has been done in the Chinese Constitution) is hardly remarkable. See also *Modern Constitutions* by K. C. Wheare, pp. 46-47.

12. Liu Shao-Chi—*The Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China* to the Eighth National Congress of the Party on September 15, 1956—Peking, 1956—p. 9.

13. *Ibid*—p. 34.

14. *Ibid*—p. 68.

15. *Ibid*—p. 63.

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17. *Ibid*—p. 69.

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MEANINGS—RUSSELL AND WITTGENSTEIN

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I

We generally do not feel difficulties with regard to words of ordinary language and their significance. We learn the use of the vocabulary of a system of communication so easily and instinctively that the common man is unable to detect any problem here. The elements of the language one uses being clearly open to one's view, the lay man does not feel mystified at all and if somebody tries to kick up the dust in so plain a matter, he cannot but have some apprehension about the sanity of the contestant. Yet, critical reflection reveals deeper strata beneath the all too clear a surface, that may entangle one in most intricate problems. The problem I propose to discuss in this paper is mainly *logical* centering round meanings of words. It will also be partly psychological dealing with the process of learning the meanings of words.

Words are facts from the physical point of view. Spoken words are noises and written words are visually perceptible marks. Sounds may either be articulate (*varṇātmaka*) or inarticulate (*dhanyātmaka*) and right from the very beginning the child makes many sounds of both types, spontaneously. Articulate sounds are words, only when they refer to, signify, stand for, point to, or in other words *mean* something else. Inarticulate sounds may, of course, signify something, *e.g.*, a cry of pain; but surely they are not "words" of ordinary language. We are not thinking here of natural language, *i.e.*, of finger-language or of the language of facial expression and other gestures. We are concerned with artificial sounds or marks that are symbols. If such a word does not symbolize anything it is a word only by courtesy, *e.g.*, "Lillibubro".

II

The first problem is : Does a word mean something by itself or is it meaningful only in a sentence? It seems that both the views are correct. We say that words like "table", "butter" are meaningful

in isolation and a dictionary gives us meanings of words, but not of sentences. But it can be doubted whether words can stand independently. They mutually imply one another, *e.g.*, an adjective implies a noun. Even when a single word appears to be really meaningful it masquerades as a full sentence. This is clear when we consider the use of words. Language proper, as defined by Oxford (concise) dictionary, is "a vocabulary and the way of using it." The word "earth-quake"! uttered with a particular inflexion of voice is the same as "Earthquake is occurring". Thus uttering isolated words, covertly for sentences may be a language-game in which every word is capable of standing alone and when so standing it applies to the present datum of perception. When you say "cat" your statement is false if it is a dog you are looking at. Every word is an assertion here and there is no distinction between words and sentences.¹

L. Wittgenstein imagines a complete language of isolated words—a language that is more primitive than ours.² He thinks of a system of communication between a builder A and his assistant B. A is building with blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones in order as A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out;—B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such call. Now, is the call "slab!" here, a word or a sentence? If a word, its meaning is different from the like sounding word of ordinary language, for here it is a call. The call "slab" is at once a word and a sentence. It is a shortened form of the sentence "Bring me a slab". Or the longer sentence is the lengthened form of the short sentence, "slab". Here isolated words do the work of a sentence. But because there are no sentences in this language it is wrong to say that the call "slab" is a degenerate *sentence* of it. In this primitive language isolated words are meaningful. We should not say this is not a language at all for, it serves perfectly well for communication between the builder and his assistant.

The meaning of a word is not to be confused with the meaning of a sentence. The latter appears to be a synthesis of the meanings of words used in the sentence. A descriptive statement like "The cow is a domestic animal" may be either true or false. But isolated words like "cow", "horse", etc., are neither true nor false logically. Hence we are to distinguish words and sentences; words have *meanings*, a sentence has *significance*. A word may have no fixed and definite

¹ Bertrand Russell—*An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, p. 75.

² Ludwig Wittgenstein—*Philosophical Investigations*, Part I/2 (2 is paragraph

meaning outside a sentence but this does not imply that, when considered independently, it is absolutely meaningless. Such a word has some indefinite meaning that gets a fixity when used in a sentence. There are various *kinds* of sentences; exclamatory—"Hay Presto"!; imperative—"You ought to tell the truth"; interrogative—"Are you going home?"; descriptive—"The earth is round"; optative—"May you live long." Similarly there are various *kinds* of words: thing-words—"butter", "cheese"; quality words—"red", "sweet"; action-words—"eat", "run"; numerals—"five", "six"; logical connectives—"but", "and", "or"; and countless others. These various verbal forms are inter-changeable. The descriptive sentence "Earth is round" may be fully expressed in interrogative form and a simple answer yes or no, *e.g.* "Is the earth round? yes." They are equivalent as their use is the same. Again the same thing-word may be used sometimes as a call and at other times as the name of a thing. Hence it may appear, as Wittgenstein contends, that the meaning of a word will depend upon the use of it as made in a system of communication.

III

It is, therefore, possible to consider isolated words outside sentences and the primitive language that is learnt by children first, is an object-language composed wholly of isolated words denoting things and non-linguistic occurrences of nature that can be known by observation alone without the help of inference. Bertrand Russell emphasises such an object-language as basic and primary—the starting point of a hierarchy of languages.³ Such primary language consists wholly of object-words which are defined *logically* as words having meaning in isolation and *psychologically* as words which have been learnt without it being necessary to have previously learnt any other words.⁴ Logical words like "if then", "or", "and", "but", "all", etc., are absent from it. All of these presuppose primary propositional forms, *e.g.*, "Either p or q", where p, q are propositional variables. The conjunctions "and", "but" join other words of primary language and have no meaning in isolation. A child's knowledge of language cannot begin with the understanding of the word "or" as it is not possible to point out any nutriment called "pudding-or-pie". These logical words belong to a hierarchy of

³ *Meaning and Truth*, Ch. IV.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

secondary, tertiary language, also admitted by Tarski.⁵ Words in dictionary are defined verbally by means of other words whose meanings must already be clear to us if we are to use a dictionary intelligently. Thus there must be words whose meanings are known through experience of facts and not through verbal definition. A child must begin with actual object-words. We may invent an object-word for a hitherto unnoticed object and hence besides the actual object-names there is a class of possible ones. New symbolism and system of notations are incorporated in our language at different times. Language is like a stream swelling with the different currents that fall into it as it surges ahead.

We have, thus, a common tendency to think of language as consisting of words, each of which is correlated with something for which it stands, an object or the *meaning* of the word. This may be designated as realistic theory of meaning. Object-words, according to Russell, denote or mean the real objects observable. John Stuart Mill and the Indian Naiyāyika also follow this theory of meaning in denotation. Denotation includes connotation for a word in the absence of its object can denote it only by connoting some of its attributes. The meaning of an object-word like "table" or "cow" can only be learnt by the child by hearing it frequently pronounced in the presence of the thing denoted by it. An association between the word and the object is established in the mind of the child by the behaviour of the elder people when they act on hearing a word.⁶ This is called "Briddha-Vyavahara" by the Naiyayika. The *uttama briddha* (elderly man) orders the *madhyama briddha* (a younger man) by saying "bring the cow", and the *madhyama briddha* acts on it. The child observes the behaviour and after frequent repetition of the situation, is able to establish an association between the noise "cow" and the animal. St. Augustine says in his "Confessions, 1.8", "When they (my elders) named some object and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples; the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body and the tone of the voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting or avoiding something".⁷ All that is essential to an object-word is some similarity

⁵ From Russell, *Meaning & Truth*, Ch. IV

⁶ *Meaning & Truth*—Ch. IV.

⁷ Quoted from *Philosophical Investigation*—Wittgenstein. Tr. by Anscombe.

among a set of phenomena, that is sufficiently striking for an association to be established between instances of a set or class and the instances of the word uttered for the set." Such association is natural like any other habitual association, *e.g.*, between visual and tactile sensations. Each child learns the language of its parents as it learns to walk, play and wash; because such associations are daily established in the mind of the child through its experience. When associations have been formed, the object suggests the word, the word suggests the object to the child. All isolated words name objects—human beings, material things, shapes, colours etc.,—and sentences are combination of such words through the rules of syntax. The meaning of a word exists independently of whether or not any language is used. When we have such a picture of language in mind we are primarily thinking of common nouns like "table" "chair" and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties. We also learn by such direct association the relational words like "up and down", "in and out", according to Russell.

IV

Ludwig Wittgenstein in his posthumous publication, "Philosophical Investigations", brings certain relevant charges against this realistic theory and against the efficacy of the above instruction-situation. We have already seen that there are various kinds of words like thing-word, quality-word, action-word, numerals, etc. St. Augustine and Russell do not seem to notice these differences of kinds and take them all of the same kind. Consider the phrase "five red apples". Though it is possible to point out apples with a certain gesture when sensibly present and utter the thing-word "apple" in the instruction-situation, it is not possible to point out red colour as an independent entity but only red things, while uttering the noise "red". But as the red thing is not *merely* red but has a certain shape or size, the ostensive explanation of the word "red" may lead to confusion and misunderstanding. The child may take the noise "red" as denoting shape or the thing itself. To prevent this one is to arm the child with a definition of the word "colour" and then say "this colour is red"; but how this is to be done in the first instance, passes comprehension. It cannot be said that we indicate the shape of the apple by tracing our finger round the apple, for the colour red has the same shape and may be taken to be the referent of the noise "shape". The case of the numeral "five" is

worse. Ostensive explanation is impossible here, for there is no such entity to be pointed out. While ostensively explaining "five", people will count 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 apples and stop. But such teaching is not *mere counting*, for 5 does not refer to the *single* apple pointed out at the end of the process. It rather refers to all the 5 apples that can be taken at a glance—the whole group. If you say "this number is 5" you have again the difficulty of explaining the noise "number". Further, if you indicate a group of 5 nuts to teach the meaning of the noise "5", the particular group of *nuts* itself may be taken to be the meaning of "five" and the child will be confused when five apples or five cows are presented. Hence it appears that the meaning of the noise "five" is only how the noise is *used*. One has to say the series of cardinals from memory up to 5. In other words, one is to act in a particular way, *e.g.*, pick up 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 nuts successively from a group. If the child can learn the use of the noise "5" he understands the meaning of it. It is not apprehending any queer entity called "five".

Even a thing-word is not without difficulty. Ostensive explanation of such a word may lead to mishandling of the word—tool. A child who has learnt the meaning of the noise "crow" in this way, happily calls every "sister of charity" by the name "crow", showing that in the instruction-situation it has really taken the colour of the crow to be the denotation of the word "crow". The word "mother" is applied by children to all women of a particular age. But such result cannot be the purpose of ostensive explanation. A material thing pointed out has colour, shape and size. Anything, but the thing itself, can be taken as the denotation of the word by the child. We cannot explain by saying "this *thing* is called table" for then again the definition of the categorial word "thing" will be presupposed.

Consider again a proper name. Can such a name signify the person or the place with which it is correlated and of which it is the name? The town Nagasaki was destroyed by nuclear fission, but the meaning of the name cannot be bombed. A person may be ill or dead but the meaning of his name cannot be so. When a man dies his name does not become meaningless; for then the statement "Socrates is a great philosopher" will include a meaningless name and hence be nonsensical, which it is not. The meaning of a name cannot be confounded with the bearer of that name. The word "meaning" can only be illicitly used to signify the thing that corresponds to the word.* Naming is not attaching a label or sign to a thing. What, if the person to whom an ostensive definition of a proper name is given, takes the

name of the man as that of colour, of race or even of the man's dress? In short, an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case.¹⁰ Such explanation will be of little avail in transmitting the use of words to a child, who is like a stranger in the country in which he is born, the language of which country he does not understand. The realistic theory of meaning appears to be an over-simplification of a complex situation. It is obviously inapplicable to logical connectives like "either-or", "and", "but", "all", "some", etc. There are no objects corresponding to these words.

We may now say only that ostensive definition helps the child to learn the proper *use* of the word or name. How then can the demonstratives like "this", "that", "there", "here" be *names* and be taught ostensively? In such a situation one will point out things and utter "there", "this". But *pointing itself* is the use of these words and not merely helping to learn their use. Thus demonstratives cannot be names of objects and all *words* are not *names*. I may ostensively define a thing by saying "This is *called* a tree", "That is *called* a dog" where "tree" and "dog" are obviously *names*. But if the words "this", "that" are also names of things pointed out, we are then to say, "This is *called* this" or "That is *called* this", which is absurd. Yet, strangely enough, many, including Russell, take "this", "that" to be only genuine proper names that cannot misguide. The "name-substance picture" of language has produced much muddle-headed problems of philosophy.¹¹ Augustine's general notion of meaning will make the actual working of language hazy. Teaching language is not explanation of meaning but is a training how to use words.¹² You understand the word "slab" if you can act upon it in such and such way. With different training you will act differently and there will be different understanding of the word. You may use the word "slab" as a call, as an order, as the name of a thing in various language-games. There is no simple, indestructible meaning of a word. "The meaning of a word is no longer for us an object corresponding to it".¹³

There is a distinction between emotive use and descriptive use of language according to modern logicians. There are emotive words with a penumbra of strong approval or disapproval hovering round them. In ordinary language there may not be any object corresponding to these emotionally toned words. If somebody says innocently "I see

¹⁰ *Ibid.* Part I/28

¹¹ *Philosophical Investigations*, Part I/28.

¹² *Ibid.* Part I/5

¹³ G. E. Moore, *Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-35* Mind 1:154.

an *old maid* in the gathering ", the person referred to will instantly fly into indignation, whereas the phrase " elderly spinster " would not bring forth the same reaction. In English society, the phrase " old maid " is taken as a term of disparagement. There are certain rules for using a word, current in a particular society and these rules are called by Wittgenstein as " grammatical rules ".¹⁴ The Bengali equivalent of " wife's brother " is notorious and derogatory. The grammatical rules of Bengali language allow even a man who has no wife to use this word. Words like " good ", " just ", " honest ", " patriot " are laudatory and honorific, whereas words like " bad ", " selfish ", " mean " are derogatory in sense. Modern positivists are making a thorough study of the logic of ethical and aesthetic words that give vent to one's felt emotions. Can we say now that these words denote and connote facts and their characteristics or are we to hold that their meanings depend upon their use according to some rules of grammar, current in a particular culture or society? Wittgenstein comes to the conclusion : " For a large class of cases though not for all in which we employ the word " meaning " it can be defined thus : the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the *meaning* of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its *bearer*." ¹⁵ There are various language -games, actual and possible, with various possibilities. One can break the occult spell of the realistic theory of meanings by showing how variously most words are actually used according to grammatical rules and sometimes by inventing language-games to suggest other possible uses. Words are like tools in a tool-box ; hammer, saw, screws, screw-driver, nails, chisel have different functions and there are similarities also. There is a family-likeness which means that similarities crop up and disappear as we consider the different members of a family ¹⁶. We get confused because of the uniform appearance of words as we hear or see them in print. In such cases their *application* is not presented clearly. Language is a part of an activity—of a form of life.¹⁷ One of such various language-games may satisfy the ordinary name-substance picture but other possible games will eliminate the fascination for that picture. There is, for example, a game of moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules. But this is only true of certain games and not of others. As we compare different games, similarities will crop up and disappear with further comparison, giving us a family of games.

¹⁴ G E Moore—*Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33*. Mind, 1954.

¹⁵ *Philosophical Investigations*, Part I. 43.

¹⁶ *Philosophical Investigations*, Part I/66, 67.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

V

There is a curious suggestion here, in Wittgenstein, and among some logical positivists, that the world of language can be quite divorced from the world of perceptible facts. We are supposed to forget that words we use have non-linguistic occurrences as causes and effects.¹⁸ But it appears to us that the material meaning or the nature of the things we wish to understand and communicate by verbal symbols is primary and other meanings are secondary, derivative or even metaphorical. Even Wittgenstein refers to at least one language-game where meaning is explained by pointing out the bearer of a name. Common nouns, proper names, and names of certain properties and actions actually acquire their meaning in a situation in which they are accompanied by the gesture of pointing to natural facts and occurrences of observation. Children begin by using the same word for many different things and it is only because the results are unpleasant and they fail to attain their objectives that the meanings of the words become more defined later on. Psychologically there appears to be no difficulty in learning a thing-word as the child has a tendency to take every word as a name of the concrete thing of perception, pointed out to it. And it also takes all things synthetically at first as a lump, so that most things are alike to it. As experience grows, the child learns gradually to differentiate things and their various aspects by the supreme principle of pleasure and pain, failure and success. This analytic differentiation is not a mere isolation of elements, but a process of integration goes hand in hand building the system of knowledge.

An object-word of primary language is, according to Russell,¹⁹ a class of similar noises associated by habit with a class of mutually similar occurrences forming a *natural kind*, experienced at the time of the noises. There is a marked, noticeable similarity, fortunately, in the members of any natural kind. It is true that there may be *several* classes that satisfy the above conditions and hence there may be misunderstanding. A child learning object-language will apply Mill's canons of Induction—agreement and difference—and gradually correct his mistakes. When you are inclined to say "cat", it is because some feature of the environment is associated with the word "Cat". It implies that this feature resembles the cats seen previously that caused the association. But it may not resemble them sufficiently to satisfy an expert; the beast presented, may be a lynx or a leopard. The association between the word and the object will not be

¹⁸ B. Russell - *Philosophical analysis*—Hibbert Journal 1956.

¹⁹ *Meaning & Truth*, Chap. IV.

right until you have seen many animals that are not cats but look like them and many other animals that are cats but look as if they were not."²⁰ This is Mill's Joint method of agreement and difference called by the Naiyayika as Anvaya--Vyatireka. It may be difficult to avoid misunderstanding at first and a long time may be necessary to form a right association; but the result of Vriddhavyabahara, accompanied by anvavyatireka, shows that the child, after all, learns the language of its parents. Ostensive explanation of quality and action-words has the same effect as each of them falls into a natural kind. The instruction-situation along with the method of agreement and difference is sufficient as is shown by the result (phalabalāt).

The theory of hierarchy of languages, advocated by Russell and Tarski, seems to avoid the difficulty of logical connectives. They are not names of objects and hence do not find a place in the primary object-language. They find a place in secondary or tertiary language and a peculiarity of these higher languages cannot falsify the material character of the object-language with which we start.

Unless different individuals recognise the same objective situations they cannot have common verbal symbols. When we translate from French into English or from code language into speech, the test of equivalence of the expressions must be that they denote or point to the same objects. Even if we say that they are equivalent because they have the same *use*, the use of expressions is not arbitrary as admitted by Wittgenstein. The use is always determined and fixed by certain "grammatical rules" in the climate of a culture. When I use a word I must "commit myself" by its use. This means that if I use, *e.g.*, "green" in this case, I have to use it in other similar cases systematically.²¹ These so-called "grammatical rules" are not merely linguistic as suggested, but must be based on non-linguistic facts and occurrences. Rules that are purely arbitrary will make communication impossible.

We have seen before that the indefiniteness of the meaning of an isolated word is removed when it is a part of a sentence. In the statements "Socrates is dead", "Rabindranath is ill" and "Excalibur is broken to pieces", the proper names are determined in a way more concretely than they are when isolated. In such sentences the bearer of the name, that is the denotation or meaning of the name, is actually dead, ill or broken and it is not true that meaning cannot undergo these vicissitudes. When the meaning of a proper name is indefinite, outside

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ G. E. Moore—*Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33*. Mind 1954.

a sentence, the question of its death or illness does not arise. When we refer to a past object by a verbal symbol, the object itself is past, though our *act of referring* may be present. Then why is it wrong to mean by a proper name the bearer of that name? An expression of emotion may also contain a statement of fact. The highly emotional expressions, "old maid", "mean" etc., when used in a particular context, are not entirely devoid of descriptive meaning. In actual common language we often use the term "meaning" as synonymous with the nature of things. In case of meanings of value-words like "good" "bad", etc., there is a question of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Two value statements may be regarded as equivalent when the satisfactions or dissatisfactions, caused by them, are of the same degree. But it may be contended that, in the ultimate analysis, these depend on the "satisfactoriness" of the objects themselves, for there is some objective basis of satisfaction. Wittgenstein is perhaps right in case of "numerals" whose meanings appear to be their use. But the "grammatical rules" that determine the use are probably based on the objective world of experience. Nyaya contends that number is an objective quality of units and groups of objects.²² It is, therefore, not unreasonable to believe that there is a basic language of object-words and Russell's theory of such a language as the starting-point of a hierarchy of languages cannot be easily ruled out of court.

²² *Bhāṣā-parichcheda*—kārikās 2 and 3.

ANNUAL CEREMONY FOR THE PRESENTATION OF "BLUES"—CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

SRI N. K. GHOSH, B.A. (CAL.), LL.B. (LIEDS.),

BARRISTER-AT-LAW

Chairman, Calcutta University Sports Board

A very pleasant function was held on 31st May, 1957 at Darbhanga Hall, Calcutta University on the occasion of the annual ceremony for the presentation of Blues to the University students who took their seats along with the Professors, Members of the Senate, Syndicate and Sports Board.

Our popular Vice-Chancellor, Prof. N. K. Sircar, M.A. (Cantab.), who is a very keen enthusiast in sports presided over the function.

Sri N. K. Ghosh, Chairman, Calcutta University Sports Board, gave an account of the Inter-Collegiate and Inter-University games of 1956-57 and accorded a cordial welcome to Sri Naidu, Chancellor and new President of Calcutta University Sports Board. In his address the Chairman mentioned about the achievements during the year 1956-57: (a) The victory of the Calcutta University Football Team in All-India Inter-University Football Final, 1956, which is regarded as the Blue riband of the Inter-University Tournaments and (b) the successful staging of the Centenary Sports in collaboration with the Centenary Sports Committee. The Calcutta University participated in Football at Banaras, Swimming and Waterpolo at Bombay, Volleyball at Allahabad, Tennis at Patna, Athletics and Rowing at Calcutta and Hockey at Banaras in the Inter-University Tournaments. Besides these Tournaments, Calcutta University Rowing Team participated in A.R.A.M. Regatta at Colombo. Many of the students of Calcutta University also represented West Bengal in National Championship in different games. Calcutta University Team also played against foreign team like Rangoon University in Football and Rowing. Sri S. Banerjee, Captain of the Indian Olympic Football Team was also the Captain of the Calcutta University Team and was recipient of Blue from this University.

The Indian Football Association, which controls the Football in Calcutta made the following observation on the achievement of the Calcutta University Football Team:

"In the sphere of All-India Tournament also Calcutta University defeated Nagpur University in the Final of the All-India Inter-varsity Football championship, 1956 at Banaras and won the coveted Sir Asutosh Memorial Shield and Sir Syed Sultan Ahmed Cup, and re-established its supremacy as the best University Football Team of the year."

Inter-Collegiate Football, Cricket, Hockey, Athletics, Swimming, Rowing and Tennis were held as usual and more number of Colleges participated.

Calcutta University Rowing Team was winner in the Inter-varsity Tournament in Pairs and in the Head of the Lake Regatta Tournament in Scull.

Centenary Sports Celebration was held with a big programme. The smooth performance of the Centenary Sports was mainly due to the enthusiastic support given by the Vice-Chancellor, the Treasurer, the Registrar, Principal P. N. Banerjee, Prof S. P. Biswas, Members of the Sports Board and other members in charge of the various sections of the Centenary Sports, Sports Journalists, etc. The thanks of the University due to the Principals of Colleges, who came forward and helped us in finding accommodation for about 400 participants both men and women on the occasion of the Inter-varsity Athletics meet in January last.

For the first time in its history the Calcutta University awarded Blues to the women students.

NUMBER OF THE UNIVERSITY BLUES

Under the New Act, 1953-54	...	37
Under the New Act, 1954-55	...	49
Under the New Act, 1955-56	...	69
Under the New Act, 1956-57	...	68

Calcutta University Sports Board is gratified to find that an increasingly large number of students has been participating in various games, but the Board also feels that a still larger number of students get no facilities for participation in games and sports or some form of physical exercise. The problem of women students regarding facilities for game and physical exercise should be seriously thought of. The provision for an enclosed ground for our women students with a woman physical Directress-in-charge cannot be delayed any longer.

Due to the efforts of our Vice-Chancellor, Union Education Ministry has contributed Rs. 80,000 for the construction of a first

floor over the University Rowing Club Building and rest of the expenditure will be met by the University. The University Tent on the Maidan has been considerably expanded and renovated with modern sanitary fittings and electrical arrangements.

Prof N. K. Sidhanta, Vice-Chancellor of our University addressed the students with a neat speech. He advised that the students specially in Rowing which is the best sports with a team work spirit should be taken seriously and the standard must be raised. In other sphere of sports the same spirit should prevail and in their future life they should take every type of work in a team spirit. The students should not only devote themselves to academic activity but extra-academic side is equally important for the development of their body and mind.

For the first time in the history of the Calcutta University, Blazer coats with University crests were awarded to the members of the Calcutta University Football Team by the Vice-Chancellor of the University.

Tea was served to the students and guests present and amidst cheer Dr D. Chakravarty, General Secretary, Calcutta University Sports Board and Registrar, Calcutta University, offered vote of thanks to the Chair.

MISSIONARY LIFE OF GAUTAMA BUDDHA

DR. ANUKUL CHANDRA BANERJEE, M.A., LL.B., PH.D.

Reader in Pali, University College of Arts

At the age of thirty-five Buddha started his missionary career and himself continued it for forty-five years i.e. till his Mahāparinibbāna. His first ministry commenced at Isipitana (Sarnath) with the conversion of a group of five monks (pañcavaggiyas) who were his quondam associates. He delivered his first sermon known as the Dhammacakkapavattanasutta (Turning of the wheel of Law) to them. It explains the four noble truths (cattāri ariyasaccāni) and the noble eight-fold path (ariya aṭṭhaṅgikamagga). As a consequence thereof, the five brahmins were converted to the new faith. Thus was laid the foundation of the Buddhist sangha.

There was at Benares a young man named Yasa¹ who was living in great luxury. Being disgusted with the worldly pleasures, he left home one day and went to Buddha who was staying on the bank of the river Varuṇā with his new recruits. Buddha delivered a discourse to him on the merits of giving alms, observance of moral precepts, means of attaining heavenly life and evils of earthly life. The discourse had the desired effect. Yasa accepted Gautama's view and became a monk. Shortly after, his other fifty-four friends embraced Buddhism and became monks. There were then sixty monks and Buddha wanted to propagate his doctrine far and wide with the co-operation of this band of selfless workers. From the *Mahāvagga*¹ we learn that he sent them out in different directions with the words.—“Go, ye now, O Bhikkhus, and wander, for the gain of the many, for the welfare of the many, out of compassion for the world. Let not two of you go the same way. Preach the doctrine which is glorious in the beginning, middle, and end, in the spirit and in the letter; proclaim a consummate, perfect and pure life of holiness.” He himself went to Uruvelā and on the way met a party of thirty young men who were amusing themselves with women in a grove. He gave them a discourse and in consequence of which they all became monks.

While at Uruvelā Buddha converted the three fire-worshipping Jātīla brothers by preaching to them the famous sermon known as

¹ P.T.S., ed., p. 21.

the 'Fire Sermon' (Adittapariyāya). Buddha then proceeded thence to Rājagaha to redeem the promise he had made to king Bimbisāra. Having heard of his arrival, the king accompanied by ministers, courtiers and citizens came to visit him. Buddha explained to them the fundamentals of Buddhism. Being filled with joy, the king presented his bamboo grove (Veḷuvana) to him for residence of monks. Buddha resided for sometime in the grove and concentrated more on the missionary work. Here were converted the two distinguished teachers, Sāriputta and Moggallāna. At that time Rājagaha was a resort of a large number of religious teachers and paribbājakas (wandering teachers). Buddha utilized the opportunity of meeting them and entering into discussions with them. On several occasions he succeeded in converting them to his own views. He also secured a few householders here as his lay-devotees (upāsakas).

King Suddhodana having heard that Buddha was preaching at Rājagaha sent Kāṣṭhapa, a play-mate of Buddha, to invite him to pay a visit to Kapilavatthu. Buddha accepted the invitation. Accompanied by a large number of monks, he came to Kapilavatthu and stopped at Nigrodha park, close to the city. In their pride the Sākyaas were at first unwilling to receive him with marks of reverence. But Buddha won them over by exhibition of his miracles. On the following day Buddha entered the city for alms with his monks. Yasodharā, the mother of Rāhula, saw him from the palace and became highly aggrieved. She requested the king to persuade his son from begging his food from door to door. The king did so but it was in vain. Buddha then gave a discourse which convinced the king of the excellence of his teaching. As a result king Suddhodana became a lay-devotee of Buddha. It became now easy for Buddha to carry on his missionary work at Kapilavatthu. The king's homage to his son as also his kinship with the Sākyaas made it possible for Buddha to win over a great number of them to his new faith. Yasodharā threw herself at Buddha's feet and asked his son Rāhula to demand his heritage. Buddha asked Sāriputta to confer the pabbajja ordination on Rāhula who was thus admitted into the order as a novice (Sāmaṇera). Many other Sākyaan youths of distinguished families followed the example of Rāhula and joined the saṅgha. Prominent among them were Ānanda, Anuruddha, Upāli, Bhaddiya, Bhagu, Nanda and Devadatta. Upāli, who was a barber, was admitted first into the order by Buddha in order to humble the Sākyaas of then noble descent. Devadatta, both cousin and brother-in-law of Buddha, brought about a schism in the saṅgha and founded a rival school. He

attempted several times on the life of the Teacher but failed in his design. He is known more for his constructive opposition to Buddhism than for his support to it. A few Sākya ladies also joined the order of nuns founded later on through the intercession of Ananda with Mahāpajāpati Gotamī at the head.

Buddha moved on to Sāvattthi (Sahet Mahet), capital of Kosala. It is the place where the Teacher spent a great part of his missionary life. Here was given a large number of discourses as also were framed many Vinaya rules for the guidance of the members of the saṅgha. In the history of the propagation of religion it occupies a place next in importance to Magadha. When Buddha visited Sāvattthi at the invitation of Anāthapiṇḍika, the rich merchant, he purchased from prince Jeta a large park and erected a monastery there and presented it to Buddha for the residence of the monks. It was through the influence and munificence of Anāthapiṇḍika Buddhism could make a headway in Kosala. Next to Anāthapiṇḍika in munificence was Visākhā who built the Pubbārāma monastery for Buddha. King Pasenadi who had regard for Brahmanic and other teachers became a lay-devotee of Buddha through the influence of his queen Mallikā and his two sisters, Somā and Sakulā, who had already become lay-devotees of Buddha. In order to convince the people of his superiority over other teachers Buddha had to resort to miraculous power here. The result had been the conversion of a few house-holders to Buddha's new faith. Notable among them were Gaṇaka Moggallāna, Pañcakaṅgathapati, Isidatta, Rohaṇa and others.

Buddha passed on to Vesāli where he spent the fifth vassa (rainy season retreat). There was at Vesāli a famous courtesan named Ambapālī. She became a lay-devotee of Buddha and made a gift of ambavana (mango-grove) to the saṅgha. A few Vinaya rules were also framed here for the welfare of the monks. It is striking to note that an event of outstanding importance occurred at Vesāli in the history of Buddhism. Buddha consented to the formation of the order of nuns, which was the unique of its kind and marked the beginning of an order of nuns in India.

When Buddha came to Kosambi, the capital of king Udena he heard that a quarrel was going on among the Vinayadharas (masters of discipline) and Dhammakathika (reciters of Doctrine) on minor matters of discipline. He failed to reconcile the monks and retired to a forest called Pārileyyaka where he was attended by an elephant and a monkey. Subsequently the monks became repentant and

approached Buddha to ask his pardon. Buddha then delivered a discourse on the evils of discord. King Udena was not at first in favour of this new religion. His queen Sāmāvatī was devoted to Buddha. It was through her efforts, the king became a lay-devotee of Buddha. His conversion was effected by Piṇḍola Bharadvāja, a noted monk of the locality. The king made generous gifts to the saṅgha later on.

Avantī, the capital of which was Ujjeni, was one of the important places in the west where Buddhism attained prominence during the life-time of Buddha. Although Buddha did not visit Avantī, he asked Mahākaccāyana, a distinguished monk of the place, to propagate his teachings there. Soṇa Kuṭikaṇṇa, a son of a rich merchant, and a few other notable persons were converted to the new faith. They helped much in the propagation of Buddhism. It was largely through Mahākaccāyana's efforts that Ujjeni became a centre of Buddhism. It attained importance a century after the Mahāparinibbāna of Buddha and played an important rôle in the later history of Buddhism.

Thus it seems that Buddhism during Buddha's life-time was not confined to a certain locality. It had a rapid progress. Towards the east it had spread to Kajaṅgala, to the west Verañja and to the north to the land of Kurus.

POSITION OF WOMEN AS REFLECTED IN THE FORMS OF MARRIAGE

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Marriage to the Hindus is regarded as most important of all the *Saṁskāras*, the members of which vary from two¹ to forty². It is believed that a person is born with debts, which he can repay, by studenthood, by performing sacrifices and by procreating sons³. It is also stated that a sonless man has no abode in heaven after death⁴. Marriage under the circumstances is regarded as almost an essential duty for all, excepting of course those who will adopt lifelong pupilage. According to *Sāstric* point of view it is incumbent that a person should always have affiliation with either of the four stages of life. Probably this is one of the reasons why in the event of wife's death a person is required to go in for the sacrament of marriage again in order to have a wife as his associate for the discharge of household duties in place of a deceased one⁵. The net result of these injunctions is that married life is an essential and integral part of the household stage of existence.

Marriage has been defined by Raghunandana as acceptance conducive to wifehood⁶. Before marriage girls are generally designated as 'Kanyā' and after marriage she becomes the wife of person to whom she is married. Her paternal gotra ceases after marriage and she becomes affiliated to the gotra of her husband. (*Svagoṭrādbhraśyate nārī vivāhāt saptaṁ pade*). Father of the girl offers her in marriage and the groom accepts her as his wife. Marriage varies in nature and form according to the variations in the nature of the gift. To the Hindu writers on law almost all possible variations of gift in marriage have come in view and accordingly they have classified marriage into eight forms as: *Brāhma*, *Daiva*, *Ārṣa*, *Prājāpatya*, *Āsura*, *Gāndharva*, *Rākṣasa* and *Paisāca*⁷. Normally from *Sāstric* point of view the position of a married wife was very high in the

¹ *Smṛti Candrikā* p. 18.

² *Vide* Gautama Dh. *Śūtra* VIII 14-24.

³ *Tai. Sūtr.* VI. 8. 10. 5.

⁴ *Nāputrasya lokostiti tatsarve paśavo viduḥ*—*At.* Brā. 39.1.

⁵ *Vide* *Udvāhacandrālōka*—p. 134.

⁶ *Bhāryāvasampādakagrahaṇam vivāhah*—p. 3 *Udvāhataivam*.

⁷ *Brāhmodaivastathāivārṣah prājāpatyastathāsurah.*

Gāndharvo rākṣasāścāiva paisācasūptamodhamah.—*Mann* III/21.

society. In the R̥gveda wife has been described as the home itself (jāyedaṣṭam)*. The idea of co-operation between the husband and wife has been clearly stated in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa which observes that wife is half of one person, and therefore before his getting a wife a man cannot be said to be perfect*. Even the Mahābhārata¹⁰ says that wife is half of a man—'Ardhaṁ bhāryā manuṣyasya'. Bṛhaspati accordingly says that wife is equal sharer with husband in religious and non-religious actions.

'*Sarīrardhaṁ smṛtā bhāryā punyāpunya phale samā*'. All these observations indicate how the position of wife in Hindu society was elated. But on the other side of the problem there are statements of the writer on law to the effect that a woman under no status of society is free to act according to her sweet will. The well known direction of Manu—'Na strī svātantryamarhati' is a pointer in this direction.

Marriage has been generally classified under two heads—righteous (dharmyaḥ) and non-righteous (adharmyaḥ), and the classification is not without a purpose. A marriage under any one of the righteous form of marriage has different legal bearing on the position of the wife and her share in property, than a marriage performed under any one of the non-righteous group.

This may be clearly noticed when the question of stridhana comes in. But the classification into two groups is not within the view of the present discussion. We shall now see how the position of women varied according as she was married according to anyone of the eight forms of marriage.

The Brāhṇa form of marriage is one in which a maiden is given away to a meritorious and learned groom, after he is invited by the father or guardian of the maiden with proper show of honour.¹¹ Here the bride has no say in matter of her matrimony and like other objects of gift, she is given away to the groom. The gift of the maiden daughter, 'kanyādāna' as it may be called must be distinguished from any other gift. There is no doubt that by this gift the proprietary right of the father over the girl ceases and it becomes transferred to the husband of the maiden, but that right in no way permits the husband to treat her wife in any way he takes. However that is a legal point, but the fact is that by such gift the girl acquires the full-fledged status of a patnī—a position which a married woman should

* R̥gveda III 53.4.

* V. 2 1.10 'Ardho ha vā eṣa ātmano yajjāyā etc.

¹⁰ Kāi Parva. 74-40.

¹¹ Kanyādāna cārcayitvā ca āruṣitvā eva svayam.

Ātmya dānāt kanyāyāḥ Brāhmaṇa dharmāḥ prakīrṭitāḥ—Manu III/27.

aspire for. She by virtue of such a gift not only becomes the wife of the person to whom the gift is made, but also becomes entitled to associate herself with the specified duty in the sacrificial work. (Ayyābha-kṣanādi). This right is the most ideal one and therefore later commentators have eulogised this form of marriage, for here the gift is a righteous one (*prakṛṣṭam*). In spite of all these things, there is no denying of the fact that the maiden here acts like a doll, with no significant role to play so far as her desire to choose a particular groom is concerned.

The Daiva form is to be treated as a variant of the Brāhma form of marriage. Here the girl is an object of gift as in the Brāhma form but the difference is this that in the Brāhma form of marriage she was given away to the groom strictly selected and honoured from the stand point of his merit. There was no other purpose behind such a gift, other than the future welfare and happiness of the bride. A grain of selfishness can be marked in the Daiva form when the maiden daughter is given away to the officiating priest in recognition of his services, rendered in the sacrifice¹⁷. The position of the girl is not improved to any extent but may be said to have deteriorated in view of the fact that certain selfish motive, in association with a bit commercial one works behind this matrimonial alliance. The girl in previous case was like an ordinary object of gift but the purpose of the same was holy in design, here on the other hand she is given away with a selfish motive so to say and to give her with such a purpose tends to make the transaction commercial in nature. Medhātithi assigns inferiority to this form for such motive¹⁸. In short, the Daiva form represents the helpless position of the maiden-daughter in marriage.

The Prājāpatya form of marriage also belongs to the righteous group amongst the forms of marriage. The position of the bride here is a bit bettered. In this form the groom is a suitor for the hands of the bride, while in other two forms, already mentioned he would have been invited by the father of the bride. So far as the Prājāpatya form of marriage is concerned the position of women has been graded to certain extent. From the definition furnished by Manu we learn that the bridegroom here is the suitor (Arthine) and he was not invited with proper honour as was the case in other righteous forms of marriage like Brāhma and Daiva. The

¹⁷ Daive tu vitate samyagritvijo karma kurvato.
Alakṛtya cātādānath daivath dharmaṁ pracakṣate. — Manu III/26.

¹⁸ Bāvatopahārasambandhena Brāhmaddaivo nūnath. — Bhāṣya on Manu III/26.

speciality of the form lies in the act that the father or guardian of the bride makes certain stipulation with the groomdesignate so that he may not marry again during the lifetime of the married wife. He is again to assure that he will not be entitled to take to Pravrajyā or renunciation but these conditions are subject to be annulled in case of death of the wife married according to Prājāpatya form of marriage. Thus the form did a great favour to the bride, such offered by restricting such matrimonial relationship to monogamous pairs only. The greatest honour that can be shown to married ladies is exhibited here for we observe the words used in the stipulation as 'Saha dharmam cara'. The groom must assure the father of the bride that such a married girl is to be given the status of Dharmapatnī'. The word 'Patnī' should be clearly distinguished from the words 'jāyā' or 'bhāryā'. Mere marriage does not make a wife a 'Patnī'. Patnī is used in the sense of a married wife who gets the right of being associated with her husband so far as the sacrificial act is concerned (cf. Patyurno yajñasamīyoge). A bhāryā or jāyā does not possess this privilege. Though the Prājāpatya form of marriage belongs to the righteous group and though the maiden offered for marriage is still an object of gift as in other righteous forms yet the position that a wife occupies by being married according to this form is a covetable one. It is a fact that such a girl gets no scope of selecting her husband, but her guardians here are to be thanked that the condition that they impose on the groomdesignate, who is a suitor, speaks for the recognition of the bride as a human being not as any other object of gift. So of the righteous forms of marriage this one may be regarded as the only form where women have been treated from a humanitarian angle of view.

When we pass on to the Ārṣa form we find the marriage was perpetrated after the suitor paid a couple of cows to the guardian or father of the bride. The definition of this form of marriage as we get in the law book of Mānu¹⁴ is significant for here we find a rational explanation of the point as to why the groom should give cows to the father of the bride. It is stated that such a pair of cows should be taken strictly for the purpose of serving some sacrificial merit. (Yajñasiddhyartham). Whatever may be the direction of the writers on law that cows were taken for sacrificial purpose, yet we must not lose sight of the fact that there was a sort of commer-

¹⁴ Ekam gamithunam dve vā varādādāya dharmataḥ
Kanyā pradānam vidhivadārṣo dhatmaḥ sa ucyate.

cial element in such form of marriage. Manu has strictly mentioned that this is taken for honouring the girl (*Arhanam tat kamārinām*). What he means to say that the commercial element was tried to be concealed under the cloak of sacrificial merit. The position of the maidens becomes a bit weakened from the position in which we find in other righteous forms. She becomes an object of commercial gift and she is given away in exchange of a pair of oxen. Such a maiden is not allowed to select her groom.

This status of women became further degenerated in the *Āsura* form of marriage, where the semi-commercial attitude of the *Arsha* form, yielded to the strictly commercial one. The definition of this form of marriage as given by Manu shows that in the *Āsura* form the suitor pleases the father or guardian of the bride by payment of a sum of money, the exact figure of which is not mentioned in any text nor is fit to be mentioned, in view of the fact that it depends strictly on the merit and beauty of the bride concerned. Thus the maiden becomes an object of commercial transaction. She is given no power of choosing the groom for herself and this is possible in a society where the theory of *Patria potestas* is strictly observed. The epithets used as '*Kanyāi caiva śaktirah*' in the definition of Manu may be interpreted as signifying a state of society in which certain amount of money is also to be given to the bride also. That may speak for the status of the girl concerned, for she might have acquired by this time consciousness about her own position. However, here we get for the first time the activity of the bride as a sharer of money, given to her father by the suitor.

Coming to the *Rākṣasa* form we will find that the helpless position of the maiden is taken advantage of by the groom who applies force to capture her by molesting or killing her guardians, when they opposed such an act. The question of exercising discretion about her marriage does not arise at all, for such an opportunity can come only scarcely.

The *Paiśāca* form is a variety of the *Rākṣasa* form of marriage. Here the groom commits rape on the girl during her unconscious state of mind. It has been condemned by writers on law for this reason. The girl here has nothing to do and the act of ravishment is perpetrated on her, when she is not in a position to understand the implications. The law makers of course had a tendency to have the act regularised by observance of ceremonies like *Saptapadi*, *Pāṇi-grahana* etc. and this may show the unfortunate position in which girls were placed under *Paiśāca* form of marriage.

The Gāndharva form of marriage is very important from the point of view of determining the status of women married according to that form. In the Manusamhitā the form has been defined as :

Icchayānyonyasamyogah kanyāśca varasya ca
Gāndharvah sa tu vijñeyah maithunyah kāmasambhavaḥ.

(Manu samhitā III/32)

Here the groom and the bride mutually get attracted towards each other and the entire design of the matrimonial connection is backed by free flow of love. The maidens are absolutely free in this form of marriage so far as the selection of groom is concerned and the guardians have no say in the matter. Their liberty in this respect is not impeded to any extent and it is the only form of marriage where the girls are found to possess an independent status and their guardians had not the opportunity to question this. Vātsāyana was the greatest propounder of this Gāndharva form of marriage for he supported such a match on account of the happy ending which follows such a union.

This status become very much raised in the Svayamvara form of marriage where girls selected their partners of life from amongst a number of suitors, who often were invited by their guardians.

This in short is the systematic study of the forms of marriage in their bearing on the status of the married ladies.

HISTORY OF MANIPUR

JYOTIRMOY ROY

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INTERREGNUM

Rabinochandra—Jai Singh had eight sons, Sanahal, Labanya Chandra alias Rabinochandra, Madhuchandra, Tulsijit, Chourajit, Marjit, Daoji alias Khongjai Ngamba and Gambhir Singh. Sanahal pre-deceased his father. Jai Singh placed Rabinochandra on the throne in 1798, before he left for Nabadwip. From this time upto the first Anglo-Burmese war, the history of Manipur is stained with fratricidal war. The princes fell out among themselves to secure the throne. Daoji and Gambhir Singh with the help of their relatives hatched a conspiracy. After a period of three years Rabinochandra's reign was one day cut short by the assassin's sword in 1801, while he was returning to the palace playing polo.¹

Madhuchandra—Madhuchandra, the third son of Jai Singh, foiling the purpose of the conspirators captured power immediately after the murder of Rabinochandra. Gambhir Singh and his party, baffled in their first attempt were lying in wait for a fresh opportunity. Madhuchandra, to strengthen his position, appointed Chaurajit and Marjit to the posts of "Jubraj" (heir apparent) and Senapati (Chief of the army) respectively. But this also failed to maintain the cohesion. Jubraj Chaurajit threw off his allegiance to Madhuchandra but failing to capture power he left Manipur for Nabadwip. After a short period he again decided to re-enter Manipur. At Cachar he managed to rally some hundred followers and with them he made his venture. Senapati Marjit at such hour joined with Chaurajit. Madhuchandra was defeated at the battle of Sangaithen and fled to Cachar in 1806.^{1a}

Chaurajit—Chaurajit after occupying the throne appointed Marjit as his 'Jubraj' and Senapati. In the meantime Madhu Chandra entered into an alliance with Krishna Chandra, the ruler of Cachar, by giving his daughter Induprabha to him.² With his help he made

¹ Bijoy Panchalle, p. 63.

^{1a} Bijoy Panchalle, pp. 99-91.

² Cachar's Intibratta—Upendra Nath Guba.

his last attempt to regain power, but was defeated and killed by Chaurajit at Bishnupur.³

But the position of Chaurajit was also not very secure. Within a short period Marjit made an unsuccessful attempt to capture power and fled to Tummoo. There he sought the intervention of Bodawpaya (1779-1819), king of Ava, who brought about a reconciliation between the two brothers. But it did not last long. He again made two successive attempts on the capital but failing to capture it he escaped to Cachar.⁴ Marjit had some horses with him including "a hockey pony of quite exceptional excellence". He presented the ruler of Cachar, Krishna Chandra and his brother Govinda Chandra four horses. Govinda Chandra asked for the best one, when it was refused, he snatched from him seven more horses.⁵ Marjit felt much offended and with a few followers went to Ava hoping to get help from that side. He agreed to renounce the claim of Mampur over Kubo-Valley and even acknowledge the overlordship of Burma if he could be placed on the throne of Manipur. After about 7 years, in 1892 he succeeded in inducing the ruler of Burma to espouse his cause.

During the winter of 1812 one division of the Burmese army accompanied by Marjit reached Kakching Khulel in Manipur through the Imole Pass. Another division led by the Sumjok Raja entered into Manipur by the Muchee route and encamped near Huecrok. This division was totally defeated and its leader killed by Pitambar Singh, a nephew of Raja Chaurajit. Pitambar then advanced to Kakching but was miserably defeated. Now it was the turn for Chaurajit to fly to Cachar. Cambhur Singh also followed him. Marjit became the ruler of Manipur.⁶

At Cachar Chaurajit was not sitting idle. He had already learnt from Krishna Chandra that the British Government was making preparation to declare war against Burma. He thought that as he was driven out by the Burmese forces, the British might help him to secure his throne.⁷ Accordingly in the year 1813, he sent his uncle, Bhadra Singh with a letter to the Governor General with a view to making an alliance with him. He promised that if the Governor General agreed to help him to restore his authority, in that

³ Bijoy Punchalle, p. 92

⁴ Report on the Eastern Frontier of British India—Capt. Pemberton.

^{5a} Assam District Gazetteers, Vol. I, Cachar, pp. 25-26.

^b Letter from Marjit Singh, Raja of Manipur to the Magistrate of Sylhet District 6th January, 1818, Prachin Bangla Patra Sankalan—Dr. S. N. Sen, p. 74.

⁶ Report on the Eastern Frontier of British India—Capt. Pemberton, Prachin Bangla Patra Sankalan—Dr. S. N. Sen. Introduction, p. 77.

case his Naga and Kuki forces would be at the disposal of the British Government in their operation against Burma.⁸

Soon after the despatch of this letter Chaurajit due to some misunderstanding with the new ruler of Cachar (1813), Govinda Chandra, left Cachar for Jaintia and began to raid Cachar. Govinda Chandra also heard that Ram Singh, the Chief of Jaintia was making preparation to invade Cachar. He was not at all sure of his strength and feeling helpless in the face of imminent attack, applied for help to the Governor General of India.⁹ But no help came from the British Government. In the mean time Gambhir Singh, brother of Chaurajit who was appointed senapati of Cachar force- joined in a conspiracy against Govinda Chandra along with other important officers like Tularam and Sanandaram. Govinda Chandra again applied to the Governor General of India in 1823 to allow him to get the service of one English man and 25 Hindusthani sepoy.¹⁰

INVASION OF CACHAR BY MARJIT

It has been already said that towards the close of 1812 Marjit occupied the throne of Manipur as a vassal of Burma. He never forgot the insult he had received from Govinda Chandra. He decided to take his revenge by attacking Cachar after consolidating his authority in Manipur. But before doing so, he in a letter to the Magistrate of Sylhet explained his intention as well as the reason for invading Cachar, so that the British Government might not come to the aid of Govinda Chandra due to any misunderstanding.¹¹ In reply to that letter the Magistrate informed him that he had received no orders from the Governor General to help the Raja of Cachar. Only Capt. Davidson had been sent to Badarpur with troops to guard the frontier of the company's territory.¹² In 1818 Chaurajit feeling confident of his position in Manipur marched against Cachar with a large force. It was quite impossible on the part of Govinda Chandra to resist him. Chaurajit at the request of Govinda Chandra came from Jaintia to help him. Gambhir Singh also stood by his side. Such unexpected alliance among them compelled Marjit to retire. But Chaurajit

⁸ Letter from Marjit to the Governor General of India Prachin Bangla Patra Sankalan—Dr. S. N. Sen No. 137, p. 61.

⁹ Letter from Govinda Chandra to the Governor General of India. Prachin Bangla Patra Sankalan—No. 141, pp. 66-67.

¹⁰ Letter from Govinda Chandra to the Governor General, dated the 18th April, 1813. Prachin Bangla Patra Sankalan—Dr. S. N. Sen.

¹¹ Letter from Marjit to the Magistrate of Sylhet. Prachin Bangla Patra Sankalan—Dr. S. N. Sen. No. 162, p. 72.

¹² Prachin Bangla Patra Sankalan—Letter No. 162, p. 74.

at the end of this trouble remained in possession of a large part of Cachar kingdom.¹³

MANIPUR UNDER MARJIT

In 1812 Marjit securing the throne of Manipur sent the Burmese forces back to their country and remained in undisputed possession of the country for about six years.¹⁴ These years passed in peace and he found time to undertake some development works. He made some additions and alternations in the palace and further beautified it. A road from the palace up to Sangaitheh was constructed in his time.¹⁵ Some Burmese fashions including the dragon as the state emblem were introduced in his time. This was due to his long association with the Burmese. Friendly relation with Burma facilitated foreign trade. Grazing grounds again became crowded with cattle. In view of the return of prosperity in Manipur many of those who left the country along with Chaurajit came back.¹⁶ But inspite of it Marjit for his dependance on Burma and leanings towards Burmese fashions failed to earn much regard from his people. That became apparent at the time of his invasion of Cachar in 1818. The numerical strength of his forces was so much superior to the combined army of Govinda Chandra, Chaurajit and Gambhir Singh that he could have easily occupied Cachar. But when it became known to his forces that they would have to fight against Chaurajit and Gambhir Singh, no allure-ment could stir up any enthusiasm in them to fight. Marjit was quick to realise the workings of their mind and to prevent further calamities he hurried back to Manipur.¹⁷

Though Marjit ascended the throne of Manipur formally acknowledging the suzerainty of the ruler of Burma yet within a few years he realised that he could rule his country practically as an independent king. He reduced his subjection to a mere agreement in the paper. Yet nothing untoward had happened between the two countries. His soaring ambition sneaked in Kubo Valley also. Without receiving any authority from Burma, he allowed people to cut down trees in that valley.

Old Bodawpaya, the ruler of Burma was naturally offended but he had then no time to take steps. After his death in 1819, Bogyidaw succeeded him. It was at his request that the late ruler of Burma

¹³ Report on the Eastern Frontier of British India, Capt. Pemberton.

¹⁴ Report on the Eastern Frontier of British India, Capt. Pemberton.

¹⁵ Bijoy Punchalla, p. 95.

¹⁶ Report on the Eastern Frontier of British India, Pemberton, p. 45.

¹⁷ A History of Assam—Gait, p. 272

had agreed to help Marjit to secure the throne of Manipur. Bagyidaw after ascending the throne summoned Marjit to the Burmese capital to pay homage. Marjit apprehended that he would be put to trouble if he attended the installation of the new king. He pleaded his inability to attend the ceremony due to the hostile intentions of his brothers—Chaurajit and Gambhir Singh. A Burmese army was immediately despatched to seize him. After an unsuccessful encounter Marjit, with his army, fled to Cachar.¹⁸

OCCUPATION OF CACHAR BY THE REFUGEE KINGS OF MANIPUR

Having been driven out of Manipur Marjit came to Cachar and surrendered himself to Chaurajit. He also handed over to him the charge of the sacred image of Govindaji. Chaurajit pardoned him and received him with kindness. Then the three brothers Chaurajit, Marjit and Gambhir Singh occupied the whole of Cachar Kingdom. Govinda Chandra fled to Sylhet and applied to the Governor General to annex Cachar and bring it under the administration of Sylhet District. But the British Government then refused to interfere in the affairs of Cachar.¹⁹ Letters from Cox's Bebar and Assam also tell the same story 'The prevailing anarchy and disorder loudly called for British Intervention, if not annexation. The nobles of Assam like the Raja of Cachar, implored the Governor General again and again to save their unhappy land from desolation and ruin but the East India Company's government refused to interfere until Burmese aggression forced their hands and rendered a radical revision of their North Eastern Frontier policy an imperative necessity'.²⁰

The Kingdom of Cachar was already divided into two parts between Govinda Chandra and Chaurajit. The three Manipuri brothers after driving away Govinda Chandra repartitioned it among themselves. Chaurajit ruled the tract, east of the Tilam hill from Sonaimukh. Gambhir Singh got the land west of Tilam hill, which he ruled from Gumrah and Marjit ruled Hailakandi from Jhapirband.²¹

ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE MANIPUR TILL 1823 :—

The Burmese forces after occupying Manipur in 1819 placed one Jadu Singh, son-in-law of Charib Niwaz on the throne of Manipur. But shortly he was replaced by Shoobal Singh, brother of Nara

¹⁸ Eastern Frontier of British India, p. 33—By A. C. Banerjee.

¹⁹ Letter from Govinda Chandra to the Governor General (Lord Moira). Prachin Bangla Patra Sankalan, Part II, No. 168, p. 76-77.

²⁰ Prachin Bangla Patra Sankalan—Dr. S. N. Sen, Part II. Introduction, p. XVI.

²¹ Kacharer Itibritto—Upendra Nath Guha, p. 170.

Singh.²² But none of them ever enjoyed the confidence of the Manipuries. Heera Chandra, son of a former ruler Rabino Chandra remained in Manipur and supported by his countrymen continued to annoy the Burmese garrison. In 1822 Pitambar Singh, a nephew of Marjit went from Cachar to help Heera Chandra. They succeeded in defeating a large Burmese detachment. The country had been so much devastated, that the leaders of these parties found themselves unable to get provisions for their men and they withdrew into Cachar. Next year Pitambar was again sent to oust Shoobol, the puppet ruler. He became successful in his mission, but refused to hand over the country to Chaurajit. At this, Gambhir Singh went to Manipur with a small force and defeated Pitambar near Jaynagar. Pitambar fled to Ava for good. Gambhir Singh from the extreme difficulty of obtaining supplies was compelled to return to Cachar almost immediately.²³

The Princes of Manipur, even when banished from their country, failed to pull on with each other. After returning from his raid in Manipur in 1823, Gambhir Singh soon quarrelled with Chaurajit and occupied the whole of Cachar. Marjit was allowed to enjoy his share under him but Chaurajit took shelter in Sylhet and remained there till the outbreak of the first Anglo-Burmese War.²⁴

In the mean time Govinda Chandra, the deposed ruler of Cachar finding no hope of getting any help from the British Government entered into negotiations with the Burmese Government. In the year 1823, Burmese army invaded Cachar through Manipur but they were repelled by Gambhir Singh. When the Anglo Burmese War was formally declared in 1824 Marjit feeling insecure at Cachar fled to Sylhet.²⁵ From 1823 to 1824 Gambhir Singh made repeated requests to the British authorities for help against the Burmese incursions. But they preferred not to make any commitment in this affair until the out break of the First Anglo-Burmese War in 1824.²⁶

²² Statistical Account of Manipur—Brown.

²³ Report on the Eastern Frontier of British India—Pemberton, pp. 46-47.

²⁴ Report on the Eastern Frontier of British India, p. 47.

²⁵ Statistical accounts of Manipur—Brown.

²⁶ Burmese War—Wilson.

NEW ASPECTS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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I

The institution of the State and its relation to the individual have been studied under various names such as Politics, Political Philosophy, Political Theory or Political Science. There is more than one book under each of these titles. Professor Adamovich of the Vienna University does not use any of these names in his contribution to the UNESCO anthology on "Contemporary Political Science" published in 1950. He describes his article as "The Science of the State"¹. It appears to be a new title which can be added to the above list.

The word "Politics" is derived from the Greek word "Polis" (pō' līs). In the Greek language, this word "sufficed for both city and state".² It is only natural, then, that "Polis" would be accepted as a synonym for the city-state. Professor Barker also adopts this usage of the word.³ Even then, the association of such a modern word as the "State" with "Polis" does not seem to be appropriate. Whereas the state is exclusively a political association, "Polis" was a spiritual bond.⁴ As Professor Cole maintains "Polis" does not mean 'State', and in translating it as 'State' we are twisting Greek thought to suit our own patterns of thinking". Professor Field suggests that we should call "Polis" a community rather than a State.⁵ However, "Politics" stands for knowledge centering round the affairs of "Polis" or 'city-state'. In short, "Politics" is primarily the knowledge of the State.⁶

Aristotle calls such knowledge as master science in his book on "Ethics",⁷ but he describes his own special study in this field as

¹ Adamovich, L. "The Science of the State in Germany and Austria", pp. 23-37.

² Durant, W. "The Story of Civilization" Vol. 2, "The Life of Greece" (New York, 1931), p. 204.

³ Barker, E. "Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors" (London, 1918).

⁴ Dickinson, G. L. "The Greek View of Life" (London, 1911 Edn.).

⁵ Cole, G. D. H. "Essays in Social Theory" (London, 1950), p. 13.

⁶ Field, G. C. "Political Theory" (London, 1956), p. 8.

⁷ Professor Giddell defines Political Science as the science of the State "Political Science" Revised Edn (1951), p. 8.

⁸ It is also called "Nicomachean Ethics" as it was edited by Aristotle's son Nicomachus. Aristotle - "The Nicomachean Ethics" (Loeb Classical Library), London (1928), p. 5.

"Politics". Although he published both these books in one volume, which shows how close was the relationship between ethics and politics in his time, later on they were separated.⁹

The word "Political" is the adjective of the word "Politics". "Political Philosophy" emphasises a special aspect of the study. "Philosophy" is 'darshan' or a particular insight into the ultimate. It is wisdom based on the Knowledge of the Reality. The word "Political" in association with "Philosophy" implies an inquiry into the ultimate reality or the basic principles of the State. Political Philosophy "deals with generalizations rather than with particular".¹⁰ "It is the study of the ideal social organisation".¹¹ Politics has long been an associate of philosophy. In Scottish tradition, Politics forms a part of Moral Philosophy.¹² Ever since Confucius, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, took active interest in the morals and mechanism of the State, Politics has become a legitimate pastime of philosophers. Indeed philosophers have made and are also making significant contributions to the theoretical aspect of Politics.

"Political Theory" has more or less the same connotation as "Political Philosophy". The word 'Theory' has a very special meaning. It means a well-founded speculative view. It is a supposition explaining something. "Political Theory" emphasises the contemplative aspect of the affairs of the State and its related concepts. Even now in Oxford University the chair of this particular department is called Chichele Professorship of Social and Political Theory, and its Professor G. D. H. Cole zealously defends the use of the word "Theory" against "Philosophy" and "Science".¹³

The association of the term "Science" to Politics" is a nineteenth century innovation. Taking science as a systematic knowledge, Political Science implies such a knowledge of the state. Political Science stands for both an empirical investigation of political phenomena and the utilisation of such knowledge as a technique of control of political relations. It becomes, ultimately a

⁹ Durant, W. *ibid.* f.n. p. 533.

¹⁰ Gettell, R.G. *ibid.* p. 5.

¹¹ Durant, W. "The Story of Philosophy," New York 1951 edn.) p. XXVIII.

¹² Keirstead, B.S. and Watkins, F.M. "Political Science in Canada" in "Contemporary Political Sciences" Paris (1955) p. 171.

¹³ Cole, G.D.H. "Scope and Method in Social and Political Theory". Inaugural

¹⁴ Lecture delivered at Oxford on 9 November, 1945 and published by Clarendon.

Professor Cole once told me that he refused to participate in the International Political Science Conference because he took strong exception to the adoption of the word "Science" after the word "Political".—(Personal communication).

study of power.¹⁴ Sir John Seeley pointed out to the students of the Cambridge University in 1885 that the subject which had hitherto been called "Political Philosophy" would now be called "Political Science".¹⁵ In the twentieth century, in particular, the subject is almost universally called "Political Science". There are important National Political Science Associations and there is, at present, a world organisation called International Political Science Association, with its Head Quarters in Geneva.

Although the state is the central issue of Political Science the emphasis has shifted now from the state to political behaviour, and social and psychological factors and forces of the government and the governed.¹⁶ Walter Lippmann,¹⁷ MacIver,¹⁸ Merriam¹⁹ and Lasswell²⁰ represent this modern trend. The International Political Science Conference at Paris on September, 1948, declared in a resolution that the scope of Political Science should include (i) Political Theory, (ii) Political institutions, (iii) Parties, groups and public opinion, and (iv) International relations.²¹ Thus it makes a considerable expansion of the subject matter of Political Science. Although political relations are studied, at present in a far more intensive way and in a wider perspective, yet the state continues to be the dominant feature of Political Science. In fact, this science "begins and ends with the state".²²

II

We are all born as members of a society. And society in the aspect of its political organisation is called the state. State has come into existence at a particular stage of social and political evolution in a particular area. By now it has become the most dominant and effective of all human associations. It is also the most universal. Save and except those who are born in a tribal stage of society like the Eskimos in the North Arctic, we are born into a politically organised society, i.e., the State. Although the tribal society and the State are not apparently the same, yet it is

¹⁴ Seeley, J. R. "Introduction to Political Science" London (1901), p. 1.

¹⁵ Eisenmann, C. "On the Matter and Methods of the Political Sciences," in *Contemporary Political Science* Paris (1950), p. 103.

¹⁶ Lippmann, W. in "Public Opinion" New York, (1922) and "Phantom Public" New York (1925).

¹⁷ MacIver, R. M. "The Modern State" London (1926) "The Web of Government" N.Y. (1947).

¹⁸ Merriam, C. E. "Systematic Politics" Chicago (1945).

¹⁹ Lasswell, H. D. "The Analysis of Political Behaviour," London (1948).

²⁰ "Contemporary Political Science", p. 4.

²¹ Garner, J. W. "Political Science and Government", Calcutta (1955 edn.) p. 8.

rather difficult to draw a rigid distinction between them. It has been proved by recent social anthropological research into the political unit in primitive societies that even the tribes can have well developed political system. Professor Schapera shows in his admirable work on "Government and Politics in Tribal Societies" (1956) that Bushmen, Hottentots* and Bergdama and Southern Bantu in South Africa do possess politically organised government. They also have the element of territoriality,²² which is regarded as the most distinctive mark of a modern state.²³ This type of research might change the views about the differences between the tribe and the state, popularised till recently by Sir Henry Maine²⁴ and Professor MacIver²⁵ who hold that the tribal societies lack the "sharply defined" territorial basis. Moreover, whatever the apparent differences there might have been between the tribe and the state in the past such differences are being gradually removed as a result of the expansion of the state. Most of the tribes like Red Indians in the United States of America; Toros, Wasukuma, Kikuyu, Masai and Bahayas in Africa; Gonds, Santal, Bhils, Munda and Naga in India; the Vedda in Ceylon; and Maoris in New Zealand are being integrated into a state organisation. And as ILO publication on "Indigenous Peoples" (1953) indicates the integration of such peoples into the socio economic life of the independent countries has become a matter of international concern. It is likely that in future all the tribes would be incorporated within the modern state structure.

However, as majority of us are members of the state, it is natural that we should be keenly interested in the concern of the state. It is in our own interest that we should "investigate this institution, should attempt to discover its origin, should question or uphold its authority, and dispute over the proper scope of its function".²⁷ Such interest is fundamentally a concern for understanding Political Science.

We have to recognise incidentally, that a wider interest in Political Science is, indeed, a recent development in human history.²⁸ Political Science is essentially a twentieth century subject of dis-

* According to John Gunther only a few Bushmen and pure Hottentots survive to day. "Inside Africa" London (1955), pp. 476-77.

²² Schapera, I. "Government and Politics in Tribal Societies", London (1956), p. 15.

²³ Briery, J.L. "The Law of Nations" Oxford (1949, 4th edn.) Maciver, R.M. "The Modern State", London (1956), pp. 7-8. Hyde, C.C. "International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States," Boston (1951), 2nd. rev. ed., pp. 16-17.

²⁴ Maine, H. "Ancient Law," London. (Pollock's ed 1930), pp. 144ff.

²⁵ Maciver, R.M. "The Web of Government," New York (1947). p. 158.

²⁶ ILO "Indigenous Peoples" Geneva (1953).

²⁷ Gettell, R.G. "History of Political Thought" London (1932 edn.), p. 4.

²⁸ Annas Besant : "Lectures on Political Science". Madras (1919), p. 11.

course. This is one of the principal reasons why the UNESCO study project selects Political Science as the first field of investigation.²⁹

Although politics, received the status of science fairly recently, as an object of speculation it is almost as old as any other subject of investigation into human relationship. Both Professor Seligman,³⁰ Editor-in-Chief of the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, and Professor Ebenstein³¹ agree that the earliest of the social sciences is politics, because the most important of human groups has, in general, been the state.

Nevertheless, it is true that scientific approach to politics had to wait for centuries and this delay can be attributed to three factors. In the first place, Political Science is itself a revolutionary branch of study. It seeks to discover the real social and political foundations of the state. Such discovery can, indeed, be detrimental to the vested interests. In fact, these interests stand in the way to the serious study of Political Science. It may be one of the reasons why the grant for research in Politics, in various countries, is proverbially so inadequate.

Secondly, as Mr. Lévy-Brühl points out that social science, including Political Science of course, cannot develop without the preliminary right to criticise existing institution.³² And this right has never been recognised by authoritarian and absolutist regimes. Freedom of thought is the basic condition for the cultivation and development of Political Science. It has been pointed out by Professor Adamovich,³³ Mr. Perticone³⁴ and Messrs. Rijpperda Wierdoma and Hintzen³⁵ in their respective articles on "Contemporary Political Science" that many Political Science subjects could not be studied in fascist Germany, Austria and Italy, and in Holland at the beginning of the last century, simply because specialists feared reprisals from authorities who required complete subservience to the *status quo*. Intellectual freedom is essential for the growth of Political Science. Critical inquiry was demanded as a matter of human right for the first time by the Greeks³⁶ So political speculation was practically

²⁹ Salvadori, M. Introduction—"Contemporary Political Science", p. 1.

³⁰ Seligman, E.R.A. "What are the Social Sciences" in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. I, p. 3.

³¹ Ebenstein, W. "Political Science" in Encyclopaedia Americana. New York (1951 edn.), Vol. 12, p. 309.

³² Lévy-Brühl, "The Social Sciences As Disciplines. France, Belgium and Romanic Switzerland" in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. I, p. 246.

³³ Adamovich, L. *ibid.* p. 28.

³⁴ Perticone, G. "Political Science in Italy" pp. 252-56.

³⁵ Rijpperda Wierdoma, J.V. and Hintzen, G.A. "Political Science in the Netherlands", pp. 281-283.

³⁶ Bury, J.B. "A History of Freedom of Thought," London 1914 reprint, p. 22.

initiated by them. Such inquiry became a permanent feature of European society since the Renaissance. And with Machiavelli, the typical representative of the Renaissance, we find the beginnings of a Science of Politics.³⁷ From that time onwards Political Science has developed considerably, and even now it is in a growing stage.

In the third place, it has to be recognised that Political Science is most certainly not a productive science. In an acquisitive society, a political scientist is not as much essential as a chemist or physicist or an engineer. He is not even as useful as a statistician, or an economist or an industrial psychologist. He is not yet, with some exceptions, in countries like Britain³⁸ and America,³⁹ linked with administration and business organisation. He continues to be an academician. Indeed, this is one of the main reasons why Political Science has a delayed growth in history.

Thus the nature of the subject itself, and its prerequisite together with its social value explain the relatively late interest in its study. But these negative factors are no longer in effective operation. On the contrary, we have several new factors which have increased our interest in Political Science.

Firstly, with the march of time there has been an increasing participation of a larger part of the community in the process of government. Power has or is being shifted from the few to the many. Due to this accession of the masses to a new status, the bases and postulates of politics have been enormously widened and enriched. In the past ordinary men had little to do with the governmental processes. As pointed out by Professor Merriam: "During the greater part of a man's experience, the bulk of the population in any political unit was excluded from a full role in government, held as slave, serf, subject or partial citizen".⁴⁰ But to day it is all changed. Masses have become powerful and their new importance is clearly underlined in Mr. Ortega Y Gasset's "The Revolt of the Masses".⁴¹ Their opinion counts in deciding questions of the seat and exercise of political power. Bernard Shaw records this change in his own cynical way: "The politician who once had to learn how to flatter Kings has now to learn how to fascinate, amuse, coax,

³⁷ "Machiavelli, Niccolo (1469-1527)" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 14, p. 577.

³⁸ Robson, W.A. "Political Science in Great Britain" in "Contemporary Political Science," Paris (1950), pp. 808-10.

³⁹ Merriam, C.E. "Political Science in the United States" in "Contemporary Political Science", pp. 244 and 247-48.

⁴⁰ Merriam, C.E. "New Aspects of Politics". Chicago (1925), p. 8.

⁴¹ London (1951).

humbug, frighten or otherwise strike the fancy of the electorate",⁴² This is true whether the politician is a democrat Nehru or a fascist Franco. Every modern politician seeks to win the support of the majority opinion and in the process of doing so contributes to the stimulation of the political intelligence of the people.

In the second place, enormous productive capacity of a modern industrial society contributes a great deal in inspiring the study of Political Science. A surplus productivity means, firstly, the relative leisure for the toiling class during which time they can pursue new queries, and, secondly, the formulation of new demands for the distribution of social surplus relating to the abolition of starvation and fear. Indeed, scientific and technological improvements have "multiplied the productivity of the soil, the output of factories, given the hand hundred times its former power, opened out materials and processes of incalculable value to millions of persons, and cleared the way to a wonderland of achievement in health and well-being".⁴³ Machinery has reduced the amount of labour expended in production and enhanced the effectiveness of the individual. Introduction of atomation would relieve men further from dull and routine work⁴⁴ and give them more leisure for creative life. More leisure would make possible a vigorous political and cultural life for the people.

The very realisation that science can "solve completely the material problems of human existence"⁴⁵ causes revolutionary changes in human outlook. It is now clearly possible to "abolish the misery born out of want" and to raise "the millions to a level of material well being at which they would be able to share, for the first time, in the fairest treasures of our whole cultural heritage".⁴⁶ As Professor Toynbee remarks "This new dream of the possibility of abundance for all Mankind had generated unprecedentedly insistent and impatient demands for 'freedom from want'".⁴⁷ New demands are being formulated to-day for education, full employment, shorter hours for labour, better housing, proper medical care, and abundant

⁴² Shaw, S.B. "Man & Superman", London (1928), p. 197.

⁴³ Merriam, C. E. "Systematic Politics", Chicago (1945), p. 247.

⁴⁴ Bernal, J.D. "Science in History", London (1954), p. 497; Sha noll, D. "Electronics -Today And Tomorrow" in "Profile of America", ed. by Davis, E., New York (1954), p. 231.

⁴⁵ Bernal, J.D. "Science and Industry" in "The Frustration of Science, London (1935), p. 69.

⁴⁶ The Earl of Listowel, "Science and Legislation" in "Human Affairs" Planned and Edited by Cattell, R.B., Cohen J., and Travers, R.M., London (1938), p. 318.

⁴⁷ Toynbee, A. "A Study of History" Abridgement of Volumes VII-X by D. C. Somervell, London (1957), p. 339.

recreational facilities for all. And such demands give shape to the major political and social movements of modern history."⁴⁸

In the third place, as conquest of the physical and natural world is reaching a stage of relative perfection due to science, we have gained an enormous confidence. This confidence is reflected in our present efforts to control and plan our social relations. Ultimately we have realised that without the control of social relations, the possibilities that are now made available because of science will remain unrealised. This realisation was very clearly made public by a group of British scientists in 1935 in an anthology on "The Frustration of Science". Professor Toynbee also admits that such social limitations have become "practical limitations on the human plane" to "the potential capacity of technology".⁴⁹ Professor Merriam fully recognises the need for social reorganisation in the light of modern science in the following words: "One of the greatest needs of our time is the organisation of our modern intelligence in terms of understanding of physical inventions in their relation to behaviour and social inventions. The wide gap between the understanding of "machines" and social mechanisms is one of the greatest danger points in our civilization. The farther and faster one advances without the other, the greater the degree of risk."⁵⁰ Similar view have also been expressed by Professor Mannheim.⁵¹ In fact, we have reached a stage where either we take active interest in social relation and politics and grow or we remain ignorant and decay. We must intelligently plan our society if we are to profit fully by the potentialities of modern science and escape extinction through thermonuclear misadventure. Political Science can effectively help such planning by offering sound political principles with a view to eliminating "waste in political action" and release "the constructive possibilities in human political nature".⁵²

In the fourth place, science has so much perfected the state machine through improvements in transport and communication that the scope of individual initiative and local freedom has become very much restricted. Modern techniques have sharpened both the instruments of coercion and persuasion. They have caused "the pro-

⁴⁸ Lasswell, H D "World Organisation and Society" in "The Policy Sciences" Recent Developments in Scope and Method, ed by Lerner D and Lasswell, H D, Stanford (1951), p 113.

⁴⁹ Toynbee, A. *ibid*, p. 333.

⁵⁰ Merriam, C E "The Role of Politics in Social Change", New York (1936), p 98

⁵¹ Mannheim, K "Present Trends in the Building of Society" in "Human Affairs" London (1938) p 280

⁵² Merriam, C E, "New Aspects of Politics", Chicago (1935), pp vii-viii.

gressive centralization of power",⁵³ and, thus, made possible "a new intensity of governmental control".⁵⁴ In both these ways, the cause of liberty and freedom of the locality are adversely affected. In addition, the scientific techniques have increased "the amount of organisation in the world"⁵⁵ and made it possible for a few determined men to dominate millions of unarmed citizens, if they have the nerve to do so".⁵⁶ Politically it implies increasing strength of the executive. As Professor Wheare points out "From the time of the invention of the gunpowder up to the present, the executive, with its control over the armed forces and the police, has had its power enormously increased. The machine gun alone is a most powerful force in the increase of the executive's control over the community. The development of radio, and of other means of communication, has strengthened the executive in other ways. Armed with a control over these powerful means of governing the citizens the executive finds its position transformed even from the opening years of the twentieth century".⁵⁷ Thus the net result is "that fewer men have executive power, but those few have more power than such men had formerly".⁵⁸ Never before had so many been at the mercy of the so few. Even the Stalin deviation could be possible on such an extensive scale due to developments of modern technique.

Consequently it is now possible to suppress a people's movement with greater ease and develop a thought pattern to the prejudice of the holders of political power. Aldous Huxley's "Brave New World" and George Orwell's "Nineteen Eighty-four" are two different extreme examples of what technology can do for society. But it does not mean that new forces and new possibilities cannot be employed for increasing the maximum social welfare. Much would depend ultimately on the motives by which science would be used. This is a thrilling opportunity as well as a great threat. If we now fail to plan our society in the light of correct political principles, there is a chance that we might be reduced, in future, to a new type of slavery. It is probably this consideration that has led Bernard Shaw to comment that Political Science is "the science by which alone civilisation can be saved".

⁵³ Huxley, A. "Science, Liberty and Peace", New York (1946), p. 1.

⁵⁴ Russell, B. "Authority And the Individual", London (1949), pp. 44 and 30-31.

⁵⁵ Russell, B. "Values in the Atomic Age" in "The Atomic Age", London (1949), p. 85.

⁵⁶ Wheare, K. C. "Modern Constitutions", London (1956 reprint), p. 100.

⁵⁷ Wheare, K. C. *ibid.*

⁵⁸ Russell, B. "The Impact of Science on Society", London (1952) p. 83.

Finally, Political Science has one special aspect compared to other branch of human knowledge. We, as individuals, can ignore chemistry or literature but not politics. Even if we are not interested in politics, be it a question of war or peace, is never uninterested in us. We can never pursue our interest and calling during national and international emergencies. We are vitally affected by all major political questions of our time, simply because political relations are increasingly affecting our daily lives. Even the dangerous race for thermo-nuclear experiments vitally affect us and our future generation. And such problems are essentially political in nature. In that context, it is no exaggeration to say that we are virtually living in a political age. And we can never fully understand such an age without some knowledge of Political Science.

Thus the rise of the masses, increased production, technological revolution with its important social and political implications, the nature of the subject itself in contrast to other subjects are the principal aspects of contemporary Political Science.

GAUDAPĀDA: HIS WORKS AND VIEWS

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Gaudapāda is a great personality in Advaita philosophy of India. His works form the basis of Advaita and he is regarded as the preceptor of Govindapāda of whom Saṅkarācārya was a direct disciple. Much is not known about his date, life and works. His views are gathered from the books which tradition ascribes to him.

DATE AND LIFE

In the biography of Saṅkara, it is stated that Gaudapāda met Saṅkara at a particular time. But there is no other proof to confirm such a statement. So, it seems that Gaudapāda was no contemporary of Saṅkara. But it is almost impossible to fix his actual date. Saṅkara's date is generally admitted to be 788 A.D. But there is a hot controversy over this issue. If for argument's sake this date of Saṅkara be taken as true, Gaudapāda's date will approximately be the seventh century A.D. Gaudapāda cannot be much earlier than Saṅkara as his disciple Govindapāda was the preceptor of Saṅkara.

It is difficult to determine the actual place where Gaudapāda was born. Sureśvara, the direct disciple of Saṅkara, in his 'Naiṣkarmyasiddhi' calls him a man from Gauḍa or Bengal.¹ Gaudapāda was a sannyāsin and Govindapāda, the preceptor of Saṅkara was initiated by him. Besides this, nothing is known about his life. Ācārya Saṅkara gathered his main principles from the writings of Gaudapāda. Sureśvarācārya also quoted the different statements of Gaudapāda in his 'Naiṣkarmyasiddhi'.² The subsequent Advaitins were also much influenced by his writings.

WORKS AND VIEWS

Gaudapāda wrote a 'kārikā' on Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad and this is his main work. There are various editions of this book and Saṅkara annotated on it. An annotation Mitākṣarā by name on this Kārikā is also extant and this is found in Benares.

There is an annotation on Sāṅkhyakārikā composed by Gaudapāda. But we are not sure about his authorship of this book. The

¹ N. S. (Benares Sans. Series 1904), 4/44, pp. 288.

² See N. S. (Benares Sans. Series 1904), pp. 286-287.

excellence of his pen is totally absent here. But tradition ascribes this book to him. Vācaspati Miśra has refuted the views of his annotation in his 'Sāṅkhya tattva Kaumudī'.²

There is again an annotation on this annotation 'Candrikā' by name. But the annotation on Sāṅkhyakārikā, perhaps, was not written by Gauḍapāda himself. It is not possible for an advaitin to write any annotation on Sāṅkhya. Though a few advaitins like Vācaspati Miśra annotated on Sāṅkhya, still it is not possible in the case of the writer of Māṇḍukyopaniṣad kārikā. Vācaspati Miśra did not refute the views of this book with any respect for the author. This is an additional reason why we may doubt the authorship of Gauḍapāda in respect of the annotation on Sāṅkhya kārikā.

His next book is the annotation on 'uttara Gītā'. It has been published only in 1910 by T. K. Bal subrahmanya Sāstri, the proprietor of Vāṇi Vitās Press at Srīrangam. Uttara Gītā is regarded as a part of the Mahābhārata. But this portion is not found in many editions of the same. Uttara Gītā is full of the ideas of Advaita and it is nicely written. It may be that this was written by Ācārya Gauḍapāda, but the subsequent thinkers were not much influenced by this annotation.

The later advaitins accepted Māṇḍukyopaniṣad Kārikā as authoritative. The Kārikā contains four prakaraṇas, the first being—Āgama prakaraṇa, the second—Vaitathya prakaraṇa, the third—Advaita prakaraṇa and the last being Alāta Sānti prakaraṇa. Āgama prakaraṇa contains 29 slokas, Vaitathya prakaraṇa 38, Advaita prakaraṇa 48 and Alāta Sānti prakaraṇa 100 slokas. Thus there are 215 slokas in all in the whole Kārikā.

In the Āgama prakaraṇa Gauḍapāda explains the four principles—Viśva, Taijas, Prājña and Turiya. Viśva is the Vaiśvānara or the Great Person, Taijas is Hiraṇyagarbha or the golden egg and Prājña means Īśvara or God. They are at bottom identical. Difference is due to illusion. The individual soul or Jīva is always the Śiva or God. Jīvahood is illusory. Godliness is also of the same nature. Turiya alone is ultimately real. The creation is illusory. But the locus of this illusory creation is real. Even an illusion is not possible without a real locus. The snake that appears in illusion manifests itself on the locus 'rope' which is not illusory. The apparent difference among Viśva, Taijas and Prājña is due to ignorance or Avidyā. Ātman is their real essence and this is the ultimate reality.

² See Sāṅkhyatattva Kaumudī (the edition by late Purna Chanda Vedāntasūren) pp. 211.

After this, Gauḍapāda states the different theories of creation and refutes them. Some think that the creation is due to the will of God. Some others hold that the creation is from Time, some others are of opinion that the creation is for enjoyment or Bhoga. There are people again who will say that the creation is due to the sportive spirit and there is yet another view which holds that the creation is due to the nature of God. Gauḍapāda refutes all these views as he says that God the perfect being can have no desire for creation (āpta-kāmasya kā sprhā). Therefore he concludes that creation is to be regarded as illusory.

Turiya Atman is the ultimate reality. It is imperishable. It is non-dual. It is also uncreated. Viśva and Taijas come under the law of cause and effect while Prājña is governed by the law of cause only. But Turiya transcends everything. Viśva can know Taijas. Prājña is incapable of grasping the reality. But Turiya is all-knowing. Turiya is all. It is knowledge in essence. Prājña and Turiya equally do not see duality, but Prājña contains the potentiality of tamas or sleep while Turiya transcends it. Viśva and Taijas lack the knowledge of reality. Prājña knows no dream, it has only the sleep. But Turiya has neither sleep or tamas nor dream. When the jīva wakes up from sleep and dream and acquires true knowledge, his ignorance is destroyed, the Advaita shines forth and he attains the Turiya stage.

Gauḍapāda, then, shows the identity between Virāt, Hiraṇyagarbha and Isvara on the one side and Viśva, Taijas and Prājña on the other. Praṇava is Brahman. Three letters constitute Praṇava and these are—'A', 'U' and 'M'. 'A' represents Viśva, 'U' taijas and 'M' Prājña. As 'A' marks the beginning of all letters, so Viśva is the beginning. As 'U' is superior to 'A' and remains in between 'A' and 'M' so Taijas is superior to Viśva and stands concealed by Prājña. 'M' is the last letter here. As the letters here culminate in 'M' so every thing culminates in Prājña. Thus one who understands the identity between Viśva and Virāt, Taijas and Hiraṇyagarbha, Prājña and Isvara and knows that Turiya or 'A' is the last resort is a respectable sage. Praṇava is to be realised and the knowledge of identity between the Jīva and Brahman is the *summum bonum* of life. One who fixes his mind on Praṇava knows no fear. Praṇava is the beginning, it is the end and again it is the middle. Praṇava is Isvara and it resides in the hearts of all.

Gauḍapāda shows the identity between the Jīva and Brahman and also the falsity of the world with the help of the texts in Āgama

prakaraṇa and then in Vaitathya prakaraṇa he adduces arguments in order to confirm his views. He says that what is visible in dream is false or Vitatha. The mountains and elephants cannot reside inside the body and in dream, strangely enough, we find that this is true. So, the veracity of the dream objects is easily questionable.

Now the dream objects are as visible as the objects of the waking life. So, the objects of the waking life are as false as the dream objects. Of course, here it should be remembered that the dream objects are not on a par with objects of the waking life in all respects. The dream objects are private in the sense that only particular individuals observe them. But the objects of the waking life are not private, but they are public. All people who are in the world observe them. But still both the types of objects are equally false as they are visible.

If everything is false, nihilism becomes the only position. Gauḍapāda refutes this charge and tells us that Ātman makes the hypothesis of difference through its own māyā. Ātman alone is ultimately real and the false world appears on this locus.¹

Gauḍapāda defines māyā or ajñāna as neither existent nor non-existent nor both. It is neither Composite nor non-Composite nor both. The knowledge of Brahman alone destroys it.²

Ācārya Śaṅkara in his Adhyāsa Bhaṣya proves it as Common to all people. The doctrine of Māyā enunciated by Gauḍapāda attained its full fledged development in the philosophy of Śaṅkara.

Gauḍapāda thinks that God exhibits the difference which remained as *latent desire* through Māyā. This is creation. As creation is due to Māyā, so God is not entangled in it. The relation between the real (God) and the false (the world) is not possible. Can there be any relation between what exists and what does not?

As the rope appears in the form of the snake, so God appears as the world. The illusion of snake ceases to exist when the rope is known as the rope. In the same way the world becomes naught with the knowledge of Brahman as the non-dual reality. The reality is non-dual and duality is due to māyā. Brahman appears as over-powered by Māyā, but actually it is not.

After this, Gauḍapāda gives us the different theories of Self or Ātman and describes them as due to ajñāna or ignorance. The differ-

¹ Kalpayatyātmānātmānamātmāna deḥ Sva māyayā
Sa eva Vudhyate bhedāniti Vedānta nīśasyati.—M.K.

² Tacca na sat nāsat, nāpi sadasat, na Vinnaṃ nā vinnaṃ nāpi Vinnaṃ vinnaṃ, nāpi na niravayam na, sāvayam, sobbhayam, kevala Brahmātmaikyaśvajñānapadayaṃ—
Quotation on Uttara Gīta.

ent theories are :—Prāṇa or life—breath as the self, Elements as the self, Attribute as the self, Tattva or principle as the self, Pāda or leg as the self, Viṣaya or object as the self, loka or region as the self, Deva or god as the self, Veda as the self, Jajña or sacrifice as the self, Bhoktā or enjoyer as the self, Bhojya or the enjoyable as the self, Sūkṣma or the subtle as the self, Sthūla or the gross as the self, Mūrta or the immanent as the self, Amūrta or the transcendent as the self, Kāla or Time as the self, Dik or Space as the self, Vāda or argumentation as the self, Bhuvana or the universe as the self, Mana or the mind as the self, Vijñāna or knowledge as the self, Dharma-dharma or Virtue and vice as the self and the like. Gaudapāda says that these are the different ways in which the ignorant people think of the self. One who knows the Self as indeterminate and one is really a wise man. The locus of differences is One and above all modifications. Modification is false, the locus is true. The universe is as false as a dream ‡

People sometimes misunderstand Gaudapāda and think that he did not recognise any difference between a dream and the world. But this is not true. Gaudapāda calls the world a dream as he means to say that like dream the world is false. But he also knows that unlike dream the world is publicly observed and so it is not totally on a par with the dream. This was only implicit in the kārīkā of Gaudapāda and later on Śaṅkara made this explicit by distinguishing between two grades of falsity—Vyavahārika and prātibhāsika. To Śaṅkara, the world is Vyavahārika whereas the dream is only prātibhāsika.

Any way, Gaudapāda was very much clear in declaring that from the transcendental or Pāramārthika standpoint, there is no creation, no destruction, no bondage, no aspirant for salvation and no salvation also, there is only the indeterminate non-dual Self and this is the only reality.

Now the question is : Who can know this Truth? According to Gaudapāda, one who has overcome anger, fear and attachment and who is conversant in the Vedas can know this. The constant remembrance of Advaita is the means for liberation. This is the sum and substance of the Vaitathya prakaraṇa. In the Advaita prakaraṇa, Gaudapāda again establishes Advaita with the help of reasoning.

Gaudapāda believes in jīvan mukti and tells us that a man may be free even when he is embodied and he behaves almost automatically

‡ Svapnamāye yathā dṛṣṭe gandharvanagaram yathā Tathā Vivra midam dṛṣṭam
Vedāntesu Vicakṣaṇaiḥ.

without any consideration of the consequences. He does not believe in the death of Ātman or self. Ātman is uncreated. What is uncreated is also deathless. So the realisation of Brahman or Ātman after death means nothing.

To Gauḍapāda, Ātman is omnipotent like ākāśa. As ākāśa circumscribed by a pot is only empirical and really ākāśa is one and indivisible, so jīva is like ākāśa circumscribed by a pot and Ātman is one and indivisible. Creation etc. are all due to māyā and they have no ultimate reality. As with the destruction of the pot, the ākāśa, circumscribed by the pot is merged in the boundless ākāśa, so the ātman immanent in a jīva merges itself in Paramātman. As the ākāśa circumscribed by a pot is really the same as the great ākāśa, so jīvātman and paramātman are one, they appear as distinct only due to ignorance or avidyā.

Here it may be objected that if Ātman is one in all the bodies, why then the weal and woe of one person will not be the weal and woe of all? Gauḍapāda says in reply that this cannot be. As the presence of dust and smoke in the ākāśa circumscribed by a particular pot does not imply the presence of dust and smoke in the ākāśa circumscribed by all other pots, so the weal and woe of a particular jīva do not imply the same for all the jīvas. Really there is no distinction in the ākāśa, but the particular ākāśa circumscribed by a particular pot has its distinction of name, form and effect. There is equal difference in the ego of the jīvas, but there is no distinction in the essence of the self. The ākāśa circumscribed by a particular pot is no modification of ākāśa. So the jīva also is no modification of Ātman. Ātman undergoes no change, change occurs only in the ego. Śruti also testifies to only one self. Taittirīya upaniṣad speaks of the same self in all the five different sheaths or Kośas.

An objection may be easily urged against this contention of Gauḍapāda. In Śruti in the context of creation specially in Karma Kānda, the difference between jīva and Paramātman has been clearly stated. How, then, they can be non-different in Jñāna Kānda? Here Gauḍapāda says that their difference is only apparent and not real. Only from the standpoint of the experience of ordinary life this difference is to be maintained, but ultimately there is no difference at all.

Now the question is: Worship or upāsana is advocated in Śruti. In upāsana the difference between the worshipper and the worshipped is admitted, If jñāna which is above all differences is ultimately real, then what is the use of upāsana which entails difference? Here Gauḍapāda says that everyone is not fit for the same spiritual dis-

cipline. As there is difference in capacity and calibre of different people, so there should be different disciplines meant for them.

Gauḍapāda classifies people in three groups according to their capacity and calibre in the spiritual sphere and these are: Bad, Medium and Good. People having bad and medium talents are fit for Karma and upāsana is prescribed for them. But a man with good talents knows that these are inferior to jñāna and jñāna alone represents the ultimate truth. Here Gauḍapāda says that the Advaitins have no quarrel with the dualists as they know that dualism implies the distinction of Advaita and this distinction is due to ignorance. The Advaitins cannot quarrel at all, as to them there is no second thing to quarrel with.

Gauḍapāda understands Jñāna, the ultimate reality as self-luminous or Svayamprakāśa, Jñāna remains manifested though it is no object in any sense.

Gauḍapāda, then, speaks of the means of liberation.¹ The mind is attracted to the objects of enjoyment. The mind is to be withdrawn from objects. But this withdrawal is a long and laborious process. It is to be followed slowly and steadily. People derive joy in Savikalpaka Samādhi. But this is not the end of the process. People should proceed further to attain Nirvikalpaka Samādhi and when this stage will be achieved the non-dual reality will shine in its pristine purity. This is the *Summum bonum* of life and existence.

Let us now turn to the last chapter of the Kārikā which is technically known as Alāta Sānti prakaraṇa. The word 'alātā' means search light or Maśāla. If the search light is revolved, different forms appear. These forms do not remain in the light, nor are they lost in the light. Similarly the world appears. But it has no ultimate reality. The false world also really does not originate from Brahman nor is it lost in Brahman. Of course, Brahman is to be admitted as the locus of this false appearance.

Gauḍapāda thinks that what is non-existent is non-existent for all times—past, present and future. The silver in the nacre though appears in illusion, still from the ultimate stand point it is non-existent for all times. This is in short the view of Gauḍapāda in his Alāta Sānti prakaraṇa.

Gauḍapāda also refutes dualism and Buddhism in general in Alāta Sānti prakaraṇa. The unborn cannot be born. Those who say that the cause is the effect mean that the cause is born as the

¹ *Laya sarvavedhyayecittam Vikṣiptam Samayeśu pūnāḥ Sekaśāyam Vijnāyāt tannā
prāptam na cājāyāt.* (Gauḍapādīya āgama 3/44)

effect. If the cause is born, how can it be unborn and eternal? Thus he refutes the Parināma Vāda of the [Sāṅkhyists and the others. Those who advocate the origin of existence out of non-existence (Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas) cannot cite any example in support of their contention. If we admit the birth of the born, there is the fallacy of indefinite regress. So the conclusion is that the unborn appears as the born. The self is unborn, unmoved and unobjective. It is jñāna in perfect poise and non-dual.¹ The world is the false appearance or vivarta of this self. There are people who call the self non-existent (Buddhists) and this, according to Gaṇḍapāda is due to ignorance. The self is existence and it is bliss. One who knows the self attains the bliss of the self.

This is all about the Kārikā of Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad. We shall now discuss Gaṇḍapāda's annotation on 'uttara Gīta'. 'Uttara Gīta' contains three chapters. Lord Kṛṣṇa is the speaker and Arjuna is the listener there. In the first chapter, the distinction between yogārūḍha (one who has already been a yogin) and Ārurukṣa (one who is desirous of being a yogin) has been clearly stated. In the second chapter, the identity between the Jīva and Brahman as the reflection (Pratibimba) and the original (bimba) respectively has been supported on a set of fresh arguments. Gaṇḍapāda was a believer in Pratibimba Vāda or The Reflection theory so far as the relation between the Jīva and Brahman is concerned. The third chapter of 'uttara Gīta' describes how a yogin surrenders himself to God as the last resort and abandons futile activities. The first chapter of 'uttara Gīta' contains 57 slokas, the second chapter 46 and the third one 16 and thus the total number of the slokas comes to 119.

CONCLUSION.

Gaṇḍapāda propagated Advaita philosophy with its necessary corollary Mayā Vāda. But this Mayā Vāda is never the replica of the Śūnya Vāda of the Buddhists. We have already discussed this point and this need not be repeated here once again.

From the historical point of view the Kārikā of Gaṇḍapāda and his annotation on 'uttara Gīta' are both authoritative. These two books are regarded as the earliest extant treatises on Advaita philosophy. Saṃkara imbibed his main principles from the treatises of Gaṇḍapāda and the Post. Saṃkarite Advaitins also quoted his views as authentic. This is why the importance and influence of Gaṇḍapāda and his works can hardly be exaggerated so far as the Advaita of India is concerned.

¹ Ajñānam Vastutvam Vijnānam Śāntam Iyayam.

NYĀYA-MANJARI

VOL II—(30)

JANAKI VALLABHA BHATTACHARYYA. M.A., Ph.D., *Samkhyatirtha*

THE DEFINITION OF A CHASTE-WORD IS PUZZLING

A dative case is that which is intended by means of a karma. The word 'karma' requires an explanation. Does it mean an action? Or, does it mean a case which is the most desired one? If the first meaning is accepted then as all cases are desired for the sake of an action, *i.e.*, for its coming into being. So each of them should be taken as a dative case. In the sentence "A student gives honorarium to his teacher" the teacher should not be a case at all since he has got no action. He has been selected only as a recipient of a gift. He has got nothing to do with the verb 'to give'. He receives the gift. Therefore, he has an action to perform. But the act of receiving is distinct from that of giving. An object is the destination of an action. It is the goal towards which an action proceeds. Now, the defenders may hold that the word 'karma' stands for an objective case. Such an interpretation does not stand to reason since a noun or its equivalent does not become a case because of its relation to a case. The universally accepted view is this that a noun or its equivalent which is related to an action is a case. The etymological meaning of the word 'kāraṇa' is that what brings about an action is a kāraṇa (a case).

The best instrument by which an action is produced is 'karana' (an instrumental case). As the meaning of the nominal suffix 'tamaḥ' (*i.e.*, the suffix indicative of the superlative degree) is hard to comprehend so the word 'sādhakatama', contained in the definition of an instrumental case, is inappropriate. An effect comes into being when all conditions without an exception assemble. But it does not come into being if anyone of them is absent. Such being the state of things which particular case shall we select as the best one in order to sprinkle waters from an auspicious pitcher? Now, the contenders may defend that the excellence of an instrumental case lies in its having intensive operation directed towards the production of the principal effect. Such an operation is shared by all cases. But it does not exclusively belong to fuels—an instance of instrum.

mental case. In the example "He is cooking with fuels" how do you say that fuels are the instance of an instrumental case? The purport of the objection is that fuels should not be taken as the instance of an instrumental case since they have no distinctive feature to indicate the above case-character.

A locative case is that which points to a locus. With regard to this definition something should be said by way of criticism. A locus in order to be so must contain something. What is this 'something'? Is it a verb or a case? In other words, does it contain a verb or a case? If you define it precisely and hold that the container of a verb (an action) is a locative case then all cases should be included in the class of locative case since all cases are syntactically connected with a verb. Now, the defender of the said definition may clarify the above definition thus. Let us take an example of the locative case, *viz.*, "He cooks rice on a pot". A pot is a locative case since it contains rice which is being cooked. The act of cooking produces its effect on rice. Rice is the container of the resulting part of the act of cooking. A pot contains rice which is the receptacle of the act of cooking in some form. Therefore, a pot is taken as a locative case. In other words, a locative case points to the indirect locus of a verb. The above contention is not tenable. The illustration that he cooks on an even spot cannot be justified if the above meaning of the definition of a locative case is accepted. One should rather say that he cooks in water. The point in objection is this that water directly contains rice which is being cooked but not a spot. Again, the illustration that he takes his food on a mat becomes grammatically incorrect since a mat is the container of a person who takes his food but not of the act of eating. Now, the defender may revise the above definition of locative case and hold that a locative case is such as contains a verb through the medium of both nominative and objective cases. In that case the above two illustrations of locative case, *viz.*, "He cooks rice on a pot", "He takes food on a mat" should be incorrect since a pot and a mat are not loci of both nominative and objective cases. Now, the defender may say that locative case is the locus of anyone of the above cases. In that case, the locus of an objective case involves a reference to the locus of a nominative case and vice versa the locus of a nominative case involves a reference to the locus of an objective case. Thus, the new revised definition of a locative case is in no way different from its immediate antecedent one. The last two definitions are identical in their sense and content. Now, if the defender holds that a locative

case is the container of all cases then the illustration that he cooks rice on a pot should not be grammatically correct since a pot is not the locus of all cases. Moreover, a locative case should cease to be a case since a locative case does not find its own locus in itself. Let a few examples of locative case be examined. They are as follows:— "One takes his bath at noon", "One eats at night", "One rambles in the east" etc. In these cases time, space etc., having no operation to perform should be devoid of the essence of a case. Thus, they cease to be cases. Thus, the illustrations in question should be considered as grammatically incorrect.

An accusative case is that which refers to the most favourite desideratum of a subject. As the term 'sādhaka-tama', contained in the definition of an instrumental case, conveys no meaning so the word 'īpsita-tama' involved in the definition of an objective case, communicates no sense. Nobody can determine the most favourite one since an action to be accomplished being desired all cases are equally required for its completion by a subject hence all of them are the most favourite ones. Now, the contender may say that the goal of an action is the desideratum of a subject. The objector points out that the word to which the case ending 'am' is attached stands for something which is other than an accusative case. The above goal of an action cannot be an accusative case. A case stands for the cause of an action but an object is the result of an action but is not its cause. It involves contradiction to hold that what is the cause of an action is also the most favourite desideratum to be achieved by the same action.

Now, the defender may contend his case thus. An object of an action is mentioned as a case because it is capable of producing an action. If this is your contention then the causality of an action is very strange. The causality of an instrumental case takes a unique form, that of a locative case takes another peculiar form and that of a dative case takes a third distinct form. In the case of an accusative case though boiled rice is accomplished by an action yet the former is the invariable cause of the latter since the said action is not performed if its object is not its goal. In other words, an object is the final cause of an action. The said hypothesis of the grammarians is not convincing. What is the final result cannot be said to be a means since pleasure and such other phenomena which are the mere goal of an action should also be called the means of it. One should bear in mind that the designation 'case' does not depend upon the arbitrary will of the founder of a branch of study. In other words,

such a nomenclature is not due to the convention set up by a great teacher. A noun or its substitute becomes a case when it enters into relation to an action. The exact nature of the relation is this that what is the means to an action is a case. If a contrary relation takes place between them, how will a noun enjoy the status of a case? Now, the grammarians raise an objection to the above criticism. They point out that if the above criticism is accepted then one should say that a man cooks rice but he should not say that a man cooks boiled rice since boiled rice is the result of the act of cooking. The objectors review the said critical remark and hold that they have already stated what they have got to say with regard to the definition of the accusative case. In the body of the said definition the word 'ipsitatama' (most desired) has been given. It is an objective which qualifies the accusative case. This adjective carries sense. If it applies to rice in the sentence "A man cooks rice" then it loses its significance since it has no distinctive capacity for bringing about a result.

That which is independent is the subjective case. What is independence? You may say "One who moves out of his own will is independent". In that case how do you explain the sentence "The bank of a river breaks down"? The subject of the verb 'breaks down' is 'bank'. The bank is an inanimate object. It has no will. Hence, it cannot be the subjective case of the said verb. Now, the grammarians may revise their definition and hold that the case the operation of which controls those of other cases is said to be the subjective case. The objectors examine it and find defects in it. They hold that an action is to be produced by all cases. As such one fails to understand the point that the operation of which case governs that of which one since all the cases constitute an interdependent system. Now, the grammarians may hold that the case which induces other cases to do an action but itself is not induced by other cases to do it is the subject. In that case all inanimate objects cannot be the subjective case. Thus, the charge which has been already brought against the grammarians remains unsolved.

Now, the grammarians may revise their definition and hold that the subjective case is that the operation of which is expressed by a verb. The critics join issue with them and point out that they fail to grasp the import of this definition. A verb does not express the operation of a particular case. But it conveys all operations of all cases. If one does not subscribe to this assumption then all cases cannot co-operate to do the same action. Now, if a verb expresses

the operations of all cases then all cases should be taken as the subject of a verb.

Now, the grammarians may revise their thesis and hold that the subjective case is that the operation of which is mainly expressed by a verb. This revised thesis is not tenable. The reason is as follows. When a sentence is communicated a verb is uttered only once. If it is uttered once then how can it express the operation of a particular case subordinately and that of another case principally? In the Sanskrit Grammar two types of the subjective case have been mentioned. The first and the second types are represented by the independent and the causative subjects. How does a verb convey the said additional meaning?

As the definitions of cases are not consistent so rules which govern case endings following the above definitions, are not approved of us, the critics. The rules of the Sanskrit Grammar run like this:—'The Ablative case takes the fifth case-ending and the locative case takes the 7th case-ending. These rules cannot take effect if the ablative and the locative cases are not properly determined by their exact definitions.

Another point may be added to our critical note. In the Sanskrit grammar there are rules which govern the combining of two or more correlative words into a single compound word or the combining of a word and a nominal suffix, correlative, into a single word. Are they correlative ab initio? Or, they have become correlative on the strength of the conventional sutra of Pāṇini viz. Samarthah pada-vidhiḥ? In any case the term 'correlation' has got to be clearly explained. The grammarians may say that if two terms relate to one and the same meaning, they are correlative. In other words, correlation consists in the relation to one and the same meaning. How do the grammarians come by this meaning of the term 'sāmarthya' (correlation)? They may say that the said meaning is revealed through the use of compound words and nominal suffixes and the knowledge of such uses. It is also evident that correlation is cognised if there are examples of compound words and nominal suffixes and they are cognised and that if correlation exists then the examples of compound words and their knowledge become possible. Thus, the above hypothesis illustrates a glaring instance of vicious circle.

Another point may be added to this critical note. There are examples of compound words when the said correlation is conspicuous by its absence. They are as follows (1) *asraddha-bhojī* (the negative

particle is syntactically related to the root 'bbuj' but not to śrāddha. It signifies a Brāhminapa who does not participate in a feast due to funeral ceremony), (2) dadhi-ghaṭaḥ (dadhi is not directly related to ghaṭa. The word 'pūrṇa' has been dropped. It means a pot full of sour milk), and goṭathaḥ (the word 'g' is not directly related to rāthaḥ. The intervening word 'vāhita' is missing. It stands for a cart which is carried by bullocks). Similarly, many instances of nominal suffixes are noticed in the absence of correlation. The word 'āṅgulika' is used. It means one who digs with a finger. The word 'vārksamūlika' has been used. It denotes one who has come from the root of a tree. These usages presuppose the instrumental and the ablative cases. These cases have not been properly defined. Hence, these usages are not correct. If a person speaks a sentence then he is a speaker. Suppose there is a place where nobody speaks. How do we say that there are no speakers on the spot? Hence, these rules of grammar are not logically justifiable.

The definition of a nominal stem (prātipadika) as given by Pāṇini in the sūtra "Arthavadadhātunapratyayaḥ prātipadikam" is too wide since it is applicable to a sentence as well.

Now, the grammarians may contend that Pāṇini has written a complementary sūtra to mend his defects. It runs thus—'Kṛtaddhitasamāsāśca. It has been mentioned as a special injunction since the word 'samāsa' finds a place in it. As it is a special injunction so it excludes all sentences excepting compound words from the province of nominal stems. Thus, a sentence will be excluded from a nominal stem. In other words, the definition of a nominal stem as given by Pāṇini is exact. If this is the contention of the followers of Pāṇini then the critics may as well point out that the above definition of nominal stem should not contain two adjectives viz. (1) adhātāḥ (other than a verb) and (2) apratyayāḥ (other than an inflexion) since a verb and an inflexion will be excluded from the field of nominal stems on the strength of the special injunction.

Now, the followers of Pāṇini may contend that as a compound word and its corresponding expounding sentence convey the same meaning so they are of kindred function and the mention of the compound word in the special injunction can exclude only a sentence but neither a verb nor an inflexion. They simply hope against a hope. The words which constitute an expounding sentence and those which constitute a compound word have no kindred function. Hence, there is no necessity of holding that a compound word and its expounding sentence have kindred function. Moreover, it has

been established that a sentence is significant. Hence, the definition of a nominal stem suffers from the defect of being too wide.

As a nominal stem has not been exactly defined so case-endings such as 'sup' etc. cannot be added to a nominal stem in accordance with the sūtra "Nyāp prātipadikāt" etc. There is no need of discussing this matter. So, the science of grammar is full of serious defects. Its rules exercise little influence upon linguistic transactions.

The following reasons exhibit serious defects in the science of grammar. (1) The celebrated commentator of Pāṇini has taken pains to subject to a minute examination all which has been clearly expressed, which has not been stated and which has been subtly hinted at. (2) In some cases, straight definitions have been refuted under the pretext that they contain redundant long vowels or that they involve greater quantity of syllables. (3) In some cases, the interpreters hold that this plausible rule does not apply to this particular case because the commentator has not explicitly approved of its application. (4) The field of application of a sūtra has been sometimes indefinitely stated. A few illustrations have been mentioned and a big gap has been left open. Such a measure leaves room for indecision. The mention of ākṛti-gaṇa illustrates the above point. (5) In some sūtras the word 'vahula' occurs. This shows that rules involving the word 'vahula' are vague. In many cases, these rules hold good. This shows that the field of these rules has not been exactly described.

Some other critics remark that the following usages are found in the grammar. They are as follows, (1) śobhā; (2) cīrṇam (this word cannot be analysed); (3) matur anu-harati; (4) phalina barhiṇan ghāsi; (5) kāndīśika; (6) bhrājiṣṇu, (7) ganeya; & (8) vareṇḍa. These usages find no place in the authoritative collection of correct words. Definitions of memory, doubt and illusion are conspicuous by their absence in the grammar, of Pāṇini. The said grammar has swerved from its duty. These critics find fault with Pāṇini's grammar and have heaped contumely on it. The defects of a grammar are as palpable as the disease of ascites. As we like to avoid the unnecessary swelling of the bulk of our work so we close our examination here.

Now, the grammarians may contend thus:—"Let us take for granted that Pāṇini, the framer of grammatical rules, has no sharp intellect, and the celebrated commentators have no deep insight. But a grammarian who has very keen intellect may be born. Many other commentators who have penetrative insight may see the light of the day. From such persons we shall learn the correct rules of grammar."

In other words, Pāṇini's failure does not block the future of the Sanskrit grammar".

Such a contention does not hold good since critics, having superior intellectual attainments, may expose the hollowness of the established conclusions, but the abler critics of the said critics may join issue with them and find fault with their decision and the others may also subject their view to severe criticism. Hence, a regressus *ad infinitum* will be the inevitable conclusion. Therefore, there is no work on grammar which is free from all reproaches. The net result is that the great vow of the study of grammar simply entails great hardship on its reader. Bṛhaspati has also given his voice to the above note. He says that it is impracticable to master up vocabulary used in the Sanskrit Language if one studies word per word, the correct rules of Sanskrit Grammar have not as yet been established, the existing grammar is open to serious defects and the hope of correction faces the fallacy of regressus *ad infinitum*. The followers of the great teacher Sūtra hold that the science of grammar is a fell disease.

Some other critics have also said that he who is under the influence of bad stars or is cowed down with the fear of royal punishment or has been cursed by his parents embraces the study of grammar of longue *halcine*.

Some critics have also said to this effect —

In order to blunt the edge of one's sharp intellect Pāṇini's grammar and its commentary known as *vṛtti* should be prescribed for his study and sesame, a kind of pul-es, wood apples and boiled rice prepared from a particular kind of rice should be prescribed for his food since these are the best instrument of benumbing keen intellect.

Even if a learned man takes pains in the study of grammar he cannot acquire proficiency in Vedic vocabulary as he is able to understand human dialects.

There is no acknowledged avenue of understanding Vedic words. Hence, the Vedas remain unintelligible from the very beginning. How can they be the source of valid knowledge?

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HYPOTHESIS THAT CHASTE WORDS ARE DENOTATIVE

Let the adverse criticism, recorded in the preceding chapter, be reviewed. It has been stated that words used in ordinary dialects

such as 'gāvi' etc. are as denotative as chaste words used in classical Sanskrit Language such as 'go', etc., are from eternity. We shall now cast a shadow of doubt on the above rival hypothesis. The objector has put forward a rival hypothesis that words used in ordinary dialects, e.g., gāvi, etc. are denotative. They have logically established it. It is a piece of illusory knowledge. A critical student of Indian Philosophy who having examined these hypothesis distinguishes the true hypothesis from the false one.

After this, knowledge which dawns in his mind is true. He comes to understand that chaste words such as 'go', etc., have only denotation but words used in common dialect have no denotation. Through the influence of this knowledge he is relieved of his suspense of judgment. A labourer who carries load becomes nervous when he comes across too heavy load. If a portion of it is reduced then he entertains a doubt whether he will be able to carry the remaining portion or not. Similarly, the student of philosophy doubts whether words used in common dialects have denotation or not. Such a doubt is interesting but not idle. Then he will adopt such lines of thinking as will solve his doubts. If he follows the indicated lines of thinking then he will obtain mental satisfaction. The path of argument leads to the determination of truth. So, we refer to it. Let us now examine the hypothesis whether one undergoes the same discipline when he learns to use words used in ordinary dialects as he does in the case of words used in the Sanskrit language. If the use of words used in common dialects such as gāvi, etc., is learnt in the similar manner then one should conjecture that they are eternal. Let us now examine whether we have an opportunity of subscribing to such a hypothesis or not. When a student is initiated into the Vedic lore the teacher imparts minute lessons to him. The teacher is very particular about the correct pronunciation of each Vedic word. He pronounces each word with its proper accents, nasal sound and vowels. His disciple exactly repeats it. If he has any slip in his pronunciation, the teacher gives him proper instruction. Unless and until the student is able to read the Vedas in a proper manner the teacher does not allow him to leave his residence. The student also learns the Vedas with rapt attention. A student who has received proper instruction will be a teacher. He will also instruct his student in this manner. The present teacher was also a student in his young age. He was also initiated into the Vedic lore in this way by another teacher. This teacher was also taught by another teacher. Jaimini holds that in this way the study of the Vedas has been continuing

from eternal time. The Naiyāyikas hold that the study of the Vedas has been in vogue from the day of creation.

In this manner if words like *gāvi*, etc., have been guarded against deformation like words 'go', etc., and if these words are also employed to convey their meaning on their own strength then the former word will certainly share the same dignity with the latter ones which are held to be eternal. If the above condition is fulfilled then whom shall we blame? But we have got an alternative hypothesis to suggest. The speaker pronounces the word "go". But the listener does not repeat it in the same manner since his organ of speech does not act properly owing to his inadvertence, sloth, etc. He tries to pronounce but actually mispronounces it. Thus the word which is pronounced becomes deformed. We learn it from our experience. Hence a doubt arises in our mind. Words which have already assumed perverted form or will take such form are used in the dialect of carters. The old uncultured fellows cannot even properly pronounce these deformed words when they talk to boys and girls of the cowherd class. Thus the origin of many deformed words may be traced to inability to pronounce chaste words. Thus a doubt arises even in the mind of a person of keen intellect. Are words like 'go', etc., which are established from eternity significant and denotative? And are other words deformed, being mispronounced through inadvertence? Or, do all words enjoy the same status alike? Now, the objectors may contend that all words have the same status. If this is their contention then we point out that even to-day some words, being mispronounced by ignorant ladies and children, assume perverted forms. Now we ask "Can they discharge the onerous function of the chaste words?". The objectors cannot say "let them bear the burden of the chaste words." The reason is that one is directly aware of the fact that these words have assumed perverted forms. In other words, the deformation of chaste words has taken place.

According to reasons stated above, words which are now used by uncultured ladies and children are considered to be debased owing to their deformation they cannot vie with chaste words. If deformed words of recent origin do not enjoy the status of chaste words then we argue "How can words like '*gāvi*', etc., which may be explained otherwise, enjoy the status of chaste words like 'go' etc.

The illustrious teacher Jaimini has also said to this effect. As it requires a good deal of effort to pronounce a word so words, being mispronounced, become defective. This defect amounts to deformation.

Sabara, the commentator, has stated in his commentary that a good deal of effort is required to pronounce a word properly. A wind springing up in the region of umbilicus, goes up, increases in bulk in chest, passes through trachea, dashes against the top of palate and springing back moves in the mouth and manifests various letters. A person who intends to pronounce a word may be at fault. One desires to have a fall on the dry land but falls down on the swampy ground. One thinks that he will touch once but touches twice, etc.

(To be continued)

Reviews and Notices of Books

Children's Films—A Symposium. The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. Price Annas Eight.

Sometimes back the Government of India made an announcement regarding the promotion of the children's films movement by helping in the formation of a Children's Films Society and subsidising production. With this end in view, a symposium was held. Sri R. R. Diwakar, Governor of Bihar presided over this symposium on children's films in New Delhi on October 11, 1954. Those who took part in the symposium were Dr. Radhakrishnan, Sri Diwakar, Sri M. V. Krishnaswamy, Sri P. K. Atre, Sri J. S. Bhowmargary and Mary Field. The pamphlet under review contains the learned opinions of these reputed men on the subject.

Historical and Biographical Films. A symposium, Publications Division, Government of India. Price Annas 6.

This again is a collection of papers read at a symposium on historical and biographical films held in Delhi in connection with the state awards of films in 1955. Those who took part in it were Miss Marie Seton, Dr. Kalidas Nag, Sri Shorab Modi, Sri P. K. Atre and others. Professor N. K. Sidhanta, Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University was the Chairman who summed up the discussions. His opinions are also incorporated here.

1. Towards Socialism through Planning. 2. Towards a New Social Order. The publications Division. Government of India. Price Annas Two each.

These are two small pamphlets published by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and belong to the series 'India on the March', which are intended for wider circulation. Attempts have been successfully made here to give a brief exposition of the subject in a short space.

Informative Literature published by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi.

Informative literature on various subjects published by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting from time to time include 'Our Merchant Navy,' which depicts India as a sea-faring nation, Basic Education in Questions and Answers, Agriculture in the 2nd Five Year Plan, Labour in the Plan, Housing in India, Rural Industries, Nutrition, Foreign Aid for the Plan,

Railways since Independence, Progress of Land Reform, Communications in India, India Has a Plan. The price of these pamphlets varies between annas four to annas ten. An allied volume is Cultural Unity of India, edited by Mrs Gertrude Emerson Sen, the author of Pageant of India's History who has made India her home. She has taken great care in proving conclusively that there exists a strong cultural bond among our people belonging to different geographical regions which bound us together in the past and will do so in all times to come.

B. K.

Progressive German Reader. (For Arts and Science Students) by Dr. H. G. Biswas, M.Sc., D. Phil, published by the University of Calcutta pp. 368+XX. Price Rs. 12/8/-.

"I have gone through the book and am very glad to add my name to the long list of those who have so much admired this book. There is no doubt in my mind that it will amply fulfil the purpose for which it is written. The author deserves our warm congratulations for his achievement."

P. K. Bose.

The Tenth year. Published by the Director, the Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi. Price Re 1.50 only. pp. 183.

This is a brochure published in commemoration of August 15, 1957. The small volume contains the outlines of the more important achievements of Union Government as well as the State Governments and the Union Territories. The book which covers a period between April, 1956 and March, 1957 is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the activities of the Central Government, the second and third parts deal with the Government of the States and Union Territories respectively. Topics discussed in the first part include Social, Economic, Internal and External affairs. The affairs of the States and Union Territories discussed in the volume are Developments, Food and Agriculture, Public Health, Education, Industries and Labour.

The reader will find here in a small compass almost every thing he wants to know about the country's achievements in recent years.

The get up and printing is good. We commend the book to the readers, who will surely profit by a perusal of it.

B. K.

Ourselves

UNIVERSITY LECTURES

Sri Manilal Bandyopadhyaya, Girish Chandra Ghose Lecturer of the University for 1955, delivered a course of three lectures on "Contributions of Girish Chandra to the National Literature", in September last in Darbhanga Hall of the University.

Professor A. Appadorai, Director, Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, and Taraprasad Khaitan Lecturer for 1956, delivered a course of two lectures on "The use of force in International Relations", in September last also, in the Darbhanga Hall of the University.

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DEATH OF DR. ROHINIMOHAN CHOUDHURI, M.A., PH.D.

We mourn the passing away of Dr. Rohinimohan Choudhuri in this month. Dr. Choudhuri joined the Post-Graduate Department in Economics as a Lecturer as early as 1917, and served the University with credit and distinction for a number of years. He was a capable and competent teacher, and he endeared himself to his colleagues and students alike by his amiable and charming disposition. Unfortunately he had to retire from his service rather prematurely on account of a disabling illness which confined him to bed for about 15 years. A useful and promising career was thus interrupted by the will of Providence. We convey our sincere condolence to the members of the bereaved family.

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DEATH OF SRI AMARENDRANATH RAY

We also mourn the loss of Sri Amarendranath Ray, who breathed his last in Calcutta on 2nd October. Amarendranath made his mark in the field of Bengali Literature even when he was a student. He contributed learned and informative articles in different periodicals of Bengal. He was appointed "Girish Lecturer" of the Calcutta University in 1935, and his lectures were highly appreciated by all. He served as the Secretary of the Bengali Publication Department of the University for more than 17 years. His earnestness, competence

and industry in this field were praise-worthy. During the period of his service he edited a number of books and compiled a number of anthologies which bear an unmistakable testimony to his erudition and scholarship. Unfortunately the last years of his life were darkened by a fatal malady. A useful career has been cut short. We convey our sincere condolence to the members of the bereaved family.

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Notifications

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/315/139 (Am.)

It is hereby notified for general information that, the Sangit Bharati, Calcutta has been affiliated in History of Indian Music (Paper I), Theory of Raga, Swara and Tala and knowledge of Musical Instruments (Paper II), English (Paper III), Bengali (Paper IV), Classical Music Vocal only (Papers V and VI), Kirtan, and Rabindra Sangit and Bengali Songs other than Kirtan or Rabindra Sangit or Folk Songs) (Paper VII to X) to the I Mus. standard and in History of Indian Music (Paper I), Development of Music in the West (Paper II), English (Paper III), Bengali (Paper IV) Classical Music Vocal only (Papers V & VI), and in the following subjects to be taken up for Paper VII & VIII, viz (i) Kirtan and (ii) Rabindra Sangit to the B Mus standard, with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e., with permission to present candidates at the I.Mus. and B.Mus. Examinations in the subjects from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 26th August, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/310/138 (Am.)

It is hereby notified for general information that the Nistarini College, Purulia has been affiliated, in English, Bengali Vernacular, Additional Paper in Alternative Bengali, Alternative Bengali, Hindi Vernacular, Sanskrit, Commercial Geography, History, Civics, Logic and Mathematics to the I.A. standard and in English, Bengali Vernacular, Alternative Paper in Bengali Vernacular Bengali, History, Economics, Philosophy and Mathematics to the B.A. Pass standard from the session 1957-58 with permission to present its students for the examinations of 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 26th August, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/303/137 (Am.)

It is hereby notified for general information that the Alipur Duar College, Jalpaiguri has been affiliated in English, Bengali Vernacular, Civics, Logic, History, Sanskrit, Commercial Geography, Commercial Arithmetic and Book-keeping and Mathematics to the I.A. standard, and in English, Bengali Vernacular, Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics to the I.Sc. standard from the session 1957-58 with permission to present its students for the I.A. and I.Sc. Examinations in 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 23rd August, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

The following orders have been passed with regard to the remaining five B.A. cases arising out of the Intermediate Examinations, 1956.

The Examination for 1956 of the following candidates is cancelled and they are debarred from appearing at any examination of this University in 1957 :—

I.A. 1956 cases

1. Parimal Raychaudhuri, Roll Jal. No. 98, Regn. No. 10411 of 1954-55, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
2. Bimalendu De, Roll Jal. No. 160, Regn. No. 7330 of 1945-46, Jalpaiguri A. C. College.
3. Radhakanta Datta, Roll Kat. No. 28, Regn. No. 3811 of 1955-56, Katwa College.

I.Sc. 1956 cases

1. Chinmay Samanta, Roll Kat. No. 28, Regn. No. 3993 of 1955-56, Katwa College.
2. Malayranjan Aichsarkar, Roll Kat. No. 58, Regn. No. 3753 of 1955-56, Katwa College.

The candidates pertaining to your College may kindly be informed of the orders in respect of them expeditiously.

N. C. ROY,

Controller of Examinations.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

The following orders have been passed by the Vice-Chancellor and Syndicate in respect of the cases of breach of discipline arising in connection with the B.Com. Examination, 1957 :—

I. The examination for 1957 of the following candidates is cancelled.

1. Parimalkanti Siba, Roll Cal. 200, Regn. No. 1586 of 1951-52, City College.
2. Kalimohan Das, Roll Cal. 1263, Regn. No. 13994 of 1917-48, City College.
3. Dasarath Lal Gupta, Roll Cal. 1823, Regn. No. 6451 of 1954-55, City College.
4. Philip Kurikattae, Roll Cal. 1383, Regn. No. 3701 of 1951-55, City College.
5. Mohammad Ali, Roll Cal. 1403, Regn. No. 2606 of 1954-55, City College.
6. Sunilkrishna Datta, Roll Cal. 2352, Regn. No. 7751 of 1953-54, Vidyasagar College.
7. Nitaichand Bandyopadhyay, Roll Cal. 3405, Regn. No. 9644 of 1952-53, Seth Anandram Jaipuria College.
8. Shyam Sundar Todi, Roll Cal. 3622, Regn. No. 18763 of 1953-54, St. Xavier's College.
9. Nabagopal Chattopadhyay, Roll Chander. 8, Regn. No. 10136 of 1954-55, Chandernagore College.
10. Ritendralath Basu, Roll Chander. 16, Regn. No. 21458 of 1953-54, Chandernagore College.
11. Subimal Chakrabarti, Roll Nai. 43, Regn. No. 14113 of 1954-55, Naihati Rishi Bankimchandra College.
12. Nisithkumar Mukhopadhyay, Roll Nai. 121, Regn. No. 2561 of 1951-52, Naihati Rishi Bankimchandra College.

II. The examination for 1957 of the following candidate is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any examination of this University in 1958 :—

Tarapada Bandyopadhyay, Roll Cal. 3027, Regn. No. 16072 of 1953-54, Surendranath College.

You are requested kindly to inform the candidates concerned who appeared from your college of the above orders expeditiously.

N. C. ROY,

Controller of Examinations.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

The following orders have been passed with regard to the R.A. cases arising out of the Final M.B.B.S. Examination held in June, 1957 :—

I. The following candidate is exonerated from the charge of Breach of discipline :—

1. Rabindranath De, II Regn. No. 14952 of 1951-52, Roll Cal. No. 302.

II. The Examination for June, 1957 of the following candidate is cancelled :—

1. Syamsunder Mallik, Roll Cal. No. 781.

III. The Examination for June, 1957 of the following candidates is cancelled and they are debarred from appearing at the next Final M.B.B.S. Examination of this University :—

1. Nirodranjan Biswas, Roll Cal. N. No. 310.
2. Rabindrakumar Saha, Roll Cal. N. No. 356.

IV. The Examination for June, 1957 of the following candidate is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at the subsequent Final M.B.B.S. Examination of this University in 1957 and 1958 :—

1. Subodhkumar Sarkar, Roll Cal. N. No. 357.

The candidate/s who appeared from your College may kindly be informed of the decision/s in respect of him/them expeditiously.

N. C. ROY,

Controller of Examinations.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Corrigendum

In the list of Expulsion cases for the I.Sc. Examination, 1957 published by this office on the 24th July, 1957 on page 9 Serial No 33.

in place of
Narayan Ghoshal, Ber. 37, Regn. No 15519 of 1956-57, Krishnath College.
read

Srinarayan Ghoshal. Ber 37, Regn. No 15519 of 1956-57, Krishnath College,

Senate House,
The 24th September, 1957.

N. C. ROY,
Controller of Examinations.

BIHAR UNIVERSITY

No. 251-R

I have to inform you that Sri Raghubansh Mani Singh, a student of the IV Year Arts class of the Gaya College, Gaya, has been expelled for gross misbehaviour till the session 1958-59.

P. ROYCHAUDHURY,
Registrar.

ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY

Notice No 89

The following examinees who used unfair means at the Annual Examination of this University held in the month of March/April, 1957, have been awarded punishment noted against their names :—

Examination.	Roll No.	Name	Father or Guardian's name and address.	Debarred up to and inclusive of the examination, to be held in
B.A.	204 D211	Rabia Begum	Mr. Faiyaz Ali Khan, Khusro Bagh Road, Rampur.	1957
B.A.	244 E1018	Kbair Mohd.	Mr. Noor Mohd. Sadar Bazar, Faizabad.	1958
B.Sc.	656 C7090	Qazi Jamaluddin	Hafiz Qazi Reazuddin Ahmad, Vil. Nemot Hat, P.O. Azamnagar, Dist. Purnea (Bihar).	Do.
II Yr. Diploma (Engg.)	48 D8422	Purshottam Das Jain.	Mr. Trilockchand Jain, P.O. Rampur Manhyaran, Dist. Saharanpur, U.P.	Do.
LL.B. (Final)	122 E488	Dinesh Prasad Saxena.	Shri Bhagvati Prasad Saxena, Diwan House, Rang Mahal, Aligarh.	Do.
High School	751 E2949	Zebul Nisa Begum	Mr. Larafat Hussain Khan, Imli Asmat Khan, Rampur.	1957

Illegible.
Registrar.

OFFICE OF THE BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION, ORISSA

Notification No. C-499

In accordance with Regulation 14 of Chapter X of the Regulations of the Board, the following candidates who took recourse to unfair means at the Supplementary High School Certificate Examination of 1957 are penalised as noted against each.

Sl. No.	Name,	Roll No.	Institution.	Penalties imposed
1	Shri Guru Charan Mahanty, P.O. Bhawanipatna, Dist. Kalahandi.	407	B. M. High School, Bhawanipatna.	Results of this examination cancelled and debarred from appearing at any examination of the Board prior to the Annual Examination of 1959.
2	Sri Laxman Senapati, P.O. Bhawanipatna, Dist. Kalahandi.	410	B. M. High School, Bhawanipatna.	Results of this examination cancelled and debarred from appearing at any examination of the Board prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1959.
3	Sri Lingaraj Dash, Parbatipur Sasan, P.O. Narasingpur, Dist. Cuttack.	533	A. N. High School, Narasingpur.	Results of this examination cancelled and debarred from appearing at any examination of the Board prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1959.
4	Sri Ramesh Chandra Swain, Vill. Jayachandrapur P.O. Ashram Balikuda, Dist. Cuttack.	1742	Kondrapara High School,	Ditto.
5	Sri Udayanath Patnaik, Vill. Ambithy, P.O. Talmul, Dist. Dhenkanal.	1951	Talmul High School	Results of this examination cancelled and debarred from appearing at any examination of the Board prior to the Annual Examination of 1959.
6	Sri Brundaban Pati, Vill. Hemgir, P.O. Hemgir, Dist. Sundargarh.	3305	Town High School, Sambalpur.	Ditto.
7	Sri Umakanta Pandey, Vill. Durgapalli, P. O. Barabazar, Dist. Sambalpur.	3814	Do.	Results of this examination cancelled and debarred from appearing at any examination of the Board prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1959.

Cuttack—1,
The 20th August, 1957.

S. SAHU,
Secretary.

ANDHRA UNIVERSITY

No. 82/3188/57.

Waltair, 5th July, 1957.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYNDICATE

Sub : Misconduct at University Examinations—March April, 1957.

Read : Syndicate Resolution, dated 18th June, 1957.

ORDER

The results of the following candidates who have been found guilty of resorting to unfair means at the University Examinations held in March April, 1957, are cancelled and they are debarred from appearing for any of the University Examinations for the periods noted against each :

S. No.	Name of the candidate	Examination.	Reg. No.	Period of restriction.
1	D. V. K. Papa Rao.	Intermediate	12158	Debarred for one year and permitted to sit for the University Examinations to be held in March-April, 1958 or thereafter.

2	Karumanchi Venkatapati Rao.	Intermediate.	12379	Debarred for one and half years and permitted to sit for the University Examinations to be held in Sept. 1958 or thereafter.
3	L. Ramamohana Rao.	Do.	12477	Do.
4	A. Venkateswara Rao.	Do	12672	Do.
5	Kolli Madhusudana Rao	B A.	3345	Do.

(By Order)

V. SIMHADRI RAO,
In Charge Registrar

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYNDICATE

The result of K Appa Rao, candidate with Reg. No 8921 for the Intermediate Examination held in September, 1956, is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing for any of the University Examinations in future, until and unless the Syndicate gives him special permission.

(By Order)

V SIMHADRI RAO,
Deputy Registrar

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

Office of the Registrar.

No. 11/14/6-20
Copy of the Resolution :

July 18, 1957

" Considered the case of malpractice of Roll Nos 3, 8 of B Sc Chem Engg Part IV and Roll No 17 of Supplementary Admission Examination of 1957.

" Resolved that all the above three candidates be rusticated for two years and be not allowed to appear at any of the University Examinations before 1959."

Roll No.	Name and address of candidate	Examination
3	Sri Avantia Krishna, Son of Sri Avantia Venkata Narasimha Rao, Dangeru Draksharama P O East Godavary Dist. (Andhra State)	B.Sc. Chem. Engg. Pt IV, 1957.
8	Sri Bobba Panduranga Nageswara Rao, S/o Sri Bobba Kotaiah, Amudalapalli, Guntur (P O), Indupalli (Via), Krishna Dist. (Andhra State)	Ditto.
17	Sri Mukti Nath Chaturvedi, S/o Shri Ramdhari Chaturvedi, C/o M/s. Pustak Kutir Gyanvapi, Varanasi	Admission Supplementary Examination, 57.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH

No : 11306-485/57G

From
The Registrar,
Panjab University,
Chandigarh.To
The Principals of all the Colleges
affiliated to the Panjab University,
Chandigarh.

Sir/Madam,

I am to inform you that the Principal, Government College, Ludhiana, vide his letter No. 1189/35 Edn, dated 21-6-1957, has rusticated the following students, with effect from 21-6-1957 for the reasons mentioned below (Reg 4 & 5, Panjab University Calendar 1954, Vol. III, Page 17).

S No.	Name and the Regd No. of the student,	Father's name	Class.	Reason for rustication
1	Mohinder Kumar Chathli (54-gl-161)	Tilak Ram Chathli.	4th year	Gross misconduct
2	Kulwant Singh Grewal (54-gl-147)	Gurdial Singh	4th year	Do.

K. L. MUKERJI,
Assistant Registrar (Cdn),
for Registrar.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY (CHANDIGARH)

Notification

It is notified that—

I. Bhag Chand Dayalwal, son of Shri Dayanand (Regd. No. 55-ez-9127), who obtained admission to the B.A. Examination, April, 1955, on production of a bogus Intermediate Certificate and Migration Certificate from Ajmer Board and subsequently tried to get his name changed from Bhag Chand Dayalwal to B C. Arora on production of a false document has been declared as not a fit and proper person to take any future examination of this University, under regulation 3, at page 83, of the Calendar, Volume I, 1954.

II. The concession of supplying the question papers set and printed in Hindi, Panjabi and Urdu besides English, to such candidates as had not read English up to the 8th class Examination has been extended for the Matriculation Examination, 1959.

III. M.A. Part I Examination which was scheduled to be held on August 1, 1957 has been postponed to September 8, 1957.

IV. A Degree Course in Dairying in the Faculty of Agriculture has been instituted at this University with effect from this year's admission.

Chandigarh—3
Dated : June 27, 1957.

J. R. AGNIHOTRI,
Registrar.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH

No. 11648-11822/57G.

I am to inform you that the Principal, Vaish College, Bhiwani, vide his letter No. 465 dated 24th June, 1957, has expelled the following student for a period of three years, with effect from 24th June, 1957, for the reason mentioned below :—

S. No.	Name of the student	Father's name	Class	Reasons
1.	56-vb-18 Charanjit Singh	Sardul Singh	2nd year	Gross misconduct

Chandigarh,
The 13th July, 1957.

K. L. MUKHERJI,
Assistant Registrar (Co-ordn.)
for Registrar.

KARNATAK UNIVERSITY

Notification No. 1029 of 1957

It is hereby notified that the under-mentioned candidates who have been found guilty of having used unfair means at the College and University Examinations held in the first Half of 1957, are declared to have failed at those examinations and have forfeited their claims to exemptions if any, earned this year or in previous years, and they are further debarred from appearing at any college or University examinations, before the date mentioned against each :—

Seat No.	Name of the Candidate	College	Debarred up to
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F. Y. ARTS EXAMINATION, 1957

60	Shri Hallur, Devendra Tai Sitava.	Karnatak College, Dharwar	1st December, 1957.
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F. Y. SCIENCE EXAMINATION, 1957

101	Shri Kulkarni, Vasant Venkatesh.	Karnatak College, Dharwar	Do.
102	Shri Kehwrad, Bichappa Giddappa.	Do.	Do.
106	Shri Kurubgond, Sadashivappa Basetteppa.	Do.	Do.

INTERMEDIATE ARTS EXAMINATION, 1957

224	Shri ² Kademani, Krishnappa Parappa.	J. S. S. College, Dharwar	1st December, 1958.
582	Shri Kulkarni. Krishnaji, Keshav.	Vijay College, Bijapur	1st December, 1959.
1168	Shri Nimbai, Shivashan-karappa. Channappa.	Do.	Do.

INTERMEDIATE SCIENCE EXAMINATION, 1957

1260	Shri Kakraddi, Narayan Govindappa.	Basaveshwar College, Bagalkot	1st December 1959.
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INTERMEDIATE SCIENCE (AGRI.) II-YEAR EXAMINATION, 1957

65	Shri P. S. Varaghese	College of Agriculture, Dharwar	1st December, 1959.
94	Shri Joshi Dattatraya, Raghu-nath.	Do.	Do.

S. S. WODEYAR,
Registrar.

SARDAR VALLABHBHAI VIDYAPEETH

(Syn. 57/7-Item 6)

Notification E(4) of 1957

It is hereby notified that the following candidates at the Inter. Science Examination of this Vidyapeeth held in March/April, 1957, having been found guilty of breach of rules of examinations debarred from appearing at the examinations of this Vidyapeeth to be held in March/April, 1958 and shall not be allowed to keep terms at any of the constituent colleges of the Vidyapeeth for any examination during the academic year 1957-58 :—

Name of Candidates.	Seat No.
1. Desai Kanubhai Purushottamdas	7
2. Amin Dineshchandra Fulabhai	69
3. Patel Pravinchandra Vithalbhai-D	290
4. Tragad Chandravadan Jekishandas	394
5. Patel Manubhai Mohanlal	455

Vallabh Vidyanagar

Via : Anand (W.R.)

17th July, 1957.

T. G. DEOKULE,

Act. Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF DELHI

(1) The following candidates for the various University Examinations held in 1957, who were proved to the satisfaction of the Executive Council to have resorted to unfair means in the course of the examination, have been disqualified from passing the examination held in April, 1957 :—


S. No.	Examination	Roll No.	Name of candidate.	Father's name	College
1	Qualifying	3	Kanwal Narain Mehra.	Shri Purshotam Narain Mehra.	Hindu
2	B.Sc. (Pass) Old Course.	1497 (Enrol No. DC. 670).	Padam Narain	L. Pyare Lal	Ex-student (Delhi).
3	II B. Text	295 (Enrol No. LP. 766).	Dharam Vir	B. Ram Lal	Delhi Polytechnic.

(2) The undermentioned candidates for the various University Examinations held in 1957, who were proved to the satisfaction of the Executive Council to have resorted to unfair-means in the course of examination, have been disqualified from passing the examination of 1957 and debarred from appearing at any examination of the University for a further period of one year, viz. 1958 :—

S. No.	Examination	Roll No.	Name of candidate	Father's name	College
1	Qualifying	249	Ranjna Mathur (W)	Shri Gur Prasad Mathur.	Indraprastha
2	Do.	1816	Darshan Singh	S. Gurbakhash Singh.	S. G. T. B. Khalsa.
3	B.A. (Pass)	782 (Enrol. No. H. 9224).	Narendrakumar Jain.	Shri Nem Chand Jain.	Ex-student (Hindu),

Delhi
The 15th July. 1957.

T. P. S. IYER,
Registrar,



THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

Vol. 145]

NOVEMBER, 1957

[No. 2

THE POETIC GENIUS OF VICTOR HUGO

DR. MISS INDIRA SARKAR

Victor Hugo is one of the greatest poets of France. In his book entitled "Contemplations," we find verses on all different subject-matters. We shall refer to some of the poems that appear in this book.

In *L'Âme en Fleur* (The Soul in Bloom) we get a collection of love-lyrics. Most of the poems are small. The language is very simple. The passions are personal and the sentiments expressed therein are genuine. There are no artificial expressions and no conventional words used by him. Hugo's romanticism is not mystical. He does not use words like unseen, limitless or infinite. In this respect his idealism is different from that of German romanticists. He indulges in direct and intimate contacts with nature and has personal relations with trees and flowers. He is a true romantic poet. There is no attempt at mysticism in Hugo's lyrics about death, soul and the hereafter. God comes in his love-lyrics as in his other verses. But his God is nothing very abstract, metaphysical or severe. God figures in Hugo's imagination as a solid reality. He considers every man to be a book written by God. He does not believe that wickedness is a creation of God. The idea of God is a characteristic feature of Hugo's romanticism.

L'Amour (Love) is another poem in which Hugo describes forests, streams, stars and birds. They are his constant companions of man in joy and grief. This is romanticism as we find in the Vaishnava poetry. It is questionable if even Shelley, even among the English romanticists had made use of nature so frequently or

talks of flowers and birds so glibly as Hugo does. It is interesting, however, that Hugo is very objective in his treatment of nature. He is almost similar to the Vaishnava poets like Vidyapati, Chandidas and others. Shelley tries to personify the objects of nature to a certain extent. Tagore has gone much further in this direction. Hugo differs from both of them because he does not try to personify his treatment of nature. He is hardly subjective. He is nevertheless idealistic like Shelley and Tagore.

In his poem entitled *La Nature* (Nature) Hugo is very objective in his treatment of nature. He avoids imparting a soul to it. There is no subjectivity in the manner in which he addresses nature. The chief feature is his appreciation of nature as an agent beneficent to man. In his conception nature helps man in his peaceful domestic, economic and social activities. He does not consider nature to be an aider or an abettor of man in his immoral, vicious and criminal activities.

Melancholia (Melancholy) is a lengthy poem, in which Hugo presents us with several snapshots of social life. Poverty, misery, vice, immorality, crime, etc. are exhibited by him in their naked reality. It is interesting to note that Hugo who is a romanticist in certain works is also a realist "par excellence" in others. In *Melancholia* we catch a glimpse of his prose stories like the *Last Days of a Condemned* and *Les Misérables*. The social evils are described and analysed by him in a realistic manner. We get something like a socialistic analysis here, but Hugo does not attempt to find a solution for the difficult problem. At any rate, we can see him functioning as a poet of the down-trodden and miserable people. In this connection, we should note that many other French authors of the nineteenth century like Alphonse Daudet for example were exponents of the miseries associated with the poor.

In *La Chnette* (The Owl) we find Hugo indulging in a moralizing vein. In many nature-poems as well as verses on family and social life, Hugo always says something about the sins, vices and crimes of man. He touches upon what men should do in order to reform themselves. This tendency for reform is a marked feature of his romanticism. This, of course, is more obvious in his novels and stories.

In *Le maitre d'Etude* (The Teacher) Hugo presents us with another didactic and moralizing poem. Here he manifests himself as a teacher, as a pedagogist, a propagandist and social reformer. The poem becomes almost prosaic. In this poem Hugo loses as an artist. Genuine poetry is sacrificed for a social message. It is

worthwhile to note. however, that even in such moralizing poems, there are a few phrases which indicate the poet's imaginative power.

Choses Vues (Things seen) is a poem where we find again prosaic tendencies. There is hardly any art in this piece. Hugo's sympathy for the poor overpowers his poetic faculty. He goes into detail about the miseries of the poor widow and the sufferings of the orphans. The descriptions become almost like a newspaper report. Perhaps it is interesting to note another item in Hugo's literary workmanship. He is interested in the daily life of common people. Commonplace activities of ordinary men and women form the subject-matter of a great many of his poems. A poem like this one reminds us of Wordsworth's *Highland Lass* and *The Solitary Reaper*.

Insomnie (Insomnia) is a fine, imaginative poem about the sleeplessness of a poet. A really creative artist cannot have rest even at night. The spirit keeps him busy. The idea compels him to think, to dream and to compose like a galley slave. In his sleepless hours Hugo reviews the stories of world literature from the Old Testament down to Dante. Nay he sketches the designs of his own lyrics, dramas and novels. Verses follow verses during his insomnia.

In his poem entitled "*Le Revenant*" (The Ghost) Hugo gives us a poem in the Wordsworthian style. It is realistic and descriptive poem relating about the misfortune of a family.

Jour du Soir (Evening Joy) is another poem in which Hugo indulges in thoughts about death. The picture of a dying man in the midst of evening joys enables us to see that Hugo has a pessimistic vein in his personality. This pessimism is to be regarded as a mark of his romantic creativity.

Le poète (The Poet) Hugo exhibits Shakespeare as a wild and untrimmed creator. In his appreciation, Shakespeare lives, moves and has his being far removed from polished society and conventional manners. His creations are horrible specimens of life. This account of Shakespeare is an index to Hugo's romanticism. Shakespeare is presented as an exact antipode to the well-ordered system of classical restraint. This poem is written in the same key as Stendhal's *Racine at Shakespeare* (Racine and Shakespeare).

Magnitudo Parvi is a lengthy poem divided into several parts. It can be compared, in its general make up, although not in its general message to Tennyson's *In Memoriam* and Browning's *Men and Women*. In this poem we have a rather connected view of Hugo's general philosophy about nature, man, society and God. We understand that he makes a distinction between two worlds. The

first is the material world. It comprises the earth, the planets, and the entire solar system. He gives us almost a complete picture of the planets as known to the astronomers of his time. We can regard the first portion of the poem as a poetic interpretation of astronomy. The second half of the poem is given to the other world. This is the world of man. In this part, we get an idea of Hugo's conception of the human spirit, the mind, the soul, the progress of humanity, etc. In this section two items are specifically noteworthy. The first is Hugo's reference to the infinite, eternity, divinity and last but not least to God. As in other poems, here too the thoughts of Hugo are never very far removed from God. The idea of God belongs to his system of thought as a very integral and essential part. Again and again he speaks of God as indispensable to man and his existence. All the same there is no vagueness in his imagination. He is not a mystic. Esoteric ideologies do not trouble him in the least. In the second place, we get a clear idea of Hugo's view about human society. The sufferings of man in his daily life are constantly before his mind's eye. He is always troubled by the miseries of the "poor and the pariah".

THE LITERARY CHARACTERISTICS OF VICTOR HUGO

Hugo is an imagist. He thinks only in images. It is simply due to his imaginative creativity that his poetry does not degenerate into dry didactic versification. He possesses the awkwardness and naturalness of primitive man. He creates myths out of facts, events and history. In his hands every sensation becomes a symbol and every symbol a myth. The individual at once becomes a symbol, a type, an universal. The principle of antithesis is fundamental with him like that of light and shade in drawings. He initiates a revolution in prosody. He abolishes distinction between noble words and ordinary ones. He is also famous for coining new words which introduce meanings like remoteness, contrast, suggestiveness, multiplicity, vigour, fantasy, etc. With his new words he was able to intensify realism. The fundamental defect of Hugo is his absence of measure and proportion, lack of taste, neglect of nuances, multiplication of antithesis abuse of vocabulary and versification.

Hugo remains one of the greatest poets of France and can be compared to Goethe of Germany, Shakespeare of England, Dante of Italy and Tagore of India, in his literary greatness and creative genius.

INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY ON SPAIN DURING ARAB RULE

MD. NURUL HAQUE, M.A.

History should not be considered as mere chronology of events ; its sphere is to be widened enough to take into account affairs other than the rise and fall of a king or the description of wars or other similar matters which are of little value to the common people. As history confined itself within this narrow sphere so far, a group of scholars, not to speak of the common people, are apt to come to the conclusion that the study of history is useless and comes from the workshop of idle brains! Whatever might be the cause of such misunderstanding, it is the time to represent history as a living subject in order to draw the interest and sympathy of our people and to fulfil the aims of the subject.

But this is not an easy task. The sources to furnish the economic and social condition of the ancient people or to represent their thoughts and consciousness are few and far between. As a gift of the two World Wars,—which opened a new vista before the whole civilised world—history just enters into this new phase of life, and very recently some efforts are being made in this direction.

But the fact that the physical geography of a country casts great influence on moulding its history hardly draws any attention from the historians. Plato's *Latus* or Aristotle's *Politica* bears some hints that "a deep study of history needs the study of geography." Later, the Arab scholars like Ibn Sina, al-Maqdisi, al-Masudi and Ibn Khaldun studied the relationship between history and geographical environment on a more scientific basis. But little compact study has yet been made to this direction.

Of the countries, the physical geography of which cast great influence on their histories, Spain offers the most interesting story. Spain, the greatest Peninsula of Europe, is surrounded by water on three sides, in the east by the Mediterranean Sea, in the west by the Atlantic Ocean and in the south by the strait of Gibraltar. Beyond this strait lies the desert land of Africa. In the north there is the great mountain the Pyreneese.

In those days of inadequate communication the Pyreneese and Gibraltar had some speciality of their own, while the former was

insurmountable and thus separated Spain from the rest of the continent, the latter was too narrow a water passage to cross easily. As a result, the history of Spain was more influenced by the political change of Africa than that of Europe. Thus in the 5th century A.D. the Visigoths of Africa had established themselves in the Peninsula.

By the end of the 7th century A.D. the Arab Muslims after a long struggle of 70 years, subdued the Berber of North Africa and conquered the whole of the North West portion of the continent. Now they were to proceed either southwards along the coast of Africa or northwards for Spain. But as the task of crossing the Gibraltar, which would offer less resistance than the desert would do, was considered easy, Muslim general Musa made up his mind to cross the Strait. Count Julian's invitation offered an opportunity to do so.

Musa sent an advanced guard to Spain under Tarif who returned with rich booty and good report of the prosperity of the land. Thus the richness of the Peninsula (like that of India) instigated the foreigners to invade the country.

Being assured of the favourable position, Musa now sent a body of 12,000 soldiers under Tarif who landed in Spain in 710 A.D. This brave general conquered half of the Peninsula. In the meantime Musa also arrived and completed the victory. The whole Peninsula came under the Muslims. But beyond the Mount Pyreneese he could not advance. He was recalled.

The bravery and resoluteness of the African Berbers who formed the bulk of the Arab army was largely responsible for this rapid and grand success. Desert-life made the Berbers fearless and they now came in great use to this grand expansion. Thus the physical geography of North Africa indirectly supplied the Muslims with the most forceful element in the conquest of Spain.

Mount Pyreneese was crossed by the successors of Musa but the battle of Tours sealed their fate beyond it. In the words of Prof. Hitti, "The Arab-Berber wave, already almost a thousand miles from its starting place in the Gibraltar, had reached a natural standstill." Separated from their base by thousand miles of enemy lands, the Arabs were suffering from various natural set-backs,—there were the hilly tracts, the hostile highlanders and the limited supply of manpower, arms and ammunition. Thus the physical geography of Spain served as a great check in the advancement of the Arabs beyond the land.

Spanish geography fixed another boundary line to the Moslem territory within the country itself. The peninsula is divided into two

unequal but natural divisions—the north and the south. The north is smaller than south and full of plateau and mountainous lands, while the south is comparatively plain and fertile. A great plateau divides the two. With Cordova as their capital, the victorious Muslims established themselves in the south which they called Andalusia. The defeated Goths fled to the mountainous districts of the north and by establishing petty principalities like Galicia, Leon, Castile and Biscayan, they hold out in stubborn resistance. Situated within the confines of mountains, they were well guarded by nature itself. Due to this geographical barrier, the Muslims were compelled to agree to the independence of the northern provinces.

The hostile highlanders of these hilly tracts made constant inroads on Andalusia but these incursions did not materially endanger the position of the Muslims so long the latter were powerful. The Muslims made counter attacks, defeated the Christians but could not crush their power because with every approach of the Arabs, the Christian highlanders disappeared within their mountainous homes. When the Muslims turned southwards, they again started troubles.

During the reign of Abdur Rahman III, Orlando II of Leon invaded Muslim territories and defeated two Muslim generals. Abdur Rahman took the field himself and turned Orlando out of his country. But no sooner than he turned homeward, Orlando in co-operation with the ruler of Navarre re-appeared. He died soon and his son Ramire II carried on the raid. Abdur Rahman took the field again, defeated Ramire who took shelter in the hills. Abdur Rahman was to remain satisfied by obtaining nominal homage from Ramire. As soon as Abdur Rahman died and his son Hakam II succeeded him, the Christians started troubles. Hakam somehow managed to check the Christian advancement.

When the later Umayyad Caliphs of Cordova became weak, these tribes resumed their hostile activities with greater force. Alfonso VI of Castile and the chiefs of Leon and Navarre defeated the Muslims and occupied Toledo. Soon they were driven out by the Alhamride Sultan Yusuf. The struggle went on and finally in 1212 A.D. the Muslims were defeated at the battle of U'kab. Soon the greater part of Andalusia with its metropolis Cordova was lost to the Christians (Ferdinand III).

Now the table was turned. The defeated Muslims took shelter in Granada, an well-protected city in the hilly tracts of Sierra Nevada. The Christians from time to time made attacks upon Granada, the

last fortification of the Moors. The Muslims taking opportunity of the mountainous tracts repelled the attacks till the end of 15th century. Granada fell to the Christians in 1492 and soon the Muslims were totally expelled from the soil of Spain.

Thus we see that till the beginning of the 13th century, the northern hilly tracts of peninsula indirectly proved disastrous to the Muslims because due to the existence of plateau and mountains, the Arabs were bound to keep alive their defeated foes so dangerously situated near at hand. It was an inevitable evil which proved fatal to them. But it was the mountains of south Spain which saved them for last two hundred years.

Geographical factors hastened the fall of the Muslims in another way. A considerable portion of the Moors originated from the Berbers of North Africa. Dwellers of the desert as they were, these Berbers brought with them their inherent tribal feuds, and when after 11th century, the central powers of Andalusia became weak, their mutual jealousy and love of independence became prominent and created a number of semi-independent kingdoms detrimental to the cause of the Muslims in general. This weakened their position to a great extent and paved the way for their own extinction from the Spanish soil.

* * * * *

Like the political history the economic prosperity of Spain under the Muslims was influenced by geographical factors to a great extent. The climate and soil of Spain were different in different parts of the country,—suitable for cultivation in some places and for pasturage in others. In north Spain, the climate was intensely cold and rainfall was heavy. This portion of the peninsula was bleak and "ill to cultivate". But it offered a good pasturage. The southern Spain was tormented by the hot winds which blew over from Africa but its climate being genial and Mediterranean, it was well watered and capable of high cultivation.

Of the six main rivers—Guadalquivir, Guadiana, Tagus, Duro, Minho and Ebro—the most navigable is the Guadalquivir. The Arabs settled themselves in the fertile valley of the Tagus, the Guadiana and the Guadalquivir. The great productiveness of the soil of these areas naturally suggested the development of natural resources by agriculture.

The Moors understood the soil and resources of the country better than any nation that had ever inhabited it. So under them

agricultural system was the most perfect one. They settled themselves in different places according to their own nature and ability of production. The Berbers were given the middle of Spain or the *Messeta*—suitable for pasturage; the Mulims of Egypt and Syria were settled in the south where cultivation was possible. From Egypt Mesopotamea and Hindusthan they collected seeds of useful plants and fruits hitherto unknown to Spain. These seeds were sown in proper places by experts. Every encouragement was afforded to the agriculturists; a most successful irrigation system through digging countless canals was introduced. This was made possible due to the existence of numerous rivers mentioned above. As a result, agriculture flourished marvellously. Spain is indebted to the Moors for the introduction of rice, sugar-cane, silk, cotton and infinite varieties of fine fruits.

With the development of Agriculture, industry began to flourish. Spain is gifted with various mineral resources. Gold and silver were found in Algiers, pearls in Catalonia and rubies in Malaga. Toledo, Cordova and Granada became the centre of steel and iron industry.

Spain possesses large areas suitable for pasturage. In these areas were settled the Berbers whose means for livelihood in their past desert life had been the grazing of animals. Settled in proper place, they now produced wool which helped Cordova to grow as the centre of textile industry.

But an extensive commercial relation with foreign countries was necessary without which the output of the soil would bring little prosperity to the country. In this respect the physical geography of Spain came in great help; the proximity of Mediterranean suggested the extension of an world-wide commerce. "Little effort was required for the establishment of profitable commercial intercourse between the sea-ports of Spanish peninsula and those which at frequent intervals dotted the sea-shores of the Mediterranean." Spain had various sea-ports of which al-Mariya was the greatest. It was called the "Gateway of the East". Goods produced in different parts of the land were carried on through riverways, canals to these ports from where they were exported to different markets of the east and west. Spanish ports had regular commercial exchange with countries like Sicily, Rhodes, Cyprus, Syria, Egypt and Morocco round the Mediterranean. The great markets of Christendom also maintained a close relation with Spain. The wares of constantinople, Venice, Genoa, found ready purchases in the bazar of Cordova and other provincial capitals of Andalusia.

Thus the physical geography of Spain not only determined to a great extent, the rise and fall of Muslim power in the Peninsula, but also helped the Muslims in bringing a good deal of economic prosperity to Spain through agriculture, industry and commerce.

RAIN IN THE CITY

(A Sketch)

KALIDAS RAY

(Translated by UMANATH BHATTACHARYA,
from the original Bengali)

It's raining and raining
Since the morning hours.
Incessant, unusual showers !
Sun's not seen ;
Where does he float who knows
Unable to cross the horizon !
The trees and creepers swoon,
'Whelm'd with so much bounty and boon !
Hush'd are the houses in the City ;
They drowse. In fond felicity,
A pair of pigeons alone
Is cooing in the recess of the beams ;
There's no other bird
In the delug'd world, it seems.
No household-hearth is lit ;
No cur is out in the street ;
Cover'd from head to foot,
Cars and rickshaws run their route,
Now and again,
Amidst the rain.
Knee-deep is the water under the bridge,
Their wheels submerge and loose their ease.

22

The clerks, they wade thro' the road,—
A helpless band !
Holding in one hand
The loose ends of their robes ;
Securing under the armpit their shoes,
Rolled in newspapers ;
And holding in the other their umbrellas,
Patchy and old.
From house to house the house-maids go,
Wrapping their heads with napkins. Lo !

32

Flooded is the market-place ;
All's in a mess !
With basketful of vegetables on her head,
The vender-maid,—
She came for sale. What ails her ?
With tearful eyes
And drench'd, dishevell'd hair,
Shelter she seeks under the grocer's ;
“How to return home ? ”
Ponders she, gazing at the sky.
At the corner of his hovel idly doth lie
The pedlar. Lives he from hand to mouth.
No meal's in store for him this day,
Muses he in dismay.
With tray of spiced nuts, crisp and fresh,
Near at hand, the dealer, broods ;
Ah, his goods
Won't sell tomorrow—
O sorrow !
They are getting damp already.
The cobbler has taken seat
At the forge of the blacksmith ;
With empty stomach, coughs he every minute.
There's no customer at the shop.
The door is left ajar. From my balcony
A lunatic I see ;
Squats he
With bundles of rags.
Beggars and hags
Gather under the neighbouring portico.
With the rise of the day
Rises the tempo
Of hunger and tumult.

On such a day as this
Wing'd is my imagination within me ;
As I sit at my window, my soul doth flee—
Listlessly.
Away, away, to the Land of Dream,
Beyond many a hill, across many a stream

THE GLASSY ESSENCE

PROF. D. C. BISWAS, M.A.

A. C. College, Jalpaiguri

. but man, proud man,
Drest in a little brief authority,
Most ignorant of what he's most assured
His glassy essence—like an angry ape,
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
As make the angels weep.

Measure for Measure, Act II, Sc. iii.

It may seem an unfashionable freak to conventional taste to describe the dark comedies of Shakespeare as anything but 'dark'. Brooding, pessimistic, cynical, problematical, the trio is commonly held to be as opaque as the other comedies are refreshingly lucid, and the tragedies are effulgently transcendent. The sparkling, gurgling stream of his fancy seems to have entered a blind eddy from which it emerges into the high seas of his mighty tragedies, but its rippling music has meanwhile mellowed into a deep mournful tone. The perplexities of critics to find out a suitable explanation have been summed up by W. W. Lawrence :

"Critics have been too much inclined to emphasize one or more possible explanations of the problem comedies—personal misfortune or bereavement, disappointment in friendship or in love, the degeneration of the age, the demands of the theatre, the influence of prevailing literary and dramatic fashions, haste and carelessness."

The bowilderment is the product of the myth of a tolerant, humane Shakespeare whom we miss here. While modern scepticism has disintegrated, dwarfed and even denied him, the mythical personality of a 'sweet' Shakespeare persists. (The ghost of Milton dies hard.) Difficult though it is to conceive of a duality between the man and the artist, the integrated artistic vision is not to be equated with the catalytic material offered by faith in life or want of faith, pessimism or personal misfortune, etc. There is no denying the witchery of poetry. The process of imaginative synthesis which Coleridge described as 'esemplastic' is relevant here. The total vision

of Shylock as a man "more sinned against than sinning" comprises the stuff of a persecuted jew, savagely vindictive, also transcend it. Neither is the resultant vision of Macbeth as of a humanized murderer stealing our heart merely a summation of what he does or fails to do, says or by silence conveys. So the artistic vision of, say, 'Macbeth' or *Much ADO*, *Twelfth Night* or *The Tempest* is as much a transmitted vision as the quality of imagination transfused. In other words, the more successful is the 'feigning' the more effective is the art, and wider is the gulf between the artist and the man. 'Poetry is capable of saving us', said I. A. Richards. But how, we do scarcely know. It can at any rate save one from self-exposure. So the masterpieces of Shakespeare are the least revealing so far as the thought-content of the man—Shakespeare is concerned.

The 'dark comedies' are admittedly his imperfect creations, but they are the most suffused with abstractions. The term *dark* is obviously confusing as these plays may in fact serve as the best illuminants. But there is always a convenience in calling man or things by familiar names. Moreover, the expression may be made to have an association with 'contemplation' in the manner of Miltonic *Ilpenseroso*.

Orthodox criticism swears in the name of art-puritanism and makes a bogey of intellectualism in art. The conventional Shakespeare is denied the cerebral cortex as it were, and the liberty of any definite point of view. His problem comedies which gather up the significant thought-current into an integrated attitude to life itself are therefore under double ban. They seem to challenge the myth of a decent and docile Shakespeare, so comfortably malleable to a set artistic pattern. More so, the pipe through which all the winds of the world seem to blow has inconveniently brought out a discordant tune of its own. So there is no end of bustle and stir in the critical forum to make these plays conform to the conventional pattern-study. *Measure for Measure*, artistically superior to its companion-pieces and less intractable, is made much, too much of. Critics as early as Dowden and Pater, and as recent as Miss Alexander M. Pope, read in it an epitome of Shakespeare's moral judgment—his sense of justice being in its essence a "finer knowledge through love", and even a christian colouring in it. But the total impression of the play is very different, though there are stray passages which support this view. Isabella's prayer for Angelo's life, the Duke's final pardon, and the transcendence of justice by mercy are cited as the stock illustrations. But these critics have taken the last act too

seriously. The observation of Croce is very suggestive: "not only does this comedy verge upon tragedy, but here and there it become immersed in it, vainly attempting to return to the light romantic vein and end like a fairy story, with every one happy." Raleigh also corroborates this view when he says that here we have "mere plot, devised as a retreat to save the name of comedy." Moreover, the principal characters of this play, the so-called mouthpieces of the christian doctrine and tolerance repel us by their action and utterances, their inconsistencies and complacency. Isabella and Angelo appear almost as "two pendent portraits or studies in the ugliness of puritan hypocrisy". This, of course, is too severe a view. Nonetheless Isabella is too hard and shifty to be attractive. Her repellent selfishness of chastity shows her off in a worse light than even Cassandra, who succumbed to Promos, and that particularly in the shameful scene where she castigates the trembling Claudio. Moreover, her overzealousness to save her soul leads her to be a bare procuress, and so far as the Duke is concerned we cannot quite get over Lucio's notion of him as "the old fantastical duke of dark corners". This eavesdropper sneaks under the guise of a holy man smelling out other peoples' conscience. So the cumulative vision of the play is neither benign nor tolerant. It is the vile atmosphere of the stews, of mean hypocrisy and machination, falsehood and treachery, glozed over with a final glitter in the manner of a morality play. Shakespeare tears the veil of romance and sentimentalism to expose reality in its crudity and hideousness. So, this play is fundamentally analogous to the other two dark comedies in tone and character and the homiletic strain is no more than intermittent, and does not determine the play's total effect.

Shakespeare seems to have the most profound preoccupation here with the 'glassy essence' of man, and almost a cynical obsession with man's apish freak to crack his very essence for the mere sport of a jangling crash. Love is lust, lechery. Chivalry is a mad idolatry that 'makes the service greater the Gods'. Honour is a false imposition. "Let's write 'Good Angel' on the devil's horn, 'tis not the devil's crest." "Power changes purpose." Virtue follows the 'furr'd gown'. Justice is arbitrary, corrupted. We are 'our own traitors'. 'Blood, thou art blood' ! 'Seeming ! Seeming' !

That this altitude of mind is neither freakish nor occasional, but the consummation of a mood of mind which the sportive mockery of the earlier plays subdued and the imaginative transfiguration of the tragedies did but transcend, it will be the endeavour of this discourse to show.

Let us start with the English history plays, and mark how Jack Cade, the buffoon, throws all others into shade by his quixotism, and how Falstaff pulls the leg of King Henry IV. How deftly does Shakespeare shift the emphasis by sheer conviviality ! He has a crew of Jacks, the giant-killers in the comedies, *viz.*, Bottom, Dogberry, Stephano, etc. In fact, buffoonery is a potent instrument in Shakespeare's comic method to reduce all the pompous fusses of a romantic love, the vindication of wronged innocence, love of power, to a farce. All the seriousness of Henry or his sort proves no laughter non-conductor ! Laughter is as much an intellectual process as an automatism, once set in motion. Beside the clinkings of sack-cups, the giggles of the hostess, and Falstaff's gargantuan laughter, Hotspur's and Henry's cannon balls burst with no boom or bang but with a whimper ! Prince Hal is an easy convert to the magnetism of Falstaff's amoral world, and by his dissoluteness, irreverence, and subsequent superiority over his father reduces kingship and all its rigorous ceremonialism to a rot. His homily on the kingly crown as "thou best of gold, art worst of gold" read in the context of his father's confession of the "indirect crooked ways" he had adopted to win it makes royalty a magnificent trifle. No less devastating is the impression that gains ground regarding the unworthiness of kings. Shakespeare divests his English Kings of all but the superflux of royalty. Henry V's admission, "I think that the King is but a man as I am" is no humility, but a self-realization reinforced by circumstances. Richard II, so full of pomp and grandeur feels the same smallness.

"Cover your heads and mock not flesh and blood
with solemn reverence."

All this deceptiveness of appearances finds a crowning utterance in *Measure for Measure* :

O place, O form,
Which often dost with thy case, thy habit
Wrench awe from fools, and tie the wiser souls
To thy false seeming !

The merry-mocking vein, gentle irony, and above all the lack of high seriousness which are the marks of Chaucer's wide human sympathies and amiable good humour are noticeable in Shakespeare only by rare snatches. Chaucer seems to view humanity with a degree of Olympian gusto at everything being right with the world. In Shakespeare the really humorous characters in the comedies are

sidelights, and the total comic vision is sometimes a reflected glare. No matter from what angle the light may come it is the illumination that of course matter! Leave out Dogberry and Verges, *Much ADO* descends down to the foppery of a wit combat, sometimes too blunt and savage at that, and, in the main episode, to the exhibition of life as being a horrible mess. What is *Twelfth Night* but a weary husband-hunting without the revelry of Sir Toby's *Cakes and Ale*? Is not *As You Like It* too ethereal and fantastic without a Touchstone and a Jaques to guard against? But these merry devils—the near approaches the Chaucer's creations—play no star-roles in the plays, longest though they live in the reader's mind. Shakespeare's choice of materials and his placing of emphasis leave no doubt about his seriousness to tear the veils of pretensions guises.

The antithesis between the real and the unreal is the soul of Shakespeare's comic technique. His supreme capacity of reducing every ideal of life, every situation and character to an unreality indicates his artistic aloofness, and something more than that—his sceptical bias! He seems to measure life, and all its values with reference to either a positive transcendental standard which we cannot guess or negatively, from the cynical standpoint! The yardstick for measuring the abnormality is with every comedian the accepted norm in society and human conduct. In Shakespeare the norm does not exist, or if it does it is variable with every man. Sometimes a Theseus rules out the lovers as absurd, and is himself ruled out by the superior realism of Bottom. Jaques measures the romantic life at Arden and finds it wanting, but when he meets Rosalind he discovers his own limitation. But Rosalind herself is her own critic. Sir John reduces Kingship itself to a nullity, but is himself reduced to such!

An analysis of the comedies will reveal how Shakespeare pricks the bubble of sweet follies and finds himself in grim earnest in the dark comedies. His satire deepens into Cynicism, and the man stands out with the artiste's garb on his back—himself no less exposed than those whom he exposes.

In the comedies the dominant theme is love, but the divine flame brightly though it burns is no steady flame. Apart from the atmospheric variations, and the proverbial unevenness of love's courses, Shakespeare's presentiment of love, particularly of its contemporaneous variety of romantic love, has been satiric. In *Love's Labour Lost* where the abrupt transition from the solemnity of studious seclusion to the frolic, gambols and masquerades of love is itself ridiculous, the foamy side of love does not yet obtrude itself. Nonetheless the

mock-heroics of an academic celibacy is flatly exposed. In *The Comedy of Errors* Shakespeare has to ballast the mercurial element of Plautus's farce by the sombreness of a sad start and by infusing an element of romance in the bohemian-twin's advances to Luciana. But the 'venom Clamours' of the jealous wife, and the scenes of harlotry eclipse the faint glimmer of the slender romance. *The Taming of the Shrew* administers a sledge-hammer stroke to the brittle essence of romance, and is savagely cynical. The shrew-tamer's brutal method is not only justified by the end, but its efficacy as the only method of inducing wifeliness is confirmed in view of the younger bride, so charming hitherto for her maidenly meekness, making a false start in disobedience soon after her marriage. In *Two Gentlemen of Verona* love first appears in the hideous company of treachery, breach of friendship and deception. Its first disturbing manifestation in the play jars on the ears of some critics inasmuch as they consider it an altogether unhappy play. It is indeed too gloomy for a starter, but is nonetheless a landmark in the evolution of Shakespearian amour. It is more linked with the dark comedies than with the middle comedies. *A Midsummer Night's Dream* described by the earlier critics as Shakespeare's first masterpiece of a comedy, for reasons of its conformity to an ethical standard, is for quite different reasons an important play indeed! Never before or since have the vagaries of romantic love been so much held up to ridicule as here. Shakespeare seems to have castigated it in brutal ways - by keeping Theseus and Hippolyta free from the least vestiges of love, by Bottom's assy transformation, his translation to the fairy land and still keeping his feet squarely planted on the earth. Theseus' sweeping, shattering comment on love and poetry as being at par with madness, though not unwarranted by the situation in the play, is nonetheless very incisive. This negative attitude is the product of a temperamental incapacity masquerading itself as tolerance and sanity. From *A Midsummer Night's Dream* to *The Merchant of Venice* the transition is so spontaneous. In the commercial society love too is a commercial proposition and Portia's submission to her father's lottery is too cold and conventional to say the least of it! Her subsequent championing of her husband's cause, chivalrous though it is, confirms nonetheless her prudence and forensic skill which the commercial society fostered. The ring-episode is a ticklish little intrigue; but meanwhile Shylock has so much usurped our sympathetic interest that the winning party's title-tattle sounds as an inconsiderable trifle. Moreover, for the astute lady who

has defeated the formidable Shylock to stoop to a petty prank sounds like a condescension made in favour of her husband who has meanwhile become a superfluous non-entity. This after all is the common stuff, human nature's daily food, and the gleam of romance fades into the light of common day. In *Much ADO* the main plot—the Hero-claudio episode is a pure *marriage de convenance*, quite a glamourless and insipid sort elevated almost to the level of a tragedy by a foul intrigue without a sufficient warrant in motive. The Benedick-Beatrice episode receives so much importance as to throw the main plot into the shade. The wit-duel of an avowed misogynist and a man-hater canterizes the heart by its arid intellectualism. Even if it be just a seeming the real motive of the seemers is outshone by the motive of intellectual triumph over the opposite sex. The way to their union is smoothed by the rude shock each sustains at Hero's betrayal, which inclines them to make a common cause of avenging it. Shakespeare denies them the glory of the vindication of Hero's honour; but revenge serves as a sufficient cementing principle. Their acceptance of each other is in the manner of a sceptic's final concession to the conventional. Viola in *The Twelfth Night* is a husband-huntress whose decision to go to Orsino's Court in disguise is too sudden—"what else may hap, to time I will commit". But she seems pretty certain of her victory and goes into the fray more or less like the Shavian heroine Ana out to victimize Tanner. Shakespeare has stifled the romantic motive of Barnaby's Silla. Olivia's violent attachment to the disguised Viola serves to reduce the sublimity of romance to the ridiculous by the evident impossibility of the union. On the other hand Malvolio, the unfortunate victim of social snobbery is made to realize that social propriety must have precedence. His prudery does not only invite stringent remarks from Sir Toby but the cakes-and-ale scenes reduce virtue itself to an affectation. Sir Toby, himself a half-brother to Sir John Falstaff has an idiotic chum whose merry ideal of life and unconsciousness preserve him from the buffets of circumstances. In *As You Like It*, so merry and romantic a play, a rehash of Lodge's romance we notice a parallelism between the idyllic life at Arden and a running commentary on it by Jaques and Touchstone. Rosalind, a victim of love at first sight, makes a damaging comment on Celia's love and as a matter for that on hers too: "There was never a thing so sudden but the fight of two rams and Caesar's thrasonical brag of I came, saw and overcome." In *Romeo and Juliet* so intensely saturated with romance Shakespeare does not spare Romeo even at the moment of highest exaltation.

He deviates from Brooke's poem, his original, to introduce a jealous tinge, the greenish tinge, to the glorious hero.

Charlton's view that in Shakespeare's comedies there is a progressive attempt at the conquest of happiness is an altruism superimposed on Shakespeare. The difficulty is presented not only by the dark comedies alone but by the middle comedies also which Charlton considers to be the perfect embodiment of Shakespeare's comic idea. The cool reason which is said to offer an effective safeguard against emotional and imaginative excesses, is an abstraction and no body seems to be in possession of it. Neither Viola nor Rosalind nor Beatrice seems to be guided by reason. Viola who may be said to be more reasonable than Orsino and Olivia each of whom is in the grip of a strange infatuation is herself much too forward, and her abrupt decision to try her luck at the Duke's Court cannot be approved in the light of reason and maidenly decorum. Rosalind who falls madly in love with a swain because he has overthrown a wrestler, and goes in male attire, talks incessantly like a chatter-box is no embodiment of reason. Beatrice, a half-sister to Katharina, the shrew would have found it too hard to find a husband, but for Hero and others. Her remark, "Thus goes every one to the world, but I and I am sun-burnt ! I may sit in a corner and cry heigh-ho for a husband" though made in merry jest has a ring of earnest apprehension in it. Even Theseus and Portia are found wanting when judged by the all-too stern a standard in which reason and emotion are perfectly balanced.

Romantic love is but a vagary. Laugh at it or with it a little. It may be foul and beastly too ! The tragic torments of Troilus as he looks on Cressida's deceptions is all-o life :

O cressid ! O false cressid ! false, false, false.
 Let all untruths stand by thy stained name
 And they'll seem glorious.

Marriage is a holy institution sanctified by the experience of ages and devoted wifeliness is the grace and beauty of it. But even this can be filthy and loathsome. The questionable means Helena adopts to win her snobbish husband is shocking. Does the end justify the means here ? All is not well that ends well ! Virtue itself can be repellent as is the rigid chastity of Isabella. She is shocking in view particularly of her inconsistency. When she pleads for Claudio his vice becomes just a venial slip but when piteously implored for the sake of her brother she flares out in a fit of fury. Soon after she

gives her consent to the foul trick to escape it. Justice is corrupted. Authority, a demi-god is arbitrary and like

The words of heaven; on whom it will, it will—
On him it will not, so.
Yet still 'tis just.

*** *** *** ***

Great men may jest with saints; 'tis wit in them
But in the less foul profanation.

So life has become a hideous business to Shakespeare, and he does never emerge completely out of the slough of Cynicism. Echoes of the thoughts expressed in these plays—and there is a super-abundance of abstract thinking in these plays, can be heard in his mighty tragedies. The satiric vein of the comedies has deepened into Cynicism. Love, honour, virtue, etc. are all but seeming. Reality itself is somewhat relative; awaiting supersession at the hands of a relatively superior reality !

Much of the thought-content of the dark comedies, generally pessimistic and even cynical, forms the broadbasis of his mighty tragedies. The abstractions of thought are embodied in moving forms, and even transfigured by imaginative vigour, depth of vision and feeling. But it is easy to detect the genesis of his tragic concept, the soul-stirring emotions and the focal point of his obsessions. The cumulative vision is certainly different, but there the artist has wrought the transmutation. The dry materials of his thought gain in imaginative content and breadth of vision as they emerge from the dark eddy of his mind into the sun-lit high seas of the tragedies. The themes of his tragedies and as a matter for that of almost all his plays are merely the canvases, the outlines of which he did cull from various sources. But whatever might be the themes, the psychical obsessions may be charted in terms of corruption of justice, sexual jealousy, hypocrisy, problem of morality, conflict between passion and reason, etc. These seemed to have rankled in Shakespeare's mind and his perplexities are so abundantly evident in the dark comedies. In the tragedies, inspite of transfiguration of imagination and the diffusiveness conditioned by the breadth, their recurrence cannot be said to be accidental. The corruption of justice is too evident in *Measure for Measure* to be missed. Angelo is merely a devil wearing the crest of an angel, and that sternness is a mere seeming is virtually the theme of the play. In *King Lear* the theme is

different, but Lear's mind is overwhelmingly tortured by the corruption of justice. Its relevance in the play—if we at all seek coherence is madness—is the injustice that his daughters had done to him. And his daughters being his own flesh and blood he feels that as a supreme dispenser of justice he must have been guilty of the worst excesses. These obsessions gaining ground revealed themselves in iterative images.

Why dost thou lash that where? Strip thine own back;
 Thou hotly lusts to use her in that kind
 For which thou whip'st her. The usurer hangs the cozener.
 Through tatter'd clothes small vices do appear;
 Robes and furr'd gowns hide all.

Frailty of women which is the soul-killing torment to the romantic Troilus, becomes a perplexity with Hamlet and the dominant tragic motif in 'Othello'. The black moor is no less bewildered at the irreconcilability—'so sweet was ne'er so fatal'. than Hamlet when he says "what a piece of work is man ! . . . in action how like an angel ! in apprehension how like a god ! And yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust." That patriotism and even heroism are no sufficient motive Achilles's conduct is the best illustration. Does not Coriolanus too confirm it? The mighty war-gods are all ruthlessly exposed. The apparent insignificance of Julius Caesar in the play may also serve to explode the myth of romantic heroism. Desdemona's worshipful adoration of mere heroism and Othello's surrender to sloppy maidenly sentimentalism preparing the way for the tragic catastrophe may also be interpreted as a cryptic commentary.

Blood, thou art blood
 (*Measure for Measure*)

As we are ourselves, what things we are?
 Merely our own traitors. (*All's Well*)

Antony's life in *Antony and Cleopatra* is the perfect illustration of the remark made rather ineffectually in *All's Well*, and no sublimation of Cleopatra or grandeur of Antony can suppress it.

Isabella's homily on apish pranks that men dressed in brief authority play on life puts us in mind of the 'glassy essence' of life, and we cannot avoid linking it up with Macbeth's cynicism expressed in the line "It is a tale told by an idiot" and further with Prospero's "we are such stuff as dreams are made on." Critics explain away Macbeth's sublime lines as mere frustration of a man

of sin whose crooked, sinful ways have brought his ruin. But no such explanation can be found either for Prospero's statement or even for Isabella's.

In the tragedies the cynical obsessions may be said to have taken concrete forms in frustrated lives—in the shipwrecks of misplaced fatherly love, of tyrannic ambition, impractical idealism, ill-matched love—none of which is by itself a sufficient cause. There is no logicity in life indeed! It is but a blind irrational instinct moving about in a dark immensity, much of which is so utterly incomprehensible! Yet there is no "unkindness in things themselves" as Shakespearian tragic climax would make us believe. Life then would have suffered a total annihilation. "A dog, a horse, a rat have life", so have we men!—Shakespeare seems to say. What final catharsis the plays may bring about in the audience is another matter. It is the resultant of a complex process made up mainly of the unreality of the situation, and our constant awareness that what we see is not life! That an Othello dies or a Hamlet or a Cordelia is no matter for us now. Why after all should there be an Iago, a Coneril, an Edmund, or even a Gertrudo? Is life indeed so bad a business as that?

THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSAL

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Words are classified into four groups by the earlier grammarians, and this is accepted by many rhetoricians. These four groups denote substance, action, quality, and universals respectively. To these four, others add words given by chance or convention to some objects as in the case of proper names¹. Mukula² and Maṃnaṭa³ recognise only four divisions rejecting the words denoting substances, while Rudraṭa⁴ accepts Bhāmaha's position. Of these divisions words denoting substances are the most important since the substance which is an object or a subject or a substantive is the locus for all the rest⁵. Qualities are inseparably associated with 'Dravyas'⁶ and actions are predicted of them⁷. As regards 'jāti', Rudraṭa observes :

"Bhinna kriyā guṇeṣv api bahūṣu dravyeṣu citra gātreṣu
Ekākāṇā buddhir bhavati yataḥ sã bhavējātiḥ"⁸.

The universal is a common idea or a concept we arrive at from an observation of the similarities of various objects, qualities and actions. Thus the object or 'dravya' involves the three divisions, and the universal in its turn does the same. Thus the same word refers both to the particular object and to the universal. Yet time and space constituting the context or environment of the word determine or condition its meaning to the particular⁹. But the outcome of such an interpretation is that the very division of the words into four groups is completely falsified; for, on the one hand, we have words denoting qualities and actions, while there are words denotative of the particulars or the universals on the other. And these universals or particulars constitute the very life of the qualities and actions.

¹ Bhāmaha : Kāvya-lakṣaṇa, 6.21 :

"Dravya kriyā jāti guṇa bhedāt te ca caturvidhāḥ
Yadrcchā śabdān apy anye dītihādī pratiṣṭhate".

² Abhidhā vṛtti mātṛkā, p. 4 : "Catuṣṭīḥ hi śabdānām pravṛtīḥ bhagavats
mahābhāṣya kāreṇopavarṇitā — jāti śabdā, guṇa śabdā, kriyā śabdā, yadrcchā śabdāś ceti".

³ Śabda vyākāra vicāra, p. 1 : "Jātiḥ, kriyā, guṇāḥ, sanjñā vācya "rthāḥ samitā
dhavanīḥ".

⁴ Arthaḥ punar abhidhāvān pravartate yasya vācakaḥ śabdaḥ Tasya bhavanī
dravyam guṇaḥ kriyā jātir itī bhedāḥ" (7.1).

⁵ "Jāti kriyā guṇānām pṛthagādhyāro 'tra mūrtimad dravyam" (ibid. 7.2).

⁶ "Dravyād aprthagbhūto guṇaḥ" (ibid. 7.4).

⁷ "Nityam kriyānumeya dravyavikāreṇa bhavati dhātvarthaḥ" (ibid. 7.5).

⁸ Ibid, 7.6.

⁹ "Sarvaḥ svam svam rūpam dhātte 'rtho deśakālanīyamam ca Tasya na khalu
badhniyān niṣkāraṇam anyathābhīreṣāt" (ibid. 7.7).

As against this view of Rudraṭa we have the famous verse of Bhartṛhari:

“Gaur hi svarūpeṇa na gauḥ, nāpy agauḥ,
gotvābhisambandhāt tu gauḥ”¹.

The word ‘cow’ does not denote the mere form of the particular animal that has a dewlap; nor does it denote the animal that is not a cow, for the specific form of the animal too enters into the meaning. It is the presence of gotva’ or the universal cow that determines the meaning of the word ‘cow’ and of the object ‘cow’. And this presence, consequently, is essential and vital to the particular ‘cow’. After observing that the word is a symbol, Viśvanātha proceeds to explain the reference of this sign thus:

“Sanketo grhyate jātāu guṇa dravya kriyāsu ca”².

- The symbol refers to the universal, to the qualities, to the particular, and to action. This is the original position of Bhāmaha. Viśvanātha observes that ‘jāti’, ‘guṇa’, and ‘kriyā’ are properties of the particular object; and the words stand as symbols for these properties of the objects, and not for the objects themselves³. This statement clearly contradicts his earlier statement since he is unable to reconcile himself either to the particular or to the universal. On the one hand, he takes the word to be a symbol of the universal and of the particular; and on the other hand, he considers the universal to be a property of the particular

This confusion arises from an imperfect sympathy with the problem of the universal. There are two distinct views on the question and the moment they are mixed up there arises confusion. At the outset we have the view of the grammarians that the words are symbols denoting objects, qualities, actions and universals. As against this there are the Mīmāṃsakas according to whom a word is a symbol for the universal. Says Maṃmaṭa:

“Sanketiś catur bhedo jātīdir jātir eva vā”⁴

For all practical purposes we take the particular object which alone satisfies our needs and demands. A word therefore has to refer to a particular. Yet since the objects are many, and since the same word ‘cow’ has to be applied to all cows, we have to take for granted that the primary meaning of a word has no reference to the particular.*

¹ Vākyapadīyam.

² Sāhitya Darpaṇa, II. 4.

³ “Eva eva hi vyakter upādhiṣu sanketo grhyate. Na vyaktau” (ibid, p. 33).

⁴ Kāvya-prakāśa, p. 82.

⁵ “Yady apy artha kriyā kārīṭayā pravṛtti nivṛtti vogyā vyaktir eva. tathāpy Anantyaḥ vyabhiçārācca tatra sanketaḥ kartum na yu'yate iti gauḥ. śikṣā, calo ditiḥ ity adīnāṃ tṣayavibhāgo na prāpnōtī ca tad upādhyā eva sanketaḥ” (ibid pp. 32-33).

But how can we account for words like 'white', 'moves', and 'Dittha'? A universal quality, a universal action, and a universal name cannot possibly co-exist in the same particular; nor can we establish that the verbs and adjectives are merely particulars since they are dependent on objects. The object is apprehended through the universal, while the adjective and the verb condition this universal by specifying and qualifying the object ¹, and hence the apprehension of the universal precedes that of the quality or act. This implies that a word denotes the mere 'upādhi' or 'vastudharma' or the nature of the object; and the object as such is indirectly signified by the word.

The 'Upādhi' is revealed either as the nature of the object or as a name attached to it by a speaker. The nature of the object can be either an existent or some forthcoming modification of the same. The nature of the object as an existent will refer either to something vital and necessary to it, or to something accessory. The former is the universal while the latter is a quality. The particular object as apprehended through the universal is qualified by the adjective ². Hence words may be divided into four or five groups but of these, one set will denote the particulars and the universals, and the other set will denote the qualities and actions of the particulars ³. As such qualities and actions are not universals.

As against this view, the Mīmāṃsakas contend that all words denote universals and incidentally the particulars, since the universal and the particular are inseparably united.⁴ But the Buddhists reject these two views altogether and consider 'apoha' as the meaning of a word; by this they mean that a word 'cow' means the exclusion of non-cows as a whole. And yet the word cow refers to the object cow by giving rise to a purely mental concept ⁵.

However, we think of the subject and the predicate, of a substantive and its adjectives, and use words accordingly. The objects corresponding to the words are treated as existents in the world outside ⁶ or at least given a mental existence. Each sentence gives us a content or thought in terms of this existence and in terms of

¹ Abhidhā vṛtti mātrkā, p. 5 : "Kaścit punar upādhir labdha svarūpaśya vastuno viśeṣadhāne hetuḥ, yathā śuklādir guṇaḥ. Na hi śuklāder guṇasya paṭāli vastu svarūpa pratilambhāna nibandhanatvam, jāti mahimnaiva tasya vastunaḥ pratilambha svarūpatvāt".

² Kāvyaaprakāśa, p. 84 : "Śuklādīnā hi labdha sattākam vastu viśiṣyate".

³ Abhidhā vṛtti mātrkā, p. 6. "Guṇa kriyā śabda saṃjñi vyaktiṇām eva tat tad upādhi nibandhana bhedaśuṣām ekākāratāvagatī nibandhanatvam, na tu jāter iti bhagavato mahābhāṣya kāraṇyātrābhimatam".

⁴ Kāvyaaprakāśa, p. 45 : "Vyakty avinābhāvitvātta jātvā vyaktir ākṣipyate".

⁵ Tadān apohovā śabdārthaḥ kaurīd uktaḥ" (*ibid.* p. 38).

⁶ Vyāsa on Yoga sūtra, 3.17 : "Na sattām padārtho vyabhicarati. Vṛkṣa ity ukte asiti gamyate".

the reference of the words to the objects. We have to examine the theory of the universals to arrive at the correct import of words and of sentences.

Patañjali raises this problem when he attempts to answer the question, 'what objects are denoted by words?' He classifies all words into those that denote class, quality, action, and personal names¹. This classification is based on the objects and their qualities². The main question turns upon the words that denote a class. Does a word signify a universal or a particular? In Mīmāṃsā we have the view that the word denotes a universal³, and Mammata observes: "Sarveṣāṃ śabdānāṃ jātir eva pravṛtti nimittam"⁴. Still it must be the universal with reference to the particular. Vājapyāyana held this view.⁵ An individual is a particular as determined by its universal, and it is the existence of a universal which unites its particulars. All things have their own particularity, while universality is said to be an all-pervasive categorical character of things. And Helārāja tells us: "Vājapyāyaṇīcārya matena, sūrvatrikī jāti padārtha vyavasthopapadyate"⁶.

But a different view was taken up by Vyāḍi:

"Dravyābhīdhānam vyāḍiḥ"⁷.

According to this view, a word is primarily related to action and action refers to a particular. Thus Helārāja observes:

"Vyāḍi mate tu satva śabdānāṃ dravyam arthas,
tasyaiva sū kṣāt kriyā samanvayopapattē"⁸.

A word denotes a concrete particular. Thus to fetch water we require the concrete particular pot, and not the universal pot. If the word denotes a universal, how is the universal related to the word? Now, it is argued that 'adhyāropa' enables us to arrive at the community of objects.

"Svājātiḥ prathamam śabdāṇi sarvāni evābhīdhīyate
Tato 'ītha jāti rūpeṣu tad adhyāropa kalpanā"⁹.

¹ On 1.1.2: "Catuṣṭayī śabdānāṃ pravṛttau: jāti śabdā, guṇa śabdā, kriyā śabdā, yadrecchā śabdāś caturthāḥ".

² Nāgeśa: Pradīpodyota: "Śabdānāṃ arthe yā pravṛttau sū pravṛtti nimittabhedāt prakāra catuṣṭayaavatītyarthaḥ".

³ Mīm. Sūtras, I 3.30-5.

⁴ Kāvyaṇṇakāśa, II.

⁵ Vārtika 85, on Pāṇini 1.2.61.

⁶ On Vākyapadiyam, III. 2.

⁷ Vārtika 45, on Pāṇini, 1.2.61.

⁸ On Vākyapadiyam, III. 2.

⁹ Vākyapadiyam, III 6.

Thus, the word 'cow' first gives rise to the universal.¹ And between the hearing of a word and the awareness of its meaning, there must be some transition, some interval'. In this transition the eternal 'śabda' slowly merges in the universal 'artha', and thus becomes identical with it. Thus arises the apprehension of a universal content from the cognition of a word which in its turn is also taken to be a universal.

2. It is said that the universal is identical in all its particulars and hence different persons are able to have similar cognitions of the same. Words, therefore, mean primarily such universals as distinguish the particulars of experience². If the word denotes only particular, the universal or generic idea of an object becomes impossible. A word cannot be a collective term denoting all the particulars, for the collective term might have to undergo a series of changes with the exit and entrance of objects in the universe. The particular and the universal, on the other hand, are inseparable from the standpoint of both knowledge and existence. But if a word were to mean only a particular, then it must have as many meanings as there are particulars in that class. This is a clear violation of the principle that a word can have only one meaning. If the word does not denote a universal, there can be no unalterable or eternal connection between the word and its meaning. The particulars being many, the understanding of a word would be complicated, difficult, and impossible. Hence the indissoluble union of the universal and the particular appears to be a necessity of thought.

But there is an alternative. The word primarily denotes a universal; and we can say that its secondary meaning refers to the particular. That is, the reference of a word to a particular object is a case of secondary meaning or lakṣaṇārtha³. Thus a word like 'red' means the universal 'redness'; and in the phrase 'red pen', it denotes a particular pen with the quality of red colour, by lakṣaṇā or implication. The word 'cow' means the universal 'cow', but by implication or inference it comes to mean the particular cow participating in the universal.

¹ "Śva ātmīyā gośabdātmikā, na tu sakala śabda sādharāṇī śabdatvādīḥ" (Helārāja on III. 6).

² "Arthasya jhaṭity eva śabda svarūpābhedenāvaśabodhe 'pi yathā pratipādita kramārayeṇa" (*ibid*). Cf. "Śva;āti pratyāyanād anantaram artha jātīnām gotvādīnām ātmaśaśasyāś śabda jāteḥ samāropasya kalpanā" (*ibid.*).

³ Cf. Nyāya Sūtra, 2.2 c6.

⁴ Śāstradīpikā, p. 154 : "Tatra gām ānayet ānayaṭīr ānayaṇa sāmānyam abhidhāya, tad vyaktīm lakṣayati; go padam apī svārtha dvārenānayanam eva gokarmakatvākāreṇa tat sambandhi svarūpeṇa lakṣayā pratipādayati . . .

It is no doubt a weighty argument that in the absence of the identical universal, the bare particulars cannot give rise to determinate ideas, for example, of cows as distinct from the determinate knowledge of the horses¹. The several particulars assume the character of the identical universal, become its basis, and also become the means of revealing it. This view has to explain why some particulars get into relation only with some one kind of universal, and not all with all universals indiscriminately. This must be due to the very nature or constitution (*svabhāva*) of the things. And if the particular alone is the object of immediate apprehension, the universal cannot spring into existence at a later stage like the head of king Charles. Moreover, the universality of an object is apprehended even before the name of the object is yet known.

The universal, however, is a whole or unity for these theories. Let us take the universal term 'forest', and by the forest we mean a series of trees appearing in a specific way. But is the idea of a forest perceivable in every tree? Every tree exists by itself, and is detached from the others. There is no bond of connection or unity between them except a spatial one, which unites many more other objects besides these. But let us consider the 'yellow book'. Here the quality and the book are not two distinct things, but one and the same. It is not the universal 'book', nor the universal 'yellow' that we cognise, but a concrete synthetic unity of a yellow book². Let us take the word 'fire' as a third example. By itself the word 'fire' does not express the full nature of the object. The 'ākṛti' or pattern is only the combination of the component parts, and such a pattern leads us nowhere. Alexander argues that the particular owes its universality to the uniformity of its medium, thus making the universal to be the plan or configuration of the particulars which are identical in kind³. The plan embodies uniformity, and since "the universal subsists in so far as its particulars exist, it is spatio-temporal though not particular"⁴. Consequently, repetition of particulars is absolutely necessary for the possibility of a universal. The universal then is a plan demanding repetition, for "apart from possible repetition a plan would be only the plan of a particular, not even an individual"⁵.

¹ *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 99. "Katham asaty eka rūpe sāmānye vyanta vilakṣaṇāni svalakṣaṇāṇyavilakṣaṇa rūpam vikalpam janayanti".

² "Samajyanti na bhītyante svato 'atīṣṭh' pāramāthikāḥ rūpam ekam anekam ca teṣu buddher upaplavaḥ" (*Tattva Saṅgraha Pañjikā*, p. 228).

³ S. Alexander · *Space, Time and Deity*, p. 210, 214.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 222.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 229.

Such a theory would make the universal a pure mental construct. And according to Kaṇāda, both the universal and the particular are relative to the understanding¹. The universals are marks or qualities with the aid of which we assimilate a variety of objects and classify them into various groups and classes. The universals are separate and distinct from the particulars². The distinction, it is alleged, does not amount to a difference, nor separateness, spatial separation. They may be said to be temporally separate. That is, a universal may exist even when no individual instance of it exists. This is a conceptual possibility; yet Kaṇāda tells us that the universal exists in the form of the similar or common qualities in the particulars.

But if there is a specific feature in a cognition there must be a corresponding feature in the object involved. And if we apprehend the universal in an object this apprehension must have an objective basis³. Hence some thinkers make out that the universal is a quality or an objective which alone is taken to be the 'characteristic being of the universal'. This characteristic being is apprehended neither as universal nor as particularised.⁴ The substantive or the noun is therefore treated as denoting a particular.

3. Russell divides all terms into particulars, qualities, and relations. Of these, qualities and relations are taken to be universals. Johnson simplifies this into substantives and adjectives, where the adjectives are the universals. The substantives can never function as predicates, whereas an adjective can be either a predicate or a subject. Thus in a statement like "unpunctuality is a fault", Johnson would treat the subject as an adjective which is a universal. But in such a case the difference between a particular and a universal vanishes, since the universal can be a particular by becoming a subject. Further a subject is self complete and can stand by itself, but an adjective is always incomplete and demands an auxiliary or support. And Russell's universals called qualities and relations are equally incomplete involving a combination of objects or words. Thus the universals of both Russell and Johnson are largely predicates. But in a sentence like "Socrates is mortal", mortality is the predicate and is a universal. And in a sentence "Mortality is a characteristic of Socrates", we have the same meaning, but mortality is treated as

¹ Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 1.2.3 - 'Sāmānyam visesa itī buddhy apekṣam.'

² W.D. Ross : Aristotle, p. 158.

³ Jayanta : Nyāya Mañjarī, p. 314.

⁴ 'Viśayātīśyam antarcā pratyañātīśyānupapattiḥ'.

⁵ John Cock Wilson :
Statement and Inference, pp. 380ff.

subject. In other words, the distinction between subject and predicate cannot be due to the distinction between particular and universal. Moreover, by universal we always mean a substantive, since the universal is that of which something is predicated.

The universal should not be equated with a property or a quality. We speak of a man with the felt hat, but we speak of a cow possessing the property of cowness. If it is said that we cognise the cow as having a dewlap, then this dewlap is seen in all cow; and what is the relation of cowness to this dewlap? Wherever we see the dewlap there is the cow. The dewlap determines the cowness, and cowness determines the dewlap, and this is a vicious circle¹. Here we have the differentia in the property or quality called the dewlap, over and against the universal called cowness. How are these to be related? If the universal is different from the dewlap, it can be either a quality or a substantive. If it is a quality, we cannot relate this quality to the quality called the dewlap since qualities cannot be related to one another independent of a substantive. If there is a substance of which these are the two qualities, is that substance same as the particular object or not? If it is the same we will have a visible reality along with a visible quality, and this is a contradiction in terms. If it is not the same, then it cannot be logically related to the particular. But if, on the other hand, the universal is a substantive, this substantive must be the same as the particular since the other alternative fails us. Being the same as the particular, the entire universal will have to subsist in one and the same object.²

Quality is not a universal. Oil, shining metal, water, and mirror reflect a fact in accordance with their nature, and the same face is reflected in them in many forms. In the same way a quality, like whiteness, is conditioned by space and time and reveals itself as many when it is associated with the various objects. In other words, whiteness is one wherever it appears, whereas a universal, though it is one, is implicit in many as many.³ Moreover, there is no invariable concomitance between a universal and a quality, since the apprehension of colour, for example, is subsequent to the apprehension of the

¹ 'Dandī dandavān iti vad gotvī gotvavān iti pratyanābhāvāt. Sāsānādimattva dharmasyaikaṣya sarvatra pratibhāso 'stīti cet kṛtam tairhi jātā tatra evānuvṛtta vyebaharopapattēh. Kim ca jātīm svīkurvatā tād vyāñjanam līcid vācyam tad api kutra vartata iti paryanuyoge yatra jātis tatra vartata ity uktāv anyonyāśray itā (Cītaukhī, p. 304).

² 'Ubhayor vā kutra vṛttir iti paryanuyoge, yadi vyāñjakāntaram abhy upagacchet, tadānavaethā; yadi na, tadubhayor api vastu mātra vṛttitayā sarvatra sarvā; āvar varteteti jātisānkarya prasangah' (ibid.).

³ Mukula : Abhidhā vṛtti mātrkrā, pp. 5, 6 : "Ataś ca śūklādi vyakter ekatvāj jāteś ca bhinnāśraya samavetatvāo, chuktitvādi jāty abhāvan na śūklādi śabdānām jāti śabdātvaṁ".

universal.¹ Quality is dependent on a substance or object, for without an object there can be no quality. As such the existence of quality depends on the existence of an object, and the object is apprehended through the universal. Hence quality is defined as

“Sattve niviśate 'paiti prthag jātiṣu drśyate
ādheyaś cākriyāś ca so 'sattva prakṛtir guṇaḥ”

The universal does not reside in the mere particular, for it is the principle underlying 'dravya', 'guṇa' and 'karma'. As the fruit ripens its former colour disappears and the yellow colour becomes integral to it ; and the yellow colour is integral to the nature of the object. Yet this yellow colour is different from the fruitness, since many objects, which are not fruits, can be and are yellow. This colour is not an object nor an act, nor a universal.²

But this position is not compromised with the plurality of manifestations for any quality. Each quality is one and not many. Yet because of the multiplicity of the loci each quality appears as many ; and we should not take this to mean that quality is a universal. Since its multiple manifestations only mean the multiple bases that support it ³ We are to speak of many white colours as the manifestations of a universal whiteness, we are mistaking an abstraction and thus running into a delusion.⁴ Therefore, we have to conclude that the universal is neither a quality nor a relation ; and qualities and relations too are not universals.

That the universals are qualities arises from the fact that we consider such concepts as 'manness' and 'cowness' along with such ideas as honesty, truthfulness and virtue. That is, by universal we at times mean an abstract noun. And one of the defects in the customary formulation of the theory of the universals savours of abstractionism. The particular cows are taken up, their specific differences and peculiarities are systematically eschewed, and some likeness common to all of them is felt. The felt common element has at times no distinct name, and thus we get at an abstract noun 'cowness' or 'Gotva' which is said to be the universal. That this is a violation of the prin-

¹ Cf. *Kāvyaśāstra* p. 22 : “Yady api śuklavāder nityatvābhy upagame gotvādīnā sama kalam eva sambandhitvam, tathāpi tasya sambandhaḥ kadācid apity api, na tu gotvāder iti viśeṣaḥ”.

² See *Patañjali : Mahābhāṣya*, 4.1.14.

³ Cf. *Tattvabodhini* on *Pāṇini*, 4.1.44 : “Sanyā jā'i kriyā śa'dān hitvawegna vacinaḥ Catuṣṭaye śabdānam avṛttir ity ākara grantha nishkarṣād esa nirṇayaḥ”.

⁴ *Mammasa*, p. 37 : “Guṇa kriyā yadṛcchānām vastuta, eka rūpānām apy āśraya bhedād bhedā iva lakṣyate.

⁵ *Rasagāṅgādhara*, p. 184 : “Tad uktam—'guṇa kriyāyadṛcchānām vastuta eka rūpānām āśraya bhedād bhedā iva lakṣyate' iti. Tatbā ca bhedā pratītir bhrama eva ti bhāvāt”.

principles of language and of common sense has been shown long ago by Berkeley. Yet this error persists ; for this abstract noun has a tendency to slide into a collective noun. And in the ultimate analysis it turns out to be a quality, whence arise mysterious ways of relating it to the particular. But as Laird points out : "It might be possible to arrive at redness by the process after eliminating the distinctive shades of red, but it would be interesting to know what colour is when the redness of the reds and the greenness of the greens have been abstracted from it... .. Again the mutilated figure of a triangle which is neither right-angled, acute-angled, or obtuse angled, is plainly not triangular".¹ And the universal, instead of dissolving the particulars into nothingness thus, has to enable us to proceed from the knowledge of one particular to that of another. Consequently all abstractionist theories of the universal fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem.

4. The universal, we are told, is ever operative only as an element in individual things ; it is immanent in the particulars. But what is this immanence ? We can think of a universal even when no particular instance of it exists. The obsolete species like the mastodon can be studied and thought of now. In so doing we construct mentally our own world of study and this world has its basis in the obsolete past. But with the ideas of justice, holiness and beauty we construct values of life as universals and try to apply them to the actual problems of life. In so doing we are trying to understand the application of a single unitary principle to the manifold problems, objects, and persons we come across. The problem of the universal and the particular is in essence the same as the problem of the One and the Many. And Prof. Dawes Hicks observes on the alleged immanence of the universal in the many particulars : "the problem of the One and the Many is not solved by the simple device of stationing the One in the Many. For, although in the world, universals may still not be of the world, and conceived as Aristotle conceived them, they assuredly are not. A concrete fact is not, that is to say, a 'syntheton' made up of a fixed, eternal type or form plus an indeterminate formless element, two being somehow welded together. How exactly the universal is related to the particular Aristotle was no more able to inform us than Plato had been. Perhaps no term in the philosophical vocabulary more often proves an obstacle to scientific thinking than the term 'immanent' ; and it is a delusion to imagine

¹ A Study in Realism, p. 111.

that in the notion of immanence is to be found a means of escaping the perplexities of Platonism."¹

The universal is defined as "nityam ekam anekānugatam sāmānyam". It is real and one, and exists at one and the same time in all the species. It is immanent. Immanence may be defined as running through or enlivening the many. This makes the relation between the universal and the particular one of conjunction or external relation, or an inherent or internal relation. That there is no such external relation is evident from our cognition. If it were an inherent relation, it would lead to a regress since relation is self-contradictory. Further how can the one real run through the many ?

"Anuvṛttatvam sāmānyam ity apy alakṣaṇam.

Kim idam anuvṛttatvam nāma ? Anekāśritavam
iti cen, na. Avayavinā saṁyogādibhis cāvyaabhicārat.
Nityatve satīti cen, na. Samavāyena vyabhicārat.
Ata eva na bahu vṛttitvam ity api."²

Hence the universal in any possible relation to the particular becomes inexplicable. The monads are immanent in every object, and yet we do not take all the objects as the particular instances of the one universal monad³

5. But if a word primarily denotes a universal, it becomes ununderstandable until it refers to a particular. If the denotative power reveals or expresses only a universal, the particular can never be known from the word. But if we maintain that the 'śakti' or capacity of the word is to denote the particular, where is its 'jāti' ? How can this 'jāti' be related to the 'śakti' ? If we grant that the word expresses a universal, it may be urged that there is an invariable concomitance between the universal and the particular, and hence the particular is invariably known. But there is no proof for this hypothesis⁴. If it be said that there is an inseparable relation between the universal cowness and the particular cow, we can only argue that the idea of the one arises from the idea of the other; and this is a fallacy of *petitio principii* ⁵.

¹ Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume V, p. 173.

² Śrī Harṣa : *Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khāḍya*, p. 1082

³ "Asambandhatve satīti cen, na Anubhū vyabhicārād iti" (*ibid.* p. 1082). Cf. *Citsukhi*, pp. 190-193

⁴ "Atha jātāvevāvasita saṁgatikūni padāny ākalita viśeṣāyās tasyā boddhum śakyatvāt tatpāryavasita vyāpārāṇi viśeṣāṇi api bodhayantīti matam tad api na Viśeṣeṇ padānām śaktir asti, na vā ? Asti ce jātir eva śabdārtha ity abhyupagama bhanga prasangaḥ" (*Citsukhi*, p. 163).

⁵ "Avinābhāva asiddheḥ" (*ibid.* p. 161).

⁶ "Ātmāśrayatvāt" (*ibid.*).

Moreover, if words denote universals then words like time, space, and direction will have to be devoid of any meaning¹. But Rudraṭa answers that an object is that which has a specific form and that which is self-productive of change; consequently direction, time and space are no objects² and hence neither particulars nor universals. The properties of the particulars are only superimposed on these by the poets³ : and a conventional twist cannot convert them into particulars. But if they are neither particulars nor universals, we have to take them to be relations alone.

If the universal is distinct from the particulars then it should be cognised apart from the particular, if it is not distinct it would be the same as the particular. It cannot be both distinct and non-distinct⁴. If it is distinct, is it omnipresent or is it confined only to particulars? It cannot be omnipresent because it is not known to exist in the intervening space between two objects⁵. Prasastapāda argues that a universal exists only in its members. If so, how is the universal related to the unborn things of tomorrow? For, the universal is stationary and inactive, unlike the particular.

Anyatra vartamānasya tato 'nya sthāna janmani
Tasmād acalataḥ sthānād vṛttir ity atiyuktatā
Yatrāsan vartate bhāvas tena sambadhyate na tu
tad desinam ca vyāpnoti kim apy etan mahādbbutam⁶ ”.

If it is confined to particulars how could it be cognised in a thing that will come into existence tomorrow? One cannot say that it comes into existence then, since the universal, being eternal, cannot have a temporal beginning. If it is unique, eternal, and inclusive, the universal cannot be the 'svarūpa' of the particulars which are many, non-eternal, and exclusive⁷. The universal cannot be perceived in time since it is said to be eternal; and an eternal entity is of no practical value.

6. But let us consider the nature of a perceptual act which can be expressed as 'this is also a cow', 'this too is a cow', and so

¹ "Api ca jātir eva śabdārtha iti niyame kālākāśa dig ādi śabdānām avācakatva prasangāt kālākāśādau kālātvaḥ jātir abhāvāt" (*ibid.*).

² "Jāti kriyā guṇanām prthag ādhāra" ita mūrtimaḥ dravyam dik kālākāśādi tu nirūpām avikriyam bhavati" (Kāvyaśāstrakāra, 7.2).

³ "Sukaviparamparayā ciram avigatatayānyathā nibaddham yat vasiṇ tad anyādrśam api badhniyāt tat prasiddhyaiva" (*ibid.*, 7.8).

⁴ Śāstradīpikā, p. 98 : "Pṛthakte vyaktiḥ jātir dīśyeta pṛthageva vā abhede vyakti matram syām dvedhā cen na virodha'at"

⁵ "Yadi ca bhinnā Jātih, eā sarvagatā? vyaktiḥ eva vā? Na tīvat sarvagatatvam, antarāle anupalabdhich" (*ibid.*).

⁶ Sarvadarśana sūtra saṅgraha, p. 27

⁷ Śāstradīpikā, p. 93 : "Katham hi nānābhūtānām anityānām vyāvṛtta svabhāvanām eka rūpa nityānuvṛtta svabhāvā ca jātir ātmā syāt ?"

on. This perception is not modified by the differences of time, space, and outlook. It offers a twofold idea of things.¹ On the one hand we have the 'this'. It excludes. It separates the cow of the immediate apprehension, from the cow of the past. It particularises the perceptual act. The word 'cow' denotes the universal and includes the present one in itself. Hence in every cognition we have both the universal and the particular as the two elements of the whole. To put it in a different way, the universal is eternal and it can still be embodied in the particular. For, in so far as the universal element is involved, the particular too is eternal². The universal may be absent in the particular entity that will come into being tomorrow. But the particular while coming into being determined by its causal conditions manifests itself as associated only with that specific universal to which it belongs³. Just as some conjunction is necessary for the emergence of an effect, likewise a particular must spring up so that there can arise a 'jāti-vyakti' relation. In the absence of the manifesting particulars, the universal is not perceived: for, the particulars can manifest it only in that particular space and at that specific time, where they are cognised. As such the universal exists everywhere but is cognised only when a particular is present. Consequently, there is no difficulty for the presence of the universal in the unborn thing of tomorrow or in the dead object of yesterday⁴. Since there is an element of identity between the universal and the particular, with the origination of a particular there emerges the universal too. The universal only gets itself manifested, for it does not originate⁵. This explanation places the examination of the nature of the universals on a different footing, rendering them almost invulnerable. This is a view which bears close affinities with the position of Advaita and with that of the leading Buddhist thinkers, for these thinkers have no sympathy with any adjectival theory of the universe or of the propositions.

¹ "Sarveṣv api vastuṣu 'iyam api gaur iyam api gauḥ. ayam api vṛkṣo 'yam apīti' vyāvṛttīnūptānukāram pratyakṣam deśakālāvasthāntareṣv aviparyastam udiyamānam sarvaṁ eva tarkābhāsam vṛtya dvyākāram vastu vyavasthāpavat kenānyena sakyate bādhitam" (*ibid.* p. 79).

² Jātiḥ api vyakti rūpeṇānityā, vyaktir api jāty ātmanā nityeti nātra kācid anīṣṭā-pattih" (*Sāstradīpikā*, p. 101).

³ "Svākāraṇāḥ nispādyamānā vyaktir jāti vīśeātmanā sambaddhaivotpādyata iti na doṣaḥ" (*ibid.* p. 102).

⁴ Nyāya Mañjarī. pp. 809-811.

⁵ "Na hi gavādi vyaktinām utpattimattve tad ākṛtinaṁ apy utpattimattvam syāt. Dravya, guṇa, karmaṇām hi vyaktaya evotpadyante nākṛ tayaḥ (Śaṅkara on Vedānta Sūtra, 1. 8. 28).

WAVES TO THE DISTANT SHORE

S. C. BRAHMO

Truths of the past lie enshrined for all times in books that give us a glimpse into the secrets of different ages and reveal the wisdom of the distant past. The soul of man works upon these materials that beguile our hearts and bring bright sunshine in the bleak stretches of our life. The horizon of man's mind is widened by education that unfolds the intelligence of people to go deep into the nature of things. "Whatsoever things were written aforetime" says a proverb "were written for your learnings".

In connection with the Centenary exhibition of the Calcutta University all the Universities of India lent out their publications to make the book exhibition a success. The rare books exhibited in the Asutosh Building drew special attention of a large number of visitors. Out of the book-stock of three lakhs, the Central Library of the University of Calcutta displayed thirty-nine rare books some of which are being explained here.

Sri Karunanidhan—Bilas by Kavi Jayanarayana Ghosal, a Kavya on divine love of Sri Krishna written during 1813-14 and printed in 1825 presents elaborate materials on social education of Bengal during late 18th century. Rudimentary influence of English education on Bengali literature is first traced in this Kavya. In the Persian translation of the Vedas entitled *Sirr-i-Akbar* by Prince Dara Shikoh written in beautiful hand, the beginnings and the ends of the various chapters are highly ornamented and well decorated and each line in each page is written within golden line. This manuscript is not dated, but it appears to be a copy of the time of Dara Shikoh himself. The facsimile reprint of *Ritusamhara* by Kalidasa, Calcutta 1792 which is the first Sanskrit book in print in Bengali character and a rare book, viz. Thomas Carlyle's *Past and Present* with the signature put in by Dr. Rajendra Prosad, President of India, one time a student of this University adding Eshan Scholar to his name were among the exhibits. *A Grammar of Bengali Language* by William Carey printed in 1805 from Serampore and the first Bengali monthly, viz. *Digdurshan* (1818-1820) edited by John Clarke Marshman were of immense interest to the scholars.

Like the rare book display of C. U. Library important rare exhibits lent by courtesy of Sudhir Brahma were also informative. The collection from 'Brahmo Family' of Akur Dutt Lane threw a flood of light on the history of this University from its very inception. No age could be properly understood unless the past stands are revealed to the eye. The achievements of our forefathers stand like landmarks of the past and open vast fields for research.

The imprint of the book entitled *Landmarks of History : Ancient History from the Earliest Times to the Christian Era* showed that Thacker Spink & Company in the year 1862 held the privilege to be the publishers for books prescribed by the Senate for various examinations. The selected English Courses of this University for Entrance Examination of 1872, I A. Examination of Dec., 1875 and B.A. Examination of January, 1878 indicate that Thacker Spink & Co. were the first publishers to this University. In the year 1877 University Book Press was set up at Manicktola area of Calcutta and printed a book, viz. *An Analysis of Sir William Hamilton: Lectures on Metaphysics* which was duly exhibited along with undermentioned books that arose curiosity of many visitors :—

- (1) *The English Reader* ... adapted to improve the younger classes of learners in reading by the progressive arrangement of the lessons. Calcutta School Book Society's Press, 1857.
- (2) *Manual of Practical Chemistry*. Pub. by the Medical College, Calcutta, 1837.
- (3) *Ontology* being a translation of *Tatwa-vidya* a Bengali work by D. N. Tagore, Cal. Central Press, 1871.

During the period of formation of the University of Calcutta, students had to prosecute their studies with the aid of books published and printed at London. The undernoted few books were read with interest by the predecessors of 'Brahmo Family' who were students of this University and valuable notes written by them along with their signatures are seen in the pages of these books :—

1. *The Conduct of the Understanding*
—by John Locke (Size . $4\frac{1}{2} \times 2\frac{1}{2}$ Inch), 1813.
2. *The Students' Manual*
—by Rev. John Todd (Size : $5 \times 3\frac{1}{2}$ Inch.), 1835.
3. *The Season and Castle of Indolence*
—by James Thomson (Size : $4\frac{1}{2} \times 2\frac{1}{2}$ Inch.)
MDCCLXVI.
4. *Don Quixote*
—by De La Mancha (Size : $4\frac{1}{2} \times 2\frac{1}{2}$ cm.), 1809.

Leaving aside the contents of these books, if we make an analytical study on size, printing, type face, binding, design, etc. from the different dates of publications, the evolution of the physical aspect of the book, i.e., the history of book production, as a whole, could be understood.

The printing press came into use for the first time in Calcutta in the last quarter of the 18th century. Printers and publishers had to face opposition both from so-called society and the Government for printing was not in the first instance recognised as a medium for the diffusion of knowledge. Ignoring these obstacles, the late Amritalal Brahmo printed and published some books and Journals from his printing press, viz 'Standard Press' of Akur Dutt Lane, Calcutta. A few pages of these century-old publications in English and Bengali were also exhibited. In the capacity of printer and publisher of the book entitled *Speeches by the Marquis of Lansdowne, Viceroy and Governor General of India, 1888-94*, Amritalal Brahmo wrote in 1905 the preface as follows :

"... It goes without saying that, with the spread of education, with the growing political aspirations of the people with the military activity of a great European power on the North-West Frontier Province, with the growth of expenditure in every department of administration and with the ever-falling Rupee, the task of governing India is becoming more and more difficult every day. The speeches will afford an interesting study as to how Lord Lansdowne tried to cope with the numerous and growing difficulties . . . These are some of the considerations that have actuated the publisher to undertake the publication." The letter of appreciation from the then Viceroy's Palace, 'Belvedere', Calcutta sent to Amritalal Brahmo in 1905 was also displayed along with the opinions of Newspapers :

The Hindoo Patriot—'The publisher has done a public service by bringing out Lord Lansdowne's speeches and we are sure the public will accord to him that patronage which his venture will entitle to.'

The Englishman—'"The book is well bound and carefully edited and should prove valuable as a book of reference in the study of Indian affairs."

A Bengali Journal, viz. *Bama Bodhini* printed from 'Standard Press' in 1893 revealed the elegance of early type faces in Bengali, Sanskrit and English. If we compare Bengali and Sanskrit types of to-day with types used in *Bama Bodhini*, we will find that no sub-

tantial improvement has yet been attained in respect of fineness and variety of the type faces.

The original M.B Diploma awarded to Buddynath Bromo (Baidyanath Brahmo) in 1847 from the Medical College of Bengal established in 1835 was an interesting item among the exhibits. The diploma is in parchment and carry the golden seal of the Examiner of Bengal Government and signatures of all the professors of the Medical College. A comparative study of this diploma with the certificates awarded now will show the various changes which the University of Calcutta has effected in respect of form, seal, size and colour of paper. It is found from Vol. I *Hundred Years of the Calcutta University* that Dr. Baidyanath Brahmo's name is associated with introduction of vaccination system in Calcutta.

At the bottom of this diploma, the Entrance Certificates of his son and grandson, Babu Anrita Lal Brahmo and Asutosh Brahmo were exhibited with two original seals of the University of Calcutta. The University seal was imprinted in the white entrance certificate of 1899 but in 1873-74 certificate there was no seal and it was in blue paper of 7" × 6" in size.

Thanks are due to the Calcutta University for organising such a unique display of rare and antiquarian books which help to open the windows of the dark past and make known the unknown. Exhibitions of this type, if organised from time to time, will prove to be a liaison between the past and the present.

HOW YOUR CHILDREN BEHAVE

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The term "problem children" is used in abnormal psychology, child psychology and mental hygiene. It stands for some misdeeds done by children of certain ages. Clinical observation shows that from early childhood to the age of twelve children showing some abnormal and antisocial behaviour are known as "problem children." It is a hard task indeed, to bring up and to deal with them at home and in the school. So, many parents, nurses and teachers are looking to the psychologist for proper guidance of such children. Modern researches show that the knowledge of Applied Psychology can contribute something of real value in the handling of the "problem children" and in the training of the normal children so that they do not develop delinquency and criminality in the long run. "Problem children" upto the age of twelve are left to be managed at home. There are a few psychologists and psychological clinics in India that give advice to parents on the management of such "difficult children." Cognizable cases between the ages of seven and fifteen are generally dealt with in Juvenile Courts and the punishment consists in removal to reformatories. These children are called delinquent children. Law does not take any special consideration of young offenders above the age of fifteen upto twenty-one and such young offenders when convicted are housed in ordinary jails or sometimes in Juvenile reformatories for the rectification of their antisocial behaviour.

Misdeeds of "problem children" are of various sorts, *e.g.*, stealing, cheating, runaway behaviour, sex misconduct, temper tantrums, enuresis, expression of violent aggression, nervousness, long-standing thumb-sucking habit, jealousy of morbid type, stammering, lying, etc. Many a child gets into the habit of stealing because it is a part of the activity of the gang with which the child happens to be associated. Stealing is a kind of game to "problem children." They are really "unhappy children." Such children are not concerned about the things they steal or even what they may be exchanged for. Stealing and other forms of misbehaviour are the vicarious manifestation of the unmastered tension due to mental conflict; and the act of stealing gives some sort of temporary relief to "problem children" and delinquent children.

Recent researches in clinical psychology have shown that there is close association, of a cause-effect variety, between the parental attitudes or family situation and the child's misbehaviour. There are definite evidences that stealing or runaway behaviour is due, wholly or in large part, to the family environment. If we have made a thorough investigation of the social and cultural situation, the school history, the health factor, as well as the family adjustment, we shall be better able to determine the effect of each of these upon the behaviour of "problem children." It has been found that parental attitudes of over indulgence is largely responsible for the development of misconduct in children. So it has been said by an eminent psychologist that "there are no problem children, only problem parents."

Now we shall try to show how and why a child becomes a "problem child"; and it is of special interest to psychiatrists and social workers. Stealing is a real psychological problem, for often the child is unconscious of his underlying motives. It has been found by psycho-analytical investigations that almost all types of misbehaviour shown by "problem children" are associated with some mental conflict, especially those concerned with sex. The misdeeds of "problem children" may be the danger signals of personality disorders which, like physical disorders may require wise handling and guidance if permanent damage is to be avoided.

Of late the socio-psychiatric aspect of abnormal and antisocial behaviour of children has been drawing the attention of sociologists, social psychologists, child psychologists and psychoanalysts. If we believe that delinquency is the failure of the individual to adjust to society, we should concentrate all our efforts on promoting that adjustment. If we believe that delinquency is a social malady, then every measure taken to raise the level of society must reduce its incidence. Some modern psychiatrists and researchers are of opinion that the early childhood environment is solely responsible for development of delinquency in children. They work on the assumption that the social, moral, cultural, economic and the hereditary factors all combine to influence the family life and through it predispose the child to show abnormal and antisocial behaviour. Children are the product of their environment, and their failure is said to be the failure of society at large. Hence efforts are made through the activities of social workers and by the education of parents to bring about a healthier atmosphere at home so that the "problem child" may be redeemed. In suitable cases psychological treatment is also undertaken to remedy the harm already done to the child. Delinquent acts

are sometimes done by young children during the confusion period following an epileptic attack. In such cases proper physical and mental treatment is advised.

I like to conclude this paper by citing one or two case histories which are perhaps typical :

Take the case of a boy who was the only child of his parents. In school he was all along well-up in studies. But at the age of nine troubles began. He developed a tendency of lying and stealing. Then in a school examination he did miserably. This drew the attention of his father who after an investigation came to learn that his son was for sometime playing truant and staying away from his classes.

The father was a man with strict ideas about discipline. He immediately engaged a tutor with the hope of mending the boy's behaviour. But the result was quite unexpected. The boy refrained from attending school at all. Being overwhelmed with agony the father brought his son to a psychologist. The psychologist tested the boy's intelligence and found it much higher than the average. He prescribed for the boy a new environment, free both from strict discipline and pampering.

Accordingly, the father sent his son to the house of a maternal uncle, who was a considerate and affectionate person. The uncle gave the boy some painting colour and a brush in order to divert his attention towards a healthy hobby. The boy found much interest in the painting materials and began to draw whatever came into his mind.

In the meantime his father brought a horse. The boy heard of this and insisted on being taken to his father's house. The father brought him back to his house and allowed him ride the horse. Riding was an exhilarating experience for him. After a few days the boy became so much enamoured of the horse that he devoted much of his time in feeding and taking care of it. All his delinquent tendencies disappeared. This case history reminds us of the boyhood days of Sir Winston Churchill. Sir Winston relates vividly in his autobiography how his father's horse helped his young mind acquire poise, swiftness and courage.

Here is another case history—Dr. Berkeley Hill was for some time the Superintendent of Mental Hospital in Ranchi. Once a delinquent boy was brought to him. The doctor examined the boy and thought that lack of sympathy and love at home was the cause of his problem behaviour. He took special interest in this case and

kept the young delinquent at his own house. He used to take out the boy with him for walks, told him interesting stories, laughed and cut jokes with him. The tension was relaxed and the boy began to disclose his mind to the sympathetic doctor.

One day Dr. Berkeley Hill's gold watch was found missing. All evidence of the circumstances pointed to the boy as the culprit. The Doctor kept completely silent about the matter. He went on pouring more and more love and affection on the emotionally starved boy. He began to spend more time in the boy's company. He was determined to reach the hidden recess of the mind from where sprang the boy's anti-social behaviour. In course of a talk the boy confessed that he had stolen the watch and broken it open. He could not explain why he had done so, but returned the broken watch to the doctor.

Through patient and persistent psychoanalysis the doctor came across a strange story. When the boy was very young his mother was carrying some months. There was some change in the mother's attitude to her son. The mother, who was preparing for a second child-birth, could not naturally pay as much attention to the son as she had done before. But the more the mother shifted her centre of affection, the more the boy clung to her. The boy would often put his ears on the belly of his mother. He tried to listen to the throbbing of the baby in the womb.

"What is in your belly, mother?" the boy would often ask the mother. The mother felt disconcerted at such a question and would every time drive him out of the room. The mystery in the boy's mind deepened and after sometime he found a new little member added to their family. This little brother of his displaced him in maternal love and care. The relation between the faint throbbing in his mother's womb and loss of maternal love remained completely mysterious to him. So, whenever he happens to hear the ticking sound of a watch he breaks it open only to find out what lies in it.

It remains only to be said that the boy was completely cured of his delinquent behaviour.

HISTORY OF MANIPUR

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THE FIRST ANGLO-BURMESE WAR (1824-26) AND GAMBHIR SINGH

Though the English had commercial intercourse with Burma since the 17th century, their political relationship with that country began to grow a century later. By the middle of the 18th century when the paramount power of India fell into their hands and their empire extended in the eastern side up to the farthest limits of Chittagong, Sylhet and Goai para districts, the Empire of Alaungpaya gradually bringing Pegu, Tenasserim and Arakan within its fold touched the border of the British frontier district of Chittagong. Conflict is inevitable when the two rising imperialist powers meet in the common frontier.¹ After the conquest of Arakan by Burma, large numbers of Arakanese for fear of oppression crossed the border and took asylum in Chittagong. The Government of Burma demanded total expulsion of all these Arakanese, and threatened war, if the demand was not met. Lord Wellesley, however, refused on 'Grounds of humanity' to consider expulsion. The imminent outbreak of hostilities was prevented by the mission of Symes.² In the meantime fresh refugees from Arakan entered Chittagong and began to make inroads into Burmese territories from their new base. This rendered the Anglo-Burmese relations more strained. In 1718 when the English were engaged in suppressing the Pindaris, Bodawpaya, the emperor of Burma, sent a letter to Lord Hastings "demanding the surrender of Chittagong, Dacca and Kassimbazar which in medieval times paid tribute to the ruler of Arakan". When Hastings received this letter the Pindari menace was over. "The Governor General returned it to the Burmese King with the comment that it was perhaps a forgery."³ On receipt of such reply Burma would have immediately declared war. But the death of Bodawpaya at that moment, defeat of the Burmese forces at Siam, and on the other hand, the success of their opponent against the Marathas (1817-18) and the Pindaris made the Government of Burma pause.

In 1817 the Burmese army taking advantage of the internal dissensions in Assam entered that country and placed their nominee Chandra Kanta Singha on the throne. But shortly after the Burmese army had withdrawn the party opposed to Chandra Kanta went on intriguing

against him and finally dislodged him. The Burmese were informed of the turn of the events and they at once despatched a strong contingent under the command of Ala mingyi. Chandra Kanta joined with him and was raised to the throne under Burmese suzerainty. But he was not long to enjoy the friendship and protection of the Burmese. He scented danger and fled to Gauhati. Chandra Kanta then became determined to oust the Burmese from Assam. The Burmese forces again poured into Assam in 1821 under Minginaba Bandula, who defeated and drove out Chandra Kanta¹.

The occupation of Manipur by Burma in 1818 has already been narrated in the previous chapter. Govinda Chandra, the Raja of Cachar deposed by the princes of Manipur might have been negotiating with the Burmese authorities at that time. The British district Goalpara became the victim of Burmese raids. Lord Amherst wrote, "There is nothing now to prevent them from sacking Dacca and plundering all the adjoining districts". In 1823 the Burmese occupied the island of Shahpur near Chittagong from the British. Next year Ram Singha II, the Raja of Jaintia, was called upon to pay his homage to the emperor of Burma being also the sovereign of Assam. The British asked the Burmese not to enter into Jaintia. The Burmese paid no heed to it and soon marched into Cachar and Jaintia. No territory was then left outside the eastern frontier of British India, to be conquered by Burma¹.

Bodawpaya died in 1819, and he was succeeded by his grand-son Bagyidaw. The new monarch living in the midst of sycophants failed at times to measure accurately his own strength or that of his adversaries. "With absolute ignorance of international affairs king Bagyidaw attributed to himself omnipotence of invincibility; in his opinion which was confirmed by Minginaba Bandula, the English were mere traders and they could be easily subdued by his Assamese levies, and his redoubtable Burman Commanders might rest in peace behind the shadow of the golden throne". The British success in India was attributed to the incompetency of the Hindus; the British army would experience different results when they would have to deal with the Burmans who were not Hindus. The impoverished coffers caused by a futile war with the British was proposed to be replenished by the plunder of Calcutta. "The Burmans had conquered the Chins, the Singphos, the Manipuries and the Assamese; and after such a series of triumphs their victory over the British was a foregone conclusion. After the conquest of Calcutta King Bagyidaw proposed to march to England, the occupation of which would be signalled by

the installation of his son as viceroy of 'all the British dominions.' Success of the Burmese in Assam further strengthened his beliefs.

However provoking might be the activities of the Burmans, the British tried up to the last moment to avoid war. Neither the condition in India nor the attitude of the British Parliament was in favour of their entering into a large-scale warfare. But when the Burmese became so much determined to invade the British territories and drag them to war, Lord Amherst, the then Governor-General of India, finally on the 24th February, 1824, declared formal war against Burma.

The princes of Manipur were eagerly waiting for this moment. When the war actually broke out the British Government realised the importance of Cachar and Manipur. Moreover, the co-operation of the local people was necessary to conduct any operation in that direction. It was under these circumstances that the British Government had to change its indifferent attitude towards those deposed rulers of Cachar and Manipur and open talks for alliance. A treaty of subordinate alliance was concluded with Gobinda Chandra, by which the British Government agreed to accept him as the ruler of Cachar. Simultaneously, the British accepted the responsibility of protecting Jaintia. In the meantime the British forces began their operations and by October, 1824, they became successful in driving away the Burmese from Jaintia and Cachar. But Manipur and the Brahmaputra Valley remained still under Burmese occupation.

After the expulsion of the Burmese from Cachar the British officers called together the three brothers, Chaurajit, Marjit, and Gambhir Singh and proposed the following arrangements: "Chaurajit to be Rajha, with Marjit Inbarajah successor and Gambhir Singh Senapati or General-in-Chief." It is said that Chaurajit and Marjit on account of age refused to accept this arrangement. Accordingly Gambhir Singh was made Raja and Nar Singh, a great-grandson of Gharib Niwaz was made Senapati. Chaurajit receiving a monthly pension of Rs. 100/- from the British government went to Nabadwip. Similarly, Marjit also got a pension of Rs. 100 - per month and settled in Sylhet. He died at Balughat, a place in the southern part of Sylhet.

When the Burmese army retreated from Cachar but were still in occupation of Manipur, a large British army of 6,000 strong under Brig.-General Suddham came to Cachar from Dacca to enter into Manipur and invade Burma. But through the jungles and swamps they could not advance further than the Jiri river. Camels brought

for carrying baggages were found to be useless in that area. Losses due to diseases were so heavy that the army had finally to be withdrawn from that area.

David Scott was already carrying on negotiations with Gambhir Singh to have effective co-operation from him. Gambhir Singh expressed his willingness to advance into Manipur with 500 men who later on constituted the Manipur Levy. After the agreement with the British regarding the future political set-up of Manipur, Gambhir Singh and Nar Singh with their men went to Badarpur camp to receive military training. Expenses of training and equipments of this Manipur Levy were entirely borne by the British Government.¹⁰

Before October, 1824 the Burmese had a force of ten thousand strong at Dudpatil near Silchar. Their sudden disappearance from that stronghold apparently seems to be very strange, specially when the roads were still muddy and swamps not dried up, offering an extremely difficult field for the British forces to advance.

But a look into the general plan of the British operation will help to understand the mystery. The British forces simultaneously began their operation by land in the (1) Assam front, (2) Arakan front and through the sea in the (3) Rangoon front. The object in the Rangoon front was to keep a large Burmese force engaged. At the beginning of the war in the Assam and Arakan front, the British forces were successful in keeping their enemy at bay, but they failed to make much headway due to lack of supplies and geographical barriers. In the Rangoon front also the achievements were negligible. On the other hand, the hill tribes of Assam oppressed by the Burmese began to rise against them. At this time Chandra Kanta, the deposed ruler of Assam, again laid his feet in the Burmese trap and was imprisoned at Jorhat. Still the conditions for the Burmese did not improve. Discontents and risings always haunted them. The Burmese general Mingimaha Bandula was faced with a grave situation due to shortage of supplies. He handed over the charge of Assam to a governor and himself went back to Burma withdrawing major portion of his forces. It was probably for this reason the Burmese forces were found to disappear overnight from Cachar in 1824.¹¹

Mingimaha Bandula after returning from Burma proceeded to attack Bengal through Arakan. A British force was defeated by him at a place called Ramu. But almost at the same time he was called upon to resist the advance of Archibald Campbell in the Rangoon

front. At this stage the aggressive policy of Burma came to an end. After that, all battles fought by Burma were purely defensive. In December, 1824, Mingimaha Bandula appeared with his forces before Rangoon but was driven 40 miles north to Donabew. In April, 1825 he was finally defeated and killed by Campbell. Prome, the capital of Southern Burma fell to the British. Thereupon the war entered its last phase. The emperor of Burma came down from his dream-land to negotiate peace with the British.¹²

The liberation of Manipur from the Burmese occupation is intimately connected with the 1st Anglo-Burmese War. The brief summary of that war in different fronts given above will help the reader to understand the circumstances which favoured Gambhir Singh to achieve his object. When Suldham's forces failing to enter Manipur withdrew from that area after leaving two small contingents at Sylhet, Gambhir Singh sought permission to enter into Manipur with his men. In the meantime the major portion of the Burmese forces having been withdrawn from the Assam front, the chances of severe resistance from the Burmese side became few. Hence the permission sought by Gambhir Singh to move was easily obtained.¹³

On the 17th May, 1825, Gambhir Singh with 500 Manipuri soldiers marched for Manipur from Sylhet and reached Banskandi within 7 days. Lieutenant Pemberton, a British Officer, also accompanied him. From Banskandi they marched along the muddy road for 30 miles. Beyond that there stood in front of them steep ranges stretching from north to south. Gambhir Singh with his men, after crossing innumerable hurdles reached the western border of the Manipur valley on the 10th June, 1825. On his arrival the Burmese forces fell back at Undra, 10 miles away from Imphal. After occupying Imphal, Gambhir Singh marched to Undra and found that the Burmese had already left. By the end of June, he returned to Sylhet leaving behind only 300 soldiers to defend Manipur.¹⁴

On December 18, 1825, Gambhir Singh, having obtained some reinforcements (1,500 muskets and requisite number of men),¹⁵ returned to Manipur. He was accompanied by Captain Grant. At that time, there were still 300 or 400 Burmese soldiers in the Kubo valley. But shortly they left that place leaving the valley solely under the protection of 500 local people. Gambhir Singh sent his troops there early in January, 1826. The Raja of Sumjoo collected about 700 men in the Tammu stockade to resist the advance of Gambhir Singh's troops. Thereupon Gambhir Singh and Captain Grant arrived at the scene and put them to flight. The sudden

disappearance of the Raja of Sumjoo was partly due to the impression that a British battalion had entered Manipur. Captain Grant expected that such an impression would cause some alarm at the Burmese Capital and create a diversion in favour of the British army operating in the Delta. Another stockade on the right bank of the Ningthi river also fell into their hands. Captain Grant reported : " The activity, judgement and skill, he (i.e., Gambhir Singh) has displayed on this occasion, has proved the justice of the opinion previously entertained of his merits. The steady gallantry which, without the usual aid of canon could force a brave enemy to evacuate a strongly fortified position, is a very satisfactory illustration of the character of his followers." ¹⁶

On February 1, 1826, Gambhir Singh arrived on the western bank of the Ningthi and found the entire area deserted. The inhabitants had made a hurried retreat leaving their cattle behind and allowing the Manipur prisoners to escape. Even the land on the opposite side of the river was deserted.¹⁷ It was then the last stage of the war.

After the defeat and death of Mingimaba Bandula at Donabew in April, 1825, the prospect of the war became clear to the emperor Bangyadaw. Yet in order to have a better bargain he was advised by his ministers to continue the war during the rainy season. Campbell spent the rainy season at Prome. The Burmese forces failing to make any profit out of the season only whiled away their time. In the month of August when the sky again became clear Bangyadaw at last showed his eagerness for peace. But the severe terms offered by the British were not acceptable to him. His forces were still roving in Assam, Manipur and North Burma. He was not ready to be cowed so easily. Fighting recommenced. For the last time the Burmese guns thundered for a while and were finally silenced. In the meantime Gambhir Singh occupied Manipur and his forces proceeded to Ava, the western bank of the Ningthi river on the 1st February, 1826. Ava was not far off. Campbell also advancing northward occupied Yandaboo, a town within 45 miles from Ava. All chances of defence through resistance vanished in the air. The war came to a close by the treaty of Yandaboo signed on the 24th February, 1826.¹⁸

Gambhir Singh's title to the throne of Manipur was recognised by the treaty. But there was still some confusion about the nature of his sovereignty. It was stated in the Article (II), " His majesty the King of Ava renounced all claims upon and will abstain from all future interference with the principality of Assam and its dependencies and

also with the contiguous petty states of Cachar and Jynteeah. With regard to Munnipore, it is stipulated, that should Gambhir Singh desire to return to that country, he shall be recognised by the King of Ava as Rajah thereof." It was not clarified whether Gambhir Singh should be treated as the sovereign ruler of Manipur or a vassal king under Burma. From the British standpoint it was not safe to allow Manipur to remain a dependency of Burma because the existence of Burmese hold on Manipur would expose the Sylhet frontier to the danger which had precipitated the war in 1824. The question was discussed by the supreme government and even referred to the court of Directors. "Major Burney, Resident at Ava, was directed to report to Calcutta the sentiments of the Burmese Ministers on this delicate subject. But fortunately they did not demand suzerainty over Manipur. On one point however they persistently refused to make any concession. During the military operations Gambhir Singh had succeeded in occupying not only Manipur proper but also the Kabaw valley inhabited by the Shans. The Burmese government refused to agree to the inclusion of the Kabaw valley in Gambhir Singh's dominions, claiming that it was an integral part of the Burmese Empire. Within a few weeks of the conclusion of the treaty of Yandaboo some Burmese troops crossed the river Ningthi and entered the disputed valley, but they soon retired into the Burmese territory of their own accord. Instead of renewing hostilities Gambhir Singh submitted the matter to the decision of the British government. The authorities in Calcutta supported the claim of Gambhir Singh until, in 1832, Major Burney submitted a confidential report in favour of the Burmese claim. In his letter dated July 5, 1832, he pointed out that the disputed valley had been in possession of the Burmese Kings since 1370 A.D. and that for 12 years prior to the outbreak of the late war the Burmese had enjoyed uninterrupted possession." Accordingly Lord William Bentinck decided to return the valley to Burma." The government of India wrote to its Resident at Ava on March 16, 1833, "...the supreme government still adheres to the opinion that the Ningthee formed the proper boundary between Ava and Manipur ; but that in consideration for his Majesty's (i.e. Burmese kings) feelings and wishes and in the spirit of amity and goodwill subsisting between the two countries, the supreme government consents to the restoration of the Kubo valley to Ava, and to the establishment of the boundary line at the foot of the Yoomadoungh hills". The transfer of the valley took place on January 9, 1834. Gambhir Singh accepted the decision with reluctance. In order to compensate Manipur for

this loss the government of India agreed to give the Raja a stipend of Rs. 500/- per month, which continued till the integration of the state with the Indian Union.

There are reasons to doubt the authenticity of Major Burney's report. It is found in the history of Assam written by Gait that in 1475 the king of Manipur along with the king of Pong invaded Khumbat and established his authority over the Kubo valley. According to Major-General Sir James Johnstone (who was a political agent in Manipur for a long time), sometimes the rulers of Manipur "held a considerable territory east of the Chindwin river in subjection, at other times only the Kubo valley, a strip of territory, inhabited not by Burmese, but by Shans and lying between Manipur proper and Chindwin. Again they were driven back into Manipur proper. For the greater part of the last century (18th century) the Kubo valley unquestionably belonged to Manipur and it was never in any sense a Burmese province, being, when not under Manipur, a feudatory of the great Shan kingdom of Pong."²⁰ In view of the chequered history of Burma it is difficult to believe that "the valley had been in possession of the Burmese kings since 1370 A.D.", as stated by Major Burney. The Puranas of Manipur also refer to the valley as a part of the kingdom of Manipur. In fact, the river Ningthi forms the geographical boundary of Manipur in the eastern side and the political boundary also should have coincided with that. The report of Major Burney regarding the Kubo valley was probably influenced by his desire to gain popularity in the Burmese court. William Bentinck also, it seems, preferred to please the powerful Burmese ally by conceding to their demand at the cost of Manipur. But neither Gambhir Singh nor his descendants willingly acquiesced in the cession of what they considered to be their ancestral territory. It is heard that when the decision of the government of India was communicated to ailing Gambhir Singh in his palace, he became extremely mortified and on that very day breathed his last.

By a treaty executed at Badarpur on March 6, 1824 Govinda Chandra had been recognised as the protected ruler of Cachar.²¹ Gambhir Singh who ruled over Manipur for some time nourished the desire of annexing that kingdom to Manipur.

It may be recalled here that Gambhir Singh after coming from Manipur to Cachar served in the army of Govinda Chandra for some time on a monthly salary of Rs 50.²² At the end of the Anglo-Burmese War, Gambhir Singh, having been placed on

the throne of Manipur decided to take his revenge. One day in April, 1830 Govinda Chandra was assassinated at his secret instigation.²³ Several claimants at once put forward their claim over Cachar. But the most serious claim was that of Gambhir Singh, who applied for a lease of Cachar for 20 years on an annual tribute of Rs 15,000. His claim was supported by Captain Grant, Commissioner of Manipur, but seriously opposed by Captain Jenkins and Lieutenant Pemberton, who pointed out that it would be dangerous to entrust the defence of Cachar to the weak ruler of Manipur. Lord William Bentinck decided in favour of annexation. A hilly tract in the eastern part of Cachar was given to Gambhir Singh, the plains were annexed on August 14, 1832 and formed a district.²⁴

Successive Burmese invasions on Manipur for the last 60 years came to a close with the termination of the First Anglo-Burmese War. Burma at last had to renounce her claim over Manipur. But finally when they left the country, the number of the adult male population in the valley did not exceed 300.²⁵ A large number of people had been killed in action or carried into captivity or had fled for safety to the Burma Valley.²⁶ Colonies of Manipuri refugees grew up in different parts of Cachar, Sylhet and Tripura. Many went as far as Dacca for safety. Agriculture and cottage industries of Manipur were completely ruined. Fields were covered with jungles. The valley presented a very desolate and gloomy appearance. Gambhir Singh and Nar Singh had to begin everything from the start. The image of Govindaji was brought back from Sylhet and reinstalled in the palace-temple. The hill tribes who became independent during the war were again brought under the rule of the Manipur Government. Normal life within the state was gradually restored. Agriculture and industry were revived. Population began to increase. Gambhir Singh built a new palace on a hill top at Langthabal three miles and a half south of the old palace. A long canal also was excavated for boat-race in front of the new palace. The rulers of Manipur used it for their residence till 1844. But later on it was badly damaged by two successive earthquakes of 1869 and 1880. The ruins of that palace may still be seen in that area.

Formerly the kings of Manipur had their sway extended even over the interior of Naga hills. This is evident from the Manipuri names of many Naga villages in that region. But during the period of the decadence, just before and during the Burmese war of 1819-25, whatever influence Manipur had was gone. In 1832, Captain Jenkins and Pemberton escorted by Gambhir Singh and his troops forced a

passage through the hills with a view to finding out a practicable route up to Assam. They went *via* Paptongmei and Samagudting, to Mohong and Deljood. At that time Gambhir Singh re-asserted the authority of Manipur over that area and reduced to submission several villages including Kohima, the largest of them. At Kohima he stood upon a stone and had his footprints set up in a prominent position, together with an upright stone having carved figures (dragon insignia) and an inscription. The Nagas greatly respected this stone and cleaned it from time to time. They opened large trade with Manipur and whenever a Manipuri visited a Naga village he was treated as an honoured guest, at a time when a British subject could not venture into the interior without risk of being murdered.

Even till the Naga Hill campaign of 1879-80 the Nagas regarded Manipur as the stronger power of the two (Manipur and British) " In 1833 when the Angamis started giving troubles to the British, Gambhir Singh with his forces accompanied by Lt. Gordon, Adjutant of the Manipur Levy, again subdued Kohima and other Angami villages and exacted tributes." As a result of the repeated expeditions many Nagas began to learn Manipuri. Had there been no British administration and European missionary activities the people of these areas might have gradually accepted the Manipuri culture.

Gambhir Singh had no children for a long time. After his death the succession of Nar Singh was almost a certainty. But a few years before his death in 1831 prince Chandrakirti was born. Nar Singh did not at all feel disappointed. He had no hankering for the throne. In the year 1839 on the 9th January Gambhir Singh died in his langthabal Palace."

Gambhir Singh restored Manipur from the Burmese with British help. For that he was always grateful to the British and helped them according to his capacity, to tide over any difficulty in this frontier. But in view of this it must not be construed that he accepted the throne of Manipur as a vassal of the British. In his treaty with the British Government in 1833 (which will be discussed in the next chapter) there is no clause showing his sovereignty in any way curtailed. It is found in the *Statistical Account of Manipur* written by Mr. Brown in 1873 that "on the conclusion of the Burmese war by the treaty of the yendabo in 1826, Manipur was declared independent." Hence Manipur during the time of Gambhir Singh should not be ranked with other native states of India. There were reasons for the British also to remain grateful to Gambhir Singh. Had they not received the timely help from this brave son of Manipur

it would have been impossible for them to launch an attack on Ava through Manipur and bring the war to conclusion, as early, in 1826.²⁰

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INDIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA: BEGINNINGS OF BITTERNESS (1880-1900)

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“There is only one reason for the original introduction of Indians from India to what is now called the Union of South Africa—the desire of the Natal Colonists of those days to exploit the Potential wealth of the coastal districts . . . The ultimate end of this policy was clear from the outset. The coolie was to be welcomed as a permanent settler of the colony and as a contributor to its prosperity . . . His coming amply justified the predictions of those who favoured it.”

—Jan H. Hofmeyr, Deputy Prime Minister of South Africa.

“If our history proves anything—it is this—that however we may regard our Asiatic problem, the fact that it came into existence is due to the Europeans and to the Europeans alone . . . the self-interest of the Europeans brought the Indians to the South.”

—Jan H. Hofmeyr, Deputy Prime Minister of South Africa.

“Political and economic slavery exists within the British Empire and indeed it is not an over-statement of fact if it is said, as it is often said by many responsible British leaders, that the British Empire is the greatest of the Slave empires of the world . . . Racial discrimination and hostile class legislation against the interests of Asiatic and Negro labourers by the whites is something akin to legalised peonage and slavery.”

—Dr. T. N. Das in the *Modern Review* (December, 1927)

“Mr. Gandhi, you are preaching to the converted, it is not vices of Indians that Europeans in this country fear but their virtues”.—Sir Lionel Curtis.

The Union of South Africa *Unie Van Suid Afrika* as the Boers call it—a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, was constituted in 1910 following the Act of Union passed by the British Parliament in 1909. It is an amalgam of four provinces Natal, the Cape province, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The first two were British Colonies whereas the last two independent Boer republics before

Union. British influence is still strong—but diminishing—in the first two. Boer influence holds sway in the third and the fourth. The Union, excluding the contested area of South-West Africa, covers about 470,000 square miles. It is, in other words, about the size of France Germany and Italy put together.

The Union has a total population of 12,646,375 divided into different racial groups as follows :—

1. Africans	85,00,000 (approx.)
2. Europeans	26,00,000 (approx.)
3. Coloureds	10,00,000 (approx.)
4. Indians	4.10,000 (approx.)
5. Cape Malaya	40,000 (approx.)

The European in the Union is thus outnumbered by a ratio of about 4 to 1. The ratios between Europeans and non-Europeans are more extreme all over Africa, "but nowhere has the disparity between the numbers of blacks and whites produced such turmoil, anguish and strain." ¹ This tension is due in the main to the racial policy of the Government of South Africa, which rules out all ideas of racial partnership. Field-Marshal Smuts, one of the greatest South Africans that ever lived, justifies the policy in the following words—The native Africans "have not the inner toughness and persistence of the Europeans, nor those social and moral incentives which have built up European civilization in a comparatively short period. But they have a temperament which suits mother Africa. . . .

"Nothing could be worse for Africa than the application of a policy, the object or tendency of which would be to destroy the basis of this African type, to de-Africanize the African and turn him either into a beast of the field or into a pseudo-African . . .

" . . . the British Empire does not stand for assimilation of its peoples into a common type, it does not stand for standardization, but for the fullest (and) freest development of its peoples along their own specific lines. This principle applies not only to its European, but also to its Asiatic and African constituents." ²

The European settlers in South Africa are divided into two none-too-friendly groups the Afrikaners and the Britons. The former number 1.5 million in round figures and are mostly descended from the Dutch, Flemish, French Huguenot and German settlers. The latter, who number a little more than a million—1,100,000 in round figures—are, on the other hand of British descent. Afrikans, the local

¹ Inside Africa by John Gunther, p. 444.

² Africa and Some World Problems by Jan Christian Smuts.

language derived from Dutch, is the principal language of the former. English is the principal language of the latter. The two groups are separated "not only by their background and language, but by bitterly intense emotional, economic and political differences."

South Africa, as noted above, is no believer in racial partnership. It denies the most elementary rights and privileges to nearly ten million of its black and brown citizens. Its racial policy is, in fact, a challenge to the conscience of civilized humanity. We are, however, concerned here with the policy of the Government of the Union of South Africa to the South African citizens of Indian origin.

The Indian problem in South Africa, if it is a problem at all, is the creation of the Government and the European settlers of Natal. Half a century before the formation of the Union of South Africa, Natal, then a crown colony, had invited Indian labour to work on her mines and plantations.

Natal, in the thirties and forties of the 19th century, says E. A. Walker, "was exuberant. First wool displaced ivory at the head of the list of exports, and coffee and cotton made a good modest footing; but soon sugar became king in the tropical coast-belt and in the Legislative Council (of Natal). And with sugar-cane Indian coolies." "The Zulus of Natal, accustomed to a leisurely pastoral life that they were, were not suitable for work on the sugar-cane plantations. The Planters thought of importing convict labour from England. The settlers addressed a petition to Queen Victoria in 1855 for the necessary permission. The request was, however, turned down. The scheme of importing destitute children from England for work in the fields of Natal too came to nought (1859)."

The Government of India were first requested in March, 1856, to send Indian labourers. The Governor-General in Council turned down the request on January 2, 1857, "as no useful purpose" was to be "gained by authorising such emigration". The refusal of the Government of India to export labour to Natal was followed by an unsuccessful attempt to utilize local African labour by raising the hut-tax from 7 sh. to 11 sh. per annum. A local company imported a few Chinese labourers. But they had to be sent home before long.

The Government of India were approached again. The Governor-General-in-Council wrote in his despatch under date March 31, 1858, "After a careful consideration of the subject we have come to the

³ Inside Africa by John Gunther p. 444.

⁴ A History of South Africa, p. 4.

⁵ For attempts to get labourers from various sources vide Beginning of Emigration to Natal by Iqbal Narain in the *India Quarterly* (Vol. XI, No. I), pp. 31-55.

conclusion that if the colony agrees to the rules which we have considered sufficient in regard to other colonies it will be unjust to it and to Indian labourers not to allow them to go to the colony if they can be prevailed upon by legitimate offers to do so.”⁶

The Government of Natal then passed two ordinances “authorizing and regulating the immigration of Indian labourers”. The ordinances were followed by Legislative enactments in 1859. Law 13 of 1859 dealt with the import of coolies from territories East of the Cape of Good Hope, not in India. Law 14 of 1859 authorized the Government of Natal to import labour from India. Law 15 of 1859 enabled private individuals to introduce at their own expense immigrants from India. The laws obtained Royal assent in October, 1859. These Acts of the Natal legislature were folloed by legislation by the Government of India. Act No. XXXIII of 1860 passed by the Government of India on July 21, 1860 permitted the emigration of Indian labourers to Natal. The Act came into effect on August 7 of the same year.

The first batch of Indian labourers to Natal sailed from Madras by S. S. Truro on October 13, 1860. They landed at port Natal on November 16, 1860, after a voyage of thirty-four days. They included a statutory proportion of women and were imported at the public expense of Natal. The labourers, on their arrival, were allotted to different employers for three years—later extended to five years by Law No. 17 (Natal), 1864,—under indenture. The indenture system, as P. S. Joshi puts it—“was an invention of the British brain to substitute it for forced labour and slavery. The indentured ‘coolies’ were half-slaves, bound over body and soul by a hundred and one inhuman regulations”.⁷ An indentured labourer was to receive a wage of 10 shillings a month in the first year of indenture with free board and bed. The wages were to rise to 12 shillings in the third year. On the expiry of the third year, the labourer had to serve a fourth year of indenture either under his old master or under any other employer. He might serve a fifth year of indenture, if he liked. He was however given the option to compound at the rate of £ 2-10 shs. a year for the fourth and the fifth years. At the end of the five-year period, the labourer could live and work freely. He was then entitled either to a free passage home or to crown land in Natal in lieu of the free passage. In Gandhiji’s words, “They were under no obligation to labour after the expiry of that period (of 5 years) and

⁶ Home (Public) Letters to Court No. 11 of 1858, dated March 31, 1858.

⁷ Verdict on South Africa, p. 43.

were entitled to work as free labourers or (to) trade in Natal, and settle there, if they wished." ⁸ The freedom of the indenture-expired coolies was in practice restricted and hampered in a thousand ways and one. An indenture-expired coolie had to obtain a pass if he wanted to go from one place to another. If he married and desired that the marriage should be recognised as legally valid by the Natalian authorities, he had to register the marriage with the Protector of Indian Immigrants. He was subjected to a number of other restrictions besides.

C. W. M. Gell points out—"It is also clear from Bishop Ferguson Devie's pamphlet ⁹ that Natal did not get Indians on terms which the Europeans altogether approved. But, in fact, if they wanted Indian labour, they had no choice in the matter of terms, for those were imposed by the Government of India as the conditions on which alone it was prepared to sanction indentured emigration. The evidence of this is the correspondence between the Governments of Natal and India which preceded the opening of coolie immigration, the text of Law 14 of 1859 and the further assurance for the proper performance of the terms which the Natal Government had to give to the Government of India before the latter permitted the resumption of emigration in 1874. There were some in those days in Natal—and more particularly at the time of the Wagg Commission ten years later, who believed, as others like to believe today, that Natal got its Indians on the understanding that they must re-enter indenture on the expiry of their contracts or immediately return to India. Many Europeans, then, as to-day, feared Indian economic competition, though a few saw that it might be in the interests of the community as a whole. But the Government of India confronted Natal either with the cessation of Indian immigration or with allowing the Indian to choose at the end of his five years' indenture to remain in South Africa or a free passage. Throughout this early period the benefits occurring (accruing?) from Indian labour were so obvious and immense that Indian immigration was welcomed almost (unanimously) despite its (from a European racial point of view) attendant disadvantages."¹⁰

The indenture system had in the opinion of late G. K. Gokhale, six principal features. The indentured recruit bound himself to go to a distant, unknown land. He had to work for any employer to whom he

⁸ *Satyagraha in South Africa* by Mahatma Gandhi, p. 42.

⁹ *Early History of the Indians in Natal*.

¹⁰ *The Creation of a Historic Myth* quoted in the *Modern Review* (December, 1952), pp. 483-34, from the *Indian Opinion*.

might be assigned and had no choice in the matter. He had to live on the employer's estate and could not leave the estate without a special permit. He had to do any work he was asked to do, however difficult and unpleasant it might be. The indentured labourer could not voluntarily withdraw from the contract during the period of his indenture. He had thus no means of escape from the hardships of indenture, however intolerable they might be. He bound himself to accept arbitrarily fixed wages—10 shillings a month plus free board and bed in the first year of the indenture rising to 12 shillings a month plus free board and bed in the third year—throughout the period of contract. The wages given to him were invariably lower than those paid to free labourers around him. Indentured labourers were at the same time placed under a special law which imposed on them a "criminal liability for the most trivial offences of negligence or carelessness liable to imprisonment with hard labour."¹¹ "Such a system", Gokhale pointed out, by whatever name it may be called, "must really border on the servile." The system "was responsible for increasing the rate of suicide from ten to twelve times what it was among those classes in India from whom the indentured were drawn."¹²

Section 51 of the Act II, 1870 (Natal) provided for a free grant of land to the indenture-expired Indians if they commuted their right to a free return passage to India. Not a few took advantage of the law and accepted free grants of land instead of a free return passage to India. Of these, "some remained in employment, others established themselves on the land or became traders or interested themselves in some other enterprise."

The Indians, it must be noted here, did not force their way into Natal against the will of its inhabitants. Large sums of public money were spent on their travelling expenses. The Government of Natal actually "undertook to pay from public funds £ 10,000 a year towards the cost of the transport of these immigrants, an arrangement which certainly appears to involve an inequitable subsidy to a particular class of employers. But the fact that it continued for over thirty years is a certain proof of the anxiety of the colony of Natal to secure Indian labour."¹³ Each batch of indentured immigrants had, by statute, to include a certain proportion of women. The Government of Natal had "specifically undertaken" that once the immigrants had worked out their indentures, "they should be free to engage in any ordinary occu-

¹¹ *Vide Verdict on South Africa* by P. S. Joshi, p. 43.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44 (quoted).

¹³ *Natal's Indian problem* by Mabel Palmer, p. 8.

pation and should not be subject to any discriminatory legislation.”¹⁴ The Government of Natal should have foreseen that such conditions would inevitably produce a permanent Indian population in the colony. They did not realise the consequences of their policy and have been trying to evade them “as soon as they became irksome”.

The labourers were followed by traders from India and Mauritius and by Indians of other professions, whereas the mass of Indian labourers were low-cast Madrasis, the traders, who followed, were mostly from Gujrat and Kathiawar and had a higher social standing. It was these latter, who principally pushed over the Drakensburg into the Transvaal Indian traders in Natal gradually became a permanent factor in the economic life of the colony. They often did well in South Africa and became comparatively wealthy.¹⁵ An increasing number of ex-indentured Indian labourers began to settle down as free labourers in Natal on the expiry of their indentures. It began to dawn on the Natal Europeans that the Indians in Natal were not a merely migrant labour force, that they were in Natal to stay.

The stay of the Indians in Natal was, in fact, a great boon to the colony. The Wragg Commission observed in 1866—“We are content to place on record our strong opinion, based on much observation, that the presence of these Indians had been much beneficial to the whole colony and that it would be unwise, if not unjust, to legislate to their prejudice.” Sir J. Leige Hulett, an ex-Prime Minister of Natal said in 1903: “The condition of the colony (of Natal) before the importation of Indian Labour was one of gloom, it was one that then and there threatened to extinguish the vitality of the country and it was only by the Government assisting the importation of labour that the country at once began to revive.

The coast had been turned into one of the most prosperous parts of South Africa. They could not find in the whole of the Cape and Transvaal what could be found on the coast of Natal—10,000 acres of Land in one crop—and that was entirely due to the importation of Indians. . .Durban was absolutely built up by the Indian population.”

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ European writers on South Africa's Indian problem generally attribute the success of the Indian traders partially to their lower standard of living and some questionable practices. (*Cf.* “Probably they (Indian traders) did not feel that intense sense of superiority to the native which animated the white man, and were more willing to treat them with courtesy and consideration. But part of their success was certainly due to their lower standard of living and one is tempted to wonder whether they also took advantage of the native by undue credit facilities or direct money-lending, a development which might be expected under the circumstances.” Natal's Indian Problem by Mabel Palmer, p. 9.)

The opinion expressed in the above paragraph is highly controversial and it is very difficult to say whether and how far it is true.

The Indian traders set up retail business for the benefit of Indians settled in Natal and other places in South Africa. They did well on the whole. The prosperity of free Indians and Indian traders frightened the Europeans. Systematic attempts were made by them (the Europeans) from the eighties to curtail the rights of the free Indians and to stop further Indian immigration. Attempts were made to prevent the rise of a class of free Indians, which might compete with the Europeans on terms of equality and also with the natives in certain cases. The emergence of educated professional classes "extended the frontiers of the struggle from the economic to the political arena." Sir Thomas Hyslop frankly summed up the European attitude when he said, "We want Indians as indentured labourers but not as free men." It should however be admitted in fairness to the European community that it was afraid of the Indians for reasons more than one. These were the fear of an unfair economic competition by Indians, of political domination by Indians created by the rise of professional classes, of racial juxtaposition and of racial inter-mixture due to a grave disparity in the numbers of Indian men and women. Last but not least, there was and there is still the feeling of collective superiority of the South African Boer and English settlers over all coloured races—Black and Brown alike.¹⁶ To sum up, "The socio-cultural differences due to divergences in race, religion, language and civilisation, among Indians, Europeans and the indigenous communities complicated the above issues and further widened the psychological cleavages . . . economic, political and racial considerations in their turn led to statutory restrictions on Indian immigration and settlement, on acquisition, occupation and alienation of land, on trading and other professions, and on the recognition of Hindu and Muslim personal law of marriage, inheritance and divorce. Adequate educational facilities were denied and the elementary rights of franchise and representation were denied or restricted. Added to all these were the innumerable inherent problems of labour as so many manifestations of the general question of capital versus labour. The surprising diversity of the problems ranges from Parliamentary representation to ceremonial cremation!"¹⁷

Right after right was taken away from the Indians in contravention of the letter and spirit of the condition on which the Government of Natal had obtained the Government of India's consent to the emigra-

¹⁶ *Vide* *Indians Overseas, 1888-1949*, by C. Kondapi, p. 7.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

tion of Indian labourers. "Beginning from 1895 measures were taken with the sole object of reducing persons of Asian origin to position of permanent inferiority vis a-vis European."¹⁸

The year 1880 witnessed the beginnings of anti-Indian bitterness in South Africa. The Government of Natal was requested by the English Settlers to impose restrictions upon the indenture-freed Indians who chose to settle down in Natal. Some suggested that the Indian labourers be sent back to India on the expiry of their term of indenture. Others advocated the imposition of a poll-tax upon them. An anti-Indian agitation, which came into existence about this time, steadily grew in volume and intensity. It became so vehement that a Commission—the Wragg Commission—had to be appointed in 1883¹⁹ to enquire into the truth or otherwise of the anti-Indian allegations.²⁰ Representative Englishmen examined by the Commission were of opinion that the Indians were very helpful to the Colony of Natal and its European settlers. Sir Henry Binns, one of the witnesses, declared—"Were coolie immigration to be permanently stopped in a very short time after such stoppage there would cease to be as much employment for Europeans, as there is now. Tropical cultivation never has been and never will be carried on without Indian labourers."²⁰ Sir J. Leige Hulett whom we have quoted once before told the Commission—"The free Indians, at present in the Colony, are an immense benefit being largely engaged in agricultural pursuits. I do not think the competition of the free Indians has interfered in the slightest degree with the development of the country by English Settlers."²¹ The findings of the Commission were in favour of the Indians, who were praised for their "commendable industry" in agriculture. "In fairness to the free India," the Commission reported "we must observe that the competition (of Indians with Europeans) is legitimate in its nature, and it certainly has been welcomed by the general community. There can be no doubt that Natal is admirably suited, whether as a temporary or a permanent home, to Indian immigrants. We are impressed with the necessity, at a time when the colony is labouring under a depression of the most serious nature, of so moving that its agricultural development shall not be restrained. We are anxious not to imperil the interests of those persons, who have been induced, by an abundant and continuous supply of Indian

¹⁸ *Spotlight on South Africa* (Government of India publication), p. 5.

²⁰ Quoted in *Verdict on South Africa* by P. S. Joshi, p. 49.

²¹ *Ibid.*

labour, to invest their capital in large industries of undoubted benefit to the whole colony." ²² The Commission observed further that to legislate against the free Indians "would be unwise, if not unjust."

Matters in the South African Republic (the Transvaal) had been taking an evil turn for the Indians in the meanwhile. Many of the free Indians, who had followed the indentured labourers into Natal, had pushed farther inland into the South African Republic to explore new fields for trade and had settled down as merchants, traders, hawkers and manual labourers of various categories. The Indians, it should be borne in mind, could lawfully enter, live and trade freely in the Transvaal. Article 14 of the London Convention of 1884 between Her Majesty's Government and the South African Republic laid down—"All persons other than natives conforming themselves to the laws of the South African Republic (a) will have full liberty with their families to enter, travel or reside in any part of the South African Republic, (b) will be entitled to hire or possess houses, manufacturing warehouses, shops and premises; (c) may carry on their commerce either in person or by any agents whom they think fit to employ; (d) will not be subject in respect of their commerce or industry to any taxes whether general or local other than those which are or may be imposed upon Burghers of the said Republic."

The above article, it may be noted, is in accord with Article 4 of the Queen's Proclamation (November 1, 1858,) issued on the occasion of the transfer of India from the East India Company to the Crown in 1858. Article 14 of the London Convention is in fact, a confirmation on the international plane of the spirit underlying the said Article of the Queen's Proclamation which runs as follows—"We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects; and these obligations by the blessing of Almighty God we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil."

The Indian settlers in the South African Republic soon became an eyesore to the Boers, who sought to get rid of the "unwanted" intruders by all means within their power. The hands of the Republican Government were strengthened by a European agitation against "the threatened invasion of Asiatics such as already has commenced in Pretoria". The agitators pointed out the danger to the European community of allowing these Asians to settle in the centre of the townships owing to their "neglect of sanitary measures and loathsome

²² *Ibid.*

mode of living" and urged that they should be "isolated within their own locations quite separated from the white population".

Sir Hercules Robertson, the British High Commissioner in the South African Republic, recommended to the Colonial Office in January, 1885, that Article 14 of the London Convention (see above) should be so amended as to deny the rights guaranteed by the said Article to the Africans, the Indians and the "Chinese Coolie immigrants". Lord Derby, the Secretary of the State for Colonies, agreed.

The amendment was followed by Law 3 of 1885. It imposed a number of humiliating and discriminatory disabilities upon the Indians, among others, and reads as follows :—

1. "This law applies to persons belonging to any of the aboriginal races of Asia, including thereunder the so-called coolies (*i.e.*, Indians), Arabs, Malays and Mahomedan subjects of the Turkish Empire.
2. With respect to persons referred to in section I, the following provisions shall be in force—
 - (a) They should not acquire citizenship in the South African Republic;
 - (b) They shall not be owners of landed property in the Republic. This provision has no retrospective effect ;
 - (c) Those who settle in the Republic with the object of trading etc. shall have to be inscribed in a register, to be specially kept by the Landrosts of the respective districts, according to the model to be prescribed by the Government.

A sum of £25 is payable with the registration to be effected within eight days after arrival—punishment in default will be a fine varying from £ 10 to £ 100 and in default imprisonment for not less than fourteen days and not more than six years.

Those settled in the Republic before the law becomes operative are to be registered without payment.

- (d) The Government shall have the right to assign to them special streets, wards, and locations for habitation.

This provision shall not apply to those who reside with their masters in whose service they are."

The Indians protested against the Law. Sir Hercules Robertson advised Her Majesty's Government to acquiesce in the Law, "as it appeared necessary for the protection of public health". The latter declared in 1886 that they would not raise any objection to anti-Asian legislation.

Law III of 1885 was certainly a flagrant violation both of the letter and the spirit of the original London convention and the Queen's Proclamation. Its only redeeming feature from the Indian point of view was that it recognised the right of Indians to settle in the Transvaal for purposes of trade.²³

The Law was amended by an Ordinance of the South African Republican Government in 1887. Articles (b) and (d) of Section 2 of the said law were amended as follows :

Section 2, Article (b)—“They shall not be owners of landed property in the Republic except in those streets, wards and locations that the Government for sanitary purposes shall assign to them.”

Section 2, Article (d)—“The Government shall have the right for sanitary purposes to assign to them special streets, wards and locations for habitation”.

“*Sanitary purposes*” were however, a camouflage. The motive behind Law III, 1885, as well as the Ordinance of 1887, was in reality an economic one. A petition to the President of the South African Republic from the European citizens of the Republic about this time confirms the above suspicion. The petition says, *inter alia*—“We firmly believe that the agitation against Indians owes its origin not to their habits as regards sanitation but to trade jealousy, because owing to their frugal and temperate habits, they have been able to keep down the prices of necessities of life, and have therefore been an inestimable boon to the poor classes of the society in the State.” Another representation of the Europeans to the Republican Government pointed out—that they recognised in the Indians “a peaceful and law-abiding and therefore desirable class of people. To the poor they are a veritable blessing inasmuch as by their keen competition they keep down the prices of the necessities, which they can do owing to their thrifty and temperate habits”. It was pointed out further that the withdrawal of the Indians from the Republic would cause not a little hardship to the Europeans, specially those who lived far away from the centres of business as they depended upon the Indians for the supply of their daily wants. The representation concluded with an appeal to the Government not to do anything that might “scare away the Indians from the Transvaal”. The Government however ignored the representation and the sage counsel it gave.

²³ “... it appears that Indians were permitted not only to trade but to reside outside locations. They were allowed also to own property outside locations through a nominal European trustee.”—Report of the Asiatic Inquiry Committee, 1921.

The Press, the organ of the Transvaal Government was of opinion that the Indians were the canker eating into the very vitals of the community. It also expressed the fear that the Europeans might catch contagion from the Indians many of whom were alleged to be suffering from leprosy and syphilis.

Expert medical opinion goes to show that the segregation of Indians for sanitary purposes was wholly unwarranted. H. Prior Vale, B.A., M.B., B.C (Cantab.), a medical practitioner with five years' practice in Pretoria in 1895 and with considerable practice among Indians, observed in course of a statement that he had found the Indians "generally cleanly in their persons, and free from the personal diseases due to diet of careless habits. Their dwellings are generally clean and sanitation is generally attended to by them . . . the lowest class Indian lives better and in better habitation and with more regard to sanitary measures, than the lowest class white Generally, in my opinion, it is impossible to object to the Indian on sanitary grounds, provided always the inspection of the sanitary authorities is made as strictly and regularly for the Indian as for the white."²⁴ C. P. Spink, M.R.C.S., L.R.C.A. (London), a Medical practitioner of Johannesburg, observed in 1895 that Indian residences were quite up to the mark from a sanitary and hygienic point of view and might be safely inhabited by any European. He said further, "I have resided in India . . . their habitations here are far superior to those of their native country."²⁵ Another medical practitioner, Mr. Namacher, M.D., etc. observed in 1895 that the better class of Indians at Johannesburg "are as clean in their habits and domestic life as white people of the same standing".²⁶

Commercial rivalry, we re-iterate, lay at the root of anti-Indian feeling and agitation. The Indian traders, by their economic and temperate habits were able to reduce the prices of necessaries. This did not suit the European businessmen, who would make very large profits. Indian traders were, almost all, teetotallers. Their habits were simple and they were content to make small profits. This is why the European mercantile community was hostile to them.

(To be continued)

²⁴ Quoted in the petition submitted to Lord Ripon by the British Indians in the South African Republic in 1895.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

MEMOIRS* OF A POLYHISTOR †

DVIJENDRA NATH GUHACHAUDHURI

Mother India produced a galaxy of great men in the nineteenth century. Many of the luminaries are no more in this world! Of them, Avināś Chandra Guha‡ will be enshrined for centuries to come in the sweet remembrances of countless countrymen moved and thrilled by the soul-stirring strains and life-giving messages of him!

Born at Rānchandrāpur in the district of Barisāl in East Bengal on 22nd March, 1875, with a silver spoon in mouth, Avināś Chandra was the son of late Svarūp Chandra Guha who was a very distinguished lawyer of Barisāl Bar at his time. Svarūp Chandra worked like a prince in his legal profession. He commanded esteem and compelled respect. As English is the Court language now, so Persian was the Court language in Pre-British & Early-British days. The proficiency of certain men in Eastern Classics (*i.e.* in *Arabic*, *Persian*), both written & spoken, is a theme of wonder to many Muslims themselves. East has produced many such eloquent, and impressive speakers in Eastern Classics; among them Svarūp Chandra's is a household word certainly to conjure with in his days, whose eloquent, powerful and mellifluous organ-voice in the course of his legal arguments in Persian language, still seems to be ringing and lingering in the "fretted vaults" of the law courts of Barisāl. He became a past-master in the art of elocution in *Arabic*, *Persian* & *Urdū*, and was honoured with the surname of "Munshī", *i.e.* a learned person (in *Arabic*, "Allama"—profound scholar, from *ḥam* meaning learning, knowledge). For significance of 'Munshī', see "Hindusthān Standard", Late City Edition, Calcutta, February 5, 1952, p. 4, col. 4; see "Svarūp Chandra Guha—A Biographical Study", "Barisāl Hitaishī", Vol. LVII, Nos. 7-8, 10, 14-15, 17-22, 25, 1949—kept in the National Library, Belvedere, Calcutta—27, Call No. 169. D. 52.

Avināś Chandra's early education began in his native village Pāṭhasālā and Vernacular school and later on into the seventh class

* *Mem'oirs* (-wārz; -wōrz), *m*, (F. *me'moire*, *m*, memorandum, fr. *me'moire*, *f*, memory, fr. L. *memoria*). An account of something deemed noteworthy; a biography; a record of investigations of any subject; essay on learned subject specially studied by the writer. (f. F *me'moire* masc., spec. use of *me'moire* fem. Memory).

† From Greek *poluistōr* (*polu*-Poly- + *histōr* learned man from *id-know*; cf. *eidenai*, to know, Latin *videre*, Sanskrit *vid*, English *wit*), *pol-i-histōr*, a person of great and varied learning; man of varied learning, great scholar.

‡ "The name that made the man, immortal and best."

of the Bariśāl Zillā School in 1881 at the age of 10. He lost his father when he was only 7 years old. He was brought up in a Bengali home under fervent care, supervision and affectionate eyes of his eldest paternal uncle who was nominated in the Will of Svaiūp Chandra as Executor of the Zamindari Estate and other properties left by him to his son, Avināś Chandra. Avināś Chandra's father was the youngest of the five brothers. All his paternal uncles were men of letters, well-versed in Eastern Classics and were prominent men in their days. The sons of his eldest paternal uncle were scholars of the Calcutta University and were well known in the field of public activities, in legal profession and in the high offices of the State service. All his cousins were older than he. They tutored Avināś Chandra in his school days. No private tutor was employed for him. It was in this environment that Avināś Chandra was cradled. His mother Durgāmaṇi was a very good natured, devoted and careful mother, unlike those who would spoil their children with too much affection and too much licence, with the presiding angel of his mother to guide him, Avināś Chandra was never in want of inspiration, example and advice; under these happy auspices began and progressed the instruction and education of the future intellectual giant, the hero of noble works and sturdy independence in the most impressionable years of Avināś Chandra's early life and no wonder, he was advancing, in his studies, by leaps and bounds. Avināś Chandra did not fail to pay due respect and devotion to his parents, superiors, all throughout his life. His promising career of future greatness was observed by all with great interest. He showed brilliant results all along at class examinations. His answer papers were read in the class by the teachers. He had learnt Latin (the language of the ancient Romans in Europe a classic language of the West) from the clergymen of the Baptist Mission Church, while a student of the 4th class of the school. He was philobiblic. He read the standard works on varied subjects of English and Bengali writers from the School Library and from the Bariśāl Public Library as well. He was far in advance of his fellow brethren, and was capable of sound and profound thinking on many serious subjects and had an abiding taste for serious literature. He married Prabhāt Kāminī, aged 10 years, in the year 1890 on May 2 (Vaiśākha 20, 1297 B S.), under the guardian-ship of his elder first cousins, i.e. the sons of his oldest paternal uncle. Prabhāt Kāminī was an educated lady whose

education was done at home and after her marriage under the guidance of her husband. She was an able house-wife, a good cook, whose sweetness of nature, suavity in manner, strength in character, impressed the mind of everybody. She was the mother of educated sons and accomplished daughters. His marriage was celebrated with great pomp and splendour. His married life was one of much conjugal love and respect till the last days of his life. He married in the much-esteemed *Kulīn* family of Gābhā in Barisāl, daughter of Śyāmā Charaṇa Ghosh, the School-Inspector of his age. He got full marks in Sanskrit essay writing at the Test examination. He came out with laurels at the Entrance Examination in the First Division in 1891 at the age of 15, securing a First-grade scholarship of Rs. 20 per month, standing tenth and won "T. P. Desilva Medal" (Gold) for proficiency in English and "Barisāl-Kāśīpur Prize" presented by Pratāp Chandra Mukhopādhyāya (a Govt. Pensioner, Editor, "Kāśīpur Nivāsī", Barisāl) for proficiency in Sanskrit* from the Barisāl Zillā School, and joined the F.A. class of the Presidency College. He was a philomath, besides other subjects of his F. A. course. He made his mark at all class examinations there. In the Annual Examination of the First year class, he secured almost full marks in English hitherto unknown to many. Prof. H. M. Percival, M.A., a polymath and the most distinguished amongst the Professors of English and History (including Political Economy), later on offg. Principal (1909), read in the class the answer papers of Avināś Chandra with delight and amazement. Avināś Chandra always preferred English editions of the prescribed texts, because of their terse annotations. He passed his F.A. Examination in the First Division in 1893, securing a Second-grade scholarship of Rs. 20 per month, standing eleventh, and took his B.A. degree in Honours in Sanskrit from the same college in 1895, standing First in the First Division in the list of which he was the unique figure. He was the first man to earn such distinction among the whole *Vanigaja Kayastha* community of Bengal. He achieved the said distinction in his district as well. He secured very high marks in all the papers in Sanskrit and he wrote in *Devanāgarī* characters. In the Second Honour Paper, Avināś Chandra answered the question No. 5, in Sanskrit Poetry in *Anuṣṭubha meter*, the subject being the translation of Mrs. Felicia Dorothea Hemans's famous poem "Casabianca", stanzas I & II, into Sanskrit. He had done it admirably although the

* See "Kāśīpur Nivāsīra Samgraha", Part I, 1889, p. 18, vide Letter No. 362 of May 7, 1892 given by Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal (1887-90), Sir Stuart Colvin Bayley, C.S.I., K.C.S.I., C.I.E. SSPP, Vol. XXXIII, 2, p. 19, 1960, s.r. "Vidya Vritam".

Sanskrit prosody was not prescribed as a text-book then. In the Fourth Honour Paper in Sanskrit Grammar, he showed an uncommon talent in obtaining almost full marks in that paper. While he was subsequently reading in the Sanskrit College, Paṇḍit Hara Prasād Sāstri, M.A. (later on Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Hara Prasād Sāstri, C.I.E., M.A., D.Litt.) who was then a Professor of Sanskrit in the Presidency College, said in glowing terms in the midst of the students and the professors about the answers given in the said paper by Avināś Chandra, thus—"Generally, the Hindusthānī students secured high marks in Pāṇinian Grammar, but lo! this year a Bengali student, some Guha, secured high marks in that paper answering all the questions wonderfully". He won "Rādhā Kānta Deb Memorial Medal" (Gold) for proficiency in Sanskrit at the B.A. Examination. He at first took Honours Course in both English and Sanskrit. The former was given up, the latter was retained. So long he retained Honours in English, he secured very high marks too in that subject in class examinations which again wondered the teachers and the taught. While reading in the B.A. class, Avināś Chandra once gave a lucid exposition of the term "Observation" (Locke's, "Conduct of the Understanding"—Ed. by Thomas Fowler, D.D. Third Edition, Oxford, 1890. p. 56, thus—"The usual meaning of observation is attention to a phenomenon as it presents itself to us naturally, as distinguished from experiment in which we ourselves arrange the circumstances and conditions under which a phenomenon is to be observed. * * * * may mean either (1) look upon all as pure matters of fact ; or better (2) look upon all as materials for future knowledge, but not built up by obs. into knowledge. History, in Gr., means 'investigation'." This was highly eulogised by all. He composed a Sanskrit poem "Capeta Mālinee" in three verses in *Mālinee meter* in honour of the Goddess of Learning, which revealed his learning in Sanskrit. This versification was published in a Sanskrit Journal (The writer regrets that he could not recollect the name of the journal. He will be thankful if any person gives full informations about the publications of the poem in question as well as other compositions which are unknown, either in published, un-published, manuscript or in preparation forms). He secured a scholarship of Rs 25 per month known as "Mahārājā Durgā Charaṇa Law Scholarship", while he was reading in the Sanskrit College, Calcutta. His knowledge of *Mugdhabodha Grammar* of Vopadeva too, was unusual. He passed his M.A. Examination in Sanskrit in 1896, standing First in the First Division and won

"University Gold Medal" and "Sonāmanī Prize" containing books worth Rs. 100 from the University of Calcutta for proficiency in Sanskrit. This time, too, he got very high marks in each paper and thenceforth he was well-known in academic circles for his versatile and profound scholarship. It is to be noted here that Avināś Chandra stood first in Sanskrit among the whole *Kāyastha* community of Bengal, since the introduction of the M.A. Examination without Honours in 1885 by the University of Calcutta ('Graduates—Honours in Arts, M.A.' was begun in 1865 and it was retained up to 1884 by the Calcutta University). Since then, Avināś Chandra was the first man to hold the distinction of being First in Class I at the M.A. Examination in Sanskrit in the district of Bākarganj in East Bengal and he was the second man of being First in Class I at the M.A. Examinations in the same district. He was the second man also, who achieved the unique distinction of being First in First Division in Sanskrit from the Presidency College in 1895 at the B.A. Examination in the University of Calcutta, since "Graduates—B.A. Honours" Course was started in 1885 by the University. An anecdote is prevalent about Avināś Chandra's strong desire for hearing Indian Classical Music from a very well-known musician of India. No doubt it was a strange occurrence. The night before Avināś Chandra's M.A. Examination, he discarded his text-books and went to hear Indian Classical Music in the house of late Srināth Dās, a distinguished Vakīl of High Court, Calcutta (a public thoroughfare by the name of "Srināth Dās Lane", off Wellington Street, Calcutta—12, cherishes his memory), on the occasion of Jagaddhātṛī Pujā. Unexpectedly, the nocturnal adventure in the *maṭhis* stood the young Avināś Chandra in good stead. When the result of the M.A. Examination was out, he stood first with very high marks to his credit. He attributed his success to the master-hand musician of India. It calls attention of the readers to a fact akin to an event in the life of late Sir Deva Prasād Sarvādhikārī, who, writing his 19th Century reminiscences, made a reference to a travelling Shakespearian Company, performing the drama under canvas. He was a student then and not the Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University, which he became later. The boy Sarvādhikārī was appearing at his Entrance Examination. The night before his English examination, the truant school-boy gave up his text-books and went to witness a Shakespearian play on the Maidan of Calcutta. Unexpectedly, the night enterprise in theatrical world stood the young examinee in good stead. When the result of the examination was out, he topped the list. He

attributed his success to Shakespeare.* Avināś Chandra was very regular in his studies and gifted with a singularly retentive memory. Even after a long time he could reproduce *verbatim et litteratim* what he had read. He took to medicine and got himself admitted into the Medical College in 1897 and he studied there for about 3 years. In the Medical College examinations too, he showed brilliant results and for this he received all his tuition fees as a 'reward' being added to the scholarship in the Annual Examination of the First year class. He was the recipient of 'Medical College of Bengal Medal' (Gold), Session 1898-1899, for proficiency in Chemistry at the Second year class Annual Examination. In all examinations of the Second year class, he occupied very high places as well.† His proficiency in Physiology, Zoology, Materia Medica, etc., extorted great admiration from the Professors of the respective subjects. Avināś Chandra gave up the medical studies owing to partiality shown against him by the then Principal Surgn. Lt.-Col. G. Bomford, M.D., I.M.S., in the matter of College examination, while he was a student of the Second year class, and took to law in the Metropolitan Institution and passed the B. L. Examination in 1903 with credit. While attending law lectures in the College, he displayed considerable proficiency in the subjects there also. He was an article clerk to Mr. Rām Charaṇa Mitra, M.A., B.L., Senior Govt Pleader, High Court (1899-1921), Calcutta. He was enrolled as a Vakeel‡ of the High Court on April 11, 1905 and later on, an Advocate§ (Ordinary Original Jurisdiction) on 2nd July, 1928 and retired from practice in July, 1939.

Out of the money he received from the University of Calcutta in "Sonāmaṇi Prize," Avināś Chandra purchased a good number of books on musical science that made his friends curious. To them, Avināś Chandra replied smilingly, "I have a mind to acquire knowledge in musical science." He was philomusical or philharmonic, a great lover of Indian Classical Music, a *maestro* (an Italian word, meaning a great musical composer), a *connoisseur* (one who knows

* "Advance," Calcutta, Saturday, April 12, 1932, p. 2, col. 8; p. 3, col. 1.

† Free tuition, i.e. refund of fees at the end of the 1st year and "Government Stipendiary, Junior" for Rs. 8/- per month; Do., at the Second year class. Recipients of "Prosecutor's Prize" in Anatomy.

‡ From Ar. '*awka*' lat' (?) signifying 'hands over'; one to whom law-suits are handed over for doing needful on behalf of clients, is *Vakeel*. In Arabic, God is also *Vakeel*, because living beings surrender unto Him. Per, *Vakil-i murdfe'a*. Ar. *wakil da'* 'wa Eng. *Pleader*.

§ One who pleads the cause of another, esp. in a Court of law in Scotland and France, professional pleader, in Courts of justice. O. Fr. *avocat*-L. *advocatus*-*advoca'te*, -a'tum-ad, to, *roca're*, to call: to call in (another to help as in a lawsuit or in sickness).

a subject well ; a critical judge in art, musics, &c. From *Fr. connoître-L cognoscere*, to know), and had a profound knowledge of it. He was a good player on the *Setār*, *Tabalā* (modification of the ancient *Tritantrī* devised by *Amīr Khasru*, *Tabalā* and *Banya*, being invented by him as well, after dividing the *Pākhawaj* into two parts), etc. He could prepare musical notation (*svaralipi*) in both English and Bengali in a masterly manner. He had a desire to put *Sāmans* of the *Sāma Veda* in the Bengali musical notation, but it was not fulfilled owing to his sad demise. * *Avināś Chandra* began his studies in musical science, while he was reading in the Medical College. Well-known and high-calibre musicians of India sang Classical music and they played on musical instruments and stringed instruments on the occasion of marriages and other ceremonies in the family at *Rāmchandrapur*. They were themselves thankful for having received such a good *connoisseur* as *Avināś Chandra* and they very much regarded him. They delighted *Avināś Chandra* by playing music in *Rāgī-Rāgmīs* of high order on Classical music. No doubt, his love of music was very landable and great. He received many invitations from musical organisations of Calcutta and he attended those functions. Sometimes, he acted as judge in musical competitions and his judgment was accurate and to the point and was absolutely free from partiality. Musical soirées were occasionally held in Calcutta, where he formerly resided. Friends paid their occasional visits to *Avināś Chandra* and amused themselves in his house by singing Classical music. Musical books of the Western and the Eastern countries abound in *Avināś Chandra's* library of rare collections.

Avināś Chandra had a fine taste in cookery. He was polyphagous. He used to take daily meals deliciously with his own choice subservient to the preservation of health and mind. For he truly believed in the dictum *mens sana in corpore sano*. He was fond of teasing the guests, friends, relatives, acquaintances whenever occasions arose and that in a very grand style. All were done out of his own accord and the directions he gave to cooks. Sometimes the cooks wondered at him for his valuable directions which were even unknown to them. Feasting the men sumptuously with different varieties of palatable cooked food and sweets was his great pleasure and enjoyment. He was always attentive to the invitees on the occasions. During his student life, he used to dwell in hired houses with servants and cooks surrounded by

friends and relatives. Even in the professional life and after, the house of Avināś Chandra turned into a 'Lodging-house' where many men other than relatives, friends, acquaintances and others, lived and had their messing with the family of Avināś Chandra. This shows the man in his true perspective and throws a flood of light on his noble character.

Avināś Chandra carried on studies and had no love for lucre. He refused to be booked with more briefs than were necessary for his plain-living and high-thinking. His legal opinion couched in "Is marriage of an adopted son with a *sugotrā* of his natural father prohibited?" [See 88 C.L.J. (7 & 8), 1951, pp. 5n—12n; Do. (11), 1951, pp. 13n—19n], is *illustrissimo* in the Hindu Law. Fine in advocacy, deep in encyclopaedic knowledge of literature, philology, history, philosophy, law, &c., he was adored in the High Court from all quarters. His mode of delivering legal addresses before the court in *Oxonian* (f. *Oxonia*, latinized form of *Oxford*, *Oxford* + —An.—of or belonging to Oxford) accentuation added great admiration to all. Dr. Rāsh Behārī Ghosh, the greatest Indian Jurist of modern times, who was also one of the most brilliant men, and an eminent leader of the present generation, extolled Avināś Chandra for his acumen in legal matters and highly eulogised him for his correct pronunciation in *English* and his chaste and elegant manner of writing *English* and his selection of words in the right way and in the right place. Late Aśvinī Kumār Dutt of Barisāl, classmates, colleagues, friends, admirers, students and chenteles, because of their regards towards Avināś Chandra for his profound learning, skill and talent in law, had a great expectation of his elevation to the Bench, the most exalted position that the children of the soil could aspire to, but for various reasons, the expectation of Aśvinī Kumār and others could not be fulfilled. His forensic ability should be read with interest amongst others from the following cases which appeared in different Law Journals of India: 4 Cr. L.J. 433; I.L.R. 37 Calc. 863; 20 Ind. Cas. 399; 64 Ind. Cas. 518; 21 C.W.N. 860 (L.P.); 24 C.L.J. 40 (L.P.); A.I.R. 1921 Calcutta 806; A.I.R. 1923 Calcutta 13; 7 R. C. 451. Ind. Rul. Cal. Judges and lawyers often sought valuable opinion from Avināś Chandra in the matter of legal intelligence and they accepted his opinion as true, authentic and *bonafide*. He possessed the rare combination of varied knowledge, and mastery of legal principles and his addresses were *ad rem*, *à droite* and *copia verborum*. He was a legalist. He often uttered in the deliberation among his friends the ever-memorable words "Fear

God and no lad", which are frequent among the common people of England. The maxim "firmness, impartiality and integrity, in fear of God and without fear of man" (XIII C.W.N., 35, CCXXIX, Notes) *a'la* foregoing adage is looked up to by the English judges in the juridical realm. He was regular in attending the Court, rarely kept himself away from there. He made the Bar Association, High Court, a place of culture and learning. The following letters speak for themselves :

पि ३४१ बतीन दास रोड
२४/१/४१

अद्यास्पदेषु,

* * * आपनार सङ्गे बहुकाल देखा हय नाइ। आपनि Libraryते ना आसार जन्य विशेष अभाव अनेकेइ अनुभव करेन। कारण अनेक विषयेइ विशेष किहु जानिते हइछे, आपनार कथाइ सकले मने करेन। आपनार लेखा एकटा कागजेर दुफ्फा आमि preserve करे रेखेछि ताते Matthew र एकटा verse एर (१) Greek Testament (२) Vulgate एवं (३) Luther एर German translation लेखा आछे। से atmosphere कि आवार फिरे आस्वे !*

इति

श्रीमणीन्द्रकाल बन्धोपाध्याय†

Sj. Avinas Chandra Guha,
Advocate.

The true perspective of the man echoes in the epistles below :

"I heard very often from Pandit Haraprasād about your father. I was his pupil for 2 years 1897-1898. I know how lovingly he spoke about him. * * * His humility about his learning. He was the example, विद्या ददाति विनयं। He was never obstinate in his manners. Yet he was always ready to give aid to appreciating questions. He was held in esteem by Brajalāl Sāstrī. Often on the table we discussed questions on Hindu Sāstras. He was always up-to date in that respect".‡

५१६, बाकिगाञ्ज प्लेस,
कलिकाता १९।
२२/१०/४८

कस्याणवरेषु,

* * * * * आमि छासजीवने या किहु सिखेछि तार चेये बेसी सिखेछि—तार साहचर्ये। आमादेर Libraryते तार मत पण्डित केइ छिल ना एवं एखबजो नाइ—एइ

* Some portions of the letter.

† B.L. Advocate, High Court, Calcutta (Date of enrolment—19-4-1907).

‡ Narendra Nā'h Seth, B.L., *Dharmarindea*, Advocate, High Court, Calcutta (Date of enrolment—16-4-1904; died—14-10-1948), a literator, a critic, a life-long political sufferer for the cause of emancipation of India from the British rule; whose criticism "Government of India Act, 1935. A Repeal—What it Means?" (Submitted to the House

आमार विश्वास । तिनि डिसेन वास्तविकइ एकटी 'walking encyclopaedia'* तौहार ये विषये किछु समस्या हइत, तौहार निकट आसितेन । तिनि अनायासे अति सरलभावे से सकलैर समाधान करिया दितेन । आइन, साहित्य, इतिहास, भाषातत्त्व, दर्शन ये कोन विषयेर फूट समस्या समाधानेर अन्य तौहार कोन पुस्तकेर प्रयोजन हइत ना ; खुब कदाचित् तौहाके बलिसे धुनिबाडि एकदु देखिया काल बलिब । America, Germany वा ये कोन देशेर एकटा छुट्ट सहर कोथाय स्थिर करिते ना पारिया केह तौहार काछे उपस्थित हइले तिनि तत्क्षणत् से जायगार एमन सडिक् परिचय दितेन ये मने हइत सेखानकार तिनि एकजन अधिवासी । Anatomy कोन प्रश्न उत्थित हले एमनभावे सडिक् उत्तर दितेन ये मने हइत चेन एइमास Anatomy से first हये Medical College थेके बेरिये आसछेन । एइ विचार उपर तौहार छिछ स्वभावेर सौन्दर्य ; कि माधुर्य, कि विनय, कि अमायिकता, तौर छिछ से बले बोल करा जाव ना ! * * * *

मङ्गलाकाङ्क्षी

श्रीप्रबोधचन्द्र चट्टोपाध्याय †

Avināś Chandra was elected President of the Bar Association, High Court, Calcutta, in 1930-31. He succeeded Golāp Chandra Sarkār, Sāstri, M.A., B.L., at whose feet Avināś Chandra had learnt Hindu Law in College and in legal careers, as an authority‡ on Hindu Law. He was presented by Sāstri a copy of "Dāyatattva of Raghunandana" (English translation with Original text—Second Edition, Calcutta, 1904) with blessings from him. Many outstanding authors, scholars of the land and abroad honoured Avināś Chandra by making presentation of their books with their best regards unto him. Only two persons in the High Court could interpret correctly the texts of the *Smṛitis* from the original, the first being Golāp Chandra, and the next Avināś Chandra. He had the *Vedic*, the *Smṛiti*, the *Purānic* literatures at his finger-ends D. F. Mulla's version of Hindu Law is veracious. It is *verbum sat sapienti*. He speaks quite fittingly, thus—"There is perhaps no branch of law more difficult to study and comprehend than the Hindu Law.

Secretary, Government of India on the 19th March, 1936) roused a great sensation among the people. This was read by Avināś Chandra all throughout. Nowhere did he raise any dissentient voice against the scathing remarks made by the critic. It was published in "The Calcutta Law Journal", Vol. LXIII, Notes Portion, pp. 19-45. The letter was written to the writer of this article by late Seth, these are the excerpts. See "Barisal Hitaishi", Vol. LVI, Nos. 33, 34, 1948. c. r., Avināś Chandra Guha—A Savant.

* See Gaṅgā Nātha Jhā, M.A., D Litt., Manu Smṛiti, Vol. I, Part 1, Calcutta, 1920, Prefatory Note, vi, for the term.

† Letter written to the writer of this article, a portion B.L., Advocate, High Court,* Calcutta (Date of enrolment—6-7-1909; died—14-12-1948), an eminent criminal practitioner.

‡ Person whose opinion is accepted, [esp. expert in (on) a subject From Fr. *autorite*], from L. *suautoritatem*,

* * * * Of all the topics of Hindu Law there is none more intricate than that of woman's peculium, technically called *strīdhana*.¹—Principles of Hindu Law, Third Edition, 1919, Preface to the First Ed., vii.

Sir Asutosh Mookerjee very much appreciated Avināś Chandra's vast learning. At his desire, Avināś Chandra was appointed a Professor of Hindu Law in the University Law College, Calcutta, in 1916. Later on, he lectured on Constitutional Law as well to the students. He commanded encomiums from all quarters in the discharge of his professorial duties. His wide range of study and depth of learning, especially of arts, politics, etc., were universally acknowledged. He was really a miracle of learning. Speaking of Avināś Chandra's erudition Dr. S. C. Bagchi, LL.D., observed, "Professor Guha directed my attention to the German authorities on the Vedic literature quoted in the lectures; he has read the proofs of the Sanskrit portion of the third lecture and I am sure that his knowledge of Sanskrit has made this portion quite free from any error" (See "Juristic Personality of Hindu Deities", Foreword, vi, Asutosh Mookerjee Lectures, 1931, University of Calcutta). Avināś Chandra won great popularity in the University Law College (See "The Calcutta University Law College Magazine", Vol. VIII, January, 1938, No. 1, "Editorial Notes"). He was regular in his class-work, seldom absented himself from the College. His loving-kindness towards the students was immense. He retired from service in July, 1937. He was appointed Examiner and Paper-setter in Arts and Law examinations of the University of Calcutta. He was offered the posts of "Tagore Law Professorship" and "Dean of the Faculty of Law" in the Universities of Calcutta and Dacca, but he refused all the covetable posts with thanks to the respective authorities for want of time.

Avināś Chandra was known as an *Allama* (profound scholar),* a polymath, a man of vast reading and erudition and a great linguist. He received great ovation and recognition in the educated circles throughout the land and abroad. He was a Classicist.† He knew

* Learned person, person versed in literature esp. that of ancient Greece and Rome. From *AE* *escaler* (School, or refash. On LL *scholaris* (-ar). *L. schola* Gr. *scholē*).

† Latin and Greek scholar 'Classicist'—classical scholar (ship); of classical education; (-ism) a Latin or Greek idiom. 'Classics' is derived from the Latin 'Classicus' (of the first class). The Romans were divided into classes, those in the first being called 'Classici'. The word 'Classici' in the past, was meant 'the choicest products of literature of ancient Greece and Rome.' 'Classics,' now-a-days, include Greek, Roman, and modern writers of the first rank, or their works of intrinsic value and excellence. 'Classicist' one versed in the classics. Goethe's 'Faust' is a classic of a very high order in German language, so also 'Abhijñānaśākuntalān' of Kālidāsa in Sanskrit.

many modern and ancient languages no less than a score and five of the West and the East. He was a *Vedic* scholar. His *Vedic* studies were profound and extensive. His was intention to write essay for "Dwārakā Nāth Pāl Vedic Competition Prize" (See Cal. Gaz., Aug. 9, 1922 ; Part IB), but it was not fulfilled owing to his illness. The subjects for essay for the "Dwārakā Nāth Pāl Vedic Competition Prize" for the year 1924 were under seven heads. The competition was limited to Hindu inhabitants of Bengal, Bihār and Orissā, and Assām ; irrespective of caste or age. The subjects were on *Vedic* research work. He possessed a very big library of precious books worth several thousands of rupees on different languages and on varied subjects. He collected the books not only from India, but from places outside India, especially from Germany, America, Egypt and England. In his teens, while a student of the Second year (1892-93) F.A. Class of the Presidency College, his *first* literary production saw the light. His *first* poem "Varṣī geetī" in Bengali and subsequently, his many poems and reviews on books and *Vedic* article were published in the "Navyabhārata" between 1299 B S to 1325 B.S., and in the "Bhārati" in 1300 B S, which spread his reputation as a writer, critic of high order far and wide. He was a polyhistor, and even if he had never written any poetry, his criticisms in the "Navyabhārata" (1307-1310, 1317, 1325 B.S.) would style him to be ranked as one of the greatest critics of Bengal. He was a *star* of the first magnitude in the firmament of letters. He was one of the most suggestive of critics. Young men, especially literators, flocked to hear his talks and they gained by his rich and wonderful mine of knowledge. They set store on Avināś Chandra's deep lore in literary matters. Alas, the poetic career of Avināś Chandra was too short as the flight of a meteor. In almost 50 years like the English poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834), Avināś Chandra had presented to the literary world a body of poems in the "Navyabhārata" (1299 B S. to 1304 B.S.) many of which may rank with the very greatest in the realm of poetry. These will retain their glory and charm so long as the Bengali language and literature endure. The style of Avināś Chandra has an austere majesty that extorts respectful awe from all. He was marked as a poet by originality, insight, grace, deft subtlety of thought, and charm of diction. His poetry abounded, in a series of vivid pictures, with his keen sensibility to the spiritual aspects of the universe, his sense of mystery and wonder. Yet he had given to all these things an air of probability by a wealth of

vivid and life-like details by placing the scene of action in an age long gone by, far away from the world of man. Avināś Chandra's deep enchanting voice charmed all even when he was a student at School and Colleges. He was a voracious reader, studying day and night. His student life did not end with his academic career, but he had been a *student* all along. Like a *Yogin* he had devoted his life to the pursuit of knowledge, and learning was the sole business of his life. He had no other business or interests than to acquire knowledge. He was interested in a bewildering variety of subjects—in classics, medicine, sociology, aesthetics, and so forth. He studied all these subjects both intensively and extensively and kept himself thoroughly conversant with the latest advancement in them. His industry in these respects was indefatigable. This was a rare achievement in this modern age of specialisation. He tried to be a *specialist* in every department. His ambition and eagerness were to know more and more about more and more and they remained in him till his last breath had ceased—"Light, more Light ! Light is Divine ! Light is life ! A Living example ! A Shining Light ! An embodiment of true culture, true Learning—that was in Avināś Chandra !" So also, the last words of Göethe were 'Mehr licht !' It is a matter of great regret that Avināś Chandra did not leave behind him any work worthy of his great learning, excepting a few poems, articles, criticisms, etc., referred to elsewhere which are almost all that remain of him. He who might have enriched the literary world by sheaves of knowledge has given only a few morsels. His friends, admirers, pupils, relatives, acquaintances, often asked him the reason for this ; the reply that he gave reveals not only the *encyclopaedic sweep* of his great intellect, but also, his intellectual integrity and modesty of character. He was a polyglot. He used to read the original works on all topics of all subjects in Greek, Latin, French, German in the matter of Western civilization and culture and in Sanskrit, Sanskritic languages, Arabic, Persian, Hebrew, Urdū for Eastern civilization and culture, leaving aside the renderings of them. His pronunciation and intonation were exemplary. They remained in him unimpaired to the last of his life. The Classical languages of the West and the East, excepting Persian, were self-taught by Avināś Chandra. He had learnt Persian from an eminent Maulvi of Calcutta Mādrāsāh. He was very much pleased at the learning of Avināś Chandra. One day, in course of study, Maulvi Sāhab in an ecstasy of joy, said to Avināś Chandra, "Well, why then, are you keeping me as your teacher of Persian?" Like his

father Munshī Svarūp Chandra, Avināś Chandra had great erudition in Persian language—"He was envied by most Persians themselves, for his vast knowledge and unrivalled command over Persian language and deep erudition in Persian culture" (See Avināś Chandra's "Verb-inflexions in Persian"). The Hon'ble Justice Sir Zāhhādur Rahīm Zāhid Suhrāwardy, Kt., M.A., B.L., Barrister-at-Law, Late Judge, High Court, Calcutta, Maulvi Wāhed Hossain, B.L., Advocate, High Court, and other Persian scholars shared the same view about Avināś Ch. He was an Arabist too. He studied the Arabic language through the medium of French & German languages. Observing on the Arabic language, Maulvi A'hmud Ullam, Late Arabic Senior Scholar of the Calcutta Mādrāsāh, opined, " * * * a classic language as the Arabic—which varies so widely in its construction from all other languages of the world."—(*From a letter, Calcutta, The 2nd March, 1882, opening para.*: The centre place of the Arabic language was in the middle and the northern portions of Arabia (Nezd province and Syria). From these places the Arabs as well as the Arabic language had spread out on all sides. The trace of the oldest Arabic is found in an inscription being dated 4th Century. Before that, no Arabic composition could be obtained. See Bahr-ul-Uloom Maulana Obaidullah-el-obaidi Suhrāwardy's "An essay on the Arabic language and literature," 1873; Qorān Sharīpha, 4th edition, 1343 B.S., Calcutta, Preface, 1292 B.S., rendered into Bengali from the Original by Bhāi Girīś Chandra Sen). Such is the Arabic language. It is one of the most difficult languages of the world. People say 'Greek to any one.' Why not 'Arabic?' In India, Darululum at Deoband, about 90 miles from Delhi, is a well-known institution in Muslim theology and Arabic culture and language. As for the Sanskrit language Pāli, Avināś Chandra attracted the attention of Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Satīś Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇ, M.A., Ph.D., M.R.A.S., F.A.S.B., Late Principal, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, who was considered to be the best spirit in the ocean of Learning of Pāli & Tibetan languages. Even a veteran scholar of his eminence spoke about Avināś Chandra's great learning in Pāli, thus—"As regards Pāli, I have to learn many things which are unknown to me, still to many, from Avināś Bābu." He was *homo multarum litterarum*. He left a Sanskrit composition in verse where he discussed that the *Kāyasthas* were nothing but twice born, because they possess *gotras* which are not possible for the *Sūdras* and, as for some reason or other the ceremony of investiture with the sacred thread has ceased to continue in them they are known to be *Sūdras* at present. *Sūdras*

are not forbidden to the study of the *Vedas*. And he has conclusively proved the same from the texts of the *Vedas*, the views of the commentators of the East thereof and the exegesis of the Western scholars. That what he has written down will be held in great esteem among the scholars in the realm of Indian History & Culture and his name will retain a niche in the temple of fame as a scholar of outstanding merit. Written in elegant style embellished with melodious *Sārdḍūlavikṛīḍita* meter all throughout, the composition resembles no less than the composition of the renaissance period of the *Kāvyā* literature of the Sanskrit language. A very distinguished educationist valued him by this significant epithet—"Compared to his depth of learning all our University professors, educationists of the country are as mere children. He is more learned than all of us put together!"

Of late, Avināś Chandra's articles on *Vedic*—"Paijanya"—The Calcutta Review, August, 1955; *Legal*—"Is marriage of an adopted son with a *saṃotrā* of his natural father prohibited?"—S.C.L.J., 1951, pp. 5n—12n, 131—13n; "Plebiscite"—University Law College Magazine, Calcutta, Vol. XX, 1950-51; "Mīmāṃsā rules of Interpretation"—Do., Vol. XXII, March, 1951. "Athenian Law & Custom"—University College of Law Magazine, Calcutta, Vol. XXIII, March, 1955; "Significance of the State"—The Calcutta Review, August, 1956; *Historical*—"Successive Strata of the Population of England"—Vidyāsāgar College Magazine, Vol. XXX, Winter Number, 1952; "Chīṭhī"—Mandirā, Pous, 1361; Vidyāsāgar College Patrikā, Jyaiṣṭha, 1362; *Miscellaneous matters*—Invitation Letter composed in Sanskrit:* "Śrī Śrī Mahāmīyā Vijayate" (*Sanskrit gāthā* †)—Kāyastha-Samāj, Śrāvaṇa, 1344; "Tārābhāṣya-tantra," 3, 2, 3, 8 (*Ancient & Modern dhyān*): translation from Sanskrit into English—Bariśāl Hitaiṣī, Vol. LIII, No. 50, 1951 B.S.; Compiler of the hymns of the Goddess Sarasvatī from the *Rigveda*; Do., *ज्ञात्, सजात्, सजात्य, ज्ञाति, अज्ञात्, असजात्य* from the Rv., Vs., Ts., Nirukta; Do.,

* The invitation letter in Sanskrit verse to the learned Brāhmanas (in pursuance of the custom prevalent in the Hindu society from time immemorial) on the occasion of the *Śrādh* ceremony of Śyāmāsundarī Guha Chaudhurāṇī was composed by Avināś Chandra in a very beautiful language and style in *Sārdḍūlavikṛīḍita* metre. That memorable work was performed with great elan and much costs on "हराचिद्विसे सूर्ये तुला संगते" i.e. जनविशुद्धनरवयोदयशताब्दोय सौरकार्तिकस्य दशम्यवासरे—Friday, October 20, 1922 (3rd Kārtika, 1929 B.S.) at Rāmchandrāpur in the district of Bariśāl in East Bengal. Śyāmāsundarī was Avināś Chandra's eldest paternal aunt.

† Gāthā in the *Rigveda* usually means only song, 'verse,' like Gātu—Macdonell & Keith's Vedic Index of Names and Subjects, Vol. I, London, 1912, p. 221; *Rgveda*—VIII,

On Old Indian Poetics (Alamkāra : bibliog.); *Philosophical*—“Schwegler on Hume”—The Calcutta Review, December, 1955; *Musical composition*—“Rāg Vasanta—Tāla Tetālā” : *Sangīta—Vijñān Praveśikā*, Jyaiṣṭha—A’ṣāḍa, 1361; “Rāg Sindhu-Vairavī—Tāla Tetālā” : Do., Kārtika—Agrabhāyaṇa, 1361; “Rāg Chhāyāṇaṭ—Thumrī” : Do., Agrabhāyaṇa, 1362; “Rāgmālā—Jayajayanti, Bhūpālī, Iman-Kalyāṇ” : Do., Jyaiṣṭha, 1363 (*Sanskṛit*); “Mia Mellār—Tāla Teodā” : Do., A’ṣāḍa, 1364, are published. Others are awaiting publication in various journals. He had a mind to write two voluminous books on cultural topics, but being snatched away from his sphere of activities by the cruel hand of death, his desire remained a desire for ever.—“Death opens the gate of Fame, and shuts the gate of Envy after it.”—Tristram Shandy, Vol. V, Ch 3.

He corrected many manuscripts, theses, articles, addresses, papers, pamphlets, memoranda, legal drafts (such as, deed of gift, endowment, etc.) on various matters, coming from personages and places of importance at home and abroad. Sir A’śuṭoṣa Mookerjee, the great educationist, the *Juris Consultus* (*Juris con-sult*), the chief architect of the Calcutta University, entrusted to Avināś Chandra in bringing out a *revised edition* of *Vyavahāra-Mātrika* of Jimūtavāhana (In memoirs of the As. Soc. of Bengal, Vol. III, No 5), but it could not be done for preoccupations being followed by the lamentable death of Avināś Chandra.—“Death . . . openeth the gate to good fame, and extinguisheth envy”.—Becon, Essays : Of Death.

Avināś Chandra was a man of born genius. His unique combination of all the various aspects of genius gave him the true epithet—“the Man”. His genius shone forth, of course in its greatest brightness, in the course of his practice at the High Court, Calcutta. Genius is of no age, nor of any locality. Had he been born in any other age or in any other clime, or, had he adopted any other profession, his outstanding merits and personality would have left their marks on them. Of Avināś Chandra it may truly be said *nullum quod tetigit non ornavit*—nothing did he touch which he did not adorn. His was a full and varied career, giving acquaintance with everything that can broaden, deepen, strengthen or sharpen the mind. He like Göethe scorned knowledge that does not lead to action : “men ought to know that in the theatre of human life it is only for Gods and angels to be spectators”.

What a wonderful personality was that of Avināś Chandra ! His personal magnetism acted like a charm upon people wherever he went. He was a strong-built man who lived in the world of lofty thoughts and deepest convictions. He had no craze for worldly honours. Nor did he care for the frowns or favours from anybody. All honours came to him unsought and unsolicited but in recognition of his vast erudition, profound scholarship and ideal character. He was a thinker of the highest order, a piercing seer into the unknown future, a philosopher whose utterings were in cadenced words. His great reputation rested on solid structure. He hated self-propaganda, self conceit, self-esteem, self-feeling and always lived a life of plain-living and high thinking. He was a good conversationalist, grave in demeanour, but full of jollity. He was so jolly green. His was geniality in his smiles and his sense of humour in his utterances. He was a *bel esprit*. Face is the index of mind, so the gift of humour of eminent persons reveals their inner trait of character for as Thomas Carlyle truly said, "The essence of humour is sensibility ; warm, tender fellow-feeling with all forms of existence." (Essays : On Richter.) And Avināś Chandra had that in plenty. He was accessible to all, rich and poor, high and low alike. He was first and foremost a gentleman in true sense of the word as Samuel puts it, "It is a grand old name, that of gentleman, and has been recognised as a rank and power in all stages of society. To possess this character is a dignity of itself, commanding the instinctive homage of every generous mind." He was *ad extremum* a nationalist in every walk of life. He was a quiet and unassuming man. His so much learning was concealed behind a closed exterior. His motto seemed to be one lived best by the hidden life—*bene vixit qui bene latuit*. The eight fold qualities of the learned given below, are perhaps applicable to Avināś Chandra :

“दुर्म नोद्धते न निन्दति परान् नो भाषते निहुरं
प्रोक्तं केनचिदप्रियञ्च सहते क्रोधञ्च नाकम्बते ।
ज्ञात्वा ज्ञातमपि प्रभूतमनिशं सन्तिष्ठते मूकवद्
दोषांश्चादधते गुणान् त्रितनुते चाष्टौ गुणाः पण्डिते ॥”

—उद्भटश्लोकमाहात्म्यम् ।

He was a loving father to his sons and daughters and gave them as much opportunity to be with him as was possible in the circumstances. He was of course, always forgiving, bearing no ill-feeling, malice, grudge or whatsoever, though he was a very severe task-master. He was *suaviter in modo, fortiter in re*. He was extremely

a tolerant man. His was a sympathetic heart and he was helpful to all. His mind was full of the milk of human kindness and love for one and all. He gave away his money liberally to those poor students, who came to him for help and it was from the money that he received as *scholarships* in the College life. He made provisions for the benefit of the people by establishing charitable institution, thoroughfares, etc., in his village, town, sub-divisions of the district of *Bāquirganj* after the name of his illustrious father Svarūp Chandra Guha Chaudhuri. His self-sacrifices and works for the people were a *beacon light* to many, specially in his family and native district. He was an orthodox *Ārya* by religion, *Kāyastha* by caste, performing religious rites properly throughout life and a pious man to the very core of his heart, enjoying life 'in unreprieved pleasures free'. He was not a so-called *Puritan* or a *Purist moralist* or a *Sanātani*, nor any other 'ist'. He is to the younger generation an inspiration, an ideal, an example to follow, to mould and to enliven. He is dead but in the words of Late Sarojinī Nāidu—"his imperishable genius will shine through the ages in undimmed beauty and splendour." A man of this kind has a lasting resort in the bosoms of all, never to decay and never to be forgotten! Avināś Chandra always recalls to our mind the famous lines of Göethe :

“ Wonach soll man am Ende trachten?
Die welt zu kennen und nicht zu verachten.”

The Guha family of Rāmchandrapur to which Avināś Chandra belongs, is treated to be the abode of both the Goddess of Wealth and the Goddess of Learning, living conjointly with each other in peace and harmony :

“रामचन्द्रपुरं धन्यं गुहवाटी विशेषतः ।
रमावाण्यौ विरोधिन्द्यौ सम्भूय यत्र तिष्ठतः ॥
वाणीलक्ष्मणोरितोऽन्यत् न प्रायेण समुद्रतिः ।
सर्वथा नकुलीभ्याल्योरेकत् संगतिः कुतः ॥”

—इति जनश्रुतिः ।

Those who come in contact with the members of the family of Avināś Chandra (a family which is considered as one of the most respectable families in Bengal, its status being in the society very august) will certainly testify that they have possessed in them in a marked degree the supreme attributes of sweetness, sociability and light which, as

Matthew Arnold remarked, surely constitute the very essence of true culture.*

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* Read in observance of Tenth Death Anniversary (Vijaya vāsara) of Avinśa Chandra Guha on March 2, 1957, in a largely attended meeting held on the occasion.

† Gk. *biblion*, a book, *graphia*, description—list of books of any author, printer, country, subject; the knowledge of books, their editions, and history.

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They are all registered documents
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TRANSLITERATION, PRONUNCIATION AND SPELLING

'va'- antasthāṣ (Dento-labials)—va As, Svarūpa, Avināśa, Dvijena, Priyamvadā,
Revā, Vibhūti, Vāqī, Vīqā, Praṇava, Pravīqa, Devadatta, Devāhuti.
'śa'- Uṣmāṣaṣ (Palatal)—śa. As, Avināśa, Pradhānta.

D. N. G.

NYĀYA MAÑJARĪ

Vol. II (31)

JANAKIVALLABHA BHATTACHARYYA, M.A., PH.D., *Sankhyatirtha*

THE HYPOTHESIS THAT DEFORMED WORDS ARE ETERNAL IS NOT TENABLE

Now, the defenders of the eternality of deformed words come forward and hold a brief for their hypothesis. They argue in the following manner. The critics should put forward direct proofs in order to establish the late growth of unchaste words spoken by the uncultured people. The origin of words like *gāvi* etc. is surely traced to inadvertance and such other defects. Hence they cannot enjoy the same exalted position as the chaste words, *viz.*, *go* etc. do.

The critics say in reply that they will give the proper answer in no time and their wish will be fulfilled. The great thinkers who hold that deformed words such as *gāvi* etc. have been current in this country from eternity are asked to solve the above-mentioned rational doubt. They should ponder over it. The chaste words 'hasta', 'pāṇi' and 'kara' are synonyms. Is the word 'gāvi' a synonym of the word 'go' in the same sense? or, is the word 'gāvi' the perverted form of the word 'go' owing to some possible defects either in the reception or in the pronunciation of the latter one. It is not rational to think that many synonymous words denote a single object. If the *raison d'être* of the said statement is asked, an answer is as follows. The canon of the philosophy of grammar is this that a single word denotes a single object. What leads to formulate the canon is this that if it is accepted then the relation of denotation holding between a word and its meaning is easy to establish. Again, one is to face a lot of troubles if the relation of denotation holds between many words and a single object. If a word exclusively denotes a single object then a word and its meaning remain unaltered for ever. They will never falsify each other. This word denotes only this object. This object is denoted by this word only. Thus, this canon is justifiable. But if many words signify a single object then the object may not be denoted by a particular word since there are many other words to denote the said object though the said word does not denote the said object. Hence, if the hypothesis that many words denote a particular object is accepted then there is a chance for

misrepresentation. Again, if another hypothesis that a word denotes many meanings is accepted then a word has a fair chance of misrepresenting its meaning since the said word points to meanings other than the known one. Hence, any hypothesis which embodies the breach of the above rule may be a menace to the understanding of the true meaning of a word.

All the synonyms such as 'hasta', 'kara', 'pāṇi' etc. denote a single object. A few stray cases like this do not illustrate the violation of the said rule. Each of the words such as 'aksāḥ', 'pādāḥ', 'māśāḥ' etc. do not come under any rule. As they are exceptional cases so one is compelled to admit that a single word denotes different meanings. This rule is quite accidental. But the initial rule is easy and straight. It conveys that one word has got a single denotation only. In other words, a word stands for a single object. Now, if one admits that the words 'go', 'gāvi' and other deformed ones are synonyms then the above rule does not hold good since every chaste word has its corresponding deformed word. Hence, it yields place to another rule. The breach of the initial rule is due to some defects in the speaker such as inadvertence etc. It has been said before that the deformed words such as gāvi etc. do not enjoy the same elevated position in language as the chaste words such as 'go' etc. do because of their defective origin.

Moreover, the power of denotation belonging to a word is very subtle. It is neither perceived nor inferred. It is revealed only by means of presumption. If presumption is too weak to reveal it, no other sources of knowledge can illuminate it. Again, if presumption is indirectly established then words like 'go' etc. cannot gather sufficient strength from presumption to communicate their meanings. Thus we see that words such as 'go' etc. possess the power of denotation by means of which they convey their meanings such as the real cow etc. The said power of denotation does not belong to deformed words such as 'gāvi' etc. Why has the age-long tradition of the expert grammarians been broken by the uncultured rustic? In other words, why do not the uncultured persons imitate the practice of the cultured ones if chaste words are only competent enough to convey their meanings? An answer to this question is this:—the use of chaste words has been superseded by that of vulgar words just as the communication of one's intention by means of the winking of an eye and the signal, given by hands, etc. has yielded place to the use of words of the lower caste non-Aryans. Does not the power of denotation belong to the winking of an eye or to words and sentences, spoken by the

lower castes? We stick to the view that they do not possess the power of denotation. If this is true, why do they convey their sense? We say that they have got no innate power of conveying their sense. As they have got no stable character so the innate power of denotation does not belong to them. These hints or words convey meanings on the strength of convention arbitrarily set up by the people who use them. The power of denotation as proposed by the Naiyāyikas has a universal significance. This power of denotation has been set up by God and has been in vogue since the first day of creation. It is cognate with the innate power of denotation advocated by the Mīmāṃsakas. It should not be compared with the conventional power of denotation the range of application of which is very limited. The innate power of denotation or such power as has been introduced by God belongs only to words like 'go' etc. but not to deformed words such as gāvī etc. Owing to the similarity of letters belonging to words 'go' and 'gāvī' when the word 'gāvī' is pronounced it revives the memory of the word 'go' and thus conveys the meaning of the word 'go' recalled in our mind.

How do such persons as are ignorant of words like 'go' etc. remember them? Which is the sure means of learning them? A special study is the sure way of their access. Which science is to be studied? The study of grammar is called abhiyoga, which is necessary for this purpose. One has got repeatedly to study the science of grammar and closely to observe the illustrations cited in it. The complete acquisition of the science of grammar is known as its special study. By such study one acquires innumerable chaste words which are worthy of being used by the cultured persons. Such acquisition of chaste words helps him to detect the nature of unchaste words used by the uncultured ladies and the majority of rustic people because of their dissimilarity. But our objector has said that the number of chaste words is so vast that none can get them by heart by hundreds of divine years. We do not share the view of our objector. Tradition says, "The science of grammar which has been formulated by Pāṇini and elaborated by the two other sages of great repute teaches rules well tested by them. These rules give such a faultless analysis of words that they stand above all defects such as defects of being too wide or too narrow." As the Vedas distinguish virtue from vice, as the incarnation of God draws distinctions between truth and falsehood, as the codes of Ethics differentiate between good and evil, as the instructions of Manu and others discriminate between edible and non-edible as an oath points

out the difference of purity from impurity, so grammar shows the distinction between chaste and unchaste words. Every body is acquainted with the truth of the above statement. No body can deny its truth. The truth of the said statement may be easily verified even today. It is a well-known fact that there is a gulf of difference between the speech of persons well versed in the science of grammar and that of other persons such as the uncultured rustic. Thus owing to the absence of training the employment of deformed words may owe its existence to ignorance. We shall make gratuitous assumptions if we hold that the power of denotation uniformly belongs to chaste and deformed words. If we learn by heart the science of grammar, we can easily discern the difference between chaste and unchaste words. There is a standing rule that chaste words are denotative but unchaste words are not. Hence, we are in a position to conclude that all charges, levelled against our hypothesis by our objectors, are refuted. One objection still remains unanswered. It is this that there is no source of valid knowledge which points to the chastity of a word.

The chastity of a word is not a perceptible property. There is no mark which helps to infer it. The authoritative works do not reveal it. Therefore, the hypothesis of chastity is full of defects.

THE CHASTITY OF A WORD IS FIT TO BE PERCEIVED WITH THE AID OF THE AUTHORITATIVE WORKS

There is another verse which contradicts the findings of the above verse. It says: The chastity of a word is a perceptible property. There is a mark which points to the existence of chastity. The authoritative works reveal it. Therefore, the hypothesis of chastity is not defective.

As we visualise the purity of water not contaminated by a piece of floating hair etc. so the auditory perception of the chastity of a word its proper accent, the actual order of its constituent letters and such other properties are correctly presented to our consciousness. This awareness is neither indecisive nor contradicted by another true judgment nor is produced by a defective sense-organ viz. ears. The ascertainment of the truth of the said auditory perception is nothing but the clear and distinct auditory perception of a word which is a collection of letters. When we judge a piece of auditory perception as untrue the perception possesses a contrary character. The defects which invalidate its truth have been exactly

defined. Hence, we hold that the chastity or the unchastity of a word is directly cognised by our sense-organ.

The objectors come forward with a pertinent question which is as follows: If the chastity or the unchastity of a word had been directly perceived with our ordinary sense-organ then persons whose intellect has not developed under the tutelage of grammatical training would have been directly acquainted with the said properties (chastity or unchastity) of a word. But it is a fact that such persons do not perceive the chastity or the unchastity of a word only with their ears. Therefore, the chastity or the unchastity of a word is not a perceptible property.

The upholders of the above hypothesis contend that the said objection does not hold good. The complete statement of our hypothesis is this that the said property is grasped by our auditory sense-organ if it receives the aid of instructions from a sound grammarian. In other words, though our naked ears cannot detect it yet our trained ears are competent enough to do it. This is what we admit. Similarly, we cannot deny that Brahmanahood is perceptible since it is perceived with our eyes which have improved under the instructions of the Sāstras. Some logicians have advanced arguments in favour of our hypothesis. If one goes up the peak of a mountain and sees an object below from the top of the mountain, then one cannot say that the said perception has not been rightly designated. Or, if the truth of determinate perception is established, verbalised perceptions have been also proved to be true. Let us cite another well-known parallel case of perception. Suppose, a man sees a jack-fruit tree in front of him for the first time. An experienced man who is conversant with the name of this tree comes there and initiates him into its name. He teaches him that the name of this tree is 'Panasa' (jack-fruit tree). He remembers the word of the experienced man and sees the tree. His eyes in co-operation with the memory of the said name produce a piece of verbalised knowledge in the form "This is a jack-fruit tree." Thus when one acquires the relation of denotation holding between a name and the object named a piece of verbalised knowledge of the above description is unavoidable. The author of the Nyāya-sūtra realises that this piece of verbal knowledge is of course perceptual. But this is not the only form of perception. In order to give a clear expression to his view he adds the word 'avyapadeśya' to the definition of perception which has been recorded in his sūtra. The initial perception which arises from the sense-object-

contact only is called 'indeterminate perception'. It is not verbalised. When one communicates his perceptual knowledge to others it is always verbalised. The memory of the word (the above name), instructed by an experienced person, and the eyes jointly produce the second perception that this is a jack-fruit tree. This is an instance of visual perception. This is the account of the above logicians. Similarly, in the present case the auditory sense-organ, accompanied by the instruction imparted by a person well versed in grammar, grasps directly the chastity or unchastity of a word. Hence, the above properties of a word are perceptible but not otherwise. The above logicians have also cited other ways of determining Brahmanhood at the sight of a man. In a country where the moral code is well maintained by the efficient administration of an influential king the good conduct of a person reveals that he is a Brahman. A king ably governs a particular country in accordance with the code of Manu and other distinguished law-givers. Owing to the personal influence of the king there are persons who observe the duties of their caste and different stages of life. Nobody belonging to a lower caste, can pose as a member of a higher caste, putting on the garb of a member of a higher caste and adopt a higher profession in that state. During the reign of such a king if we notice the good conduct of a particular person, we at once recognise his Brahmanhood. This recognition is direct. Similarly, when we notice that some persons have applied themselves to a work, hearing a distinct word we gather the sense of the word from their activities. We also remember the rules of grammar and find out the formation of a word. We find out its root and suffix. In the case of a verb we notice such an inflexion as represents its class-character. With regard to the structure of a word we also take into consideration other points, viz., the dropping of a letter, the super-addition of a letter, the supersession of a letter or a syllable by another letter or syllable and such other points. All these things constitute the infallible sign of the chastity of a word or a sentence. If the said infallible mark is present in a word and the word conveys a meaning then we rightly infer that the word is chaste. The authoritative work, viz., Vedic and Smṛiti Literature instructs us to use chaste words such as madhu (honey) etc. during the observance of a sacrificial rite so that the institutor of a sacrifice surely derives the result of the said sacrifice, viz., heavenly bliss since the use of chaste words during the performance of a sacrifice is beneficial to a sacrifice. The Śāstras instruct that if a learned person uses unchaste words during the performance

of a rite then he commits a sin which hinders the completion of a rite. They also bear evidence to the existence of the language of the common people who use non-sanskritic words (unchaste words).

Now, an objector opposes the above view and holds that if the nature of unchaste words is previously determined like *kalañja* (a kind of fruit or the meat of a deer, killed by a poisoned arrow) then an injunction or a prohibition has room for working upon it. But the *Sāstras* say nothing about the nature of unchaste words. It is not also proper to think that the nature of unchaste words is implied by an injunction. This point has been stated before. The upholders of the hypotheses in question meet with this objection. They hold that there is an element of truth in the above objection. But it is also a truism that Vedic literature and Dharma *Sāstras* furnish us with instructions on virtuous and vicious deeds. From the above statement it is implied that one should use chaste words and avoid the use of unchaste words. But it is also a bounden duty for a dutiful man to ascertain the nature of chaste and unchaste words since the injunction or the prohibition presupposes the definite knowledge of such words. Such knowledge is also true. It cannot be disregarded since an injunction requires it. Or another solution of the above problem is possible. Pāṇini has quoted a passage from the *Smṛti Sāstra* as an authoritative one. On the strength of its validity a Vedic injunction when enjoins the use of chaste words as the basis of the said *Smṛti* passage may be assumed.

We have no access to a Vedic injunction which enjoins the sipping of water before the commencement of a religious deed. But *Smṛti* works furnish us with this instruction. We postulate a Vedic injunction as the basis of the instruction, given by the *Smṛti* works. Therefore, the validity of the hypothetical Vedic injunction should not be challenged. Therefore, the chastity of a word comes within the province of the *Sāstrās*. A person, skilled in the use of language, uses unalloyed chaste words. Good speeches, delivered by such a person, consist of the faultless order of letters. Their style is elegant and vigorous. They command applause from the learned scholars. They are a class in themselves. But the utterances of the rustic people consists of ill-chosen letters which mar the development of feelings or sentiments. They, being very harsh, irritate the mind of the audience. Everybody has direct experience of difference between the speech of a learned man and that of a vulgar person. With the aid of a grammar only we are in a position to ascertain the purity of the faultless speech of a learned person. Therefore, the distinction

between chaste and unchaste words is not baseless. The Vedic passages such as "A Brāhmaṇa should not speak the language of the very low-caste people and should not also use deformed words since a deformed word is as good as a word of the base people", being interpreted, point to the efficacy of employing chaste words.

The objector has raised a point which runs thus: There is an injunction that one should speak chaste words. It is regulative in its character. There is also a prohibition that one should not speak unchaste words. Such a prohibition is meaningless. Therefore, the said Vedic passage carries no weight. This point is not forceful. If there is an injunction that one should drink water and if there is a prohibition that one should not drink fire then the said prohibition becomes absurd since it has no scope. But the above prohibition is not of that character. The objector may argue that the very injunction that one should use chaste words implies that one should not use unchaste words. Therefore such a prohibition is absolutely unnecessary. The reply to it is as follows. As the non-Aryans have no status in the society of the Aryans so unchaste words have no place in the classical language (*i.e.*, Sanskrit Language). Therefore they are not worthy of being used. But our experience says that the unchaste words correctly convey their sense. Therefore, the use of unchaste words has a possibility. So the above prohibition is significant. Though all worldly transactions may be conducted alike by chaste and unchaste words, yet the use of chaste words is conducive to merit. This injunction stands on the same footing with another injunction that one should take his meal, facing the East. These injunctions serve no worldly interest. Their goal is merit.

As a line of distinction has not been drawn between chaste and unchaste words so one apprehends that it is an impossible feat to teach all chaste words since one has got to instruct them one by one. This objection which has been raised before has been solved. We have elaborately proved that the true nature of a chaste word is both perceived and inferred. As a chaste word is recognised so rules may be easily prescribed concerning chaste words. Thus all sophism which centres round the definition of the chastity of a word stands refuted. We have said that a word is chaste if it obeys the rules of grammar and conveys a meaning. The chastity is a universal. It belongs to all homogeneous words just like the universal of cowness. Or, it is not a universal. It is the common property of all chaste words like *pacakatva*—the common property all cooks. Though the chastity of a word is a common property yet it acts as a differentia. The net

result of this assumption is this that all our transactions with all chaste words are made by means of it. The chastity of a word is a common property shared by all chaste words. Hence, it connotes all homogeneous chaste words.

Or, let expressiveness be equivalent to the chastity of a word. Let us accept your suggestion. Though your suggestion is accepted yet the rule, viz., "One should speak chaste words only" may be prescribed with impurity. Though an unchaste word does not convey a meaning, yet one may suspect that it has a meaning since on hearing it the basic chaste word is recalled to mind. This benefit of doubt may accelerate the use of unchaste words. The above rule will be fruitful since it will check the possible use of unchaste words. As the above rule imposes restriction, it, truly speaking, amounts to a negative rule since its main function is to dissuade persons from using unchaste words. Thus a regulative rule is *de facto* a negative rule (*para samkhyā vidhi*). Shall we hold that the rule in question has double functions? Our solution to this problem is this that if a rule has double characters, no serious defect defaces it. Let us discuss another objection. If an injunctive statement holds out a promise of reward then it is to be treated as a recommendatory statement since it has no independent voice. If one follows a recommendatory statement, he acquires no merit. If one does not follow it, he commits no sin. Thus, the rule which governs the use of chaste words and dissuades one from the use of unchaste words deserves to be neglected. This is the sum and substance of the above objection. But it does not stand to reason.

(To be continued)

Reviews and Notices of Books

Towards the Unification of the Faiths, Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectures, 1954-55—By George Perrigo Conger, Ph.D. University of Calcutta, 1957. Price Rs. 6.

The book under review comprises the Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectures for 1954-55 and consists of eight chapters. In the first chapter the author attempts a brief historical account of the religions as well as an autobiographical sketch of himself. In the other chapters he treats of such themes as intellect and intuition, monism and monotheism, matter and spirit, Avatars and prophets, faith and works, this world and another world. The discussion throughout the book is rather laboured and there is no continuity of thought. Some chapters are even riddled with contradictions.

In the discussion on intellect and intuition, for instance, the author maintains that intellect and intuition are incommensurable and that intuition is autonomous (pp. 23, 26). He, again, says that intuition is to be tested by empiricism, rationalism, and pragmatism. What, then, happens to the autonomy of intuition? He further says, "This is the way to a true integralism, with intuition open to intellectual criticism and with intellect leading to intuitional fulfilment, wherein full rounded experience, socially tested, gradually minimizes and ideally eliminates the errors of which philosophies and religions have been guilty" (p. 26). But this goes ill with his statement "intuition must be recognized and accorded status though it eludes intellect and need not be caught in its net" (p. 26). And, what is worse, "What is needed in the problem of intellect and intuition", says he, "is to find a thought or concept which, communicable enough, can serve, so to speak, as the radius of an intuition, so that one man may reproduce for himself the intuition of another" (p. 27). But the problem remains: How connect the two—intuition and intellect?

On page 28 the author says, "We said that typically the religions which in outgrowing polytheism have developed in regions east of Iran are in principle monistic, interpreting all Reality as of one sort or kind—whether as we say spiritual, as in India, or more natural, as in China—while other religions which have developed in Iran and west of Iran, especially Judaism, Christianity and Islam, are dualistic, emphasizing at least a temporary contrast between the one personal God and the world He has created." We are really confused by this statement. Monism, to be sure, is the theory that there is one supreme Reality, while dualism is the theory, according to which, there are two ultimate realities. How can one regard Judaism, Christianity and Islam as dualistic I wonder.

According to these religions, there is one God who is the ultimate Reality and the world, as the author himself admits, is His creation.

Again, on page 29 he says that Hegel, existentialists, and Vedāntists regard *being* as "the most general and all-inclusive concept." There are Vedāntists like Sāṅkara and Rāmānuja. What Vedāntists, then, does the author refer to? On the other hand, according to Hegel, as we know, *being* is the least and, for that reason, the most imperfect conception of Reality. A confused or confusing statement like that cited above we may have from a beginner in the philosophical studies, not from a Stephanos Nirmalendu Lecturer. In like manner, the author makes a mess of monism and monotheism, matter and spirit, Avatars and prophets, faith and works. In the chapters he discusses things that have no bearing upon the themes under consideration. In the chapter on matter and spirit, for instance, he discusses the proofs for the existence of god. Sometimes some problems are stated, badly stated indeed, and no solution of them is attempted. According to the author, "matter and spirit are not opposites." He says, "We have seen how the traditional views of matter have in recent years been modified, and how traditional spiritisms have been rendered more and more dubious. There should now be not merely a revised estimate of matter, but a view which will see true spirit as indigenous to it" (p. 55). Needless to say that our view of matter has been changed by modern scientific researches. We now regard matter in terms of energy. For us matter has thus become very subtle. But, as we see, there is still a gulf between matter and spirit. Sometimes, again, the author deviates from the theme under discussion. In one context in the chapter on matter and spirit, he says, "Thus the experimental empiricism of the Western scientists, interpreted in terms of microcosmic epitomization, may lead in orderly evolution to the experiential empiricism of the Indian sages" (p. 61). But how? If the phrase "experiential empiricism of the Indian sages" means anything, it means the supreme spiritual experiences of the sages, who in their experiences, transcended the empirical world. The experimental empiricism of the Western scientists, on the other hand, obviously means the empirical study of the empirical things by sensuous means. How bring the empirical study of things by the scientists into line with the supersensuous realization of the Supreme by the sages? In the author's view, "spirit is matter at its best, matter refined and purified, as it is in the integrations and differentiations of personalities in the great religious groups." An overzealous materialist could be proud of this statement. For, according to materialism, consciousness or spirit, as we call it, is nothing but matter in its subtlety and complexity. That he is matter-minded the author exhibits when he says, "The day is coming for new insights into the world around us, to see that the sciences are interpreting a universe which, without supernatural supplements or idealistic transformations,

contains within it resources for religion" (p.59). He quotes the late Sir Jagadish Chandra Bose as saying "I have built this laboratory as a temple." And the author himself says, "The universe of science 'is like a great temple; worship, however, in such a temple will require some revisions of traditional theologies'" (p. 59). Sir Jagadish obviously used the term 'temple' only as a figure of speech. Prof. Conger, however, means that the universe of science is literally a temple and that the pursuit of scientific knowledge is religion. It seems that Prof. Conger has written only some annotations on Julian Huxley's *Religion without Revelation*, wherein he says, "There is no revelation concerned in it (religion) more than the revelation concerned in scientific discovery, no different kind of inspiration in the Bible than that in Shelley's poetry." What, then, happens to the religions?

On page 118 Prof. Conger says, "It should be axiomatic that no unification of faiths can leave out one sixth of mankind. Let us not forget the millions of men and women and children in the Soviet countries, many of whom have advanced beyond us in their distrust of superstitions and whose passion for social justice with dedication to the common good, though we think it has sometimes led them to extremes and has engendered political hostilities, still stands ideally before us. We have argued that with the advance of naturalism and new understanding of its religious resources, materialism should be revalued Thus the Soviet system, so often regarded as irretrievably hostile to religion, may turn out to be principally hostile only to theology and sometimes in spite of itself to be one expression of a new type of religion" (p. 119). In so many words, then, Prof. Conger says that naturalism or materialism is a religion, religion, according to him, being adjustment to the universe. In that case, indeed, we cannot stop with materialism. Exuberant sexual love is, then, the religion of the youth; drinking and getting drunk is the religion of the drunkards; for they assuredly think they are in their ways best adjusted to the world. The question, however, remains: How can we be actually or factually adjusted to the universe? Prof. Conger does not touch even the fringe of this problem. He nevertheless speaks of unification of the faiths (p. 121). But, if naturalism stands, the unification of the faiths is out of the question; they can only be replaced by naturalism or naturalistic religion, as he calls it.

The publishers' blurb on the book is headed "A philosophy for the twenty-first century". I wonder, however, how could a bundle of contradictions and half-baked ideas that this book is make a philosophy for next century.

Adhar Chandra Das

James Joyce: A Study in Technique. By Dr. Sisir Chatterjee, M.A. (Cal.), Ph.D. (Lond.). Published by Dasgupta & Co. Private Ltd., Calcutta 12; 1957. Pages 108. Price Rs. 8'00, Foreign 8. 6d.

This is the last volume in the author's series of publications on the contemporary English novel. Hardly a prophet with a message in the contents of his works, Joyce is rightly studied as an experimenter in form, as one preoccupied with the technique, the style, and the medium of fictional articulation. Through an analysis of technique the author seeks to interpret the aesthetic theory behind, with profuse illustrations from Joyce's writings at different stages of development. Incomprehensible as Joyce appears to common readers in his final effort "to push language to its extreme, at the loss of its universal connotative value, they are helped by Dr. Chatterjee's elucidation to find meaning in his works. In the confused mass of notations, phrases, data, images, situations they begin to discover a complicated book which has a key.

Joyce is viewed as a medley of influences of Aquinas' philosophy, Freud's psycho-analysis, Dujardin's internal monologue, and Kierkegaard's existentialism. The starting point of his art is the theory of Epiphany, "a showing forth of the mind by which one gives oneself away, . . . a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself" (*Stephen Hero*). Based on the cardinal principles of *integritas*, *consonantia*, and *claritas*, that is, wholeness, symmetry, and radiance, "the luminous silent stasis of aesthetic pleasure", it achieves realism of the intensest kind in the representation of inner life. It enables Joyce to catch the incomplete, chaotic, and confusing flux of life on the levels of the preconscious, subconscious, and unconscious, and to "dump a huge quantity of the raw material of life in the middle of the high way of modern English literature". The technical pattern becomes "the counterpart of the chaos of modern life itself". It is for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, since these are the most delicate and evanescent of moments, though this rigid recording of immediate perception of reality tends to make a product of art rather distasteful. Whether this absolute "truthfulness almost to a fault" is to be the ideal of the artist involves the fundamental question of the function of art as the representation of life.

Epiphany as a new literary technique does away with the traditional necessity of "plot with style"; and its pitiless method gives the literary art the precision of physical sciences and the subtleties of arts, from both of which Joyce has borrowed techniques. He has absorbed vitalism from philosophy, free association from psycho-analysis, impressionism from painting, and *leit motif* from music. Cine montage, close-up, flash-back, fade-in, and fade-out are also freely used in unravelling thoughts. Here is a specimen from *Ulysses* of compressed associative writing: "Sindbad

the Sailor and Tinbad the Tailor and Jinbad the Jailor and Winbad the Whalor and Ninbad the Nailer and Finbad the Failer and Binbad the Bailer and Piubad the Pailer and Minbad the Mailer and Hinbad the Hailer and Rinbad the Railer and Dinbad the Kailer and Vinbad the Quailer and Linbad the Yailer and Xinbad the Phthailer." And this from *Finnegans Wake* loads language with symphonic qualities: "The fall (bababadalgharaghtakamminarro-nukonnbronntonnerronntthunntrovarr-hounawnskawntooohooordenenthurnuk!)"

As a self-conscious artist Joyce endeavours to confer on language a complete autonomy as an integrating agent, effecting synthesis of immediate perception through old devices like poetic cadence, metaphor, apostrophe, and verbal variation of sound, as much as through new tricks like play on etymology and multiple accretions of meaning. Language imitates life and acquires a distinct structural rhythm. The vitality of Joyce's language experiments is shown in the boldness of his spelling (e.g. Voise, Kishes, Somewhit, Saptimber, Beausome) as also in the freedom of his compound-formation abolishing hyphen and dove-tailing words naturally (e.g. nocoloured, suddenrise, coalsmoke, thusness). His successful reproduction of the whole cycle of the evolution of English prose style from Anglo-Saxon to American slang in describing Mrs. Purefoy delivering a child in the Oxen of the Sun episode in *Ulysses* is a further evidence. Joyce is of greater interest to the philologist than to the mere critic, and the potentiality of his experiments still awaits full prospecting.

The interpretations of Joycean technique by standard critics like Levin, Daiches, and Infroyce are so closely woven as to make the volume lose freshness at times, but then intellectual stuffing is a feature of much modern critical as well as creative literature. A succinct appreciation on the coverflap would have more ably introduced the book than the reprint in a hurry of practically the entire preface. As a prestige publication, the production lacks a standard in its make-up regarding the quality of paper, the narrow margin, the type font, and a fair sprinkling of errors in printing.

The select bibliography including references to periodical reviews, will be of considerable help not only to researchers in Joyce's works, but also to students of modern fiction, nay, of contemporary literature in general.

K. LAHIRI

Ourselves

DEATH OF SHRI RAMAPRASAD DASGUPTA

We deeply mourn the death of Shri Ramaprasad Dasgupta which suddenly and unexpectedly occurred towards the end of this month. Shri Dasgupta was University Lecturer in the Department of History for about twenty-three years and he endeared himself to his colleagues and students alike by his quiet and unostentatious manner, simplicity of character and genuine love for learning. The University teachers and students meeting in the University on the day following his death passed a resolution recording their sense of sorrow and loss on the sudden and unexpected demise of Professor Dasgupta. A copy of the resolution was sent to the members of the bereaved family. We convey our sincere condolence to Mrs. Dasgupta and her children.

DEATH OF SHRI PANCHANAN SINHA

We also mourn the loss of Shri Panchanan Sinha who was the Principal of the Asutosh College and University Lecturer in the Department of Economics for many years. Principal Sinha was one of the last representatives of the old generation of teachers who adopted the teachers' vocation seriously, earnestly and with all sincerity. Work—work for the good of the students entrusted to his care, was the all-absorbing passion of his life. From morning till late in the night, he was always present in the college premises to perform regularly and assiduously the duties of the Principal. His colleagues and students, all alike, cherish his memory with love and affection. His indeed was a life which was lived for the well-being of his pupils and he has left an example which is worthy of being followed. We send our condolence to the members of the bereaved family.

UNIVERSITY LECTURES

During the month a number of special lectures was delivered in the University in accordance with the terms and conditions of various endowments and trusts. Prof. S. P. Chatterjee, Hirankumar Basu Memorial Lecturer for the year 1956, delivered two lectures on "Theory of Continental Drift and Origin of the Himalayas". Dr. Subodhchandra Sengupta, Saratchandra Chatterjee Memorial Lecturer for 1956, delivered four lectures on "Michael Madhusudan Datta—Poet and Dramatist". Kazi Abdul Wadud spoke for four days on "Saratchandra and Bengali Fiction after him". Justice Dalip Singh Sanud, the first person of Indian descent to have been elected to the Congress of the U.S.A. gave a talk on "My 37 years of experience in the United States".



Notifications

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/1033/2 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the B. E. College, S. bpur, Howrah has been affiliated in the Degree Course in Mining Engineering (B. E. Mining) with effect from the session 1956-57, i.e. with permission to present candidates at the B. E. Part I examination from 1958 and not earlier, in the third year subjects from 1959 and not earlier, and at the Final B. E. Part II (Mining) examination from 1960 and not earlier.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

C/2026/76/(Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that the Obstetric and Gynaecological department of the Nilratan Sircar Medical College and Hospital, Calcutta is recognised as a place where service for six months will qualify a House Surgeon for admission to the D.G.O. Examination.

Senate House,
Calcutta.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/407/44 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Serampore College has been affiliated, in Alternative Bengali and Additional Paper in Alternative Bengali to the I.A. standard and in Bengali (Pass) and Additional Bengali Vernacular to the B.A. standard with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e. with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta
The 21st August, 1957

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/397/46/(Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Narasinha Dutt College, Howrah has been affiliated in English, Bengali, General Economics, Indian Economics, Accountancy, Business Organisation, Commercial Geography, Commercial Law, Advanced Accountancy and Auditing, Banking and Currency

to the B.Com. standard with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e. with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta
The 22nd August, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/2008/68 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Shri Shikshayatan College, Calcutta has been affiliated to the I.A. standard, in Alternative Bengali and Additional Paper in Alternative Bengali with effect from the session 1958-59 i.e. with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1960 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta
The 22nd November, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification

No. C/325/141 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that the Nabagram Hira Lal Paul College, Hughli has been affiliated to the I.A. standard in English, Bengali, Vernacular, Logic, History, Civics, Commercial Geography, Commercial Arithmetic and Book-keeping and Mathematics with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification.

No. C/320/110 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that the Rishra Bidhanchandra Ray College, Hughli has been affiliated to the I.A. standard, in English, Bengali, Vernacular, History, Logic, Civics, Com Geography, Com. Arith & Book-keeping with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

Senate House,
Calcutta.
The 13th August, 1957.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Notification.

No. C/402/69 (Aff.)

It is hereby notified for general information that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Girls' College, Howrah has been affiliated to the B.A. (Honours) standard, in History with effect from the session 1957-58 i.e., with permission to present candidates in the above-named subjects at the examinations mentioned, from 1959 and not earlier.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF DACCA

Misc. Sec. No. 1621

Orders of the Executive Council

Dated the 29th September, 1956.

Disciplinary action have been taken against the following candidates who were found guilty of resorting to unfair means or other acts of indiscipline at the University Examinations, 1956 as noted against each

Sl. No.	Roll No.	Regn. No. and Session.	Name of candidate.	Father's name	Name of Institution	Name of Exam.	Action taken against
1	171	4665 of 1950-51	Md. Afsaruddin Sarker	Mvi. Tarabuddin Sarker	Salimullah Hall	Muslim M.A. Part II, 1956	Examination of 1956 is cancelled and debarred from appearing at two subsequent Examinations.
2	172	5736 of 1950-51	Md. Azizullah	Mvi. Wali Ullah	Do.	Do.	Do.
3	176	11927 of 1949-50	A. S. Md. Falaht Ullin Sarker	Late Mvi. A. Mazid Sarker	Do.	Do.	Do.
4	208	5745 of 1950-51	Md. Aminul Islam	Mvi. Abdus Sobhan	Do.	Do.	Do.
5	216	5392 of 1949-50	Md. Abdur Rahman Minah	Late Mvi. Md. Saletun Ali	Fazlul Huq Muslim Hall.	Do.	Do.
6	225	5633 of 1949-50	Kazi Zahurul Alam	Mvi. Kazi Hyder Jinn	Do.	Do.	Do.
7	227	6304 of 1950-51	Mohammed Mahajuddin	Mvi. M. Hamid Abdur Razzaque.	Do.	Do.	Do.
8	229	6276 of 1949-50	Md. Shafiqul Alam	Mvi. Pannuddin Prodhon.	Do.	Do.	Do.
9	4	2069 of 1950-51	Md. Abulur Rahman	Mvi. Siddique Rahman	Salimullah Hall.	Muslim M.Com. Part II 1956.	Do.
10	7	4583 of 1950-51	Mohiuddin Ahmad	Mvi. Md. Ismail Mazar	Do.	Do.	Do.
11	17	7821 of 1950-51	Md. Shamsul Hossain Chowdhury.	Md. Hossain Chowdhury	Do.	Do.	Do.
12	458	995 of 1951-55	Abul Bashir Mohammad Serajul Huq.	Mvi. Muhammad Ali	External (Council Centre)	I.A. Examination 1956.	Examination of 1956 is cancelled and debarred from appearing in any Examination of the University.

13	129	102 of 1955-56	Gulam Rahman Chowdhury.	Mvi. Mozaffar Hossain Chowdhury.	S. M. Hall	Pre. 1956.	M.A. Examination of 1956 is cancelled and debarred from appearing at two subsequent Examinations.
14	251	679 of 1947-48	Abdul Wahed Bawwas	Late Mvi. Ekin Bawwas	F. H. M. Hall	Final LL.B. of July, 1956.	Do.
15	43	P. 127 of 1952-53	Abdur Rob Mirdha	Mvi. Abdur Rahn	E. P. Veterinary College, Tajsan, Part I, 1956.	Diploma (A.H.)	Do.
16	235	564 of 1947-48	Mustafa Kamal	Mvi. Sa'leque Ahmed	S. M. Hall	Final LL.B. of Examination of the paper on Law of Crimes is cancelled.	
17	54	6605 of 1950-51	Tasaddiq Hussain Siddiqi.	Mvi. Tabarak Hussain Siddiqi.	F. H. M. Hall	Pre. LL.B. of Examination of the paper on Constitutional Law is cancelled.	
18	77	H. 4 of 1952-53	Rahmatullah Khan	Late Mvi. Atallah Khan.	Iqbal Hall	Do.	Do.
19	143	6692 of 1950-51	Muhammed Mabur Rahman Khan.	Mvi. Amir Ali Khan	Do.	Do.	Do.

University Buildings.

Ramne, Dacca the 17th November, 1956.

M. R. KHAN,
Controller of Examinations.

UNIVERSITY OF DAWA

Orders of the Executive Council

Dated the 9th March, 1957

Disciplinary action have been taken against the following candidates who were found guilty of resorting to unfair means or other acts of indiscipline at the Engineering Examinations held in September, 1956 and Final M.B.B.S. Examination held in December, 1956 as noted against each.

Sl. No.	Exam. Roll No.	Regn. No. and Session.	Name of candidate	Father's name	Name of Institution	Name of Examination.	Action taken against
1	33	36 of 1954-55	Sirazul Islam	Mvi. Wabed Ali	A Engineering College, Dacca.	Diploma in Eng. Part II.	Examination of 1956 is cancelled and debarred from appearing at two subsequent Examinations.
2	105	777 of 1951-52	Zia Uddin Ahmed	Late Mvi. Mohiuddin Ahmed.	Do.	Do.	Do.

3	165	2004 of 1948-49	Md. Sersajul Islam	Mvi. Md. Abdul Wahed Bhuiyan.	Dacca Medical College. Final M.B.B.S. (December).	Examination of December, 1957 is cancelled and debarred from appearing at two subsequent Examinations.
4	65	724 of 1953-54	A. N. Abdul Mannan Talukder.	Mvi. Ehsanawaz Talukder.	A. Engineering College, Dacca.	Examination of 1956 is cancelled.
5	27	6930 of 1950-51	Syed Sersajul Hoda	Mvi. Syed Qamrul Hoda	Do. B.Sc. (Preliminary) Engineering.	Do.
6	103	6549 of 1953-54	A. Z. M. Shamsul Alam	Mvi. M. A. Khalequz	Do.	Do.

M. R. KHAN,
Controller of Examinations,
Dacca University.

University Buildings,
Ramna, Dacca the 26th March, 1957.

UNIVERSITY OF DACCA

Orders of the Executive Council

Dated the 7th July, and 29th July, 1956

The undermentioned candidates who were found guilty of resorting to unfair means or other acts of indiscipline at the following University Examinations are debarred from appearing at any future Examination of the University for the period noted against each and their examination of 1956 is cancelled.

INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION 1956

Sl. No.	Exam. Roll No.	Regn. No. and session.	Name of candidate	Father's name	Name of Institution	Debarred from appearing at the Examination of.
1	5089	2336 of 1954-55	Bijankumar Bhawmic	Kailashchandra Bhownic.	Conilla Victoria College, Conilla.	1957 and 1958
2	5307	2117 of 1954-55	Chittaranjan Majumdar	Babu Hanchandra Majumdar.	Do.	Do.
3	5373	1594 of 1953-54	Md. Nayeb Ali	Abdul Aziz Bepari	Do.	Do.
4	5450	1469 of 1953-54	Sudhinchandra Paul	Rajnikanta Paul	Do.	Do.
5	5380	7205 of 1952-53	Md. Zafar	Mvi. Nuruzzaman Chowdhury.	Do.	Do.

6	14	1275 of 1951-52	Akhতারuzzaman Mazumder.	Ansar Ali Mazumder	Do.	Do.
7	178	2398 of 1954-55	Sudhirkumar Bhattacharjee.	Lalit Mohan Bhattacharjee.	Do.	Do.
8	318	1825 of 1953-54	Abdur Rashid Patwary	Mvi. Abdul Ghani Patwary.	Do.	Do.
9	925	2590 of 1954-55	Md. Sekandar Ali	Late Minnat Ali	Do.	Do.
10	1111	8316 of 1949-49	A. K. M. Mahiuddin Chowdhury.	Mvi. Md. Yusuf Chowdhury.	Feni College, Feni	1957, 1958 and 1959
11	1095	2169 of 1953-54	Kishorimohan Saha	Upendrakumar Saha	Do.	1957 and 1958
12	1090	2155 of 1953-54	Gitaranjan Nag	Sachindrakumar Nag	Do.	Do.
13	1237	4400 of 1954-55	Md. Anwaruzzaman	Mvi. Tayebuddin Ahmed	Chittagong College, Chittagong.	Do.
14	1268	5819 of 1953-54	Anima Barua Chowdhury.	Babu Sushenkumar Chowdhury.	Do.	Do.
15	1261	5930 of 1953-54	Shamsuddin Ahmed	Late Aftabuddin Ahmed	Do.	Do.
16	1416	P. 84 of 1953-54	Shamsun Nahar (W)	Mvi. A. K. A. Mannan	Private (Chittagong Centre.)	Do.
17	5736	8031 of 1953-54	Md. Shah Alam Chowdhury.	Sobanhydor Choudhury	Sir Ashutosh College, Kannugopara.	Do.
18	7763	4057 of 1953-53	Chittaranjan Kaiborta Das.	Babu Steenamtaram Das	Do.	Do.
19	5356	871 of 1953-54	Manzurul Hussain Chowdhury.	Mvi. Md. Absar Chowdhury.	Murachand College Sylhet.	Do.
20	1726	1114 of 1954-55	Syed Afruz Hussain	Syed Zahur Ali	Do.	Do.
21	1736	1139 of 1954-56	Nilkantha Roy	Rebottilal Roy	Do.	Do.
22	1790	2678 of 1953-53	Md. Ataur Rahman	Md. Illias Masah	Do.	Do.
23	1821	983 of 1953-54	Md. Ohid Bakht Chowdhury.	Md. Feroz Bakht Chowdhury.	Do.	1957, 1958 and 1959
24	5963	1662 of 1952-53	Muhammed Abdul Maleque.	Md. Abdul Ghoni	Anandamohan College, Mymensingh.	1957 and 1958
25	6060	1588 of 1954-55	Mohammed Hussain	Maqbol Md. Nabab Ali Sarker	Do.	Do.

26	6066	1659 of 1954-55	Md. Abdul Hannan	Moyzeuddin Talukder	Do.
27	2042	2494 of 1953-54	Samir-un-Nasrath Guba	Babu Inanendranath Guba.	Do.
28	2043	1649 of 1954-55	Tirthabashi Roy	Late Ramchandras Roy	Do.
29	2049	2192 of 1953-54	A. F. M. Nurul Islam	Mri. Abbas Ali	Do.
30	2034	1544 of 1954-55	Mohammad Moazzem Hossain.	Md. Hasan Ali	Do.
31	2150	4908 of 1951-52	Md. Mahbubur Rahman.	Md. Armanullah	1957, 1958 and 1959
32	2151	2552 of 1953-54	Muhammad Zabnu' Huq Farjani.	Mri. Kazemul Hoque	1957 and 1958
33	2221	1480 of 1954-55	Id. Fazlur Rahman	Md. Eliabi Roy	Do.
34	2726	5331 of 1954-55	Md. Abdul Wahed	Md. Abdul Mojib	Do.
35	2737	5273 of 1953-54	Md. Habibur Rahman Miah.	Manshi Md. Ahsonullah	Do.
36	2745	5293 of 1953-54	Md. Miraluzzaman	Mri. M. L. Hammad Rahman.	Do.
37	2753	5285 of 1953-54	Muhammad Abdus Samad.	Late Mri. Md. Rahimuddin Sowdagar.	Do.
38	2781	9532 of 1948-49	Mohammed Zabbur.	Abdul M. Inan Ali Sarker	Do.
39	6295	4543 of 1953-54	A. K. Md. Moutaz Uddin Patwary.	Md. Aboudullah Patwary.	Do.
40	3030	657 of 1951-52	Mahmud Das	Late Nagarihasi Das	Do.
41	3050	5723 of 1953-54	Joydeb Maio	Babu Basantakumar Maio.	Do.
42	3067	3857 of 1954-55	Mahmudun Mallik	Atalbehari Mallik	Do.
43	3113	3722 of 1954-55	Mahmuddin Ahmed	Late Khanshib Dr. Ramizuddin Ahmad.	Do.
44	3326	5001 of 1953-54	Md. Shahjahan Miah	Abdul Barick Howlader	Do.
45	3558	3548 of 1954-55	Chowdhury Mahbul Haq.	Anwar Hossain Chowdhury.	Do.
				Rajendra College, Faridpur.	

Sl. No.	Exam. Roll. No.	Rega. No. and Session	Name of Candidate	Father's Name	Nazimuddin Madaripur. College.	Debarred from appearing at the Examination of.
46	3605	585 of 1954-55	Md. Saidur Rahman	Zillur Rahman	Do.	Do.
47	3621	624 of 1954-55	Md. Joynal Abedin	Md. Wazir Ali Miah	Do.	Do.
48	3715	5757 of 1954-55	Md. Hakmot Ali Munshi	Md. Elen Munshi	Quaid-e-Azam Memorial College.	Do.
					Name of Institution	
49.	6434	5558 of 1954-55	Manindra Chandis Mallick	Matbu Sudan Mallick	Haraganga College, Munshiganj	1957 & 1958
50.	6494	5545 of "	Paresh Chandra Sarker	Late Chandra Kumar Sarker	"	1957, 1958 and 1959
51.	3361	5428 of "	Deba Kumar Goswami	Stee Kund Behari Grawani	"	1957 and 1958
52.	3878	5485 of "	Abu Mohammad Mozaharul Ali Bhuiyan	Warish Ali Bhuiyan	"	"
53.	3891	6561 of 1953-54	Manoranjan Chakraborty	Purna Chandra Chakraborty	"	"
54.	3935	6069 of "	Muhammed Reazul Huq Khan	Mvi. Md. Ensuf Khan	Devendra College-Monikganj	"
55.	3986	6098 of "	Md. Monir Uddin	Monsur Ali Ahmed	"	"
56.	3940	6116 of "	Muhammed Anwar Hossain	Mahammad Hossain	"	"
57.	3951	7041 of 1954-55	Ashar Ali Khan	Mvi. Ahsan Ali Khan	"	"
58.	3977	6105 of 1953-54	Jitendra Nath De Sarker	Jogendra Nath De Sarker	"	"
59.	3980	7774 of "	Md. Mukdons Hossain Khan	Md. Fakub Khan	"	"
60.	4362	6835 of 1954-55	Delwar Hossain Khan	Late Gholam Mortuza Khan	Quaid-E-Azam College, Dacca	"
61.	4507	967 of 1952-53	A K M. Salehuzzaman Chowdhury	Mvi. Razuddin Bhuiyan	"	Examination of 1956 is cancelled only.
62.	4532	7565 of 1951-52	Abdus Satter Choudhury	Mvi Moazzem Hossain Choudhury	"	"
63.	6661	6747 of 19	Saiyid Munirul Haque	Saiyid Moinal Haque	Dacca College, Dacca	1957 and 1958
64.	8860	1725 of 1954-55	Abul Karamat Muhammad Fathullah	Mvi. Ahmadallah	Islamic Inter. College, Dacca	"

65.	4563	3002 of 1954-55	A. M. Atiqullah Khan	M. vi. Sultan Uddin Khan	Imperial Salimullah Int. College, Dacca	"
66.	4586	3072 of 1954-55	Mahabbat Ali	Late M. vi. Nawab Ali	"	"
67.	4620	13931 of 1948-49	Muhammad Basur Rahman Bhuiyan	Late M. vi. Abdul Hakim Bhuiyan	"	"
68.	8563	6802 of 1954-55	Md. Abbas	Abdul Rahman	Quaid-E-Azam College, Dacca	"
FINAL DAY COURSE EXAMINATION, 1956						
69.	16	206 of 1954-55	Chuni Lal Barua	Late Rashik Chandra Barua	Govt. College of Commerce, Chittagong	1957 and 1958
70.	23	109 of 1953-54	Syed Fakhru'l Islam Mahmud	Syed Abu Taleb	"	"
DEGREE EXAMINATION						
71.	217	342 of 1949-50	Nizam Uddin Ahmed	M. vi. Shamsuddin Ahmed	Comilla Victoria College, Comilla	1957 and 1958
72.	353	17725 of 1948-49	Mohammed Wajihullah	M. vi. Salamattullah Patwary	External Candidate, (Chauhanani Centre)	"
73.	2172	4777 of 1949-50	Fenindra Lal Talukdar	Late Babu Rajkumar Talukdar	Chittagong College, Chittagong	1957 and 1958
74.	685	6686 of 1951-52	Md. Muzibur Rahman Choudhury	M. vi. Md. Mahmud Rahman Chowdhury	M. C. College, Sylhet	"
75.	649	2970 of 1952-53	Rathindra Majumdar	Harendra Mohan Majumdar	"	"
76.	2304	2799 of 1952-53	Rajyeshwar Das	Pandab Chandra Das	"	"
77.	784	4312 of 1951-52	Md. Fazlul Haque	Late Md. Addul Gaffur Sarker	Anandamohan College, Mymensingh	"
78.	2339	3205 of 1949-50	A. K. Md. Abdul Mannan	Md. Azimu'ddin Sarker	"	"
79.	779	1815 of 1952-53	Md. Nawab Ali Miah	Md. Kamal Bepari	"	"
80.	744	3072 of 1952-53	Md. Lohman Hossain Fakir	Md. Mamtaruddin Fakir	"	"
81.	894	7609 of 1950-51	Md. Abdul Bari	Haji Jahsbar Fakir	"	"

82.	525	6546 of 1952-53	Abu Zahur Md. Enayattullah Khan	Mvi. Abdel Jabbar Khan	"	"
83.	826	1448 of 1950-51	Ruknuddin Ahmed	Mvi. Bedaruddin Ahmed	"	"
84.	1330	6018 of 1950-51	Mahammad Mozammel Haque	Late Mvi. Mofizuddin Ahmed	Fazlul Hug College, Chakhar	"
85.	1331	16136 of 1947-48	Syed Abdus Satter	Mvi. Syed Afeeruddin	"	"
86.	2954	17896 of 1947-48	Muhammed Abdur Rahman	El-Haj Mobsak Ali	Jagannath College, Dacca	"
87.	3214	3907 of 1951-52	Shamsuddin Ahmed	Late Itwari Mistary	Salimullah Muslim Hall, Dacca University	"
88.	3453	1977 of 1951-52	A H. Md. Abdur Rahman Chowdhury	Mvi. Hassan Ali Chowdhury	"	"
89.	3344	7856 of 1947-48	Kesab Chandra Ray	Late Natulchandra Ray	Jagannath Hall, Dacca University	"
90.	92	13527 of 1947-48	A. K. M. Khorshed Alam Chowdhury	M. K. Rahman	Dacca Medical College	November, 1956 and April, 1957

FIRST M.B.B.S. EXAMINATION OF APRIL, 1956
(held in July, 1956)

M. R. KHAN
Controller of Examinations

THE UNIVERSITY OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR, SRINAGAR

Notification

The following candidates who were found guilty of using unfair means at the various Examinations of this University held at the annual session, 1956 have been disqualified from passing any Examination of the University for the period shown against each.

Sl. Roll No.	Regd. No.	Name of the candidate and parentage	R-sidence or Institution from which appeared	Period for which disqualified.
I. MATRICULATION				
1. 16	---	Wali Mohd. Waza S/O Mr. Abdul Aziz Waza	Govt. High School, Kishtwar, Jammu	Two years (1956-57)
2. 68	---	Bhumi Parkash Chowhan S/O Chanda Lal Chowhan	S.A. High School, Bhadawash, Jammu	Do.
3. 939	---	Omkar Singh S/O Harnam Singh	Govt. High School, Reasi, Jammu	Do.
4. 1057	---	Sita Ram Sharma S/O Beli Ram Sharma	Govt. High School, Rajouri, Jammu	Do.
5. 2374	---	Om Prakash Gupta S/O L. Faqir Chand Pachyla	Pachyla Bazar, Chabtra, Udhampur	Do.
6. 2375	---	Wali Mohamad Hajin S/O Abdul Ghani	Proper Kishtwar, Jammu	Do.
7. 5572	---	Gulam Mohamad S/O Kh. Ali Joo	Buchwara, Srinagar (Kashmir)	Do.
8. 5679	---	Basai Lal Peshin S/O Arjan Nath Peshin	Noonar, Kathwar, Budgam (Kashmir)	Do.
II. INTERMEDIATE				
1. 110		Jawahir Singh M.N. S/O Major Narayan Singh	M.N. S.P. College, Srinagar	Two years (1956-57)
2. 206	2015-S-52	Mohd. Akbar Draboo S/O Kh. Aziz-ud-Din Draboo	Narwara, Srinagar	One year (1956) only
3. 300	2871-S-55	Chaman Lal Raina S/O Capt. Radha Kishen Raina	S.P. College, Srinagar	Do.
4. 465	1201-A-54	Piaray Kishen Mieri S/O P. Jia Lal Mieri	A.S. College, Srinagar	Two years (1956-57)
5. 773	1082-Gj-52	Vinod Kumar Sharma S/O Pt. Yogeshwar Kumar Sharma	Govt. G.M. Science College, Jammu	Three years (1956-58)
6. 833	1432-Gj-53	Ajit Singh Oulkh S/O Gurdial Singh Oulkh	Do.	Do.
7. 1067	2846-S-55	Gh. Qudir Kawosa S/O Haji Habib Ullah Kawosa	S.P. College, Srinagar	Two years (1956-57)
1. 653	9720-S-50	Chunni Lal S/O Pt. Arjan Nath	Chokora, P.O. Bijbehara, Kashmir	Two years (1956-57)
IV. ADIB-FAZIL (Hons. in Urdu)				
1. 112	288 S-49	Abdul Hai S/O Mohamed Khalil	Dabtal, S.R. Guni, Srinagar	Three years (1956-58)

Sd/- GHULIAM MOHAMMAD,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF ALLAHABAD

Notice

The following candidates have been disqualified from the Examination of 1957 and debarred from appearing for the Examination of 1959 for using unfair means to pass the Examination,

Roll No.	Enrolment No.	Name	Date of birth	Father's name	Address	Examination	Period for which debarred
577	L-125	Dina Nath	5th August, 1932	Sri Bindeshwari Prasad.	Moh. Rath Haveli Faizabad	B.Sc. Part I	1958
30	J-3373	Surendra Nath Tiwari.	1st January, 1936.	Sri Chandra Bali Tiwari.	Vil. Bharsara P.O. Gola Bazar, Dist. Gorakhpur.	B.Sc. Agricultural Engg. Final.	1958
348	K-860	Jai Karan Nath Shukla.	13th December, 1939.	Sri R. B. Shukla	Sri R. B. Shukla, Dist. Co-operative Officer, Jalaun (Oran).	B.Sc. Part II	1958
971	CMP/A/339	Shiva Kumar Pathak.	2nd July, 1932	Sri Shyam Narain Pathak.	C/o Dr S. N. Pathak, Waitgunj, Hardoi.	B.A. Part II	1958
454	K-2493	Ram Nath Pandey	3rd January, 1939.	Pt Ram Pratap Pandey.	Vil. Jagdishpur, P. O. Imailgunj, Dist. Allahabad.	Do.	1958
49	I-820	Kaushal Kumar Srivastava.	15th July, 1933	Sri Shridhar Lal Srivastava.	39, Dilkusha, Allahabad	L.L.B. Final	1958
77	I-1119	Narendra Kumar Agrawal.	19th July, 1933	Sidheshwar Nath Agrawal.	Allahabad Hosiery Stores, Johnstongunj, Allahabad.	Do	1958
144	J-2681	Yamuna Singh.	1st August, 1933.	Braj Bhushan Singh	Vil. & P. O. Gondia, Dist. Paraggarh.	Do.	1958
541	I-4727	Shiva Vikash Trivedi.	2nd July, 1933	Sri Shiva Tewari.	Moh. Katra Abdul Ghanu Fatehpur City.	L.L.B. Previous	1958
4	I-408	Amar Nath Bhargava.	1st August, 1934	Pt. Gajadhar Pd. Bhargava.	28, Thornhill Road, Allahabad.	L.L.B. Final	1957
515	H-4753	Rajendra Kumar Srivastava.	13th February, 1931.	M. Chail Behari Lal	269, Ahiyapur, Allahabad	L.L.B. Previous	1958
1521	L-1266	Avadesh Singh.	19th July, 1941	Sri Janardan Singh	Vil. Unchadiba, P.O. Manikpur, Dist. Banda.	B.A. Part I	1958
13	J-4875	Dharam Vir	30th November, 1936.	Sri Ram Bharose Lal.	Vil. Ramen Ka Pura, P. O. Leader Press, Allahabad.	B.A. (Pass)	1958

I. D. CALREB,
Asst. Registrar (Admn.)



THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

Vol. 145]

DECEMBER, 1957

[No. 3

CASTE IN THE VEDAS

BASANTAKUMAR CHATTOPADHYAYA

It is generally believed that in the Vedas there is no evidence of the caste system, or, if there was caste, it was determined not by birth but by profession, those who officiated as priests being called Brāhmaṇas, those who were kings or warriors being called Kṣatriyas and so on. An attempt will be made in this article to show that there is clear evidence of the existence of the caste in the *Ṛgveda Samhitā*, and that the caste was determined not by profession, but by birth.

It is well known that in *Ṛgveda Samhitā* (10.90.12)¹ the four castes are referred to. "The Brāhmaṇas were His mouth. The arms were made Rājanyas (Kṣatriyas). The Vaiśyas were His thighs, with His feet the Sūdras were created." It is contended that much weight cannot be attached to this verse as verses of the 10th Maṇḍala of the *Ṛgveda Samhitā* were composed at a much later period than the date of composition of the other portions and that the language of this verse is undoubtedly of a much later date. Indeed the suggestion has been made that this verse is an interpolation. Further its interpretation as given above has been challenged.

First, about interpretation. There can be no doubt that the interpretation as given above is the correct one. Sāyaṇa in his

ब्राह्मणोऽस्य मुखमासीद्ब्राह्मणः जनः ।

उर उरस्य यक्षिणः पद्मांश्चैव जायत ॥

—*Ṛgveda Samhitā*, 10.90-12.

commentary on the above verse after giving the above interpretation observes in support of it: "The origin of the Brāhmaṇa etc. from the mouth etc. is clearly stated by the Vedas in the seventh Kāṇḍa of the *Yajurveda Samhitā*." Sāyaṇa then quotes the opening words of *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda Samhitā* (7.1.1). The following is a translation of the relevant portions of the passage referred to.² "Prajāpati wished to be born (as many). From the mouth He created (some objects). . . Among men the Brāhmaṇas (were created from His mouth). . . Hence they are the foremost (objects). . . Because they were created from His mouth. . . From His heart and arms fifteen objects were created. . . Among men the Kṣatriyas (were created from His heart and arms). . . Hence they are powerful. Because they were created out of strength. From His middle portion seventeen objects were created. . . Among men the Vaiśyas (were created from His middle portion). Hence they are more wealthy than others. From His feet twenty-one objects were created. . . Among men the Sūdras were created from His feet. Hence the Sūdra is not entitled to perform a sacrifice." Vālmīki says, "The Brāhmaṇas were created out of his mouth, the Kṣatriyas out of his heart, the Vaiśyas out of his thighs and the Sūdras out of his feet. *The Vedas say so*" (*Rāmāyaṇa* 3.14.30).³

In the *Mahābhārata*, Śāntiparva (72.4, 5) it has been stated that the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣatriya, the Vaiśya and the Sūdra were created out of the mouth, the arms, the thigh and the feet of the Brahṁā.⁴ Manu says, "For the improvement of the world Brahma created the Brāhmaṇas, the Kṣatriyas, the Vaiśyas and the Sūdras out of His

² प्रजापतिरकामयत प्रवयिष्य इति समुखतः द्विषतं निरमिमीत ब्राह्मणो मनुष्याणां . . तस्मात् ते मुख्याः . . मुखतो हि असृज्यन्त । उरसो बाहुभ्यां पञ्चदशं निरमिमीत . . राजन्यः मनुष्याणां . . तस्मात् ते वीर्यवन्तः वीर्याद्धि असृज्यन्त । मध्यतः सप्तदशं निरमिमीत . . वैश्यो मनुष्याणां . . तस्मात् भूयानः अन्वेभ्यः । पक्षः एकविंशं निरमिमीत . . यद्वो मनुष्याणां . . तस्मात् यद्वो यज्ञे अनवकृतः ।

—*Kṛṣṇayajurvediya Taittirīya Samhitā*, 7 1.1.

मुखतो ब्राह्मणः जाताः उरसः क्षत्रियास्तथा ।

ऊरुभ्यां जज्ञिरे वैश्याः पक्षां यद्वो इति श्रुतिः ॥

—*Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa*, 3.14.30.

ब्राह्मणो मुखतो सृष्टो ब्राह्मणो राजसत्तम ।

बाहुभ्यां क्षत्रियः सृष्ट ऊरुभ्यां वैश्य एव च ॥

वर्णाणां परिचर्यायै मयाणां भरतर्षभ ।

वर्षैश्चतुर्थः सृष्टतः पक्षां यद्वो विनिर्मितः ॥

—*Mahābhārata*, Śāntiparva, 72.4.5.

mouth, arms, thighs and feet" (*Manu* 1.31).⁵ The *Srimadbhāgavatam* says, "From the mouth, the hands, the thighs and the feet of the Supreme Being were created the four castes and the four āśramas" (11.5.2).⁶ It will thus be seen that the verse (*R̥gveda Samhitā* 10.90.12) has been interpreted in the same way in the *Yajurveda*, the *Manusmṛitī*, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Srimadbhāgavatam*. There should not, therefore, be any doubt about its correct interpretation. As regards the question whether the verse is an interpolation it may be observed that the same verse occurs not only in the *R̥gveda Samhitā* but also in other Vedas. Thus it occurs in the *Sukla Yajurveda Samhitā* (31.1.11) and also (with very slight verbal alteration) in the *Atharvaveda Samhitā* (19.6.6).⁷ As the Vedas were transmitted by the mouth by several preceptors to several disciples at the same time it would have been very difficult to make an interpolation. It would have been still more difficult to interpolate the verse in two other Vedas. Further, it is most unlikely that the interpolated verse would receive recognition in the most prominent religious books, e.g., the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata*, the *Manusmṛitī*, the *Bhāgavatam*, etc. It should, therefore, be concluded that it is a genuine verse of the Vedas.

As regards the objection that the 10th Maṇḍala of the *R̥gveda Samhitā* was of later date it may be observed that there is mention of castes in other portions of the *R̥gveda Samhitā* which are acknowledged to be of older dates. Thus *R̥gveda Samhitā* (8.35.16, 17 and 18)⁸ contain prayers to the Aśvinī Kumāras to be propitious to

5 लोकाणां तु विहङ्गार्थं मुखवाङ्मनोपादतः ।

ब्राह्मणं क्षत्रियं वैश्यं शूद्रं च निरवर्तयत् ॥

— *Manu* 1.3.

6 मुखवाङ्मनोपादतः पुरुषस्याश्रमैः सह ।

चत्वारो जातिरे वर्णाः गुणैर्निर्मादयः पृथक् ॥

Bhāgavatam 11.5.20

7 ब्राह्मणोऽस्य मुखमासीद् वाङ्मनो राजस्योऽभवत् ।

मनसं तदस्य यद् वैश्यः पद्भ्यां शूद्रोऽजायत ॥

— *Atharvaveda* 19.6.6.

8 ब्रह्म जन्मतं

— *R̥gveda Samhitā* 8.35.16.

सायण—'हे अश्विनी ब्रह्म ब्राह्मणं जन्मतं प्रीत्यतः'

अस्य जन्मतं

— *R̥gveda Samhitā* 8.35.17.

सायण—"अस्य क्षत्रियं"

"क्षत्रिजन्मतस्तु जन्मतं विश्वः"

सायण—"विश्वः वैश्यान्"

the Brāhmaṇas, the Kṣatriyas and the Vaiśyas. *R̥gveda Samhitā* (6.75.10)⁹ says, "May the Brāhmaṇas who perform sacrifices protect us." *R̥gveda Samhitā* (7.103.7 and 8)¹⁰ refer to Brāhmaṇas chanting hymns in sacrifices. *R̥gveda Samhitā* (4.50.9)¹¹ refers to the gift of wealth to poor Brāhmaṇas. (Incidentally it may be observed that the numerous references to the duty of making gifts to Brāhmaṇas found in the *Satupatha Brāhmaṇas* etc. are supported by the *R̥gveda Samhitā*). *R̥gveda Samhitā* (4.42.1,¹² 5.69.1,¹³ 8.25.8¹⁴) refer to the Kṣatriya caste. Thus there are references to the caste in those portions of the *R̥gveda Samhitā* which are considered to be of the oldest date, viz., Maṇḍalas 2 to 7. It is needless to say that the references quoted above are not exhaustive, and that there are many other references to the caste besides those quoted above. For an exhaustive list one should refer to the numerous references quoted in the Index of the *R̥gveda Samhitā* for the words *Brahma*, *Brāhmaṇa*, *Kṣatra*, *Kṣatriya*, *Rājanya*, and also its derivatives and also to compound words containing these words.

ब्राह्मणासः पितरः सोम्यासः शिवे नो द्यावापृथिवी अनेहसा ।

पूषानः पानु दुरिताद्वता वधो रक्षा माक्रिर्नो अधश्च ईशत ॥

—*R̥gveda Samhitā* 6.75.10.

"Oh Brahmanas, you are like our fathers you perform sacrifices, you prepare Soma,—do protect us May the earth and the heaven which are free from sin, be good to us.

May the god Pūṣa protect us from sin.

10

ब्राह्मणासो अतिरात्रे न सोमै

—*R̥gveda Samhitā* 7.103.7.

साग्रथ "यथा अतिरात्रे सोमयागे ब्राह्मणास ब्राह्मणाः राक्षी सुत शस्त्राणि पर्यायेन शंसन्ति"

ब्राह्मणामः सोमिनी वाचमक्रत ब्रह्म कृण्वन्तः परिवत्सरीणम्

—*R̥gveda Samhitā* 7.103.8.

The frogs croaked like Brāhmaṇas chanting hymns in sacrifices.

11

अप्रतीतो जयति संधनानि प्रति जन्थानि उत या सजन्था ।

अवस्यं योवरिवः कृणोति ब्रह्मणे राजा तमवन्ति देवाः ॥

—*R̥gveda Samhitā* 4.50.9.

That king can win the wealth of his opponents and other persons who gives money to poor Brahmanas. The gods protect him.

12

मम द्विता राष्ट्रं अत्रियस्य विज्ञाथोः

—*R̥gveda Samhitā* 4.42.1.

"I have two kingdoms ; One in earth and one in heaven, I who am a Kṣatriya".

13

वी रीचना वरुण वीरुत दून् etc.

—*R̥gveda Samhitā* 5.69.1

14

अज्ञतावाना नि वेदतुः सावित्याय सु क्रतु

—*R̥gveda Samhitā* 8.25.8.

We should now examine the question whether there is anything in the *Rgveda Samhitā* to indicate whether the caste should be determined by birth or by profession. On this question there is a prevailing opinion that those who actually worked as priests or teachers of the Vedas or at least regularly recited the Vedas were called Brāhmaṇas. That this theory is not correct would appear from the *Rgveda Samhitā* (8.92.30)¹⁵ which refers to a Brāhmaṇa who spends his time idly. The verse uses the word *tandruu* which Sāyaṇa explains to mean one who wants to lead an idle life, who does not believe in the Vedas and has given up performing sacrifices and other duties. As such a person has been called a Brāhmaṇa it is clear that the caste did not depend upon the performance of the duties prescribed for a Brāhmaṇa.

Again we find in the *Rgveda Samhitā* (2.43.2)¹⁶ reference to the son of a Brāhmaṇa chanting the Vedas in sacrifices. This verse makes it clear that caste is hereditary and that the son of a Brāhmaṇa is employed for the performance of the work of a Brāhmaṇa.

It would thus appear that there are references to various castes in many portions of the Vedas including those that were composed in the earliest times, that caste did not depend upon the performance of some particular work, but was determined by birth.

Before concluding this article it seems necessary to refer to a passage of the *Rgveda Samhitā* (viz., 9.112.3)¹⁷ which is sometimes quoted in support of the theory that caste is not determined by birth. It may be translated thus: "I am a composer of Vedic verses. My father is a physician. My mother grinds corn on the stone. We try to earn money in various ways, like cows in a cowshed. Oh

15

मो षु ब्रह्मैव तन्द्रयुर्भूवो वाजानां पते ।

मत्वा सुतस्य गोमतः ॥

—*Rgveda Samhitā* 8.92.30.

Oh Indra, do not be like an idle Brāhmaṇa who does not perform sacrifices etc. Drink Soma mixed with milk and be glad.

१६ उद्गतिव शकुने साम गायसि ब्रह्मपुत्र इव सवनेषु ब्रंससि

—*Rgveda Samhitā* 2.43.2.

Oh bird, you are singing as the Udgāta priest sings Sāma, as the son of a Brāhmaṇa recites in sacrifices.

वावरहं ततो भिवशुपलप्रचिषी गमा

मानाधिबो वस्यबोऽनुगा इव

तस्मिन्निन्द्राविन्दो परि सुव

—*Rgveda Samhitā* 9.112.3.

Soma, flow for Indra." Here it is not stated that the father and the son belonged to different castes. To argue that the father must have belonged to a separate caste, Vaidya (not a Brāhmaṇa) because caste was determined by profession is 'to beg the question'. The point for decision being whether caste should be determined by profession or birth, it cannot be assumed that caste was determined by profession. Moreover, the *Ṛgveda Samhitā* (10 97.7 and 22) refer to physicians who are Brāhmaṇas by caste making it clear that physicians might be Brāhmaṇas. Even now there are many Vaidyas (physicians of the Indian school of Medicine) who are Brāhmaṇas by caste. Hence *Ṛgveda Samhitā* (9 112.3) referred to above does not show that father and son might have belonged to different castes.

INDIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA—BEGINNINGS OF BITTERNESS (1880-1900)

PROF. SUDHANGSU BIMAL MOOKERJEE
Khalsa College, Amritsar

II

The Indians in the South African Republic requested the Government in June, 1888, to exempt them from the operation of the law which ordered that 'Kaffirs' should not be in streets after nine in the evening. The request was turned down. A few months later in August, 1888, the High Court decided in the case of Ismail Sulieman and Co., that Asiatics could carry on business only in locations. The Indians felt uneasy. They lodged a protest to Her Majesty's Government against the judgment and the dispute was submitted to arbitration. Mr. Mellius de Villiers, the Chief Justice of the Orange Free State was appointed arbitrator. He upheld the decision of the High Court and observed that "the South African Republic was entitled to give full force and effect to Law 3 of 1885, subject to the sole and exclusive interpretation in the ordinary course by the tribunals of the country."

The Volksraad passed a resolution in September, 1893, authorising itself to devise ways and means to enforce compliance with Law 3 of 1885. A Commission, appointed in August, 1895, to investigate the question of the administration of the said law, recommended that Law 3 of 1885 should be immediately applied and rigorously maintained. The recommendation was adopted by the Volksraad by a resolution in November, 1896.

Law 3 of 1899 forbade mixed marriages, *i.e.*, marriages between whites and non-whites. The Law, needless to say, affected the Indians along with all other non-Europeans in the South African Republic. An Indian trader, Yakub Hajee Mohammed, sued the Government in August, 1898, for a declaration of rights in course of an appeal before the High Court against the refusal of a trade licence in Church Street, Pretoria. The Court upheld the action of the Government.

Law 15 of 1898 laid down that "no coloured person might be a licence-holder, or in any way connected with the working of the

digging." Section 130 of the Law prohibited a European who alone could acquire a leasehold in a stand, from transferring or subletting the right to a coloured person, permitting him to reside on or occupy ground under such right. Section 131 laid down that no coloured person should be permitted to reside on proclaimed land in the mining district of Witwatersrand except in bazars, locations, mining compounds and such other places as the Mining Commissioners might set apart.

The Orange Free State outdid the South African Republic by passing a law in 1891, which prohibited an Arab, a Chinaman, a coolie or any other coloured person from Asia from carrying on business or forming in the Orange Free State. Indian business houses were forced to close down after the expiry of a twelve month period ending on September 11, 1891, and the Indian mercantile community was packed out without any compensation whatever.²⁷

The malicious propaganda against the Indians, begun before the enactment of the above law, however continued. It was contended, for example, "As these men (*i.e.*, Indians) enter the State without wives or female relatives the result is obvious. Their religion teaches them to consider all women as Soulless and Christians as natural preys."²⁸

Natal, which had first invited the Indians to South Africa, was not to lay behind the South African Republic and the Orange Free State. The Natal Advertiser in its issue of 15.9.93, after showing that "the real coolie" was indispensable to South African economy, declared: "The sooner steps are taken to suppress, and, if possible, to compel the Indian trader the better. These latter are the real canker that is eating into the very vitals of the community."

The Indians in Natal were fast growing in number on the Europeans in 1891. Two-thirds of them were free men. Some had Municipal and Parliamentary franchise.²⁹ The European colonists were frightened by the increasing numbers and growing prosperity of the Indian settlers. The majority of the European settlers, observes the Wragg Commission, "were strongly opposed to the presence of free Indians as rivals either in agricultural or commercial pursuits". The Governor of Natal therefore proposed that the

²⁷ This, however, does not agree in all details with the following: "... , passed a law prohibiting any Asiatic from trading or farming and the Indians settled there were forthwith deported without any compensation."—*Our Countrymen Abroad* by Kumari Mukul Mukherjee, p. 193.

²⁸ *Green Book*, No. I. 1894, p. 30 presented to the O. F. S. Volksraad.

²⁹ *A History of South Africa* by E. A. Walker, p. 522.

Indians be compelled to return to India on the expiry of the period of indenture. The proposal was not accepted by the Government of India. The Government of Natal next proposed that the period of indenture be extended. The Government of India, however, did not agree. The proposal, they contended, would deprive the Indian immigrant of the option of returning home on the completion of the 5 year period of indenture. The proposal, the Government of India argued further, would prevent the Indian immigrant from making the best use of the second five years of his stay in Natal. The reader will please note that under the existing law the indentured Indian immigrant had to complete this period to earn the privilege of a free return passage to India. Return home after the first five years would, therefore, deprive the Indian labourers of the right of a free return passage.

The first step to keep down the number of Indian settlers in Natal by preventing future settlement was taken by an Act of 1891, which repealed Section 51 of Act II of 1870. The Section offered Crown land to the Indian labourer at the end of ten years after arrival in Natal. Natal, which was granted self-government in 1893, sent the Binns-Mason Deputation to the Government of India in the same year. The Deputation requested the Government of India to agree to the compulsory return of Indian labourers from Natal on completion of their period of indenture. The Government of India told the Deputation that they (*i.e.*, the Government of India) would not object to the insertion of a condition in all future contracts that the labourers must return to India on the expiry of the last terms of their indenture "provided that failure to fulfil this condition should not constitute a criminal offence".

The Government of India themselves did not know how to compel the indenture-expired labourers to return to India. They wrote to the Secretary of State for India. "We believe however that refusals to return will probably be rare, that they may be reduced to a minimum by imposing a tax on residence of Indian immigrants in the colony³⁰. The latter, however, pointed out in his reply that the initiative in the matter should come from the Government of Natal and that the Government of India should not propose or approve the imposition of a tax on Indian immigrants for residence in Natal. He suggested at the same time what he thought to be a simple and more effective method to compel the indentured labourer to contribute from his

³⁰ *The Government of India Despatch*, dated 22nd May, 1891.

earnings a certain proportion of the cost of the return passage and to provide for the forfeiture of such contribution in the event of not returning within some reasonable period. The India Office rightly "apprehended the possible imposition of a special tax on emigrants choosing to remain in the colony (Natal), contrary to the terms of their undertaking, as also the extension of such special tax to free Indians who went to the colony, at their own expense and without conditions, for purposes of trade"³¹. The Colonial Office however wrote that "such a tax would be in effect a penalty for enforcing contracts voluntarily made by the coolies in India and might be justified on the ground, but that it would not follow that the allowance of such a measure would preclude disallowance of a law imposing a special tax on free Indian emigrants to Natal"³².

Because the Government of India insisted on immunity from criminal prosecution of the indentured Indians, who stayed back in Natal, the Binns-Mason Deputation recommended a residence-tax on them. The Natal Legislative Assembly accepted the recommendation and passed Act 14 of 1895. The Act modified the Indian Emigration Act 25 of 1891 in some important respects. Section 110 of the latter provided for a full passage back home to an Indian labourer who had spent ten years in Natal and had completed five years of service, if he applied within twelve months after the expiry of his indenture. Section 114 provided for the forfeiture of this privilege under certain circumstances. Section 13 of Act 17, however, nullified both the sections under reference. The Act, no doubt, provided for a free return passage to India; but disallowed the grace period of twelve months granted under section 110 of Act 25 of 1891. An ex-indentured Indian was allowed to stay in Natal whether he took out a licence or not. Section 6 of Act 17 proposed a licence-fee of £ 25 per annum. The Government of India, however, objected and the fee was fixed at £ 3 per annum. Every ex-indentured Indian above 16—if a man—and above 12—if a woman had to pay the fee if he or she wanted a licence to stay in Natal.

The imposition of a licence-fee of £ 3 a year bordered on the barbarous. Indian wages were still very low. They were kept down by the continuing influx of fresh indentured immigrants at an initial wage of ten shillings a month. The impost drove not a few Indians

³¹ *Indians Overseas 1888-1949*, by C. Kondapi, p. 23

³² *Selection of papers regarding the Indian problem in South Africa for the use of the Government of India delegates* (1926), p. 21, Despatch No. 1020, J. and P. dated 4th July, 1894.

to lives of sorrow and dishonour. Sir Liege Hulett, an ex-Prime Minister, declared on the floor of the Natal legislature that it (the licence-fee) had the effect of driving many Indian women to lives of shame. The late G. K. Gokhale remarked, "This cruel impost caused enormous suffering, resulted in breaking up families, and driving men to crime and women to a life of shame."

A redeeming feature—perhaps the only one—of Act 17 of 1895, was that it recognised the right of ex-indentured labourers to stay in Natal even if he or she did not obtain a licence for the purpose. Those who did not take licence could not be forcibly sent back to India. Nor did the Act make any provision for penalising them. Ex-indentured Indians could not therefore be directly forced back to India. But the Act provided that each fresh Indian immigrant entering Natal under an indenture should agree either to return to India on the expiry of his indenture or to re-enter into a contract for work on hire.

The grant of self-government to Natal in 1893 has been referred to above. This was the signal, as it were, of flinging wide open the flood-gates of anti-Indian activities of the Government of Natal. The helpless Indian community was deprived of many of the rights and privileges it enjoyed under the Old regime. The first session of the First Parliament of self governing Natal passed a Bill depriving all Asian immigrants of the Parliamentary franchise so long enjoyed by them. The Bill was submitted to the Colonial Office for Royal assent (1894).

A new star had in the meanwhile appeared on the South African horizon. It grew and grew in brilliance from day to day till at last it became a beacon for humanity at large, a symbol of hope for the down-trodden, disinherited and submerged humanity all over the world. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, a young Indian Barrister—India's Bapu of future years—was at this time in South Africa on a purely professional call. He discovered the Bill by accident at the farewell party in Durban on the eve of his departure for India. "At the farewell entertainment held by Dadu Abdulla in my honour", writes Gandhiji, "some one put a copy of the Natal Mercury into my hands. I read it and found that the detailed report of the proceedings of the Natal Legislative Council contained a few lines on 'Indian Franchise'. The local government was about to introduce a Bill to disfranchise Indians read out the report to the traders and others present and explained the situation as well as I could, suggesting that Indians should strenuously resist this attack upon their rights. They agreed

but declared that they could not fight the battle themselves and therefore urged me to stay on. The same night I drew up a position to be presented to the Legislative Council. A telegram was sent to the Government requesting them to delay the proceedings. A committee was formed with Sheth Abdulla Haji Adam as Chairman and the telegram was sent in his name. The further reading of the Bill was postponed for two days. The position was the first ever sent by Indians to a South African Legislature. It was South African Indians' first experience of such a mode of procedure and a new thrill of enthusiasm passed through the community. Meetings were held everyday. The requisite funds were soon oversubscribed. Within a month a memorial with 10,000 signatures was forwarded to Lord Ripon and the immediate task I had set before myself was accomplished".³³

Mahatma Gandhi founded the Natal Indian Congress at this time (1894). The Natal Legislative Council ignored the Indian representation and as noted above, passed the Franchise Bill and sent it for Her Majesty's approval. Mahatma Gandhi's efforts, however, did not go in vain. Joseph Chamberlain, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Colonies, refused to advise Royal assent to the Bill. His letter to the Prime Minister of Natal will be read with interest. "Electors of important constituencies in Great Britain have considered Indian gentlemen worthy not merely to exercise the franchise, but to represent them in the House of Commons. I desire, however, to guard myself from the supposition that I regard this question merely from the point of view afforded by the experience of this country, and that I have not paid due regard to local considerations. It is manifestly the intention and desire of your Government that the destinies of the colony of Natal shall continue to be shaped by the Anglo-Saxon race; and that the possibility of any preponderant influx of the Asiatic voters should be averted But the Bill under consideration involves in a common disability all natives of India without exception, and provides no machinery by which an Indian can free himself from this disability, whatever his intelligence, his education or his state in the country, and to assent to this measure would be to put an affront on the people of India such as no British Parliament could be a party to".³⁴

³³ *Satyagraha in South Africa* by M. K. Gandhi, Part I, Chapter, VI.

³⁴ Quoted in *Indians Abroad Directory* by S. Waiz, p. 478. Also in *Verdict on South Africa* by P. S. Joshi, pp. 54-55.

The Bill, modified on the advice of Chamberlain, was re-introduced in the Natal legislature in 1896. Sir John Robinson, the mover of the Bill summed it up in the following words: "This Bill will disqualify all persons who are precluded by virtue of their experience from the exercise of the high privilege of citizenship". The Bill was an improvement upon its predecessor inasmuch as it left the 'door open for the admission of Indians to the Parliamentary franchise as soon as India become a self-governing dominion'.³⁵ Even before the acquisition of self-government by India, the Governor of Natal might make exceptions in the cases of those Indian settlers whose names were already on the Voters' Roll and who were 'otherwise qualified and competent'. The Bill, passed by the Natal legislature, received Royal assent in due course and was placed on the statute-book as the Franchise Act, 1896, (Act 8, 1896). A handful of Indians, whose names were on the Voters' Roll at the time, continued to enjoy parliamentary franchise even after the passing of the Act. But no Indian, who was not already a voter in 1896, could acquire parliamentary franchise in future.

White Natal became more and more anti-Indian. Tension in Natal went on mounting in consequence. In the closing years of the 19th century, the Indian population in the colony was almost equal in number to the European. The number of free or 'passenger' Indians had been on the increase for some time. The European settlers felt uneasy and the smouldering fire of fear and hatred finally burst out in anti Indian riots in 1897. Mahatma Gandhi had come back to India in the middle of 1896. He utilised his stay in India by meeting prominent national leaders and by addressing a number of public meetings. He had also published a pamphlet on the Indian question in South Africa. Indians at home were thus acquainted with the grievances of their compatriots abroad. Incorrect reports of Mahatma Gandhi's activities reached Natal and England. The Reuter cabled to Natal that Gandhi had made European Natal appear in India "as black as his own face". The latter become furious.

The Indian settlers wanted Gandhiji to be back in their midst. A cable to this effect reached him while he was in Calcutta. He responded to the call and immediately sailed for Durban with his family. Two ships—S. S. Courland and S. S. Naderi—steamed into the port of Durban on the 18th or 19th of December, 1896, with about 800 Indian immigrants on board. Half of them were bound for the

³⁵ *Indians Overseas, 1888-1949*, by C. Kondapi, p. 385.

Transvaal Gandhiji and family were on S. S. Courland. Gandhiji, it must be noted, had nothing to do with the immigrants. His arrival simultaneously with them was a coincidence pure and simple.

There had been cases of plague at Bombay at the time the ships weighed anchors. They were therefore put under quarantine for five days. But the quarantine order had more than health reasons behind it and the passengers were not allowed to disembark on the expiry of the period of quarantine.

The European residents of Durban had been in the meanwhile agitating for the repatriation of the passengers on board the Naderi and the Courland and their agitation was one of the reasons for the quarantine order. The Europeans were holding monster meetings everyday. As Gandhiji puts it, " Durban had become the scene of an unequal duel. On one side there was a handful of poor Indians and a few of their English friends, and on the other were ranged the white men, strong in arms, in numbers, in education and in wealth. They had also the backing of the state, for the Natal Government openly helped them. Mr. Harry Escombe, who was the most influential of the members of the (Natal) Cabinet, openly took part in their meetings." ³⁶

Gandhiji was the real target of the attack. There were two charges against him—

(a) that during his stay in India in 1896, he had indulged in unmerited condemnation of the Natal Europeans;

(b) " that with a view to Swamping Natal with Indians he had specially brought the two shiploads of passengers to settle there."

The quarantine of the Courland and the Naderi, as noted above, was not due to reasons of health alone. It really sought to force the passengers aboard the steamers to return to India by intimidating them or Dada Abdulla and Co., the proprietors of the Courland and the agents of the proprietors of the Naderi. The passengers were threatened with dire consequences. if they landed—"If you do not go back, you will surely be pushed into the sea. But if you consent to return, you may even get your passage money back." ³⁷

To make a long story short, the Indian passengers were at last allowed to disembark on January 13, 1897. Gandhiji and family were advised by Mr. Escombe to land at dusk, when the Port Superintendent would escort them to their destination. On the,

³⁶ *The Story of My Experiments with Truth* by M. K. Gandhi (Phoenix Press, London, Edition), Pt. III, p. 158.

³⁷ *Ibid.* (quoted).

advice of Mr. Laughton, a Durban lawyer and an old friend, Gandhiji decided otherwise. His wife and children were sent to the house of his friend and client, Mr Rustomji, Gandhiji himself landed at about 4-30 p.m. in the Company of Mr. Laughton and proceeded on foot to Mr. Rustomji's place about two miles from the port.

Let Gandhiji say what followed : " As soon as we landed, some youngsters recognised me and shouted 'Gandhi' Gandhi'. About half a dozen men rushed to the spot and joined in the shouting. Mr. Laughton feared that the crowd might swell and hailed a rickshaw . . . But the youngsters . . . frightened the rickshaw boy out of his life and he took to his heels. As we went ahead, the crowd continued to swell, until it became impossible to proceed farther. They first caught hold of Mr. Laughton and separated us.

Then they pelted me with stones, brickbats and rotten eggs. Some one snatched away my turban, while others began to batter and kick me. I fainted and caught hold of the front railings of a house and stood there to get my breath. But it was impossible. They came upon me boxing and battering. The wife of the Police Superintendent, who knew me, happened to be passing by. The brave lady came up, opened her parasol though there was no sun then, and stood between the crowd and me. This checked the fury of the mob, as it was difficult for them to deliver blows on me without harming Mrs. Alexander the wife of the Police Superintendent).

" Meanwhile an Indian youth who witnessed the incident had run to the Police station. The Police Superintendent Mr Alexander, sent a posse of men to ring me round and escort me safely to my destination. They arrived in time." ³⁸ and took him first to the police station, which lay on the way to Rustomji's house. Mr. Alexander suggested that Gandhiji should take shelter in the police station. The latter however expressed his desire to proceed to Rustomji's place. He thanked the Alexanders and said that his assailants would certainly 'quiet down' when they realized their mistakes and that he had trust in their sense of fairness "

Escorted by a police force, Gandhiji safely reached the house of Mr. Rustomji. He had bruises all over, but no abrasions except in one place. Dr Dadiborjor, the ship's doctor who was present on the spot, rendered the best possible help." ³⁹

European rowdies got scent and surrounded Rustomji's house before long and demanded the surrender of Gandhi. The presence

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 160-61.

³⁹ *Ibid.* p 161

of mind of Mr. Alexander, who had arrived there in the meanwhile, saved the situation and averted what might have been a horrible catastrophe. He sent Gandhiji to the police station in the uniform of an Indian police constable. The mob dispersed after making sure that Gandhiji was not in the house.⁴⁰ Humanity with gratefully remember the Alexanders for all time to come. Natal Indians recognised their services by presenting suitably engraved gold watches to them.

The British Government informed the Government of Natal that the assailants of Gandhi should be prosecuted. Gandhiji, on his part, surprised all-friends and foes alike-by issuing a statement the tension prevailing in Natal and by refusing to initiate legal proceedings against his assailants. A 'coolie' from enslaved India spoke in the voice and accents of the son of Man! The new star had risen well above the horizon.

Gandhiji next tried to acquaint the British public with the South African Indian question. He wrote to Dadabhai Naoroji, M.P., Sir William Wedderburn, Sir William Hunter and Sir Mancherjee Bhabnagri and to various departments of the British Government.

The steam-roller of racialism set in motion by the Government of Natal moved on in the meanwhile. The disfranchisement of Indians was followed by Act 1 of 1897, which prohibited immigration into Natal except on certain conditions. All fresh immigrants had to pass a prescribed dictation test in a European language. Each such immigrant had further to be in possession of a specified amount of money at the time of his or her entry into Natal. The right of free entry into South Africa granted by the London Convention of 1884 was thus nullified by Act 1 of 1897, which was approved by Her Majesty's Government. The Secretary of State for India however wrote at the time of the promulgation of the First Immigration Restriction Ordinance by the Government of Natal in 1897 that it could be accepted only if "it is applied equally to immigrants from all countries and is not based on differences of race and colour". He however blessed the prohibition of immigration in principle in his despatch of 21st July, 1897 in the following words: "We regret the necessity for restrictions which exclude the British Indian subjects from South Africa, but accept the prohibition of further immigration in order to secure the fair treatment of those who are lawfully settled there. We are there-

⁴⁰ *Vide Satyagraha in South Africa* by M. K. Gandhi (Pt. I Chapter 16) and the *Story of My Experiments with Truth* by M. K. Gandhi (Phoenix Press, London Edition) Pt. III, pp. 160-63.

fore entitled to demand fair and equitable treatment involving complete equality before the law for those Indians who have already been allowed to settle in Natal, or who might hereafter under the new immigration law be permitted to do so"⁴¹.

The Dealers' Licence Act, 1897, (Act 18, 1897) sought to impose restrictions on Asian trade in Natal for the first time. It laid down that all traders—Asian and otherwise must obtain trade licences in future. The actual granting of licences however made all the difference. The Licensing Officer of the Durban Municipal Council admitted perhaps with a feeling of pride in 1921: "A European licences is granted as a matter of course, whereas an Indian licence is refused as a matter of course, if it is a new one"⁴². Act 18, it should be noted, governed the issue of licences in municipal areas only. Trade licences were withheld from those who failed to keep their books in English. Licencing Officers were appointed by Town Councils or Town Boards to issue annual licences in boroughs and townships to wholesale and retail traders. These Officers had the sole discretion of granting or refusing licenses. Appeals against their decisions did not lie in any court of law. Section 6 of the Act however permitted appeals against the decisions of a Licensing Officer to the Town Council or the Town Board, which employed him or to a special board of three persons appointed by the Administrator. Rightly did the Secretary of State for India observe: "A law which requires a licence to be taken for carrying on any wholesale or retail trade of whatever description and leaves it in the absolute discretion of one or two authorities to grant or refuse such licenses as they think fit, unfettered by any rule or principle, is without precedent.

"Such law would obviously be open under any circumstances to grave abuse and the danger of its abuse is inevitably increased when it is liable to be used only against one section of the population, and when the final decision on any question arising under it is entrusted to a Municipality or other local body"⁴³. The Secretary of State for India requested at the same time that the grounds on which licences might be refused should be specified in another Act, if the law in question was at all thought necessary.

Act 18, 1897, was grossly abused. On appeal against refusal of licences in a number of cases, the Judges passed severe strictures on the licensing authorities. Chief Justice Sir Walter Wregg remarked

⁴¹ Quoted in *Verdict on South Africa* by P. S. Joshi, p. 57.

⁴² Quoted in *Indians in South Africa* by Bhaskar Appasamy, p. 20.

⁴³ *Confidential Memorandum submitted by the Government of India Deputation to the Government of South Africa*, May 11, 1926, p. 41 para. 5.

in course of his judgment on the appeal of Somnath Maharaj that a Licensing Officer should not be in the employ of a Town Council. Nor should he be, the Judge continued, in the confidence of the Council⁴⁴. The proceedings of the Town Council were quashed by the learned Judge and the appeal was admitted. What struck one as being wrong in this case was", he observed, "that the copy of the record should be withheld. The application was made to the Council by the appellant for a copy of the record and the reasons why the licence had been refused. There was nothing wrong in the application. It was one, which, in the interests of justice, should have been granted. But it was refused. And when the appellant's counsel (Gandhiji) came before the Court, he was in the dark as to the record and he did not know what was operating in the mind of the Licensing Officer."⁴⁵ The action of the Town Council was characterised by Sir Walter as "*oppressive*", "*unjudicial*" and "*improper*."

The year 1898 was a bad one for the Indian traders in Natal. A large number of Indian licence-holders in Durban and New Castle were refused the renewals of their licences. The Chief Justice of Natal held that the Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the Town Councils in their capacity as licensing authorities. The Privy Council disagreed. The Secretary of State for Colonies observed that it was unfortunate that aggrieved parties should be deprived of the right of appeal because there was a difference of opinion over the interpretation of a statute. He suggested that the Government of Natal should issue a circular to all local authorities that unless they exercised with "reasonable liberality" the powers given to them by Act 18 of 1897, the Act itself might be reconsidered. The Government of Natal agreed and circularised the local bodies accordingly. The circular had a salutary effect, albeit temporary.

The Secretary of the State for Colonies wrote to the Government of Natal in May, 1899, that the dealers, who are refused licences, should be given the right of appeal to Natal Supreme Court. Emigration from India, he feared, might otherwise stop.⁴⁶ The Government of India too wrote a similar letter to the Government of Natal one year later (July 1900). The Licensing authorities would not however mend their ways. "In Durban", writes Mr. L. E. Neame, "the Act (Act 18, 1897) has been admittedly utilized in order to

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 54, Letter no. 12991 d. May 20, 1899.

prevent Indian merchants opening up shops in particular streets. The Licensing officer is the servant of a body of white shop-keepers. He . . . can hardly be expected to sacrifice his appointment by opposing those who employ him."⁴⁷

The tables below show how Indians were discriminated against in the matter of issuing trade-licences :

Licences Issued in Durban

	To Indians	To Non-Indians
1895-1908	11,765	20,472

Number of Licensed Dealers in Natal

	Indians	Non-Indians
1904	1,334	1,930
1908	1,008	2,034

In 1900, the Government of Natal ordered that adult children—male and female—of indenture expired Indians must each pay an annual tax of £ 3 for stay in Natal. A similar tax, the reader may remember, had already been imposed on the parents of such children in 1895.

Thus ended the 19th century on the South African Scene and it closed ominously for the Indian Settlers. They had been pushed out of the Orange Free State. Natal, which had invited Indians to South Africa less than fifty years ago and the South African Republic (the Transval) had reduced them to a position of perpetual inferiority to the European settlers. They were given to understand that they were undesirable outlanders, unwanted interlopers. Greater hardships and more degrading humiliation awaited them.

The Anti-Indian feeling of white South Africa is an amalgam, an outcome of economic competition, racial prejudice and fear complex, among others. Mr. Chamberlein wrote in 1895 : "I believe them (the Indian settlers) to be a peaceable, law-abiding and meritorious body of persons, and I can only hope that, even as matters stand, their undoubted industry and intelligence, and their indomitable perseverance, will suffice to overcome any obstacles which may now face them in the pursuit of their avocations".

The Indian trader was and is disliked by his European Counterpart because there is a clash of interest between the two. The former is able to undersell his European rival partly because he

⁴⁷ *The Asiatic Danger in the Colonies*, p. 85.

spends much less on his living than the latter. The Europeans cite this fact in support of their contention that the Indians have a low standard of living. The Indian, they say, can live "on the smell of an oil-rag."⁴⁸ The Europeans seem to have forgotten that it is they who have created conditions to depress the Indian standard of living. The doors of good, and necessarily expensive, hotels and restaurants are, for example, closed to Indians. They are compelled to patronise the inferior and cheaper ones in consequence. Their "disabilities compel (them) to practise economics which are so distasteful to them as to any other self-respecting citizen."⁴⁹ The Indians do not generally drink. But the liquor bill of the average White South African is a rather heavy one. Gambling at the races and elsewhere, expensive sports, and luxuries have inflated white wages and a thousand extravagances and one enter into the high cost of living among the Europeans.

"There is no greater cultivator of the land in the world than the Indian. There is no agriculturist so patient. There is no agriculturist more industrious and steady."⁵⁰ But the wages paid to him are scandalously low. £. 2-10 shs. a month was almost the maximum he could expect in 1927. The barracks or living quarters on the plantations were very often unfit for human habitation, the white-wash on the outside being the only respectable thing about them. The low wages paid to them have not been a little responsible for keeping down their standard of living.

Mahatma Gandhi's masterly analysis of the genesis and nature of the anti-Indian feelings in Natal is well worth quoting: "But the Indians gave more than had been expected of them. They grew large quantities of vegetables. They introduced a number of Indian varieties and made it possible to grow the local varieties cheaper. They also introduced the mango. Nor did their enterprise stop at agriculture. They entered trade. They purchased land for building, and many raised themselves from the status of labourers to that of owners of land and houses. Merchants from India followed them and settled there for trade. . . .

"The white traders were alarmed. When they first welcomed the Indian labourers, they had not reckoned with their business skill. They might be tolerated as independent agriculturists, but their competition in trade could not be brooked.

⁴⁸ Bishop Fisher's article in the *Modern Review* (1927),

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

"This sowed the seed of the antagonism to the Indians. Many other factors contributed to its growth. Our different ways of living, our simplicity, our contentment with small gains, our indifference to the laws of hygiene and sanitation, our slowness in keeping our surroundings clean and tidy, and our stinginess in keeping our houses in good repair all these combined with difference in religion, contributed to fan the flame of antagonism. Through legislation this antagonism found its expression in the disfranchising bill and the bill to impose a tax on the indentured Indians. Independent of legislation a number of pinpricks had already been started."⁵¹

Mabel Palmer observes that European Natal's attitude and policy can be understood and even excused, if we remember the position of the early settlers in the colony. They were a microscopic minority among an overwhelming majority of barbarians. "Segregation a hundred years ago", she observes, "was probably necessary if the standards of white civilization were to be preserved. The tragedy is that a policy intended to prevent the Whites being pulled down to the level of the Bantu is now being applied to prevent brown and black from rising to the standard of European civilization, and is indeed undermining White civilization itself in South Africa by basing it on the exploited labour of Semi-Servile classes."⁵²

⁵¹ *The Story of My Experiments with Truth* by M. K. Gandhi (Phoenix press, London, Edition, Pt. II, pp 129-30)

⁵² *Natal's Indian Problem*, pp. 10-11.

HISTORY OF MANIPUR

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NAR SINGH (1834-50)

At the time of Gambhir Singh's death in 1834, Prince Chandra Kirti was only two years' old. Accordingly Nar Singh became the regent and took over the administration of the country. He gave ample proof of his leadership and heroism during the last war. But the successive attempts of different aspirants to the throne did not allow him to rule peacefully. The first occurred in 1838. In that year Tarring Komba, the eldest son of Rabino Chandra, made a raid with three hundred followers from Cachar. They were defeated and dispersed by Nar Singh's forces. Tarring Komba was killed within a short period. Jogindro Singh, the eldest son of Marjit, tried to invade the country. But he and his brother were both killed in the hills on their way to the valley. Tribhubanjit and Ram Singh, two sons of Chourajit, also made a vain attempt to capture the throne and were killed. In 1844 after an unsuccessful attempt when Maharani Kumudini Devi, the mother of Chandra Kirti, left with her son for Cachar, Nar Singh formally ascended the throne. The last attempt to dislodge him was made by Melai Romba and his brother, descendants of Raja Charairongba. They invaded the valley from Cachar. Nar Singh's forces defeated them. Melai Romba's brother was killed, and he himself was taken prisoner. "He was executed by being put into a basket and flung into the river. This was the last political execution up to 1873".

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANIPUR AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

After the death of Govinda Chandra, the ruler of Cachar, Gambhir Singh made an appeal to the British Government to give him that territory on lease. But why it was not given to him has already been discussed in the previous chapter. The boundary between Manipur State and the newly formed Cachar District still remained undefined. This and other petty incidents created misunderstanding between Manipur and British India. Finally the Governor-General

and Council communicated the following resolution to Gambhir Singh in 1833.—

*“First—*The Raja will, agreeably to instructions received, without delay, remove his thana from Chandrapur, and establish it on the eastern bank of the Jiri.

*Second—*The Raja will, in no way obstruct the trade carried on between the two countries by Bengalee and Manipuri merchants. He will not exact heavy duties, and he will make a monopoly of no articles of merchandise whatsoever.

*Third—*The Raja will in no way prevent the Nagas inhabiting the Kala Naga and Naonjai ranges of hills from selling or bartering ginger, cotton, pepper, and every other article, the produce of their country, in the Plains of Kachar, at the Banskandi and Oodherban Bazars as has been their custom

*Fourth—*With regard to the road commencing from the eastern bank of the Giri, and continued *via* Kala Naga and Kowpum as far as the valley of Manipur, after this road has been finished, the Raja will keep it in repairs, so as to enable laden bullocks to pass during the cold and dry seasons. Further, at the making of the road, if British officers be sent to examine or superintend the same, the Raja will agree to everything these officers may suggest.

*Fifth—*With reference to the intercourse already existing between the territories of the British Govt., and those of the Raja, if the intercourse be further extended, it will be well in every respect, and it will be highly advantageous to both the Raja and his country. In order, therefore, that this may speedily take place, the Raja at the requisition of the British Govt. will furnish a quota of Nagas to assist in the construction of the road.

*Sixth—*In the event of the war with the Burmese, if the troops be sent to Manipur either to protect the country or to advance the Ningthi, the Raja, at the requisition of the British Govt. will provide hill porters to assist in transporting ammunitions and baggage of such troops.

*Seventh—*In the event of anything happening on the eastern frontier of the British territories the Raja will, when required, assist the British Govt. with a portion of his troops.

*Eighth—*The Raja will be answerable for all the ammunition he receives from the British Govt. and will, for the information of the British Govt. give in every month a statement of expenditure to the British officer attached to the levy.”

To those clauses it was added that "the two ranges of hills Kala Naga and Noonjai, which are situated between the eastern and western bends of the Barak, we will give up all claim give him the line of the Jiri and the western bend of the Barak as a boundary, provided the Raja agrees to the whole of what is written in this paper"

Maharaja Gambhir Singh accepted those terms. All the provisions of the above treaty with the exception of the last remained in force². The last one became inoperative when the British officer connected with the Manipur Levy was withdrawn.

The terms of the above treaty speak of mainly economic and military alliance between Manipur and the British Government. The latter being more powerful might often have its will prevailed upon the former on common matters.

But Manipur was undoubtedly free from any political bondage during the time of Gambhir Singh and Nar Singh. Government of India was wise enough to allow Manipur to exist as an independent state, between the two frontiers of the British and the Burmese. The presence of Manipur levy, financed by the British Government and commanded by British officers, within the state may lead to some doubt. The circumstances under which the Manipur Levy was raised have already been stated in the previous chapter. The necessity of Manipur Levy from the British side ended after the annexation of Cachar and conclusion of the Anglo-Manipur treaty of 1833. It was retained one year more under British control for the prevention of any uprising in Manipur, which might follow the death of Gambhir Singh. After one year when it was found that Nar Singh was capable of maintaining peace, the command and responsibility of the Manipur Levy was handed over to the Manipur Government in 1835³. Major Grant, Commandant of the Levy, after handing over his charge left Manipur. Capt. Gordon who had been serving as adjutant since 1827, was appointed by the British Government as Political Agent in Manipur. Besides him another British Officer Capt. Pemberton was then serving in Manipur. He entered Manipur in 1825 along with Gambhir Singh and since then he had been busy in collecting information about Manipur. In 1835, he was appointed by the British Government as Joint Commissioner in Manipur⁴. He was posted by the British Government "for preservation of a friendly intercourse and as a medium of communication with the Manipur Government and as occasion may require, with the Burmese authorities on the frontier and more especially to prevent border feuds, which

might lead to hostilities between the Manipurians and the Burmese." ⁵ It is quite evident that the duty of the Political Agent in Manipur was like that of an Ambassador. Mr. Gordon remained as Political Agent in Manipur till his death in 1844. He was succeeded by Mc-Culloch. As long as Nar Singh lived the Political Agent maintained strict neutrality in the internal political affairs of Manipur. Their business also was not affected by occasional political uprisings. ⁶

CONSPIRACY OF MAHARANI KUMUDINI DEVI

Maharani Kumudini Devi was the mother of Prince Chandra Kirti. When Gambhir Singh died Chandra Kirti was only two years old. The Maharani always had an apprehension lest the Regent Nar Singh should finally usurp the throne. ⁷ There was, of course, no cause for such apprehension. The Maharani and her son were looked after with due honour. Debendra Singh a brother of Nar Singh was very much jealous of the power and prosperity of Nar Singh. But in view of the popularity enjoyed by Nar Singh it was not possible for him to bring about his fall by a direct action. So he thought it best to set the Maharani against the Regent. Some of his agents became successful in convincing her that Nar Singh would soon banish or murder Chandra Kirti and formally ascend the throne. The Maharani who had already such suspicion in her mind, blindly fell into that trap. ⁸ She soon won over Thangal, Paosang, Mantrimayum Nabin Singh. Nabin Singh suggested by Debendra Singh presented before the Maharani a plot to murder Nar Singh and got her approval. Debendra, however remained always behind the scene without involving himself directly in all these affairs. His idea was that if Nar Singh was killed he could easily occupy the throne by removing Chandra Kirti. But in case the plan failed Chandra Kirti with his mother would surely be banished. He would, therefore, remain safe, and after the death of Nar Singh there would be no difficulty in his ascending the throne.

In 1844, one day while Nar Singh was deeply engaged in meditation in the temple of Govindaji, Nabin Singh, according to the preconceived plan went there to murder him. Fortunately Nar Singh could escape with his life, though severely injured. Nabin Singh was caught and beheaded by the guards then and there. ⁹ According to the treaty of 1833 a road was being constructed from Jirighat to Bishnupur with the co-operation of the government of Manipur and under the supervision of Capt Guthrie since 1837. The work continued up to 1844 ¹⁰ while Nar Singh was attacked by Nabin Singh,

neither the political agent Capt. Gordon nor his assistant was in the valley. They had been away to visit the construction of the new road. After the failure of that plot the Maharani with her son accompanied by Thangal and Paosang made her way to Cachar and placed herself and the son under the protection of the British. At the time of their flight they avoided the new road. So the Political Agent or his assistant did not meet them on the way.¹¹ Nar Singh "suspecting the complicity of the Maharani in the attempt on his life did not hesitate to proclaim himself Raja, and although the British Government were not quite satisfied with the arrangement it was allowed to pass."¹²

Large Scale Entrance of Kukis in Manipur :

The Kuki's are a wandering race consisting of several tribes, different from the Manipuris and the Nagas. "Their original home cannot be correctly ascertained, but there seem to be traces of them as far south as the Malaya Peninsula." They were first heard of as Kukis, in Manipur between 1830 and 1840 ; though tribes of the same race had long been subject to the Raja of Manipur. The new immigrants begun to pour into the hill tracts of Manipur from the south, in large numbers driving away other inhabitants. Nar Singh had just then formally ascended the throne and there were still chances of intestine quarrels. Under these circumstances, it was not possible for him to cope with the situation. He sought the co-operation of the Political Agent Mc. Culloch. Mr. Mc. Culloch noticed that the Kukis had been driven north by more powerful tribes and that their first object was to secure land for cultivation. As they arrived, he settled them down in different places on the exposed frontier. Mc. Culloch advanced them large sums from his own pocket, assigning different duties to each chief's followers. Some were taken into irregular troops. Thus within a short period thousands of fierce Kukis were settled down as peaceful subjects of Manipur. Mc. Culloch's success in this affair was highly appreciated—both by the government of Manipur and the British.¹³

The Maharani's Appeal to the British Government :

It has already been mentioned that the Maharani with prince Chandra Kirti, arriving at Cachar, placed themselves under the protection of the British Government. A small guard of sepoy's was appointed for their security. For their support an allowance of

Rs. 100 was allowed to them from the Kubo compensation money. They stayed nearly five years at Cachar. During this period the Maharani to restore the throne to Chandra Kirti made many applications to the British Government. At that time they did not like to interfere in the internal affairs of Manipur and remained silent. The Maharani, thinking that the assistance of Capt. Jenkins, Commissioner of Assam might be useful for her cause, proceeded to Assam to consult with him. After she had some correspondence with him, she was advised to refer the matter to the Political Agent of Manipur. Thus spending nearly a year in Assam she returned to Cachar, where she remained until the death of Nar Singh in 1850.¹⁴

Death of Nar Singh :

In the year 1850, Cholera broke out in the Manipur valley in epidemic form. Large numbers of people died of it. Maharaja Nar Singh was also attacked with it and was taken in its toll. His brother, "Debendra Singh, a man of less firmness and talent than Nar Singh, assumed the Raj, it is said in the Political Agent's correspondence of the time, at the request of Nar Singh. According to the Manipuri authorities, Nar Singh was averse to his succeeding him desired the restoration of Gambhir Singh's son Chandra Kirti Singh. He is said also to have exhorted his three sons to proceed to Cachar, and render every assistance in their power to further this end." Debendra Singh, however, did not lose a moment to capture the power as soon as Nar Singh died. The three sons of Nar Singh immediately fled to Cachar and were reported to be in communication with the party of the Chandra Kirti Singh.¹⁵

The ancestors of Brahmin community bearing the titles of 'Brajamayum' and 'Anoubam' came to Manipur during the time of Gambhir Singh, those of 'Kulinmayum' and 'Gosainmayum' came during the time of Nar Singh. A certain Brahmin came from Shantipur. He came to be known as Brajamayum since he worshipped Gopalji. 'Anaubam' came from a Brahmin family of Agartala. Kulinmayum came from a 'Kulu' Bandopadhyaya family of Barahnagar near Calcutta. 'Gosainmayum' also came from Shantipur from a Goswami family. Acharya Brahmin also came from Khara-daha in Assam. In Manipur he came to be known as 'Warilibam,' meaning story-teller.¹⁶

Maharaja Nar Singh was a patron of Kirtan. The style of Kirtan known as 'Nipa-palla' was highly developed in his time. All the participants of this kirtan are males. They put on large turban

'mala' and large folded cloth. 'Dhop-malla' which is held at the time of Jhulonjatra was introduced at the time of Gambhir Singh and Nar Singh. The idea of that 'palla-kiitan' originated from Thakur Krishnadas Goswami. The princesses of the royal family used to participate in 'Jala-keli' (devotional play in water) and 'Rasheswari-palla'. Generally the princesses of Nar Singh's family used to perform 'Jala-keli' acting as Krishna and Radha and throwing water in each other's body. The princesses of Jai Singh's family preferred to play 'Rasha' with Sri Krishna singing the songs of 'Rasheswari-palla'.¹⁷ Nar Singh thus not belonging to the direct royal line enjoyed the warmth of his people's heart on account of his versatile qualities and contributions. His descendants also bear the title of Rajkumar.

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THE BEAUTIFUL CITY OF VENICE

DR. MISS INDIRA SARKAR

Venice is a dream city for poets and artists. Its structure is fantastic. Its old history and artistic greatness have given the city a special importance. In spite of the passing of time this city remains unique in the world. The topographic position is very peculiar and strikes the eye of visitors, no matter if they are come by sea, land or air.

The lagoon which surrounds Venice is connected with the sea by means of the Lido-Canal and the Malamocco-Canal. During spring and autumn, when Scirocco winds blow, then the usual water-level rises in the canals and some-times overflows the narrow lanes. The people have tried to strengthen the basic structures of their houses by using large planks of wood, in order to isolate the walls.

In the modern age of technical advancement, we can still enter Venetian homes by using the water-route. The lagoon is not disturbed by the noise of the mainland. There are no cars in the centre of the city and yet it is a paradox, when we recall that it possesses the biggest autogarage in Europe. We never see horses or coaches here. Instead of trams and autobuses there are motor-boats and steam-boats known as 'moscafi' and 'vaporetti,' plying up and down the canals. The gondola with its gay gondoliers still remain the chief means of transportation in this city.

Venice is composed of one hundred islands. There are about one hundred and fifty canals and four hundred bridges. These groups of islands have given the city a kind of a pear-shape intersected in the centre by the 'Canal Grande'. There are also about 2,500 small lanes.

There is a strip of land on the East side known as the Lido. This is a famous summer resort and has a wonderful beach for swimming. It forms a natural dam which protects the city from being wiped away by the sea. Venice is so charming that it always attracts visitors to this oasis of beauty and peace. But the city does not live on its ancient, historic and artistic past alone. The Venetians are conscious that it is not possible to live on memories. So they have built up an industrial centre at Marghera and a trade centre at Mestre. The beautiful palaces, glorious monuments and

churches that decorate this city are surrounded on the outskirts by factories and industrial plants. Hence we see, that the world-wide reputation which Venetian commerce used to enjoy, still maintains its position up to this day.

HISTORIC GLIMPSSES :

During the time of the Holy Roman Empire, the lagoon 'Veneta' was scantily inhabited by fishermen and farmers. With foreign invasions and pressure from without, the inhabitants receded more and more into the mainland. The Huns and the West Goths flocked into the country and formed new settlements there. Venice is supposed to have been built in the year 451. The Venetian people began to elect their rulers. The first Doge of Venice was Paola Lucio Anafesto.

Venice came under the influence of Byzantine culture. Its importance grew and it formed a natural link between the Byzantine and the Holy Roman Empire. Its special geographical position favoured commercial expansion. Pirates were driven out of the Dalmatian coast. The Republic of Venice won great repute and enjoyed privileges. In 1177 it was able to play a diplomatic part in the reconciliation policy between Pope Alexander III and Barbarossa. Political and historical greatness inspired the Venetians to join the fourth Crusade bound for the Holy Land.

Venice gained in importance during the Crusades. It took part in the conquest of Constantinople. The island of Crete belonged to its possessions. At this epoch, it reached the zenith of its glory. Venetian traders came to the shores of India and the Far East. Marco Polo went to China. All kinds of costly materials and precious metals were brought back from the East.

In the political field Venice changed from a democratic to an aristocratic government. Only nobles belonging to the highest caste were allowed to govern the Republic. The rules and regulations of its regime were written down in the Golden Book in 1297. It became a rival to other Italian sea-ports, like for instance Genoa, and expanded its territory to the mainland. It soon included Treviso, Padua, Verona, Brescia and Bergamo under its jurisdiction. So its territory extended from the Swiss frontier up to the Adriatic Sea. Cyprus was won in 1489. Venice had to put up a hard fight in order to keep its possessions. Its position was weakened, when another route was discovered to India, *v.z.*, around the Cape of Good Hope. Gradually it lost its trade-monopoly with India and the Middle East.

The rise of Napoleon and the spread of his democratic ideas were a death blow to its aristocratic and conservative Government and lead to its fall. The whole province passed into the hands of the Austrians in 1806. But the love for freedom made every one fight bravely against foreign rulers. In 1866, Venice was reconquered and became a province of Italy.

ARCHITECTURE :

The architecture of Venice is manifold and its real charm lies in harmonious diversity. Due to its trade with the East and its connection with the Byzantine Empire, it is not surprising that many of its churches and palaces have oriental architecture. The Basilica of San Marco is a typical example. Some other churches were influenced by Renaissance architecture. The business-houses along the 'Canal Grande', like the Fondaco dei Turchi are also Byzantine in shape. The monks of the Begging Order brought Gothic architecture to Venice as seen in the church of Saint Peter and Paul, with its pillar-shaped steeples, this is different from the Byzantine churches with cupolas.

The later Gothic architecture can be seen in the different palaces that give a special significance to the city. Here we can mention the Ca d'oro and the Foscari and Pisani Palaces. The Venetians loved this kind of architecture and this explains why the Renaissance came in vogue so much later. In the second half of the fifteenth century, we find Lambardo Coducci and Rizzo constructing new palaces and churches. The eastern part of the Doge's Palace, the Library and the Vendramin and Grimani Palaces belong to this epoch.

During the Middle Ages sculptural works came from Byzantine. Artists made reliefs on church and palace-walls and chiselled designs out of stone. All forms of plastic came from the Orient, as is seen in the corner decorations of the Doge's Palace. At the time of the Renaissance, Antonio Rizzo was the architect of the Doge's Palace. The figures of Adam and Eve were his creations. Many of the frescos and reliefs in the Doge's Palace were executed by Venetians like Mantegna. Bellini was especially known for his new type of Madonna figures. Tintoretto and Veronese made use of the wonderful Italian colour-schemes in their paintings that have become immortal.

Mosaic art also came from Byzantine. The decorations of San Marco and the Domes of Murano and Torcello bear testimony to this kind of art.

The glass-blowing industry established on the island of Murano, and started in the middle of the thirteenth century is very famous. Venetian glass is still much appreciated all over the world. Silk-weaving is also of a high standard. These rich silks and brocades did not only constitute the wearing-apparel of wealthy ladies, but were also used for export purposes. Even Venetian lace that had been in vogue during the Middle Ages has still retained its former popularity. The leather work of Venice is very well-known. Venetian furnitures belonging to the aristocratic society are very beautiful.

It is interesting to walk through the small lanes and look into fine shop-windows, displayed with lovely articles at night. Exquisite jewellery can be purchased here and gold is cheap as compared to other European cities. The open air cafés on the San Marco Square are filled with people. The promenade along the 'Canal Grande' is crowded in the evenings, when people walk to and fro from one palace to another. There are a number of bridges on this promenade and everybody stops to see the famous Bridge of Sighs, adjoining the Dogen Palace. The prison-windows and the torture chambers of the Dogen Palace look on to the Bridge of Sighs. The promenade along the 'Canal Grande' leads to the Luna Park, which is the amusement centre of Venice. Here there are many merry-go-rounds and similar attractions for young and old. There are café-terraces and people sit here watching passers-by.

The Rialto Bridge is huge and monumental with many steps leading to the top. It is situated in a congested part of the town and after walking through many narrow lanes, one is suddenly taken by surprise, to see the huge bridge appearing before one's eyes. On either side of the bridge there is a large market-place, filled with hundreds of stalls. Everything can be bought here. It is an open-air bazar and adds to the particularity of the city. It is fascinating to go shopping here.

The people are friendly and care-free. The food is excellent with delicious gravies which are very palatable for the Indian taste. It is a tourist town and one can find people from all over the world. Chinese, Japanese, Americans, Africans, Europeans, Indians mingle in the streets and make a gay picture.

Venice is a city with a charm of its own. It is nice to visit this city of bridges and canals in early spring and autumn. Then the climate is not too warm and there is a cool ocean breeze blowing over the city. On a warm, mild night, when the stars are shining and the silvery moon is clear and bright then one should walk down to the square of San Marco and gaze at the brilliant illumination of lights all around. Whoever has seen Venice on such a night will never forget it and it will remain one of the finest souvenirs for all times to come.

NYĀYA-MĀÑJARĪ

VOL. II (32)

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Moreover, an objection has been raised that it is an impossible feat to instruct all chaste words, one after another, since chaste and unchaste words have not been properly defined. This objection has been met since it has been elaborately stated before that the essence of chaste and unchaste words is directly cognised or inferred. On the basis of this essential property, regulative injunctions may be easily framed. Hence all sophistical arguments centering round the definition of the chastity of a word have been silenced. The definition of a chaste word is this. A chaste word is such as obeys the rules of grammar and is expressive. Thus the chastity of a word is expressiveness coupled with obedience to the rules of grammar. This common property behaves like a universal, *e.g.*, the universal of cowness. It belongs to all individuals coming under the same class. Or, chastity is not a universal. But it is a common property like the essence of all cooks (*pācakatva*). Though it is not a universal yet it serves the purpose of a differentia, since the common property of all individuals belonging to a class is a distinguishing mark. The net result is that all general statements about chaste words may be made on the strength of this common property. In other words, generalisation of all chaste words is possible.

Or, though we agree to your proposal that the chastity of a word is its expressiveness yet the rule, "One should use chaste words only" deserves application. An objection may be raised to this effect that as an unchaste word, being not expressive, has no chance to be used, what is the utility of the above rule? Though an unchaste word is not expressive yet the use of such words is not impossible. Let us take a hypothetical case. On hearing an unchaste word, a person may remember a chaste word. He may doubt whether the word conveys a sense or not. Relying on the benefit of this doubt the use of unchaste words may be in vogue. In order to do away with such possibilities, the above rule will be significant. Now, a new difficulty arises. A regulative injunction has both positive and negative imports. But in this case the import of the said injunction is, truly speaking, negative. Thus it is more of the nature of a *parisamkhyā vidhi* than that of a

nyama vidhi since its function is mainly negative. Hence, an injunction is saddled with the functions of two distinct types of injunctions. The objectors think that it is objectionable to hold that an injunction discharges two functions. But our contention is that such functioning on the part of an injunction is not objectionable.

Let us discuss another objection raised by our opponents. The purport of their criticism is as follows:—The Vedic sentences which speak of the reward or the punishment of an action are means to an end. They enjoy no independence. Thus, they are only recommendatory in their character. As merit or demerit has no connection with rites suggested by recommendatory sentences so one who employs either chaste or unchaste words acquires neither merit nor demerit thereby. This is the sum and substance of the above objection. But the above objection does not stand to reason. Though a recommendatory sentence is not an end in itself yet it insists upon the restricted use of chaste words. Now, if one follows it, he acquires merit. But the use of unchaste words is a violation of injunction, i.e., the above rule. Hence, a person who employs unchaste words commits a sin. The result is that demerit accrues to him. Now, our opponents may criticise this solution. He may point out that the recommendatory sentence “Juhū is to be made up of leaves” should have also connection with merit or demerit. In other words, if one follows the instruction, given by the recommendatory sentence, he should acquire merit and if one does not follow it, he should commit a sin. Our answer to this charge is this that if such a consequence happens, wherein lies a defect? Let us clarify the standpoint of the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas do not accept the division of the recommendatory sentences into two classes, viz. fruitful and fruitless. They have also shown that the constituent words of a recommendatory sentence convey a distinct meaning and purport and differ from those who believe in the hypotheses that there are fruitless recommendatory sentences in the explanation of these words. This point has been discussed before. Let us stop here. Hence, the Naiyāyikas hold that recommendatory sentences such as “If a word is properly employed, it fulfils our desires in the next world” are fruitful. The above recommendatory sentence, cited by us, points to the study of the science of grammar, since if one does not go through grammar, he can hardly use chaste and correct words. Thus, the purport of the above sentence is that one should read grammar. It is virtually an injunction. The other recommendatory sentences should be interpreted in this light.

The opponents have also raised a question, *viz.*, "Why has not Pāṇini, himself, the author of grammatical sūtras, mentioned the utility of the study of grammar". Such an objection does not land us in difficulty, since the people of all over India from the Himalayan region up to the Cape Comorin know very well that grammar is ancillary to the Vedas. If the Vedas are useless then let them who are ignorant of the Vedas be blessed. All Vedic acts which yield tangible and transcendental results will be given up. The baser persons who fall outside the pale of four castes will win a victory over us.

Now, let us turn our attention to the other aspect of the problem. If the study of the Vedas is fruitful, the Vedas along with their ancillary sciences serve our purpose. The accessory sciences have got no distinct utility to materialise. There is no need of assuming any separate mission which they fulfil. Nobody cares to expect a distinct fruit from the *Prayāga* sacrifice since a *Prayāga* sacrifice is subordinate to the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice. As Pāṇini, the author of grammatical sūtras, is aware of the character of the science of grammar, he has made no mention of its utility.

But the commentators on the Sūtras of Pāṇini have shown the principal utility of grammar and other utilities which follow from it in order to promote the interest of their audience. Hence, nobody should be taken to task.

Now, the objectors may put questions, *viz.*, "How has grammar become ancillary to the Vedas? What benefit do the Vedas derive from grammar? But these are very trifling questions. The questions like the above ones do not stand to reason since either the Vedas and their ancillary sciences are eternal or they have been composed by God. Now, we should prove how Pāṇini, Pingala, Parāśara, etc. are designated as authors of several sciences. They are so called because they have composed them either concisely or elaborately. But really speaking, the meaning of the Vedas and its knowledge stand on the same footing with the Vedas. They are either eternal or owe their existence to God. Hence, nobody should be taken to task on this issue. The sources of knowledge which comprise the Vedas and their ancillary sciences within them are counted to be fourteen in number.

The sources of knowledge are fourteen in number. They are as follows: "The four Vedas, six ancillary sciences, *Mīmāṃsā*, the extensive science of logic, the *Pūrāṇas* and the codes of Law (*Dharmaśāstras*) constitute the sources of knowledge. Many sophistical arguments have been put forward against the re-

finement of words. They simply exhibit verbosity but do not stand upon the solid rock of reality. The objectors have said before, "Which word falls outside the range of chaste words? What is the refinement of a word?" In order to avoid all these problems we do not subscribe to the hypothesis that the science of grammar owes its existence to the usages of the authoritative persons. We have already stated that the science of grammar is co-eternal with the Vedas. Though the science of grammar is eternal yet it might have been taken up by an ignorant person in the obscure past and might have been passing through the circle of ignorant persons. Thus the science of grammar has a little significance. In order to meet this possible objection we hold that the science of grammar is based upon the usages of the cultured persons as the *smṛiti* literature is based upon the Vedas. This literature prescribes such duties as have been enjoined by the Vedas and does never prescribe such ones as have been enjoined by books other than the Vedas. The words which have been taught by the science of grammar as chaste ones are seen to be used as such by the cultured persons; just as the teaching of the medical science that a sick person is cured of his malady taking myrobalan is corroborated by the practice of reliable persons. Pāṇini has not composed the science of grammar having learnt it from the cultured personages. Caraka has not also composed his medical treatise, having ascertained the properties of various substances by means of the experimental method since the beginning of the cultured persons cannot be traced out. Thus, the fallacy of a vicious circle is met. The science of grammar does not originate from the cultured persons.

The objectors have pointed out many incorrect usages of the cultured persons. They have also referred to a list of unchaste words which have been used by the ancient sages. With regard to these illustrations the expert linguists have shown the line of defence. In order to restrain the unnecessary enlargement of this volume we cut short all these discussions.

The objectors have found fault with the definitions of a verb and a non-inflected word and with the rules which govern case-endings etc. Many erudite scholars have reviewed the said criticisms and given a fit reply to them. Now, it may be objected that these reviews may be re-examined and so on, *ad infinitum*. In other words, no decision will be arrived at. The objection does not hold good, since the path which has been shown by the expert linguists is free from disturbances created by the thieves in the shape of destructive critics.

If we follow the above line of defence then the other objections raised by our critics are also met with. The said objections are as follows: The treatise of grammar is incomplete since it does not contain a few words such as *śobhā*, *cirṇa*, *varṇya*, *gaṇeya*, *bhrājīṣṇu*, *kāndīśika* etc. The science of grammar falls short of the definitions of memory, doubt, illusion, etc. These defects have been imagined by some critics. These objections have been thoroughly answered by the grammarians themselves in their own works.

The Sūtra of Bṛhaspati is no sūtra at all. It is not worth considering. He has demonstrated his vain scholarship by advancing a few sophistical arguments which have been manufactured by his pure imagination. We need not enter into the contents of his arguments since they are simply annoying.

In fine, the science of grammar is stainless by its very nature and is elegant. It cannot be soiled if one throws the dust of slander at it.

THE STUDY OF GRAMMAR IS COMPULSORY

The science of grammar should be studied by all since it is the purest of all sciences and is held in esteem by all persons. It is a means to four human ends. One who wishes to realise them should study it. Moreover, one who intends to obtain mastery over polished language should study it.

Water is purer than the earth. Verses of the Vedas are purer than water. The great sages have stated that the science of grammar occupies a similar place among the three Vedas, viz, the Sāmaveda, the Yajurveda and the Rgveda.

It has also been said to eulogise the science of grammar. The persons who have sanctified their mouth (tongue) by studying grammar are gods but not men. They are gods who, having assumed the forms of human beings, stalk on this earth.

It is better to be born as mute whales in the murky deep water than to be born as men whose speech is not refined by the study of grammar.

Manu, also, has said in his own work that a scholar who is well-versed in the science of grammar and a scholar who is wellup in the Mimāṃsā system purify their lineage. He says that he, who can analyse a word, and he, who can correctly interpret the Vedic sentences employed in sacrifices, sanctify their lineage.

Puspadanta has also said to this effect. I have been cursed by the goddess Durgā. As a result of it my citizenship from the city

of Siva has been cancelled. Wretched as I am I lead the life of a captive. If I am to be born in the next life on this dirty earth full of miseries then I may see the light of day in such a place where my ears are filled up with the charming utterances of grammarians—utterances which are as clean as the flow of milk-emitting sprays of sweet nectar.

Those who have closely studied the science of grammar and obtained mastery over refined language may have an easy access to the Vedic words which have diverse forms. Other persons also may thoroughly understand the meaning of the Vedas with the aid of the Vedic lexicon (Nirukta) which is intimately connected with the Vedas. How is it that the Vedas shall not be the source of valid knowledge? In other words, is there any sense in the objection that the Vedas will remain for ever a sealed book?

The Vedic collection and the science of grammar do not mutually depend upon each other. One can independently learn the science of grammar. If he acquires proficiency in language he can clearly understand the meaning of the Vedic texts. Thus, the charge of mutual dependence is answered.

Those who have not swerved an inch from the proper line of expression and remain devoted to the Vedas have held the science of grammar in esteem. How can the eternal science of grammar which has been recognised by Patañjali, the celebrated teacher, enjoy the same status with the grammar of rustic words?

THE CONCLUDING PORTION

The barbarians have an access to a few loopholes. They have proclaimed loudly the falsity of the eternal Śāstras and heaped contumely on them by means of demonic language. We have refuted all their charges. The truth of the Vedas remains unshaken.

In fine, we have discussed the four sources of valid knowledge, viz., perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony in accordance with the traditional point of view. Let those who will act upon these sources of valid knowledge realise their ends of life.

The sixth chapter of Nyāya-manjari ends here.

The logical portion of Nyāya-manjari ends here.

IDENTITY PRINCIPLE

THE BOOLEAN FORMULATION

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I

The principle of identity has been variously formulated. From the point of view of logical operations most of the formulations are, however, worthless,—worthless not because the formulations are incorrect or the underlying principle is untrue, but because these formulations are logically sterile. By characterising them as logically sterile we mean to say that they are not capable of any deductive development, which is useful for logical operations. It is true that most logicians pay liberal tributes to the principle of identity. But the principle is mostly represented as an idle member of the dignified trinity of traditional logic. Of the many enunciations consider, for instance, the one put forward by Bradley who following Sigwart says that “Truth is at all times true” or “once true always true, once false always false. Truth is not only independent of time, but it does not depend upon change and chance. No alteration in space or time, no possible difference of any event or context, can make truth falsehood. If that which I say is really true, then it stands for ever”.¹ Ignoring the question of time unnecessarily² introduced in the above formulation, Bradley’s enunciation may more simply be restated as “if p , then p ” and “if $\neg p$, then $\neg p$ ”, where “ p ” signifies any proposition and “ $\neg p$ ” “not p ”. In other words, the identity principle is interpreted as a principle of propositional determination i.e. as a statement of the defining mark of “proposition”. Thus anything is a proposition that may be either true or false, but not both. The above formulation is certainly useful as indicating a principle of propositional determination, as a formula expressive of the unambiguity of the act of judgment. Again, it cannot be questioned that, however formulated, the identity principle is a necessary condition of sound reasoning, that we cannot start to state and reason unless we initially pay our regards to this dignitary of traditional logic. But, it may be asked, is this all that may be said in favour of this principle?

¹ Bradley : *The Principles of Logic* (II edn.) Vol. I, chap. V, sec. 5.

² The concept of time is here not only unnecessary, it also clouds the notion of identity. It is perhaps worth noting, parenthetically, that to remove a possible confusion in this connection, Bosanquet introduces the distinction “between the time of predication and the time in predication.” See his *Logic* (II edn.) vol. I, sec. I, iii.

It is not necessary to consider other formulations of which some, it is true, are less objectionable than others. For Bradley's enunciation is the type of most of the formulations of the identity principle which, therefore, are as barren as Bradley's. We have said that *most* formulations are barren. "Most" has been used with a view to making some notable exceptions *e.g.*, the formulations of Leibniz and Boole.³ Freed from the metaphysical implications, Leibniz's formulation comes to the statement: $x=y$ when and only when everything that may be said about one of the things, x or y , may also be said about the other. We are not, in the present paper, concerned with the merits of the formulation of Leibniz. It may, however, be incidentally noted that by Leibniz's formulation may be justified the rule of substitution and the properties of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity of the identity and equivalence relation. Boole formulates the identity principle as $x^2=x$. This formula is not an idle principle in the Boolean system. Boole transforms this traditional law of thought to an active principle which determines the nature of logic as distinguished from other studies. In fact, $x^2=x$ is a corner stone of the Boolean system of logic. The most important thing about this formulation is that though the formula applies to all possible objects of thought, in Boole's hands it has become an instrument that uniquely determines the character of logic as distinguished from other deductive systems. Again, Boole's formulation makes the identity principle a firm base of the most important method of reasoning in the logic of classes.

In what follows we shall use the expressions: logic, Boolean logic, algebra of classes, class-calculus, Boolean algebra etc. as synonymous; similarly "algebra", "ordinary algebra", "algebra of numbers" etc. will be used as synonymous expressions. In section II Boole's symbolism will be explained, the meaning of $x^2=x$ will be explained in section III, and section IV will show the importance of $x^2=x$ as forming the basis of the most important method of reasoning—the method of elimination of a certain symbol from given premisses.

II

According to Boole, all the operations of verbal language, as an instrument of statement and reasoning, may be conducted by the following non-verbal symbols;

- (a) literal symbols like x, y, z etc. used to represent names of things;
- (b) signs of operations as $+$, \times etc. used to signify the processes by

³ Another notable exception is Jevons's rule of substitution of similars. In his logic Jevons takes identity as a fundamental relation rather than class inclusion and exclusion. But we have omitted Jevons's formulation, for Jevons's system is to a great extent based on the works of Boole;—Jevons himself admits this: 'the forms of my system may in fact be reached by divesting his (Boole's) system of a mathematical dress . . . *Pure Logic* p. 3.

Similarly the Russell-Whitehead formulation of the identity principle closely follows Leibniz's "identity of indiscernibles" subjected to certain necessary restrictions.—*Principia* vol. 1, p. 51.

which names are combined or resolved so as to form new names; (c) the sign of identity, =, used to combine names so as to form propositions.

(a') A literal symbol is called a class-symbol when it is used to signify a class-name or, directly, a class. Thus x symbolises the class X, y the class Y etc. (e.g., the name man or the class signified by "man"). Class-symbols are also called *elective* symbols. For a class is, in Boolean terminology, the result of an act of *election* of individuals according to the presence or absence of an attribute or a set of attributes. By "election", it may be noted, Boole means what is meant by "selection". If we elect, for example, the X's (say, men) we get the class X (man) which is to be symbolised by x . That is, the symbol x in the given instance, represents indifferently either "man" or man.

(b'): X, Y etc. may be regarded as the results of single acts of election; hence x , y etc. may be treated as representatives of what may be called simple classes. It should be noted that the notion of simplicity is relative, a thing is more or less simple in relation to another thing, a class is simple in relation to another class. Now, the results of single acts of election may be variously combined. Thus, a second act of election may be performed on an already elected class (we speak indifferently of electing individuals and electing class). For instance, when X is a class (say, white things) we may, by a second act of election, get the X's that are Y (y stands for, say, sheep) i.e., the class XY such that XY's are members of the class XY. Or, given the class Y we may form the class YX by electing all Y's that are X. This newly elected class will be expressed by $y \times x$. The combination of two or more elective symbols x , y , etc. in the form $x \times y \times$ etc. will, in other words, express the class of things to which the names signified by x , y , etc. are together applicable, i.e., the members of the class signified by $x \times y$ are also members of the classes represented by x and y . The operation of combining two or more class-symbols, x , y , z etc. in the form $x \times y \times z \times$ etc. is called *logical multiplication* and the expression $x \times y \times z \times$ etc. the *logical product* of x , y , z , etc. Now, it is a well-established convention in mathematics to omit the sign \times when the elements between which it is to be used are variables (also when of two elements one is a variable). Thus, in the ordinary algebra we write ab instead of $a \times b$. In Boolean algebra too this practice is followed, i.e., the multiplication sign is replaced by the mere juxtaposition of symbols. E.g. for $x \times y$ we shall agree to write xy .

The symbol + is called the sign of aggregation or logical *addition*. It symbolises "and"—the verbal sign of conjunction, and "or"—the verbal symbol for alternation. E.g. if x =men⁴ and y =women, then $x + y$ = "men and women", or "men or women". In translating + in the verbal language, + is to be replaced by "and" if it forms a part of the expression

⁴ In such case i.e., when "=" is used between an elective symbol and a verbal symbol, "=" is to be read as "stands for the name (or the class signified by the name)".

used as the subject of a proposition, but "or" is to be substituted for "+" if this sign forms a part of the expression for the predicate. E.g. in " $x+y$ are z ", "+"="and"; but in " x is $y+z$ ", "+"="or". The expression $x+y$ is called the logical sum of x and y ; similarly, $(x+y)+z$ is the logical sum of $(x+y)$ and z . It must be noted that two classes X and Y may be added if and only if the classes are exclusive; if anything is XY then $x+y$ is not interpretable. That is, in Boolean logic "and" and "or" (i.e. $+$) are taken in the exclusive sense; the sign $+$ may be put between two (or more) elective symbols when and only when the classes signified are exclusive. So $x+x$, $y+y$ etc., or $x+y$ when the classes X and Y overlap are generally uninterpretable in Boolean logic.

The operation of aggregating or collecting parts into wholes suggests the opposite operation of exclusion, exception or *logical subtraction*. The sign of exception is expressed in ordinary language by "except" e.g. "all men except Asiatics" excludes Asiatics from the class signified by "man". In Boolean logic the operation of exception is expressed by the minus sign, $-$. Thus $x-y$ represents the above expression when x =men and y =Asiatics. It must be noted that exclusion presupposes inclusion, i.e., any class Y may be subtracted from a class X when and only when Y is included in X . In other words, $x-y$ implies $x-xy$; $x-y$ is not interpretable if xy is not equal to y . Comparing the three operations symbolised by "+", " \times " and " $-$ " we may sum up thus: " $-$ " presupposes that the subtracted class is included in the class wherefrom the exclusion is made, the elective symbols to be combined by "+" must represent classes that are exclusive, and " \times " or juxtaposition may be used without any such restriction, i.e., the classes multiplied may be inclusive or exclusive.

It will be noticed that the mathematical law of commutation for multiplication, $xy=yx$, and for addition, $x+y=y+x$, hold also when x , y etc. are elective symbols. Thus, white sheep (ry)=sheep that are white (yx), man and women ($x+y$)=woman and man ($y+x$). Again, elective symbols satisfy the distributive law of multiplication over addition, $z(x+y)=zx+zy$, and over subtraction, $z(x-y)=zx-zy$. E.g., let x =men, y =women and z =European; then European men and women ($z(x+y)$)=European-men and European-women ($zx+zy$). Similarly, with the distributive law of multiplication over subtraction. Elective symbols also satisfy the law of association for addition, $a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c$, and for multiplication, $a(bc)=(ab)c$.

(c'): The sign of identity, $=$, is used for the formation of proposition out of elective symbols. Propositions are not mere collections of verbal symbols. They assert certain relations between what the verbal symbols signify; when they do not assert, they are possible assertions. In Aristotelian logic this relation is expressed by "belongs to", "is predicated of" and their negatives, and in traditional logic by "is", "are" and their negatives. Boole uses the identity sign, $=$, to represent the

assertive tie between classes. That is, in Boolean logic propositions are treated as equations *e.g.* "the stars (x) are the suns (y) and planets (z)" will be expressed in the Boolean system as $x=y+z$. Incidentally, from $x=y+z$ follows $x-z=y$ which is the representation of "the stars except the planets are the suns".

We are now in a position to introduce the principle $x^2=x$.

III

We have seen that the combination of two elective symbols x and y in the form xy signifies the whole class of things to which the names represented by x and y are together applicable. Now, if two symbols signify the same class then their product will signify the class that either of them taken alone would signify. *E.g.*, the verbal symbols man and featherless-bipeds severally signify the same class. So if $x=\text{men}$, $y=\text{featherless bipeds}$, then $xy=x$, or, $xy=y$. As x signifies what is signified by y we may, in the above equations, substitute x for y . And we have $xx=x$ or, following the practice of ordinary algebra of writing x^2 for xx , $x^2=x$.

The above equation has apparently no analogue in ordinary algebra. It states the principle that the result of a given act of election performed twice is the same as that of the same act performed once. That is, an elective symbol multiplied by itself⁵ is identical with the symbol itself. Or what comes to the same thing, an idea repeated twice is the same as the initial idea itself. Repetition does not add anything to the idea, at least anything that is logically significant. Thus, if we elect all X's and then elect X's from the class X for the second time the result is that of the first act of election viz., the class X. This principle is not, however, peculiar to non-verbal symbols. Repetition of a verbal symbol too neither heightens a quality nor strengthens an assertion *e.g.*, "good, good man" means, for logical purposes, what is meant by "good man".

We have said that the equation $x^2=x$ has no analogue *i.e.*, is not interpretable, in the ordinary algebra. But this statement is not, strictly speaking, true. For the equation $x^2=x$ also holds in the algebra of numbers under certain conditions; it holds if and only if x admits of the value 0 or 1 (note that $0^2=0$, $1^2=1$). We may, then, conceive of an algebra in which the variables, admit only of the values 0 and 1. Laws of such an algebra will be identical with those of the logic of which $x^2=x$ is an unique principle. The symbols 0 and 1, then, have a place and are interpretable in logic. The algebra of numbers will coincide with (the algebra of) logic when and only when, the variables take only 0 and 1 as their values.

The symbol 0 as used in ordinary algebra satisfies the law $0y=0$ whatever number y may represent. The question is: how are we to

⁵ For simplicity we speak indifferently of multiplying (or adding) classes as well as of multiplying (or adding) symbols.

interpret 0 if logic is to conform to the above law about 0? The interpretation must obviously satisfy the condition that the class signified by Oy is identical with the class signified by 0; whatever class y may represent. It will be immediately seen that in the algebra of logic, the condition $Oy = 0$ is satisfied if and only if 0 is made to represent "nothing"—the empty nothing class, also called the *null class*. For, whatever class y may represent, the individuals, if any, that are common members of the Y -class and nothing class are identical with members, if any, of the nothing class. Thus "nothing \times man" = "nothing" or Oy (when $y = \text{man}$) is empty; there are no elements which are simultaneously members of the class nothing and of the man-class.

The symbol 1 as used in the algebra of quantity satisfies the law $ly = y$ whatever value y may take. The question arises: what interpretation must be given to 1 if the above law is to hold in logic? It is clear that whatever class y may signify the class signified by ly must be identical with the class represented by y . Now, the condition $ly = y$ is satisfied in logic when and only when 1 is interpreted as representing the *universe* or the universal class. Thus the members of the class signified by "man \times universe" or ly (where $y = \text{man}$) is identical with those of the class man i.e. $ly = y$. To sum up, 0 and 1 occupy a place in logic, and in the algebra of logic they are to be interpreted as representing respectively the null and the universal class.

We must now introduce the concept of *contrary* or supplementary class. Two classes that are exclusive and together exhaust the universe are called contrary or supplementary classes (note that by "contrary" Boole means that is meant, in the language of traditional logic, by "contradictory"). There is nothing which is at the same time a member of two contrary classes, i.e. $xy = 0$ where x and y represent two contrary classes. Again, there is nothing outside the scope of the contrary classes X and Y taken together or "added"—hence the name supplementary; a class supplemented by its contrary exhausts the universe i.e. $x + y = 1$ where x and y represent the contrary classes X and Y . We know that in Boolean logic the universe is represented by 1; we also know that the universe is the sum of any class X and its contrary, say, Y , i.e. $1 = x + y$. Since the universe divides itself between any two contrary classes, when any class X is taken away (i.e., subtracted) from the universe the remainder is obviously the contrary of X . So the contrary of any class X may be found by subtracting X from the universe. That is, if x is a class-symbol $(1 - x)$ will represent the contrary class.

From what is said above it follows that " $x + (1 - x) = 1$ ". This principle holds in logic as well as in ordinary algebra. In logic this formula symbolically expresses the truth that the contrary classes exhaust the universe. It also follows that " $x(1 - x) = 0$ ". This is a principle of logic. It holds in the algebra of numbers if and only if the possible values of x

are restricted to 0 and 1. In the algebra of classes this formula states the truth that contrary classes have between them no common members, that the determining properties of a class and those of its contrary cannot, at the same time, be predicated of the same thing, or as Aristotle would put it, that it is impossible for an individual to have an attribute and also not to have it at the same time. In traditional logic and metaphysics, this principle, expressed by Boole as $x(1-x) = 0$, is called the law of contradiction. Boole calls it the law of *duality*. This principle is intuitively obvious and "has been commonly regarded as the fundamental axiom of metaphysics".⁶ Boole, however, believes that it is "but the consequence of a law of thought, mathematical in its form"⁷—the consequence of $x^2 = x$. The expression $x^2 = x$ is the mathematical formulation of what is called, in traditional logic, the law of identity. The equation $x(1-x) = 0$ is, we have seen, the Boolean formulation of the traditional law of contradiction, while $x + (1-x) = 1$ is Boole's mathematical representation of the principle called the law of excluded middle. The Boolean formulation of the above-mentioned trinity of traditional logic is repeated below:

Principle of Identity	:	$x^2 = x$	(p)
Principle of Contradiction	:	$x(1-x) = 0$	(p')
Principle of Excluded Middle	:	$x + (1-x) = 1$	(q)

We shall ignore in this paper the relation of p or p' to q , and discuss only the relation of p and p' . For Boole claims that "the fundamental axiom of metaphysics"—the contradiction principle—is a consequence of $x^2 = x$. It is indeed easy to deduce p' as a consequence of p . Since $x^2 = x$, we have by transposition, $x - x^2 = 0$ whence we get $x(1-x) = 0$. It must, however, be noted that Boole emphasises only one side of the truth. It is true that p' is "but a consequence" of p ; but it is equally true that that p may be deduced from p' . Thus $x(1-x) = 0$, or, by distribution, $x - x^2 = 0$, or, by transposition, $x = x^2$, or $x^2 = x$ (by symmetry). The deduction of p' from p and that of p from p' are for comparison repeated below along with the axioms presupposed in these demonstrations. The symmetry of the two demonstrations maybe noted. First, the axioms (A's):

A_1 : $x1 = x$, and the distributive law of multiplication.

A_2 : if two classes are equal, then their difference is equal to 0.

A_2' : if the difference between two classes is 0, then the classes are equal (A_2' is the converse of A_2 and conversely).

Now the demonstrations. "i" is to be read as "implies."

$$\begin{array}{l} p \text{ i } p' : \\ x^2 = x \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} p' \text{ i } p : \\ x(1-x) = 0 \end{array}$$

Boole : *Laws of Thought* (Dover edition) p. 50.

Ibid., p. 50.

$$\therefore x-x^2=0 \text{ (by } A_2)$$

$$\therefore x(1-x)=0 \text{ (by } A_1)$$

$$x-x^2=0 \text{ (by } A_1)$$

$$x^2=x \text{ (by } A_2')$$

We find, then, that the identity principle, p , implies the principle of contradiction, p' , which implies the identity principle. In other words, p and p' are coimplicant or equivalent principles; of them one is not fundamental and the other derivative. Boole calls p' the law of *duality*. Since p' coimplies p ("coimplies," it may be noted, indicates a symmetrical relation) we may apply the name duality indifferently to $x^2=x$ or to $x(1-x)=0$.

A note on "duality" must, at this point, be added. We know that Boole calls $x(1-x)=0$ the law of duality. But Jevons uses the name for the principle $x+(1-x)=1$, for the universe consists of the duality of any class X and its contrary $1-X$. Again, "duality" is also used in the modern logic and algebra to indicate a certain symmetry in the transformation of a formula in terms of 0, 1, +, \times (and elective symbols). According to this usage of "duality" *i.e.*, according to what in modern algebra is called the principle of duality, every formula in terms of 0, 1 etc., yields a "dual" formula paired with the first such that each member of the pair may be obtained from the other by interchanging 0 and 1, + and \times (or juxtaposition); —in this interchange x , $(1-x)$, y etc., and "=" must be left unchanged. Thus $x(1-x)=0$ gives by the above rule of substitution $x+(1-x)=1$ which similarly gives $x(1-x)=0$. The above principle of duality holds in the Boolean logic with respect to p' and q . But consider $x^2=x$. By the principle of duality we should have $xx=x$ *dl* $x+x=x$ (*dl*=is the dual of). In Boolean algebra the duality of $xx=x$ is not, however, allowed; for in Boolean system $x+x$ is not interpretable; + is permitted between elective symbols only when they signify classes that are exclusive. The duality of + and \times and also of 1 and 0 in an algebra in which the variables may take only 0 and 1 as their possible values are shown below.

$$(P)xx=x \text{ dl } x+x=x \text{ (p)}$$

$$(Q)x(1-x)=0 \text{ dl } x+(1-x)=1 \text{ (q)}$$

$$(R)(1-x)(1-x)=(1-x) \text{ dl } (1-x)+(1-x)=(1-x) \text{ (r)} (r')0+0=0 \text{ dl } 1 \times 1=1 \text{ (R')}$$

$$(p')1+1=1 \text{ dl } 0 \times 0=0 \text{ (P')^s}$$

$$(q')1+0=1 \text{ dl } 1 \times 0=0 \text{ (Q')}$$

It will be noticed that P , Q and q represent respectively the principle of identity, contradiction and excluded middle. From the formulae in the extreme left hand column we get the formulae in the second column by the relation of duality. Corresponding to P , Q and R we get respectively P' , Q' and R' when $x=0$, and R' , Q' and P' when $x=1$; again, corresponding to p , q and r we get respectively p' , q' and r' when $x=1$ and r' , q' and p' when $x=0$. It is obvious that the formulae in the extreme left and extreme right hand columns all hold true in Boolean logic, for in this system

^s P , p , P' , p' etc. are used for numbering the formulae. P , p' etc. refer to the respective right-hand side expressions; p , P' etc. to the respective left-hand side expressions.

multiplication has unrestricted scope, the sign \times is permissible between elective symbols whether the classes signified are exclusive or inclusive. But p and r do not hold in Boole's class-calculus; for in Boolean system addition of x and y in the form $x+y$ is allowed when and only when $xy=0$. So $x+x=r$, or $(1-x)+(1-x)=(1-x)$ is not always interpretable. Does r' hold in Boole's logic? It is a very difficult problem. It may be said that r' does not hold true because 0 is not exclusive of 0 and exclusion is the precondition of addition. On the other hand, it may be argued that r' is permitted in Boolean algebra because $x+y$ is allowed when and only when $xy=0$; and $0 \times 0=0$, i.e., any class symbol $a \times 0=0$, hence $a+0$ is interpretable (let $a=0$ and we have $0 \times 0=0$ and $0+0=0$), i.e., the dual of R' also holds true. We have said that $x+x=x$ and $(1-x)+(1-x)=(1-x)$ do not always hold; "not always", because they hold under certain conditions: when and only when x in the former is 0 and in the latter 1. Whether the above argument in defence of the acceptability of $0+0=0$ is accepted or not, Boole must accept the formula in his system of logic. For the principle of elimination of a given symbol from two equations requires the addition of 0 to 0. (For the purpose of elimination of a term, e.g., the middle term of a syllogism, the premisses in the form $V=0$, say, $V_1=0$ and $V_2=0$ are to be combined as $V_1+V_2=0$. So Boolean algebra must accept r' mentioned above.

The property of x which permits the reduction of xx to x is called *idempotence* with respect to multiplication and that of x which permits the reduction of $x+x$ to x is called *idempotence* with respect to addition. Multiplicative and additive idempotence are two varieties of the identity principle in its most generalised form. It will be recalled that in explaining $x^2=x$ we said that an idea repeated twice is the same thing as the initial idea itself. In this statement the expression "repeated twice" is, however, ambiguous. It may mean multiplicatively repeated or additively repeated i.e. $xx=x$, or, $x+x=x$. We have seen that Boole accepts the first, but rejects the second, sense of "repetition". That is, Boole accepts idempotence with respect to multiplication and rejects idempotence with respect to addition except when x is 0. In other words, in Boolean system $x^2=x$ has no dual except when x is 0. Specifically, $0 \times 0=0$ is true without its dual holding true, $0 \times 1=0$ and its dual are both true, and also $1 \times 1=1$ and its dual are true. We must, then, restrict the application of "duality" generally to the relation of $x(1-x)=0$ to $x+(1-x)=1$, or to the relation of Q' and R' respectively to q' and r' .

IV

We have explained above the Boolean formulation of the identity principle. We may now proceed to show the immense importance of the identity principle as formulated by Boole. It will be admitted that logic

is concerned mostly with reasoning or implication,⁹ and most of the forms of reasoning proceeds by the elimination of a given term from the premisses. So the elimination of given terms from premisses (and implicants) is the most important method for deducing conclusions (and implicates). We shall see that the basis of the method of elimination is the identity (or contradiction) principle. But let us first explain in some detail the term *elimination* and introduce what Boole calls the method of elimination.

In reasoning, especially when reasoning contains more premisses than one, some elements (*i.e.* terms) of the given premisses are required not to reappear in the conclusion; some one term, at least, of the given premisses is to be eliminated if a conclusion is to be drawn. Thus the middle term of the traditional syllogism is to be eliminated in the conclusion. Again, suppose that $x = yzw$ and suppose that we want to obtain from it a description of the symbol y ¹⁰ not in terms of *all* other symbols contained in the equation but in terms of some of them, say, in terms of x and z only. This requires the elimination of the symbol w in the above equation. It is supposed that elimination requires two premisses wherefrom a certain term is to be eliminated. From this premisses and the belief that elimination is the necessary condition of reasoning it is deduced that syllogism is the type of all reasoning. But this is not correct. For reasoning need not involve two premisses, nor does it require always the elimination of some elements contained in the given datum, *e.g.*, the immediate inference of traditional logic and the Boolean *analysis* of single propositions, nor again, does elimination necessarily require two premisses (or equations). From a single premiss any number of symbols may be eliminated and from a number of equations a single symbol may be eliminated. The method of elimination shows an important point of difference between the algebra of class and that of numbers. In the ordinary algebra we may eliminate one symbol from two equations, two symbols from three equations *i.e.* $n-1$ symbols from a set of n equations. Here a fixed relation exists between the number of equations and that of the symbols that may be eliminated. But no such fixed relation holds in logic between the number of equations and the number of terms that may be eliminated. In logic from a single equation an indefinite number of symbols may be eliminated and conversely from an indefinite number of equations a single symbol may be eliminated. This difference between logic and algebra is due to the unique law of duality to which the symbols of logic are subject. We are

⁹ Reasoning and implication differ in many important respects. But what we are going to say applies indifferently to both of them. So we ignore their difference and treat them as if "reasoning" and "implication" were equivalent expressions. And we shall sometimes use "reasoning", sometimes "implication".

¹⁰ Strictly speaking, the description not of the symbol y but of what y signifies. But for simplicity we ignore this distinction.

going to introduce the Boolean method of elimination. We shall discuss the method of elimination from single equations. The same method holds for sets of equations. For the premisses of the form $V_1=0$, $V_2=0$ etc. may be added together in the form of a single equation, $V_1+V_2=0$. So the method of elimination discussed below indifferently applies to single equations as well as to sets of equations.

The rule for eliminating any symbol from a given equation may be formulated thus: Bring, if necessary, the terms of the equation to the first side (in the form $V=0$), give to the symbol to be eliminated the values 1 and 0 successively, and multiply the resulting equations together. Consider, for instance, the equation, $y=vx$ which represents, say, all men are mortal, (where y =men, x =mortal and v is the indefinite symbol signifying "some"). Suppose we want to eliminate the symbol v and interpret the result. Bringing the terms of the equation to the first side we have $y-vx=0$. When $v=1$, the equation becomes $y-x=0$ (i); and when $v=0$, the equation becomes $y=0$ (ii). Multiplying together the resulting equations (i) and (ii) we have $y(y-x)=0$, or $y-yx=0$ (noting that $y^2=y$), or $y(1-x)=0$ (by the rule of distribution). The last equation is the result of the required elimination. It symbolically states that Y that are not X do not exist; in the above concrete example, that men who are not mortal do not exist, or that there are no immortal men.

Consider the oft-quoted syllogism "all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal". Suppose the premisses are given, we are required to deduce a conclusion by eliminating men (the distinction between "man" and "men" may be ignored). Let z =man, y =mortal and x =Socrates. Note that x signifies an individual and not a class. But this does not matter if we remember that x symbolises an individual. As in traditional logic singular propositions are treated as universal propositions just so x may be regarded as a class symbol *i.e.*, x may be said to signify a single-membered class. We may, then, represent the first premiss as $z(1-y)=0$ (all men are mortal, or, immortal men do not exist), and the second premiss as $x(1-z)=0$. The two equations may be reduced to the single equation $z(1-y)+x(1-z)=0$. We are required to eliminate z from this equation and interpret the result. When $z=1$, the equation becomes $(1-y)=0$ (i) and when $z=0$ it becomes $x=0$ (ii). Multiplying (i) and (ii) we get $x(1-y)=0$ which, translated in verbal language, states that Socrates is mortal. Consider the syllogistic premisses of the forms all M are P, and no S are M (AF mood in fig. 1). They may be represented respectively as $z(1-y)=0$ and $xz=0$ (when $x=S$, $y=P$ and $z=M$). Adding the premisses we have $xz+z(1-y)=0$. Suppose we are required to draw conclusion from this equation by eliminating the symbol z . When $z=1$, the equation becomes $x+(1-y)=0$ and when $z=0$ the equation becomes $0=0$. Multiplying

these results we get 0 which indicates that AE in fig. I is an invalid mood.

The elimination of any symbol x from any equation involving x is to be effected, we have seen, by successively changing in that equation x into 1 and 0 and multiplying the two resulting equations together. Is the principle underlying this rule valid? If so, what is the proof of its validity? We shall see presently that the principle is valid by virtue of the tautology $x^2=x$ or $x(1-x)=0$. But before we attempt to prove the validity of the method of elimination we must introduce the notion of expansion in the Boolean system. Again, the notion of *expansion* is related to the concept of *function* which must be introduced first.

Any algebraic expression that involves a symbol, say, x is called a function of x . And the notation for expressing the function of x is $f(x)$. Similarly, an algebraic expression that involves two or more symbols x, y , etc. is called a function of x, y , etc. and may be expressed as $f(x, y, \text{etc.})$. Consider, for instance, $f(x)$. It indifferently represents any of the following functions $x, 1-x, \frac{1+x}{1-x}$, etc. Similarly, $x+y, x-2y, \frac{x+y}{x-2y}$ are the instances of $f(x, y)$. Now if in any function $f(x)$ we change x into 1 the result will be expressed by the notation $f(1)$, and when x in $f(x)$ is changed into 0 the result will be expressed as $f(0)$. Thus, when $f(x)$ represents the function $\frac{a+x}{a-2x}$, $f(1)$ expresses the result $\frac{a+1}{a-2}$ (we get it by substituting 1 for x) and $f(0)$ expresses $\frac{a}{a}$.

Any function $f(x)$ in which x is an elective symbol or a symbol susceptible of the values 0 and 1 is said to be expanded when it is reduced to the form $ax + b(1-x)$ (a and b being coefficients 1, 0 etc.)— a and b being so determined as to make the result equivalent to the function from which it is derived.¹¹ Thus the expansion of $f(x)$ is $f(1)x + f(0)(1-x)$. Similarly, $f(1-x) = f(0)x + f(1)(1-x)$ the right-hand side expression being the expansion of $f(1-x)$. x being an elective symbol admits of the value 0 or 1. Note that for each of these values the expansion $f(1)x + f(0)(1-x)$ of $f(x)$ (or the expansion $f(0)x + f(1)(1-x)$ of $f(1-x)$) assumes the same value as the function $f(x)$ (or the function $f(1-x)$). We are now in a position to prove the validity of the principle underlying the method of elimination and to show thereby the importance of the identity (or contradiction) principle. It will be useful to note the following symbolism that we are going to use in the proposed proof.

$f(x)$ = the function of x , any algebraic expression involving x .

$f(1)$ = what $f(x)$ becomes when x is changed into 1.

$f(0)$ = what $f(x)$ becomes when x is changed

¹¹ *Laws of Thought* (Dover) p. 72.

Theorem: If $f(x)=0$ be any logical equation involving the elective symbol x , with or without other elective symbols then will the equation $f(1)f(0)=0$ be true independently of the interpretation of x ; and it will be the result of the elimination of x from the equation $f(x)=0$.

Proof: Expanding the first member of $f(x)=0$ we have

$$f(1)x + f(0)(1-x) = 0 \quad \text{or} \quad f(1)x + f(0) - f(0)x = 0$$

$$\text{or} \quad \{f(1) - f(0)\}x + f(0) = 0 \quad \text{or} \quad \{f(1) - f(0)\}x = -f(0)$$

$$\therefore \quad x = \frac{-f(0)}{f(1) - f(0)} = \frac{-f(0)}{-\{f(0) - f(1)\}} = \frac{f(0)}{f(0) - f(1)} \quad (v_1)$$

$$\therefore \quad (1-x) = 1 - \left\{ \frac{f(0)}{f(0) - f(1)} \right\} = \frac{f(0) - f(1) - f(0)}{f(0) - f(1)}$$

$$\text{or} \quad (1-x) = \frac{-f(1)}{f(0) - f(1)} = -\frac{f(1)}{f(0) - f(1)} \quad (v_2)$$

We have now obtained the values of x and $(1-x)$. We know that the equation $x(1-x)=0$ is a tautology. Substituting the values of x and $(1-x)$, v_1 and v_2 , in this valid equation, $x(1-x)=0$, we obtain

$$\frac{f(0)}{f(0) - f(1)} \times \left\{ -\frac{f(1)}{f(0) - f(1)} \right\} = 0 \quad \text{or} \quad -\frac{f(0)f(1)}{\{f(0) - f(1)\}^2} = 0$$

$$\therefore \quad f(0)f(1)=0 \quad \text{or} \quad f(1)f(0)=0$$

(for if $\frac{x}{y}=0$, then $x=0$).

It will be noticed that the above proof of the proposition "if $f(x)=0$, then $f(1)f(0)=0$ " is really based on the principle of duality. For the elimination of x is really effected by the tautology $x(1-x)=0$. In the above demonstration we have first determined the values of x and $(1-x)$ from the expansion of $f(x)=0$ and then put these values in the valid formula $x(1-x)=0$ which is coimplicant to $x^2=x$. So the elimination is really effected between $f(x)=0$ and $x(1-x)=0$. It may, then, be said that the most fundamental method of reasoning and deduction of implicates in the logic of terms is based on the Boolean formulation of the identity principle, $x^2=x$, which, therefore, is not merely an idle necessary-condition of sound reasoning, but an active principle of the logic of classes.

Reference

G. Boole : *The Laws of Thought*, chapters II, III, V, VII and VIII.

VIRGINIA WOOLF

S. PREMA

Once in her diary—she left at her death 26 volumes of it—she made a rather a curious note: “I’m the hare, a long way ahead of my critics.” It sounds a conceited remark. Actually it is no more than a just observation. It seems as though, as during her life, after her death also, Mrs. Virginia Woolf would prove to be a hare “a long way ahead of her critics”, for ever eluding their attempts to grasp, categorize or anatomize her. In short, even more than other novelists, Mrs. Woolf demands humility from her critics—humility and sensitive awareness—just as she herself approached life with these qualities.

It is perhaps convenient to study her separately as a novelist, as an essayist, and as a personality and an influence. She was no doubt all of a piece, and the ‘elements’ were subtly mixed in her, and to dissect the substance is to miss the essence, or destroy the harmony. But there are advantages in the facet-by-facet study, so long as the unity of the whole is not forgotten.

A few words first about her life. Virginia and Vanessa were the talented daughters of the great Victorian biographer and critic, Sir Leslie Stephen. Educated at home, they fully participated in the currents of Victorian thought, and Greek literature and classical music gave a particular strength and quality to their cultural equipment. In the opening years of the 20th century they made friends with the Cambridge friends of their brothers, Adrian and Thoby, and so in time the now celebrated ‘Bloomsbury Group’ acquired a distinctive habitation and a name. Lytton Stacey was its brain, and Virginia Woolf the soul of Bloomsbury: but some of the others, Vanessa and her husband Clive Bell the artist, E. M. Forster the novelist, John Maynard Keynes the economist, Leonard Woolf whom Virginia presently married, were hardly less distinguished. They met, talked, surveyed mankind from China to Peru, cultivated beauty in its diverse manifestations, and cherished personal relationships. The high priest was the Cambridge philosopher, G. E. Moore. Their pet aversions were hypocrisy and vulgarity. As the years passed, the ‘Bloomsbury Group’ developed something of the coterie spirit, and it was said in derision that, shorn of its highbrow pretensions, it

was really a mutual admiration society. But this was the language of jealousy and detraction, and had little to justify it.

In 1915, three years after her marriage, Virginia Woolf published her first novel, *The Voyage Out*. Her brother-in-law, Clive Bell, classed her soon afterwards with great novelists like Dostoevsky and Conrad—but the achievement was yet to come. In the course of an active career extending over a period of 25 years, she wrote about a dozen novels, the more important of which may be grouped as under :

First Period :	<i>The Voyage Out</i> (1915)
	<i>Night and Day</i> (1919)
	<i>Jacob's Room</i> (1922)
Second Period :	<i>Mrs. Dalloway</i> (1925)
	<i>To the Lighthouse</i> (1927)
Third Period :	<i>The Waves</i> (1931)
	<i>The Years</i> (1937)

A critic has remarked that the novels of the first period deal with love and freedom, those of the second period with marriage and truth, and of the third period with the world and reality. But this is misleading, for all her novels are preoccupied with essential reality of the human adventure on the earth, which naturally involves exploration into the nature of love, freedom and truth. The emphasis varies from novel to novel, there is a deepening, an increasing comprehension, but it is a difference in degree, not kind.

Even in her earliest novels—*The Voyage Out*, *Night and Day*—conventional in form though they appear to be, Mrs. Woolf tends to minimise incident and maximise the role of conversation. In *The Voyage Out*, Terence realizes the fulfilment of his love for Rachel only when he dies. There is perhaps a reflection of her early home life, its intellectual play, in Mrs. Woolf's *Night and Day*, while its hero and heroine, Ralph and Katherine, in their game of hide and seek recall Shakespeare's Benedick and Beatrice. That love is a mystery, even a gift of grace, and not a syllogistic deduction is not seen by these professed anti-romantics. It was the shock of the outrage on Hero that galvanised Benedick and Beatrice into an awareness of their love, but Mrs. Woolf provides for no such shock treatment to her Ralph and Katherine.

Meantime, the work of Proust in France and of Dorothy Richardson and James Joyce in England was opening new vistas of explora-

tion of consciousness, and Virginia Woolf was fascinated. *Jacob's Room* tells the life history of a certain Cornish widow's son, Jacob, from childhood—through schooldays, Cambridge, London and the war years in Greece—to his death in battle. The sight of litter in Jacob's room starts a chain of memory and reverie in the old mother, consciousness is extended in space and time, and Jacob's life-story is covered as in a full circle. It is a human story,—not narrated, but as it were projected on a screen—impression follows impression, Jacob grows, Jacob dies. Only his old shoes remain—the crowning mockery!

Mrs. Dalloway, the next novel, was obviously inspired by the theme of Katherine Mansfield's *The Garden Party* (1922) and owed much to James Joyce's *Ulysses* (1922). In the former, the death of a young man at the front gate chills the progress of a garden party. The little girl, Laura, makes an attempt to seize the truth about "the inexplicable marvel of life"—but it is the craziness of life alone that strikes the insensitive. In *Mrs. Dalloway* too there is a party: and at the other end of London there is a suicide. The links between the 2 worlds of life and death are more tenuous here than in Katherine Mansfield's story, but they are all the same. Clarissa Dalloway has heard of Septimus Warren Smith's death—and there is death in her heart. To feel like a human being, distance is no bar: a Sir William Bradshaw will be insensitive even when tragedy stares him in the face, but Clarissa cannot but feel differently. Death somewhere is death everywhere. Isolation is already death,—and perhaps death may be a release! Mrs. Woolf suggests with a marvellous economy of suggestion the filiations between man and man, which we may deny only at the risk of spiritual death. For insinuating this ambrosial truth, Mrs. Woolf found the Joycean method of limitation in space and time (Dublin, one day) very useful; she too concentrated on a day in June in London, the Big Ben keeping time efficiently. Mrs. Woolf however is more selective than Joyce, she condenses impressions where Joyce elaborates them, and she avoids Joyce's linguistic aberrations and, too, his coarseness and his occasional revolting naturalism. Where he gains in massiveness and power, she scores by her balance and reticence—the liveness and nimbleness of a hare.

In her next novel, *To the lighthouse*, the scene shifts to the house of Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay in the Hebrides. Two points of time—2 days separated by ten years—are juxtaposed: it is the same room, the Lighthouse yonder is unchanged, and yet change there has been in the human landscape. Did Mrs. Woolf put some-

thing of herself into Mrs. Ramsay? It seems probable. Like Mrs. Dalloway, like Mrs. Woolf herself, Mrs. Ramsay too is a dedicated practitioner of the difficult art of living. How to be oneself—and yet merge unobtrusively with one's surroundings? How to weave the strands of human relationships into a silken fabric, soft and soothing and serene? The Lighthouse is surely a symbol: but symbol of what? Of the ecstasy of transcendence? Of the promise of beatitude? *To the lighthouse* is an adventure in consciousness and scores by reason of its integrity no less than its beauty.

After *Orlando*, a *tour de force* which sketched the history of a character who starts life as an Elizabethan boy and ends as a 20th century young lady, Mrs. Woolf published in 1931 *The Waves*, probably her greatest achievement in the 'stream-of-consciousness' genre. The title is significant. The technique draws from the life of the sea—its turbidity and movement, its riches and its profundities, its ceaseless ebb and flow. It is the story of 3 boys and 3 girls—their journeyings through life, at first together, presently pursuing diverse paths, but they are all the time members of one another, they are entangled in obscure currents, they even meet once in a way. The task of surveying the complicated relationships of the group is given to Bertram, whose long monologue holds a position somewhat analogous to that of Mrs. Bloom's in *Ulysses*. Compared however to the turbidity, the involved flotsam and jetsam of the latter, Bertram's monologue is transparently clear and as pure and refreshing as spring water, with a murmur as of water flowing over little pebbles, the sentences come upon us, and their meaning winds its way to the heart. No, no: human life is no hard rocky substance, though often it seems to be such; touch it, and the hardness disappears and currents are started, they widen more and more, and seem to comprehend all and everything. Beneath the apparent solidity there is the real flux—the unceasing ebb and flow, the rhythm which is also the unchanging Real. The line of development of Mrs. Woolf's work reached its natural point of movement in *The Waves*. Here she had at last succeeded in conveying the whole rhythm of life, the baffling flux, the endless interplay of things on one another. It is as though we have been permitted to isolate a piece of hard matter and really see it as a universe of electrons and protons charged with blinding velocities.

Although Mrs. Woolf considered *The Waves* to be "far and away the greatest of her works", it is not difficult to stake this claim with more weight of reason for its successor, *The Years*. She

worked on it for 6 years, casting and recasting it, and she wrote under a pressure—the pressure of her artistic conscience. When it was over she almost wished to burn it, but her husband persuaded her to publish it. Here at last she had achieved the fusion of outward form and inner life—formal pattern and fluid rhythm—the hard atom and the whizz of the electronic flights. The four dimensions of human experience—the *not-I*; and the *outer* and the *inner*—are here held in delicate balance, and clarity and comprehension are wedded to truth and appropriateness. *The Years* is solid, but it is also life—and its logic doesn't obscure its vast reserves of meaning.

As a novelist, Virginia Woolf's work is remarkable for two reasons: her high seriousness and utter integrity as an artist, and her individual, almost 'poetic' prose style. She not only wished to tell a story, but also to render the movements in the mind and heart of her characters. Not what people seemed to 'do', but what they thought—or felt—was the main thing. She thus penetrated below the surface and tried to mark the currents of the cross-currents—to adjust her moorings in the world invisible—to make soundings—to plumb the depths. It was exciting, it was also exhausting—and the customary clarities seemed to grow hazy or disappear altogether. But it was not clarity that she was after, but truth—the whole truth if possible—and nothing but the truth. Once tear the veils away, once dive deep into the sea that is life, and the individual is seen in his isolation: isolation even when he is in the centre of the crowd. On the other hand, at another level of consciousness, this viperous sense of isolation is seen to be nought, the interconnectedness of individual and places is seen to be a reality, and the visible and the invisible—the *I* and the *not-I*—are also seen to be but aspects of the whole, which alone has reality. One catches a gleam of the truth, but soon the earth-crust obscures the truth: and one must persevere again. Death is there always, the permanent challenge: and to be able to see life even beyond death is the whole arc of our destiny. Mrs. Woolf doesn't falsify life—but neither does she turn away her face from the possibility of hope. She is a courageous, and alone a conscientious artist.

While it is usual to class Mrs. Woolf with Proust, Joyce and Dorothy Richardson, she is less involved and obscure than the first two and she is more radiant than the last. 'Stream of Consciousness', in so far as it is a modern technique, is her servant, not her master; and it gives her work a tantalising phosphorescence without quite destroying the groundwork of logic and clarity. No doubt

the simple pattern of plotting is here absent. Now in Karnatak music we are familiar with Kritis with their pallavi-anupallavi-charanam division, and we are also familiar with the alapana of a particular raga. If the former corresponds to a Jane Austen novel, Mrs. Woolf's *The Waves* may be compared to musical improvisation round a central theme. This too is music,—in some respects music that is continually in touch with the soul. A high imaginative attention is called for in the artist, and no less from the *sahridaya*, the student. But the rewards are immense.

The elusiveness of Mrs. Woolf's art as a novelist—its exploration of infinity within a seemingly limited range (Jane Austen's 'a bit of ivory' again), its pursuit of complexities and contradictions with a view to inferring the veiled harmony, its fierce integrity of spirit in the unwearying search for the 'essence' or the incandescent truth about life—is properly matched by the fascination and adequacy of her prose style. It is said Mrs. Woolf revised her writing again and again till she got the right rhythms and was sure of the right effects. No crudity, or slipshodness here, no heaviness, no sloppiness, no woolliness; it is a feminine style, with lights playing over it, with jerks, with seductive long-drawn-out rhythms, with sharp cries too and even suggestive silences. "Easy reading, hard writing", said Mr. Montague, explaining the secret of good writing, and this particularly applies to Mrs. Woolf's style. The one supreme virtue of prose is appropriateness, and Mrs. Woolf's style is always appropriate to the mood, the person, the occasion. How well she can make a point or evoke a scene! Look upon this picture and that she says, and we can see them both, separated though they be by 25 years; words here are charged with magic, and they hold us as it were in a spell.

It is this sheer mastery of style that partly at least account for Mrs. Woolf's phenomenal achievement as an essayist and as a critic. "Very personal, written in beautiful prose, and creative": so Sir Hugh Walpole once referred to Mrs. Woolf's collection of essays, *The Common Reader*, coupling it with the essays of Lytton Strachey and Logan Pearsall Smith. Although Mrs. Woolf declared that "journalism embalmed as literature is unreadable", this obviously doesn't apply to the many biographical and critical essays which, first written journalistically, have since been published in volume form. Here two biographies, *Flush* (biography of Elizabeth Barrett Browning's dog) and *Roger Fry*, her talks to women students in Cambridge, *A Room of One's Own*, the 2 series of *The Common Reader*, *The*

Moment and *The Death of a Moth*, not to mention her diary and her letters, contain some of the finest and most enjoyable prose of our time. Always, whether she is writing about a person or a book, her feminine intuition seizes the quintessential quality while her 'Bloomsbury' training helps her to present it to our gaze with all the aids of intellectual analysis and cultural distinction. Her subjects range from Chaucer, Montaigne, Ford and Defoe to Dostoevsky, Conrad, D. H. Lawrence and Sinclair Lewis, from Greek to modern American Literature, from titans in letters to literary eccentrics. And especially is she illuminating when she tries to assess the work of a Jane Austen or a George Eliot, or when she tries to probe the personality of a Miss Pilkington or a Miss Mitford. She is on the whole more generous with the weak than with the strong, the comparative failures than with the resounding successes. "It is the fact", she says in one of her essays, "that one likes people in spite of their faults, and then likes the faults because they are theirs, that makes one distrust criticism, and wake, after attempting it, in horror at dead of night." But while this as an example of Mrs. Woolf's self-criticism, it cannot be said that in her judgment on the classics she has been ever swayed by too much prejudice or misplaced sympathy. She could be harsh towards some of her contemporaries—Mr. Bennett and Mr. Wells and Mr. Galsworthy, for example—but as a critic of literature she is a reliable and stimulating guide, and invariably sends us back to the objects of her enthusiasm.

As a personality and as influence, Mrs. Woolf is even more difficult to evaluate than as a novelist or as an essayist or critic. Of her perhaps more than of almost any other contemporary writer it could be said that it is her personality that gives the so distinctive tone, the stir of fascination, to her work. In her life two elements strove for mastery: the zest for life and the perpetual invasion of death. As one of her critics puts it, "Her art is tragic—she understands all shades of grief—life passes before her under the perpetual menace of death, which robs even while it fulfills.....she is in love with life—It's you I embrace, you I draw to me—adorable world!" The world is adorable no doubt and attracts us, but is it the flame attracting the moth, attracting and destroying it? Mrs. Woolf, hypersensitive and superlatively intelligent, was nevertheless a prey to nerves; like Charles Lamb she had a nervous breakdown while still young, and the possible recurrence of the tragedy never failed to agonize her. The borderland between life and death, seemed very thin to her, and the consciousness of this gave that glow and edge to her

writing which so completely overwhelms her readers. Although her sympathies were wide ranging and although she could mix with the male of the species with quiet self-confidence and indeed with the distinctive charm that her beauty and her rich intellectual gifts gave her, she could not fail to raise her voice—at times shrill—against all the perversions and arrogant assumptions of a society largely man-made and man-dominated. The chief occupations of man seemed to her to be shedding blood, making money, giving orders and wearing uniforms. She would have nothing to do with this false facade that passes for civilization ; like Lysistrata, said E. M. Forster, Mrs. Woolf withdrew. *A Room of One's Own* is Mrs. Woolf's eloquent indictment on man, and her exhortation to woman to awake, arise and claim her just heritage.

Of course too much should not be made of the 'feminist' side of Mrs. Virginia Woolf, for she was primarily a humanist and only secondarily a 'feminist' with a difference. She has said that in all human beings there are two sides, the masculine and the feminine, and the proportion, the tensions between them alone, vary from individual to individual. Virginia Woolf was feminine to her 'finger-tips' but to this was grafted a singular masculine intellectual vigour and will power, and it is this unique combination of qualities that made her so charming a personality on the 20th century British literary scene as well so striking a force, so potent an influence in contemporary life and letters. Other women writers there have been who have made an impact on their contemporaries by the force of their personality. But Mrs. Woolf combined in herself both the qualities that made a Jane Austen or a George Eliot and the force of personality that made a Madame Du Deffand. It was a dual role that called for a terrific expenditure of intellectual and psychic energy, and in the end she broke under the strain. We are still at the beginning of our attempts to gauge her work and estimate her influence. But now or later, however we may try to sum up her achievement or catalogue her qualities, she will continue to elude her critics : she is the hare, always a long way ahead of her critics.

TOWARDS INTERPRETING THE SHAKESPEARIAN COMIC TECHNIQUE

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The critical platitude that in Shakespeare there is essentially no difference between a comedy and a tragedy from the point of view of dramatic technique remains to be challenged. Even a critic like Stoll says that *Romeo and Juliet* might have been a comedy, and *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, a tragedy, with but a slight alteration. But is it indeed so simple as that? Admitted that to the time-worn musical method of comic repetition and variation, successfully employed by the Italian renaissance comedians and later brought to perfection by Moliere, Shakespeare was not much inclined. He had however strayed into it, very sparingly though; so does a wild warbler deviate into a chance symphony. Critics are only too prone to attribute it to an intellectual incapacity in Shakespeare, euphemistically called his concreteness of thought, synthetic genius, as if the last word on the comic technique is the 'musical method'! Music as an art-form has certainly stretched itself out to a fuller perfection than painting, sculpture or any other visual art, which being less abstract necessitates a higher degree of verisimilitude. But not necessarily therefore should the 'musical method' itself be preferred. What is popularly known as 'dramatic illusion' is so much more than a device of the spoken word. Moreover, if representational truth be a defect in art, Shakespeare's tragedies are as much, if not more, inartistic as his comedies. But, as a matter of fact, aesthetic appeal enhanced by recognition with familiar experience is also based on abstract qualities. The point is this that Shakespeare's genius has been so baffling that critics are so much more eager to impose a pattern on him than to interpret him according to the standard he has himself set. Even so, the method of sizing up a genius—if this platitude be pardonable—by a common yardstick is ever futile, if not dangerous.

The artistic processes involved in the 'musical method' are repetitions and variations which resemble those in music. A motif, a device or a situation is thus repeated. These imply a measure of artificiality and abstraction. Shakespeare's vein is unabridged comedy where the characters are so much more than mere sources of mirth to the audience. It is, on the other hand, in the 'widest

commonalty spread' among all including the players. The audience of Shakespeare laughs in sympathy or by contagion rather than in condescension or derision. The farce, on the other hand, lends itself easily to the mechanical musical method and presupposes a degree of oversimplification and artificiality. Whether Shakespeare was averse to it on grounds of its artificiality, or incapable of it, is more than we can ascertain with certitude. But the fact remains that this prolific comedian wrote only two full-fledged farces, viz. *The Comedy of Errors* and *The Merry Wives of Windsor*. The latter though written later, to please his Sovereign's fancy and not his own, shows that he was definitely not in his elements here. It is unimpressive reading, and here he has only marred his divine Falstaff. For *The Comedy of Errors* Shakespeare is indebted to various sources, mainly to Plautus, but the matter that he has invented for his purpose—and that is indeed far more important than what he has incorporated from the original—viz., the discovery of the wife in a moving scene, the study of Adriana's jealous love, etc. lift the play far above the farcical. The pang of the doomed Aegeon with which the play opens even elevates it to the rank of a species of comedy, not infrequent among his own plays, that of a painful situation ending happily. So he discarded the farce early though he had begun it, might be, because neither the story nor the characters would conform to truth. Instances are numerous in Shakespeare of the story being fantastic and unreal, though the characters are real. In such cases Shakespeare's sense of practical business led him so much to charge the situations with humanity as not to betray belief. But a farce would not admit of the complexities of intellect and emotion in a character.

Though he found the farce either intractable or unsuitable the farcical element is so plentiful in his plays as to obtrude itself even in the region of tragedy. Life itself is an irrational synthesis like that! Nonetheless Shakespeare's art is not a dupe of life so as to violate the logic of Art. So supreme is the craftsman's command over his tool that even the farcical element in a tragedy is made to yield sometimes a contrary effect. So, it is the difference in emphasis partly inherent in the situation itself and partly acquired from its peculiar setting that determines the motif to be either comic or tragic. Just as a flash of painful smile readily fading out even in the contorts of the face may heighten the encircling gloom, so laughter may also like a summer gale scatter out the clouds. Does not the drunken frivolity of the Porter in *Macbeth* as De Quincey first pointed it out, fling back on the scene of murder a peculiar awfulness? It is not

because of Dogberry and Verges in *Much ADO* having the secret of Hero's betrayal that dissipates the dismal atmosphere of the Church scene, but more truly perhaps due to their rendering a more potent magic—the magic of smile. It is the integrated vision depending on the grouping of moods, their correlation, relative emphasis, atmosphere that makes a lot of difference not only in the degree but also even in the character of response

All plastic arts presuppose a structural design, and most of all, a drama that has to take into account the stage, the players, the limitation of time—"The two hours' traffic of our stage," and also the perceptive range of the audience, etc. The varied sources of Shakespeare's plays, even considering only those so far identified, sometimes numbering even six or seven for a single play, point to a synthesising intellect. May it not therefore be presumed that he planned a whole play related to the imaginative response? In fact, his use of the comical or even farcical elements also betrays some conscious artistic design. It is no careless dovetailing or casual affair. Frail though the materials are in themselves sometimes as thin as the prattles of Speed and Launce, Launcelot and old Gobbo, the two Dromios, etc. they are neither a matter of thoughtless scattering nor quite so insignificant in their contexts as when isolated from there. Besides either setting, keeping up or intensifying the comic tone these may serve even graver purposes. Sometimes they act as counterguards against a play's downward trend to mundanity, and even contrarily, against its flight to a mere fantasy. Sometimes again these supply the atmosphere, occasions for lovely songs, low language of the so-called Wordsworthians living nearest to the earth, and incidentally the most unforgettable comic characters. What a God's plenty is even here! A very significant fact that has scarcely received any notice is that these little touches which give life to the plays are, like the mysterious and hardly perceptible breath of life, Shakespeare's own creations and no ingenious source-hunter has yet succeeded in tracing them to others. The farcical element is more or less supernumerary to the main story, and makes a comparatively earlier appearance in the early comedies. But as the comic art perfects itself, it tends towards complexities, the farcical superficialities becoming more and more integrated, and both situations and characters gain in plausibility. Thus the so-called farcicality itself becomes three dimensional, neatly interwoven with the main plot by a variety of strands, and the mouthpieces no more remain merely as such but attain a measure of self-importance as human beings. In the early

plays it serves only the comic motif, as in *The Comedy of Errors* the Dromios duplicate the main plot in order to intensify the farcical tone and are called into action as soon as their masters. Speed and Launce either singly or in combination set quite early in *Two Gentlemen of Verona* a merry mood which the love-versus-friendship theme definitely lacks. Sly is the butt in the 'induction' of *The Taming of the Shrew* and Grannio the earliest victim of the shrew tamer's Churlishness comes on the stage in the second scene. But even in *A Mid Summer Night's Dream* Shakespeare's earliest masterpiece the Quince-Bottom episode attains the nature of a subplot spread out in different scenes, and its function is not merely vicarious, the main plot having been in the meantime set to the comic tune by the magic juice. Moreover, the incomparable Bottom like the spirit of comedy itself remains fundamentally sensible in the midst of a mad whirligig of romance and wears an ass's head to talk sense to the mortal's and immortals alike. In the mature comedies the subsidiary comical element is sometimes deferred till the plot has taken a definite turn towards an inevitable complication. The Gobbo-scenes in *The Merchant of Venice* follow the signing of Shylock's bond, and the introduction of the braggart boorish moor in the parallel plot of the casket-choosing. There is an annoying suspense at the uncertainty of Portia's fate, and more so, at Antonio's provocative challenge to Shylock as 'lend it rather to thine enemy'. So the Gobbo-scenes serve the purpose of dissipating the solemnity. The Dogberry-Verges scene comes later still and does the same purpose but much more effectively. Kenneth Muir's view—'As the play was to be a comedy, Shakespeare had to inform the audience before the church-scene that Don John's Villainy would come to light, and for this purpose he created Dogberry' gives only a partial justification. The purely technical service he renders to the plot might have been done by another character, and much better, in the fitness of things, by Beatrice. So the assignation of this function to Dogberry is only a technical plea. He renders a much more serious service to the play by supplying it with a very well-timed gaiety when the situation has become intolerably painful. The very telling mode of unconscious self-victimization as a butt of ridicule comes as a welcome summergale to relieve the sultry cloudiness of the situation. Never is the repetitive device so instantaneously effective as here, though once again in Act II Sc. 5 lines 70 74 of *Twelfth Night* Shakespeare uses it.

Comrade. Away! You are an ass, you are an ass.

Dogberry. Dost thou not suspect any place? . . . O that he were here to write me down an ass! but masters, remember that I am an ass—though it be not written down, yet forget not that I am an ass . . . Oh that I had been writ down an ass!

The three middle comedies need be separately treated because of their affinities in respect of technique, and more particularly because they are for the same ground different from all others. The matchless trio (*As You Like It*; *Much Ado*, *Twelfth Night*) is each in its central chord attuned to the comic, and the subsidiary plot like the second string playing up in vibrational unison accentuates the tone, or sometimes simply keeps up the undertone. In *Twelfth Night* the boisterous subplot runs parallel to the main episode heightening by the clinker and revelry of 'Cakes and Ale' the comicality inherent in the main situation. The art of comic Juxtaposition is here very subtly effected. While the lovers are almost each sighing for the wrong person, the merry gang of Sir Toby is parodying the same theme at the expense of Malvolio. When the subplot itself is carried to a painful excess Feste does the business of evaporating it in clownish prattles. Coming in between *Much Ado* and *Twelfth Night*, *As You Like It* lacks the boisterous element of a comedy—the Poms of Dogberry and the romps of Sir Toby'. The principal comic situation of the play arises however from Rosalind's disguise. Though she is just once—as when she swoons away at Oliver's handling in the blood-stained handkerchief of Orlando to her, on the verge of disclosing herself, Shakespeare does not exploit the comic potentialities of the situation to the fullest, as Ben Jonson or Lyly would have done. However, being in its central situation directly posed under the comic glare the need for environmental adjustment is even less here than in its companion pieces. The play's action being over in the first act Touchstone's role as a merry Jester ends there, and in the forest of Arden he becomes a half brother to the cynical Jaques. The two together provide scope for the subtle technique of comic Juxtaposition henceforth.

In *Twelfth Night* the meeting of Viola and Olivia is not certainly on the same level with that of Orlando and Rosalind from the point of view of the potential comicality. Viola is in a dubious situation being engaged as an emissary in a love suit which should it prosper will ruin her own happiness. Naturally she has not her heart in the work. Nevertheless being encouraged by Olivia's churlishness she unmuzzles her wit, but with the result that she falls into an

unforeseen difficulty. So she has to put a restraint upon her natural gaiety, and make herself as scarce as possible. So the central situation of the play does not yield its maximum result, not at any rate, to the extent its counterpart in *As You Like It* does. Rosalind being sure of Orlando is brimming over with hilarity the natural outlet of which is her sparkling wit. Viola has still a long upstream journey before her, and both the wind and the wave are against her. The Sir Toby-Malvolio subplot is therefore an artistic necessity for the purpose of accentuating the comic tone. *Much Ado* also provides for a centrally comic situation, for the Benedick-Beatrice episode has been so much toned up as to throw the Hero Claudio affair into the shade. In fact, Prouty explains in his recent remarkable book *Sources of Much Ado About Nothing* that Shakespeare purposely made the Hero-Claudio episode a glamourless marriage of convenience in order that the complementary anecdote may push up to prominence. But at a later point in the story the vilification of Hero adds a new strand to the story complicating the whole issue in so horrible a mess as to silence all laughter, and against its lingering long on the brink of tragic suspense Dogberry and Verges provide, and they reinstate the comic Muse on the play's high comic pedestal.

The process of integration of the comical supernumeraries, coeval with Shakespeare's progression in the comic plane, is illustrative of his subtle artistry in utilizing a situation for a variety of purposes. Thus the Quince-Bottom episode introducing an atmosphere of low comedy gives a sense of 'solidarity' to the general fairy tale nature of the play. Moreover, Bottom in his derisiveness is a distant cousin of Touchstone, though he is more an intuitionist than an intellectualist. The Gobbo-scenes serve the incidental purpose of stressing the unpopularity of Shylock, and the inexcusable foppishness of Bassanio. They also contribute to a sense of realism as against the unreality of Shylock's bond, and the Lord of Belmont's will. A similar purpose is served also by Stephano-Trinculo scenes in *The Tempest*. The observation of the joint editors of the New Shakespeare edition may be quoted in this connection.

" Few have remarked how admirably significant as a set off to Caliban is Stephano, type of his predestined conquerors, the tarry, racy, absolute British seaman, staggering through the isle of magic with a bottle It is hard to overestimate the solidarity of Stephano, and the value it gives to the whole fairy picture". Furthermore, the Caliban-Stephano conspiracy is a burlesque of the

tyranny of power-lust, besides providing a topical joke at the contemporary craze for fashions in dress in the manner of Autolycus.

Even the characters cease to be two-dimensional and gradually develop a complex tissue of motives and desires. Whereas Launce, Speed, Grumio and the Dromios are types of abstraction resembling the portraits of Ben Jonson, even Lancelot Gobbo is not a mere buffoon poking fun at his 'true-begotten father' and by trying confusion with him 'raise the waters in his eyes'. He has not only a conscience, 'a kind of hard conscience' that counsels him to stick on to Shylock but also a kind of heart too that feels. But he is only a precursor of the host of immortals who are even more finely drawn, and certainly more unforgettable than the so-called heroes and heroines of the comedies and even the English histories.

A supremely significant fact of Shakespeare's excellence as a Comic artist has been little noticed. It is his superb witchery in so projecting the comical, be it a character or a situation, that the total vision of the play becomes at once comically charged. It is indeed the way of pointing to the comical that constitutes the heart of the comic method. In cartoon and caricature the artist isolates the comic trait and then distorts it by exaggeration. He is thus more at home in sketchy profiles than in rounded off portraits. A measure of simplification and flattening down is advantageous to the comic artist too. Only a superb comic artist like Chaucer can draw a full face of the Miller in all its life-like details and then pointing to the wart on the nose with 'a toft of herys reed as the bristles of sowes erys' reduces it to sheer comicality or by a subtle hint at the nasal tone of the prioress, 'entuned in her nose ful somely' converts her reverence, piety, etc. into a laughable affectation. So it is the comic perspective that is so much more difficult of attainment than a mechanical adherence to any aesthetic theory. But Shakespeare may be said to have achieved this miracle through the medium of some irresistibly comical characters or situations. These eclipse the so-called principal characters and incidents, create a comical bias in the readers or the audience, and even determine the comic vision of the plays. Is not Bottom more important to our vision of *A Mid Summer Night's Dream* than Theseus or Dogberry far more memorable than either Claudio or even Benedick? It is the same inexplicable comic process as in Chaucer, viz., the art of projecting the wart on the miller's face, the only difference being that Chaucer had to deal with a face or a character and Shakespeare had to grapple with the subtle organism of a whole play, with its medley of motives,

variety of situations and characters, etc. That he succeeded in keeping the reader's attention focussed on the essential comicality, the reader's or the audience's final impression is the best testimony. So the comic technique of Shakespeare consists in his subtle, almost inexplicable art of subordinating sometimes a serious story to a comic underplot or to a few farcical touches in a character. It is Falstaff, 'the roast Mannigtree ox with the pudding in his belly' that triumphs over grave Henry and rash Hotspur, not only in the reader's sympathy but also even in the impressionistic response. This indeed is the subtle magic of Shakespeare's art as a comedian.

The method of comic emphasis without its correlatives of isolation, distortion or any deliberate artifice whatsoever is a triumphant artistic achievement indeed! It is the miracle of a man of genius and is as inscrutable as the voice of nature. Shakespeare does not usually disfigure life to laugh at it. Rather he laughs at life, laughs with life and laughs it into beauty. Even the prophet of *clan ritual* will only rarely discover a reformatory zeal in his laughers. It is just an amused acceptance of the imperfections inherent in man—his pathetic combination of the God-like and the beastly—"how like a god . . . the paragon of animals . . . the quintessence of dust!"

The common methods of exaggeration, verbal and anecdotal repetitions so as to convey the impression of the mechanical inelasticity and unhuman automatism, parody, irony, juxtaposition are only a few of the identified comic techniques of Shakespeare. These are scattered in the pages of his plays with a prodigal profusion. How supremely effective is the technique of the burlesque! The sublimity of romantic love, and rationalism descend to the ludicrous in Titania's violent passion for the assy monster, and the asinine head's homily on reason. Does not the royal expeditionary party of Stephano and Caliban wallow in the miry pool? It is Chaucer's technique again:

" But for to speken of his conscience
She was so charitable and so pitous
She wolde wepe if that she saugh a mous
Kaught in a trappe, if it were deed or bledde "

Thus if Shakespeare does not conform to any set pattern he illustrates a myriad. In fact, his genius is like Proteus changeful and elusive. Nonetheless, nothing is more certain about him than that he has his unique grip on the fundamentals of the comedy no less than he has on those of the tragedy. But the modern craze for pattern-study makes the worship so much greater than the god as even to incline to a denial of the divinity should it prove intractable!

THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSAL

II

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7. There are the 'dravyavādins' or the believers in the bare particulars, according to whom a word denotes only the properties of a particular object .

“ Dravyadharmā padārthas tu dravye sarvārtha iṣyate
dravyadharmāśrayād dravyam atah sarvārtha iṣyate.”¹

The properties of an object are grouped generally under quality, action, number and gender ; and these properties are associated with each particular word or object through the mind.

“ Tathā mamāpi Jātivādino mukhyām Jātim
abhidadhati kecid, upacatitām anya iti mata
dravye 'pi sāmyam ”²

A word gives rise to some knowledge having a specific form which agrees with that of the object concerned . The bearing of the word conveys forth the definite form of the object before the mind. In other words, the object is an intellectual image, 'an intellectual or mental thing . for meaning originates from the intellect' and reveals the object as an intellectual or mental image.³ And this image may or may not agree with any external object. Hence do the Buddhists argue that the validity of a universal is open to doubt; and likewise doubtful is the reality of a particular that is permanent.

¹ *Vakya-padīyam*, III, 13

² Śabdāḥ pratyāyamaṇa guṇādayo dravya dharmāḥ Sarva 'rtha dravya rūpeṇā bhūmiyate" (Helārāja).

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ "Ann pravṛtti rūpam yam prakhyātam akrtim viduḥ kecid vyavṛtti rūpam tu dravyatvena pracukṣate". (*Vakya-padīyam*, III, 19).

⁵ "Vyāvṛttākūrā buddhi sanniveseṣād akūro 'tra datsauc dravyam iti prasangād uktam" (Helārāja).

⁶ "Buddhārthasya vacyatvam".

⁷ "Śabdā uccaritād vākārayati buddhir utpadyate iti tad akarasya śabdārthatvam, na buddheḥ Sa hy ākūro bāhyo 'stu, na va ; śabda vācyatvasya na kaciḥ kṣetih" (Helārāja on III, 19).

As a result the function of a word is only to discriminate between things, and this is called 'apoha'.

“ Atad vyāvṛttir apohah padārtha iti kṣaṇa
bhanga vādinah ”

Thus the word *cow* has the inherent power of distinguishing or differentiating a cow from all non-cows. It is in this light that Yāska observes that names are given by words, for the words constitute the easiest possible method of removing doubts and vagueness; they ensure accuracy :

“ Apīyastvāc ca śabdena sanjnā karaṇam vyavahārā-
rtam loke.”¹

But for some Buddhists, the words denote neither positive nor negative objects. It is true that by the negation, rejection, or exclusion, we arrive at the positive meaning. Yet the nature of meaning lies in the simultaneous cognition of the positive and the negative aspects.

But how can we conceive of a negative denotation without first having a positive one? For, all negation presupposes, and is based on affirmation.² And yet when we examine the origin of the concept called universal, we find that we arrive at the universal cow by grouping together all cows and by excluding all non-cows at the same time. We proceed by distinguishing one object from another, and in this process we resort both to affirmation and negation. And every word denotes something positive, and this positive factor is not exhausted by its distinction from others.³ And when Dignāga observes that the word denotes or conveys a negation, he implies that the denotation of a word is positive in appearance and negative by implication, for negation is its formative and determining principle. The negative implication makes the import of a word significant, and this emphasises the positive purport.⁴ Thus in Buddhist logic, a word gives rise to a conceptual image in the mind of the individual. This image is taken to be an external reality which exists independent of the mind. The denotation of a word, therefore, means the

¹ *Nirukta*, 1.2. Cf. *Vākyapadiyam*, 1.126 : “Tadvaśād abhinispattau sarvam vastu vibhāṣyate”. Puṇyārāja says : “Abhinispanna vastūnām sarvānākārāṇām vibhāgo 'pi vyākṛta evety arthah.”

² *Nyāyacārtika*, on 2.2 65

³ *Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 317-21.

⁴ See *Nyāyavārtika*, pp. 328-29 and *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-ṭikā*, p. 492.

evocation of this conceptual image which characterises several individuals.

The Buddhists hold that only the bare particulars are real, and these are immediately apprehended. The universal is a fiction of the mind since it can never be an object of perception like the bare particulars. This universal can be no other than the feature which is common to a whole class of objects, and the knowledge of such a universal presupposes that of all its particulars. In such a case the apprehension of the universal is mediated by the apprehension of the particulars ; and a mediated experience does not give real knowledge. The universal, therefore, is a pure form of mediate apprehension having no real existence in the world.¹

If the universal exists, and if it is different from the particulars there are many difficulties to be overcome. Any two things to be different from one another must at least occupy different places. But the universal is not cognised as extended in space, nor is it perceived as distinct from the object. If it is said that the universal exists in the particular, does it exist in each particular? If so, is it the entire universal or only a part thereof that exists in each? If it exists in its entirety, it cannot exist in two particulars at the same time. Nor can we think of the parts of the universal. Further, the universal cannot exist in all the particulars but only in those which are relative to it. If it exists everywhere it cannot escape from being perceived since *esse is percipi*. If it is said that it exists everywhere but only certain particulars manifest it, they must reveal it properly. A lamp, for instance, manifests some objects but these objects are not perceived in the lamp. If the particular is like the lamp, its universal will fall outside of it. And in reality we have only bare particulars (*svalakṣaṇas*) given in perception. On the other hand, we have conceptual images, which are mental fabrications and which are superimposed on *svalakṣaṇas*. The former is determined by the principle of *anurūṭta* and is subjective. The latter is characterised by *vyāvr̥tta*. As Randle observes : "The doctrine of 'apoha' is inseparable from the theory of 'svalakṣaṇa'. Exclusion of what is other is the ground of the practical notion of sameness of character in things which are absolutely diverse in character. According to the Bauddhas 'sarvam pṛthak'—the atomistic principle which finds expression in the doctrine of 'svalakṣaṇa'

¹ *Sāstradīpikā* : *Vikalpākāramātram sāmānyam, alikamvū.*"

or 'kṣaṇa'—there cannot be any positive resemblance in reals. A cow is like a cow in virtue of what both are not'.¹

But a cow can be apprehended as distinct from the non-cow only when one has understood the nature of the cow and that of the non-cow. And when one comprehends the nature of the cow by means of a positive predication, the universal ceases to be negative in character.² Moreover, similarity assumes the resemblance of certain common parts in the objects cognised. But the syllable in the case of words is an undifferentiated whole, where there could be no similarity.³ At the same time there can be a similarity between two objects only when they are two, in which case they must also differ from one another. The perception of the object, therefore, involves both these elements. On the one hand, the universal assimilates the particulars, while the particulars on the other exclude one another. And as long as we ignore the element of difference, we cannot offer a satisfactory explanation of the relation between the universal and the particular.

A word is employed with a variety of meanings, and one of these must be the primary meaning. The Sāṅkhya and the Buddhists hold that a word denotes a particular (*vyakti*). As against these, the Mimāṃsakas consider the universals to be the import of the words. The Grammarians combine these two views. The Jaina thinkers take the differentia or the pattern or the form (*ākṛti*) as the import of a word. The Nyāya thinkers accept all these three as constituting the import of words.⁴

The particular is an object limited by space and time, and having certain specific qualities, so that it can be cognised. As the *Nyāya Sūtra* defines it, "Vyaktir guṇa viśeṣāśrayo mūrtiḥ."⁵ It is a manifest form (*mūrti*) that can be cognised by the senses; and it is determined or limited by the primary and secondary qualities. It is such an individual that is often connoted by a word in popular usage. In ordinary speech 'the cow' does not stand for its universal at all, since the universal cow is single and as such cannot be specified as this or that. Moreover, if words do not mean particulars, and since

¹ *Indian Logic in Early School*, p. 125.

² *Sāstradīpikā*, p. 104 : "Ago vyāvṛttim hi pratīyate avāśyam prathamam eva gaur pratyetaḥ Gaur gaur iti ca vidhi rūpam sāmānyam avagamyam mānam katham nirvṛti rūpam śakyam angikartum".

³ "Avayava sāmānya yogātmakatvāt sādīśasya, varṇānām cānavayavatvāt (*ibid.*, p. 142).

⁴ "Go śabdasya hi pratyakṣa siddha vyakti ākṛti kriyā guṇā ly artheṣu pravujyamānasya jātir arthatvena vaidikaḥ prapinnā. Vyaktiḥ sāmānyādibhiḥ. Ūbhayam vairyā-karapāḥ. Avayava samethānākāya ākṛtir arthātādibhiḥ. Tritayam api naiyāyikāḥ".—*Vivaraṇa Prameya Samgraha*, p. 181.

⁵ *Cf. Nyāya Sūtra*, 2.2.66.

we use a word to refer to a particular object it follows that words cannot directly mean particular at all ; and all meaning, in so far as it refers to an object, will turn out to be indirect, secondary and inferential.

This view is open to serious objections. A word does not mean any one particular but only the particulars of a certain class.¹ When we speak of the cow, we do not mean a particular cow only, but a particular cow as participating in the genus or universal cow.¹ A word, therefore, refers to a particular object because of the association or connection of the particular with the primary meaning. A word does not and cannot denote merely the particular apart from its universal ; and we have to admit that there must be and is a close co-operation or association (*sahacarana*) between the universal and the particular. And Vātsyāyana observes : “Tatrāyaṁ sahacaranād yogād vā jāti śabdo vyaktau prayujyate iti”.² Hence the individualistic theory is unacceptable.

8. There is another view which speaks of forms or configurations. The Jaina thinkers hold that a word denotes the specific form or pattern of the objects. The pattern is the specific arrangement or collection of the parts, indicating or revealing the universal as embodied in a specific way. Form, therefore, constitutes the differentia of the members of a class, and a word must primarily mean this form.

But the form by itself does not constitute the nature of a thing. The clay model of a cow has the form of a cow, and we do not mean this clay model by the word *cow*. Moreover, the word *cow* has a meaning which refers not merely to the form of the cow, but also to the particular cow. The pattern and the particular have no separable existence. Vātsyāyana, therefore says :

“Na cāvayava vyūhasya jā'yā yogah. Kasya tarhi? Niyatāvayava vyūhasya dravyasya. 'Tasmān nākṛtiḥ padārthah.'”³

And when different individuals are grouped under one genus by virtue of a principle which inheres in them thus assimilating them to one class and differentiating them from other classes, something like a universal appears to be necessary for thought and life. Moreover, when we cognise different particular cows we are aware of some similarity or identity even ; and this can be explained satisfactorily

¹ Cf. *Nyāya Sūtras*, 2 2.58, 59.

² On *Nyāya Sūtra*, 2 2 61.

³ On *Nyāya Sūtra*, 2.2.62.

only when we admit of a universal element attached to, or inherent in, the particulars :

“ Tasmād ekasya bhinneṣu yā vṛttis tan nibandhanāḥ
sāmānya śabdaḥ sattādāv ekādhikaraṇena vā”¹.

And this universal element is not something which we are adding to the object, but it is something objective and latent in the object concerned.

The theory of the Jainas recognizes the existence of common characters or similarities among the particulars, and these similarities are the real universal. In the language of Stout, the universal is the distributive unity of a class.² Stout warns us not to analyse this unity, since such an analysis leads to a vicious circle. The universal, therefore, is not beyond the particulars ; nor can it be in the particulars, since what is in the particulars is itself a particular. It is a character, quality, or relation. It constitutes the principle of similarity amongst apparently dissimilar particulars. This similarity is vital to the classification, and is arrived at by the mind from an observation of the discrete particulars. Thus this universal is not only objective, but is also an object of thought ; for it is no class-essence. Consequently the universal is multiform, non-eternal, and limited, having an objective existence in the similarity of many particulars.

Thus the object of knowledge is both universal and particular, for it is characterised by similarity and specific features as well.³ The similarity is said to be twofold. On the other hand, there is ‘tiryak sāmānya’ which refers to similar modifications arising in the object, as, for example, the dewlap in the cows. On the other hand, there is ‘ūrdhatva sāmānya’ which constitutes the personal identity of the object.⁴ Thus in the former case the universal requires a plurality of particulars, while in the latter case the universal dispenses with the many particulars. But Pārthasārathi accepts only the former as the universal since the particular dharmin in the latter is self-identical.⁵ In other words, without a repetition of similar objects, there can be no universal.

Perception as assimilative establishes the real existence of the universal as common to the particulars. And at the same time we

¹ *Ślokaṭīkā* : Akṛtivāda, 12.

² *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Volume X, pp 4, ff. See his *Analytic Psychology*. Book II, Chapter X.

³ “Sāmānya viśeṣātmaḥ.”

⁴ Māṇikyānandī : *Parikṣāmukha Sūtra*, p. 5 : “Sadṛśa pariṇāmas tiryak” ; parāpara vivartavyāpi dravyam ūrdhvatā.”

⁵ *Sāstradīpikā*, p. 93. “Ekasminneva devadatte yuvāyam vṛddho ‘yam, kṛtāyam ti na tatra jātir angikriyate.”

also cognise the differences between one particular and another. These are two distinct conditions. For instance, colour and taste are simultaneously cognised and yet are distinct, since two different senses cognise them. And even if the same sense organ were to cognise two things, it does not mean that the two things are identical. The distinction between the cognition of the universal as assimilative and of the particular as exclusive is real. This difference in the two cognitions proves that the one object differs from the other. Moreover, an object can be experienced or cognised only when it is real or exists; and the cognised universal cannot be a case of illusion. Otherwise even the particulars will have to lose their reality.¹ The facts of experience thus tell us that there is no universal other than likeness or similarity which refers to certain common properties between the members of a class. This similarity is specific to every class. It exists in the many and therefore it is not one. It has a beginning and an end. It is limited spatially and temporally.²

Rāmānuja accepts the same position when he denies the reality of a universal other than 'likeness' which manifests itself as the greatest number of similarities among the particulars. This is closer to Mili's doctrine of natural kinds, according to which the members of a class exhibit the greatest number of resemblances among them, and also the greatest number of differences from the members of another class. And Rāmānuja tells us that there is no identity of name even among the members of the same class; and as such the members agree with one another not because of a single 'likeness' pervading them all, but because of a different 'likeness'. And this common character is not apprehended immediately.³

But is similarity the only criterion in assimilating an object to a genus? Similarity has no existence apart from universality. And a likeness constituted by the configuration or arrangement of the parts can never give the clue to the abiding nature of a universal, which nature is apprehended by us. On the contrary, similarity is a direct consequence of the nature of the universal.

However, Aristotle too seems to have maintained that "things universal are only similar. There is no one beauty, but many things that are beautiful, and so it is with every class of things in common."⁴ If so why do we say 'This is a cow' and not 'This is like a cow'?

¹ Prabhācandra : *Prameya kamala mārtanḍa*, pp. 13. -157.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 139-40.

³ On *Vedānta Sūtra*, 1. 1. 1.

⁴ T. Cass: *The Development of Aristotle's (Mind, Vol 34, p. 68).*

The Jaina thinker might reply that here we superimpose (*adhyāropa*) identity or similarity; but it is not a convincing answer. And how do we know that there is agreement between the common characters of similar objects? It cannot be due to some other common character, for this will lead to an infinite regress. If we speak of a thing as partaking of a form, we are only using a metaphor which does not explain the mystery involved. For, the form or pattern as a whole cannot be in each of the things. Nor can only a part of the form be in each thing. Many things can be said to partake of one form because this bears the same relation to it. But what is this sameness of relation? Whether the relation be external or internal, the relation between the universal and the particular appears self-contradictory. Sameness will make the particular a copy or image of the form. A copy, if it is like the original, will reduce the original to the level of a copy. If it is unlike, then it cannot be a copy. Moreover, any two copies of the same species too are alike one another; and we cannot make a particular the copy of another particular.

The universal is that principle which is said to run through the particulars. The universal effects through similarity and continuity. It is an invisible or suprasensible principle devoid of any connection with the particular and yet affecting the particular. But a particular can be affected by another particular only.¹ Further a universal which thrives upon similarity fails to account for the differences between the members of the same class and for the differences of values and purposes subsisting among the particulars. Nor can we explain the universal as something unconnected with the particular, since the idea of a universal is based upon some relation. Whether the universal is like or unlike the particular, we take it for granted that the universal is more real and unchanging. As a consequence, the particular cannot have the same unchanging or permanent reality. To this extent Plato is justified in investing his Ideas with Reality. And the many particulars cannot then have the same reality, though they too are real in a sense.

The arguments of the 'akritivādins' are based on the view that all the members of a class exhibit the same universal element. What is this same element? Is the nature or essence of all cows.

¹ Śrī Harṣa : *Khaṇḍana khaṇḍa khāṇḍa* : "Anuvṛtta pratyaya kāraṇam sāmānyam iti na lakṣaṇam, sāmāgryā sarva kāryotpattēḥ tayā tad ekadeśāntarāśi ca vyabhicārāt . . . (p. 1079).

for instance, one and the same? If so, the difference between the universal and the particular will vanish :

“ Sarvatra go svabhāvasyaikasya anirūpanāt.
Nirūpane vā jāti svikāra vaiyarthyaṭ.”¹

One common word, or one common element, will become significant and necessary, thus rendering redundant the multiplicity of instances. But the disparate particulars get into relation with the homogeneous universal because of the causes that give rise to the former. The universal is necessary for including the different particulars of a class. In other words, differences are vital to the nature of the manifestation of the universal.² And the particulars are different though the universal is one, there is no bare identity. And since the nature of the manifestation differs from particular to particular because of the medium of the particular, we do not have the same universal for the members of all the species.

9. The particular has a definite form and specific particular qualities or attributes.

Nākṛti vyakty apekṣitvā jāty abhivyakteḥ³. The universal has no existence apart from the particular and from its form, for the universal is manifested only through the particular, which is revealed to us and is therefore cognisable. As such the particular is the medium where the universal manifests itself in a form specific to all the particulars of the class⁴. The form or ‘ākṛti’ is no other than the patterned arrangement of the primary qualities. It is the medium or form of all expression or utterance, and is invariably associated with all objects. It differentiates one class from the other class of objects. “Jāti” or the universal is the general notion or idea in which all the objects of a class participate.

“ Samānaprasavātrukā Jātiḥ.”⁵

We conceive of the universal cow apart from the particular cow: and this makes the universal objective. The form is conjoined to the particular, and it may reveal the universal too. But the object of perception is primarily the particular and the word is to denote this

¹ *Citsukhī*, p. 3rd4

² *Sāstradīpikā*, p. 112 : “Vyaktibhede 1) sāmānyam atmānam labhate, uanyathā :
C. “Evam satī vyakti bhede sāmānyam, tad abbū at tū nāsti sām ānyam eva Vaktavyam”
(*Ibid.*).

³ *Nyāya Sūtra*, 2.2.64.

⁴ “Vyakty ākṛti jātyas tu padārthah.” (2.2.65)

⁵ *Nyāya Sūtra*, 2.2.68.

alone. According to Uddyotakara it is through "Samavāya" or inherent relation that the universal permeates its particulars, and therefore the universal is the essence of the existents of a particular class. It gives us a comprehensive knowledge of its particulars. A word, therefore, conveys the knowledge of a particular as belonging to a specific genus,¹ and as having a differentia known as form. And in the *Muktāvalī* we read :

"Jātimān śabdārthah. śaktir Jāty ākṛti viśiṣṭa
vyaktau viśrāmyati."

Thus a word denotes a particular having a specific form and participating in or revealing the universal.

"\ yakty ākṛti yukte 'py aprasangāt proksanādīnām
mṛdgavake jātiḥ."

A particular deprived of its participation in the universal can never be the denotation of any word.² But words, as popular usage endorses it, denote particulars. It is from this standpoint alone that Vācaspati in examining the negative statement observes that a word denotes the universal which universal embraces all the particulars wherever and whenever they may be found; and as such it denotes all the particulars of the class.³ And since the word has only one primary meaning we cannot say that it directly means the universal and indirectly the particular. But the meaning of a word is a synthesis of the universal, particular, and form of the object denoted. Consequently, if only one of these factors is emphasised in popular usage, it only means that the other two are not relevant to the purpose on hand.

The word, therefore, denotes a particular as qualified both by the universal and the pattern or form. It is "Jāty ākṛti viśiṣṭa vyakti".⁴ There are thus three aspects to the problem. One is the pictorial aspect called up by the word. Then it denotes the individual and the universal. As Dr. L. S. Stebbing observes: "The demonstrative symbol means its denotation, that is, it stands for the object denoted, whereas the descriptive phrase means the properties and not the objects denoted".⁵ That is, a word is a significant symbol or sign, and it acquires a meaning only when it is "consci-

¹ *Nyāya Sūtra*. 2 2 68.

² "Na dravyamātram avīśiṣṭam jātyā vinābhidyate." (*Vātsyāyana* on 2.2.60).

³ *Nyāyātārīka tātparyāṭīka*, on 2 2 68.

⁴ Cf. *Muktāvalī*, pp 370-1: "Tasmāt tat taḥ jāty ākṛti viśiṣṭa tat tad vyakti bodhanupapattya kalpyamāna śaktir jāty ākṛti viśiṣṭa vyaktā viśrāmyatīti."

⁵ *Modern Introduction to Logic*, p. 500.

ously designed to stand for something." As Ogden and Richards observe: "it is only when a thinker makes use of them that they stand for anything, or, in one sense, have 'meaning'.¹ It is on this principle that new words, scientific or technical or otherwise, are coined; and these words stand as signs or symbols for the objects of knowledge. And according to Russell; "meaning is a characteristic of 'signs' and 'signs' are sensible or imaginal phenomena which cause actions appropriate, not to themselves, but to something else with which they are associated The whole essence of the practical efficacy of 'thought' consists in sensitiveness to signs The effects of words as signs are prodigious, while their intrinsic interest as sensible occurrences on their own account is usually very slight.² Meaning has nothing to do with the object directly. It only comes to be associated indirectly with the object of thought or perception. And Stebbing, therefore, observes: "A hearer understands a word used by a speaker when he is referred to that which the speaker intended to indicate to him".³

But what is intention? And how is it different from the context? Jaimini observes that the order of words is dependent upon man's will.⁴ But no amount of willing can alter the existing order of the syllables in the word *God* as long as we want to preserve the meaning of the word *God*. Rather it is the order in which one employs the words that may be said to be dependent on his will. But even then, grammatical syntax which is a systematisation of popular usage, that controls this order. And as it has been made clear in the earlier chapter, if a word is not vitally and intensely related to the object it becomes meaningless and useless. Consequently the meaning communicated by the words depends upon the nature of words and the nature of objects, both being powerfully influenced by the intention of the speaker. Yet the personal intention cannot run counter to the objectivity of a word and of its sense.

Coming back to the problem we have to consider how we apprehend the universals. The object of perception is a sensuous presentation which is a particular, and we cognise it. That it embodies a universal something we make out or infer, and not perceive. This inference comes to us as we remember the past objects and associate them, directly or indirectly, with the presented datum;

¹ Meaning of Meaning.

² *Mind*, No. 116, pp 402-08.

³ *Logic in Practice*, p. 66.

⁴ 1.1.26: "Loke samniyamanāt prayoga samnikarṣaḥ syāt "

and the inference here is a logical necessity of thought. That is, the universal is a mental idea or concept. Let us look closer and consider the particulars of a class, the cows. All the cows are said to be enlivened by a permanent universal; the power or nature of each cow represents the universal element which must be common to all the particulars. But are all cows essentially like one another in their nature, power, value, or purpose? A rigid and unalterable principle like the universal must root out all fundamental differences of temperament, character, and outlook. And such an eternal principle cannot also admit of differences even if these are brought about by the variations of time and place. Thus it follows that the universal has no objective existence, for it is an intellectual construction of a living mind.

Moreover, the universal does not possess a form, or qualities, or verbal associations. But the object we cognise has all these properties, and thus appears to be characteristically distinct from its universal. If the universal were to have the same features as the individual, it cannot be distinguished from the other. And if both are presented as one unit or whole, the universal must be a fact of immediate experience, in which case we have to admit that the universals are rooted in objective reality. Does this prove that they are eternal and are immanent in the varied particulars of the class? What can be the relation between these two? It might be said, as some thinkers of the Navya Nyāya did, that a word denotes an individual as determined by the universal. As the Dinakarī puts it.

“ Navyās tu samsthānānupasthitāḥ api gotvādinā gavādy
anvaya bodhāj jāti viśiṣṭa vyaktāḥ eva śaktiḥ,
samsthāne ca prthag eva śaktiḥ vyutpatti vaicitryācca
samsthāna vyaktyor eka padārthayor api parasparam
anvaya bodhāt. Sastraṁ padārtha ity eka vacanam tu
jāti vyaktyor eka śakti lābhāyaivetyahuḥ.”¹

Here the form or the pattern is given up, for in a verbal cognition we are presumed to be understanding both the universal and the particular. The universal is eternal, while the individual is anything but eternal. Then the cognition of the impermanent and discrete particulars cannot give rise to the cognition of the universal.

Consider the words *thing* and *object*. These are assuredly uni-

¹ On *Muktārālī*, pp. 370-71.

versals and we need not go in after a thingness or objectness; for to explain the word *thing* we shall be then courting a still more difficult and vague word. And without taking recourse to such a process, and without having any factual basis for such concepts as 'thing' and 'non-being', we do refer to particulars by a common term or concept. Thus even when there are four varieties of non-being, we do not postulate a universal for non-being; and we apply the generic concept of a nest even in an unreal case like that of the "mare's nest". We take it for granted that we cannot speak of a universal with reference to a negation. But how can we explain the concept of non-being? It is said that from the idea of being we derive the idea of non-being, in which case one universal is said to be capable of yielding many concepts. And for these concepts then we do not require the objective existence of discrete particulars. Hence the concept has no objectivity and with this the universal too fails to have any objectivity.

The Universal is characterised by continuity and identity. In such a case action cannot be a universal since the action of one is not the self-identical action of another. And there can be no universal 'cookness' even, since when he is not cooking the individual fails to participate in the nature of that universal and thus breaks the continuity of the universal.¹ In other words, the universal to be universal must be present or immanent in an object throughout, for the particular object is its medium of expression. And this does not appear to be borne out by facts always. Moreover, we first experience or cognise a particular. We then assimilate it to other particulars following the laws of association. This gives rise to a generic idea and then we name it. This name is the universal. Hence the universal is something directly derived from the objects, but indirectly through the operation of the mind and the will, since it has a pragmatic value :

“ Bhedañāne satīcchā hi sanketakarāṇe tataḥ
tat kṛtis tac chrutiś cāśya ābhogas tan matis tataḥ
anvaya vyatīvkābhyām idam eva viniścitam
samartham kāraṇam tasyām anyesām anavasthītiḥ.”²

Proceeding in this way we mentally arrive at the notions of 'jāti' and 'ākṛti'. In this process association plays a prominent role, and the particulars are not so much united as gathered together. Even granting that they are really united by an underlying principle, how

¹ 'Pācākādi śabdānām upādhi paratva svīkāraḥ' (*Citsukhi*, p. 164).

² *Tattvasaṅgraha*, 773-74.

are the particulars united under a universal or a genus? If the universal is the result of the unity of their causes, then no one, says Śrīdhara, can unite the same particular produced by different causes; thus fire produced by the friction of wood has to be intrinsically different from the fire produced by something else. The sameness of effects too cannot unite the particulars into one class, for both the cows and the buffaloes yield milk; and yet they belong to two different groups. This unity, therefore, must be sought in a universal.¹ But Śrīdhara ignores the fact that there is an intrinsic difference between the two fires and between the two varieties of milk because of the intrinsic differences between their causes.

¹ *Nyāna Kandali*, p. 318; "kim ca vady eka hetut vād ekatvam, bhinnakūraṇa prabhavāṇam vyākṛtīnām ekatvam na śyāt.....Eka kāryaṭvād ekatve ca varjātiyānām apy ekatvāpatteḥ....."

(To be continued)

THE BASIC TEACHINGS OF HINDUISM*

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FRIENDS of the New World! The most important thing we have to do is to run our own lives. Every one has the duty to develop his talents, his knowledge, his understanding in order to contribute to the work of the world in some way. Our beliefs are the cornerstone of our daily living. They point us the way to a fuller, richer and happier life.

Hindu religion and culture can show us this way for self unfoldment and as such every intellectual man in the face of the globe should turn his attention to a work-a-day knowledge of the Hindu faith, for among all the races of the world, the living centre of Hindu life is spiritual and religion is a reality to every Hindu seeker.

The West is surely proud of its lofty achievements in science and technology. But we shall not forget that materialism has only increased the skill of mind and hand. The arts, crafts and sciences of our glorious century does not give us any knowledge of the inner self of man.

The result is obvious. We are sick of body and heart. Material knowledge has not bestowed us happiness and joy. It has not made us honest and truthful, it has not given us security, moral courage and spiritual enlightenment.

An ancient prayer of the Hindus was—lead us from untruth to the heaven of truth, carry us to the land of illumination from the world of darkness and make us immortal out of death.

This prayer contains the quintessence of Hindu culture. The great initiates of the ancient Hindu faith realised that man is divine in origin and the goal of human life is to release into manifestation the spiritual values in man. The quest for truth and freedom is the eternal quest. And in this quest, our seers came to realise that the spiritual entity, the ultimate reality behind the phenomena is an essence of *ananda*, bliss or joy. In order to realise this, one must have spiritual sense or intuition. Our material senses are unable to unravel the inner harmony, the great mystery of life. With this spiritual awakening, one of the noblest sages in ancient India pro-

* Lecture delivered to the Students of Religion at the Columbia University, New York, on the 22nd November, 1954.

claimed with joy and vigour: "Listen, O Listen! Ye men of the universe, ye are all sons of immortality, ye abide in a glorious temple which is the tabernacle of the Godhead. I have known that great sun-lit personality who is beyond all darkness and who is the greatest power. By knowing him and him alone, ye can transcend the ocean of death."

These brave seekers were courageous people. They proclaimed with conviction that man is one unto God and it is because of the veil of ignorance that we cannot feel our Divinity. In the divine play of the Lord, one must so play that he can see that he is the eternally perfect being—that he comes out of bliss, lives in bliss and dies in bliss.

One who accepts this gospel of unity of man and God will find no evil in the world. His entire outlook on life is changed. There is really no death nor disease. Every indication of discord, of inadequacy, of fear or frustration is merely a false impression and is engendered by the belief that man lives in matter and is conditioned by it.

Man is to live in the consciousness of divine love, Love which for ever embraces, enfolds and upholds man. This is the injunction given in the oldest of the Upanishads. It says Envelope everything whatever there is in this world with the Divine Essence. Enjoy but through the gateway of renunciation and covet no earthly wealth. One who lives in the joy of God lives in bright thoughts which can only reflect peace, goodwill towards man, health and holiness.

The wayfarers in the path of religion must, therefore, realise the nothingness of material life and intelligence and the mighty actuality of the all pervading power of the Supreme whom in India we call by the name Brahma. The science of this spiritual realisation is Brahmagvidya. To the hungry and to the sick we must proclaim this gospel. We must discard sense testimony and understand that God is Life, the principle of immortal good unfolding throughout eternity. This Brahmagvidya is not the exclusive property of the Indians. Our wisest seers were the most catholic-spirited human beings. They wanted to give this immortal science to everybody on earth, we must make the whole world Aryan and tell all human beings that the real man includes tenderness, joy, peace, perfection, beauty, harmony, goodness, reality, substance—in short, all the qualities of spirit. To accept this spiritual fact, is to realise an outpouring of blessings. The constant acknowledgment that the

real man reflects God's all-inclusiveness brings greater and greater peace and love, harmony and joy in human experience.

Before I proceed further, I must tell you that the Hindu way of life is not one of mere asceticism. The negation of life is not the true Hinduism as many most wrongly believe. It is a misrepresentation to declare that the Indian culture, that the Hindu dharma denies all value to life, detaches from all earthly interests and insist on the nothingness of the life of the moment. The four-fold aims of life consists of desire and enjoyment, material advancement, ethical conduct and spiritual liberation. Fullness of life must precede the surpassing of life in the limitless joy of *Moksha*. It is with this vigour, it is with this spirit that the Vedic bards pray : " I shall live for hundred autumns, I shall grow for hundred years. I shall look and see, I shall love and enjoy, I shall develop and learn all these years. I shall ascend higher and higher—may not for hundred years but for more than that." This period of long life should be one of incipid activity and ceaseless endeavours after the higher and nobler ideals of life.

In the *Atareya Brahmana*, we find that clarion-call to movement. The poet points to the radiant sun in the sky and enjoins us to work continuously like the sun for he that works attains joy and peace. The Hindu religion accordingly is a religion of progress. As Sri Aurobinda said : " It is time that this parrot talk about the unpractical, metaphysical quietistic anti-vital character of Indian civilization should cease and give place to a true and understanding estimate." With the above in mind, I shall tell you that our stress all through the centuries was on the spiritual values. The Hindu always thinks that the spiritual life is a nobler thing than the life of external power and enjoyment. Let us not be carried away by wrong notions of Sankara's *Mayavada*. This world is not a reality in contrast with the absolute viewpoint, but it is a reality for all practical purposes. The lofty illusionism of Sankara should not make you think that we Hindus have no regard for moral values, ethical conduct and the right effort. The whole history of India would prove that Indian spiritual culture was never a tired quietism on a conventional asceticism but a high effort of the human mind to go beyond the life of desire and vital satisfaction and arrive at the summit of spiritual calm, greatness, strength, illumination, divine realisation, settled peace and bliss. But the damaging accusation that Indian culture depresses the vital force, paralyses the will, gives no incentive nor initiative to human life is false. Our spirituality is

true to the kindred points of heaven and home and merges together the perfection of the worldly life with the perfection of divine joy. But once you accept the proposition that man must divinise himself, the question is natural to ask how are we going to do that. This is the real issue in spiritual life. Hinduism is fully conscious of this fact.

It says that creeds and dogmas have no real values. Religion is true in the degree we have of actual spiritual experience. Realisation is the be-all and end-all of all religious pursuits. Those who have made the journey are unanimous in their verdict that man attains the same goal and enjoys the same peace and bliss in the supreme by whatever path a man may go. Because of this view, we are the most catholic in our outlook. India has a medley of religious creeds and sects but there was never any bloodshed over it. In very recent times, Paramahansa Ramkrishna, the great Guru of Swami Vivekananda illustrates this in his only life. He followed the highest than all the known religions of the world and came to the conclusion that all the paths lead to the same spiritual sources. You know that of all the great religions of the world, Hinduism is a religion which has no founder. We say that religion is eternal and it has been there since the very beginning. Dharma is one with this eternal law—whom the Vedic seers termed *Rta*, the cosmic order. The English word *right* comes from the same root as *Rta*.

Man lives in the world of matter, subject to death and the much falsehood of mortal existence. To rise beyond this death, to become one of the immortals, man must turn from the region of disorder to the region of eternal *Rta*. This is what is inner illumination. It is what the Rishis mean when they ask us to turn from the falsehood to the truth, to battle with darkness and conquer the superb light. The whole past of India is a glorious example of vast and unparalleled search for and experiment with the highest spiritual truths. The seekers in this noble mission were broadminded men. They had no prejudice nor any bigotry and welcomed every new approach, every new allure to the realisation of the supreme beatitude, of the many ways of spiritual attainments, the four are the recognised paths—they are the path of knowledge, the path of action, the path of love, and the path of Yoga. These paths are not exclusive and separate paths, they blend together, they meet together and develop into a unified whole the more we travel in the path.

All these paths take it for granted that the spirit is the truth of our being. Our life should be a growth and evolution in the fullness and joy of the supreme, whom we call *Brahma* in India. We must

have the true vision of self. Our actions and our efforts are for a cosmic sense and feeling, a cosmic idea, will, love and delight into which we can relax the limited, ignorant suffering ego. The *Bhagavat Gita*, the Divine song makes it clear that the disinterested work is the way to health, wealth and peace. If we look into the innermost recesses of our individual, social, national and international activities, we shall find at once that the guiding force of all our actions are greed and lust, selfish aggrandisement and personal gains. This is what we call our economic life. But this philosophy of greed is the cause of all the worries and cares, all the battles and wars of the world. He that eats for himself takes no food but devours sin — this was said by a great seer in the *Rigveda*.

We must have a new outlook, a new birth and a new orientation. Let us be moved by the spirit of love and live a life of love. If we do so, we shall have harmony and joy. There will be no discord, no war and no division of nations. Let us not exalt the illusion of evil, including war, to the point where we make it real.

This is what is called sacrifice in the Hindu religion. Our life should be dedicated life. We should not live for our own petty selves. We should be conscious of cosmic unity, and we should love. We should live for God and surrender ourselves wholly to the divine will. Here action blends with *bhakti* or love. The spiritual man is under the divine directive to be productive, to expand and increase good by reflecting God's goodness and power.

This is man's primal and eternal function, and to this end he has been given extraordinary authority, dominion over the whole earth.

It is this spiritual process which enables us to manifest God's power and carry on His mission here on earth. The more we accomplish the divine purpose, the more we attain knowledge, the more we understand and appreciate that man is the spiritual and perfect likeness of God, his function in this world is to manifest this divinity that lies dormant in him. The more we have true knowledge, the more we are released from the captivity of material sense, the more we attain spiritual freedom, with *Jnana* we are loosed from the bonds of tyranny and time, where the blindness of ignorance and error prevailed, we get the light and joy of spiritual perception. This drive towards the transcendental, eternal and infinite, and the moulding of man into a conscious soul and power of that supreme Existence and creative joy have been the engrossing motive of Hindu Philosophy the sustaining force of Hinduism, and the guiding force of Hindu

culture. The path of *Yoga* is an auxiliary process. It enjoins and prescribes certain exercises which are beneficial to the seeker in his upward journey. Divine mind supplies man with unlimited intelligence and perfection. God has given energy, infinite capacity, unexhaustive strength. We are to take this hidden source of energy. We are to unfold the richest possibilities of development in communion with the divine principle. The more we take to yogic discipline, the more we are provided with inspiration and spiritual assurance.

All these paths are trodden paths. Countless seers and sages have walked along them and testified as to the truth and value of them. We need therefore have no doubts in the matter.

One should point out the path of absolute surrender to the will of God. The *Gita*, that glorious book which contains the quintessence of Hindu spirituality within the short space of seven hundred slokas end with the unmistakable call of Srikrishna to Arjuna to give up all other standards of conducts and devote himself heart and soul to the supreme being.

But one should not forget that this path of surrender is not a path strewn with roses. Arjuna was asked to fight ruthlessly in the battle-field of Kurukshetra. Even Jesus the Prince of Peace and Love says : "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth ; I came not to send peace but a sword" (*Mathew* 10 : 34). It is for this reason that king Rukman asked for tribulations and sorrows lest he forgets his love in God.

Peace is less to be desired than suffering. In peace we become complacent with earthly conditions. Trials and tribulations awaken us to cast the anchor of our hope beyond matter and to seek reality in the spiritual fountainhead of love, joy and harmony. The sword of the spirit must be wielded for the sake of righteousness. The glory of God must be established here on earth at the sacrifice of our peaceful life in fighting with the dark forces of evil. Evil has no existence in reality. True salvation takes place right where we are and it operates in our human experiences lifting us out of mortal frailties into the realization and recognition of the allness of spirit. True *Jnana* and true *Bhakti* and true *Karuna* is the recognition that man is already free that the salvation is here and now in the experience of our oneness with infinite power, love and joy.

Ye bright intellectuals, hark the message of ancient India and rejoice. The power and plentimore of America should inaugurate

the herald of a new dawn if it is united with the spiritual heritage of India.

Realise with receptive hearts and reverent moods that spirituality is the real power in the universe. In the hurry and bustle of your great dynamic life, listen to the still small voice of Mother India which is spreading over continent and ocean to the globe's remotest bound. Unless you build the edifice of the mighty American democracy on the solid foundation of spirituality, it would be an evil day for the world.

We proclaim to you the mystery of our esteemed Brahnavidya. Hark, realise that you are all Divine beings. God is gentle and loving, for the consciousness of His own infinitude is the most powerful armour He has. He has no need to the aggressive or combative. Let us realise the infinite nature of all being and in proportion to our understanding of the divine nature of all being we would become gentle and more peaceful. Love is never defensive—it depends its own by being infinite. God does not have to do anything, He only has to be. But that being is infinite activity, perpetual unfoldment.

Mahatma Gandhi is the highest modern example of the excellence of Hindu culture. He put forth the forces of soul, the armaments of love for winning the freedom of India and he succeeded. It is a matter of regret that he did not live to put his great Idealism in the field of International politics.

You young hopefuls of the richest and most powerful nation on the earth, my fervent appeal to you today is that if we want to build the dream-world of love and peace, we must apply the soul forces in our fight with communism and through love and love alone, we must strive for the creation of a new, a better, a richer and a happier world.

Reviews and Notices of Books

Speeches of T. T. Krishnamachari—(The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. Rs. 2'00).

The Speeches of India's Finance Minister made in Parliament during the last Budget discussions throw an authoritative light on general government policy in economic matters, problems connected with the Second Five Year Plan, particularly as regards financing the Plan, the structure and objectives of taxation and the problem of foreign exchange. This collection also includes the annual speech to the Associated Chambers of Commerce in December 1956, giving a general review of economic policy. Mr. Krishnamachari said: "Basically, the attempt is to reconstruct the tax structure in this country. If that is being an interventionist, I plead guilty to being an interventionist. Yet nobody can do anything so far as the large mass of people like the people of this country are concerned without being an interventionist. At the same time I disclaim all ideas of arrogating to myself the position of Providence. In fact I dislike anybody who thinks that he can order the lives of their people for all time to come, and begin preaching with a series of "dents". Autonomous organisations, which plead for full autonomy in regard to their actions, have no place unless their autonomy is geared to the Plan objectives". T. T. 's speeches are always lucid and always provocative.

SANTOSH KUMAR CHATTERJEE

Toward a More Democratic Social Order—by Wendell Thomas (Published by Exposition Press of New York: price \$ 2'50).

Mr. Wendell Thomas makes a diagnosis and suggests a cure. The same sin of violence that has ravaged human life in the family and the neighbourhood has ravaged it in wider areas where it is known as "imperialism". Modern nationalism has been imperialistic, so that world society has been something less than human. The League of Nations and the United Nations have been attempted to mitigate the evils of our subhuman state without daring to transform civilization into a truly human society by establishing a world federation. Mr. Thomas makes a case for a reorganised democracy, both political and economic. A democracy "requires a residential landholding community, broadly religious, as a foundation. It requires the assignment of land to individual owners for good use, plus a system of money based on labour, and a way of protecting the consumer from exploitation, while using capital creatively in a world fellowship of nations." He explains his scheme of a new and deeper democracy—calling for a more active participation of the people

and increased opportunities for co-operation and productive living. "I believe that in a genuine democracy, government will be decentralist—that is, will spring from people living together in their local or neighbourhood relations In a true democracy the people of a local community would, in town-meeting fashion, govern themselves....." There is a Gandhian touch about the whole scheme. An interesting book. ,

SANTOSH KUMAR CHATTERJEE

The Fundamentals of Hinduism: A Philosophical study—By Dr. Satishchandra Chatterjee, M.A., Ph.D.; Dasgupta & Co., Ltd., Calcutta. Price Rs. 3/8 & Rs. 4/8.

The book under review is written by an eminent scholar and as such it bears the impress of an analytic mind so rare amongst the common run of writers on religion and allied topics. The author takes Hinduism to be identical with Hindu religion and it means, according to the author, both the Hindu way of thinking and the Hindu way of life. The scope of the subject has been defined in the first chapter and in subsequent chapters such topics as the nature of God, the conception of self, the theory of the world, the Law of Karma and rebirth and such other allied topics have been thoroughly discussed. The age-old tenets of Hinduism, its doctrines and beliefs, its philosophical speculations and metaphysical bases have been analysed and developed in the light of modern metaphysics. It must be admitted on all hands that Hinduism contains the most important elements of Indian culture. In the volume under review the author has presented the fundamental principles and doctrines of Hindu religion set against its philosophical background. It has been rightly said that a fuller appreciation of Hindu religion needs a better understanding of Hindu philosophy. Without a grasp of the ideas of Hindu philosophy, Hindu religion would look full of dogmas and superstitions, and the significance of the manifold beliefs and activities would go unnoticed. The author has done a singular service to the cause of Hindu culture and Hindu religion by orienting the fundamental elements of the Hindu religion in the light of western thought. People who are not acquainted with the culture of India would better appreciate Hindu religion if and when such books are consulted.

The book has been divided in twelve chapters and it presents a detailed picture of Hindu view of life and the beyond. All the important schools of Indian thought have been brought in to illustrate such topics as the Hindu concepts of Bondage and Liberation, the status of the world, etc. A critical estimate of Varnashrama Dharma has made the book interesting. The fourfold classification of Hindu Society is a controversial institution and it has received proper attention from the author. We congratulate him for bringing out such a learned volume on a topic which needs an expert's attention. Post-independent India stands on

a different footing and all the pronouncements on our culture and dharma must be authoritative. Dr. Chatterjee has done a fine job in accomplishing the self-appointed task which men of his standing alone could accomplish. His penetrating insight into the nature of Hindu religion has found the truth in it. To illustrate our point we would refer to his treatment of the fourfold path of liberation, *viz.*, Raja, Jnana, Bhakti and Karma Yoga. All these paths, although apparently different, have an underlying core of unity so difficult to be ascertained by the man in the street. The author points out: "While the paths are different, the self realised through them is the same. In Raja Yoga, the final state of samadhi reveals the self as pure consciousness which is self-centred and self-shining. In Karma Yoga also the self is realised as the pure subject which is above all affections and afflictions of the mind-body and the selfish desires and interests of the ego in man. Bhakti yoga also ends in the surrender of man's egoism and the recognition of his self as pure consciousness which is in communion with the divine consciousness. So also in Jnana Yoga the self is realised as pure consciousness which is the same as the divine consciousness and bliss." We recommend this book to all who care to know what Hinduism really is, as purged of the narrow sectarianism so frequently taking the place of the Sanatana Dharma.

SUDHIR KUMAR NANDI

Ourselves

UNIVERSITY LECTURES

The Hon'ble U. Nu, Prime Minister of the Union of Burma and Kamala Lecturer of the University for 1943, delivered a course of four lectures on Buddhism in this month in the Senate Hall of the University. The distinguished lecturer spoke on 'Buddha', 'Dhamma', 'Sangha' and 'Buddhism after Buddha's death'. The lectures attracted a large audience every day and they were highly appreciated. The visit of the Prime Minister of Burma to the University created a great deal of interest.

Sri Gopendranath Das, M.A., LL.B. Sir Charuchandra Ghosh Memorial Lecturer for 1953, delivered a course of three lectures on 'Concept of Equality in the eye of Law' in the Darbhanga Hall of the University.

Professor L. Dudley Stamp of the University of London delivered a highly interesting public lecture on 'Land and People: Geographers contribution to National Planning'. In this lecture, the Speaker drew pointed attention to the problem of population in the world and its impact on food. The lecturer said that the area of available land for agriculture and production of food was shrinking in this age of industrial civilisation and it was high time that more attention was paid to the problem of food in National Planning. The contribution of Geographers to this field of investigation would be of immense value.

Professor E. G. Richardson, Head of the Department of Physics, King's College New Castle-on-Tyne, Durham University, England, delivered a course of three lectures on Electro-Acoustics and Ultrasonics at the Lecture Hall of the Institute of Radio Physics and Electronics in the University. The lectures were thought-provoking and they had an appreciative audience.



Notifications

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification

The Vice Chancellor and Syndicate have been pleased to award the Maharaja Sri J. M. Tagore Medals for 1939 to the under-mentioned candidates from your college :—

1. Sri P. G. Ghosh Maharaja Sri J. M. Tagore Gold Medal.
2. „ Manoranjan Basu Maharaja Sri J. M. Tagore Silver Medal (a gold-rimmed silver medal out of the value of the medal).

The medals will be presented to the candidates at the ensuing Convocation to be held in January next. The medallists concerned may kindly be informed accordingly and requested to write to the Registrar of this University for their Admit Cards for admission to the Convocation pandal.

Further I am to request you to be so good as to let this office know immediately the full name of Sri P. G. Ghosh and home and present addresses of both the candidates

This may please be treated as very urgent.

Senate House,
The 2nd December, 1937.

B. B. BANERJEE,
Asst. Controller of Examinations.

NOTIFICATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BOMBAY

No. Ex 3386 of 1937

It is hereby notified that the undermentioned candidates who are found guilty of having practised unfair means at the University Examinations held in March and April 1937 are declared to have failed at the respective examination, and to have forfeited their claims to exemptions, if any, earned by them at the examinations held this year and that they are further debarred from appearing at any University or College Examination before the dates mentioned against their respective names :—

Seat No.	Name	College	Date up to which debarred.
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INTERMEDIATE ARTS EXAMINATION

210 Bane, Harischandra Sitaram	Kishinchand Chellaram College	1st January, 1938
247 Chaudhari, Satchidanand Gajanan.	Jai Hind College	1st January, 1938
1096 Majithia, Varjivandas Hari-das.	Do	Do.
2629 Nanavati, Kiran Dhanvant-lal	Siddharth College of Arts and Science.	1st January, 1938
5488 Mirchandani Hari Mulchand	Jai Hind College	1st January, 1938

INTERMEDIATE SCIENCE EXAMINATION

635 Gosalia, Kishore Vanra- das	Siddharth College of Arts and Science.	1st January, 1938
1569 Khania, Narotam Jairaj	Kishinchand Chellaram College	Do.
4138 Bhandari, Ved Sagar	Bombay College	Do.

B.A. EXAMINATION

895 Awar, Vimal Sauaji

Wilson College

1st January, 1960

Bombay.

The 16th September, 1957

T. V. CHIDAMBARAN.

University Registrar.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY (CHANDIGARH).

It is notified that—

1(a) Subject to the approval of the Senate and Government a third class M.A. has been allowed one chance to improve his class in the same subject, within a period of two years of his having first obtained third class and that his result will be declared only if he improves his class.

(b) Persons who have already passed the M.A. examination, under the old scheme, in 3rd Division, can re-appear, for purposes of improving their division, up to 1960. If they appear in 1958 or 1959, they can appear in the old scheme or the new scheme, as they like, but after that they shall have to first pass M.A. Part I and then M.A. Part II examinations.

(c) Persons who have obtained third division on the combined result of M.A. Part I and Part II shall re-appear in both the parts if they wish to improve their division. This will mean that even if a person has obtained second class marks, in one of the two parts, he shall have to re-appear in that part also.

(d) M.A. Examination under old scheme has been extended up to 1959 both for the category contained in (b), above and for failed candidates.

Note: - Permission to re-appear in the examination for purposes of improving the class does not mean that private candidates shall not have to satisfy the requirements of the regulations laid down for such candidates.

2 The following persons have been declared as not fit and proper persons to be admitted to any future examination of this University for the reasons noted against each.

(a) Gian Singh s/o Shri Nihal Singh, who produced a copy of bogus certificate of his having passed the Matriculation Examination of the Panjab University, Lahore, in 1927, (under Roll No. 20252).

(b) Harish Chander s/o Shri Jyoti Prashad, who obtained a duplicate copy of the Matriculation Certificate on the basis of a false statement of having passed the said examination from Panjab University, Lahore, in 1946.

Chandigarh (Capital).

Dated October 9, 1957.

J. R. AGNIHOTRI,

Registrar.

UTKAL UNIVERSITY

Notification No. EC/613

In accordance with Standing Order No. 29 of the Syndicate the following candidates who took recourse to unfair means at the Supplementary Intermediate and Degree Examinations of 1957 are penalised as noted against each.

Roll No.	Name	Institution	Penalties imposed
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INTERMEDIATE IN SCIENCE

1149	Sri Durvasula Ramachandra Rao. S/o Sri Durvasula Kameswara Rao, Bhupati Street, Jaypore, Dist. Koraput.	Vikram Dev College, Jeypore.	Result for 1957 Supplementary Examination is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any of the examinations prior to the Annual examination of 1959
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BACHELOR OF SCIENCE

444 Sri Nikunja Bibari Pujari, Ravenshaw College, Result for 1957 Supplementary Examination is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any of the examinations prior to the Annual examination of 1959.
S/o Sri Rajib Lochan Cuttack.
Pujari, Jharuapara. P.O.
& Dist. Sambalpur.

University Office, Cuttack,
The 8rd September, 1957.

Illegible,
Assistant Registrar.

AGRA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CF/17 1957

It is hereby notified that the Supplementary Examination of 1957 in the case of following candidates has been cancelled and they have further been debarred from appearing at any Examination of the University in 1958, as they used or attempted to use Unfairmeans at the Supplementary Examination of 1957.

Examination	Roll No.	Enrolment No	Name of candidate	College or Centre
B.A. Part I	S13796	A568378	Amar Nath Sharma	Meerut College, Meerut.
B.A. Part I	S13888	A568456	Govind Ballabh Bhatt	Do.
B.A. Part II	S12644	A557136	Shyam Lal Jain (Student of J. V. Jain College, Saharanpur)	Do.
B.Sc. Part II	S2125	A549262	Ramesh Chandra Chaturvedi	D. A. V. College Kanpur.

Senate House,
Agra
August 28th 1957.

L. P. MATHUR, D.Sc.
(Capt.)
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF SAUGAR

Notification No. Ex 87, 57

I. It is notified for information that the following candidates who appeared at the various Examinations of the University of Saugar held in March-April, 1957, have been found guilty of using or attempting to use unfair means at these examinations and have, therefore, been debarred from appearing at the University Examination during the period mentioned against their names :—

Roll No.	Enrolment No.	Name of Candidate	Examination	Institution	Year for which debarred.
954 W/734		Km. Shipra Gupta D/o Dr. Hari Narayan Gupta, Budhpara, Raipur. M.P.	I.A.	Women candidate	1958
190 B/11513		Ram Kumar Dubey S/o Shri Ramadhin Dubey. Petition Writer. Hatta, M.P.	Do.	Mahakoshal Mahavidyalaya, Jabalpur.	Do.
475 B/8349		Trilok Singh Grewal C/o Shri Gurdeo Singh Grewal, Narbada-Para, Raipur. M.P.	I.Sc.	Ex-student	Do.
694 B/11777		Lakshman Kumar Satpathi S/o Shri Jaideva Satpathi, M.L.A. Vill. & P. O. Toshgaon. Dist Raipur, M.P.	Do.	Science College, Raipur.	Do.
832 B/11896		Kamta Prasad Singh S/o Shri Baij Nath Singh. M.E.S., Khamaria, Jabalpur, M.P.	Do.	Mahakoshal Mahavidyalaya, Jabalpur.	Do.

266 B/13080	Deodas Chaurasia Biniya Bai Chaurasia, Bombay Bazar, Khandwa, M.P.	S/o Smt. Chaurasia,	I Com.	S. N. College, Khandwa.	Do.
1132 B/6060	Navin Chandra Upadhyay, S/o Shri P. N. Upadhyay, Jawaharganj, Khandwa, M.P.	Upadhyay,	B A.	Ex-student	Do.
129 B/9486	Rewa Shanker Awasthi S/o Shri Deo Datta Awasthi. Dy. S. P. Ranital, Jabalpur, M.P.	S/o	B.Com. Pt. I.	G. S. College, Jabal- pur,	Do.
12 B/15785	Kewal Kumar Bhalla S o Lala Desh Miter Bhalla, 346, Prem Nagar, Jabalpur, M.P.	S o	Pre- Engineer- ing.	Govt. Poly Tech, Jabalpur.	1958 & 1959
23 B/15737	Naunihal Oboveja, 30B, Thea- tre Road, Jabalpur Cantt. M P		Do	Do.	1958
65 B/15931	Suresh Kumar Sharma S o Shri Girdharilal Sharma, 1185, Wright Town, Jabal- pur, M P.	S o	First Dip. in Engg.	Do.	1958
1161 B/13755	Narender Singh S/o Shri S. Pata Singh Surajganj, Itarsi Distt Hoshangabad, M P	S/o Shri	I A.	Narmada Mahi- vidyalaya, Hoshan- gabad	Do.

Note — The Results of Examinations held in 1957 have been cancelled in all these cases.

2. The Result of Examination held in 1957 of the following candidate has been cancelled for breach of examination rules :—

29 B 14896	Anwar Ahmad S o Shri N. or Ahmad, Near the House of Kazi Hasan, Ahmad Vakil, Opp. Tilak Park, Quoha Sehore, Bhopal, M.P	Final Diploma in Mech. Engg.	S. V. Poly Techn. Bhopal
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Sagar,

Dated the 13th August, 1957.

ISHWAR CHANDRA.

Requis rar.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY (CHANDIGARH)

Notification.

It is hereby notified that —

(i) The following persons have been disqualified as noted below :—

(i) Baldev Singl. Goraya son of Shri Bhagat Singh (Roll No. 45996) Matriculation Examination 1957) has been disqualified for four years, i.e., 1957, 1958, 1959 and 1960 for impersonation.

(ii) Mohinder Singh s/o Shri Amar Singh (Roll No. 6784, Intermediate Examination, April, 1957) who impersonated Baldev Singh has been disqualified for five years (1957 to 1961).

(iii) Bhagwan Samra s/o Shri Abah Raj, Khadafalsa Man-Ka-Chowk Jodhpur, who obtained a duplicate copy of the Matriculation Certificate on the basis of a false statement of having passed the said examination from Panjab University Lahore, in 1946, has been declared as not a fit and proper person to be admitted to any future examination of this University.

(iv) Raghbir Singh s/o Shri Gulab Singh who obtained a duplicate copy of the Matriculation Certificate on the basis of a false statement of having passed the said examination from the Panjab University, Lahore, in 1939, has been disqualified from appearing in any future examination of this University.

(v) Tilak Bais/o Pt. Sunder Dass, who tampered with the duplicate copy of the Matriculation Certificate (Roll No. 80914, 1947), has been declared as not a fit and proper person to be admitted to any future examination of this University.

(II) The University M.Sc. Tech. Department is being shifted to Chandigarh and admissions to this class will be made next year.

Chandigarh—3

Dated September 10 1957

J. R. AGNIHOTRI,
Registrar

UTKAL UNIVERSITY

Notification No. EC /650

Dated Cuttack, the 20th September, 1957.

In accordance with Standing Order No. 28 of the Syndicate the following candidates who took recourse to unfair means at the Supplementary Intermediate Examination of 1957 are penalised as noted against each.

Roll No.	Name.	Institution,	Penalties imposed.
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INTERMEDIATE IN SCIENCE

886	Sri Nepal Chandra M.P.C. College, Banerjee, S/o Sri Baripada. Shashadhar Banerjee, Lal Bazar P.O. Bari- pada. Dt. Mayurbhanj.	Result for 1957 Supplementary Examination is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any of the examinations prior to the Supplementary examination of 1958.
887	Sri Gopal Chandra Das, S/o Sri Priyanath Das, Lal Bazar, P.O. Baripada, Dt. Mayur- bhanj.	Do. Do.

University Office, Cuttack,
The 20th September, 1957.

Assistant Registrar

PATNA UNIVERSITY

The undermentioned candidates are debarred from appearing at any University examination for the period noted against their names as they were found guilty of using unfair means at the Intermediate and Master examinations in Arts of 1957.

Sl. No.	Centre.	No and Examination.	Reg. No. and College.	Candidates Name.	Period of punishment.
1	Senate Hall	Roll Pat No. 517 M.A.	280-1955 Geography Deptt. Patna University.	Karunanand Das.	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the M.A. Examination, 1961.
2	Senate Hall	Roll Pat. No. 509 M.A.	6501-51 Geography Deptt. Patna University.	Arif Raza.	Do.
3	Senate Hall	Roll Pat. No. 510 M.A.	1845-52 Geography Deptt.. Patna University.	Atul Narayan. Jannar.	Do.
4	Magadh Mahila College, Patna	Roll Pat. No. 292 I.A.	1172-56 Magadh Mahila College.	Sabita Ghosh	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary examination of 1958.

SECONDARY SCHOOL CERTIFICATE EXAMINATION BOARD

No B-VI-(iii) of 1957.

It is hereby notified that the result of the undermentioned candidates who have been found guilty of having practised unfair means at the S.S.C. Examination of October 1956, are cancelled and the candidates are further debarred from appearing at S.S.C. Examination, as shown against their respective names. These candidates have also forfeited their claims to exemptions, if any earned by them under the existing Regulations :—

Examination Seat No. and Centre.	Name of Candidate	Name of School.	Debarred up to.
B-8089/Ratnagiri	Bhagwat, Ganu Bhiwe	Appeared as a Teacher Candidate.	30th June 1959
B-8012/Ratnagiri	Chavan, Shivaram Paibatrao	Appeared as a Teacher Candidate	30th June 1958.
D 86/Bagalkot	Hiremath, Basayya	Rechayya S. M. Shala, Amingsadh	30th June 1958.
D 87/Bagalkot	Hiremath, Kotreyya	Sangayya Khasgatesh School, Talhok	High 30th June 1958

Purna—1, 6th July 1957

M. V. DESHPANDE

Secretary

S. C. Examination Board.

SECONDARY SCHOOL CERTIFICATE EXAMINATION BOARD

No B-VI-(ii) of 1957

It is hereby notified that the results of the undermentioned candidates, who have been found guilty of having practised unfair means at the S.S.C. Examination of March, 1957, are cancelled and the candidates are further debarred from appearing at the S.S.C. Examination before the month and year mentioned against their respective names. These candidates have also forfeited their claims to exemptions if any earned by them under the existing Regulations :—

Examination Seat No. and Centre.	Name of candidate.	Name of School	Debarred up to.
A 1078/Andheri	Shah, Bhogilal Tokarchand.	The Malad Central School and Bal-Mandir, Malad	1st January 1959.
A-502/Bombay	Modi, Sorendralal Tribhovandas.	Bharda New High School, Bombay.	Do.
A 14012/Dadar	Rakhang, Alhuniya Fajrinahamad.	B. E. L. Night High School, Worli, Bombay, 18.	30th June 1958
A 11738/Dadar	Nalwala, Sakina Gulam Hussain.	Appeared as a Private Candidate.	1st January 1959
A-17194/Ghatkopar	Joshi, Mahendrakumar Mithanlal.	Shri V. C. Gurukul High School, Ghatkopar.	Do.
A 18055/Andheri	Kalsulkar, Kam'akar Ramchandra.	R. M. Bhatt High School, Parel, Bombay, 12.	Do.
A-19118/Bombay	Bhatt, Ashwinkumar Chinmanlal.	Appeared as a Private Candidate.	Do.
A-20106/Bombay	Shah, Harivadan Harishchandra.	Bai Lilavati (K. L. D.) Hindu High School, Bombay 4.	Do.

A-20107/Bombay	Shah, Jayantilal Babulal	Bazargate High School Bombay 1.	Do.
A-22880/Dadar	Baxi, Diliprai Santan- rao.	App ared as a Private Candidate.	Do.
B-3275/Dhulia	Marathe, Madhukar Baburao.	J. B. City High School, Dhulia	Do.
B-23561/Baramati	Salve, Hari Shripati	S. J. Vidyalaya Dhond (District Pona)	Do.
B-24222/Jalgaon	Patil, Ramrao Kondu	Appeared as a Private Candidate	Do.
B-25149/Kolhapur	Powar Babasaheb Dattu	Chhatrapati, Rajaram High School, Kasaba- Bavda (District Kolha- pur).	Do.
B-27924/Sangamner	Anarthe, Jaywant Rajaram.	Appeared as a Private Candidate,	Do
B-29419/Uhasnagar	Haryani, Sunder Sugno- mal.	Appeared as a Private Candidate.	Do.
C-976/Ahmedabad	Patel, Chandrakanti Fulabhai.	Democratic High School, Raipur Gate, Ahmedabad.	Do.
C-1832/Ahmedabad	Bhatt, Jaysut Laxmi- shankar.	Sheth, C. N. Vidya- laya, Ellis Bridge, Ahmedabad 6.	Do.
C-1846/Ahmedabad	Abuwala, Jeni Saifuddin	Municipal Girl's High School, Ahmedabad.	Do
C-4997/Ahmedabad	Tahilramani, Gordhan Vishindas.	The Sindh Academy Shantinagar, Wadej, Ahmedabad 13.	Do.
C-11575/Bilimora	Shah. Pramodechandra Manharlal.	D. C. O. Sarvajani High School, Pardi (District Surat).	Do.
C-11650/Bilimora	Tandel. Manubhai Jivanbhai.	J. J. Mehta Sarvajani High School. Bili- mora.	20th June 1958,
C-13241/Cambay	Patel, Ramesh Somabhai	Nar High School, Nar (District Kaira).	1st January 1959.
C-13827/Godhra	Tabawala, Tasaddu- khussin Talebbhai.	M. Y. High School, Dohad (Panch-mahale)	1st January 1959.
C-18612/Navsari	Rana, Pravindlal Chha- ganlal.	Sheth, R. N. Jain Sarvajani High School Navsari.	Do.
C-18935/Palanpur	Paribar, Hansraj Dhulaji.	Indian Railway High School, Abu-Road,	Do.
C-18936/Palanpur	Paribar, Hansraj Manroop.	Indian Railway High School, Abu Road.	Do.
C-22135/Rajkot	Jivrajani, Pragji Ravji	Alfred High School, Rajkot.	Do.
C-23862/Surat	Shah, Nalinkumar Chuniisal.	Sheth, R. G. A. Sarva- janik High School and R. H. Middle School, Vapi (District Surat).	Do.
C-28470/Ahmedabad	Christiau, Milton Hiralal.	Tutorial High School, 3, Gates, Ahmedabad.	Do.
C-28699/Ahmadabad	Shah. Navinchandra Ghanshyamlal.	City High School, Saranpur, Dolatkhana, Ahmedabad.	Do,

C-29432/Ahmedabad	Shah, Hasumati Gopaldas.	Appeared as a Private Candidate.	Do.
C-29437/Ahmedabad	Shah, Kirt Vadilal	Dehgam Municipal High School Dehgam (District Ahmedabad).	Do.
C 29447/Ahmedabad	Shah, Pravin Mulchand	Dehgam Municipal High School Dehgam.	Do
C 29454/Ahmedabad	Shah, Gmota Govindlal	Sheth, J. H. Sonawala High School, Mehmabad (District Kaira)	Do.
C 32436/Bilimora	Patel, Nichhabhai Fakirbhai	K. V. S. High School, Gandeva (District Surat).	Do.
C-33089/Cambay	Rana, Shantilal Bhanlal	Cambay High School, Cambay.	Do.
C-33245/Lathoi	Shah, Rasiklal Girdharlal.	Appeared as a Private Candidate.	Do

Poona -1, 6th July, 1957.

M. V. DESHPANDE,
Secretary,
S. S. C. Examination Board.

UNIVERSITY OF RAJASTHAN

Notification

The following candidates had resorted to unfair means at the High School Examination 1957. Their examination had therefore been cancelled and they are further debarred from appearing at any examination of the University to be held in the years noted against each.

S. No.	Roll No.	Name of candidate	Name of Institution or place of residence.	Year(s) for which debarred.
1	980	Kanbvalal	Private (Jaipur)	1958
2	1416	Victor Emanuel	Do	Do.
3	6073	Mali Ram	Private (Sikar)	Do.
4	6171	Hanif Ali	Daibar Inter. College, Kisanganagar.	Do.
5	6956	Abdul Gaffoor	Daibar High School, Mikanra	Do.
6	7196	Fateh Singh	Private (Nagaur)	Do.
7	7206	Hari Singh	Private (Jaipur)	Do
8	11001	Gyanendra Kumar Gupta	S. K. Inter. College Sikar	Do.
9	11923	Vishambhar Singh	Shri Motilal Inter. College Jhunjhunu.	Do
10	11924	Vishnu Dayal Bhargava	Do.	Do.
11	18161	Khushi Lal Gaur	Fateh High School, Udaipur	Do.
12	14196	Tek Chand Mohar	Govt. High School, Patelnagar	Do
13	14431	Kamal Nayan Agarwal	Govt. High School, Bhilwara	Do.
14	14584	Chandra Dutta	Govt. High School, Bansi	Do.
15	15382	Mohan Lal	Govt. High School, Deogarh Mandla	Do.
16	17905	Vankat Ramon Singh	Mahatma Gandhi High School, Jodhpur.	Do.
17	25514	Mahendra Prakash Mathur	Private (Jhalawar)	Do.

Jaipur,
Dated 18th July 1957.

K. L. VARMA,
Registrar.

ANDHRA UNIVERSITY

Proceedings of the Syndicate.

No. S2-3188/57

Waltair, July, 31. 1957.

Order

The results of the following candidates who have been found guilty of resorting to unfair means at the University Examinations held in March-April, 1957, they are debarred from appearing for any of the University Examinations for the periods noted against each.

S. No.	Name of the candidate	Examination	Register No.	Period of disqualification
1	M. Krishnamurti	Intermediate	11112	Debarred for one year and permitted to sit for the University Examination to be held in March-April 1958 or thereafter.
2	Kuza Sorojini	Matriculation	137	Debarred for one and half years and permitted to sit for the University Examination to be held in September, 1958 or thereafter.
3	D. Lingappa	Do.	728	Do.
4	Y. Luther Paul Sastry	Do.	729	Do.
5	B. Manikya Reddi	Intermediate	863	Do.
6	Avula Santhosh Kumar	Do.	2532	Do.
7	Sammata Sakuntala	Do.	7553	Do.
8	Marupudi Mohana Rao	Do.	9441	Do.
9	Aniseti Siva Rao	Do.	12669	Do.
10	T. V. Subba Rao	B.A.	1603	Do.
11	K. Ramaji Rao	I o.	2302	Do.

Waltair,

Dated the 31st July 1957

K. V. GOPALASWAMY,

Registrar.

SRI VENKATESWARA UNIVERSITY

No. 4161-B/57

The results of the following candidates, who have been found guilty of resorting to unfair means at the University Examinations held in March-April, 1957, are cancelled, and they are debarred from appearing for any of the University Examinations for one year, as noted against each of them.

Name of the candidate	Examination	Register Number.	Period
1. D. Narappa, Government Arts College, Anantapur.	Intermediate	260	Debarred for one year and permitted to sit for the University examination to be held in September, 1958 or thereafter.
2. Y. Ramanjulu, Government Arts College, Anantapur.	Do.	297	Do.
3. V. Konda Reddy, Government Arts College, Anantapur.	Do.	445	Do.
4. K. Narasimbulu, Osmania College, Kurach.	Do.	1448	Do.

5. B. Lakshmi Reddy, Osmania College Kurnool.	Do.	1341	Do.
6. C. Pattabbiramaiah, Osmania College, Kurnool.	Do.	1450	Do.
7. A. Krishna Murthy, Osmania College, Kurnool.	Do.	1333	Do.
8. D. Giri Rao, Osmania College, Kurnool.	Do.	1476	Do.
9. V. S. Rajan, B. T. College Madanapalle.	Do.	1716	Do.
10. M. Subbi Reddy, B. T. College, Madanapalle,	Do.	1692	Do.
11. Krishnaiah, B. Venkateswara Raja's College, Nellore.	Do.	1947	Do.
12. Ramanappa Chetty, C. Sri Venkateswara College, Tirupati.	Do.	2731	Do.
13. Y. Nagaraja Reddy, Sri Venkateswara College, Tirupati.	Do.	2705	Do.
14. V. S. Narayan Murthy, Sri Venkateswara College, Tirupati.	Do.	2709	Do.
15. K. Ramadoss, Sri Venkateswara College, Tirupati.	Do.	2722	Do.
16. Mohammad Khader Husain, Osmania College, Kurnool	B A	461	Do.

Dated the 29th July 1957

Illegible
Asst. Registrar.

SRI VENKATESWARA UNIVERSITY.

Tirupati,

No. 1161—B, 57.

dated 29-7-1957.

SRI T. Chinnakonda Reddy, candidate with Register Number 213 of the Intermediate Examination held in March-April, 1957, who appeared for the Intermediate Examination at Government Arts College, Anantapur, had been found guilty of resorting to unfair means and also of assaulting an Assistant Superintendent at the latter's residence for detecting and reporting against him to the Chief Superintendent.

2. His result at the Intermediate Examination has been cancelled and he is permanently debarred from appearing for any of the University Examinations in future.

(By Order)

B. PUBBA RAY
Asst. Registrar.

GUJARAT UNIVERSITY

No. Exam./A/ 44885 of 1957.
Office of the Gujarat University,
Ahmedabad, Dt : 26th July 1957

It is hereby notified that the undermentioned candidates who have been found guilty of having practiced unfair means at the University Examinations held in March-April 1957, are declared to have failed at the respective examination, have forfeited their claims to exemptions, if any, earned by them at the examination held this year or in any previous year and that they are further debarred from appearing at any University or College examination before the dates mentioned against their respective names :

	Name	College	Debarred up to
		Int. Arts.	
3123	Joshi Jaykumar Natverlal.	S.B. Gaida College, Navsari.	30-6-1959.
		Int. Science.	
1497	Patel Maganbhai Balubhai.	M.T.B. College, Surat	30-6-1959.
1703	Patel Hasinukhlal Ganda- bhai.	S.B. Gaida College, Navsari.	30-6-1958.
		Int. Commerce.	
733	Mukka Ganpatlal Kalidas.	Sir K P. College of Commerce, Surat.	30-6-1959.
		B.A.	
1931	Desai Harish Dabhyubhai.	S.B. Gaida College, Navsari	30-6-1958.
		B.Sc.	
127	Dalal Rajnikant Ramani	L.D. Arts & M.C. Sc. Inst. Ahmedabad	30-6-1958.
		B. Pharm.	
21	Patel Krishnakant Govindlal.	L.M. College of Phar- macy Ahmedabad.	30-6-1958.

Illegible,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF RAJASTHAN

Notification

The undermentioned candidates, had used unfair means in the following University examinations of 1957. Their present examination has therefore been cancelled, and they have further been debarred from appearing at any examination of the University to be held in the year(s) noted against each.

S. No.	Roll No.	Enrolment No.	Examination.	Name of the candidate.	College (Place of residence in case of non-collegiate candidates).	Year(s) for which debarred.
1.	187	57/780	L.L.B. (Final)	Ved Pal Krishna Dhir.	University Law College, Jaipur.	1958 & 1959
2.	169	Ex 53/256.	B.A.	Ram Narain Singhal (Ex-Student).	S.M.K. College, Jodhpur.	1958
3.	108	56/759	"	Prem Chand Chhajjar (Teacher).	Madanganj.	1958
4.	1619	53/1889	"	Mau Mohan Sharma.	M.B. College, Udaipur.	1959
5.	2160	53/342	"	Uma Shanker Kausbik	R.R. College, Alwar	1958
5A.	2273	55/605	"	Mahendra Singh Nirbhay	M.S.J. College, Bharatpur	1958
6.	2314	52/3562	"	Bhoopendra Singh (Ex-Student)	Do.	1958
7.	267	56/2620	B.Com. (Prev)	Purushottam Das Sharma (Prinus)	Maharaja's College, Jaipur.	1958
8.	820	52/3631	"	Deshraj Kabra (Teacher)	Bharatpur.	1958
9.	295	57/780	Inter. Arts.	Kr. Mool Singh (Ex-Student)	Maharaja's College Jaipur.	1958
10.	339	54/800	"	Balhadra Sharma (Teacher)	Sawaumadhapur Distt.	1958
11.	537	53/4509	"	He'tam Bishnoi (Ex-Student)	Govt. College Sri Ganganagar.	1958
12.	639	54/3571	"	Nirmalsingh Gill (Ex-Student)	Do.	1958
13.	883	51/2006	"	Gyasi Singh Gurjar	M.S.J. College, Bharatpur.	1959
14.	963	55/1496	"	Gopi Krishan Bhootra	S.M.K. College, Jodhpur.	1958
15.	1617	56/1579	"	(Miss) Uma Dev Mathur. (Woman)	Jaipur	1958
16.	1789	55/5284	"	Nirmal Chandra Chaturvedi	S.S. Jain Subodh Inter. College, Jaipur	1958
17.	1760	55/6308	"	Tej Singh Shekhawat	Do.	1958
18.	1765	55/6811	"	Kalyan Prasad Nagar	S.K.N. Inter. College, Jobner	1953
19.	1781	55/2032	"	Rameshwarlal Kumawat	Darbar Inter. College, Kishanganh	1958
20.	2442	55/6844	"	Deedar Singh Grewal	Govt. College, Sri Ganganagar	1958
21.	2497	55/6923	"	Satya Dev Johri	Do.	Only Examination cancelled.
22.	371	54/4080	Inter. Science	Radha Raman Khatri	Maharaja's College, Jaipur	1958
23.	609	51/6199	"	Brij Krishna Joshi	Govt. College, Kota	1958, 1959.
24.	1131	54/3313	"	Vishambher Dayal Gupta	Maharaja's College, Jaipur	1960 & 1961.
25.	1297	54/4091	"	Rajendra Prasad Srivastav	Do.	1958
26.	1530	55/5556	"	Lalit Mohan Chaturvedi	5th G.R. Chumaria Inter. College, Fatehpur.	1958
27.	451	52/2347	Inter. Com.	Satya Narayan Gupta (Ex-student)	Hadendra Inter. College, Bundi	1958

Jaipur,

Dated 26th July, 1957.

Illegible,
Registrar.

PATNA UNIVERSITY

Circular No. 27/Exam.

Patna, the 20th July, 1957

The undermentioned candidates are debarred from appearing at any University Examination for the period noted against their names as they were found guilty of using unfair means at the Annual Intermediate and Bachelor Examinations in Arts and Science, Commerce and Law part I Examination held in May, 1957.

Serial No.	Centre.	Roll No.	Reg. No	Candidates Name.	Period of Punishment.
1	Patna College.	Roll Pat No 85 B Com.	2871-55 B Com. Class Patna University.	Ram Janam Sinha.	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Suppl. Examination of 1958
2	Magadh Mohila College, Patna.	Roll Pat. No. 302 I A.	1133-55 M. M. College, Patna.	Savitri Sinha.	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Suppl Exam. 1958.
3	Patna Law College, Patna.	Roll Pat. No 320 B.L. Part I.	1267-54 Patna Law College Patna.	Mathura Prasad Sinha.	Debarred from appearing at any University Exam. prior to the May, Exam. 1953.
4	Tri-Chandra College, Nepal.	Roll N.p. No 91 I.Sc.	563-56 Tri-Chandra College, Nepal.	Nail Kumar Jha.	Debarred from appearing at any University Exam. prior to the Suppl. Exam. of 1959
5	Tri-Chandra College, Nepal.	Roll No. 143. I.Sc.	44-57 Tri-Chandra College, Nepal.	Shyam Prasad Suresta.	Debarred from appearing at any University Exam. prior to the Suppl. Exam. of 1958.
6	Tri-Chandra College Nepal.	Roll Nep. No 134 i.A.	1337-55 Tri-Chandra College, Nepal.	Rishnu Lal Nepali.	Debarred from appearing at any University Exam. prior to the Annual Exam. of 1959. S. Y. Hussain, Deputy Registrar.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY (CHANDIGARH)

Notification

No. S.J. 5876 5928

It is notified that—

Dass S/o Nathu, who applied for change in name from Dass to Gurdas Singh S/o Shri Nathu Singh has been declared as not a fit and proper person to be admitted to any examination of this University in future, for having tampered with his Matriculation Certificate.

CHANDIGARH-3

Dated 27th July, 1957.

J. R. AGNIHOTRI,
Registrar.

CENTRAL BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION, AJMER

The following candidates, whose particulars are given against each, having attempted to use unfair means at the Examinations of the Board for 1957, have been debarred from appearing at the Examinations of the Board noted against each :—

Serial No	Roll No. with Name of the Examination.	Name of the Candidate.	Father's Name.	Name of Institution or place of residence.	Punishment awarded.
1	157 Inter. Sc. (Group P).	Maheshchandra Agrawal.	Sri Ram Swaroop.	Govt College, Ajmer.	Disqualified for the Inter. Science Examination of 1957 and debarred from the Examination of 1958.
2	502 Inter. Sc. (Group B).	Ram Lakshman Gupta	Sri Ram Krishna Gupta.	Darbar Coll-ge, Rewa.	Do.
3	218 Inter. Arts (Group A).	Basant Kishore Bhargava	Sri Radha Ramon Bhargava.	Ajmer	Disqualified from the Inter. Arts Examination of 1957 and debarred from Examination of 1958.
4	904 Inter. Arts (Group A).	Krishnan Kumar Bharadwaj.	Shri Tika Ram Bharadwaj.	New Delhi.	Do.
5	2278 Inter. Arts (Group A).	Syed Qudrat Ali Qawar	Syed Mohd. Ali.	Delhi.	Do.

G. D. WIDHANI,
Secretary.

CENTRAL BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION, AJMER.

Notification.

The following candidates, whose particulars are given against each, having attempted to use unfair means at the High School Examination of the Board for 1957, have been debarred from appearing at the High School Examination of the Board noted against each :—

Serial No.	Roll No.	Name of Candidate.	Name of Father.	Name of Institution from which appeared. In case of private candidates name of the place of residence.	High School Examination from which debarred.
1	2	3	4	5	6
1	144	Ganomal Murijsal	Murij Mal.	Bhopal (M. P.)	Disqualified from the High School Examination of 1957 and debarred from the High School Examination of 1958.
2	597	Babu Lal Jain	Chirangi Lal Jain.	Ajmer.	Do.
3	1035	Rameshwar Lal Gupta.	Nathu Lal.	Ajmer.	Do.

4	1921	Avadbesh Prasad,	Ram Bharosa..	Satna (M. P.)	Disqualified from the High School Examination of 1957.
5	2292	Bhaiya Lal Pandey.	Ram Kripal Pandey.	Rawa (M. P.)	Disqualified from the High School Examination of 1957 and debarred from the High School Examination of 1958.
6	3190	Mahabir Prasad Dubey.	Har Prasad Dubey	Katni (Jabalpur) (M. P.)	Do.
7	3204	Shiv Senker Lal Shrivastva.	Badri Prasad Shrivastva.	Tighrskalan (Jabalpur) (M. P.)	Disqualified from the High School Examination of 1957.
8	3650	Mohammed Younus Siddique.	Mohammed Sabir Siddiqui	Hyderabad (Dn).	Disqualified from the High School Examination of 1957 and debarred from the High School Examination of 1958.
9	3901	Ram Chand Gazandas	Gazandas	Bairagath, Bhopal (M.P.)	Do.
10	4223	Rameshwar Lal.	Suresh Bhan.	Govt. Higher Secondary School, Ajmer.	Do.
11	4278	Murli Manohar.	Paras Ram Goyal	Do.	Do.
12	4283	Pradeep Singh Bararia.	Gubind Singh Bararia.	Do.	Do.
13	4890	Sukendra Chandra Ganguly.	Suresh Chandra Ganguli	Government Moinia Islamia High School, Ajmer.	Do.
14	4998	Ganapat Singh	Kam Singh.	Do.	Do.
15	4907	Deep Chand Mahawar	Kanahiya Lal Mahawar	Do.	Do.
16	5660	Bhanwar Lal Sharma.	Shankar Lal Sharma.	S. D. Govt. Inter. College, Beawar (Ajmer).	Do.
17	5996	Bhola Ram Carpenter,	Nathur Lal.	Do.	Do.
18	5997	Kalu	Wazira Kattat.	Do.	Do.
19	6269	Mohesh Prasad Gupta.	Ram Pratap Gupta.	Vankat High School, Satna (M. P.)	Do.
20	6283	Vishwanbhar Prasad.	Chandra Sakhar Prasad Sharma.	Do.	Do.
21	6324	Mangal Ram Varma.	Ram Manohar Varma.	Do.	Do.

22	6886	Laxmi Chandra Gupta	Bhagwat Prashad Gupta	Do.	Do.
23	6755	Balendu Shekhar Sharma	Anand Prasad Sharma.	Govt. High School, Amarpatan (M.P.)	Do.
24	7013	Lakshman Singh.	Uma Pratap Singh.	Martand High School, Rewa (M. P.)	Do.
25	7232	Shiv Kumar Ohri.	Haru Krishna Lal Ohri.	Martand High School, Rewa (M. P.)	Do.
26	7769	Triveni Prasad Tripathi (Secundary)	Kedar Ram Tripathi.	Govt. High School, Garh (Rewa) (M.P.)	Disqualified from the High School Examination of 1957 and debarred from the High School Examination of 1958.
27	9597	Upendra Prasad Tiwari	Ram Nath Tiwari.	Govt. Inter. College, Shahdol (M. P.)	Do.
28	9599	Bhagwan Din Kawat	Mangal Prasad Kawat.	Do.	Do.
29	9618	Jai Karan Singh.	Bashdeo Singh.	Do.	Do.
30	9723	Bhagwan Din Gupta.	Ram Phali Gupta.	Govt. High School, Boohari (M.P.)	Do.
31	9828	Prem Singh Sengar	Bhukhan Singh Sengar	Ladsaria High School, Burhar (Shahdol) (M.P.)	Do.
32	10200	Yasin Khan.	Shahamat Khan.	Govt. Inter. College, Bhopal (M. P.)	Do.
33	10260	Raendra Singh Lal.	Sardar Buchatter Singh Lail.	Do.	Do.
34	10373	Narayan Shankar Dubey.	Bhagirath Prasad Dubey.	Govt. High School, Raisen (Bhopal) (M. P.)	Do.
35	10771	Daulat	Total D's Jhamtani	Govt. High School, Barragarh (Bhopal) (M.P.)	Do.

S. A. HAIDAR
for Secretary

Central Board of Secondary Edn., Ajmer.

